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CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

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CENTRAL ASIA.

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[illegible] to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1878.

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Correspondence respecting Central Asia.

No. 1.

Mr. Doria to Earl Granville.—(Received December 29.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 20, 1873.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship copy of the Treaty of Peace between Russia and the Khan of Khiva, which is published in the "Petersburgh Journal" of the 13th instant. The text of the Treaty is preceded by a preamble, and explains the reason by which Russia was actuated in undertaking the expedition to Khiva, and the motives by which she has been influenced in making the various stipulations in the Treaty.

I am, &c.
(Signed) WM. DORIA.

Inclosure in No. 1

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of $\frac{1}{13}$ December, 1873.

ON lit dans le "Messager Officiel" d'aujourd'hui, 30 Novembre:—

"On connaît les motifs que ont amené l'expédition de Khiva. Des brigandages continuels, l'imposition de redevances sur les Kirghises soumis à notre domination, des excitations à la révolte parmi ces nomades, la capture de nos sujets réduits à l'esclavage, —tels sont les faits qui depuis bien des années réclamaient l'adoption de mesures décisives contre ce Khanat; toutefois notre Gouvernement n'avait pas perdu l'espoir d'arriver par des voies pacifiques à l'établissement de relations plus régulières avec ces turbulents voisins.

"Plus d'une fois nous avons fait parvenir au Khan des réclamations modérées, mais elles sont demeurées sans réponse ou bien elles ont provoqué de sa part un refus arrogant.

"Après l'insuccès de ces efforts réitérés, une expédition fut décidée. Le but en était d'abord de châtier le Khan pour le passé, ensuite de créer un état de choses qui garantît nos sujets des incursions et des déprédations des Khiviens et des Turcomans, et rendît possible le développement de relations commerciales pacifiques.

"La difficulté de ce problème consistait surtout en ce que les bases fondamentales de tous les Etats de l'Asie Centrale sont tellement précaires et si peu solides qu'il était à craindre qu'en frappant le Khiva d'un châtiment mérité, il ne cessât d'exister comme Etat indépendant; or, un semblable résultat n'aurait nullement répondu aux vues de notre Gouvernement, qui jusqu'à présent voue ses constants efforts à soutenir et à consolider l'existence autonome des autres Etats limitrophes de nos possessions dans l'Asie Centrale, tels que le Boukhara et le Kokand.

"Lorsque Khiva eut été occupé et qu'on fut à même de connaître les conditions de la vie intérieure du pays, on put se convaincre que même avec la meilleure volonté de la part du Khan et de ses conseillers d'entretenir avec nous des relations de bon voisinage, la force nécessaire à cet effet lui aurait fait défaut, car son influence sur les Tourkmènes nomades

ou demi-nomades ne se manifeste que par intermittence; souvent elle est nulle, et il arrive parfois que lui-même, ainsi que ses sujets colonisés, ont à subir l'ascendant de ces brigands des steppes.

"Ainsi, après le départ de notre corps expéditionnaire, les mêmes incursions et déprédations auraient infailliblement recommencé et exigé un nouveau châtiment, et alors aucun effort n'aurait réussi à préserver l'existence autonome du Khiva.

"Il était donc nécessaire de se prémunir contre une éventualité si peu désirable, qui nous eût exposé à de grands sacrifices et à une grave déviation du programme de notre politique dans l'Asie Centrale.

"C'est pourquoi il a été jugé indispensable d'établir un point fortifié pourvu d'une garnison suffisante, afin de garantir nos frontières contre les attaques des brigands, de protéger nos caravanes et celles des Khiviens, et en même temps de soutenir le Khan s'il était menacé par les Tourkmènes.

"Le meilleur point à choisir pour l'établissement de ce fort aurait pu être la rive méridionale de la Mer d'Aral, qui nous eût assuré une communication par eau avec les bouches de l'Amou-Daria. Malheureusement, cette côte, entourée de marécages ininterrompus, ne présente aucune localité favorable à l'érection d'une station fortifiée.

"On dut donc construire ce fort sur la rive droite de l'Amou-Daria; en outre il était nécessaire d'assurer les communications du fort et de sa garnison avec la Province de Turkestan. Sans parler des difficultés de la navigation sur le bas Amou-Daria—en hiver elle devient entièrement impossible et il ne reste d'autre voie que la steppe—il a été jugé indispensable de réunir à nos possessions le désert aride qui s'étend entre ce fort et la Province de Turkestan. Certes, si l'on avait pu trouver une autre garantie quelconque qui nous rassurât efficacement pour l'avenir, on y aurait donné la préférence. Mais quelque stérile et onéreuse que soit pour nous une pareille acquisition territoriale, elle a été inévitable, vu que le Khan de Khiva lui-même a reconnu et déclaré qu'il ne serait en mesure de remplir ses obligations envers nous et de rétablir les relations désirées avec notre Gouvernement, qu'à la condition absolue d'avoir à proximité un fort et un corps de troupes Russes. Ses vœux allaient même plus loin encore; il a instamment sollicité le maintien des troupes Russes pour l'avenir dans la ville même de Khiva.

"En outre, comme il a été dit plus haut, cette solution était la seule qui pût garantir nos frontières et notre commerce, et éviter ainsi, dans l'avenir la nécessité d'une nouvelle expédition avec toutes les conséquences qu'elle eût entraînées, c'est-à-dire la destruction définitive du Khanat de Khiva,—conséquence qui eût été tout-à-fait contraire à nos principes politiques et à nos vues sur l'Asie Centrale.

"Afin de déterminer les obligations du Khiva et ses futurs rapports avec nous, un Traité a été conclu entre l'Aide-de-camp Général de Kaufmann et le Khan de Khiva. Pour se former une idée claire et complète de la signification et du sens de cet acte, il est indispensable d'en diviser les stipulations, d'après leur teneur, en deux catégories distinctes.

"A la première doivent être rapportés tous les Articles qui fixent d'une manière précise et permanente les relations et les obligations du Khiva envers la Russie, et qui ne doivent par conséquent subir aucune modification quelconque dans l'avenir.

"A la seconde catégorie appartiennent les clauses, motivées par les exigences du moment, qui ne doivent servir qu'à l'établissement de rapports ultérieurs invariables et permanents, et peuvent être adoucies, modifiés ou même entièrement abrogées par nos autorités locales supérieures au fur et à mesure que leur maintien en vigueur ne paraîtra plus utile ou nécessaire.

"Il ne sera pas superflu, ce nous semble, d'examiner successivement chacune des clauses de ce Traité et de préciser tant leur signification que les considérations qui les ont motivées.

"L'Article I, indépendamment de sa signification morale à la suite des actes hostiles du Khiva, a pour but fondamental, conformément à nos constants efforts, de prévenir entre les Souverains de l'Asie Centrale les querelles et les collisions qui auraient pour résultat inévitable de les affaiblir mutuellement et de créer parmi eux le désordre et l'anarchie.

"La délimitation stipulée dans les Articles II et III a été suggérée par le désir d'avoir en tout temps la possibilité de réprimer les entreprises hostiles des pillards Khiviens et Tourkmènes, et de garantir les communications par terre et par eau de nos troupes et de nos caravanes.

"La rétrocession stipulée dans l'Article IV en faveur du Boukhara, d'une partie de la rive droite de l'Amou-Daria, et de la portion méridionale de la steppe qui s'étend entre cette rivière et la Province de Turkestan, est mise à exécution dans le but de placer sous la domination, et par conséquent sous le contrôle et la responsabilité de l'Emir de

Boukhara, les routes de caravanes conduisant des possessions Boukhares à celles de la Russie.

"Les restrictions à la navigation sur l'Amou-Daria contenues dans l'Article V sont indispensables jusqu'au moment où les nomades Khiviens et Boukhares auront renoncé à leurs habitudes de brigandage et cesseront de profiter de la navigation sur l'Amou-Daria pour y donner cours.

"Les Articles VI à XV établissent des règles commerciales fondées sur la réciprocité et l'égalité des droits respectifs.

"L'expérience du passé a démontré la nécessité de l'Article XVI, vu que le Khiva était un asile toujours ouvert à tous les criminels échappés de nos frontières.

"L'Article XVII met un terme à l'esclavage et au trafic des prisonniers à Khiva.

"Enfin, l'Article XVIII détermine la valeur, les termes, et le mode de paiement de la contribution de guerre, laquelle a eu en vue moins de rembourser les dépenses faites par nous que d'infliger au Khiva un châtiment sensible.

"Si nous réussissions avec le temps à dompter les Tourkmènes, à les habituer à un genre de vie paisible et à consolider la domination du Khan sur ces tribus, nous aurions ainsi résolu le difficile problème de garantir la sécurité de nos sujets, de développer le commerce et en même temps d'assurer la conservation, si désirable pour nous-mêmes, de l'indépendance du Khiva."

[For Treaty, see "Russia No. 2, 1874."]

(Translation.)

THE following appears in the "Messager Officiel" of to-day, November 30:—

"The motives which gave rise to the expedition to Khiva are well known. Continual acts of brigandage, exactions imposed upon the Kirghese subject to our rule, incitement to revolt among those nomad tribes, and the capture and enslavement of our subjects—such are the facts which have for many years called for decisive action against that Khanate; our Government had not, however, given up all hope of arriving by peaceful means at the establishment of more regular relations with these turbulent neighbours.

"More than once we have addressed to the Khan temperate representations, but they had either remained unanswered or had been met by a haughty refusal on his part.

"After the failure of these repeated efforts an expedition was determined upon. Its object was, in the first place, to punish the Khan for his past conduct, and next, to originate a state of affairs which would secure our subjects from the incursions and depredations of the Khivans and Turkomans, and render possible the development of peaceful commercial relations.

"The difficulty of this problem lay chiefly in the fact that the fundamental bases of all the States of Central Asia are so precarious and ill-consolidated that it was to be feared that in inflicting upon Khiva a well-deserved chastisement, it might cease to exist as an independent State. Such a result would have been in no way consistent with the views of our Government, who, until now, have devoted their constant efforts to the maintenance and consolidation of the autonomous existence of the other States bordering upon our possessions in Central Asia, such as Bokhara and Khokand.

"After the occupation of Khiva, and when we were in a position to learn the conditions of the internal life of the country, we were convinced that, even with the best intentions on the Khan's part, and on that of his advisers, to maintain with us relations of good neighbourhood, he would not have had the strength necessary for the purpose, since his influence with the nomad or semi-nomad Turkomans is only displayed intermittently; it is often null, and it sometimes happens that he himself, no less than his colonized subjects, have to submit to the ascendancy of these brigands of the steppes.

"Thus, after the departure of our expeditionary corps, the same inroads and depredations would infallibly have recommenced and required fresh punishment, and then no effort would have succeeded in preserving the autonomous existence of Khiva.

"It was therefore necessary to take precautions against so undesirable an eventuality, which would have exposed us to great sacrifices, and to a grave deviation from the programme of our policy in Central Asia.

"It was therefore considered indispensable to establish a fortified position, provided with a sufficient garrison, in order to secure our frontiers against the attacks of brigands, to protect our caravans and those of the Khivans, and, at the same time, to support the Khan if he should be threatened by the Turkomans.

"The best point to have chosen for the erection of this fort would perhaps have been the southern shore of the Sea of Aral, which would have assured us a communica-

tion by water with the mouths of the Amou-Daria. Unfortunately, this coast, surrounded by uninterrupted marshes, presents no favourable spot for the erection of a fortified station.

"We had, therefore, to construct the fort on the right bank of the Amou-Daria; it was, moreover, necessary to assure the communications of the fort and of its garrison with the Province of Turkestan. Without mentioning the difficulties of navigation on the Amou-Daria—in winter it becomes entirely impossible, and no other way but the steppe remains—it was considered indispensable to annex to our possessions the arid desert which stretches between the fort and the Province of Turkestan. Certainly, had it been possible to find any other guarantee which would have given us satisfactory securities for the future, it would have been preferred. But, however barren and burdensome such a territorial acquisition might be to us, it was inevitable, inasmuch as the Khan of of Khiva himself admitted that he would only be able to fulfil his obligations towards us and to re-establish the desired relations with our Government, on the positive condition of having a fort and a body of Russian troops in his proximity. His wishes went even further; he urgently requested the maintenance of the Russian troops in the town of Khiva itself.

"Moreover, as has been said above, this solution was the only one which could secure our frontiers and our commerce, and thus avoid in the future the necessity of a fresh expedition, with all the consequences which it would bring with it, that is to say, the definitive destruction of the Khanate of Khiva, a consequence which would have been entirely contrary to our political principles, and to our views as regards Central Asia.

"In order to determine the obligations of Khiva and its future relations with us, a Treaty has been concluded between Aide-de-camp General de Kaufmann and the Khan of Khiva. In order to form a clear and complete idea of the meaning and intention of this act, it is indispensable to divide its stipulations, according to their tenour, into two distinct categories.

"To the first class should be referred all the Articles which fix in a precise and permanent manner the relations and obligations of Khiva to Russia, and which consequently are to undergo no modification whatever in the future.

"To the second category belong the clauses, founded on the requirements of the moment, which should only serve for the establishment of ulterior relations of an invariable and permanent character, and which admit of being gradually softened, modified, or even entirely abrogated by our superior local authorities, according as their maintenance in force appears no longer useful or necessary.

"It will not, we think, be superfluous to examine successively each of the clauses of the Treaty, and to state clearly both their meaning and the considerations which dictated them.

"Article I, independent of its moral signification with reference to the hostile acts of Khiva, has for its fundamental object, conformably with our constant efforts, to prevent the quarrels and collisions between the Sovereigns of Central Asia which would have the inevitable effect of mutually weakening them and creating disorder and anarchy amongst them.

"The delimitation stipulated in Articles II and III was suggested by the desire to have at all times the power of repressing the hostile enterprises of the Khivan and Turkoman robbers, and to guarantee the communications by land and water of our troops and caravans.

"The retrocession stipulated in Article IV in favour of Bokhara, of a part of the right bank of the Amou-Daria, and of the southern portion of the steppe which stretches between that river and the Province of Turkestan, is put in execution with the object of placing under the dominion, and consequently under the control and responsibility of the Ameer of Bokhara, the caravan tracts leading from the Bokharian possessions to those of Russia.

"The restrictions on the navigation of the Amou-Daria contained in Article V are indispensable until such time as the Khivan and Bokharian nomads shall have renounced their habits of brigandage and shall cease to avail themselves of the navigation on the Amou-Daria to indulge in them.

"Articles VI to XV establish commercial regulations founded upon the reciprocity and equality of respective rights.

"The experience of the past has manifested the necessity of Article XVI, since Khiva was an asylum always open to all the criminals who escaped from our frontiers.

"Article XVII puts an end to slavery and to the traffic of prisoners in Khiva.

"Finally, Article XVIII determines the amount, the dates, and the mode of payment of the war indemnity, which was imposed not so much with the view of reimbursing the expenditure incurred by us as of inflicting on Khiva a sensible punishment.

"If we should succeed with time in subjecting the Turkomans, in accustoming them to a peaceable mode of existence, and in consolidating the dominion of the Khan over these tribes, we shall thus have solved the difficult problem of guaranteeing the security of our subjects, of developing commerce, and at the same time of assuring the preservation of the independence of Khiva, which is so desirable for ourselves."

No. 2.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(*Received January* 23.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 19, 1874.

AT an interview I had with Prince Gortchakow shortly after my return here, his Highness referred to certain articles of the press in regard to Central Asia, in which public attention was called to the advance of Russia in that country. In referring to remarks of the press on the Treaty concluded between General Kaufmann and Khiva, his Highness said that the motives had been clearly explained in an article from the "Messager Officiel" (copy of which was forwarded to your Lordship by Mr. Doria in his despatch of the 20th ultimo).

His Highness then repeated the arguments made use of in that article, stating that the Imperial Commander had strictly abstained from remaining in occupation of Khiva, although requested to do so by the Khan for his own protection, but that he had been obliged to occupy such a position as would enable him to maintain peace and order, which otherwise would have been impossible. The wish of the Imperial Government was to maintain the Khan in his sovereign position, and to do so they were obliged to grant him their protection.

Had the Russian forces retired altogether, disorder would have recommenced, and if they had been obliged to make a second expedition to Khiva, no other course but that of annexation would have remained.

On my relating to his Highness my conversation with the Emperor,* and the dangers which might arise from an expedition against the Turkomans, his Highness said that no such expedition was intended unless the Turkomans took the offensive against them.

His Highness took occasion to state that Russia considered Afghanistan as beyond the sphere of her action, and that they would strictly adhere to this policy.

His Highness referred to the interview he had had with the late Earl of Clarendon at Heidelberg, and expressed his belief and hope that no difficulties would arise between the two Governments on Central Asian affairs.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 3.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(*Received January* 23.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 19, 1874.

I HAD the honour to be received in a private audience by the Emperor on my return from England.

On this occasion I renewed to His Majesty my felicitations on the happy event which was to unite the two Royal and Imperial Families, and which I trusted would be the means of establishing an intimate and cordial feeling between the two nations. I expressed my satisfaction at seeing the two national flags flying together on the arrival of His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh, and I hoped that they would ever continue to do so.

His Imperial Majesty, who received me most graciously, reciprocated warmly these felicitations and good wishes. He expressed his anxious desire for the cultivation of friendly feelings with England in the interests of peace, of civilization, and of humanity. His Majesty said that he had no aggressive policy. The expedition to Khiva had been forced upon him by the lawless behaviour of the Khan towards the traders who passed through that country, and that it had been found absolutely necessary to put an end to

* See No. 3.

the state of pillage and robbery carried on by the nomad Turkoman tribes in that country.

I stated to His Majesty that there had been one act of His Majesty, which would form the brightest page in the history of his glorious reign, namely, the abolition of slavery in Khiva and its adjoining Khanates. No measure would tend more to arrest the robberies carried on by the nomad tribes, for whom the markets were closed. There would be no further inducements for the horrid practice of man-stealing, so resorted to of late years by the Turkomans. I then observed to His Majesty, in regard to the groundless fears expressed by the English journals of the advance of Russia towards India, to which His Majesty had referred, that the punishment inflicted on the Khan for his misgovernment in that Khanate, as regarded foreigners and commercial travellers, had not alarmed the public mind in England. The question of Khiva had now been settled. But I confessed to His Majesty that there was a feeling of alarm in some portion of the public mind in England; a feeling, I might say, that was in no way dictated by any hostility to Russia, but rather by a fear lest unforeseen events might engender future difficulties, which might do injury to the good relations between England and Russia, namely, a feeling of alarm at certain reports propagated by the press of an intended Russian expedition in the spring against the independent Turkoman tribes, a restless race, who led a wandering life among the steppes situated between the Caspian and Afghanistan. Such an expedition might be productive of dangers now unforeseen. It might drive the Turkomans on the soil of Afghanistan or into the Province of Herat, which might produce complications with the Ruler of Afghanistan. This was a danger which it would be wise to foresee, in order to avoid.

His Majesty said at once that there was no intention of making any expedition against the Turkomans; but, if they should attack or molest the Russian settlements, they must suffer for the consequences of it.

I remarked to His Majesty that I was happy to learn this refutation of the reports from His Majesty's own lips, and that in referring to them I had merely acted as a pilot on board ship, whose duty it was to point out the rocks, to warn the navigator against them.

His Majesty expressed his anxious wish that no cloud, as regarded Central Asian or any other question, should darken the happy relations between the two Governments; and he told me on every occasion when any difficulty manifested itself, to address myself directly to the Chancellor, adding that he would be happy to receive me whenever I judged it necessary. I thanked His Majesty for his gracious permission, and said that I should gladly avail myself of it if circumstances should render it necessary.

In closing this Report, I may add, that nothing could exceed the gracious kindness of His Majesty, nor the heartiness of his expressions of good-will and friendship towards England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 4.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received February 2.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 28, 1874.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 23 of the 7th instant, on the affairs of Central Asia.*

In conformity with your Lordship's instructions, I communicated that despatch yesterday to Prince Gortchakow, and left a copy of it in the hands of his Highness.

Prince Gortchakow stated that he should lay it immediately before His Majesty the Emperor.

With a view to place on record the assurances given to me by the Emperor and Prince Gortchakow that there was no intention of undertaking any expedition against the Turkomans unless they should take the aggressive against the Russians, I have communicated my despatches of the 19th instant to Prince Gortchakow. His Highness informed me that he submitted them to the Emperor, who had expressed his appreciation of the accuracy of the report of my audience of His Majesty.

After communicating your Lordship's despatch, Prince Gortchakow said that he could only repeat to me the assurances he had always given that the Imperial Government

* See "Russia No. 2 (1874)," No. 2.

had no intention of sending any expedition against the Turkomans, or of occupying Merve.

His Highness observed that Her Majesty's Government could materially assist the pacific intentions of the Imperial Government by using their influence through the Ameer of Afghanistan to restrain the lawless and predatory habits of the Turkoman tribes.

"We shall not," said Prince Gortchakow, "attack them; but if they attack us, or commit depredations on our commercial travellers, we shall be obliged to inflict punishment on them."

I remarked to his Highness that Her Majesty's Government had no doubts of the pacific desires of the Imperial Government, but that, unfortunately, these desires had been frequently counteracted by the military commanders, who acted on their own responsibility in contravention of the instructions of the Central Civil Government.

Military jealousy and military ambition were powerful stimulants at so great a distance from the Central Government, and were not always to be controlled.

His Highness replied, with great decision, that, although there was a party anxious for military activity and decorations, he felt that his influence was sufficiently strong to counteract such endeavours, and so long as he held power, these efforts would be restrained.

As regards Afghanistan, his Highness repeated to me that the Imperial Government considered that kingdom to be beyond the sphere of their political action, and that, happen what might, in the internal state of that country the Imperial Government would not interfere.

He referred to the positive injunctions given to Abdul Rahman Khan by the Imperial Government, as the condition on which he was permitted to reside at Samarcand, that he should abstain from all intrigues and designs dangerous to the present Ruler of Afghanistan, and his Highness repeated to me that should he contravene them he will be removed from his present place of residence.

His Highness further informed me that a scientific mission was intended to explore and survey the course of the Lower Oxus, for the purpose of improving the navigation.

It had been suggested to him that this expedition for a similar object might extend these explorations and researches to the Upper Oxus, as far as Sirikul, or Wood's Lake, which portion forms the boundary of Afghanistan.

His Highness remarked, however, that he was opposed to this suggestion, considering that it might give rise to false suppositions, and be attributed to wrong motives.

His Highness expressed his desire and hope that a perfect understanding by a free and amicable exchange of opinions should continue to exist between the two Governments, so necessary for the interests of both, and so conducive to the maintenance of peace and order in Central Asia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 5.

Sir J. Kaye to Lord Tenterden.—(Received February 10.)

My Lord, *India Office, February 10, 1874.*

I AM directed by the Duke of Argyll to forward, for the information of Earl Granville, copy of a despatch from the Government of India, dated 26th December, 1873, with inclosed Cabul Diaries.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. WM. KAYE.

Inclosure 1 in No 5.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Duke of Argyll.

My Lord Duke, *Fort William, December 26, 1873.*

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers relating to the affairs of Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
R. TEMPLE.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 5.

The Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to Mr. Aitchison.

Peshawur, December 4, 1873.

FORWARDS, for the information of the Supreme Government, translation of Cabul Diary from the 21st to the 24th November, 1873, inclusive, together with its inclosures.

Cabul Diary from the 21st to the 24th November, 1873, inclusive.

Copy of a murrasilla sent to the Russian Governor-General of Turkestan, mentioned in the Cabul Diary of 17th November, 1873, is inclosed along with a copy of letter sent to Koshad Khan, Chief of Merv Shahjehan, alluded to in the same Diary.

Abstract Translation of a Murrasilla, dated November 16, 1873, from the Ameer to the Russian Governor-General at Tashkend.

I received your kind and friendly letter dated the 1st August, 1873, on 22nd idem, and was extremely gratified with its contents. The cause of the delay of a few months in the dispatch of a reply to it is evident, viz., first you went to St. Petersburgh, and afterwards you were occupied in the Kharism expedition. I hope you have now returned in health and comfort to Tashkend, and I have, therefore, considered it advisable to take the opportunity of sending a reply to your murrasilla. I am much gratified with the contents of your letter explaining that His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia is anxious for the peace and welfare of neighbouring States, and that you have considered it one of your most pleasing duties to report to His Majesty that you have had every reason to be satisfied with me, and that I have upheld the friendship existing between us. It is as evident as daylight that at present His Majesty is a great and powerful Monarch, and it is, therefore, becoming that neighbouring States should enjoy tranquillity and convenience. This policy will tend to confirm the friendship existing between His Majesty and these States. I have expressed my gratification in my murrasilla dated the 15th "Rabiul-awul," 1288, written in reply to your murrasilla of the 28th March, 1870=25th Zilhej, 1287, containing your promise that no Russian officer will interfere with the affairs of Afghanistan, and that no assistance or advice will be given to the enemies of that kingdom which may be turned against it. I still entertain the hope that by the Grace of God the friendship existing between us will not be disturbed, and that the neighbouring States will be allowed to enjoy peace.

My attention will always be devoted to this point.

I hope you will continue to inform me of your health, &c.

Inclosure 3 in No. 5.

The Agent at Cabul to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

(Translation.) *December* 1, 1873.

TO-DAY the Ameer received a murrasilla from Khiva from the Russian Governor-General of Turkestan through his Agent, Mirza Mohamed Tahir Khan, at Bokhara, as the Governor-General forwarded it through the King of Bokhara. The contents of this murrasilla are to the following effect:—

"By order of the Emperor of Russia we took possession of the country of the Khan of Khiva by force of arms, as his actions were, in some instances, contrary to Mahommedan law; but as the Emperor does not wish to enlarge his dominions, we have restored this country to the Khan on these two conditions, viz., (1) That he releases all the slaves in his territory; and (2) That in future no trade in slaves takes place. The Khan has accepted both these conditions. As friendship exists between you and our Emperor, and as among the slaves released in Khiva 400 were the residents of our Kingdom, we send information of the same to your Highness."

Copy of this murrasilla will be submitted as soon as it is procured.

No. 6.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(Received March 5.)

My Lord, *India Office, March* 5, 1874.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a despatch from the Government of India, dated 23rd January, 1874, with inclosed Cabul Diaries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 6.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Duke of Argyll.

My Lord Duke, *Fort William, January* 23, 1874.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers relative to the affairs of Afghanistan.

We have, &c.
(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

The Secretary to the Government of the Punjab to Mr. Aitchison.

Lahore, December 17, 1873.

I AM directed to forward the accompanying closed envelope from Syud Noor Mahomed Shah to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy, referred to in the Cabul Diary of the 4th instant.

Inclosure 3 in No. 6.

Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Chief Minister of the Afghanistan Government, to the Viceroy and Governor-General.

(Translation.) 11 *Shawul,* 1290 A.H. (*December* 2, 1873).

A LETTER has recently been received from General von Kaufmann, the Governor-General of Turkestan, on the part of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, to the address

of His Highness the Ameer. His Highness has read the letter, and has fully understood its contents. A true copy thereof is herewith sent for your Excellency's perusal. Your Excellency may, in every respect, rest assured in regard to this direction, and will continue to favour me with accounts of your health.

Inclosure 4 in No. 6.

General von Kaufmann to the Ameer of Afghanistan.

(Translation.) 10 *Shawul*, 1290 A.H. (*December* 1, 1873.)

ACCOMPANIED by troops I left Tashkend for Khiva. Your Highness may have heard that the Khan of Khiva had commenced committing unjustifiable and unlawful acts, whereupon His Majesty the Emperor of Russia directed me to go to Khiva with a view to compel him by force of arms to act according to law. This undertaking was attended with full success. Having obtained a victory over the army of Khiva, I conquered the country. Afterwards the Khan of Khiva and his dependents surrendered themselves to the favour of His Majesty the Emperor. At present peace has been established in the country. It is not the wish of His Imperial Majesty to add territories to his extensive Empire. For this reason, by order of His Majesty, the country of Khiva has been allowed to remain as an independent territory as before, and I have placed Syud Mahomed Ruheem Khan on his own guddee and in possession of his ancestral dominions. Now the said Khan has agreed to fulfil certain conditions, and has also engaged to observe certain conditions for the preservation of peace and tranquillity in the country, and for the maintenance of friendship with the neighbours. After the restoration of his territory His Majesty the Emperor ordered the Khan to set at liberty all the slaves. The Khan then issued a Proclamation, prohibiting a Slave Trade, as this act was against law. The order of the Khan on the subject is now being carried out. Among the slaves released there are 400 Afghans who were collected in this territory. They want to go back to their country, some through Bokhara, some through Balk, and some through Maimena.

As your Highness is our friend, I consider it proper to bring this event to your notice.

With a view to the promotion of the welfare of your Highness's subjects, may the Almighty God prolong your life.

No. 7.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to Earl Granville.—(*Received March* 20.)

My Lord, *Tehran, January* 24, 1874.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the intelligence received by me from Khorassan regarding recent raids upon Russian property effected by the Turkomans of Merv and Akhal.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. TAYLOUR THOMSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 7.

The Meshed Agent to Mr. Taylour Thomson.

(Translation.) *December* 21, 1873.

I SAW a letter from Bokhara, in which it was reported that a month and a-half ago the Russian authorities issued a general order for the early supply of 16,000 water-skins and 16,000 felts.

As the march upon Merv is a difficult undertaking for the troops and guns, and there is a scarcity of water, the above articles are apparently required for that expedition.

Inclosure 2 in No. 7.

The Meshed Agent to Mr. Taylour Thomson.

(Translation.) *December* 21, 1873.

THE Governor of Deragez has written to say that a caravan of 100 camels, laden with indigo, green tea, &c., and accompanied by two Russians, was attacked by the Turkomans of Merv whilst proceeding from Bokhara to Khiva. The Turkomans carried off the whole to Merv; one of the Russians was killed when the attack was made, and the other carried off into captivity. He also states that the Khan of Kharesm has sent seven or eight messengers, at the instance of the Russian General, to the Akhalees, to tell them that if they will give up their plundering habits and desist from their slave traffic all the property, &c., will be restored to them which the inhabitants of the surrounding country may have taken from them in retaliation; but, should they not accept this proposal, the troops from Khiva and Bokhara will be simultaneously sent against them either whilst the snow is on the ground or in harvest time.

Some Turkomans of Merv, having gone on a plundering expedition to Khiva, carried off one of the employés of the Russian Commissariat and have confined him in Merv. A person was sent to ransom him, but the Turkomans replied that his ransom had been fixed at double his weight in Imperials.

On the 14th instant I saw another letter which had been received from Serrekhs. It was to the effect that the Russian General had sent an agent to Merv to demand the restitution of the plundered caravan, and of the Russians; otherwise they would be treated like the Yemoot tribe. The Turkomans replied that they were quite ready to fight, and that they would not give up the captives for less than 20,000 tomans.

No. 8.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to Earl Granville.—(Received April 12.)

My Lord, *Tehran, February* 20, 1874.

SINCE writing my despatch of the 24th January last, I have received no further intelligence of Russian preparations for a campaign against the Turkoman tribes in spring.

Preparations are, however, now being made to have in readiness here, four or five regiments for early service, and I have some reason to believe that it is the intention of the Persian Government to form in the spring two camps on the Attrek, one at Karee Kala, and the other at Ishkabad. Should a Russian force be also directed in spring to the same quarter, with the object of acting against or intimidating the Turkomans of the Akhal tribes, it is not improbable, having in view the policy which dictated the Shah's acquiescence in the Attrek River as the line of Persian frontier, that its presence there would not be displeasing to him. His Majesty has learned, by experience, how little confidence can be placed in his own troops, when dependent on their own resources, in a campaign against the powerful and united tribes of the Akhal and Téké; but in the presence of a Russian force in the neighbourhood of the Persian camp, he probably would hope to find not only the courage of his own troops increased therefrom, but also a more favourable disposition on the part of the Turkomans to submit themselves to Persia as the weaker Power, and one from which they would have comparatively little to dread.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. TAYLOUR THOMSON.

P.S.—I am since informed, on better authority, that the troops destined for the two places mentioned above are to be despatched from Asterabad, and that the Persian camp of 10,000 men, of whom seven regiments, of 800 men each, are infantry; 4,000 cavalry, and 18 guns, 2 being 18-pounders, and the rest 9 and 6 pounders, is to be formed at Cheh Cheheh, a small fort recently constructed between Koochan and Kelat-i-Nadir. It is believed that the Russian force will number 2,000 men.

W. T. T.

No. 9.

Prince Gortchacow to Baron Brunnow.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Brunnow, April* 13.)

Mon cher Comte, *St. Pétersbourg, le* 24 *Mars,* 1874.

JE profite du Feldjäger que Sa Majesté l'Empereur expédie à Londres pour vous envoyer un dossier de pièces diplomatiques qui, je l'espère, vous offriront de l'intérêt.

En outre, j'ai chargé Stremoukow de vous écrire au sujet de l'Asie Centrale. Les ordres de l'Empereur pour qu'aucune expédition ne soit entreprise contre les Turcomans Tékés, ce qui veut dire dans la direction de Merv, ont été donnés en termes si péremptoires, qu'aucune convoitise locale n'osera se permettre de les transgresser, tandis que l'expédition scientifique, déjà très-restreinte quant à son étendue, restera circonscrite strictement sur le terrain de la science par suite d'une volonté suprême aussi catégoriquement manifestée. Donc sous ce rapport, mon cher Comte, aucun nuage sur le terrain politique ne se trouvera lors de la venue de notre auguste Maître à Londres.

Vous connaissez l'itinéraire de Sa Majesté, et vous savez que je la quitte à Stuttgard pour aller chercher ce dont j'ai un besoin urgent, le repos, l'air, et le soleil.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) GORTCHACOW.

(Translation.)

My dear Count, *St. Petersburgh, March* 24, 1874.

I TAKE advantage of the "feldjäger" whom His Majesty the Emperor is sending to London to send you a budget of diplomatic documents, which will, I hope, interest you.

I have also directed Stremoouchoff to write to you on the subject of Central Asia. The orders of the Emperor that no expedition should be undertaken against the Téké Turkomans, which means in the direction of Merv, have been given in such peremptory terms that no local ambition will dare to take the liberty of transgressing them, while the scientific expedition, already much restricted in its scope, will remain strictly limited to the domain of science by a supreme decision, which has also been categorically expressed. On this head, therefore, my dear Count, there will be no cloud on the political horizon on the occasion of our august Master's visit to London.

You know the plan of His Majesty's journey, and you know that I leave him at Stuttgardt to seek what I urgently require—rest, fresh air, and sunshine.

I remain, &c.

(Signed) GORTCHACOW.

No. 10.

M. de Stremoukow to Baron Brunnow.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Brunnow, April* 13.)

M. le Comte, *St. Pétersbourg, le* 25 *Mars,* 1874.

JE me fais un devoir de soumettre ci-joint à votre Excellence le résumé des délibérations d'une Conférence qui s'est réunie sous la Présidence du Ministre de la Guerre, chez M. le Général Kaufmann, et à laquelle le Prince Chancelier a bien voulu me charger de représenter le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. Les conclusions de cette Conférence ont été revêtues le 7 Mars de la haute approbation de notre auguste Maître.

Votre Excellence y relèvera qu'un programme tout-à-fait pacifique a été posé pour règle de conduite à toutes les autorités militaires appelées à diriger les affaires dans la contrée Trans-Caspienne.

Quant aux velléités de nos troupes du Caucase d'entreprendre un mouvement contre les Turcomans Tékés, elles ont été formellement repoussées.

Il n'y a donc pas à prévoir pour cette année aucun mouvement militaire important dans la Steppe d'Orenbourg et dans le pays au delà de la Caspienne.

C'est dans le même esprit de modération qu'ont été dictées à notre Ministre à Téhéran les réponses à faire aux propositions du Gouvernement Persan, par rapport à une action simultanée et combinée contre les Turcomans.

D'ordre de notre auguste Maître le Conseiller Privé de Beger à été chargé de décliner toute proposition de ce genre, vu qu'une action en commun avec les Persans ne ferait que compliquer davantage la question Turcomane. Il a été également recommandé à notre

Ministre de déclarer au Gouvernement Persan que nous n'avions en vue aucune entreprise contre les Tékés, mais qu'en cas d'agression dirigée contre nos caravanes ou contre nos topographes, nous ne saurions nous empêcher de les repousser à main armée, au moyen de petits détachements volants que nous tiendrons prêts à cet effet.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) PIERRE STREMOUKOW.

(Translation.)

M. le Comte, *St. Petersburgh, March* 25, 1874.

IT is my duty to submit herewith to your Excellency the summary of the deliberations of a Conference which met under the presidency of the Minister of War, at General Kaufmann's, and at which the Prince Chancellor did me the honour to instruct to me to represent the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The conclusions of that Conference received on the 7th March the gracious approval of our august Master.

Your Excellency will perceive from them that an entirely pacific programme has been laid down for the guidance of all the military authorities charged with the direction of affairs in the trans-Caspian countries.

As to the desires of our troops of the Caucasus to undertake a movement against the Téké Turkomans, these have been formally rejected.

There is no occasion, therefore, to expect this year any important military movement in the Steppe of Orenburg, and in the country beyond the Caspian.

The replies to be returned by our Minister at Tehran to the proposals of the Persian Government in regard to simultaneous and combined action against the Turkomans have been dictated in the same spirit of moderation.

By order of our august Master, Privy Councillor De Beger has been instructed to decline any proposal of this nature, inasmuch as joint action with the Persians would only further complicate the Turkoman question. Our Minister has also been recommended to declare to the Persian Government that we do not contemplate any enterprize against the Tékés, but that, in case of aggression against our caravans or against our topographers, we cannot abstain from repulsing them by force by means of small flying detachments, which we shall hold ready for this purpose.

I have, &c.

(Signed) PIERRE STREMOUKOW.

No. 11.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received April 20.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April* 15, 1874.

IN conversation to-day with M. de Stremoouchoff, the Director of the Asiatic Department, I referred to the reports mentioned by Mr. Thomson in his despatch of the 24th January of certain raids by Turkomans on Russian property, and of an intended Russian expedition against the Turkomans.

M. de Stremoouchoff stated that no Russian caravan had been attacked between Khiva and Bokhara, observing that there was no trade in the direction named from Bokhara to Khiva, and that no Russian subjects had been killed nor carried into captivity.

His Excellency considered this report as one of pure invention, originating probably in some Eastern bazaar.

His Excellency further stated that some time ago on my mentioning to Prince Gortchakow that the Russian Minister at Tehran had spoken of an intended expedition against the Turkomans, he had by order of the Prince addressed a telegram on the subject to M. de Beger, who had telegraphed in reply that he had never spoken of any such intended expedition.

I imagine that all these reports are of old date, and were correct at a time when there was real foundation for them, and that the change which has lately taken place in regard to Central Asia, and the abandonment, at least for the moment, of any fresh military expeditions, has not yet been made known in those distant quarters.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 12.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Doria.

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 3, 1874.

THE Secretary of State for India has received a telegraphic despatch from the Viceroy, stating that reports have appeared in the newspapers that the Indian Government is sending arms and ammunition to Yarkand. The Viceroy says that these are without foundation. The Indian Government is forwarding a small quantity of ammunition given by the Sultan to the Envoy last year at Constantinople, and he supposes that this may have given rise to the reports.

Mr. Shaw has, the Viceroy adds, left for Yarkand. His orders are to maintain friendly relations with the Ameer's Government, and to attend to British commercial interests.

He will refrain from offering suggestions to the Ameer in matters of Government or foreign policy; but, if consulted, is willing to assist with information and appropriate advice.

In the event of questions arising between the Ameer and the Russian Government, he will, if opportunity arises, impress on the Ameer the risk of complications with that Government, and the importance of avoiding any step that might unnecessarily prejudice amicable relations with its Representative.

You should mention the general tenor of these instructions to the Russian Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 13.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(Received June 4.)

My Lord, *India Office, June* 4, 1874.

I AM directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to forward, for the information of the Earl of Derby, copy of a letter from the Government of India, dated the 17th April, 1874, with inclosed Cabul Diaries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 13.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury.

My Lord, *Fort William, April* 17, 1874.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers relative to the affairs of Afghanistan.

We have, &c.
(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
JOHN INGLIS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 13.

The Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to Mr. Aitchison.

April 4, 1874.

SUBMITS copy of translation of Cabul Diary from the 27th to the 30th March, 1874, inclusive.

Copy of a murrasilla lately received by the Ameer (through Naib Mahomed Alum Khan) from the Russian Governor-General at Tashkend, in reply to one from his Highness to the latter, congratulating his Highness on the nomination of Sirdar Abdoolla Khan, is inclosed. His Highness also received another friendly murrasilla from him, together with one to the address of Naib Mahomed Alum Khan, requesting him to send the murrasillas to the address of the Ameer to his Highness.

Abstract Translation of Murrasilla of 7th Mohurrum (25th February, 1874) from the Officiating Governor-General at Tashkend to the Ameer.*

The murrasillas forwarded by your Highness on the 6th Zilhij (25th January, 1874) to the address of the Goobernat von Kaufmann reached me, but, as he is still at St. Petersburgh, I will forward them to him without delay. As for the present his duties are intrusted to me by His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, I have the honour to send replies to these communications. In your murrasilla of 6th Zilhij you sent information that you had nominated your son, Sirdar Abdoolla Khan, as your heir-apparent; I congratulate you on this selection. Such nominations tend to the comfort and tranquillity of the kingdom. I wish perpetual possession of your kingdom by you and your heirs, and hope that after your death Sirdar Abdoolla Khan will follow your example and make himself an ally and a friend of the Emperor. Your Highness is aware of the friendly relations which hitherto existed between the English and Russian Governments, but lately these relations have been confirmed by an alliance between the Rulers of these two kingdoms. The daughter of the Emperor has been married to the second son of Her Gracious Majesty the Queen Victoria. I send this happy information to your Highness on account of the friendship existing between your Highness and the Russian Government, and hope that you will consider this relationship advantageous to our friendship with the English Government, who are favourably disposed to you. May God be your protector under all circumstances and keep you happy.

No. 14.

Mr. Doria to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 15.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 10, 1874.*

I HAD an interview with M. de Westmann this morning, when I spoke to his Excellency with reference to the reports which had appeared in the newspapers that the Indian Government is sending arms and ammunition to Yarkand.

I thought I could best fulfil your Lordship's instructions by communicating verbally to M. de Westmann some portions of your Lordship's despatch of the 3rd instant, mentioning especially that a telegram received from the Viceroy of India states that there is no foundation for the reports in circulation with regard to sending arms and ammunition to Yarkand.

M. de Westmann was ignorant of the reports in question, and was also unaware of Mr. Shaw's mission to Yarkand.

His Excellency took the opportunity to speak to me with reference to a rumour which had reached him that Mr. Forsyth had been the bearer of a gift of 1,000 muskets to the Ameer of Kashgar. In mentioning the subject his Excellency said he did not wish to make a complaint or speak officially, but if the report was true, it appeared to him a matter for surprise that so large a number of fire-arms should have been selected for a present to the Ameer which might be used against Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. DORIA.

No. 15.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury.

My Lord, *Fort William, May 1, 1874.*

WE have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the letter from the Secretary in the Political and Secret Department, dated 20th March, 1874, forwarding a translation of the

* Name illegible, something like "General Kulfa Kupski."

Russian letter addressed to the Ameer of Cabul by the officiating Russian Governor-General of Tashkend.

2. A translation into Persian of the English translation has been forwarded to the Punjab Government for transmission to the Ameer under cover of our letter, a copy of which is forwarded for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

3. We invite your Lordship's attention to the allusion made by the Officiating Governor-General to a request* said to have been preferred by the Ameer, and would beg to inquire whether the above expression is a literal translation of the corresponding Russian word. In the previous correspondence between the Ameer and the Russian Governor-General no mention is made of any request preferred by the Ameer, and the reference is therefore not understood.†

4. We desire further to invite your Lordship's attention to the tone adopted by Lieutenant-General Kolpakofski in his present letter to the Ameer.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
JOHN INGLIS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 15.

Lieutenant-General Kolpakofski to His Highness the Ameer of Cabul.

(Translation.) *Tashkend, 28th Sheval*, 1290 (*December* $\frac{6}{18}$, 1873).

AFTER expression of the best wishes, the contents of the letter are as follows:—

Your Eminence's letter of the 25th day of Ramazan, of the year 1290, and addressed to the Governor-General, General Aide-de-camp Von Kaufmann, has been duly and opportunely (in a good hour) received by me.

On his return from the glorious Khivan campaign the High Governor-General left for St. Petersburgh in order to report to His Majesty the Emperor on the condition of affairs in this province.

Being charged with the Government of Turkestan during the absence of his Excellency, I consider it my duty to express to you my satisfaction as regards the feelings of friendship and devotion which you set forth in your letter.

In dispatching the same to the High Governor-General for his favourable consideration, I entertain the hope that he will not refuse your request, and that he will represent to His Majesty the Emperor your conscientious mode of action, and your endeavour to become worthy of the grace of my august Master.

I fully share your opinion that peace and tranquillity serve to develop the welfare of a State, and to render durable friendly relations existing between two Powers.

Continue to follow the same straight road along which you have hitherto gone, and you will become convinced that it is the right and advantageous road as regards both yourself and the welfare of your people.

I wish you health, welfare, and good fortune in all your undertakings.

Inclosure 2 in No. 15.

The Under-Secretary to the Government of India to the Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

Fort William, May 1, 1874.

IN continuation of the letter from this Office, dated 25th February last, I am directed to forward, for delivery to the Ameer through the British Agent at Cabul, a Persian translation of the letter dated $\frac{6}{18}$th December, 1873, to the address of the Ameer of Cabul from the Officiating Governor-General of Tashkend.

2. I am to request that the Agent may be desired, when delivering the Persian translation to the Ameer, to intimate to His Highness that the reference in this letter to a

* An examination by competent translators in London showed that the word was correctly translated as "request." The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India was informed accordingly in a letter dated September 25, 1874.

† See, however, Appendix 2, No. 9.

"request" presumably made by His Highness from the Russian Governor-General is not understood by the Government of India.

3. The Agent may acquaint the Ameer that the Russian Government have given renewed assurances to Her Majesty's Government that they have no desire to interfere with His Highness' territory.

4. A copy of the English translation is inclosed for the information of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor.

No. 16.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 29.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, June* 22, 1874.

BEFORE my departure for England M. de Stremoouchoff mentioned to me that he had read in the Indian newspapers a report that Mr. Shaw had presented the Atalegh Ghazee with 1,000 rifled breechloaders, and that this fact had been boasted of by the Kashgarians who had been sent to arrange the dispute with the Russian Government on the subject of the non-payment of certain merchandize conveyed to Yarkand in a Russian caravan.

I expressed my doubts to M. de Stremoouchoff at the time as to the authenticity of the report in question, and at my interview with him on the 20th instant I was happy to assure him, in accordance with the information of your Lordship's despatch of the 3rd instant to Mr. Doria, that the Viceroy of India had informed the Secretary of State that the reports in question were without foundation.

I likewise took occasion to mention to M. de Stremoouchoff the general nature of the instructions given by the Indian Government to Mr. Shaw, as stated in your Lordship's despatch.

M. de Stremoouchoff thanked me for this communication, and expressed his satisfaction at it.

In referring to the state of affairs in Central Asia in general, his Excellency stated that the relations between the Imperial Commandant, Colonel Ivanow, and the Khan of Khiva were most friendly and satisfactory, and that order and tranquillity, since the last chastisement he had inflicted on the Yomoud tribes, prevailed.

No. 17.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 29.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June* 23, 1874.

AT an interview I had with M. de Stremoouchoff, Director of the Asiatic Department, on the 20th instant, I inquired of his Excellency whether there was any foundation for a current report that the recently appointed Governor of Krasnovodsk had addressed a Circular letter to the Chiefs of the Attrek and Goorgan tribes, informing them that he had been appointed by the Grand Duke Michael their Chief, and giving them advice.

His Excellency stated that General Llamakin, who had been formerly Governor of Mangyshlak district, and had been on amicable terms with the nomad tribes there, had been lately appointed Governor of Krasnovodsk.

On his arrival there he had addressed a letter to the Chief of the Turkoman tribes who inhabited the country between Khiva and the Caspian, as well also as to those who periodically visited the districts south of the Attrek and extended their wanderings even as far north as Krasnovodsk, in which he expressed the wish to be on friendly terms with them, and the hope that they would abstain from acts of disorder or obstruction to the commerce of the steppe. It was, M. de Stremoouchoff said, a mere friendly letter, with a view of inducing these tribes to abstain from plunder and marauding expeditions.

To this letter a very satisfactory answer had been received by General Llamakin in the sense of peace and order.

His Excellency added that he had only received this information from ordinary sources, but that in order to have authentic information, he had addressed a request to the Minister of War to be furnished with an official copy of General Llamakin's letter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 18.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June* 29.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June* 24, 1874.

I TOOK occasion yesterday, in conversation with M. de Stremoouchoff, to call his attention to the inclosed telegram which had appeared in the "Times" newspaper of Wednesday last, the 17th instant, and to ask his Excellency whether the account therein given of General Llamakin's communication with the Turkoman tribes was correct.

M. de Stremoouchoff stated that, as far as he was informed, the general statement was true, but that there were several inaccuracies which he was anxious to correct.

First. The General had not visited the Attrek, or met the Chiefs of the tribes between the Attrek and the Goorgan. General Llamakin had received them at Ashurade, where the Russian Government had a naval station.

Secondly. There was no expression of submission of the tribes to the Czar, nor any reference made by the General to their subjection to Russia.

Thirdly. There was no promise exacted or given from the Téké Turkomans of allegiance to Russia.

His Excellency then stated that the object of General Llamakin in meeting these Turkoman Chiefs was solely to establish relations of amity and good understanding with them, and to induce them to abstain from lawless acts of plunder on the caravans crossing the steppes. The assurances they had given were satisfactory, and he trusted that in future there would be peace and a friendly feeling between them.

M. de Stremoouchoff said that a Russian artilleryman had been captured on the right bank of the Amu during the raid of the Yomouds in November last, and was supposed to be a prisoner at Merv. The Chiefs of the Teké tribe were requested by General Llamakin to effect his release, which they promised to do.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 18.

Extract from the "Times" of June 17, 1874.

RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA.

(By Telegraph.)

(From our Prussian Correspondent.)

Berlin, June 16.

COLONEL LLAMAKIN, the Governor of the new military district of the Caspian, has just visited the Attrek. Between the Attrek and Goorgan Rivers he was met by the principal Elders of the Yomoud Turkomans, who declared that their whole tribe considered themselves the subjects of the Czar, and were prepared to carry out his commands. Upon this, Colonel Llamakin desired all the Elders of the tribe to meet him towards the end of June on the Silver Hills.

At Krasnovodsk the Colonel received the Envoys of the Téké Turkoman tribes nomadizing between the Caspian and the Fort of Karis, the latter being half-way to Merv. These asked for protection from the inroads of the Persian Kurds, vowing allegiance in return, and denouncing the Merv Turkomans as hostile to Russia. Colonel Llamakin ordered them to meet him again at Krasnovodsk in a month, expressing a hope that they would profit by the interval to effect the liberation of a Russian soldier kept prisoner at Merv. This soldier belonged to one of the several Russian caravans recently plundered by the Merv Turkomans on the banks of the Amu.

No. 19.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received July* 5.)

My Lord, *Tehran, May* 20, 1874.

THE Mission Agent at Meshed reports that he has been informed by Behbood Khan, Governor of Kelat, who had arrived in Meshed on the 24th April, that no Russian expedition will be dispatched against Merv this year, as a division has taken place among the

people of Merv, some of the Chiefs professing obedience to Russia, others to Herat, and again others to the Governor-General of Khorassan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. TAYLOUR THOMSON.

No. 20.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received August 2.)

My Lord, *Tehran, May* 28, 1874.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a Circular letter addressed by General Llamakin, Governor of Krasnovodsk, to the Turkoman tribes of the Ak and Ata-Baee, informing them that the Grand Duke Michael had, by command of the Emperor of Russia, appointed him to be the supreme authority over the districts of the Attrek and Goorgan.

I am informed on good authority that this Circular has been addressed to the whole of the Turkoman tribes occupying the line of country lying between the Caspian Sea, Merv, and the Oxus at Charjoo, and of the accuracy of this statement indication is found in the letter itself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. TAYLOUR THOMSON.

Inclosure in No. 20.

Circular Letter addressed by General Llamakin to the Turkoman Chiefs.

(Translation.)

MAY God keep you in His favour; may the Preserver of the universe increase your rank, so that you may understand, and, understanding, reply hereto. Prince Michael, brother of the Sovereign of Russia, and General-in-chief of the Army of Daghestan and of the whole of the Caucasus, has, by command of the Sovereign . . . . . and has appointed me to be the supreme authority on the Attrek and Goorgan. And he has instructed me to make known to all the Turkoman tribes that the commands of the Great Sovereign are that unity and concord and loyalty should be established, so that there may be tranquillity and comfort in these steppes; there should be security, so that good may be derived from one another. There should be no rebellion; there should be friendship, but no strife. The roads to Khiva should be safe and secure; this is necessary as a Russian army is there. Our traders, our caravans, our couriers, come and go to Khiva through the steppes and desert places. No injury should be done to them. This is our wish. Security, tranquillity, and ease in these plains are a greater boon for yourselves than for us, for tranquillity will increase your wealth and property. You will enjoy ease and become rich. Wherever one or two of you may remove and take up your quarters your traders will travel in safety. Your commerce will then extend; you yourselves will become respectable; your tribes will live at ease; you will be very happy, and your days will pass pleasantly.

O people of the Ak Ata-Baee, you need rectitude and friendliness, so that you may with sincerity have faith in each other. Having at all times been the means of attaining good objects, it is now necessary that, in giving you advice, the orders of the Sovereign of the World should be carried out. Therefore, in order that in these steppes your tribes may with us live in ease and comfort, come now to me. If you cannot yourselves do so, send good, respectable, intelligent men, so that I may give them good advice, and communicate to them the sincere and good wishes of the Great Emperor towards you; and, after having held consultations satisfactory to both parties, we may exchange papers, and by means of such a document our friendship may last for ever.

Now, you see that my first greeting to you recommends unity, concord, comfort, and loyal feelings. Now pay attention to the words I have written. Listen to them and accept them. Come and let us establish unity and friendship. Whatever has hitherto passed, good or bad, has gone by. Let us now act for (the cause of) welfare, security, and friendship. Send immediately some respectable men. (When) they arrive, I hope they will be pleased with me; the tribe will also be pleased with us. I trust that (when) you come our good wishes (and) intention towards the tribe may be communicated to them.

In short . . . . . understand this letter from first to last; having understood it, write me an answer, and send your respectable elders.

Look to yourselves for good or evil.

(Signed) General LLAMAKIN.

Fort Shah Kadem.

No. 21.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(Received October 30.)

My Lord, *India Office, October 29, 1874.*

I AM directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to transmit, for the information and consideration of the Earl of Derby, copy of a despatch from the Government of India, relative to the proceedings of the Russians on the Attrek.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 21.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury.

(Extract.) *Fort William, September 8, 1874.*

WE have the honour to draw the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the inclosed communications from Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, relative to the proceedings of the Russians on the Attrek.

2. General Llamakin's Circular, of which Mr. Taylour Thomson has forwarded a copy, claims "supreme authority" on the Attrek and Goorgan by command of the Emperor of Russia. The Circular purports to be addressed to the Ak Atabia, a branch of the Yomut tribe of Turkomans, whose habitation is in the neighbourhood of Asterabad; and Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran states that he has been informed on good authority that the Circular has been sent to the whole of the Turkoman tribes occupying the line of country between the Caspian Sea, Merv, and the Oxus at Charjoi.

3. If the copy of General Llamakin's Circular be genuine, and the information furnished to Mr. Taylour Thomson is correct, the Persian territory between the Attrek and the Goorgan is now practically annexed to the Russian dominions, and authority is assumed in respect to the whole Turkoman country to the borders of Afghanistan.

4. We are of opinion that these proceedings cannot fail to excite uneasiness and alarm in the minds of our Persian and Afghan allies, and that they demand the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government.

Inclosure 2 in No. 21.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to the Earl of Derby, May 28, 1874.

[See No. 20.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 21.

Translation of a Letter from General Llamakin, Governor of Krasnovodsk, to the Turkoman Tribes of the Ak and Ata Baee.

[See Inclosure in No. 20.]

No. 22.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord. *Foreign Office, November 6, 1874.*

I HAVE to transmit to your Excellency the inclosed copy of a despatch from the Government of India, relating to the proceedings of the Russians on the Attrek, and to instruct your Excellency to call the attention of the Russian Government to that portion of General Llamakin's Circular in which he styles himself Commander over the Turkoman tribes of the Attrek and the Goorgan, and to point out that the territory between the Attrek and Goorgan is unquestionably Persian territory, in which General Llamakin would not be justified in interfering.

Your Excellency will at the same time express the hope of Her Majesty's Government that the Government of the Emperor will impress upon General Llamakin the expediency of abstaining from molesting the tribes who frequent the country to the south of the Attrek.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 23.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received November* 22.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November* 17, 1874.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 6th instant, which reached me by post on the evening of the 14th instant.

In that despatch your Lordship instructs me to call the attention of the Russian Government to that portion of General Llamakin's Circular (of which a copy was inclosed in the despatch from the Government of India) wherein he styles himself Commander over the Turkoman tribes of the Attrek and Goorgan, and to point out that the territory between the Attrek and Goorgan is unquestionably Persian territory, in which General Llamakin could not be justified in interfering.

Your Lordship further instructs me to express the hope of Her Majesty's Government that the Government of the Emperor will impress upon General Llamakin the expediency of abstaining from molesting the tribes who frequent the country to the south of the Attrek.

In fulfilment of your Lordship's instructions, I had the honour of an interview yesterday with M. de Westmann, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the absence of Prince Gortchakow, when I read to him your Lordship's despatch, as also the despatch from the Government of India which was inclosed therein.

On terminating their perusal, M. de Westmann stated that the incident of General Llamakin's Circular, to which your Lordship referred, had been a *mal entendu* which had given rise to a correspondence between the Imperial and Persian Governments, and that the explanations given by the Imperial Government had been perfectly satisfactory to the Persian Government.

His Excellency admitted that General Llamakin, in lieu of naming the tribes to which he referred by their proper appellation, had generalized them in the terms he used, and he observed that the tribes referred to were in the habit of repairing for a portion of the year to Russian territory.

The whole circumstance, his Excellency said, had been misrepresented, consequent on an incorrect translation from the original Tartar text of General Llamakin's Circular, but this misrepresentation had been happily and satisfactorily rectified with the Persian Government.

Having made this statement with regard to the incident referred to, his Excellency then stated that he must express his surprise that an explanation should have been asked by Her Majesty's Government of an incident of so little importance in itself, and which solely concerned Russia and Persia. It was not customary, his Excellency observed, to interfere in the international relations between two independent States, and he could not comprehend in what way the incident referred to could affect Great Britain.

I replied to his Excellency that he must not forget that Great Britain was equally with Russia an Asiatic Power, ruling over an Empire of above 200 millions of people, and that it was the duty of the Government of India to watch over and safeguard the interests of that Empire.

The interests of the neighbouring States were more or less mixed up with those of the Indian Empire, and both Persia and Afghanistan might be considered as limitrophe States to India.

I further observed that the advance of Russia in Central Asia of late years was a subject of watchful interest, although it was not one either of jealousy or fear to the Government of India. There was a large tract of country, inhabited by independent Turkoman tribes, extending along the frontiers of Afghanistan from Khojah Saleh on the Oxus to the Persian frontier, of which Merv was the central point. Any foreign influence seeking to act on these tribes would necessarily attract the attention of the Government of Afghanistan, and his Excellency would therefore see that the Government of India was fully justified in calling attention to a question which so nearly concerned the interests of its ally.

But, furthermore, I would observe to his Excellency that not many years ago the

question of Persia formed the subject of diplomatic discussion and of a friendly understanding between our respective Governments, and I referred to the correspondence which had been exchanged between Lord Palmerston and Count Nesselrode in 1835 and 1838, in which both Governments agreed on the necessity of maintaining the integrity of Persia.

I did not, therefore, comprehend the surprise expressed by his Excellency on the communication I had then made.

M. de Westmann replied to these observations that the correspondence to which I had alluded referred to the question of the succession to the Persian throne, on which the two Governments had happily agreed, and he did not doubt that under similar circumstances the same understanding would take place. He instanced the friendly offices in which the two Governments were now engaged in regard to the Turco-Persian frontier question, but in the present instance he repeated that the incident referred to in your Lordship's despatch was a question which solely regarded Persia, in which he could not admit the right of a third Power to interfere.

"Take, for instance," said his Excellency, "the case of Kashgar. It is an independent State, geographically separated from India. Although information of an unsatisfactory nature in regard to the late mission of Mr. Forsyth has reached the Imperial Government, I should not think of asking for an explanation from Her Majesty's Government, for I should expose myself to receive as a natural answer that the relations between the Indian Government and the Ruler of Kashgar did not concern the Imperial Government."

To this observation I replied that between friendly Governments, as between two friends, there should exist no susceptibility of this nature. I would call to his recollection that on being informed by M. de Stremoouchoff that Mr. Forsyth had been reported to him as having presented a considerable amount of arms to the Ameer of Kashgar, Her Majesty's Government had taken the earliest opportunity, and on the authority of the Viceroy of India, to deny this fact. I felt convinced that any explanations requested by the Imperial Government in regard to Kashgar would be given with the most friendly alacrity.

I could only repeat what I had previously communicated to his Excellency, namely, that Mr. Forsyth had strongly counselled the Ameer of Kashgar to maintain friendly relations with Russia, and to avoid any possibility of a collision with Russian interests north of the Fian Shan range.

For my own part, I regretted that there should be any susceptibility on the part of Russia—a susceptibility which I had already experienced in regard to any reference to the affairs of Central Asia. I felt very strongly that, on the contrary, England and Russia, the two Asiatic Powers, would act wisely for their own interests, and profitably for the interests of civilization and humanity, by discarding all jealousy and distrust, and by adopting a frank and sincere exchange of opinions in regard to the affairs of Central Asia.

His Excellency expressed his entire approbation of and participation in the foregoing opinions, on the condition, of course, that there should be perfect reciprocity, as offering the surest means of confirming the happy relations now existing between the two countries.

I have only to add that nothing could exceed the courteous and conciliatory manner of M. de Westmann at this interview.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 24.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 16, 1874.

I APPROVE the language which your Excellency used to M. de Westmann with respect to General Llamakin's Circular addressed to the Turkomans inhabiting the territory between the Attrek and the Goorgan, as reported in your despatch of the 17th ultimo.

I observe, however, that on your reminding M. de Westmann of the understanding come to between England and Russia in 1834 and 1838 respecting the maintenance of the integrity of Persia, his Excellency replied that the correspondence to which you alluded had reference to the question of the succession to the Persian throne.

As this statement on the part of M. de Westmann is altogether incorrect, and as I

observe that your Excellency did not at the time correct him, I have to instruct you to take an early opportunity of pointing out to his Excellency the error into which he has fallen.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 25.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 28.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 23, 1874.*

IN conformity with your Lordship's instructions, I read to M. de Westmann this day your Lordship's despatch of the 16th instant, in which your Lordship observes on the incorrectness of the observations made by M. de Westmann in my conversation with his Excellency, as reported in my despatch of the 17th November.

I also read to his Excellency an extract, of which I inclose a copy, from Earl Granville's despatch of the 15th July, 1873.

M. de Westmann stated, in reply, that in observing to me at the time that the correspondence to which I had alluded, in 1834 and 1838, had referred to the question of the succession to the Persian throne, it had in no wise been his intention to disavow or discard the understanding which was then come to between the two Governments in respect to the maintenance of the integrity of Persia.

His Excellency fully admitted the existence of that understanding at the periods alluded to, and its validity at the present moment; he maintained, however, that the integrity of the Persian territory had not been menaced by the Circular of General Llamakin, and he further observed that if it had been so menaced, it was Persia who was the party aggrieved, and who was entitled to seek an explanation.

His Excellency then observed (but not in the light of a recrimination) that when the frontier differences between Persia and Afghanistan were lately arranged by Great Britain, and a portion of Seistan awarded to Afghanistan, no communication whatever had been addressed to Russia, although the adjudication in question referred to Persian territory.

I replied to his Excellency that this was simply a question of disputed frontier, the arbitration of which was confided to Great Britain by the parties interested in carrying out this arbitration. It was neither necessary, nor would it have been logically possible to have referred to Russia.

His Excellency stated that although Russia could not have been called upon to participate in the arbitration, yet, according to the understanding to which I had referred, namely, the maintenance of the integrity of Persia, Her Majesty's Government, when the arbitration was finally settled, might have communicated to the Imperial Government the changes which had been agreed upon in regard to Persian territory.

His Excellency begged me to report this observation to your Lordship, but in doing so to state expressly that it was with no intention of "recrimination," but as an exemplification of his interpretation of the understanding existing between the two Governments in regard to the maintenance of the integrity of the Persian territory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 25.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, July 10, 1873.*

I ALSO informed Count Brünnow, as he had broached the subject of the Shah's visit, that the Persians had inquired as to the nature of the engagements which subsisted between Great Britain and Russia as to the integrity of the Persian territory, and that I had told the Grand Vizier that, although no formal Treaty or Agreement existed by which the two countries mutually agreed to respect the integrity of Persia, yet that in the year 1834 an understanding was arrived at between the two Governments on the occasion of the nomination of Mohamed Mirza as successor to the throne of Persia; that that understanding was based on the sincere desire of the two Governments to maintain not only the internal tranquillity, but also the independence and integrity of Persia; that in the year 1838 Count Nesselrode adverted to the agreement entered into by the two Governments as still subsisting in full force, as it was also acknowledged to do by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and that Her Majesty's Government,

as they recognized for themselves the principles which guided the general policy of Great Britain and Russia in favour of the integrity and independence of Persia in the year 1834, had reason to believe, from information which they had received from Lord A. Loftus, Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, that the Russian Government referred with satisfaction to the mutual assurances that were made on this subject in 1834 and 1838, and that Her Majesty's Government considered that the best mode of confirming both Powers in those sentiments was, that Persia, while steadily maintaining her rights as an independent Power, should studiously fulfil in all respects her Treaty engagements with each, and so ensure the continuance of the friendship which both Powers, even for their own interests, should desire to maintain with her.

Count Brünnow expressed satisfaction.

No. 26.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 19, 1875.

THE Russian Ambassador called upon me on the 12th instant, being on the point of leaving England for a month, and expressed his wish to ascertain more clearly than he had as yet done the views of Her Majesty's Government on the Central Asian question. He had noticed, as he said, a certain reluctance on my part to discuss that question, and considering its extreme importance to the mutual good relations of the two countries, he was anxious that there should be between us a frank and friendly exchange of opinion.

I told him in reply that I had of late abstained from conversation on the subject of Central Asia, partly because nothing new had occurred, or was occurring, in that quarter to which it seemed necessary to direct the attention of his Government, partly because I was reluctant to seem to indicate distrust or apprehension as to the course which the Russian Government might think fit to pursue, by unnecessarily requesting explanations as to their proceedings. I quite agreed with him, however, as to the expediency of mutual frankness, believing that a great deal of unnecessary suspicion was created on both sides by native intrigue, and by the circulation of exaggerated or unfounded reports, which would be done away by a simple request to know how the truth really stood.

Count Schouvaloff then proceeded to explain at some length what he described as his personal views on the subject of the extension of Russian power in Central Asia, as to which it is sufficient to say that they were unfavourable to fresh annexations. He asked me whether he was right in supposing that there was no inclination on the part of England to advance farther in the direction of the Russian possessions, unless such advance were considered by us necessary for defensive purposes, in order to protect our actual dominions. I said that his view was undoubtedly correct, and that, so far from desiring to annex any part of Afghanistan, we should deprecate such a result as bringing only increased cost and trouble without advantage. We wished to be on good terms with the Afghan Ruler, and to exercise a friendly influence over his policy, but his independence was not likely to be menaced by us. The only case in which I could conceive an advance of British troops westward as probable was in the event of any Russian movement tending to the occupation of Merv.

I reminded Count Schouvaloff that I had warned him some months back of the great importance which the Indian Government attached to Merv, and of the danger to our relations that would ensue if it were meddled with. He said that he remembered what I had told him on that subject, and had communicated it to his Government. He quite saw the danger that might arise if the two Powers were brought face to face in the neighbourhood of Herat. "Was he justified," he asked, "in assuming that our action in this matter would depend on that of Russia, that England would not move if Russia did not?" I said I thought he might feel safe on that point; we only desired the maintenance of the *status quo*, and certainly should not be the first to take steps that might be considered aggressive. He said his Government would be perfectly satisfied with this expression of intentions from me, hinting that the language of some of our newspapers had created distrust and suspicion in Russia.

He then inquired whether the Persian Government had any reason for supposing that English influence was being used to prevent the relations of Persia with the Chiefs of Beloochistan being friendly. I said I knew nothing in detail of the affairs of Beloochistan, they being under the India Office, but I was perfectly sure that if the Persian Government entertained any such belief, which was new to me, they did so without reason. Our policy was to prevent quarrels in the neighbourhood of our frontiers, so far as we could, not to stir them up.

Count Schouvaloff then requested to be enabled to contradict reports about the close alliance into which it was said the British Government was entering with the Ameer of Kashgar. It was reported that arms had been supplied to him from India in large quantities, military instructors provided, and that the object was to use the Ameer as an ally who might be serviceable in any future quarrel with Russia. I had no trouble in contradicting the story of the arms and the instructors, and explained that the sole objects of the British Government in that region were, first, the exploration of a country which had for many generations been unknown to Europeans, and, next, the opening to trade of countries which had hitherto been kept closed by the jealous exclusiveness of the Chinese authorities.

The above were the most important features of a long and interesting conversation, of which I have not thought it necessary to set down a more detailed record, especially as Count Schouvaloff professed to have no instructions from his Government, and his expressions of opinion were therefore only personal.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 27.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received April 25.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, March 30, 1875.*

I HAVE reason to believe that the Russian Government are somewhat disquieted by the newspaper reports of the intention of the Indian Government to occupy Quettah, and that they consider that this move will be the precursor of the occupation of Herat.

No. 28.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(Received May 4.)

(Extract.) *India Office, May 3, 1875.*

I AM directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th ultimo, forwarding copies of despatches from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, relating to the Affairs of Central Asia.

With reference to Lord A. Loftus' despatch of the 30th March, Lord Salisbury would suggest, for Lord Derby's consideration, that it might be as well, without entering into the merits of the question, to remind Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, for his own information, that the right of stationing troops in any part of Khelat territory, which includes Quetta, is secured to the British Government by Article IV* of the Treaty of the 14th May, 1854, with the Khan of Khelat.

The Treaty will be found at length in Aitchison's Collection of Treaties, vol. vii, page 77, but a copy is forwarded herewith, for Lord Derby's convenience.

No. 29.

Prince Gortchacow to Count Schouvaloff.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Schouvaloff, May 11.)

M. le Comte, *St. Pétersbourg, le 5 Avril, 1875.*

JE crois devoir compléter mes précédentes dépêches par un exposé des vues générales du Cabinet Impérial sur l'Asie Centrale.

Il résulte clairement de la notice historique développant la marche de nos pourparlers avec le Cabinet de Londres que les limites de l'influence appartenant aux deux Gouvernements sont nettement tracées par l'accord intervenu entre eux.

Déterminés à maintenir cette limite intacte, nous considérons les deux Gouvernements comme ayant conservé leur pleine liberté d'action dans les contrées qui les avoisinent, et qui se trouvent placées en dehors de cette ligne. Tous deux n'ont à envisager, à cet égard, que leurs propres intérêts et leurs propres nécessités.

Pour ce qui nous concerne, nous avons pris en sérieuse considération les vœux qui nous ont été à plusieurs reprises exprimés par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique,

* "Should it be deemed necessary to station British troops in any part of the territory of Khelat, they shall occupy such positions as may be thought advisable by the British authorities."

en vue de maintenir dans son esprit, aussi bien que dans sa lettre, l'entente pacifique établie entre nous.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur a daigné ordonner de réunir pour l'examen de ces questions un Comité auquel vous avez pris part.

Votre Excellence a été à même de recueillir de la bouche même de notre auguste Maître l'expression de sa volonté.

Sa Majesté Impériale n'a aucunement l'intention d'étendre les frontières de la Russie telles qu'elles existent actuellement dans l'Asie Centrale, ni du côté du Boukhara ni du côté de Krasnovodsk et de l'Attrek. Aucun motif ne nous y engage. Au contraire, l'Empereur juge toute extension de nos limites dans ces parages contraire à nos propres intérêts. Nous ferons respecter ces limites, et nous protégerons notre commerce, nous châtierons tout acte de violence et de pillage de manière à en prévenir le renouvellement, nous travaillerons à extirper le brigandage et à établir la sécurité de nos possessions.

La configuration de ces contrées et les mœurs de leurs habitants ne permettent pas de préciser d'avance les mesures qui pourraient être nécessaires afin d'atteindre pratiquement ce but. Il nous est commandé par nos devoirs, nos droits, et nos intérêts. Nous devons le remplir, et nous le remplirons.

Mais rien ne doit être fait au delà de ce qui est indispensable à cet effet.

Les ordres de l'Empereur sont formels à cet égard. Ils ont été notifiés par Sa Majesté Impériale aux autorités militaires appelées à les exécuter.

Vous êtes invité, M. le Comte, à faire connaître ces volontés de notre auguste Maître au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, en citant à Lord Derby les paroles mêmes dont l'Empereur s'est servi en présence de votre Excellence.

Vous ajouterez que Sa Majesté Impériale a la ferme confiance que ces assurances positives faites spontanément en son nom, sans restreindre la liberté d'action qui lui appartient, écarteront toute interprétation erronée des vues du Cabinet Impérial.

Nous ne désirons pas moins que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique voir la sécurité et la stabilité s'établir dans les régions de l'Asie Centrale. Les intérêts des deux Gouvernements, loin d'y être en contradiction, nous semblent solidaires, et leurs rapports devraient à notre avis y être basés, non sur la défiance et l'antagonisme, mais sur une mutuelle confiance, de franches explications, et une certaine coopération en vue de leur but commun.

Nous sommes convaincus que, si en présence de ces résolutions de notre auguste Maître, le Gouvernement des Indes, de son côté, usait de son influence sur l'Emir de Kaboul pour le détourner de toute acte inconsidéré, de nature à exciter ou encourager les Turcomans, quelles que soient les mesures que ces tribus pillardes nous mettent dans la nécessité de prendre pour les contenir ou les châtier, elles ne sauraient porter atteinte ni au *statu quo* convenu entre l'Angleterre et nous ni aux bonnes relations que nous désirons maintenir entre les deux pays.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) GORTCHACOW.

(Translation.)

M. le Comte, *St. Petersburgh, April* 5, 1875.

I THINK it right to complete my preceding despatches by a general statement of the views of the Imperial Cabinet as regards Central Asia.

The historical memorandum detailing the course of our discussions with the Cabinet of London shows clearly that the limits of the influence to be exercised by the two Governments are distinctly defined by the agreement arrived at between them.

While we are resolved strictly to observe the limit thus fixed, we consider that the two Governments have maintained their full liberty of action in the countries adjacent to them and placed outside this line. They have each of them, in this respect, to consider only their own interests and necessities.

In as far as we are concerned, we have taken into serious consideration the wishes which have frequently been expressed by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, with a view to maintaining, in the spirit as well as in the letter, the pacific understanding established between us.

His Majesty the Emperor was pleased to give orders for the assembly of a Commission, in which you took part, for the examination of these questions.

Your Excellency had the opportunity of hearing from the Emperor's own lips the expression of his will.

His Imperial Majesty has no intention of extending the frontiers of Russia, such as they exist at present in Central Asia, either on the side of Bokhara or on the side of Krasnovodsk and of the Attrek. We have no inducement to do so. On the contrary, the

Emperor deems any extension of our frontiers in those parts as being opposed to our own interests. We shall cause those frontiers to be respected, and shall protect our commerce, we shall punish any act of violence and pillage in such manner as to prevent their recurrence, we shall endeavour to extirpate brigandage, and to establish the security of our possessions.

The configuration of these countries and the manners of their inhabitants do not admit of our stating beforehand the precise measures which may be necessary for the practical attainment of this object. It is enjoined on us by our rights, our duties, and our interests. We are bound to fulfil it, and we shall do so.

Nothing, however, should be done beyond what is indispensable for this purpose.

The orders of the Emperor are formal in this respect. They have been notified by His Imperial Majesty to the military authorities, who are charged with their execution.

You are requested, M. le Comte, to make known these decisions of our august Master to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, quoting to Lord Derby the very words of which the Emperor made use in your Excellency's presence.

You will add that His Imperial Majesty is firmly convinced that these positive assurances, made spontaneously in his name, without restricting the liberty of action belonging to him, will remove any erroneous interpretation of the views of the Imperial Cabinet.

It is our desire, no less than that of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, to see the establishment of security and stability in the regions of Central Asia. The interests of the two Governments, far from being at variance, appear to us to be interdependent, and their relations there should, in our opinion, be based, not on mistrust and antagonism, but on a mutual confidence, on frank explanations, and on a certain co-operation, in view of their common object.

We are convinced that if, in presence of these resolutions of our august Master, the Government of India, on its side, were to exert its influence over the Ameer of Cabul to dissuade him from any inconsiderate act of a kind to excite or encourage the Turkomans, whatever the measures may be which these pillaging tribes may render it necessary for us to take to restrain or to punish them, they can in no way prejudice either the *status quo* agreed on between England and us, or the good relations which we desire to maintain between the two countries.

Receive, &c.
(Signed) GORTCHAKOW.

Inclosure in No. 29.

Memorandum.

IL y a quelques années la Russie s'est vue obligée de prendre des mesures militaires afin d'établir l'ordre et la tranquillité dans les steppes Kirghises. Ces mesures l'ont placée, par la suite, dans la nécessité de faire des acquisitions territoriales considérables. Depuis lors, le public Anglais nous a attribué des plans de conquête dirigés contre l'Angleterre, et menaçants pour la tranquillité des possessions Britanniques dans l'Inde.

Ces commentaires erronés sur les desseins de notre politique dans l'Asie Centrale pouvaient amener, dans nos relations amicales avec l'Angleterre, des causes de froissement que le Cabinet Impérial avait à cœur d'éviter.

C'est dans ce but qu'il adressa à nos Légations à l'étranger la Circulaire du 31 Novembre, 1864.

Cette pièce portait un caractère purement confidentiel. Elle ne fut publiée qu'en 1865, après que le Gouvernement Britannique en eût pris connaissance par une de ses Légations à l'étranger. Ce fait et le sens précis de nos déclarations excluaient la possibilité de toute interprétation impliquant un engagement contracté par la Russie vis-à-vis de l'Europe ou d'une Puissance quelconque. La pensée du Gouvernement Impérial était nettement exprimée; elle se résumait dans l'exposé des principes qui avaient guidé, jusqu'ici, notre politique en Asie Centrale, et dans la déclaration spontanée quant au but final que les ordres de Sa Majesté l'Empereur avaient tracé à l'action de son Cabinet dans ces contrées.

En constatant les motifs qui nous avaient déterminés à ne pas dépasser la ligne tracée de Tchemkent à Issiz-Koul, la Circulaire signalait, en même temps, comme base de tout le système, la nécessité d'arrêter nos frontières à l'endroit précis où commencent les populations fixes, offrant les éléments d'un organisme social stable, avec lesquelles il nous serait possible d'établir des relations régulières.

Il était nécessaire de créer et de développer ces relations, d'un côté, en civilisant, par la colonisation, les tribus nomades englobées par la nouvelle ligne de nos frontières, et de l'autre, en attirant, par la sécurité des transactions et par des avantages réciproques, les populations du Khokand, avec lesquelles cette nouvelle ligne nous mettait en contact, et d'arriver à l'établissement de rapports commerciaux et pacifiques. Tel était le double but auquel, dès ce moment, ont tendu tous nos efforts.

Malheureusement les difficultés, sans cesse renaissantes, qui résultent du contrat entre une Puissance régulièrement constituée et des voisins à demi-sauvages, nous forcèrent bientôt à dépasser les limites que nous nous étions volontairement tracées.

Obligés de nous défendre contre les agressions continuelles des peuplades limitrophes et de châtier un ennemi que son organisation sociale rendait insaisissable, nous dûmes bientôt nous convaincre que pour consolider nos nouvelles acquisitions territoriales, nous devions établir, avant tout, au delà de nos frontières, la tranquillité indispensable à notre sécurité.

La cause de cette instabilité résidait, d'abord, dans le voisinage de tribus dont les mœurs nomades et turbulentes paralysaient toute colonisation et toute commerce par caravanes ; ensuite, dans les fluctuations perpétuelles de la situation politique de ces contrées, où le Taschkent et le Khokand, tantôt réunis, tantôt séparés, toujours en guerre, soit entre eux, soit avec Boukhara, n'offraient aucune possibilité de relations fixes ni de transactions quelconques.

Le Gouvernement Impérial s'était donc vu placé, malgré lui, dans l'alternative de laisser se perpétuer un état de désordre permanent, qui paralysait toute sécurité et tout progrès, ou de chercher à soumettre par la force des armes les petits Etats indépendants dont les mœurs pillardes et les perpétuelles dissensions ne laissent à leurs voisins ni trève ni repos.

C'est ainsi qu'après avoir franchi le désert qui nous séparait du Turkestan, nos soldats, maîtres de Taschkent, se sont trouvés placés en face de l'armée de l'Emir de Boukhara.

La conduite de ce Chef n'a point tardé à provoquer un conflit, dont les conséquences, en dépassant les prévisions immédiates du Cabinet Impérial, ont conduit nos troupes à Samarkand, qui s'est soumis sans coup férir.

Dès l'origine de cette complication nous avions franchement signalé au Cabinet Anglais le danger auquel l'Emir s'exposerait infailliblement s'il se précipitait dans une lutte que nous n'avions rien fait pour provoquer.

Les explications données par notre Ambassadeur à Londres avaient satisfaites le Comte Clarendon, alors Principal Secrétaire d'Etat,* qui lui avait déclaré que les rapides progrès des troupes Russes n'avaient provoqués ni soupçon ni alarme de la part du Gouvernement Britannique, mais que ce sentiment de sécurité était loin d'être partagé par le public Anglais, ainsi que par celui des Indes ; que pour apaiser ce malaise, qui pourrait mettre en péril la bonne entente existant actuellement entre la Russie et l'Angleterre, il serait à souhaiter qu'entre les possessions Russes et Anglaises il restât un territoire neutre, destiné à éviter le choc que pourrait causer un contact immédiat entre les deux Grandes Puissances se rencontrant au centre de l'Asie.

Ces propositions du Comte Clarendon répondaient trop aux vues du Gouvernement Impérial pour n'être pas accueillies favorablement. En conséquence, ordre fut donné au Baron Brunnow d'entrer en pourparlers confidentiels sur ce sujet avec le Gouvernement Anglais.

Sur ces entrefaites, profitant du séjour du Chancelier de l'Empire à Baden-Baden, Lord Clarendon, qui se trouvait alors à Wiesbaden, lui avait demandé une entrevue, dans le but d'arriver, par un échange d'idées, au meilleur moyen à employer pour maintenir, entre la Russie et l'Angleterre, de bonnes relations, conformes à leurs intérêts mutuels dans l'Asie Centrale. La ville de Heidelberg fut désignée comme point de réunion.

Cette entrevue eut pour résultat un accord basé sus le maintien, entre la Russie et la Grande Bretagne, d'une zone intermédiaire, destinée à séparer leurs possessions en Asie.

Dans cet ordre d'idées il demeurait entendu que l'Afghânistan formerait un Etat indépendant, qui devrait rester en dehors de l'action de la Russie.

Nous avons, en même temps, insisté auprès du Gouvernement Britannique pour que la circonscription territoriale de l'Afghanistan fût déterminée dans les limites des Khanats de Hérat, de Kaboul et de Kandahar, actuellement possédés par l'Emir Shir-Ali-Khan.†

Lord Clarendon chercha plus tard à élargir ces limites dans le but de mieux préciser les confins de l'Afghanistan, jusqu'ici mal déterminés au nord par l'absence de frontières clairement indiquées.

* Dépêche du Comte Clarendon à Sir A. Buchanan, en date du 27 Mars, 1869.

† Lettre du Prince Gortchacow du $\frac{11}{23}$ Avril, 1869.

Afin de suppléer à ce manque de précision, Lord Clarendon avait exprimé le désir de convenir d'une ligne fictive, qui étendrait les frontières de l'Afghanistan jusqu'à la rive gauche de l'Oxus.

Ce tracé géographique ne se contentait pas de la neutralisation des vastes contrées auxquelles nous avions consenti à appliquer ce principe; il s'étendait notamment au delà du territoire de l'Afghanistan proprement dit, et dépassait de beaucoup les limites reconnues par nous.

En conséquence, ordre fut donné à notre Ambassadeur à Londres de décliner le projet proposé par Lord Clarendon.

Le Baron Brunnow eut soin de constater ce refus, en remettant entre les mains du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat un extrait de la lettre du $\frac{14}{26}$ Avril, 1869, par laquelle son Altesse le Prince Gortchacow avait énoncé ce refus.

Cette réponse négative mit fin aux explications confidentielles de notre Ambassadeur avec Lord Clarendon au sujet de la zone neutre.

Après avoir été définitivement close à Londres, cette question fut reprise à St. Pétersbourg en 1869, lors du séjour de Mr. Forsyth, fonctionnaire de l'Administration des Indes, autorisé par le Vice-Roi Lord Mayo à se rendre à St. Pétersbourg, en vue d'un échange d'idées sur les questions intéressant les deux Gouvernements.

Les considérations qui servirent de point de départ aux explications confidentielles de Mr. Forsyth avec le Cabinet Impérial se résument ainsi:—

1. Les deux Gouvernements étaient animés du même désir de prévenir, en tant que cela dépendrait d'eux, tous les sujets de malentendus qui pourraient surgir par suite du défaut d'organisation politique des Etats indépendants, connus dans la géographie sous les dénominations collectives d'Afganistan et de Turkestan libres.

2. Il demeurait entendu que s'il était arrivé jusqu'à ce jour à l'Angleterre et à la Russie d'entreprendre des expéditions militaires dans une ou l'autre partie de l'Asie Centrale, et d'adjoindre à leurs possessions de nouveaux territoires, cette conduite ne leur avait été dictée que par la force des circonstances locales et par une impossibilité absolue d'agir autrement.

3. Dans l'état actuel des choses, les frontières Russes et Anglaises en Asie Centrale ne pouvant pas être considérées comme immuables, un arrangement international sur ce point resterait sans effet; le meilleur expédient pour arriver à un résultat satisfaisant serait donc de se borner à arrêter, autant que faire se pourrait, des bases générales d'équilibre politique pour les pays qui séparent les possessions Russes et Anglaises en Asie.

En suite de quoi il fut convenu:—

1. Que l'on considérait les territoires actuellement en la possession effective de Shir-Ali-Khan comme formant les limites de l'Afghanistan.

2. Que cet Emir ne chercherait à exercer aucune influence ni aucune immixtion au delà de ces limites, et que le Gouvernement Anglais appliquerait tous ses soins à le détourner de toute tentative d'agression.

3. Que, de son côté, le Gouvernement Impérial emploierait toute son influence, afin d'empêcher l'Emir de Boukhara de porter aucune atteinte au territoire Afghan.

Ces principes reçurent la pleine adhésion du Cabinet de Londres et du Gouverneur-Général des Indes.

Au mois de Mai 1870, l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique à St. Pétersbourg remit au Gouvernement Impérial une dépêche de Lord Mayo, qui, se basant sur l'accord intervenu entre les deux Puissances, proposait de fixer, dès à présent, les limites des possessions de Shir-Ali-Khan, en prenant pour base les données recueillies à ce sujet par le Gouvernement des Indes.

La dépêche attribuait, toutefois, à ces données, une interprétation qui ne correspondait point entièrement au sens précis de l'entente survenue comme conséquence de l'échange d'idées entre les Cabinets de Londres et de St. Pétersbourg.

En effet, après avoir constaté que les possessions de Shir-Ali-Khan au nord et au nord-ouest *semblaient* coïncider *à-peu-près exactement* avec celles de son père, Lord Mayo arrivait à la conclusion que les limites du Royaume de Dost Mohammet pouvaient être en général adoptées *comme les limites destinées à séparer le Royaume de l'Afghanistan des autres Etats de l'Asie Centrale* au nord et au nord-ouest.

Or, à l'époque des pourparlers avec Mr. Forsyth en était convenu de s'en tenir aux territoires ayant jadis reconnu l'autorité de Dost Mohammed qui *se trouveraient encore aujourd'hui en la possession effective de Shir-Ali-Khan.*

Cette nuance importante marquait la différence qui séparait notre point de vue de celui de Lord Mayo.

Toutefois, avant de formuler une opinion définitive, le Gouvernement Impérial crut

nécessaire de réunir des données positives à l'égard de ces contrées lointaines et imparfaitement connues.

En conséquence, le Gouverneur-Général du Turkestan fut chargé de recueillir tous les renseignements qui pouvaient éclaircir la question et permettre au Gouvernement Impérial de se former une opinion pratique en pleine connaissance de cause.

La question qu'il s'agissait de résoudre avait deux aspects :—

1. Constater l'état actuel de possession effective de Shir-Ali-Khan.

2. Rechercher, en se basant sur ce *statu quo*, la meilleure délimitation à tracer afin de répondre au but des pourparlers entre le Gouvernement Impérial et celui de l'Angleterre ; c'est-à-dire d'écarter, dans la mesure du possible, les causes de conflits et d'empiétements mutuels entre les Khanats voisins, et, par conséquent, de garantir entre eux, autant que faire se pouvait, l'état de paix que de part et d'autre les deux Gouvernements devaient désormais s'attacher à faire respecter par tous les moyens d'influence en leur pouvoir.

Dans cet ordre d'idées il résultait des renseignements fournis par le Général Kaufmann :—

1. Qu'au nord l'Amou-Daria constitue en effet la frontière normale de l'Afghanistan, à partir de son confluent avec la Kouktcha, jusqu'au point de Khodja Saléh.

Sous ce rapport nos renseignements étaient d'accord avec l'opinion du Gouvernement Britannique.

2. Au nord-est les données de fait que nous avions recueillies assignaient le confluent de cette rivière avec le Kouktcha comme la limite des territoires sur lesquels Shir-Ali-Khan exerce une souveraineté effective incontestable. Au delà de cette limite et notamment à l'égard du Badakchan et du Vakhan, il avait été impossible de saisir les traces d'une semblable souveraineté ; l'ensemble des informations présentent au contraire de nombreux indices qui devaient faire envisager ces contrées comme indépendantes. Ainsi, dans tout ce pays on ne rencontre aucun des signes qui, en Asie, accompagnent l'exercice de la souveraineté ; c'est-à-dire, la présence d'officiers Afghans et d'employés pour collectionner l'impôt. En outre, les Chefs du Badakchan se sont considérés et ont été en tout temps considérés par leurs voisins comme des Chefs indépendants.

Pour ce qui est du Vakhan, ce pays était resté, du moins jusqu'à ce jour, encore plus en dehors de l'influence directe des Chefs de l'Afghanistan.

4. Quant aux limites à reconnaître à l'Afghanistan, du côté du nord-ouest, à partir de Khodja Saleh, nos informations signalaient également des doutes sur le fait de la possession effective par l'Emir de Caboul des villes d'Aktchi, Séripoul, Meimané, Chibirgan, et Ankhoï, que l'Angleterre proposait de faire entrer dans les limites reconnues de l'Afghanistan.

Cependant, tandis que ces questions étaient encore à l'étude, le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Etrangères reçut communication d'une nouvelle dépêche de Lord Granville qui maintenait l'opinion émise par Lord Mayo sur les points en discussion.

En réponse à cette communication, le Cabinet Impérial s'empressa de transmettre au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique les renseignements fournis par le Gouverneur-Général du Turkestan, avec les conclusions qui lui paraissaient en découler.*

Après avoir précisé les points sur lesquels l'opinion des deux Gouvernements divergeait, le Cabinet Impérial s'attachait principalement à maintenir le Badakchan et le Vakhan comme Etats indépendants et en dehors des frontières assignées à Shir-Ali-Khan.

Il insistait d'autant plus sur ce point, que dans l'état actuel des choses il n'existait pas de conflit entre le Badakchan et ses voisins. Le Boukhara n'avait aucune prétention sur ce pays Les deux Etats étaient d'ailleurs trop faibles, trop absorbés par leurs affaires intérieures pour se chercher querelles. L'Angleterre et la Russie n'auraient donc à s'employer que pour maintenir cet état de paix aussi bien entre ces Khanats qu'entre l'Afghanistan et le Badakchan. Il en serait tout autrement le jour où l'Emir de Caboul étendrait son autorité sur la Badakchan et le Vakhan. Il se trouverait en contact immédiat avec le Kashgar, le Kokand et le Boukhara, dont il était jusqu'ici séparé par ces deux pays ; et il serait dès lors bien plus difficile d'éviter des conflits provenant, soit de son ambition et du sentiment de sa force, soit de la jalousie de ses voisins.

Telles étaient les considérations qui avaient poussé le Gouvernement Impérial à maintenir son point de vue pour ce qui concernait le Vakhan et de Badakchan.

* Dépêche du Prince Gortchacow du 7 Décembre, 1872.

Quant aux limites de l'Afghanistan au nord-ouest, bien qu'il existât des doutes quant au fait de la possession par l'Emir de Caboul des villes d'Aktchi, Séripoul, Meimané, Chibirgan, et Ankhoï, le Cabinet Impérial déclarait qu'il était disposé à admettre leur annexion au territoire Afghan.

Malgré ces concessions importantes le Gouvernement Anglais ne crut pas pouvoir adhérer à la combinaison proposée par nous. Dans cet état de choses, ne voulant pas retarder plus longtemps le réglement de cette question, le Cabinet Impérial, dans sa dépêche du 19 Janvier, 1873, consentit à la réunion du Badakchan et du Vakhan au territoire Afghan et donna ainsi son adhésion pleine et entière à la line de démarcation proposée par la dépêche de Lord Granville en date du 17 Octobre, 1872 (voir Annexes 1 et 2).

Sur ces entrefaites l'expédition de Khiva fut décidée.

Des brigandages continuels, l'imposition de redevances aux Kirghises soumis à notre domination, des excitations à la révolte parmi ces nomades, la capture de nos sujets réduits à l'esclavage ; tels étaient les faits qui depuis bien des années réclamaient l'adoption de mesures décisives contre ce Khanat. Toutefois, on conservait encore l'espoir d'arriver par des voies pacifiques à l'établissement de relations plus régulières avec ces turbulents voisins.

Plus d'une fois nous avions fait parvenir au Khan des réclamations moderées mais elles étaient demeurées sans réponse ou bien elles avaient rencontré de sa part un refus arrogant.

Après l'insuccès de ces efforts réitérés une expédition fut décidée.

Quoique, d'après l'entente survenue entre le Gouvernement Impérial et celui de la Grande Bretagne relativement à l'établissement d'une zone neutre entre les possessions Anglaises et Russes, le Khanat de Khiva rentrât entièrement dans notre sphère d'action, nous crûmes devoir faire acte de courtoisie en n'adoptant aucune mesure décisive contre le Khiva avant d'en avoir informé l'Angleterre.

Le Gouvernement Impérial n'avait en aucune façon l'intention de conquérir et d'annexer aucune partie du territoire de Khiva. Son but était, d'abord, de châtier le Khan pour le passé ; ensuite, de créer un état de choses qui garantît nos sujets contre les incursions et les déprédations des Khiviens et des Turcomans, et rendit possible le développement des relations commerciales.

Des instructions formelles avaient été données en conséquence au Commandant-en-chef de l'expédition.

Ces considérations furent spontanément portées à la connaissance du Gouvernement Britannique par l'organe de M. l'Aide-de-camp Général Comte Schouvaloff, qui s'était rendu à Londres.

Toutefois, lorsque Khiva eut été occupé et qu'on fut à même de connaître les conditions de la vie intérieure du pays, on put se convaincre que, même avec la meilleure volonté de la part du Khan d'entretenir avec nous des relations de bon voisinage, la force à cet effet lui aurait fait défaut, car son influence sur les Turcomans était presque nulle et qu'il arrivait souvent que lui-même, ainsi que ses sujets, avaient à subir l'ascendant de ces brigands des steppes.

Ainsi, après le départ de notre corps expéditionnaire, les mêmes incursions auraient infailliblement recommencé ; le Gouvernement Impérial se serait vu obligé de renouveler une expédition onéreuse afin d'infliger un nouveau châtiment aux Turcomans, et, en pareil cas, il aurait été impossible de conserver l'existence autonome de Khiva.

C'est pourquoi il fut jugé indispensable de construire sur la rive droite de l'Amou-Daria un fort pourvu d'une garnison suffisante afin de protéger nos frontières contre les attaques des Turcomans. En outre, il était nécessaire d'assurer les communications du fort et de sa garnison avec le Turkestan.

Nous nous sommes vus, par conséquent, obligés de réunir à nos possessions le désert aride qui s'étend entre cette province et le fort nouvellement construit. Quelque stérile et onéreuse qu'ait été pour nous une pareille acquisition territoriale, elle était inévitable, vu que le Khan lui-même avait reconnu et déclaré qu'il ne serait en mesure de remplir ses obligations envers nous qu'à la condition absolue d'avoir à proximité un détachement et un corps de troupes Russes. Ses vœux étaient allés plus loin encore ; il avait instamment sollicité le maintien des troupes Russes dans la ville même de Khiva.

Tels ont été les résultats de l'expédition contre le Khiva ; ils nous étaient imposés par un état de choses impossible à prévoir et par des nécessités indépendants de notre volonté.

Nous avions tout lieu d'espérer que les explications franches de notre Ambassadeur à Londres effaceraient à cet égard les dernières appréhensions du Gouvernement de la Grande Bretagne.

Malheureusement nous dûmes bientôt nous convaincre du contraire.

Lors de la publication du Traité de Paix conclu entre le Général Kaufmann et le Khan de Khiva, Lord Granville. par sa dépêche en date du 7 Janvier, 1874, chargea l'Ambassadeur Britannique à St. Pétersbourg d'attirer l'attention du Gouvernement Impérial sur les dangers qui pouvaient résulter des progrès de la Russie dans l'Asie Centrale pour l'équilibre politique que l'entente des deux Gouvernements avait tâché d'établir dans ces contrées.

Après avoir constaté que le Gouvernement Britannique ne trouvait point pratique d'examiner trop minutieusement si les clauses du Traité de Paix conclu avec le Khiva étaient strictement conformes aux assurances que lui avait données le Comte Schouvaloff, Lord Granville signalait au Gouvernement Impérial les appréhensions soulevées dans l'Afghanistan par les rumeurs répandues d'une expédition Russe contre Merv et contre les tribus des Turcomans de ces parages.

Il prévoyait qu'en pareil cas il pourrait facilement advenir que les Turcomans se vissent forcés à se réfugier dans la province de Badaghees en Hérat, et que dès lors il était à craindre que cela ne conduisit les autorités Russes à demander à l'Emir soit d'empêcher les Turcomans de commettre des agressions, soit de permettre aux forces Russes d'entrer sur le territoire Afghan dans le but de punir les tribus hostiles.

En conséquence, il exprimait le ferme espoir que dans cette éventualité le Gouvernement Impérial prendrait en sérieuse considération les dangers qui résulteraient d'une pareille expédition et voudrait bien établir franchement, et une fois pour toutes, que l'indépendance de l'Afghanistan est considérée comme une condition de haute importance pour le bien-être et la sécurité des Indes Anglaises et la tranquillité de l'Asie.

Quel que fut le vif désir du Cabinet Impérial d'aller au devant d'un vœu du Gouvernement Britannique, qui répondait à ses propres intentions, il lui était impossible de déférer entièrement à ces représentations amicales. Elles ne semblaient point s'accorder entièrement avec l'esprit de l'entente établie précédemment entre les deux Cabinets. En effet elles tendaient, d'un côté, à restreindre la sphère d'action que nous concédait le programme tracé d'un commun accord entre les deux Cabinets, puisque Merv se trouve bien au delà des frontières reconnues à l'Afghanistan; et, d'un autre côté, à diminuer la valeur des engagements découlant pour le Gouvernement Anglais du même accord, aux termes duquel l'Angleterrre s'obligeait à user de toute son influence auprès de Shir-Ali-Khan, afin de l'amener à conserver une attitude pacifique.

Dans sa dépêche responsive en date du 21 Janvier, 1874, son Altesse le Prince Gortchacow réitéra l'assurance positive que le Gouvernement Impérial persistait à considérer l'Afghanistan comme entièrement en dehors de sa sphère d'action. Il ajouta que, si de part et d'autre les deux Gouvernements employaient leur ascendant sur les Etats placés dans le rayon de leur influence naturelle afin de les détourner de toute agression, il y avait tout lieu d'espérer qu'aucune collision ne viendrait troubler le repos de l'Asie Centrale. Quant au danger qui, selon l'opinion de Lord Granville, pourrait résulter d'une expédition contre les Turcomans, le Prince Chancelier déclara que nous n'avions aucune intention d'entreprendre des mesures militaires contre ces tribus ; qu'il dépendait entièrement d'elles de vivre en bonne intelligence avec nous, mais que, si elles se livraient à des actes d'agression et de brigandage contre nous, force nous serait de les châtier. Dans ce cas, quoique l'éventualité signalée par Shir-Ali-Khan fût peu probable, l'Emir de Kaboul pourrait contribuer à en éloigner la possibilité, en faisant nettement comprendre d'avance aux Turcomans que s'ils provoquaient des mesures de rigueur par des actes de déprédation contre nous, ils ne devaient compter sur aucune assistance de sa part.

Cette dépêche clôt la série des communications échangées entre les deux Gouvernements sur les affaires de l'Asie Centrale.

Il résulte de la lecture de ces pièces diplomatiques que le malentendu qui semble exister entre le Gouvernement Britannique et nous n'a aucune raison d'être.

Le Cabinet de Londres semble déduire de ce que nous lui avons à plusieurs reprises communiqué spontanément et amicalement nos vues sur l'Asie Centrale, et en particulier notre ferme intention de ne point y poursuivre une politique de conquêtes et d'annexions, la conviction que nous aurions contracté envers lui des engagements précis sous ce rapport.

De ce que les événements nous ont forcés, malgré nous, à nous écarter de ce programme dans une certaine limite, il semble conclure que le Cabinet Impérial aurait manqué à des promesses formelles.

Enfin, des progrès successifs que nous avons dû faire dans ces contrées, il infère que l'Angleterre a le droit et le devoir de prendre de son côté des mesures pour restreindre notre action, paralyser notre influence, et se garantir contre des agressions éventuelles.

Ces conclusions ne semblent pas conformes à la réalité des choses, ainsi qu'à l'esprit et à la lettre des Conventions établies entre les deux Gouvernements.

Il est toujours resté entendu que, de part et d'autre, ils conservaient entièrement leur liberté d'action et d'appréciation quant aux mesures nécéssitées par leur propre sécurité.

Dès l'année 1864, lorsque nous avons donné par notre première circulaire l'assurance de notre ferme intention de ne pas étendre nos possessions en Asie au delà du strict nécessaire, nous avons clairement et loyalement indiqué les éventualités auxquelles l'état précaire de ces contrées pourrait nous mettre dans le cas de pourvoir.

Ces nécessités avaient été si bien appréciées par Lord Clarendon qu'en prenant acte de nos assurances spontanées, il nous répondit que le Cabinet Britannique connaissait par sa propre expérience aux Indes l'impossibilité pour un Gouvernement, appelé à établir sa domination sur des contrées barbares, de fixer les limites auxquelles il pourrait s'arrêter.

Les mêmes principes ont présidé à nos pourparlers avec Mr. Forsyth. Il a été reconnu notamment, *que dans l'état actuel des choses, les frontières Russes et Anglaises en Asie Centrale ne pouvant pas être considérées comme immuables, un arrangement international sur ce point resterait sans effet.*

Mais, à côté de cette latitude, réservée aux deux Gouverements dans un esprit de sagesse pratique, les points suivants ont été établis d'un commun accord :—

1. Qu'un antagonisme entre eux dans ces contrées serait contraire à leurs intérêts mutuels et à la mission civilisatrice à laquelle ils sont appelés chacun dans la sphère de son influence naturelle ; qu'ils auraient tout avantage à se prêter un mutuel concours afin de maintenir un état de paix entre les Khans de l'Asie Centrale et de ne point permettre que les intrigues de ces Khans mettent en conflit les intérêts de deux grands Empires.

2. Qu'à cet effet il était désirable de conserver entre eux une zone intermédiaire, qui les préservât d'un contact immédiat.

3. Que l'Afghanistan constituerait cette zone intermédiaire, si son indépendance était mise de part et d'autre à l'abri de toute atteinte.

4. Que les limites de cet Etat seraient reconnues d'après le tracé convenu à la suite d'une longue négociation.

5. Que les deux Gouvernements s'emploieraient réciproquement dans leurs sphères d'influence, l'Angleterre sur l'Emir Afghan, la Russie sur les Khans de Boukhara et de Khokand, pour prévenir toute agression de la part de l'un de ces Chefs contre l'indépendance et la sécurité de l'autre.

Telles ont été les bases précises de l'accord établi entre les deux Gouvernements.

Le Gouvernement Impérial n'a pas cessé pour sa part de les avoir en vue et d'y conformer ses actes.

Malgré les termes même de cet accord, qui nous laisse pleine liberté d'action sur toute la portion de territoire située entre nos frontières et celles de l'Afganistan, le Khokand conserve son autonomie et doit un accroissement considérable de sa prospérité aux bonnes relations qu'il entretient avec nous. Il en aurait été de même du Boukhara, si l'Emir ne s'était pas laissé entraîner à des actes agressifs. La nécessité de le contenir et le vœu de la population ont été les principales raisons qui nous ont obligé de garder Samarkand.

Mais nous lui avons restitué la ville de Karchi et le Khanat de Schahrissiabs. Quant au Khiva, après l'avoir châtié et mis fin à ses actes de brigandage, nous lui avons cependant gardé son autonomie. Pour ce qui concerne l'Afghanistan, nous avons employé avec succès notre influence sur l'Emir de Boukhara, afin de le dissuader de toute agression contre le territoire Afghan, et nous avons refusé de donner suite aux desseins d'Abdul Rahman Khan, neveu de l'Emir de l'Afghanistan, contre le repos cette contrée.

L'efficacité de notre action, sous ce rapport, a été reconnue par le Gouvernement Britannique.

Le Cabinet Impérial est persuadé qui si, de part et d'autre, les deux Gouvernements continuent à marcher dans cette voie, le but auquel ils travaillent d'un commun accord sera efficacement atteint ; le repos de l'Asie Centrale sera mis autant que possible à l'abri des vicissitudes que l'état sauvage de ces contrées doit faire appréhendre ; non-seulement tout contact immédiat et tout choc entre eux sera écarté, mais encore la conviction de leur ferme et loyal accord, éloignant de l'esprit des Khans Asiates l'idée d'un antagonisme sur lequel ils puissent spéculer, préviendraient les causes de troubles et de conflits ; ils pourraient aussi, en pleine sécurité, poursuivre chacun dans sa sphère naturelle, leur mission civilisatrice et le développement de leurs mutuels intérêts.

Le Cabinet Impérial sera toujours disposé à y consacrer ses efforts.

(Translation.)

SOME years ago Russia found herself compelled to take military measures in order to establish order and tranquillity in the Kirghese Steppes. These measures eventually entailed upon her the necessity of making considerable territorial acquisitions. From that time forth the English public has attributed to us plans of conquest directed against England, and threatening the tranquillity of the British possessions in India.

These erroneous commentaries on the objects of our policy in Central Asia were capable of producing causes of disturbance in our friendly relations with England, which the Imperial Cabinet were anxious to avoid.

It was with this object that they addressed to our Legations abroad the Circular of the 31st November, 1864.

This document was of a purely confidential character. It was only published in 1865, after the British Government had become acquainted with it through one of their foreign Legations. This fact, and the precise nature of our declarations, excluded the possibility of any interpretation implying an engagement contracted by Russia towards Europe or with any individual Power. The views of the Imperial Government were clearly expressed; they were summed up in a statement of the principles which had hitherto guided our policy in Central Asia, and in a spontaneous declaration of the ultimate object which the orders of His Majesty the Emperor had traced for the action of his Cabinet in those countries.

While stating the motives which had determined us not to overstep the line drawn from Tchemkent to Issiz-Koul, the Circular pointed out, at the same time, as a basis of the whole system, the necessity of definitively fixing our frontiers at the precise spot where the fixed populations begin, those populations affording the elements of a durable social organization with which it would be possible for us to establish regular relations.

It was necessary to create and develop those relations, on the one hand, by civilizing, through the means of colonization, the nomad tribes comprised in the new line of our frontiers, and on the other hand, by attracting, through the security of commercial intercourse and by reciprocal advantages, the populations of Khokand, with which this new line brought us in contact, and to arrive at the establishment of commercial and peaceful relations. Such was the two-fold object to which, from this moment, all our efforts were directed.

Unhappily the continually recurring difficulties, which result from the contact of a regularly constituted Power with semi-savage neighbours, soon compelled us to overstep the limits which we had voluntarily assigned to ourselves.

Forced to defend ourselves against the continual aggressions of these neighbouring hordes, and to chastise an enemy whose social organization placed him beyond our reach, we soon became convinced that, in order to consolidate our new territorial acquisitions, we must, in the first place, establish, beyond our frontiers, the tranquillity which was indispensable to our security.

The cause of this instability lay, firstly, in the neighbourhood of tribes whose nomad and turbulent habits paralyzed all colonization and all commerce by means of caravans; and, secondly, in the perpetual changes in the political condition of these countries, where Tashkend and Khokand, sometimes united, sometimes separated, always at war, either among themselves or with Bokhara, afforded no possibility of fixed relations, nor of any regular intercourse.

The Imperial Government, therefore, found themselves, against their will, placed in the alternative of either allowing a state of permanent disorder to reign, which paralyzed all security and all progress, or of endeavouring to subject by force of arms the small independent States whose predatory disposition and perpetual dissensions allow their neighbours neither respite or repose.

Thus it happened that after traversing the desert which separated us from Turkestan, our troops, in possession of Tashkend, found themselves in face of the army of the Ameer of Bokhara.

The conduct of this Chief soon provoked a conflict, the results of which went beyond the immediate expectations of the Imperial Cabinet, and brought our troops to Samarcand, which submitted without a blow.

At the commencement of this complication we frankly pointed out to the English Cabinet the danger to which the Ameer would infallibly expose himself, if he engaged in a struggle which we had done nothing to provoke.

The explanations furnished by our Ambassador in London satisfied Lord Clarendon,

then Principal Secretary of State,* who stated to him that the rapid progress of the Russian troops had neither given rise to suspicion nor alarm on the part of the British Government, but that the English public, as well as that of India, was far from sharing this feeling of security; that, to calm this feeling of uneasiness, which might imperil the good understanding at the time existing between Russia and England, it would be desirable that there should remain a neutral territory between the Russian and English possessions, destined to avert the shock which might be caused by the immediate contact of the two Great Powers meeting in the centre of Asia.

These proposals of Lord Clarendon were in such complete correspondence with the views of the Imperial Government as to insure them a favourable reception. Baron Brunnow received orders in consequence to enter into confidential negotiations on this subject with the English Government.

Meanwhile, Lord Clarendon, who was then at Wiesbaden, took advantage of the residence of the Chancellor of the Empire at Baden-Baden to request an interview, with the object of ascertaining, by an interchange of ideas, the means best adapted for the maintenance, between Russia and England, of good relations, consistent with their mutual interests in Central Asia. The town of Heidelberg was selected for the meeting.

The result of this interview was an agreement based on the maintenance, between Russia and Great Britain, of an intermediate zone, destined to separate their possessions in Asia.

In pursuance of this idea it was agreed that Afghanistan should form an independent State, which should remain outside of the sphere of Russian action.

We, at the same time, maintained, in our negotiations with the British Government, that the territorial extent of Afghanistan should be fixed by the boundaries of the Khanates of Herat, Cabul, and Candahar, at that time in the possession of the Ameer Shere Ali Khan.†

Lord Clarendon endeavoured subsequently to extend those boundaries, with the object of more accurately specifying the borders of Afghanistan, which were up to that time ill-defined on the north owing to the absence of clearly indicated frontiers.

To supplement this want of accuracy, Lord Clarendon expressed a wish to agree on a fictitious line, which should extend the frontiers of Afghanistan up to the left bank of the Oxus.

This geographical line did not admit as sufficient the neutralization of the large tracts to which we had consented to apply that principle; it extended considerably beyond the territory of Afghanistan properly so-called, and much exceeded the limits recognized by us.

Our Ambassador in London consequently received instructions to decline the project proposed by Lord Clarendon.

Baron Brunnow was careful to put this refusal on record, by placing in the hands of the Principal Secretary of State an extract from the letter of the $\frac{14}{26}$th April, 1869, in which such refusal had been notified by his Highness Prince Gortchakow.

His reply in the negative terminated the confidential explanations between our Ambassador and Lord Clarendon on the subject of the neutral zone.

After having been definitively closed in London, this question was reopened at St. Petersburgh in 1869, on the occasion of the visit of Mr. Forsyth, an officer of the Indian Administration, authorized by the Viceroy, Lord Mayo, to proceed to St. Petersburgh, with a view to an interchange of ideas on the questions of mutual interest to the two Governments.

The considerations on which the confidential explanations of Mr. Forsyth with the Imperial Government were based may be thus summed up:—

1. The two Governments were animated by the same desire to prevent, as far as depended on them, all subjects of misunderstanding which might arise in consequence of the absence of political organization in the independent States known in geography under the collective denominations of independent Afghanistan and Turkestan.

2. It was understood that if it had occurred to England or Russia, up to that date, to undertake military expeditions in this or that part of Central Asia, and to annex new territories to their possessions, such conduct had only been imposed on them by the force of local circumstances, and by an absolute impossibility of acting otherwise.

3. As, in the present state of affairs, the Russian and English frontiers in Central Asia could not be regarded as incapable of alteration, an international arrangement on that point would be ineffectual; the best means, therefore, of arriving at a satisfactory

* Despatch of the Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan, March 27, 1869.

† Letter of Prince Gortchakow of the $\frac{14}{26}$th April, 1869.

result was simply to settle, as far as was possible, the general bases for a balance of power as regards the countries separating the Russian and English possessions in Asia.

It was agreed in consequence:—

1. That the territories at that time in the actual possession of Shere Ali Khan should be considered as forming the limits of Afghanistan.

2. That the Ameer should not endeavour to exercise any influence or any interference beyond those limits, and that the English Government should take every care to dissuade him from any attempt at aggression.

3. That, on their side, the Imperial Government should employ all their influence to prevent the Ameer of Bokhara from making any attack on Afghan territory.

These principles met with the entire concurrence of the Cabinet of London and of the Governor-General of India.

In the month of May 1870, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh communicated to the Imperial Government a despatch from Lord Mayo, who, in view of the agreement arrived at between the two Powers, proposed to fix from henceforth the limits of the possessions of Shere Ali Khan upon the basis of the information collected on this subject by the Government of India.

The despatch, however, gave an interpretation to this information which did not entirely correspond with the precise sense of the understanding arrived at from the interchange of views between the Cabinets of London and St. Petersburgh.

In fact, after stating that the possessions of Shere Ali Khan on the north and north-west *appeared* to coincide *almost exactly* with those of his father, Lord Mayo came to the conclusion that the limits of the Kingdom of Dost Mohammed might be generally taken *as the boundary which should divide the Kingdom of Afghanistan from the other States of Central Asia* to the north and north-west.

Now, at the date of the negotiations with Mr. Forsyth it was agreed to keep to the territories which, having formerly recognized the authority of Dost Mohammed, *were still at that time in the actual possession of Shere Ali Khan.*

This important distinction marked the difference between our views and those of Lord Mayo.

Before, however, expressing any definite opinion, the Imperial Government thought it necessary to collect positive information on the subject of these distant and imperfectly-known countries.

The Governor-General of Turkestan was therefore charged to collect all the information calculated to throw light on the matter and to enable the Imperial Government to form a practical opinion with a full knowledge of the subject.

The question which had to be decided had two sides. It was expedient:—

1. To establish the existing state of the actual possessions of Shere Ali Khan.

2. To ascertain, on the basis of this *status quo*, the frontier best fitted to answer the object of the negotiations between the Imperial Government and that of England; that is to say, to avoid, within the limits of possibility, any causes of conflicts and mutual aggressions between the neighbouring Khanates, and, consequently, to guarantee, so far as was practicable, that state of peace between them, which the two Governments were on either side to endeavour henceforth to cause to be respected by all the means of influence in their power.

In regard to these considerations, the result of the information furnished by General Kaufmann was to the following effect:—

1. On the north the Amou-Daria constitutes really the normal frontier of Afghanistan, starting from its confluence with the Kouktcha, as far as Khodja Saléh.

On this point our information agreed with the opinion of the British Government.

2. On the north-east the information we had collected assigned the confluence of this river with the Kouktcha as the limit of the territories over which Shere Ali Khan exercised an undoubted and actual sovereignty. Beyond that limit, and especially as regards Badakshan and Vakhan, it was impossible to discover the trace of such a sovereignty; on the contrary, the information, taken as a whole, affords numerous indications that these countries should be regarded as independent. For instance, throughout the whole of this country one meets with none of those signs which in Asia accompany the exercise of sovereignty, that is to say, the presence of Afghan officers and functionaries to collect taxes. Further, the Chiefs of Badakshan have both considered themselves and been always regarded by their neighbours as independent Chiefs.

3. As regards Vakhan, this country had remained, at least up to that date, still more beyond the direct influence of the Chiefs of Afghanistan.

4. With respect to the frontier to be assigned to Afghanistan on the north-west, starting from Khodja Saleh, our information suggested similar doubts as to the effectual

possession, by the Ameer of Cabul, of the towns of Aktchi, Seripoul, Meimané, Chibirgan, and Ankhoi, which England proposed to include in the recognized limits of Afghanistan.

While these questions, however, were still under consideration, the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs received a communication of a fresh despatch from Lord Granville, supporting the opinion put forward by Lord Mayo on the points in dispute.

In reply to this communication, the Imperial Cabinet lost no time in forwarding to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty the information supplied by the Governor-General of Turkestan, together with the conclusions which seemed to them to result therefrom.*

After defining the points upon which the views of the two Governments differed, the Imperial Cabinet laid principal stress upon the maintenance of Badakshan and Vakhan as independent States, outside of the frontiers assigned to Shere Ali Khan.

They pressed this point all the more strongly, inasmuch as in the actual state of affairs at that moment there was no conflict between Badakshan and its neighbours. Bokhara laid no claim to that country. The two States, moreover, were too weak, and too much absorbed in their internal affairs, to pick quarrels with each other. All, therefore, that remained for England and Russia was to endeavour to maintain this state of peace among the Khanates, as well as between Afghanistan and Badakshan. Matters would be entirely changed the moment the Ameer of Cabul extended his authority over Badakshan and Vakhan. He would find himself in immediate contact with Kashgar, Khokand, and Bokhara, from which he had hitherto been separated by those two countries: and thenceforward it would be far more difficult to avoid collisions, arising either from his ambition and the consciousness of his own strength, or from the jealousy of his neighbours.

Such were the considerations which had induced the Imperial Government to maintain its position in regard to Vakhan and Badakshan.

As regards the boundaries of Afghanistan to the north-east, although doubts existed as to the possession by the Ameer of Cabul of the towns of Aktchi, Seripoul, Meimane, Chibirgan, and Ankhoi, the Imperial Cabinet declared that they were disposed to admit their annexation to the Afghan territory.

Notwithstanding these important concessions, the British Government declared themselves unable to consent to the combination suggested by us. Under these circumstances the Imperial Cabinet, anxious not to defer further the settlement of the question, consented, in their despatch of the 19th January, 1873, to the incorporation of Badakshan and Vakhan in the Afghan territory, and thereby gave their full and entire consent to the line of demarcation proposed in Lord Granville's despatch of the 17th October, 1872. (See Annexes 1 and 2.)

Meanwhile the Khiva expedition was decided upon.

Continual acts of brigandage, exactions imposed upon the Khirghese under our dominion, instigations to the nomad tribes to revolt, and the capture and enslavement of our subjects; such were the acts which had for several years called for the adoption of decisive measures against this Khanate. We still hoped, however, to arrive by peaceful means at the establishment of more regular relations with these unruly neighbours.

More than once we had addressed temperate remonstrances to the Khan, but they had either remained unanswered or had been met by a haughty refusal on his part.

After the failure of these repeated efforts an expedition was decided upon.

Although, according to the understanding come to between the Imperial Government and that of Great Britain, relative to the establishment of a neutral zone between the British and Russian possessions, the Khanate of Khiva fell completely within our sphere of action, we thought it right, as a matter of courtesy, to take no decisive step against Khiva without informing the English Government.

The Imperial Government had no intention whatever of conquering and annexing any portion of the territory of Khiva. Their object was, first, to chastise the Khan for the past, and then to establish a state of affairs which would secure our subjects against the incursions and depredations of the Khivans and Turkomans, and render possible the development of commercial relations.

Formal instructions were consequently given to the Commander-in-Chief of the expedition.

These considerations were spontaneously communicated to the British Government by Aide-de-camp General Count Schouvaloff, who had proceeded to London.

After the occupation of Khiva, however, and when we were in a position to understand the internal condition of the country, we were convinced that, even with the best intentions on the Khan's part to maintain with us relations of good neighbourhood, he would not have had the power to do so, since his influence with the Turkomans was almost null, and it not

* Despatch of Prince Gortchakow of the 7th December, 1872.

unfrequently happened that he himself, no less than his subjects, had to submit to the ascendancy of these brigands of the steppes.

Thus, after the departure of our expeditionary force, the same incursions would infallibly have been renewed; the Imperial Government would have been obliged to undertake once more an arduous expedition, for the purpose of inflicting fresh chastisement upon the Turkomans, and, in that case, it would have been impossible to preserve the autonomous existence of Khiva.

It was therefore considered indispensable to construct on the right bank of the Amou-Daria a fort provided with a sufficient garrison to protect our frontier against the attacks of the Turkomans. And further, it was necessary to secure the communications of the fort and its garrison with Turkestan.

We found ourselves, in consequence, compelled to annex to our possessions the arid desert stretching between that province and the newly-constructed fort. However barren and onerous such an acquisition of territory was to us, it was quite inevitable, seeing that the Khan himself had recognized and declared his inability to fulfil his engagements towards us, except upon the distinct condition that he should have a detachment and corps of Russian troops in his proximity. His wishes went even further; he had pressed strongly for the maintenance of Russian troops in the town itself of Khiva.

Such were the results of the expedition against Khiva; they were forced upon us by a state of things impossible to foresee, and by necessities independent of our own wishes.

We had every reason to hope that the frank explanations of our Ambassador in London would remove what apprehensions were still entertained by the British Government on this head. Unfortunately, we were soon convinced to the contrary.

On the publication of the Treaty of Peace concluded between General Kaufmann and the Khan of Khiva, Lord Granville, in his despatch dated the 7th January, 1874, instructed the British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to call the attention of the Imperial Government to the dangers that might result from the progress of Russia in Central Asia to the balance of power which it had been endeavoured to establish in those countries by the understanding between the two Governments.

After stating that the British Government saw no practical advantage in examining too minutely whether the clauses of the Treaty of Peace signed at Khiva were in strict accordance with the assurances given to him by Count Schouvaloff, Lord Granville proceeded to point out to the Imperial Government the apprehensions caused in Afghanistan by the rumours which had been circulated of a Russian expedition against Merv and the Turkoman tribes of those regions.

He foresaw that in such a case it might easily happen that the Turkomans should find themselves obliged to retire into the Province of Badaghees, in Herat, and that there would then be reason to fear that the Russians might be induced thereby to call upon the Ameer, either to prevent the Turkomans from committing aggressions, or to permit the Russian forces to enter the territory of Afghanistan for the purpose of punishing the hostile tribes.

He expressed, in consequence, his earnest hope that, in this eventuality the Imperial Government would take into serious consideration the dangers which would result from such an expedition, and he thought it right to state frankly, once for all, that the independence of Afghanistan was considered a matter of great importance for the welfare and security of British India and the tranquillity of Asia.

However much the Imperial Cabinet might desire to anticipate the wishes of the British Government, which were in accordance with their own intentions, it was impossible to defer entirely to these friendly representations. They did not seem to be in complete harmony with the spirit of the understanding previously come to between the two Cabinets.

In fact, on the one hand they tended to restrict the sphere of action conceded to us by the programme traced conjointly by the two Cabinets, inasmuch as Merv is far beyond the frontiers recognized as belonging to Afghanistan; and, on the other hand, they tended to detract from the value of the engagements on the part of England resulting from the same understanding, whereby she pledged herself to use all her influence with Shere Ali Khan, in order to induce him to observe a pacific attitude.

In his despatch in reply of the 21st January, 1874, his Highness Prince Gortchakow reiterated his positive assurance that the Imperial Government persisted in considering Afghanistan as entirely outside of its sphere of action. He added that if the two Governments employed on either side their ascendancy over the States lying within the sphere of their natural influence, with a view to dissuade them from aggression of any kind, there was every reason to hope that no collision would occur to trouble the repose of Central Asia.

As regarded the danger which, in Lord Granville's opinion, might result from an expedition against the Turkomans, the Prince Chancellor declared that we had no intention of undertaking military measures against these tribes; that it depended entirely upon themselves whether they lived on good terms with us, but that, if they gave way to acts of aggression and brigandage against us, we should be compelled to punish them.

In such a case, although the eventuality suggested by Shere Ali Khan was little probable, the Ameer of Cabul might aid in averting the possibility of its occurrence, by making the Turkomans plainly understand beforehand that if they provoked rigorous measures by acts of depredation committed against us, they could count on no assistance from him.

This despatch closes the series of communications exchanged between the two Governments on the affairs of Central Asia.

It is evident from a perusal of this diplomatic correspondence that the misunderstanding apparently existing between the British Government and ourselves is quite groundless.

The Cabinet of London appears to derive, from the fact of our having on several occasions spontaneously and amicably communicated to them our views with respect to Central Asia, and particularly our firm resolve not to pursue a policy of conquest or annexation, a conviction that we have contracted definite engagements towards them in regard to this matter.

Owing to the fact that events have forced us, against our will, to depart, to a certain extent, from our programme, they seem to conclude that the Imperial Cabinet have failed to observe their formal promises.

Lastly, in view of the successive steps which we have been forced to take in these countries, they infer that it is the right and the duty of England to take on her side measures to restrain our action, to paralyze our influence, and to secure herself against eventual aggression.

These conclusions do not seem to be in accordance with the real state of affairs, nor, indeed, with the spirit or the letter of the Conventions established between the two Governments.

It has always been understood that either party retained entire liberty of action and of judgment with respect to measures necessitated for its own security.

Since the year 1864, when, by our first Circular, we gave the assurance of our firm intention not to extend our Asiatic possessions beyond the limits of strict necessity, we have clearly and loyally pointed out the eventualities for which we might be compelled to provide in view of the precarious condition of those countries.

Those necessities were so well understood by Lord Clarendon that, in taking note of our spontaneous assurances, he replied that the British Cabinet knew by their own experience in India how impossible it was for a Government called upon to establish its Empire over uncivilized countries to fix the limits at which it would be able to stop.

The same principles guided us in our discussions with Mr. Forsyth. It was especially recognized *that in the present state of affairs, it being impossible to consider the Russian and English frontiers in Central Asia as incapable of alteration, an international arrangement on that point would be ineffectual.* But, side by side with this latitude, reserved to both Governments in a spirit of practical wisdom, the following points have been established by common consent:—

1. That an antagonism between them in these countries would be contrary to their mutual interests, and to the mission of civilization to which they have been called, each in the sphere of its own natural influence; that it would be highly advantageous to afford to each other mutual support, in order to maintain a state of peace between the Khans of Central Asia, and not to permit the intrigues of those Khans to bring the interests of two great Empires into collision.

2. That for this purpose it was desirable to preserve an intermediate zone between them, which should secure them from immediate contact.

3. That Afghanistan should constitute this intermediate zone, if its independence were secured on either side from all encroachment.

4. That the limits of that State should be recognized in accordance with the line agreed upon after a long negotiation.

5. That the two Governments, in their respective spheres of influence, England with the Ameer of Afghanistan, and Russia with the Khans of Bokhara and Khokand, should employ themselves reciprocally in preventing all aggression on the part of any one of these Chiefs against the independence and security of the other.

Such were the definite bases of the understanding established between the two Governments.

The Imperial Government have, for their part, never ceased to keep them in view, and to conform their policy to them.

Notwithstanding the actual terms of this understanding, which leaves us complete liberty of action over the territory situated between our frontiers and those of Afghanistan, Khokand preserves its autonomy, and owes no inconsiderable increase in its prosperity to the good relations it maintains with us. It would have been the same with Bokhara had the Ameer restrained himself from acts of aggression. The necessity of holding him in check, and the wishes of the population, have been the principal reasons which have compelled us to retain Samarcand.

But we have restored to him the town of Karchi, and the Khanate of Schahrissiabs. As to Khiva, after having punished and put an end to its brigandage, we still preserved for it its autonomy. With respect to Afghanistan, we have employed with success our influence over the Ameer of Bokhara, to dissuade him from aggression of any kind against Afghan territory; and we have refused to promote the designs of Abdul Rahman Khan, nephew of the Ameer of Afghanistan, against the tranquillity of that country.

The efficacy of our action in this matter has been acknowledged by the British Government.

The Imperial Cabinet is persuaded that if the two Governments continue respectively to pursue this course of policy, the object for which they are working by joint agreement will be effectually attained; the peace of Central Asia will be secured as far as possible from the vicissitudes which must be apprehended from the uncivilized condition of those countries; not only will all immediate contact and collision between them be avoided, but the conviction of their firm and loyal agreement will dispel from the minds of the Khans of Asia any idea of an antagonism upon which they might speculate, and will thus prevent all causes of trouble and conflict; they may thus, in perfect security, follow up, each in their own natural sphere, their mission of civilization, and the development of their mutual interests.

The Imperial Cabinet will be always ready to devote their efforts towards this object.

No. 30.

Mr. Lister to Sir L. Mallet.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 26, 1875.

I AM directed by the Earl of Derby to transmit to you, to be laid before the Marquis of Salisbury in Council, a copy of a despatch addressed by Prince Gortchakow to the Russian Ambassador in London, and which has been communicated to his Lordship by Count Schouvaloff.*

This despatch incloses a Memorandum drawn up by the Russian Government, reviewing all the correspondence which has passed between the two Governments since the date of the Russian Circular of the 31st November, 1864, and records the determination of the Russian Government not to extend the frontier of their possessions in Central Asia beyond their present limits, either on the side of Bokhara or on that of Krasnovodsk and the Attrek.

Stringent orders are said to have been given by the Emperor of Russia to the military authorities in Central Asia to conform to this decision.

Lord Derby would be glad to be furnished with any observations which Lord Salisbury may have to offer on this Memorandum, and especially on the point whether the boundaries of Afghanistan, as laid down in this Memorandum, are accurately defined; and I am to draw your attention to paragraph 3 in the summary, in which Afghanistan is spoken of as an intermediary zone, whose independence should be respected by both parties, as well as to that passage which follows the summary, stating that full liberty of action remains to Russia over the country intervening between the Russian possessions and Afghanistan.

Lord Derby proposes to instruct Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to express to the Russian Government the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the friendly communication of this Memorandum, but to be careful not to compromise Her Majesty's Government to any endorsement of the statements in it. Before doing so, however, his Lordship will await Lord Salisbury's observations.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. V. LISTER.

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* No. 29.

No. 31.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May* 31.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May* 20, 1875.

I HAVE the honour to inclose an article, in translation, by Mr. J. Michell, from the "Moscow Gazette" of the $\frac{1st}{13th}$ instant.

This article, after referring to and giving some details of the Khan of Khiva's visit to the Turkoman tribes in the vicinity of his capital, states that General Llamakin had returned on the $\frac{14th}{26th}$ February to Krasnovodsk from a visit to Tiflis, and that, with the approval of the Grand Duke Michael, he was about to undertake a military expedition in the direction of the Attrek, proceeding to the point chosen for a fort at Daz-Ulam ferry, where his detachment will be joined by a battalion of the Daghestan regiment, with six guns, which will be transported from Baku by barges of the Caspian flotilla.

I may here observe to your Lordship that this intelligence dates back as far as February last.

This article further states, on the authority of General Llamakin's Report, that the Ahhal Tékés had sent in their submission to Russia, and had promised to fulfil all Russian demands, having returned ninety of the Yomouds who had been taken prisoners in the attack of a village near Krasnovodsk.

Many of the elders of the Tékés had arrived at Krasnovodsk, and had received presents by order of the Grand Duke Michael.

I have also the honour to annex an article in French translation from the "Invalide Russe," on the impression produced by the last expedition of Colonel Ivanoff on the left bank of the Oxus, and by the visit of the Khan of Khiva to the Turkoman tribes.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 31.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of May $\frac{1}{13}$, 1875.

ON écrit de la section militaire de l'Amou-Daria à "l'Invalide Russe:—

L'impression produite par la dernière expédition de nos troupes sur la rive guache de l'Amou exerce une influence très-sensible sur la tournée que le Khan de Khiva a entreprise dans les localités occupées par les Turcomans et a produit un changement remarquable dans le caractère des relations des tribus Turcomanes avec leur souverain légitime, Seïd-Mohamed-Rakhim-Khan. Autre fois le Khan n'aurait pas osé paraître au milieu de ses sujets Turcomans en général, et des Iomoudes riverians du canal de Hasavat en particulier. A l'heure qu'il est, le Khan, sans avoir fait aucune concession aux Turcomans, parcourt librement leurs terres, et se voit reçu partout par les populations, dont les anciens et les Chefs se mettent à sa suite; il exerce parmi eux ses droits de grand justicier et les frappe d'impôts dont le chiffre n'a été égalé par aucun de ses prédécesseurs.

"Outre des informations indirectes reçues par le Colonel Ivanow sur le voyage du Khan, il a reçu du Khan lui-même une lettre datée d'Ismamout-Ata (centre des campements des Iomoudes du Hasavat) où Seïd-Mahomed-Rakhim a passé deux jours, dans le but de régler plusiers différends survenus entre les Iomoudes. Le Khan a déclaré aux Turcomans qui prennent l'eau du canal de Hasavat qu'à partir de cette année il les frappe d'un impôt égal à celui payé par les Ouzbeks. Les Turcomans ont entendu avec soumission cette nouvelle, en demandant seulement au Khan de vouloir prendre en considération leur position plus que gênée, qui leur rendra très-difficile le versement d'un impôt trop considérable. Le Khan a fixé l'impôt que doivent payer les Iomoudes du Hasavat à 10,000 tillia (18,000 roubles), dont 2,000 (3, 600 roubles) doivent être payés immédiatment et le reste à l'époque du versement de l'impôt par les Ouzbeks. Au lieu des ouvriers envoyés en corvée pour nettoyer les petits canaux d'irrigation, les Turcomans se sont engagés à payer 2 tillia (3 r. 60 c.) par ouvrier.

"D'Ismamout-Ata, le Khan se disposait à se rendre à Zmoukscher. D'après les informations que le colonel Ivanow a reçues par une autre voie, tous les Turcomans restent tranquillement chez eux et font d'excellentes réceptions au Khan. Deux chefs Turcomans sont venus à sa rencontre à Hasavat et l'accompagnent depuis dans sa tournée. Deux Chefs Ata-Vakil et Tiouria-Bokschi, qui s'étaient rendus les plus coupables de résistance à nos troupes et au Khan, marchent à pied devant son cheval, en signe de soumission. A Ismamout-Ata les Turcomans avaient préparé des fourrages pour les cheveaux de la suite

du Khan. Le Khan a voulu leur payer ces fourrages, mais ils ont refusé d'accepter de l'argent. Le Khan a fait arrêter cinq des Iomoudes les plus coupables de résistance et il en a fait fusiller un.

" L'Envoyé du Khan qui a apporté au Colonel Ivanow la lettre datée d'Ismamout-Ata montre la plus grande satisfaction. Il est visible que les Ouzbeks sont étonnés de la soumission des Turcomans. Dans sa réponse au Khan, le Colonel Ivanow a cru devoir insister encore une fois sur la nécessité d'allier la clémence et la douceur à la sévérité."

Inclosure 2 in No. 31.

Extract from the "Moscow Gazette" of May $\frac{1}{13}$, 1875.

(Translation.)

ACCORDING to the last letter addressed on the $\frac{11th}{23rd}$ March last to Colonel Ivanoff by the Khan of Khiva from Kunia Urgentch, it has been ascertained that the Khan started on that day from the latter place to the camping grounds of the Kulchar Turkmen by way of Hadjeili, intending to reach Porsu next day, and to return to Khiva likewise by way of the same camping grounds.

During the Khan's stay at Kunia Urgentch, he imposed on the Jomuds, who lived in the neighbourhood of that town, a yearly tax of 2,400 tillas. The Chandor Turkmen were mulcted in an annual tribute of 600 tillas. The amount of the tax is fixed in proportion to the quantity of ground occupied by the tribes, and by the number of men supplied for the Khan's service. The Khan directed particular attention on the Jomuds of Kunia Urgentch, whom he compelled to liberate twenty Persian slaves; fifteen more of them, consisting of women and children, were rescued from a body of Kul Jomuds who had decamped in the direction of Sary Kamysh.

Quiet prevails throughout the Khanate. The Turkmen are stationary in their encampments, and fulfil all the demands of the Khan.

Palvan-Divan, the Khan's Mirza-Bashi, reports that only ten executions took place throughout the whole expedition of the Khan, and that the subjects of this severity were those whom the Turkmen themselves denounced as the worst and most dangerous men of the tribe.

The Khan also despatched 200 horsemen from Hadjeili to the northern parts of the Khanate, under the command of Hakim-Atalyk, whom he has appointed Governor of Kungrad. This measure was determined on in consequence of the disorders and robberies that prevailed in the neighbourhood of that town.

The following is the position of affairs in the trans-Caspian region:—

General Llamakin reported on the 18th and 22nd February from Krasnovodsk to the Commander of the Amu-Daria district, that he returned from Tiflis on the 1st February, and that he had received the approval of His Imperial Highness the Viceroy of the Caucasus of the following military plans:—

On the arrival at Mangyshlak from Krasnovodsk of 400 to 500 Government camels, the General is to proceed from Krasnovodsk with a battalion of Shirvan infantry, a sotnia of cavalry, a division of artillery, and a rocket company, by land to Chata, by way of Lakes Shandry and Bugdaily, past the ruins of Memad and Mestodovran, along the old bed of the Attrek, through the summer camping grounds of the Djaffar-Bais and Ag-ata-Bais; from Chata the detachment will proceed down the course of the Attrek to the point chosen for a fortification at Duz-Ulam ferry; at this place the detachment will be joined by a battalion of the Daghestan regiment with six guns, which will be transported from Baku to Hadji-Mykhtum by barges of the Caspian flotilla.

General Llamakin reports a satisfactory state of things in the trans-Caspian military district.

The Akhal Téké have sent assurances of submission, and promised to fulfil all Russian demands.

Out of the number of Jomuds seized at the attack and pillage of the Au near Krasnovodsk, ninety have been returned by the Téké; thirty, however, still remain in bondage! Sofi Khan, with twenty elders of the Téké, arrived at Krasnovodsk on the 19th February; they were also accompanied by Karadja Khan and three relatives of Kurban Murad Khan, the most respected and influential spiritual personage among the Téké. The son of the Bemis Khan was also among the number of the visitors. By order of His Imperial Highness rich robes of honour were distributed among them. Sofi Khan also received a gold medal.

General Llamakin also reports that Colonel Glukhovski's agent contemplates proceeding to Akhal Téké with a caravan of goods, in order to establish commercial

relations in that quarter; special permission for this purpose has been applied for to the Lieutenant of the Caucasus. It is intended to establish a fair at Krasnovodsk in May.

No. 32.

Lord G. Hamilton to Lord Tenterden.—(*Received June* 24.)

My Lord, *India Office, June* 22, 1875.

I AM directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Lister's letter of the 26th May, transmitting copy of a despatch addressed by Prince Gortchakow to the Russian Ambassador in London, recording the determination of the Emperor of Russia not to extend the frontiers of his possessions in Central Asia beyond their present limits, either on the side of Bokhara or that of Krasnovodsk and the Attrek, together with a Memorandum drawn up by the Russian Government, reviewing the correspondence which has passed on the subject of Central Asia.

In reply I am directed to state, that whilst Lord Salisbury has read with satisfaction the assurances conveyed in Prince Gortchakow's despatch of the 5th April, they are, in his opinion, somewhat weakened by the qualifications contained in the concluding paragraphs of his Excellency's letter, and the general tenour of the Memorandum which accompanies it.

Lord Salisbury is far from wishing to underrate the friendliness of feeling which has dictated the language of both these documents; and in pointing out some inaccuracies of statement which give an incorrect impression of the objects and results of past negotiations in regard to Central Asia, he only desires to prevent the revival of discussions which it is the object of both Governments to avoid.

Lord Salisbury will, for the sake of brevity, confine his observations to a few points to which he more particularly desires to draw Lord Derby's attention. The points primarily affect:—

1. The general question of the neutral zone.
2. The course of negotiations which led to the definition of the limits of Afghanistan.

In regard to the first point, the Memorandum assumes that the question of the "neutral zone," after being temporarily laid aside in the early part of 1869, was taken up again at St. Petersburgh during the Mission of Mr. Forsyth, and that as a result of the general agreement between the Russian and English Governments, Afghanistan now occupies that position.

This deduction from the course of past negotiations must be made under some misapprehension, since, in April 1869, Lord Clarendon, after reference to this Office, distinctly informed Baron Brünnow that Afghanistan would not fulfil the desired conditions, and substituted for his original suggestion, in regard to a neutral zone, a proposal that the Upper Oxus should form the boundary line which neither Power should permit their forces to cross.* This was followed by a protest from Lord Mayo's Government against the proposal of a neutral zone, the idea of which was thenceforward, so far as the English Government was concerned, definitively abandoned. Although the subject was subsequently touched upon in the course of explanations between the Russian Ministers and Mr. Forsyth during that gentleman's visit to St. Petersburgh, its discussion was not, and was not intended to be, one of the objects of his Mission.

In regard to the second point, viz., the course of negotiations, which led to the definition of the limits of Afghanistan, Lord Salisbury considered that there are no grounds for the laboured inference drawn in the Memorandum, that the limits agreed upon in 1869 as being in the effective possession of Shere Ali did not include Badakshan and Wakhan, and that the Russian Government finally conceded the point as an act of courtesy.

The matter was one of plain historical fact.

On the death of Dost Mahomed in 1863, Shere Ali Khan inherited his father's Kingdom, which included within its boundaries Badakshan, Wakhan, and the districts known as Afghan-Turkestan. Although subsequent internal rebellion caused the Chiefs of these outlying territories to waver in their allegiance from one member of the Afghan

* Lord Clarendon to Mr. Rumbold, the 17th April, 1869:—

"It was, therefore, thought advisable to propose that the Upper Oxus, which was south of Bokhara, should be the boundary line which neither Power should permit their forces to cross. This, I said, would leave a large tract of country, apparently desert, and marked in the map before us (Weller's map) as belonging to the Khan of Khiva, between Afghanistan and the territory already acquired by Russia, and if agreed to would, it might be hoped, remove all fear of future dissension."

Royal Family to another, they, at no period, attempted to make themselves independent of Afghanistan, or to offer their allegiance to Bokhara or other foreign Power. When Shere Ali regained supreme power in 1869-70 the whole of these Chiefs, including the Meer of Badakshan, renewed their personal allegiance to him, in the most full and entire manner; and when, in December 1869, the Russian Government agreed to recognize as Afghanistan the territory then under Shere Ali's effective control, he had been for nearly a year in complete possession of Cabul, Herat, Candahar, Afghan-Turkestan, Badakshan, and Wakhan. The inquiries made at the time by the Government of India left no doubt whatever as to these material facts, and their conclusions were in no way shaken by those in a different sense formed by General Kaufmann.

Lord Salisbury cannot imagine, therefore, that the final agreement of the Russian Cabinet to the line of demarcation proposed in Lord Granville's despatch of the 17th October, 1872, was, or ever will be, looked upon by the English Cabinet otherwise than as a recognition of a fact which had never really admitted of question.

It only remains to notice the conclusion expressed in the final portion of the Memorandum, to the effect that the agreement arrived at between the two Powers has left to Russia full liberty of action upon every portion of territory situated between the Russian frontiers and Afghanistan, without any apparent right of remonstrance on the part of the English Government.

By this assumption His Imperial Majesty's present declarations, of the sincerity of which there can he no doubt, are qualified to a grave extent. It must not be forgotten in the consideration of this important question that declarations, as specific and as sincere, have been followed on former occasions by acts inconsistent with their tenour; indeed, the Memorandum itself dwells on a justification of this course of policy, under the plea of necessity. Lord Salisbury neither desires to raise bygone questions touching that necessity, nor to enter into any examination of the policy to which it may have given rise; he merely wishes to express his fear that if the present claim be allowed to pass unchallenged, it may, sooner or later, lead to complications affecting Indian interests, in regard to Merv, which may seriously embarrass Her Majesty's Government. It must be borne in mind that the establishment of Russian supremacy in Khiva and on the south-east coast of the Caspian has taken place since the course of negotiations described in the general body of the Memorandum; whilst the occupation of the Attrek districts by Russian troops may, at any time, materially affect our relations with Persia. On these and other considerations it is inexpedient, if not impossible, in Lord Salisbury's opinion, for Her Majesty's Government to accept the position of inaction which Prince Gortchacow's letter apparently wishes to force upon it, whatever may be the character of future operations by Russia against the Turkomans.

It will be gathered from the foregoing observations that Lord Salisbury is disposed to doubt the sufficiency of the instructions proposed to be conveyed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, and to apprehend that even a tacit acquiescence in the statements and conclusions of the Memorandum by the Russian Government may lead to future inconvenience.

He would, therefore, suggest, for Lord Derby's consideration, whether, without casting any doubts on the past or present declarations of the Russian Cabinet, the inability of Her Majesty's Government to accept the version now put forward of the negotiations of late years might not be clearly intimated, and a liberty of action in all contingencies, and in all quarters, reserved to the British Government as full as that claimed by the Government of Russia.

I am directed to add that a copy of Mr. Lister's letter, under reply, with its inclosure, will be forwarded to the Government of India for any observations which the Viceroy in Council may have to make thereon, with special reference to the responsibility sought to be imposed upon that Government in regard to the actions of the Ameer of Afghanistan, as indicated in the concluding paragraph of Prince Gortchakow's despatch.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

No. 33.

Mr. Doria to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June* 28.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, June* 23, 1875.

THE reply which was given in the House of Commons by the Hon. R. Bourke to Sir C. Dilke's question relative to the Russian expedition to Hissar having been published

in the "St. Petersburgh Journal" of this morning, I took the opportunity to mention the subject to Baron Jomini, who replied that the expedition was of a scientific character, which was always the first step towards commercial advancement in an uncivilized country, and that the more the inhabitants were brought into contact with civilization, there existed a greater hope of forcing upon them the conviction that it was for their own interests and benefit to cultivate commercial relations whereby they would be enriched, than to seek by plunder and assassination an uncertain gain.

His Excellency then enlarged upon the subject of the relations between England and Russia in reference to the latter's position in Central Asia, and he argued that he saw no reason for mutual jealousy; that, on the contrary, should the two Governments act more together in the interests of general progress and civilization, it might be a means of strengthening both in their respective Eastern dominions, where a powerful antagonistic element existed in the Mussulman population, a menace to both Governments, and should at any time a leader of daring character endowed with military genius arise, much was to be feared by such an event.

Nor does his Excellency regard the possibility of the two dominions eventually becoming limitrophe, should the eventuality arise, as a reason for indulging in vague fears of hostility; that, if Russia lived at peace with her frontier reaching to Austria and Germany, why should the fact of her territory touching the borders of the British Empire in India be a reason for warfare, which no reasonable mind could accept the possibility of her being able to conquer?

No. 34.

Mr. Doria to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received July* 26.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July* 13, 1875.

I YESTERDAY had occasion to call upon Baron Jomini, who during our conversation adverted to the debate which had taken place in the House of Commons at Westminster on the motion of Mr. Baillie Cochrane relative to the progress of Russia in Central Asia.

His Excellency began by expressing an entire participation and accordance in the opinions and views of Her Majesty's Government as announced to the House by the Honourable R. Bourke, I might almost say approval of the speech of Her Majesty's Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency said to me that at first a neutral zone had been talked of and proposed as a limit to the advance of both Empires, but, he added, a neutral zone is an impossibility in a territory of barbarians. Belgium, he said, can be considered a neutral country, because civilized and in a position to respect certain acknowledged international rights which are frequently entirely disregarded by the various turbulent tribes of Central Asia; that to enforce upon them a respect for the maintenance of peace often entailed on Russia a necessity of direct interference, doing away with the professions of the existence of a neutral zone, which could only be maintained in a moral sense.

But the main point of his Excellency's conversation went to show the fixed idea existing in his mind that the British and Russian Empires must eventually become limitrophe. His Excellency repeated the opinion I had the honour to recount to your Lordship in my despatch of the 23rd ultimo, that if the Empires of Russia and Austria or Germany, having a common frontier, can exist on terms of peace, why not England and Russia? And, his Excellency said, if England found it to her interests to annex Afghanistan to her Indian Empire, the Russian Government would not regard it as a menace to them, nor would they endeavour to prevent it, and that, therefore, they cannot comprehend why the future absorption of Bokhara and Khokand should raise such excitement and alarm in the minds of Englishmen.

I think that Baron Jomini viewed with satisfaction the statement that the correspondence between Her Majesty's Government and that of Russia had not led to any agreement as to the limits of a neutral zone.

I have arrived at this conviction, that many Russians, and amongst them men of political position and in Government service, entertain the full persuasion that the maintenance for any number of years of a great neutral territory between the two Empires of Russia and India is an impossibility, and that the notion must be abandoned.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. DORIA.

No. 35.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(Received August 6.)

My Lord, *India Office, August 5, 1875.*

WITH reference to Sir Louis Mallet's letter of the 3rd May last, I am directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to forward herewith, in duplicate, to be laid before the Earl of Derby, copy of a letter from the Government of India, intimating the opinion of that Government that it would be well to make known to the Russian Government the position held by them in respect to the right of stationing British troops in Khelat.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure in No. 35.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury.

(Extract.) *Simla, June 14, 1875.*

WE have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the despatch from the Secretary in the Political and Secret Department dated 7th ultimo, on the subject of Russian advances in Central Asia.

We observe that your Lordship has suggested to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the right, which the British Government possesses under Treaty, of stationing troops in any part of the territory of Khelat, should be explained to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh for his own information. We are of opinion that to prevent the possibility of future misunderstanding on this point, it would be well to make known to the Russian Government also the position which we hold in respect to the right of stationing troops in Khelat.

No. 36.

Mr. Doria to the Earl of Derby.—(Received August 9.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August 3, 1875.*

I ALLUDED in conversation with Baron Jomini this morning to the subject of the supposed expedition against Merv, stating that a report to that effect had reached me.

Baron Jomini's reply has led me to believe that there is no foundation whatever for the report. His Excellency spoke without reluctance or hesitation, and stated that there was no cause for, or advantage to be gained by, such an expedition. If there was, then, although they would be sorry to be disagreeable to England, "Every one for himself, and God for all;" but if they took Merv they would find themselves, on account of the marauding tribes, necessitated to make a further advance in order to curb and restrain them, and where was it to end? Moreover, he referred to the orders given by His Majesty the Emperor against any such attack on Merv. In the face of this appeal to the Emperor's command, and his Excellency's own assertions, I cannot hesitate to accept them as loyal and sincere, at all events as far as his Excellency's own faith and knowledge is pledged.

Baron Jomini further stated that the improved state of submission of the Turkoman tribes renders an attack on Merv less requisite, and he alluded to a "reconnaissance" of General Llamakin which had been satisfactory in this respect, finding a marked improvement in the submissive behaviour of the Turkomans.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. DORIA.

No. 37.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(Received August 21.)

My Lord, *India Office, August 21, 1875.*

I AM directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to forward, in duplicate, for the information of the Earl of Derby, copy of a letter from the Government of India, dated the 28th June last, with inclosed Report by Captain the Honourable G. C. Napier.

It will be observed that the Téké Turkomans are stated to have a Russian captive at Merv, whom they have refused to deliver up. In order, if possible, to remove all cause of collision between the Russians and those tribes, the Government of India have informed the Ameer of Cabul that it would be well for him, if he is in a position to do so, to advise the Tékés to release the Russian prisoner, and adopt a peaceful attitude towards merchants and others passing through or near their territories.

Lord Salisbury thinks that a favourable opportunity might with advantage be taken by Her Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburgh of mentioning to Prince Gortchakow this friendly act on the part of the Government of India.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 37.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury.

My Lord, *Simla, June* 28, 1875.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a Memorandum drawn up by Captain the Honourable G. C. Napier, on special duty in Persia.

It will be observed that the Tékés are stated to have a Russian captive at Merv, whom they have refused to deliver up. In order, if possible, to remove all cause of collision between the Russians and the Turkomans, we have informed the Ameer of Cabul that it would be well for him, if he is in a position to do so, to advise the Tékés to release the Russian prisoner and adopt a peaceful attitude towards merchants and others passing through or near their territories. A copy of the instructions issued to the Government of the Punjab on the subject is appended for your Lordship's information.

We have, &c.
(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
W. MUIR.
A. EDEN.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 37.

Captain Napier to Mr. Aitchison.

(Extract.) *February* 22, 1875.

LAST year a caravan proceeding (according to the Russian papers) from Khala-Ata to Petrovsk Alexandrovsk was attacked and plundered by a large body of Tékés, and a Russian soldier carried off captive to Merv, where he is still detained for ransom. Some attempts were made by the Persians to procure his release, but the matter was allowed to drop. That the Governor of Khorassan had made an offer to ransom the prisoner, I ascertained beyond a doubt from Turkomans, but the sum named was not accepted, and the attempt was not renewed. For some time, also, the Chief of Merv was in communication with Ivanoff, the Russian Commander in the Amoo Darya district, but refused to surrender the prisoner as demanded without the payment of a ransom. A threat of hostilities was met by defiance.

According to the last news I received before leaving the border, Colonel Ivanoff had renewed negotiations regarding the prisoner, and two of the Téké Aksakals, Adna Geldy Khan and Walad Khan, are at his head-quarters. The result of this will probably be the release of the prisoner.

Inclosure 3 in No. 37.

Mr. Aitchison to Mr. Thornton.

Simla, June 14, 1875.

IT will be in the recollection of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor that two years ago, when the Russian columns were concentrating on Khiva, the possibility of a collision

between the Russian forces and the Turkoman tribes excited considerable anxiety in Afghanistan. A reference having been made to the subject by Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, who was then at Simla, His Excellency the Viceroy advised the Ameer in no way to countenance any opposition on the part of the Turkomans to the march of Russian troops upon Khiva.

2. Immediately after the capture of Khiva the Russian commanders inflicted severe loss upon the Khivan branch of the Yomuds. To the best of the information which the Government of India has received, there is no reason to believe that the Russians contemplate an advance on Merv or to attack the Turkoman tribes on the frontier of Afghanistan, provided the Turkomans in that neighbourhood abstain from molesting Russian subjects and committing depredations on Russian commerce.

3. The immunity of the Turkomans from attack will therefore probably depend mainly on their own conduct. If they continue to commit acts of hostility towards the Russians and to plunder peaceful and unoffending merchants, they cannot expect long to escape chastisement. It is therefore highly desirable that all proper influences should be brought to bear on them with a view to induce them to abandon the lawless and predatory habits which many among them still retain, although there appears to be some disposition on the part of a portion of the tribes to abandon those practices.

4. The Turkoman tribe against whom the loudest complaints have been made are the Tékés inhabiting Merv and the skirt of the Koppet Dagh mountains. The Government of India has learned from various sources of information that the Tékés up to a recent date had a Russian soldier in captivity at Merv. These reports have been confirmed by Captain Napier, who has lately visited the north-eastern frontier of Persia, and who was told that the Russian soldier had been carried off by a large body of Tékés in 1874, that unsuccessful efforts had been made by the Persian authorities to procure his release, and that the Turkomans when menaced by Colonel Ivanoff had paid back threats with defiance.

5. It is manifest that this circumstance may at any time afford the Russians a just cause of quarrel with the Turkomans. And as it is to the interest of the Ameer of Cabul that a contest between the Russians and the Turkoman tribes on his border should be averted, it would be well for His Highness, if he is in a position to do so, to advise the Tékés to release the Russian prisoner if he is still in their hands, and to exercise all legitimate influence to restrain the lawless and predatory habits of the Turkomans, and thereby remove any reasonable grounds for a collision between them and the Russians.

6. I am therefore to request that the British Agent at Cabul may be instructed to explain to the Ameer in general terms the present aspect of the Turkoman question. And it should be added that if His Highness can induce the Tékés to surrender their captive and to adopt a peaceful attitude towards merchants and others passing through or near their territories, it is the opinion of the Viceroy that His Highness would act wisely in using his efforts to bring about that result.

No. 38.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Doria.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 30, 1875.

I HAVE been informed by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, that in order to avoid all cause of collision between the Russians and the Téké Turkoman tribes of Merv, the Viceroy of India has stated to the Ameer of Afghanistan that it would be well for him, if he is in a position to do so, to advise the Téké tribe to release the Russian prisoner who is said to be in their hands, and to adopt a peaceful attitude towards merchants and others passing through or near their territories.

You will take an early opportunity of mentioning to the Russian Government this friendly act on the part of the Government of India.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 39.

Mr. Doria to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received September* 2.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 28, 1875.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship a translation, by Mr. Michell, of an extract from the "Invalide Russe" of yesterday, reporting that Russian territory has been invaded by the insurgents of Khokand, and that a detachment of Russian troops has been sent against them.

I have, &c.
(In the absence of Mr. Doria),
(Signed) CHARLES S. SCOTT.

Inclosure in No. 39.

Substance of Statement in the "Invalide Russe" of August $\frac{15}{27}$, 1875.

THE "Invalide Russe" of the $\frac{15}{27}$th instant states that "according to telegrams of the $\frac{7}{19}$th and $\frac{9\text{th}}{21\text{st}}$ instant, General Kaufmann reports that his endeavours towards a pacific solution of the Khokand difficulty have not met with success. The Khokandians invaded our territory at several points, at Telian, Hadjent, &c. A detachment of troops was immediately dispatched against the enemy under General Golovocheff."

No. 40.

Mr. Scott to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received September* 6.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, August* 26, 1875.

BARON JOMINI confirmed yesterday the news which appeared in the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of the 23rd instant, in regard to the insurrection in the Khanate of Khokand.

His Excellency said that although the cruel and arbitrary acts of the Khan had long since rendered such an event highly probable, the Imperial Government were much disappointed by the occurrence; they had indulged the hope that by establishing themselves in limitary neighbourhood to these small Khanates, they might have produced a salutary effect on the Khans, and carried on their civilizing efforts on the basis of a good understanding with these countries, without being obliged to disturb the existing Governments in them.

No. 41.

Mr. Scott to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received September* 6.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September* 1, 1875.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, in French translation from the "Invalide Russe," the despatch of the Governor-General of Turkestan announcing his intention of invading Khokand, and his reasons for doing so.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES S. SCOTT.

Inclosure in No. 41.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of August 20 / September 1, 1875.

"L'INVALIDE RUSSE" publie aujourd'hui la dépêche suivante de M. l'Aide-de-camp Général Kaufmann, Gouverneur-Général du Turkestan :—

"Notre situation s'est éclaircie. Les insurgés Khokands ont envahi à plusieurs endroits le district de Kouramine, dans le but de soulever les indigènes. Leur entreprise a échoué. Leur bande principale, forte de 5,000 hommes, a été battue ; une autre bande forte de 800 hommes, est entièrement détruite ; les autres bandes ont échappé à travers les montagnes, en repassant la frontière du Khanat de Khokand.

"Les principaux efforts des insurgés étaient dirigés contre la ville de Khodjent. Ils ont attaqué, en grandes masses et de différents côtés à la fois, la ville et les jardins qui l'entourent. La garnison de Khodjent, renforcée par trois compagnies arrivées d'Oura-Tubé, a repoussé l'attaque sur tous les points et, prenant l'offensive, a poursuivi l'ennemi jusqu'à la frontière.

"On est encore sans informations sur les résultats de l'attaque des insurgés contre Oura-Tubé.

"Dans toutes nos rencontres avec l'ennemi nous n'avons eu pour ainsi dire aucune perte à déplorer.

"En ce moment je me trouve avec un détachement, en route pour Khodjent. Dans deux jours je serai dans cette ville et je me dirigerai de là sur Khokand."

No. 42.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(Received September 11.)

(Extract.) *India Office, September* 11, 1875.

I AM directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to forward herewith, for the information of the Earl of Derby, copy of a letter from the Government of India, with inclosures having reference to the affairs of Afghanistan.

Lord Derby will observe that the Government of India are of opinion that it might be advisable to communicate to the Russian Government the intentions of the Ameer in regard to Maimena.

Inclosure 1 in No. 42.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury.

My Lord, *Simla, July* 26, 1875.

IN continuation of our despatch of the 5th instant, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, further papers having reference to the affairs of Afghanistan.

2. Your Lordship will observe that the intentions of the Ameer with regard to Maimena are now assuming definite form, and that measures are being adopted for the consolidation of His Highness' authority in that district.

3. As Maimena is within the Afghan boundary, as recognized by Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Russia, we see no reason to interfere with the action of His Highness.

4. We think that it might be advisable to communicate the intentions of the Ameer to the Russian Government should Her Majesty's Government see no objections to such a course.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
W. MUIR.
A. EDEN.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 42.

Colonel Sir F. R. Pollock to Mr. Aitchison.

July 1, 1875.

SUBMITS, for information of the Supreme Government, translation of Cabul Diary from the 22nd to the 24th June, 1875, inclusive.

Extract from Cabul Diary from the 22nd to the 24th June, 1875, inclusive.

OWING to the persistence ("israr") of the Sadr-i-Azem at present, it has been agreed upon between His Highness the Ameer and Sadr-i-Azem, that whereas the Meer of Maimena has always maintained a correspondence with the King of Bokhara and Sirdar Abdool Rahman Khan,* both of whom are enemies of the Cabul Government, and the Meer writing in terms of disaffection enables the Sirdar to represent to the Russian Government his influence in Balkh and Turkestan (by showing the Meer's letters to his address or referring to them) and to push his interests with the Russians, these matters are a cause of serious apprehensions. For although while (or so long as) a good understanding exists between the Russian and English Governments, and so long as Russia has no grievance to urge against Afghanistan, she (Russia) has no opening for attending to, or acting on the representation of, the Meer of Maimena, or of Sirdar Abdool Rahman Khan; yet in the event, owing to accidental circumstances, of any misunderstanding arising between the Russian and Afghan Governments, then, from all points of view, the Meer of Maimena would become a very powerful agent for inflicting very heavy loss ("zarar rasani khari") on Afghanistan, and the preservation of such a thorn on one's side ("khar-i-baghul") was contrary to the dictates of wisdom.

For the extraction of this thorn a good opportunity now existed in the presence of forces at Turkestan, Herat, and Cabul, without any trouble or disturbance to occupy them.

For the present troops should be sent from Herat and Turkestan to Maimena in view to its subjugation ("taskhir"). Accordingly, secret letters have been sent to the Governors of Turkestan and Herat, with stringent orders to hold their troops in readiness and await further instructions, and the son of the Meer of Maimena, who arrived in Cabul with the son of Mama Rahim Khan, the chief notable of Maimena, will be detained with his companion for the present.

No. 43.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Doria.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 15, 1875.

WITH reference to Lord A. Loftus' despatch of the 30th March last, I transmit to you a copy of a despatch from the Indian Government,† expressing an opinion that it is desirable that no doubt should rest with the Russian Government as to the right of the British Government to station troops in any part of the territory of the Khan of Khelat.

I inclose, for your information, a copy of the Treaty between the British Government and the Chief of Khelat, securing this right to England, and I have to instruct you to take an opportunity of mentioning this matter to the Russian Government; but you will not fail to accompany your statement by an explanation that Her Majesty's Government have no intention of using their right unless a necessity for it arises.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

* Son of Mahomed Afzul Khan, and residing at Samarcand.

† No. 35.

Inclosure in No. 43.

Extract from Treaty of May 14, 1854.

Treaty between the British Government and Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat, concluded on the part of the British Government by Major John Jacob, C.B., in virtue of full powers granted by the Most Noble the Marquis of Dalhousie, K.T. &c., Governor-General of India, and by Meer Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat.

ARTICLE IV.

SHOULD it be deemed necessary to station British troops in any part of the territory of Khelat, they shall occupy such positions as may be thought advisable by the British authorities.

No. 44.

Mr. Doria to the Earl of Derby.—(Received September 20.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September* 7, 1875.

THIS morning's edition of the "St. Petersburgh Journal" publishes a letter taken from the "Moscow Gazette" with reference to the scientific and military expedition to explore the ancient bed of the Amu-Daria, and it describes the submission of the Akhal Téké tribe, the chiefs of which sent a deputation to General Llamakin announcing their submission and the surrender of the Russian Yomoud prisoners.

The most complete resignation to Russian authority appears to be established.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of the extract for your Lordship's information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. DORIA.

Inclosure in No. 44.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of $\frac{\text{August } 26}{\text{September } 7}$, 1875.

ON sait que l'expédition scientifique et militaire envoyée pour explorer l'ancien lit de l'Amou-Daria, connu sous le nom d'Onzboï, avait eu pour résultat indirect l'établissement de relations amicales avec la tribu guerrière d'Akhal-Téké. Une lettre que publie la "Gazette de Moscou" donne les détails suivants sur cet épisode, qui n'est pas dénué d'une certaine importance.

L'approche de la colonne du Général Llamakin produisit une vive émotion sur la tribu d'Akhal-Téké. Les Chefs se réunirent pour délibérer à Hok-Tépé, résidence des quatre Khans qui gouvernent la tribu. La délibération aboutit à l'envoi de députés au Général Llamakin pour lui annoncer la soumission complète des Tékiens et pour rendre les Yemoudes Russes faits prisonniers par l'Akhal-Téké. On décida encore d'interdire sous peine de mort le pillage des caravanes Russes et en général les hostilités contre les sujets Russes, et de choisir 100 ferrosches chargés de veiller à l'exécution de ce qui venait d'être résolu.

Peu de temps après les Khans et les Chefs d'Akhal-Téké arrivèrent au camp du Général Llamakin et l'un d'eux adressa au Général la locution suivante:—

"Nous sommes entourés par les Merwiens, les Khiviens, les Afghans, les Persans. Tous ont cherché à nous soumettre à leur pouvoir. Notre indépendance ne saurait durer. Sans attendre notre asservissement par la voie des armes, nous avons résolu volontairement notre soumission au plus puissant de nos voisins, qui saura garantir notre sécurité. Depuis ce jour nous sommes les serviteurs de l'Ak Padischah (Tsar Blanc) et nous sommes prêts à remplir tous vos désirs. Nous sommes familiarisés avec la guerre. Dites un mot et nous mettrons à votre service 5,000 cavaliers. En échange nous vous prions de soumettre à l'Ak-Padischah l'humble prière de notre peuple de bien vouloir lui confirmer la jouissance des libertés et immunités reconnues par les diplômes de Tamerlan et de Nadir-Schah."

Depuis lors, ajoute le correspondant de la "Gazette de Moscou," ont commencé nos relations commerciales avec les Tékiens, et le calme le plus complet règne dans les steppes des parages qu'ils occupent.

No. 45.

Mr. Doria to the Earl of Derby.—(Received September 20.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September 9, 1875.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship, extracted from the "Invalide Russe," the following transcript of a telegram from General Kaufmann, addressed to His Majesty the Emperor on the 25th ultimo, which appeared in the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" this morning.

The telegram narrates the events of the battle of Mahram, in which the enemy were entirely defeated, consisting of 30,000 men of the Khokand bands.

General Kaufmann states that he awaits the arrival of troops dispatched from Khodjent, and will then march against the town of Khokand.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. DORIA.

Inclosure in No. 45.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of August 27 and 28 / September 8 and 9, 1875.

LE Commandant-en-chef des troupes de la circonscription militaire du Turkestan, M. l'Aide-de-camp Général Kaufmann, annonce ce qui suit, dit "l'Invalide Russe," par un télégramme adressé à Sa Majesté l'Empereur, sous la date du 25 Août:—

"A notre seconde étape de Khodjent, notre détachement a fait la rencontre de la cavalerie ennemie, au nombre de 7,000 hommes, avec des coulevrines. Les Cosaques commandés par le Colonel Skobélew, Aide-de-camp de votre Majesté, et forts de huit sotnias avec quatre pièces d'artillerie à cheval et une batterie de fuséens, ont tenu tête à l'ennemi pendant toute la journée, sans pertes de notre côté.

"Le 22 Août Dieu a accordé sa bénédiction à nos armes. Les troupes, que je commandais en personne, ont remporté une victoire complète et décisive sur les bandes Khokandes, fortes de 30,000 hommes. L'ennemi occupait une position fortifiée ayant pour point d'appui la forteresse de Mahram. La position était entourée d'un fossé rempli d'eau et soutenue par de l'artillerie. L'attaque de la position a été conduite par le Lieutenant-Général Golovatchew, à la tête de l'artillerie et d'une partie de l'infanterie. La position a été emportée à l'arme blanche. Le Commandant de la cavalerie, Colonel Skobélew, Aide-de-camp de votre Majesté, a achevé la déroute des bandes Khokandes en poursuivant vivement l'ennemi sur une distance de quinze verstes. Il l'a acculé à la Rivière Daria, où un grand nombre de Khokands ont été noyés ou taillés en pièces.

"Le Général-Major Trotsky, de la suite de votre Majesté, a été mon principal adjoint dans notre brillante campagne et dans la bataille d'hier.

"Nos trophées se composent de trente-neuf pièces d'artillerie, d'une multitude de coulevrines et autres armes, du munitions de guerre et de vivres.

"Nos pertes sont les suivantes: un officier supérieur, cinq soldats et un djighite tués; un officier supérieur et sept soldats blessés.

"Une défaite complète a été infligée à l'ennemi. L'impression produite dans le Khanat par ce combat est immense, mais on ne saurait encore apprécier toutes les conséquences de la bataille de Mahram. J'attendrai les transports envoyés de Khodjent et quand ils seront arrivés je marcherai sur la ville de Khokand.

"Les troupes de votre Majesté se sont conduites avec vaillance, d'une manière brillante, et l'affaire a été menée lestement."

No. 46.

Mr. Doria to the Earl of Derby.—(Received September 20.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September 15, 1875.*

THE inclosed extract which I have the honour to forward to your Lordship appeared in the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg," this morning.

It is taken from the official "Gazette" of Turkestan, and gives information as to events at Khokand. The article speaks of the advance of Russian troops against Khokand bands, and of the arrival of the deposed ruler, Khodajar Khan, at Tashkend.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. DORIA.

Inclosure in No. 46.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of September $\frac{3}{15}$, 1875.

NOUS trouvons dans le dernier numéro de la Gazette (officielle) du Turkestan les renseignements suivants sur les événements du Khokand :—

"Les bandes Khokandes ont passé notre frontière et leur présence a été signalée dans la partie est du district de Kouramine, limitrophe du Khanat de Khokand. Dans la nuit du 7 Août le Maire d'Ablyk fit savoir qu'une bande nombreuse s'était approchée du kischlak (village) d'Ablyk, et que l'on avait aperçu dans les montagnes une autre bande de cavaliers venant du Khokand. A la réception de cette nouvelle, venue à 5 heures du matin, le Lieutenant-Général Golovatchew se dirigea de Taschkent sur Tilaou avec quatre sotnias de Cosaques et un détachement d'artillerie. A 8 heures du matin le 2e Bataillon de Chasseurs se mettait aussi en marche, suivi à 4 heures du soir par le 1er Bataillon de Chasseurs. Le 2e bataillon opéra sa jonction avec les troupes du Lieutenant-Général Golovatchew au kischlak de Kandjigaly (à 15 verstes de Tilaou). Les bandes qui avaient passé notre frontière s'étaient divisées en quatre détachements.

"Les forces ennemies se réunissent dans les possessions Khokandes, non loin de nos frontières, à Mahram et sur le Bisch-Aryk, et l'on fortifie la ville de Khokand.

"Le Khan déposé, Khoudoïar, arriva avec toute sa suite à Taschkent le 8 Août et fit le même jour une visite au Gouverneur-Général, qui la lui rendit le lendemain.

"Le 11 Août on reçut à Taschkent un rapport du Lieutenant-Général Golovatchew annonçant que nos troupes ont battu une bande Khokande forte de 5,000 hommes et qui avait envahi nos frontières en descendant des montagnes dans la vallée d'Angren. L'ennemi avait pris la fuite et repassé la frontière. Il était poursuivi par les Cosaques. Nous n'avons point eu de pertes dans cet engagement."

No. 47.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Doria.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, September* 20, 1875.

I TRANSMIT to you, for your information, a copy of a letter from the Indian Government,* from which you will perceive that the Ameer of Afghanistan contemplates sending a force for the subjugation of Maimena, a province which lies within his dominions; and I have to instruct you to communicate this information to the Russian Government.

No. 48.

Mr. Doria to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received October* 4.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September* 18, 1875.

AS instructed by your Lordship in your despatch of the 30th ultimo, I took the opportunity to mention to Baron Jomini that the Viceroy of India had counselled the Ameer of Afghanistan to proffer to the Téké tribe the advice to release the Russian prisoner who is said to be in their hands.

Baron Jomini evinced a lively satisfaction at the communication, and asked if I could favour him with a copy of your Lordship's despatch, as he wished to send it to-morrow to the Emperor, who has left St. Petersburgh for the Crimea. "His Imperial Majesty," his Excellency added, "will be gratified at the friendly act, and if he were present I should not ask for a copy of the despatch."

Baron Jomini remarked upon the word "prisoner" being in the singular, stating there were several. I replied it was perhaps by inadvertence that an "s" had been omitted.

I hope under these circumstances that your Lordship will not disapprove my having complied with his Excellency's request.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. DORIA.

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* Inclosure in No. 42.

No. 49.

Mr. Doria to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received October* 4.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September* 24, 1875.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship an extract from the "Petersburgh Journal" of the 17th instant, giving details of events after the battle of Mahram.

Khan Yadé Nassereddin Beg, the new Ruler of Khokand, had gone to meet General Kaufmann, giving assurances of "his devotion and submission" to the Emperor Alexander.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. DORIA.

Inclosure in No. 49.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of September $\frac{5}{17}$, 1875.

"L'INVALIDE RUSSE" publie aujourd'hui, 4 Septembre, la communication suivante :—

"Des télégrammes du Commandant-en-chef de la circonscription militaire du Turkestan, datés du 2 et 3 Septembre, annoncent qu'après la bataille de Mahram nos relations avec le Khokand ont pris une tournure pacifique. Au mouvement en avant de nos troupes le nouveau Khan du Khokand, Khan-Zadé, est venu à la rencontre de l'Aide-de-camp Général Kaufmann, en faisant des protestations de soumission et de dévouement à Sa Majesté l'Empereur, et en protestant de sa complète innocence quant à l'invasion des bandes Khokandes dans les possessions Russes.

"Les habitants de la ville de Khokand ont aussi fait leur soumission et leur exemple a été immédiatement suivi par le Sultan Mourad-Bek et les habitants de la ville de Margolan.

"Arrivées sous les murs de Khokand, nos troupes y ont établi un camp, où elles se trouvaient à la date des dernières nouvelles. L'état sanitaire des troupes est bon.

"Le 31 Août le Commandant-en-chef de nos troupes a reçu d'Abdourahman-Avtobatchi une lettre déclarant qu'après la victoire remportée par les Russes sur les Musulmans, l'auteur de la lettre et les Représentants de toutes les tribus nomades du Khokand demandent qu'on leur accorde la sécurité dont jouissent les habitants de la ville de Khokand et de tout le territoire traversé par les troupes Russes depuis Mahram jusqu'à la ville de Khokand. A cette lettre sont apposés soixante-dix sceaux, tenant lieu des signatures."

No. 50.

Mr. Doria to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received October* 4.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September* 27, 1875.

I TOOK the opportunity this evening to communicate to Baron Jomini the substance of your Lordship's despatch of the 20th instant, relative to the intention of the Ameer of Afghanistan to send a force to subjugate Maimena. In carrying out your Lordship's instructions, I took care to mark that your Lordship desired it to be understood that the communication was made solely to denote a friendly transmission of intelligence.

Baron Jomini acknowledged it as such, and replied that the British Government were in no wise called upon to convey this information, but that he appreciated the communication which prevented also the intelligence being received and giving rise to suspicion or surmise. His Excellency further remarked that Russia had ceded her pretensions to Maimena in behalf of the Ameer of Afghanistan at England's instance, that it bordered close on Turkestan, but no objection could be made so long as the Ameer loyally kept his action to enforcing the tranquillity of Maimena.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. DORIA.

No. 51.

Mr. Doria to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received October* 18.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 6, 1875.

BARON JOMINI read to me a paragraph from a despatch from Krasnovodsk, in which it was stated that the Ameer of Afghanistan was said to be intriguing and exciting ill-feeling among the Turkoman tribes near Merv, which, his Excellency added, is very desirous should be avoided; and he reverted to the communication which, in pursuance of an instruction from your Lordship I had recently made to his Excellency, of the friendly advice proffered by the Government of India to the Ameer of Afghanistan; the despatch was written from Krasnovodsk on the 24th July last, to which Baron Jomini made reference.

I promised to acquaint your Lordship without delay with the circumstance as reported.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. DORIA.

No. 52.

Mr. Doria to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received October* 18.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 13, 1875.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship a copy of General Kaufmann's Proclamation issued to the people of Khokand, published in the "St. Petersburgh Journal" this morning. The Proclamation calls upon the people to remain peaceably occupying themselves in business, then they will have nothing to fear from Russia. The concluding paragraph states that the ex-Khan, Khodaijir Khan, has been sent to St. Petersburgh, and will not return to be their Ruler.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. DORIA.

P.S.—Baron Jomini has informed me that Khodaijir Khan, the deposed Ruler of Khokand, is by the Emperor's command to remain at Orenburg, and not to be brought to St. Petersburgh.

W. D.

Inclosure in No. 52.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of October $\frac{1}{13}$, 1875.

DANS une correspondance du camp Russe devant la forteresse Khokande de Mahram, datée du 25 Août, et insérée dans la "Voix," nous trouvons le texte suivant de la Proclamation de son Excellence l'Aide-de-camp Général Kaufmann aux populations du Khanat de Khokand :—

"Peuple Khokand, Sartes, Kiptchaks, Kara-Kirghizes, et tous les ci-devant sujets de Khoudoïar Khan!

"Quelques ambitieux dont je tairai les noms vous ont provoqués à une guerre religeuse ('hazivat') contre les Russes. Ce 'hazivat' n'a pas de sens. Une guerre contre le Tsar Blanc, dispensateur de la paix et de la prospérité de tous les peuples soumis à son pouvoir, est une iniquité, et Dieu sera toujours contre ceux qui prennent les armes contre les Russes. Demandez aux Sartes, aux Kirghizes, sujets du grand Tsar Blanc, s'ils se sentent tranquilles et heureux sous l'égide de sa gracieuse protection. Demandez-leur si on les empêche de prier selon la loi d'Islam. Moi, qui suis revêtu des pleins-pouvoirs du Tsar Blanc, et qui gouverne par son ordre les populations du Turkestan, je puis vous affirmer que nos Sartes et nos Khirghizes prospèrent, s'enrichissent et jouissent d'une paix et d'une sécurité complètes. Le grand Tsar Blanc ne viole jamais le schariat, son Gouvernement est basé sur la justice et la loi.

"Quant à vos ambitieux, qui vous ont poussés à une guerre contre les Russes, ils l'ont fait, non pour votre bien, mais uniquement pour se saisir du pouvoir. Pour le mal

qu'ils vous ont fait, vous devez vous saisir de leurs personnes et me les livrer. Je suis venu chez vous avec mes troupes pour punir ceux qui vous ont excités à une guerre contre les Russes. Les armées Russes ne font pas de mal aux gens désarmés, mais ceux qui seront trouvés les armes à la main seront punis par mes ordres. Déposez donc les armes, retournez dans vos foyers pour vous occuper de vos affaires, et alors aucun Russe ne vous fera de mal, ne touchera à votre bien ; pour tout ce qui sera nécessaires aux troupes et ce qu'elles vous prendront, vous serez payés en argent. Telle est notre loi à nous, Russes ; les armées du grand Tsar Blanc n'en agissent jamais autrement.

"Votre ancien Khan a été envoyé, par mes ordres, de Taschkent à Pétersbourg; il ne redeviendra plus votre Souverain, car il m'est connu que Khoudoïar Khan n'avait pas l'affection du peuple Khokand.

"Le Gouverneur-Général et Commandant-en-chef des Troupes,
"Aide-de-camp Général,
(Signé) "KAUFMANN.

"*Bivouac de Mahram, le* 22 *Août*, 1875."

No. 53.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Doria.

Sir,, *Foreign Office, October* 20, 1875.

WITH reference to your despatch of the 18th September, I have to state to you that I approve of your having furnished Baron Jomini with a copy of my despatch of the 30th August, in which I directed you to take an opportunity of acquainting the Russian Government with the nature of the advice which the Viceroy of India had counselled the Ameer of Afghanistan to proffer to the Téké Turkoman tribe as regards the Russian prisoner in their hands, and their attitude towards travellers through their territories.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 54.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Doria.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 25, 1875.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy of a despatch from Prince Gortchakow,* which has been communicated to me by the Russian Ambassador, declaring the intention of the Emperor of Russia not to extend the frontiers of Russia beyond their present limits in Central Asia, either on the side of Bokhara or on that of Krasnovodsk and the Attrek, and inclosing a Memorandum reviewing the correspondence which has passed on the subject of Central Asia between the British and Russian Governments.

Her Majesty's Government highly appreciate the friendly sentiments which have dictated the language used in Prince Gorkchakow's despatch and in the Memorandum, and they feel that they cannot better reply to them than by a frank explanation of certain of the more important portions of the correspondence adverted to upon which it would appear that the views and intentions of Her Majesty's Government have been imperfectly appreciated.

With this object I inclose a Memorandum, which I have to instruct you to communicate to the Russian Government, in the same friendly manner in which the Memorandum forwarded by Prince Gortchakow was communicated to Her Majesty's Government, and to explain, in doing so, that the remarks contained in it are not offered in any spirit of controversy, but in the cordial desire to meet the evident wish of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia that no cause for misapprehension should exist in regard to the policy and intentions of the two Governments.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

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* No. 29.

Inclosure in No. 54.

Memorandum.

HER Majesty's Government have given their careful consideration to the Memorandum on Russian policy in Central Asia, which formed the inclosure to Prince Gortchakow's despatch to Count Schouvaloff of the 11th May last.

In thus presenting for examination an historical review of the communications which have passed between the Governments of Russia and England, and in reviewing a statement of their sentiments and policy on this important question, Her Majesty's Government gladly recognize the desire of the Imperial Government to avert cause of future misunderstanding by a friendly interchange of views.

Her Majesty's Government feel that they will best respond to the wishes of the Imperial Government in addressing to them this communication, by calling attention to certain statements and passages in the Memorandum which appear to Her Majesty's Government not to correspond with their appreciation of past transactions, or with the understanding which it is alike the interest of both Governments to keep in view.

In these observations Her Majesty's Government desire to avoid all reference to points of minor importance, and will confine themselves to those questions upon which it is obviously necessary that no obscurity or misapprehension should be allowed to exist on either side.

The Memorandum refers to an agreement of opinion between the Chancellor of the Empire and Lord Clarendon, on the occasion of their interview at Heidelberg in 1869, "founded on the maintenance by Russia and England of an intermediary zone," destined to separate their Asiatic possessions; adding that in "this order of ideas it was understood that Afghanistan should form an independent State which should remain outside the sphere of Russian action.

The interview in question took place after confidential communications between Lord Clarendon and Baron Brunnow, at that time Russian Ambassador in London, on the same subject.

It apears from the correspondence which took place at this period, that the "intermediary" zone, then under consideration, was intended on both sides to be at the same time a "neutral" zone; and from this point of view, Lord Clarendon distinctly informed Baron Brunnow, in April 1869, while thanking the Russian Government for the friendly feelings which had dictated the communication, that, in the opinion of the Secretary of State for India, "Afghanistan would not fulfil those conditions of a neutral territory which it was the object of the two Governments to establish, as the frontiers were ill-defined; and if the Russian forces advanced to those frontiers, disputes with the Chiefs on the border would sooner or later, but infallibly, ensue, and Russia might be compelled, however unwillingly, to disregard the arrangement she had entered into; and it was, therefore, thought advisable to propose that the Upper Oxus, which was south of Bokhara, should be the boundary line, which neither Power should permit their forces to cross. This would leave a large tract of country apparently desert, and marked on the map as belonging to the Khan of Khiva, between Afghanistan and the territory already acquired by Russia, and, if agreed to, would, it might be hoped, remove all fear of future dissension.

This proposal, as is correctly stated in the Memorandum, was declined by the Imperial Government, on the ground that it gave an extension to the frontiers of Afghanistan, which they could not admit; and this negative answer put an end to the confidential communications between the Russian Ambassador and Lord Clarendon, on the question of a "neutral zone."

But the Memorandum goes on to say that, after being definitively closed in London, this question was reopened at St. Petersburgh by Mr. Forsyth, on the occasion of his visit in 1869, and that, as a result of the exchange of views between that functionary and the Imperial Cabinet, it was "agreed:"—

1. That the territories in the actual possession of Shere Ali should be considered as forming the limits of Afghanistan.

2. That the Ameer should not seek to exercise any influence or any interference beyond those limits, and that the English Government should use every means to restrain him from any aggressive attempt.

3. That on its side the Imperial Government would employ all its influence to restrain the Ameer of Bokhara from making any attack on Afghan territory.

On this statement Her Majesty's Government think it desirable to remark that whatever may have been the nature of the personal communications between Mr. Forsyth and the Imperial Cabinet, it formed no part of his instructions to reopen the question of

a "neutral zone," nor does it appear that in the general agreement of opinion under the three heads cited above was this question in any way involved.

So far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, the idea of a "neutral zone" was definitively abandoned at the time of Lord Clarendon's communication in April 1869, as one which, upon close examination, had been found to be wholly incompatible with the object which both Governments alike had in view throughout these discussions.

The discussions which took place in the succeeding years as to the delimitation of the frontiers of Afghanistan happily terminated by the "full and entire" adhesion of the Imperial Cabinet in their despatch of the 19th January, 1873, to the line of demarcation proposed by Lord Granville in his despatch of October 1872, had exclusive reference to the recognition of Afghanistan as an independent State which should remain external to the action of Russia.

Her Majesty's Government insisted on including Badakshan and Wakhan within the limits of Afghanistan, because such delimitation was, in their view, strictly in accordance with historical facts, and, therefore, necessary, in order to satisfy the legitimate claims of the Ameer.

Her Majesty's Government have always cordially acknowledged the friendly and conciliatory course taken by the Imperial Cabinet in accepting the views thus set forth by Great Britain, and in thus removing, it is hoped, the only remaining obstacle to a complete understanding between the two Governments with respect to the position of Afghanistan. But it is apparent from the résumé of the agreement given at the close of the Memorandum, and the paragraphs which follow, that the Imperial Cabinet is of opinion that in arriving at an understanding with respect to Afghanistan, the common policy of the two Governments has been completely fulfilled, and that it is a part of such understanding that entire liberty of action is left to Russia in all the territories lying between her own frontier and that of Afghanistan.

It is with reference to this opinion that it is essential that the views of Her Majesty's Government should be clearly explained.

The point of departure of the two Governments in exchanging their views was the mutual desire to arrive at some common understanding as to the best means of preventing the contact of their respective possessions in Central Asia.

Various combinations were proposed and discussed with this object,—the creation of a neutral zone, the delimitation of frontiers, the recognition of the Oxus as a line which neither Power should permit their forces to cross, the maintenance of Afghanistan and Bokhara as independent States, the former under British, and the latter under Russian influence.

This last combination, as represented in the Memorandum under consideration, appears to be the only form of an arrangement with regard to which any definite understanding has been found practicable, and Her Majesty's Government have always fully appreciated the conciliatory spirit in which this question has been approached by the Russian Government.

But it is obvious that the settlement made with respect to Afghanistan can only partially effect the object which the two Governments desired to attain, namely, that of averting possible causes of future collision between them.

Her Majesty's Government fully accept the assurances of the Imperial Cabinet as to the extension of the southern frontiers of Russian territory; but they equally admit the force of the arguments which have been advanced to explain the repeated annexations which, in spite of these assurances, have taken place.

However sincere, therefore, the desire of the Russian Government to avoid future extension of territorial responsibilities, Her Majesty's Government cannot regard the present line of Russian frontier as fixed and immovable. The recurrence of similar causes may lead to similar results, and Her Majesty's Government could not regard with indifference, and as a matter with which they have no concern, further occupation and absorption by Russia of the regions which still separate Afghanistan from the Russian territory.

The grounds of the apprehensions entertained by Her Majesty's Government on this subject have been so fully stated on former occasions, that it is only necessary now to refer to previous communications, and particularly to Lord Granville's despatch to Lord A. Loftus of the 7th January, 1874, which discusses them at length.

Whatever may be the ultimate destiny of Russia in the course of its civilizing mission in Central Asia, it is impossible not to see that, in view of the present conditions of the Turkoman tribes, of the relations in which they stand to the Ruler of Afghanistan on the one hand, and those between that Ruler and the Government of India on the other, that each successive advance of the Russian frontier towards Afghanistan may involve complications which it is equally the interest of both England and Russia to avoid, and may

raise up the most serious obstacles to the continued pursuance of the policy which has hitherto guided both Powers alike to maintain intact the integrity of Afghan territory.

This is an object to which Her Majesty's Government attach the highest importance, and they must reserve to themselves the most complete liberty of action under all future contingencies as to the measures which may, in their opinion, be necessary to secure it. They cannot but feel that such an event, for instance, as the occupation of Merv, which would bring the line of Russian territory into direct contact with Afghan territory, would arouse the susceptibilities of the Ameer to the highest degree, and possibly involve him in a common course of defensive action with the Turkoman tribes upon his borders. Under such circumstances it is unnecessary to observe how difficult it might be for the Imperial Government to maintain a policy of strict abstention in accordance with its present assurances, or how impossible it might be for Her Majesty's Government to exert any effectual control over the actions of the Ameer, without undertaking responsibilities which they would most reluctantly assume, and which would virtually involve the very result which both Governments desire to avert, viz., the contact of the two Powers in Central Asia.

Whatever may be the desire of both Governments to act in concert in bringing the agencies of civilization to bear upon the wild and predatory races of the regions which separate their dominions, the time has not arrived when such a co-operation could be made intelligible to the rulers and people of the Khanates.

The presence of two centres of European power and influence in their midst would wear in their eyes an aspect of mutual menace and rivalry, and encourage hopes and speculations unfavourable to the growth of the relations between England and Russia which are an important condition of success in the task on which both are engaged, each in their separate sphere, of maintaining order and promoting civilization in their Asiatic possessions.

Nor can it be denied that the atmosphere of suspicion, intrigue, and discord which would surround the military authorities of both Powers, might at any time provoke an attitude of reciprocal distrust which might frustrate the wishes, and defeat the deliberate policy, of their respective Governments, and react perniciously on the public opinion of Russia on the one hand, and of England and India on the other.

It is for these reasons that Her Majesty's Government have always deprecated the further extension of Russian territory towards the Afghan borders, and that they have now received with the most sincere satisfaction the assurances conveyed in Prince Gortchakow's despatch as to the enlightened conviction of His Imperial Majesty that such extension, either on the side of Bokhara, of Krasnovodsk, or of the Attrek, is contrary to Russian interests, and that formal orders have been given that all future action in those regions is to be strictly confined to the defence of existing limits and the protection of property and commerce from pillage and brigandage.

No. 55.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received November* 1.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 27, 1875.

BARON JOMINI informed me yesterday that the Government had received intelligence of the deposition by his subjects of Nasr Eddin, the Khan of Khokand, lately installed by the Russian Governor-General of Turkestan, and that he had fled with a few followers to Chodjent.

Baron Jomini added that the previous Khan had carried off with him a large amount of treasure, but that Nasr Eddin had reached Chodjent without property of any kind.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 56.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received November* 15.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November* 9, 1875.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt, on the 1st instant, of your Lordship's despatch of the 25th ultimo, transmitting copy of a despatch from Prince Gortchakow, accompanied by a Memorandum, reviewing the correspondence which has

passed on the subject of Central Asia between the British and Russian Governments, which had been communicated to your Lordship by the Russian Ambassador.

On the following day I waited on Baron Jomini, when I read to him your Lordship's despatch, and placed in his hands, in conformity with your Lordship's instructions, a copy of the Memorandum in reply to the Memorandum communicated to your Lordship by Count Schouvaloff. In doing so I fully explained to his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government highly appreciated the friendly sentiments expressed in Prince Gortchakow's despatch and in the Russian Memorandum, and that the remarks in the Memorandum which I placed in his hands were not offered in any spirit of controversy, but with a cordial desire to meet the wish of His Imperial Majesty, that no cause for misapprehensions should exist in regard to the policy and intentions of the two Governments.

Baron Jomini expressed his appreciation of the conciliatory and courteous sentiments contained in your Lordship's despatch, and observed that by this frank and friendly exchange of opinions the interests of both countries could best be served.

In order that his Excellency might accurately convey to the Emperor the sentiments expressed in your Lordship's despatch I left that despatch in his hands.

Baron Jomini informed me yesterday that, on reading the Memorandum I had placed in his hands, he was happy to observe that all points which might give rise to sterile discussion had been omitted, and he again expressed his great satisfaction at the friendly tone and the conciliatory spirit in which the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government had been conveyed.

Baron Jomini stated that he had forwarded a copy of your Lordship's despatch, and of the Memorandum, to the Emperor at Livadia, and awaited His Majesty's orders in regard to the reply, which will be communicated to your Lordship by Count Schouvaloff, and the draft of which he had submitted to His Majesty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 57.

Lord G. Hamilton to Lord Tenterden.—(Received November 19.)

My Lord, *India Office, November 18, 1875.*

IN continuation of this Office letter of the 21st August last, I am directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to forward herewith, for the information of the Earl of Derby, copy of a letter from the Government of India, having reference to the relations between the Ameer of Afghanistan and the Téké Turkomans, and to efforts made by the Ameer to procure the release of a Russian captive at Merv.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 57.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury.

My Lord, *Simla, September 30, 1875.*

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the papers containing the sentiments of the Cabul Government on the Turkoman question, and an expression of their intention to offer, as far as may be practicable, advice to the Téké tribe to abstain from depredations.

2. We also inclose an extract from the Cabul Diary of the $\frac{10th}{13th}$ September, from which it will be seen that an effort has been made by the Ameer to procure the release of the Russian captive at Merv through the mediation of Jewish emissaries from Herat.

We have, &c.
(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
W. MUIR.
A. EDEN.
A. CLARKE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 57.

Mr. Thornton to Mr. Aitchison.

Lahore, July 17, 1875.

IN continuation of my letter dated 9th July, I am desired to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, translation of a letter received from the British Agent at Cabul, who had communicated to his Highness the Ameer the purport of the despatch addressed to the Agent on the Turkoman question.

Inclosure 3 in No. 57.

The Agent at Cabul to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

(Translation.) *July 5*, 1875.

I COMMUNICATED to the Ameer in presence of the Sadr-i-Azem, the abstract of your letter dated 22nd June, 1875, to me, and his Highness observed that he would give a reply after deliberation. He, however, remarked that "in reality the Turkomans are bad characters and a tribe wanting in faith. When the son of Kousheed Khan (Chief of Merv, Shahjehan) waited on me, I exhorted and advised him not to stand against the Russians." A reply in this matter will follow as soon as it is obtained.

Inclosure 4 in No. 57.

The Agent at Cabul to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

(Translation.) *July 29*, 1875.

WITH reference to your letter dated 22nd June, 1875, to my address, in the matter of the Turkoman tribe, the Sadr-i-Azem observed to-day, by order of the Ameer, as follows:—

"The lawless character and depredations of the Turkomans of Merv, Shahjehan, &c., are as evident as daylight; consequently, with regard to the consequences of the short-sightedness of these people, the Governor of Herat has permanently deputed about 500 or 600 sowars to Ghorian to guard travellers, &c. Now also, through respect to the friendship existing between the British and the Cabul Governments, the Cabul authorities will advise and exhort them, as far as possible (to desist from misbehaviour)."

I submit this letter in the Persian language, after perusal by the Ameer and the Sadr-i-Azem.

Inclosure 5 in No. 57.

Extract from Cabul Diary, dated September 10–13, 1875.

AS the British Government desired the Cabul Durbar to take steps for the release of a Russian officer imprisoned in Merv, Shahjehan, the Mustowfee (at Herat) has, under orders, sent some Jews to that place to make arrangements for the above object. None but Jews can go to that country through fear of being sold into slavery.*

No. 58.

Lord G. Hamilton to Lord Tenterden.—(Received November 22.)

My Lord, *India Office, November* 20, 1875.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a despatch from the Government of India, dated the 14th October, 1875, with inclosed Cabul Diaries.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

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* This paragraph refers to paragraph 5 of No. 1728 P., dated 14th June, 1875, from Foreign Office to Secretary to Government, Punjab. Instead of "a Russian officer" "a Russian soldier" should be understood.
(Signed) F. R. POLLOCK, *Commissioner.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 58.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury.

My Lord, *Simla, October* 14, 1875.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, further papers relative to the affairs of Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
W. MUIR.
A. EDEN.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 58.

Colonel Sir F. R. Pollock to Mr. Aitchison.

September 1, 1875.

SUBMITS copy of translation of Cabul Diary from the 24th to the 26th August, 1875, inclusive.

Extract from Cabul Diary from the 24th to the 26th August, 1875, inclusive.

The day before yesterday the Ameer summoned the Agent to the private serai (Seracha-khas, meaning a private apartment) and observed that Naib Mahomed Alum Khan had written to His Highness that a Mahommedan, by name Aishan Khwaja, Samarcandi, had, as a Russian Envoy, crossed the Oxus with a murrasila from the Russians to His Highness, and had, before obtaining permission, proceeded to Balkh, with a view to coming to Cabul. Also that His Highness wrote to the Naib that should the above Mahommedan Envoy have already arrived (at Balkh) with the murrasila above-mentioned, he should be sent to Cabul; that the Envoy will probably arrive at Mazar-i-Sharif in a day or two, and that the Naib has camped at Aibak to receive him suitably and to take accounts from Afghan officials at that place.

Inclosure 3 in No. 58.

Colonel Sir F. R. Pollock to Mr. Aitchison.

September 6, 1875.

SUBMITS copy of translation of Cabul Diary from the 27th to the 30th August, 1875, inclusive.

Extract from Cabul Diary from the 27th to the 30th August, 1875, inclusive.

Yesterday the Ameer received a letter from Aibak from Naib Mahomed Alum Khan to the following effect:—

"Aishan Khwaja, Buzurg Samarcandi,* the Russian Envoy, has arrived at Mazar-i-Shareef with three or four servants, and by the grace of God will reach Aibak in two or three days. As directed by you, I will send him to Cabul in an honourable manner. The object of his deputation has not yet become known to me, but a messenger sent by me to obtain news in Samarcand has returned, and states that it was rumoured at that place that this Envoy had been appointed to recover a fugitive of Samarcand. I do not think this statement correct. However, when the Envoy waits on you, his object will become known to your Highness."

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* *Lit.*, an elder in Samarcand.

Inclosure 4 in No. 58.

Colonel Sir F. R. Pollock to Mr. Aitchison.

September 8, 1875.

SUBMITS copy of translation of Cabul Diary from the 31st August to the 2nd September, 1875, inclusive.

Extract from Cabul Diary from the 31*st August to the* 2*nd September*, 1875, *inclusive.*

The day before yesterday the Ameer received a letter, dated the 26th August, 1875, from Aibak, from Naib Mahomed Alum Khan, to the effect that on the 4th August, 1875, the Russian Envoy, Aishan Khwaja, Buzurg Samarcandi, reached Aibak, and after halting one day with the Naib, left on the morning of the 26th idem for Cabul; that the Naib has appointed an Agent to escort and entertain him as far as the Balkh border, and that His Highness should kindly arrange for his being escorted thence to Cabul. In compliance with this request the Ameer deputed Mahomed Aslum Khan, late Kotwal of Cabul, to bring the Envoy. The latter will reach Cabul in two or three days.

Inclosure 5 in No. 58.

Colonel Sir F. R. Pollock to Mr. Aitchison.

September 13, 1875.

SUBMITS copy of translation of Cabul Diary from the 3rd to the 6th September, 1875, inclusive

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Extract from Cabul Diary from the 3*rd to the* 6*th September*, 1875, *inclusive.*

Yesterday Aishan Khwaja, Buzurg Samarcandi, the Russian Envoy, arrived at Cabul with four or five servants.

A house in the Bagh-i-Shahi has been assigned for his residence, and cooked food is given him from the Ameer's own kitchen. Mahomed Aslum Khan, who was sent to bring him, is deputed to entertain him. No official was sent to meet him (meaning on his near approach, no "istiqbal"). Yesterday in the afternoon he was summoned by the Sadr-i-Azem, and he went and delivered the murrasila of the Russian Governor (at Tashkend) to address of the Ameer. He stopped only four or five minutes with the Sadr-i-Azem and then returned. The Sadr-i-Azem took the murrasila to the Ameer, and His Highness gave it to the (English) Agent for perusal. Its contents are as follows:—

"I (the Governor-General) remained for about one and a-half years at St. Petersburgh to settle some matters. Two letters were received from your Highness at that place. In one you announced the appointment of Sirdar Abdoola Khan as your heir apparent, and we were highly gratified. The friendship existing between Russia and Afghanistan will increase and become firm owing to the recent alliance between England and Russia, and I hope that the countries under the protection of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor and Her Majesty the Queen will enjoy peace and comfort."

The Envoy has not yet waited on the Ameer, probably he will do so to-morrow or the day after. An account of his interview, together with a copy of the murrasila, will follow.

Inclosure 6 in No. 58.

Colonel Sir F. R. Pollock to Mr. Aitchison.

September 15, 1875.

SUBMITS copy of translation of Cabul Diary from the 7th to the 9th instant, inclusive.

Extract from Cabul Diary from the 7*th to the* 9*th September*, 1875, *inclusive.*

Yesterday Aishan Khwaja, Buzurg Samarcandi, the Russian Envoy, waited on the Ameer in the private small serai for about ten minutes only. It is reported that no conver-

sation except formal inquiry after the health of the heads of the two Governments (viz., Afghanistan and Russia) took place. The Envoy then returned (to the Bagh-i-Shahi). The British Agent obtained in Durbar a copy (herewith inclosed) of the murrasila made in his presence (meaning that he can vouch for its literal and exact correctness) which the Envoy has brought for the Ameer in reply to His Highness' two murrasilas dated the 6th Zilhij, 1290, copies of which were forwarded with Diary of the 29th January, 1874. As regards the paragraph of this murrasila commencing with "Murawidah-i-dosti fimaben," and ending with "Khush guzran Mekunand,"* the Cabul authorities observe privately as follows:—

"This time the Russian Government has made itself partner in the protection of Afghanistan. This paragraph is of a new tone. God knows what State secrets are concealed in it."

Translation of the Murrasila from General von Kaufmann,† Governor-General and Commander-in-chief of Turkestan, to the Ameer, dated 8th Jamadi-ul-Sani (July 12, 1875.)

(After titles, compliments, &c.)

By order of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, I stopped for about one half-year at St. Petersburgh to settle some matters of this country (viz., Russian Turkestan). Now by command of him (the Emperor) I have returned to Tashkend, and consider it advisable (*lit.* a friendly trouble) to inform your Highness of my arrival. During my sojourn at St. Petersburgh I was gratified with the receipt of two friendly communications from you. In one of these murrasilas you mentioned the appointment of one of your sons, Sirdar Abdoolla Khan, as your heir-apparent. I hope that the [A] chain of friendship existing between Russia and Afghanistan will in future increase and become firm, owing to the recent alliance between the Emperor of Russia and the Queen of England. This (alliance) has tended to the fulfilment of the best wishes of the two families, and I doubt not that this alliance of the two Powers will be an omen (*lit.*, a mark or sign) for those countries (the people of) which under the protection of the Emperor of Russia and the Queen of England live in great peace and comfort. [B] May God save you for the sake of your dignity and the comfort of (your) people! And may you live long and enjoy happiness!

Inclosure 7 in No. 58.

Colonel Sir F. R. Pollock to Mr. Aitchison.

September 20, 1875.

SUBMITS copy of translation of Cabul Diary from the 10th to the 13th September, 1875, inclusive.

Extract from Cabul Diary from the 10th to the 13th September, 1875, inclusive.

Aishan Khwaja, Buzurg Samarcandi, requested the Durbar authorities to permit him to return without delay to Tashkend. The Ameer, therefore, directed the Sadr-i-Azem to prepare the draft of a friendly murrasila in reply to the one received from the Governor-General at Tashkend, so that the above Envoy may be allowed to go back as soon as possible. The Sadr-i-Azem submitted a draft to-day, but His Highness ordered him to think over its tone, &c., for one or two days, and then write a fair copy and make it over to the Envoy. In reply to a query by the Ameer in the first interview, the Envoy said that it was given out in Tashkend that 40,000 troops had been deputed from Russia to Russian Turkestan.

No. 59.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 29, 1875.

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship a copy of a letter from the Government of India having reference to the relations between the Ameer of Afghanistan and the Téké Turko-

* In translation I have marked this paragraph between A. and B.—(Signed) F. R. POLLOCK, *Commissioner.*

† The actual title used, "adio tant," is not understood here.—(Signed) F. R. POLLOCK, *Commissioner.*

mans;* and I have to instruct your Excellency to communicate to the Russian Government that portion of the letter which reports the efforts made by the Ameer to procure the release of the Russian captive at Merv.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 60.

Lord G. Hamilton to Lord Tenterden.—(Received January 7.)

My Lord, *India Office, January 6, 1876.*

I AM directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to forward herewith, for the information of the Earl of Derby, copy of a letter from the Government of India, with inclosures, relative to the affairs of Afghanistan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 60.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury.

My Lord, *Fort William, November 19, 1875.*

IN continuation of our despatch dated 14th October, 1875, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, papers relative to the affairs of Afghanistan.

We have, &c.
(Signed) H. W. NORMAN.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 60.

Colonel Sir F. R. Pollock to Mr. Aitchison.

September 27, 1875.

SUBMITS copy of translation of Cabul Diary from the 17th to the 20th September, 1875, inclusive.

Extracts from Cabul Diary from the 17th to the 20th September, 1875, inclusive.

A copy of the murrasila which the Ameer has given to the Russian Envoy to address of the Governor-General at Tashkend is herewith submitted. The Envoy received the following khillut, and having obtained the Ameer's permission, left to-day for his destination in presence of the British Agent:—

The Envoy—
1. One Umritsur abra choga.
2. One Cashmere shawl.
3. One Yurgha horse.
4. Cash, 500 rupees.

His four servants—
1. Four broad-cloth chogas.
2. Four Peshawuree embroidered lungis.

Mahomed Aslum Khan (mentioned in diary of 2nd instant) has accompanied him to escort him as far as Balkh. From Balkh to Bokhara, Naib Mahomed Alum Khan will depute an agent for escort. In reply to inquiry, the Envoy said at the time of his departure (from Cabul), that when he left Tashkend, a Russian officer left with some troops for

* Inclosure in No. 57.

Ghulcha (Kuldja), with a view to attacking Kashgar and Yarkand for the purpose of annexing them to Russian territory. Also that the majority of the 40,000 persons given out as coming (or about to come) from Russia to Tashkend are Russian subjects desiring to dwell in Russian Turkestan, and others are Russian troops.

The Ameer to General von Kaufmann.

(Abstract Translation.) *September* 19, 1875.

I received your friendly letter of 8th Jamadi-ul-Sani, in reply to my two murasilas by hand of your Envoy Aishan Khwaja Bazurg, and was highly gratified with its contents, from which it appeared that you had returned from St. Petersburgh to Tashkend, and in which you gave happy news of the confirmation of the friendship existing between Afghanistan and Russia. By the grace of God nothing contrary to the said friendship shall take place on my part, and the dispatch of friendly communications should be considered one of the principles of our friendship. I am gratified with the news contained in the last paragraph of your letter regarding the confirmation of the alliance of the (two) Great Powers (viz., Russia and England), as this alliance will increase the comfort and security of the creatures of God "Khalk-ula." Continue to afford me happiness by giving information as to your health, &c.

No. 61.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received February 7.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 2*, 1876.

I HAVE the honour to inclose an article from the "Invalide Russe," giving an account of the late operations of the Russian army in Khokand under the command of General Skobeleff.

Since the publication of this information, telegraphic intelligence has been received that Andijan has been taken by General Skobeleff.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 61.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of January $\frac{12}{24}$, 1876.

"L'INVALIDE RUSSE" publie les renseignements suivants sur les opérations de notre détachement de Namangan (Asie Centrale) :—

"Le Commandant-en-chef du corps d'opérations au Khanat de Khokand, en laissant un corps détaché dans la section de Namangan, nouvellement annexée à l'Empire, prévoyait que l'ordre ne pourrait être définitivement et solidement rétabli dans notre nouvelle province frontière que quand les forces des Kiptchaks, qui forment l'élément prédominant de la population du Khanat, seraient brisées, vu que les Kiptchaks, malgré toute une série de défaites qui leur avaient été infligés pendant la dernière expédition au Khokand, continuaient à terroriser le reste de la population et à l'exciter à une guerre religieuse ('hazavat') contre nous.

"En présence de ces faits, l'Aide-de-camp Général de Kaufmann, en quittant la section militaire de Namangan, avait laissé au Général-Major Skobélew, Commandant de détachement de Namangan, des instructions lui prescrivant de se mettre en marche vers la fin de Décembre, avec une partie de son détachement, vers la contrée d'Eki-Sou-Arassy, située entre les rivières Naryn et Kara-Daria, centre de la population Kiptchake, afin d'infliger à ces nomades une sévère punition, et cela à une époque de l'année où ils sont forcés de rester avec leurs biens et leurs familles dans leurs campements d'hiver, ne pouvant pas alors se réfugier dans les montagnes, couverts de neiges profondes. Après cette opération, notre détachement devait tomber sur Andidjan ou tout autre centre des forces ennemies, détruire celles-ci ou les disperser, et fournir ainsi au reste de la population la possibilité de rentrer dans le calme dont on l'avait fait sortir par la violence.

"D'après des télégrammes qu'on vient de recevoir, la première partie de ce programme a été remplie avec un grand succès. Le 25 Décembre, le Général-Major Skobélew quitta Namangan à la tête de 2,800 hommes, et traversant le Naryn, arriva le 27 sur la Kara-

Daria. De ce point il envoya la colonne du Baron Meller Zokomelsky reconnaître la rive gauche. Pendant cette reconnaissance, il éclata une fusillade dans l'un des villages. Les nouvelles arrivées au détachement indiquaient que l'ennemi s'était concentré en masses très-considérables à Marghelan et Andidjan. Le 28 le détachement du Général-Major Skobélew continua sa marche, en remontant la Kara-Daria, et rasa les villages abandonnés par les habitants. Des bandes de l'avant-garde ennemie commencèrent bientôt à se montrer aux environs de la rivière et sur nos lignes de communications, et à mesure que nos troupes avançaient les Kiptchaks se repliaient sur Andidjan, où venait aussi se concentrer les rassemblements de Marghelan.

"Les trois derniers jours du mois de Décembre, il faisait des froids de 15 degrés R., mais nos troupes continuaient vaillamment leur marche, n'ayant en tout que cinq malades. Les tentes de feutre dont on s'était muni ont considérablement contribué à ce résultat favorable. En route, on rasait toutes les habitations qu'on rencontrait. Païtok, centre principal de la population Kiptchake, fut détruite de fond en comble. De ce point, on détacha une forte colonne dans les villages des montagnes.

"Se voyant menacée d'une ruine complète, une partie de la population Kiptchake commença à envoyer des députations pour demander grâce. Le Général-Major Skobélew promit d'épargner les Kiptchaks si, pour prouver leur entière et sincère soumission, ils lui livraient les instigateurs du 'hazavat.'

"Le 31 Décembre et le 1er Janvier notre cavalerie atteignit une bande de Kiptchaks en retraite, la mit en déroute et poursuivit les fuyards, qui perdirent beaucoup de monde, jusqu'au village de Yanghi-Sabaka. Après avoir nettoyé la rive droite de la Kara-Daria, le Général-Major Skobélew passa le fleuve à gué le 2 Janvier, à la hauteur de Sarhab, et s'établit dans un camp fortifié sur la rive gauche, en ordonnant de jeter un pont sur le canal ('aryk') de Moussoulman-Koul. Pendant la reconnaissance qui suivit, l'ennemi reçut nos troupes à coups de fusil. Dans cet engagement, l'Enseigne de Cosaques, Boïalsky, fut blessé à la poitrine. Tous les villages qui ont fait leur soumission et ont commencé à payer la contribution dont on les a frappés ont été épargnés par nos troupes.

"A Andidjan, où vient de se rendre Abdourahman-Avtobatchi, qui excite à la resistance toute la population des alentours, se trouvent concentrées des forces très-considérables, montant, d'après des renseignements dignes de foi, à 10,000 cavaliers, 5,000 sarbazes, et 15,000 habitants armés de fusils, Le Général-Major Skobélew, pensant que repasser le Naryn sans avoir dispersé ces rassemblements et infligé une punition exemplaire à la ville d'Andidjan serait un acte de nature à ébranler notre prestige et à compromettre les résultats déjà acquis, a décidé, si ses Proclamations n'avaient pas d'effet, de prendre la ville d'Andidjan de vive force. Il se proposait de commencer le bombardement le 3 Janvier.

"La santé et l'esprit des troupes sont excellents."

No. 62.

Prince Gortchakow to Count Schouvaloff.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Schouvaloff, February* 25.)

St. Pétersbourg, le $\frac{3}{15}$ *Février*, 1876.

SA Majesté l'Empereur a pris connaissance avec un vif intérêt du Mémorandum accompagnant une dépêche de Lord Derby, dont Lord A. Loftus a donné lecture en mon absence au Gérant du Ministère Impérial.

Je joins ci-près copie de cette pièce qui sert de réponse à la notice que votre Excellence avait été chargé de communiquer au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique en date du 11 Mai, 1875, concernant les relations des deux Gouvernements dans l'Asie Centrale.

Notre auguste Maître y a relevé avec satisfaction le désir amical de prévenir par de franches explications toute cause de malentendu entre les deux Cabinets. Sa Majesté apprécie également la largeur de vues avec laquelle Lord Derby écarte les discussions de détail et les restrictions que ne comportent point l'état mal défini des contrées sur lesquelles les deux Gouvernements ont à exercer leur influence.

Veuillez dire à son Excellence, d'ordre de notre auguste Maître, que nous adhérons entièrement aux conclusions d'après lesquelles, en maintenant de part et d'autre, l'arrangement convenu, quant aux limites de l'Afghanistan qui demeurerait en dehors de la sphère d'action de la Russie, les deux Cabinets considéreraient comme closes les discussions reconnues peu pratiques relativement à la zone intermédiaire, tout en conservant leur pleine liberté d'actions, ils se régleraient d'après le désir mutuel de tenir un juste compte

de leurs intérêts et de leurs nécessités respectives, en évitant dans la mesure du possible un contact immédiat entre eux ainsi que des collisions entre les Etats Asiates placés dans le rayon de leur influence.

Nous avons la conviction qu'en se maintenant sur ce terrain et en s'inspirant d'un esprit d'équité et de bon vouloir réciproque, les deux Cabinets réussiront à consolider entre eux les relations amicales si heureusement établies au profit de la paix générale en Europe et en Asie.

Votre Excellence peut réitérer à Lord Derby l'assurance qu'il peut compter dans ce but sur notre franche coopération.

Agréez, &c.

(Translation.)

St. Petersburgh, February $\frac{3}{15}$, 1876.

HIS Majesty the Emperor has learned with much interest the contents of the Memorandum accompanying a despatch from Lord Derby, which Lord A. Loftus read, in my absence, to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I inclose herewith a copy of this document, which is a reply to the Memorandum dated the 11th May, 1875, which your Excellency was instructed to communicate to the Principal Secretary of State of Her Britannic Majesty regarding the relations of the two Governments in Central Asia.

Our august Master has learnt with satisfaction the friendly desire, therein expressed, to prevent, by frank explanations, any cause of misunderstanding between the two Cabinets. His Majesty appreciates likewise the breadth of view with which Lord Derby puts on one side discussions of detail and restrictions which are inapplicable in view of the ill-defined condition of the countries over which the two Governments have to exercise their influence.

Have the goodness to inform his Excellency, by order of our august Master, that we entirely agree in the conclusion that, while maintaining, on either side, the arrangement come to as regards the limits of Afghanistan, which is to remain outside the sphere of Russian action, the two Cabinets should regard as terminated the discussions relative to the intermediate zone, which have been recognized as unpractical; that, while retaining entire freedom of action, they should be guided by a mutual desire to pay due regard to their respective interests and necessities, by avoiding, as far as possible, any immediate contact with each other, and any collisions between the Asiatic States placed within the circle of their influence.

We are convinced that by keeping to this principle, and cultivating feelings of equity and reciprocal goodwill, the two Cabinets will succeed in consolidating the friendly relations so happily established between them, for the advantage of the general peace in Europe and Asia.

Your Excellency can renew to Lord Derby the assurance that he may reckon on our frank co-operation for this purpose.

Accept, &c.

No. 63.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, February 29*, 1876.

THE Russian Ambassador called upon me on the 25th instant, and alluded to a report, to which I understood from him that General Kaufmann had given credence, to the effect that the British authorities in India had furnished the Ameer of Kashgar with military instructors, had aided him in drilling and disciplining a considerable force, and had also supplied him with large amounts of arms and ammunition.

A few hours after this interview I met Lord Salisbury, and I learned from him, what had already been my own impression, that the report in question was entirely unfounded, that no military instructors had been sent to Kashgar from India, nor had any arms been supplied at any time, except a few *armes de luxe* sent as a present for the personal use of the Chief.

I lost no time in forwarding this information to Count Schouvaloff, and I pointed out that it illustrated the way in which reports are spread about by the natives in those countries either with the view of making mischief or from mere idle love of gossip.

No. 64.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received March* 20.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, March* 15, 1876.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship a notification published in the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" from the "Official Gazette," stating that on the report of the Commander-in-chief of the military district of Turkestan, His Majesty the Emperor had decreed that the territory recently occupied by the Russian troops, and forming, up to the year 1875, the Khanate of Khokand, shall be incorporated in the Russian Empire, and converted into the Province of Fergan.

The Governor-General of Turkestan is charged to organize the administration of this province, by means of a provisional arrangements as was introduced in the section, of Zeravschansk and the Amou-Daria.

This arrangement will be later submitted to the supreme sanction of the Emperor.

Inclosure in No. 64.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of March $\frac{2}{14}$, 1876.

LE 19 Février, sur un rapport du Commandant-en-chef des troupes de la circonscription militaire du Turkestan, Sa Majesté l'Empereur a daigné ordonner les dispositions suivantes :—

Le territoire récemment occupé par les troupes Russes et formant jusqu'à l'année 1875 le Khanat de Khokand sera incorporé dans l'Empire et converti en Province de Fergan.

Le Gouverneur-Général du Turkestan est chargé d'en organiser l'administration, en tenant compte des conditions locales, au moyen d'un règlement provisoire à l'instar de celui introduit dans les sections de Zeravschansk et d'Amou-Daria. Ce règlement sera soumis en son temps à la sanction suprême. Les dépenses de cette nouvelle province seront couvertes par les recettes qu'on percevra des populations, et comptabitité en sera réglée sur les mêmes bases que dans les sections d'Amou-Daria, Kouldja et Zeravschansk.

No. 65.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received April* 3.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, March* 27, 1876.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 15th instant, I have now the honour to inclose to your Lordship a copy of the Imperial Ukase addressed to the Senate, as published by the "Official Gazette," annexing the Khanate of Khokand to the Imperial Dominions under the title of the Province of Ferghanah.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 65.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of March $\frac{6}{18}$, 1876.

UKASE DE SA MAJESTÉ L'EMPEREUR AU SÉNAT DIRIGEANT.—En vue d'assurer la sécurité de la frontière sud-est du Turkestan, nous avons jugé opportun d'incorporer à l'Empire le territoire récemment occupé par nos troupes et constituant jusqu'à l'année 1875 le Khanat du Khokand. Nous ordonnons de le réorganiser en Province de Ferganah, qui fera partie du Gouvernement général et de la circonscription militaire du Turkestan. En conséquence la haute administration de cette nouvelle province sera confié au Gouverneur-Général du Turkestan et l'administration locale à un Gouverneur militaire, qui sera en même temps investi du commandement des troupes cantonnées dans cette province.

Le Gouverneur-Général du Turkestan est chargé d'organiser l'administration spéciale

de cette province en tenant compte des circonstances du moment et des conditions locales, au moyen d'un règlement provisoire qui sera sanctionné dans les voies ordinaires.

No. 66.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(Received April 27.)

My Lord, *India Office, April 27, 1876.*

I AM directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to forward herewith, for the information of the Earl of Derby, copy of a letter from the Government of India, with inclosures, relative to the affairs of Afghanistan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 66.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury.

My Lord, *Fort William, March 10, 1876.*

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, papers relative to the affairs of Afghanistan.

We have, &c.
(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
W. MUIR.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 66.

Colonel Sir F. R. Pollock to Mr. Thornton.

February 7, 1876.

SUBMITS copy of translation of Cabul Diary from the 28th to the 31st January, 1876, inclusive.

Extract from Cabul Diary from the 28th to the 31st January, 1876, inclusive.

A messenger of the King of Bokhara lately brought a murrasila from the Russian Governor-General (in Central Asia) in reply to one forwarded by the Ameer on 19th September, 1875 (see Cabul Diary of 20th September, 1875), and a copy of the same is inclosed.

Abstract Translation of Murrasila, dated 27th October, 1875, from General von Kaufmann, Governor-General of Russian Turkestan and Commander-in-chief, to the Ameer.

Your friendly murrasila of 19th September, 1875, reached me at Khojend. You must have heard that three months before its arrival I had been deputed by the Emperor with troops to quell the disturbances raised in Khokand. These disturbances took place on 1st Rajab (3rd August, 1875), and Khudayar Khan, the Ruler, having fled (from Khokand) took refuge in Russian Turkestan. I was obliged to proceed against Khokand with troops. I defeated Kipchak, Kirghiz, and Khokand rebels near the Fort of Makhram, and took possession of the Khokand city (where no fighting took place), and appointed the eldest son of Khudayar Khan, viz., Nasrudin Beg, to the Chiefship. His Chiefship was previously accepted by Moollas and other people, but they subsequently forced him to become an enemy of the Russian Government. Having entered into negotiations with him, I returned to Namangan viâ the right bank of the Sir, and to avoid future difficulties posted some troops there. After a few days I was informed that disturbances had again been raised in Khokand, and that the young Chief had taken flight to our territory. Now

I have posted troops at Namangan and other frontier cities of Khokand, and have quelled the disturbances and afforded comfort to the people.

Through real friendship I have given you an account of the Khokand expedition. I hope that the chain of friendship existing between Russia and Afghanistan will daily increase and remain always firm. I desire your health and safety. May your success increase in all your affairs and actions.

Inclosure 3 in No. 66.

Colonel Sir F. R. Pollock to Mr. Thornton.

February 25, 1876.

FORWARDS copy of translation of Cabul Diary from the 18th to the 21st instant, inclusive.

Extract from Cabul Diary from the 18th to the 21st February, 1876, inclusive.

The day before yesterday the Ameer received a letter from Naib Mahomed Alum Khan, stating that formerly he was informed that an Agent of the Russian Government was on his way to wait on His Highness, but that he went back from the Oxus. Also that one Mirza Karim, Samarcandi, has now reached Mazar-i-Sharif with two sowars as a Russian Envoy, and that the Naib has written to Abdool Rashid Khan (Mustowfee of Turkestan) to detain him honourably at the above place. The Ameer has written to the Naib that should the Envoy have reached Mazar-i-Sharif, he should be forwarded to Cabul in an honourable and hospitable manner.

In continuation of the above, the Ameer received another letter to-day from the Naib to the following effect:—

"The particulars of my previous letter are as follows:—A man forwarded by the Russians arrived as far as the Oxus, but without my permission our people prevented him from coming to us. He went back; as soon as I received information I deputed an Agent to bring him, but though he went as far as Samarcand, he did not meet him. The Governor of Samarcand sent one Mirza Karim with a letter to my address to effect that a friendly murrasila (referred to in Diary of 31st January, 1876) was forwarded by the Russian Governor-General to your Highness, but that the bearer, who appeared a stupid man, returned with it from the Oxus, and that it was then transmitted through a messenger of the King of Bokhara. Also that as my above Agent had reached Samarcand, the Governor had been pleased to depute the Mirza to me with a complimentary murrasila. I have summoned the Mirza to Maimena."

The Ameer directed the Naib to send the Mirza back with a complimentary letter on his own side, and to grant him a khillut, and that he should not be sent to Cabul as had been ordered before.

No. 67.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(Received April 29.)

India Office, April 29, 1876.

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for Lord Derby's information, two copies of a letter from the Government of India relative to the affairs of Afghanistan.

Inclosure 1 in No. 67.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury.

My Lord, *Fort William, April* 7, 1876.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, papers relative to the affairs of Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
W. MUIR.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 67.

Mr. Griffin to Mr. Thornton.

Lahore, March 20, 1876.

IN compliance with your letter dated 2nd instant, I am desired to forward copy of the murrasila addressed by the Ameer of Cabul to the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan.

2. An English translation of the murrasila is also forwarded.

Inclosure 3 in No. 67.

The Ameer of Cabul to General Kaufmann.

(Translation.) *6th Mohurram* 1293 *Hijree* (*February* 3, 1876.)

YOUR friendly letter of the 27th October, 1875, corresponding with the 9th Shawal 1292 Hijree, giving an account of subjugation of Khokand, reached me in good time on the 28th Zi Hij, 1292 Hijree (26th January, 1876), and I have noted its contents, which tend to promote friendship. The narrative given by you of the mustering of Kipchak and Kirghiz tribes and Khokandis, of the appointment of Nasar-ud-din, son of Khudayar Khan (Chief) of Khokand, of his falling into difficulties and taking refuge under the mighty power of Russia, and of your deputing an army towards Namangan and the frontier of Khokand, and thereby restoring peace among the Russian subjects, &c., has impressed my heart. I strongly hope that if God pleases, nothing will interfere with the progress of friendship between Russia and Afghanistan.

The favour of your continuing to write to me about your good health is requested.

No 68.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received May* 17.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May* 12, 1876.

I AM happy to report to your Lordship that the speech of the Prime Minister on Mr. Baillie Cochrane's motion in the House of Commons has given great satisfaction here, not only in the official circles, but also generally among all classes.

I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship an article published in this morning's "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" from the "Moscow Gazette" (the organ of the Russian press which has hitherto been the least favourably disposed towards England in regard to the affairs of Central Asia), in which, after stating that the frank and firm reply of Mr. Disraeli places the two countries in the position conformable to their dignity, their greatness, and to their mutual interests, it hails with satisfaction the statement that the good understanding between the two Governments had never been more complete than at the present moment.

It further continues to observe that the mutual concord and confidence of the Great Powers had never been more decisive for the peace of Europe, and it terminates by stating

that, in the midst of the general concord, the mutual confidence between England and Russia was an element of decisive value.

I met General Kaufmann yesterday at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and he expressed to me the pleasure with which he had read Mr. Disraeli's speech, and he expressed a hope that England and Russia would act cordially together in Central Asia for their mutual welfare, and for the advancement of civilization.

General Kaufmann informed me that he was on the eve of returning to Tashkend, to resume the duties of Governor-General of Turkestan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 68.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of $\frac{\text{April 30}}{\text{May 12}}$, 1876.

Les Journaux Russes.—Dans son numéro de Dimanche, 25 Avril, la "Gazette de Moscow" consacre quelques réflexions à l'interpellation de M. Cochrane sur les affaires de l'Asie Centrale et aux explications données à ce sujet par le Premier Ministre Britannique.

Depuis deux ans, dit notre confrère, cette question de l'Asie Centrale, qui était jadis pour les antagonistes de la Russie l'éternel objet d'alarmes et de suspicions, a bien changé d'aspect. Le public Anglais a acquis la conviction que les démarches diplomatiques auxquelles le Gouvernement Britannique se voyait amené antérieurement, sous la pression des alarmistes et des Russophobes, ne servaient au fond qu'à tenir en éveil l'opinion publique contre des dangers imaginaires et à entretenir les suspicions mutuelles. Mais depuis un certain temps les publicistes Anglais ont pris à tâche de prouver que l'Angleterre est trop Puissante aux Indes pour avoir à redouter quelque chose du côté de la Russie et que si sur le territoire Britannique il existe des points insuffisamment protégés, la défense doit en être renforcée militairement et non garantie par voie de Traités.

De là aux explications données par M. Disraeli il n'y avait qu'un pas; maintenant on peut considérer les contestations diplomatiques au sujet de l'Asie Centrale comme ayant définitivement pris fin, et il convient de dire à l'honneur de l'Angleterre que c'est à son libre vouloir et à sa sage modération que nous devons ce résultat. La réponse franche et ferme de M. Disraeli replace de nouveau les deux pays dans la situation mutuelle la plus conforme à leur dignité, à leur grandeur, et aux intérêts de chacun d'eux. Le Chef du Cabinet Britannique dit qu'il ne craint pas la Russie, laquelle, elle non plus, n'avait pas interprété dans le sens d'une menace les explications données au Parlement à l'occasion des débats sur le titre de la Reine. (Nos lecteurs se souviendront, dit à ce sujet la "Gazette de Moscou," que nous ne nous étions pas mépris en son temps sur la portée des explications de M. Disraeli.) Le Ministre a dit ensuite que la Russie connaît la ferme intention de l'Angleterre de maintenir sa domination aux Indes et son influence en Orient et que la Russie ne considérait pas cette politique comme étant incompatible avec une bonne entente entre les deux Etats; ce qui nous paraît le plus remarquable dans le discours du Ministre, ce sont les paroles suivantes:—

"Loin de m'alarmer des progrès de la puissance Russe dans l'Asie Centrale, je ne vois pas de raison pour que la Russie ne conquière point la Tartarie quand l'Angleterre a conquis les Indes. Je désire seulement que le peuple de la Tartarie retire autant d'avantages de la conquête Russe que le peuple Hindou en a retirés de la conquête Anglaise."

Ces paroles ne sont rien d'autre que la vérité; il y a longtemps que nous avions dit la même chose et beaucoup de feuilles Anglaises s'étaient ralliées à notre appréciation. Mais du moment que le Gouvernement Anglais s'associe franchement à cette manière de voir, toutes les objections disparaissent comme d'elles-mêmes.

Les explications données par le Premier Ministre Britannique sont d'une grande portée à un autre point de vue encore. Dans les derniers temps d'aucuns laissaient entendre que, s'il n'existait pas une cause directe qui pût motiver un conflit entre l'Angleterre et la Russie en Asie, ce conflit pourrait naître par suite de dissentiment des Gouvernements des deux pays par rapport aux affaires d'Europe. Nous n'examinerons pas si cette opinion peut être fondée; nous en doutons, mais en l'admettant même comme telle, nous avons tout lieu de tirer des paroles de M. Disraeli la conclusion qu'aucun désaccord ne règne à cette heure entre la Russie et l'Angleterre au sujet des questions politiques qui préoccupent l'Europe.

M. Disraeli nous apprend en effet que "la bonne entente entre les deux Gouverne-

ments n'a jamais été aussi complète qu'en ce moment." Nous saluons cette déclaration avec d'autant plus de joie que ces jours-ci encore il circulait des rumeurs alarmantes au sujet de la tournure que prenaient les événements d'Orient et que les antagonistes de la Russie s'en prévalaient pour élever de nouvelles accusations contre la politique Russe. . . . Jamais la concorde et la confiance mutuelle entre les Grandes Puissances n'ont été aussi décisives pour la paix de l'Europe qu'elles le sont aujourd'hui. La révolte dans les provinces Turques est loin d'être calmée; le sang ne cesse de couler dans l'Herzégovine; à Belgrade comme à Bucharest il se produit simultanément des changements de Ministère dont la signification ne saurait être préjugée. Mais il n'y a pas de raison sérieuse de douter que toutes ces graves difficultés ne s'aplanissent sans conflagration tant que se maintiendront les liens de confiance qui unissent les Grandes Puissances, et, au milieu de la concorde générale, la confiance mutuelle entre la Russie et l'Angleterre est un élément d'une valeur décisive.

No. 69.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(*Received August* 25.)

My Lord, *India Office, August* 25, 1876.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter from the Government of India, with inclosed Cabul Diaries from the 23rd May to the 22nd June, inclusive.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 69.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury.

My Lord, *Simla, July* 17, 1876.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, papers relative to the affairs of Afghanistan.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
W. MUIR.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 69.

Colonel Sir F. R. Pollock to Mr. Thornton.

June 6, 1876.

SUBMITS copy of translation of Cabul Diary from 30th May to 1st June, 1876, inclusive.

Extracts from Cabul Diary from 30th May to 1st June, 1876, inclusive.

The day before yesterday a letter was received from Naib Mahomed Alam Khan stating that a communication had reached him from Mirza Abdul Karim, a servant of the Governor of Samarcand, from Daulatabad, the other side of the Oxus, to the effect that he (the Mirza) is in possession of a murrasila from the Russian Governor-General in Turkestan to address of the Ameer, that he wishes to proceed to Cabul, but that the Superintendent at the ferry prevents him from doing so. The Naib has sent Colonel Ahmed Khan from Akcha to bring the Mirza to him. Yesterday the Ameer received another letter from the Naib, dated Sar-bagh, the 26th May, 1876, reporting the arrival of

the Mirza with the murrasila above alluded to, and stating that he (the Naib) is bringing him to Cabul, and that the letter of the Governor of Samarcand to the Naib has been submitted in original to His Highness.

The Ameer at once deputed the Naib's agent, the Wakiludaula, to tell him (the Naib) that he should bring the Mirza with suitable honour as far as Kharzar, and that thence an agent of the Mir Munshi will escort him to Cabul. The Mir Munshi's agent has left for Kharzar. The Ameer summoned the British Agent and showed him the letter of the Governor of Samarcand to the Naib. Its purport is that the Russian Government with regard to Afghanistan aims at nothing but friendship; that Mirza Abdul Karim has left with a murrasila from the Russian Governor-General to the Ameer, and that the Naib should appoint an agent to escort him (the Mirza) to Cabul.

Inclosure 3 in No. 69.

Colonel Sir F. R. Pollock to Mr. Thornton.

June 19, 1876.

SUBMITS copy of translation of Cabul Diary from the 9th to 12th instant, inclusive.

Extract from Cabul Diary from 9th to 12th June, 1876, inclusive.

On the 9th instant Mirza Abdul Karim, the bearer of the murrasila of the Russian Governor-General, arrived at Cabul with the agent of the Mir Munshi, who, as reported in Diary of 1st instant, was sent to bring him. He has put up in the house of Sardar Mahomed Yusaf Khan. The Darbar appointed no official, &c., to meet him on the road. He receives cooked food from the Ameer's kitchen. To-day he waited on the Ameer through Sardar Mahomed Yusaf Khan and delivered the murrasila to His Highness, and after a formal interview of about half an hour returned to the Sardar's house. The British Agent has not yet read the murrasila, but it is reported that it is merely a complimentary one conveying information of the fall of Khokand. God willing, a copy of it will be submitted by next post.

Inclosure 4 in No. 69.

Colonel Sir F. R. Pollock to Mr. Thornton.

June 22, 1876.

SUBMITS copy of translation of Cabul Diary from 13th to 15th June, 1876, inclusive.

Extract from Cabul Diary from 13th to 15th June, 1876, inclusive.

A copy of the murrasila of the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan received by the Ameer by hand of Mirza Abdul Karim Khan has been obtained from the Darbar, and is herewith inclosed.*

Inclosure 5 in No. 69.

Colonel Sir F. R. Pollock to Mr. Thornton.

(Confidential.) *Abbottabad, June* 26, 1876.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith in original copy received from the Cabul Agent of the letter without date, except as to month, addressed by the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan to His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan, and referred to in the last submitted Cabul Diary from the 13th to the 15th instant.

2. A translation accompanies the letter and gives, I believe, fairly the meaning of the

* Translation will follow; it is lengthy; requires very careful translation. A copy of it shall be sent as well as translation. It relates entirely to Khokand. (Signed) F. R. POLLOCK.

writer, but the sentences were so involved that I found unusual difficulty in translating them.

3. A copy of the letter and of the translation is being submitted by this post to Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Inclosure 6 in No. 69.

General Kaufmann to Ameer Shere Ali Khan.

(Translation.)

YOUR Highness may have heard that some time ago (*lit.* in these days) some evil-disposed persons persuaded (*lit.* commanded) the people of Khokand with a view to gaining their (own) object, and considered it advantageous to endeavour to promote the same (object), and that consequently in the territory of Khokand several sad and dangerous (mohlik) occurrences took place.

My Lord (*lit.* Oh exalted Dignity !) I have considered it useless to give a full detailed account of these (occurrences) in this despatch, but it is most important to communicate them (to you), otherwise it would be contrary to the friendship existing between Russia and Afghanistan (*lit.* also the contents of this letter would have been somewhat repugnant). Consequently I have deemed it incumbent on me to give in this murrasila, in continuation of previous murrasilas, a brief account of the occurrences in Khokand and of the manner in which they terminated.

Last year in the month of "Ayeeul," corresponding with Jamadiul Sani, the people of Kipchak and Kirghiz tribes instigated and persuaded the people of Khokand to revolt, and their Sardars (headmen) Isa Aulia, Abdul Rahman Aftabchi, and other conceited persons, adopted measures against their (Khokandis) lawful Khan and expelled him from his country towards our dominions to seek shelter. At that time our agents armed with good offices had gone to the people of Khokand, and the Khan took refuge and came with them (the agents) to our territory.

As soon as Khuda Yah Khan reached here, an agent of the head of the rebels arrived at Tashkend from Khokand with all speed with a letter to the Governor-General (meaning General von Kaufmann), stating that all the people (in Khokand) had rebelled against Khuda Yar Khan in consequence of his oppression and deviation from the (Mahommedan) law, and had driven him from their country, and that they had desired Nasiruddin Khan, the legitimate heir to the Chiefship, to become their Khan. * * * General von Kaufmann most kindly accorded his consent (to their proposal) and sent a letter to the new Khan, Nasiruddin Khan, to effect that His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia was prepared to agree to his Khanship ; but his agreement depended on the fulfilment of certain engagements of the people of Khokand, though it was understood that those engagements did not differ from the (contents of the) Treaty with Khuda Yar Khan.

The Russian Government felt anxiety as to whether the Sardars of the rebels would accept (*i.e.*, obey) the new ruler (Nasiruddin) and would exercise no oppression over the people, show ability and excellence in administration, and make endeavours towards peace and comfort, and after acknowledging the authority of their great neighbours, the Russians, abstain (*lit.* forget) from seeking their own interest and gains, *i.e.*, from deposing the Khan accepted by the Russian, and would thus gain the good-will of von Kaufmann. The next occurrence proved that the deputation of the above agent to Tashkend was only a stratagem and to gain time, they disregarded the kindness of General von Kaufmann, and their coming as representatives into the Russian possessions was a mere stratagem. When their agents were in Tashkend, they gave trouble to the people of Khokand in coming to our dominions, so much so that they told them that the Russians exercise great oppression over the Mahommedans. Having become enemies of the Rusians they endeavour to kindle fire (of insurrection) in our subjects of * (?) therefore they sent invitations and letters to the Mahommedans of Khojend, Tashkend, and other border territories to join in disturbances. Before their agents had left our territory (*lit.* whether they had left or not), crowds of people of Khokand and Khojend, Karma, and Arp-tazan collected in Khojend Naloo and "Kari-ablik." We repulsed these people at once, still they succeeded in killing in a most brutal manner some of the residents of Alsatna, *i.e.*, Rahats and two Karkhanas and some cartmen, and in taking prisoner some travellers and Russians.

The Russian authorities lost no time (*lit.* were not negligent) in defence ; the Governor-General collected troops at once in Killa Mahram and repulsed the Khokand rebels, and this victory was so successful that it became impossible for them to regather. Nasiruddin

* "Ahal-i-hawas," meaning not understood.

Khan acknowledged that it was vain and puerile on his part to oppose the Russians, and having expressed repentance declared himself an ally (*lit.* his submission) of the Governor-General, and in company with the rebels hastened to meet him, and solicited him to restore his Khanship to him permanently. He (the Governor-General) considered the offence of the Khan and the people of Khokand somewhat light, and thought that the people of Khokand were innocent and the Sardars evil wishers; then the people of Khokand and the Sardars came and were made to think over and understand their interests (*lit.* discriminate between gain and loss). Then the Governor-General of Turkestan, *i. e.*, von Kaufmann, made over management of the territories of the Khan to him (the Khan), and reinstated him in the Chiefship permanently, and forgave the faults of the Sardars and rebels. * * * * As punishment to the Khan and his officers, the territory of Namangan lying between the right bank of the River Sir and the point where the River Narin falls into the River Sir, was annexed to Russian possessions. As soon as, according to our new Treaty with Nasiruddin Khan, our troops vacated Khokand, disturbances took place in Khokand, at the instigation of Abdul Rahman Aftabchi. Like his father, Khuda Yar, Nasiruddin fled from Khokand and was obliged to seek refuge under us; then the people of Khokand made Faulad Khan, a man of low family (*lit.* of unknown birth) their Khan, but he could not govern them owing to his being destitute of common sense, sound judgment, and ability, and talent. He, in the commencement of his rule, caused brutal executions in Khokand, and killed a large number of good men, as well as all the survivors of Khuda Yar Khan, such as his sons, grandsons, &c. He attempted to try his fortune in opposing us, and to recover Namangan, and even to drive us out from Tashkend. For this purpose, with the aid and at the instigation of Abdul Rahman Aftabchi, he collected a great number of people in Andejan to attack Namangan. The Governor-General sent General Tor Daski (?) from Namangan and he got possession of Andejan, and Faulad Khan and Abdul Rahman took to flight. The General Tor Daski considered the punishment sufficient, and by order of the Governor he abstained from ordering a general slaughter in Andejan and returned to Namangan; had Faulad Khan, Abdul Rahman, and their advisers and councillors been sensible and experienced persons, the above punishment would have been sufficient for them, and instead of adopting lengthy operations and risking their lives, they would have tendered apology and allegiance, but as they did not possess such sense they again raised disturbances in Namangan. As God has given us strength, and as He helps all true and just undertakings, General Skobeleff, after quelling the disturbances raised in Namangan and punishing his subjects, suitably attacked Faulad Khan and Abdul Rahman Aftabchi several times, demolished several large buildings (perhaps forts or entrenchments are meant) and took possession of Andejan; then severe fighting took place in Aska, and Faulad Beg was forced to fly towards Karatagin. Abdul Rahman recovered his senses (*lit.* his eyes were opened) and confessed that it was most difficult and impossible (for him) to succeed in his hostilities with the Russians, and tendered voluntary submission and begged pardon. He was followed by the head Sardar of Khokand rebels, who came into Major-General Skobeleff and repented his actions, and begged for forgiveness. After more than six months the people of Khokand, who were in a very distressed condition, felt inclined to make Nasiruddin Khan their Khan. He was at the time in Killa Mahram, and finding his people in straits he left for Khokand; before he had arrived at that place the Kipchaks and Kirghiz collected a large body of people and severely opposed him (several of his followers were taken prisoners), and those who escaped returned to Killa Mahram. Dissension exists amongst the people of Khokand, and in consequence of this ill-feeling some desired to appoint Nasiruddin, some Faulad Khan, and others some dissolute person (or worthless fellow), Aubash, as their Khan. The majority of the people, however, expressed their wish for assistance from the Russians; with this view the people of Khokand, Marghinan, Osh, and Isfara, and the agents of other provinces, waited on Major General Skobeleff and intimated their repentance at their enmity towards the Russians, and their inability to oppose them (the Russians), and expressed their wish for an amicable settlement of matters. They acknowledged their weakness, and begged for peace for their countrymen. They also made confessions of allegiance and submission, and brought letters from their countrymen to effect "we have submitted ourselves to the Emperor, their submission may be accepted."

* * * * * * *

This petition was accepted. The Emperor could adopt no other mode to restore peace and comfort to the people (of Khokand), because Nasiruddin was twice appointed Khan of his hereditary country, but he was expelled on both occasions towards Russian Turkestan (by his people). His Imperial Majesty considered it safer to keep these people under his own control with regard to their circumstances, and he therefore on this (last)

occasion approved of their submission. Their territory (*lit.* lands) was annexed to Russian possessions, the provinces included in the Khanship of Khokand were denominated Ublus Farghana. I intimate these events and the policy of the Emperor to your Highness, and also state that the Emperor ordered me to take possession of (*lit.* make submit) all the territories under the (late) Khan of Khokand. On receipt of this order I left with all speed next day, and reached the Ublus of Farghana; then I made over (the management of) Ublus-nai on the Sir (Darya) to Governor-General of Turkestan and Lieutenant-General Golovachef. I beg to add as a supplement to this letter, that the Russian Government is bound (*lit.* entrusted) to deal with friendship and peace in all affairs with their neighbours who govern and rule countries in the East independently (*lit.* permanently), and for this reason Russia abstains (*lit.* silent) from taking possession of them (countries), though on the present occasion we have been constrained to annex Khokand to Russian possessions; in reality this annexation has not been effected for the interests of Russia, but at the request of the people of Khokand merely to afford them tranquillity. As on account of these evil habits and intentions old-standing dissension existed amongst these people, as appears from the history of their country, and they could never attain to tranquillity under a Native Government, or till they accepted a powerful ruler and Government, such a ruler as the Emperor of Russia. I indulge in the hope that my unchanging friendship and regard may be accepted by your Highness.

Written at Tashkend in the month of Moharram 1293 Hijri, mahth of Febral (February). Written in Russian by General Gubernater, Turkestan, Adjutant von Kaufmann, Lieutenant-General Kolpakovski (?)

No. 70.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 6, 1876.

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch inclosing Cabul Diaries.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 71.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(Received September 22.)

My Lord, *India Office, September* 22, 1876.

WITH reference to my letter of the 25th August last, transmitting copy of letter from the Government of India, with inclosures, relative to the affairs of Afghanistan, I am directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to forward herewith, for Lord Derby's information, copy of a telegram which his Lordship has received from the Viceroy of India on the subject of the letter addressed in February last, by the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan, to the Ameer of Afghanistan, of which a translation will be found in the papers above referred to.

Lord Salisbury concurs in the views expressed by the Viceroy, and is of opinion that, as suggested by his Excellency, a remonstrance against General Kaufmann's proceedings should be addressed to the Russian Government without delay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure in No. 71.

The Viceroy of India to the Marquis of Salisbury.

(Telegraphic.) *Simla, September* 16, 1876.

WE send you a despatch by this next mail, expressing decided opinion on necessity of Her Majesty's Government remonstrating with Russia on Kaufmann's repeated correspondence with Ameer by hand of Russian agents, two of whom are now in Cabul.

* No. 69.

Although hitherto the Government of India have not asked Her Majesty's Government to formally remonstrate on this open breach of repeated pledges, we now deem it necessary to request you to do so, as the correspondence is creating much sensation at Cabul and forms basis of intrigue which may seriously impair our relations with Ameer.

We will on our part take earliest favourable opportunity of co-operating with any action you may deem expedient to impress on Ameer risk he runs and necessity for his stopping reception of these intriguing agents.

If without waiting receipt of despatch you can act at once on this information, result of such action communicated to me by telegraph may favourably affect negotiation mentioned in my accompanying telegram.

No. 72.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 2, 1876.

IN my despatch to your Excellency of the 6th ultimo, I inclosed a copy of the Cabul Diaries received from the Indian Government.

You will find at page 10 of those Diaries a letter addressed by General Kaufmann to the Ameer of Cabul which appears to have been conveyed to its destination by an Asiatic agent, who still remains at Cabul, and it is reported from other sources that his instructions are to induce Shere Ali to sign an offensive and defensive alliance with the Russian Government as well as a Commercial Treaty.

Although the tone and insinuation of General Kaufmann's letter appear to Her Majesty's Government to be undesirable, the letter itself does not contain any statement of a distinctly objectionable character. Your Excellency will address a note to the Russian Government, reminding them of their repeated assurances that "Afghanistan is completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence," and you will endeavour, if possible, to obtain from the Russian Government a written disclaimer of any intention on their part to negotiate Treaties with Shere Ali without the consent of Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 73.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 10, 1876.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 2nd instant, I have to inform your Excellency that I took an opportunity of speaking to Count Schouvaloff to-day respecting the Agents sent by General Kaufmann to Cabul. I reminded his Excellency that the Russian Government had on several occasions answered Her Majesty's Government that Afghanistan was completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence, and pointed out to him that the despatch of Russian Agents to Cabul with a letter to the Ameer from General Kaufmann was contrary to this under standing, and might give rise to some uneasiness in India.

His Excellency replied that he had no knowledge of the matter, but would communicate with his Government upon it.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 74.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 12, 1876.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 10th October, I have to state to your Excellency that Count Schouvaloff read to me to-day a telegram received by him from Prince Gortchakow in the following words :—

"Démentez catégoriquement que Kaufmann agit à Cabul, soit par un Agent ou soit d'une autre manière."

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 75.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(*Received October* 14.)

My Lord, *India Office, October* 14, 1876.

WITH reference to this Office letter of the 18th November, 1875, I am directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to forward herewith, for Lord Derby's information, copy of a letter from the Government of India, inclosing an extract from the Diary of the British Agent at Cabul, relative to the efforts made by the Ameer of Afghanistan to obtain the release of the Russian prisoner at Merv.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 75.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury.

My Lord, *Simla, August* 28, 1876.

WITH reference to paragraph 2 of our despatch dated 30th September, 1875, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, an extract from the Cabul Diary of the 28th to 31st July, 1876, on the subject of the efforts made by the Cabul Government to obtain the release of the Russian captive at Merv.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
W. MUIR.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 75.

Extract from the Cabul Diary of the 28th to 31st July, 1876.

ON the 28th instant the Ameer questioned the Mustaufi as to what measures he had taken for the release of the Russian who had been imprisoned by Turkomans, and about whom the British Government wrote (to the Ameer). The Mustaufi replied that he had agreed to pay 15,000 rupees to the Turkomans through the Jew traders who go to that territory for the release of the prisoner, but that the Turkomans did not accept that amount, and have considered it very advantageous for themselves to continue to keep him in prison. Also that it is difficult to obtain his release through traders; that the Persian Government also made great efforts, and that probably the prisoner is a Russian officer.

No. 76.

Lord Tenterden to Sir L. Mallet.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 14, 1876.

WITH reference to my letter of the 4th instant, I am directed by the Earl of Derby to transmit to you, to be laid before the Marquis of Salisbury, the accompanying copy of a despatch to Lord A. Loftus, from which Lord Salisbury will see that the Russian Ambassador has been instructed to deny categorically that General Kaufmann has taken any

action at Cabul by an Agent, or in any other manner;* and I am to request that you will move his Lordship to cause Lord Derby to be informed whether there is any objection to communicating to the Russian Government the letter addressed by General Kaufmann to the Ameer of Afghanistan, of which a copy was inclosed in your letter of the 25th August.

I am, &c.
(Signed) TENTERDEN.

No. 77.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received October* 18.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 13, 1876.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith copy of a note which, in conformity with the instructions of your Lordship's despatch of the 2nd instant, I have addressed to M. de Giers, calling the attention of the Imperial Government to the reported Mission of an Agent by General Kaufmann to Cabul, with instructions to induce Shere Ali to sign an offensive and defensive alliance with the Russian Government, as well as a Commercial Treaty, and reminding them of their repeated assurances that Afghanistan is completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 77.

Lord A. Loftus to M. de Giers.

M. le Sénateur, *St. Petersburgh,* September 30 / October 12, 1876.

REPORTS have reached Her Majesty's Government from a reliable source that an Agent was charged by his Excellency General von Kaufmann, Governor-General of Turkestan, in February last, to deliver a letter from him to His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan, and that this Agent is still at Cabul for the object, as is stated, of endeavouring, in conformity with his instructions, to induce Shere Ali to sign an offensive and defensive alliance with the Russian Government, as well as a Treaty of Commerce.

Her Majesty's Government are convinced that a frank and unreserved exchange of friendly communication between the two Governments on all matters relating to Central Asia will best conduce to the maintenance of that perfect understanding which now so happily exists between them, and acting in this spirit they deem it desirable to bring the reports they have received under the notice of the Imperial Government.

In doing so, I am instructed at the same time by the Earl of Derby, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to remind the Imperial Government of the repeated assurances given by them that Afghanistan is completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence.

I entertain no doubt that on being informed of the sending by General von Kaufmann of an Agent to Cabul, and of the object which has detained him there, the Imperial Government will at once instruct General von Kaufmann to conform strictly to the assurances given by Prince Gortchakow with regard to Afghanistan, the spirit of which would be infringed by the negotiation of Treaties with Shere Ali such as those to which I have referred.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 78.

Sir T. Seccombe to Lord Tenterden.—(*Received October* 18.)

My Lord, *India Office, October* 17, 1876.

I AM directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant, relative to the correspondence between the Governor-General of

* No. 74.

Russian Turkestan and the Ameer of Cabul, and to acquaint you in reply that his Lordship sees no objection to the communication to the Russian Government of the text of General Kaufmann's letter of February last, as set forth in the Cabul Diaries inclosed in this Office letter of the 25th August.

I am at the same time directed to forward herewith, for Lord Derby's information, copy of a despatch just received from the Government of India, in which the views of that Government on the subject are expressed at length. Amongst the inclosures to this despatch will be found extracts from recent diaries submitted by the British Agent at that place, from which Lord Derby will observe that, on or about the 21st August, another Russian Agent arrived at Cabul with a further letter from General Kaufmann to the Ameer. The communication to the Russian Government should, in Lord Salisbury's judgment, be confined to the text of General Kaufmann's letter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SECCOMBE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 78.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury.

My Lord, *Simla, September* 18, 1876.

THE despatches noted in the margin have communicated to us the positive assurances given, from time to time, by the Russian Government that His Imperial Majesty considers Afghanistan as "entirely beyond the sphere of Russian influence." With reference to these assurances, we have the honour to transmit, for your Lordship's information, the inclosed papers, and to call the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the subject of the official correspondence which has taken place, and is taking place, between the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan and His Highness the Ameer of Cabul.

The most recent of these communications is the letter of General von Kaufmann, dated —— February, 1876, of which a translation accompanies the Commissioner of Peshawur's letter dated 26th June.

This document, it will be perceived, contains a somewhat lengthy narrative of the late events in Khokand, an announcement of its annexation to the Russian Empire, and a declaration of the motives which have animated the Russian Government; it is stated to be in continuation of previous communications, and its transmission to be due to "the friendship subsisting between Russia and Afghanistan."

The letter is, in fact, one of a series of communications which have passed, from time to time, between the Russian General, von Kaufmann (or, his *locum tenens*, General Kolpakovsky) and his Highness the Ameer, during a period extending from the year 1870 to the present time; these communications are not merely complimentary expressions of friendly sentiment, but have reference to matters of importance, affecting, not only the foreign interests, but even the internal affairs of Afghanistan; they tend to increase in frequency; and latterly they have, on more than one occasion, been transmitted by a special agent, though it appears from the postscript to Sir A. Buchanan's letter to Lord Clarendon, dated the 2nd November, 1869, that Prince Gortchakow then agreed with Lord Mayo that Russian Agents should not visit Cabul.

The Ameer, though at first regarding the communications with distrust, and seeking the advice of the British Government as to the tenor of his reply, now acknowledges their receipt in cordial terms, and without consulting the Government of India. It will be perceived, from the appended extracts from the Diaries of the 11th and 14th August, that another Russian Agent has, within the last few weeks, arrived in Afghan territory, and left Balkh on the 7th August *en route* for Cabul, bearing a further letter from the Russian General. We may add that, notwithstanding the arrival of this second Agent, his precursor still lingers at Cabul; and that we have received, from an unofficial source, information, which we are of course unable to verify, that secret nightly conferences are taking place between him and the Ameer.

Up to the present time, the Government of India has not deemed it necessary to request Her Majesty's Government to make a formal objection to these proceedings of the Russian Generals; but the correspondence has been regarded by the Government with some anxiety; and on one occasion, in a despatch dated 1st May, 1874, the attention of Her Majesty's Government was drawn to the tone of General Kolpakovsky's letter.

We now desire to submit, for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, that the time has arrived when it is expedient that the attention of the Russian Government should be seriously called to the fact of this correspondence, and that steps should

be taken by Her Majesty's Government to prevent a continuance of proceedings which we cannot but regard as altogether inconsistent with the assurances given by Prince Gortchakow to Lord Clarendon, in 1869, and, since then, frequently renewed by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, that Afghanistan is regarded as "entirely beyond the sphere of Russian influence."

In venturing to suggest this course for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, we would represent that the issue more or less involved in the continuance, or discontinuance, of the correspondence between the Russian officers and the Ameer of Cabul, is one not of merely local or Indian, but of Imperial interest, affecting as it does the important question whether the influence of England is to be superseded and replaced by that of Russia at the Court of the Ameer. The assurances of non-interference in Afghanistan given and reiterated by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh to the Government of Her Majesty, have been, from time to time, communicated, with every expression of confidence in their sincerity, by the Government of India to the Ameer of Cabul. As the communications with His Highness, now systematically carried on by the Russian military authorities in Central Asia, are plainly irreconcileable with the above-mentioned assurances, it is obvious that the Ameer can only attribute their increasing frequency, and prolonged toleration, either to the acquiescence of the British Government, or to its inability to resent so open a disregard of those pledges on which its reliance has been publicly and repeatedly recorded. In either case, the result cannot fail to be destructive of all confidence and security in our relations with Afghanistan. The action open to the Government of India, for the control of those relations, is necessarily limited to the exercise of pressure upon the Ameer of Cabul; but we shall, on our part, lose no opportunity of co-operating with such steps as Her Majesty's Government may be pleased to take in this matter, by our endeavours to convince the Ameer of the imprudence, as well as the impropriety, of the present correspondence between His Highness and the Russian Generals.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
W. MUIR.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 78.

Colonel Sir F. R. Pollock to Mr. Thornton.

Abbottabad, June 26, 1876.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith, in original, copy received from the Cabul Agent of the letter without date, except as to month, addressed by the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan to His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan, and referred to in the last submitted Cabul Diary from the 13th to the 15th instant.

2. A translation accompanies the letter, and gives, I believe, fairly the meaning of the writer, but the sentences were so involved that I found unusual difficulty in translating them.

3. A copy of the letter and of the translation is being submitted by this post to Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Inclosure 3 in No. 78.

General von Kaufmann to Ameer Shere Ali Khan.

[See Inclosure 6 in No. 69.]

Inclosure 4 in No. 78.

Extract from Cabul Diary from 8th to 10th August, 1876.

IT is reported that another Russian Agent has arrived in Turkestan, and that, in reply to a letter submitted by the new Naib, the Ameer has written to him (the Naib) to inform His Highness as to whether the said Agent had come to visit the deceased Naib Mahomed Alum Khan, or desires to come to Cabul, and whether he is a Russian or a Mahommedan. Further information will follow after inquiry.

Inclosure 5 in No. 78.

Extract from Cabul Diary from 4th to 14th August, 1876.

THE report alluded to in the last Diary regarding the arrival of another Russian Envoy in Turkestan has now been ascertained to have been submitted by Colonel Mirza Ahmed Khan, brother of the Dabirul-Mulk, left at Balkh by Naib Mahomed Alum Khan to govern that country in his absence. It was forwarded to the Ameer by the new Naib, and His Highness inquired whether the Envoy had come merely to visit the deceased Naib, or desired to go to Cabul, and whether he is a Mahommedan or a Russian. Yesterday His Highness received another letter from the above Colonel through the new Naib, stating that Mirza Mahomed Yusaf, Mervi Samarcandi, the Russian Envoy, arrived at Balkh with six sowars, with a view to proceeding to Cabul, and was in possession of a murrasila from the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan to the Ameer, and that as information of his arrival was sent previously to His Highness, and he desired to proceed to Cabul, and news of the death of Naib Mahomed Alum Khan had been received, the Envoy was sent to Cabul on the 7th instant, in company with an agent of the Colonel who is acquainted with the Turki language.

Inclosure 6 in No. 78.

Extract from Cabul Diary from 15th to 17th August, 1876.

TO-DAY the Ameer received a letter from the new Naib of Turkestan stating that from Kurram and Sarbagh he left the ordinary road, which was longer, and adopted a short cut, and reached Tashkurghan on the 11th August, 1876; that he would be on the 12th at Naubahar, two *kos* from Mazar-i-Sharif, and on the 13th idem at Takhtapul, the head-quarters of Turkestan; also that Turkestan continues tranquil; and that when he was on his way to Tashkurghan, viâ the short route, Mirza Mahomed Yusaf, the Russian Envoy, passed to Cabul from Hazrut-Sultan on the 9th August, 1876, and consequently could not meet him.

Inclosure 7 in No. 78.

Extract from Cabul Diary from 22nd to 24th August, 1876.

YESTERDAY Mirza Mahomed Yusaf Khan, Mervi, the Russian Envoy, put up, by desire of the Durbar, in the house of Sardar Mahomed Yusaf Khan, with Mirza Abdul Karim Khan, the first Envoy, and they both received cooked food from the Darbar. To-day at 10 A.M. he waited on the Ameer, in company with Sardar Mahomed Yusaf Khan, and after communicating the compliments of the Governor-General in Russian Turkestan, submitted a murrasila from the latter in the Russian and Turki languages. His Highness, after formal inquiry (as to health, &c.), in twenty minutes allowed him to return to the Sardar's house, and got the murrasila translated from the Turki language. It appears that the Governor-General has sent this murrasila merely to inform His Highness of his return to Tashkend from St. Petersburgh. He writes that the Emperor of Russia summoned him to St. Petersburgh to discuss about some important affairs of (Russian) Turkestan, that he returned to Tashkend in six months, that he is glad to say that the friendship existing between His Highness and the Russians has now become firm, and that the Ameer's rectitude will keep the subjects of both Governments happy. A copy of the murrasila will be submitted as soon as it is obtained.

No. 79.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 21. 1876.

HER Majesty's Government approve the note which you addressed to M. Giers respecting the interference of General Kaufmann in the affairs of Afghanistan, a copy of which is inclosed in your Excellency's despatch of the 13th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 80.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 24, 1876.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 13th instant, Count Schouvaloff communicated to me a telegram from his Government denying categorically that General Kaufmann is acting at Cabul either through an Agent or in any other manner.

It is my intention to place in Count Schouvaloff's hands a copy of General Kaufmann's letter of February last, and to point out to him that his Government would seem to have been kept in ignorance of the General's proceedings.

I take this opportunity of sending your Excellency a copy of a further letter from the India Office, inclosing copies of despatches from India, in which it is shown that General Kaufmann for many years past has been in the habit of keeping up a correspondence with the Ameer, a proceeding which, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, is opposed to the understanding between England and Russia, which stipulates that Russia shall not interfere in any way in the affairs of Afghanistan.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 81.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received October 30.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 19, 1876.

ON the occasion of my conversation with M. de Giers, on the reported presence of a Russian Agent at Cabul, and of the objects of his mission, his Excellency told me that he had learnt, through the Russian Agent at Meshed, that great preparations were making at Herat for an expedition against Merv.

I told his Excellency that I thought this very unlikely, as the Ameer of Afghanistan had no connection with Merv. It would be different if the Persian Government were to undertake such an expedition, for they had an undoubted legal claim to that country; but I was not aware, nor did I think it at all likely, that the Persian Government meditated any such enterprise.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 82.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received October 30.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 19, 1876.

I HAD an interview with M. de Giers on the 14th instant, when his Excellency, referring to the note I had addressed to him (as reported in my despatch of the 13th instant) on the presence of a Russian Agent at Cabul, stated that he had no knowledge of any such Agent having been sent by General Kaufmann to the Ameer of Afghanistan, nor after inquiry at the Ministry of War could he ascertain that there was any information of any letter having been addressed or sent to Shere Ali by General Kaufmann in February last.

His Excellency further observed that at that time General Kaufmann was at St. Petersburgh.

His Excellency expressed a wish to see a copy of the letter in question, as he must suppose that it was apocryphal.

I did not consider that I was authorized to conform to this wish without your Lordship's authorization.

His Excellency stated that he had written to General Kaufmann for information, and that on his receiving his reply he would, in conformity with my request, give me a written answer to my note.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 83.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(Received November 4.)

My Lord, *India Office, November 4, 1876.*

I AM directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to forward herewith, for Lord Derby's information, copy of a letter received from the Government of India, inclosing the Diary of the British Agent at Cabul from the 29th to 31st August, 1876, together with the correspondence between the Ameer and General von Kaufmann therein referred to.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 83.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury.

My Lord, *Simla, September 28, 1876.*

WE have the honour to forward copy of a letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur, dated 9th instant, inclosing a translation of the Cabul Diary from 29th to 31st August last, and of the further correspondence between General von Kaufmann and the Ameer of Cabul, to which reference is made in the Diary.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
W. MUIR.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 83.

Mr. Macnabb to Mr. Thornton.

September 9, 1876.

SUBMITS copy of translation of Cabul Diary from 29th to 31st August, 1876, inclusive, together with original copies received from the Agent of the two murrasilas referred to in the Diary.

Extract from Cabul Diary from 29th to 31st August, 1876, inclusive.

COPY of murrasila from the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan brought by Mahomed Yusaf Khan Mervi, mentioned in Diary of 24th August, 1876, is inclosed.

Copy of the murrasila which the Cabul Government has made over to Mirza Abdul Karim Khan is herewith submitted. The Mirza has received the following khilat:—

For himself: 1 Amritsar abrah chogha, 1 khalil khani, and 500 rupees cash for expenses.

For his four servants: 4 broadcloth choghas, and 4 embroidered lungis.

In the contents of this murrasila, which has been sent to the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan in reply to that received from him, the Cabul Government has reserved for it itself a discretionary position, as a matter of precaution; so that should it happen that the Russians trouble them in any affair, and they (the Cabul Government), considering that application adverse to their interests, decline to act on it, and the Russians become annoyed, they may be able to say that they (the Cabul Government) have not entered into any engagements with the Russians, and that their border is not joined with the Russian border in such a manner that the terms "neighbourhood" and "propinquity" could be applied to them. Also that they (the Cabul Government) may remain permanently free from anxiety (*lit.* enjoy liberty), as the Russians possess no written agreement (*lit.* an explicit note of hand) from them.

Abstract Translation of Murrasila, dated 7th Shaaban (August 27, 1876), from the Ameer to the Russian Governor-General.

YOUR murrasila, dated Mohurram (February) anent Khokand matters, which you sent from Tashkend by hand of Mirza Abdul Karim Khan, reached me at Cabul in Jamadi-ul-awal (June), and I have mastered its contents. If those persons who are in the neighbourhood or propinquity of great and powerful States, and for whom it is easy and feasible to undertake certain affairs in their country or city according to their capabilities and the customs and usages of that country or city, maintain (friendly) relations with (those) States, undoubtedly it is not politic or advisable that they should deviate from such relations. But as the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor is great and powerful, and as it is customary for its neighbours and the people in its adjacent territories to expect kindness and rectitude from it, if such great and noted Government shows kindness and mercy to the people in its neighbouring or adjoining territories, certainly it will tend to the encouragement (*lit.* hopes) of neighbours and the comfort of the people of God. Continue to afford me happiness by informing me of your health, &c.

Abstract Translation of Murrasila, dated 13th Jamadi-ul-Sani (July 6, 1876), from the Russian Governor-General to the Ameer.

TO discuss about some important Turkestan matters I was summoned by the Emperor, and after remaining about six months at St. Petersburgh, returned to Tashkend. I have considered it advisable to send this information to you. The friendship existing between you and the Russian Government and between you and me has been promoted. I pray God for your (long) life. Your rectitude will tend to the comfort and happiness of the subjects (of the Government of Russia and Afghanistan).

No. 84.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 7, 1876.

WITH reference to your despatch of the 19th ultimo, I have to inform your Excellency that I gave Count Schouvaloff, on the 26th ultimo, a copy of General Kaufmann's letter to the Ameer of Afghanistan.

His Excellency observed that it did not seem to contain much of importance, but he said that he would take it away for more careful perusal, and would offer any observations he might have to make on it later.

Count Schouvaloff returned the copy on the 31st ultimo without further remarks.

I have to add that your Excellency is at liberty to give a copy to M. de Giers, as suggested in your despatch of the 19th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 85.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 15, 1876.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch upon the subject of Afghanistan.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 86.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received November 21.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November* 15, 1876.

AT my interview to-day with Prince Gortchakow I profited of the opportunity to mention the report of a projected Russian expedition to Merv.

His Highness denied at once that any such intention existed, and authorized me to inform your Lordship that there was no question of an expedition against Merv, nor any idea of occupying Merv.

Prince Gortchakow said that some of the Téké Turkomans had plundered some "Aouls" of another Turkoman tribe under Russian protectorate, and that a detachment of troops had been sent to their protection as also to keep open the communication between Krasnovodsk and Khiva.

His Highness observed that there were indications of the Afghans undertaking an expedition against the Téké Turkomans and Merv, but his Highness did not appear to be acquainted with any details on the subject.

I further mentioned to his Highness the communications which General Kaufmann was carrying on directly with the Ameer of Afghanistan through a secret Agent who had arrived some time ago at Cabul, and was still residing there; and I observed to him that these communications were not in conformity with the engagement taken by Russia, as recorded by his Highness himself, when he declared that Russia considered Afghanistan to be beyond the sphere of her political action.

Prince Gortchakow replied that there was no Russian Agent at Cabul as far as he knew, and that General Kaufmann had merely forwarded a complimentary letter to the Ameer, as he was in the habit of doing on returning to his post.

"But," added his Highness, "quand nous avons en main une baleine, je ne puis pas m'occuper des petits poissons."

His Highness, however, charged me to inform your Lordship that the reported expedition against Merv was without any foundation.

Before reverting to the subject of General Kaufmann's communication with the Ameer of Afghanistan and the presence of a Russian Agent at Cabul, I shall request M. de Giers to give me an answer in writing to the note which I addressed to his Excellency on that subject on the 12th October, a copy of which was inclosed in my despatch of the 13th October.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 87.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received November 21.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, November* 17, 1876.

I HAD an interview to-day with M. de Giers, who is the Director of the Asiatic Department in the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

I requested his Excellency to give me a written reply to my note in regard to the communication of General Kaufmann with the Ameer of Afghanistan and the prolonged presence at Cabul of a Russian Agent.

His Excellency demurred somewhat in giving a written answer, but I maintained my request for a reply in writing, which his Excellency promised that I should receive.

* No. 83.

M. de Giers then stated that there was no question of General Kaufmann entering into political communication with the Ameer of Afganistan, nor was there the remotest idea of any Treaty engagements. The Agent was simply charged to deliver a letter of courtesy from General Kaufmann to the Ameer, which was an usual custom on his resuming the duties of his post, and as the Governor-General of a neighbouring State.

To this I replied that he was not the Governor of a neighbouring State, inasmuch as the Khanat of Bokhara was still to be regarded as an independent State, and that I therefore considered it necessary that General Kaufmann should receive express orders from the Imperial Government to desist in future from sending Agents to Cabul and from entertaining political communication with the Ameer of Afghanistan.

M. de Giers then informed me that the Imperial Government had received information both from General Kaufmann, and through the Imperial Minister at Tehran, that the Afghan Government were making great military preparations. He stated that 10,000 men were assembled at Herat, with 1,600 cavalry, all well armed and equipped; that they were being constantly drilled and exercised, and that a cannon foundry was established at Herat capable of producing one cannon per day. From the information the Imperial Government had received, this armament was destined for an expedition against the Turkomans and against Merv.

It would appear, from the report of General Kaufmann, that he was somewhat disturbed in mind by this reported expedition.

General Kaufmann in his report referred also to certain incursions beyond their frontier which the Afghan troops were undertaking in the direction of Zaraffshan and Karateguin, and he referred to them as likely to produce a disturbance of the relations between Bokhara and Afghanistan.

On my inquiry, his Excellency further informed me that in consequence of a disagreement between the Turkomans and the Khan of Khiva, the latter had expressed a wish to renounce his rights of government in favour of Russia, but that General Kaufmann had opposed this wish, and was now acting as the arbitrator between the Khan and his subjects.

His Excellency stated that the Imperial Government desired anxiously that no change in the *status quo* should take place, and that peace and order should reign in Central Asia.

In giving me this communication, his Excellency referred to the original correspondence of General Kaufmann, and I suggested to him that he should forward that correspondence to Count Schouvaloff for communication to your Lordship.

No. 88.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 22, 1876.

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to communicate to the Russian Government the text of the correspondence between the Ameer of Cabul and General Kaufmann, as printed in the Cabul Diary, a copy of which was inclosed in my despatch of the 15th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 89.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(*Received December* 4.)

My Lord, *India Office, December* 2, 1876.

I AM directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to forward herewith, for Lord Derby's information, copy of a letter from the Government of India, inclosing Diaries of the British Agent at Cabul from the 18th August to the 11th September last.

Lord Derby will observe from the concluding paragraph of the Diary of 25th to 28th August, 1876, that a requisition for the surrender of a criminal is alleged to have been addressed by the Governor of Samarcand to the Governor of Afghan Turkestan, at the instance of the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 89.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury.

My Lord, *Simla, October* 16, 1876.

IN continuation of our despatch dated 11th ultimo, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of papers relative to the affairs of Afghanistan.

2. The attention of Her Majesty's Government is especially invited to the concluding paragraph of the Diary of 25th to 28th August, 1876, from which it appears that a requisition for the surrender of a criminal is alleged to have been addressed by the Governor of Samarcand to the Governor of Afghan Turkestan at the instance of the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
W. MUIR.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 89.

Mr. Macnabb to Mr. Thornton.

September 6, 1876.

SUBMITS copy of translation of Cabul Diary from 25th to 28th August, 1876, inclusive.

Extract from Cabul Diary from 25th to 28th August, 1876, inclusive.

THE Cabul Government has made over a murrasila to the Russian Envoy, Mirza Abdul Karim Khan, in reply to one brought by him from his Governor-General, and has allowed him to return (to Russian Turkestan). Mahommed Aslam Khan, late Kotwal of Cabul, has been deputed to-day with him to escort him as far as Takhtapul, whence Naib Sherdil Khan will make arrangements to escort him as far as the Oxus. A copy of the murrasila will be forwarded as soon as it is obtained.

The Governor of Samarcand sent a letter to the address of Naib Mohamed Alam Khan, at the instance of the Governor-General at Tashkend, to the effect that a man took 100 gold ashrafis from a trader in Makria Bazar, in the Russian Kingdom, and fled to Persia, and has now gone to Cabul, and that he should be apprehended and forwarded with the ashrafis to Samarcand. Naib Sherdil Khan submitted this letter in original to the Ameer, and His Highness has directed him to write to the Governor on his own part: "On receipt of your letter, I made inquiry from my son in the Cabul Durbar about the said fugitive, and have ascertained that no such person has gone to Cabul. It is not customary with the Cabul Government to demand fugitives, or to restore them to its neighbours, and consequently it is strongly presumed that, had any fugitive arrived in Cabul, he would not have kept himself secret, as he would have known that he would not be molested. It therefore appears that he has not arrived in any province of the Cabul Government." In proposing to make the Naib use the words, "the custom with its neighbours," on his own part, the Cabul Durbar means to warn the Russian authorities not to trouble them (the Durbar) in future in similar matters.

No. 90.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 12.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November* 28, 1876.

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 22nd instant, I have communicated to the Russian Government the text of the correspon-

dence between the Ameer of Cabul and General Kaufmann, as printed in the Cabul Diary, of which I received a copy in your Lordship's despatch of the 15th instant, and I have the honour to annex a copy of my note to M. de Giers on this subject inclosing a copy of the exact text which I communicated to his Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 90.

Lord A. Loftus to M. de Giers.

M. le Sénateur, *St. Petersburgh, November* 28, 1876.

IN conformity with the instructions of the Earl of Derby, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to inclose to your Excellency, for the information of the Imperial Government, the text of the correspondence between the Ameer of Cabul and General Kaufmann.

I profit of this opportunity to request your Excellency to favour me with a reply to the note which I had the honour to address to you on the 30th September / 12th October last, and to renew, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 90.

Copies of Correspondence between Ameer of Cabul and General Kaufmann, sent to Russian Government with Lord A. Loftus' Note of November 28, 1876.

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 83.]

No. 91.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 12.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 6, 1876.

I CALLED M. de Giers' attention to-day to the inclosed article from the "Agence Russe," stating that the Russian papers announce that the Indian papers "Rassul" and "Bombay Gazette" have received a telegram from Lahore, stating that the Ameer of Cabul had evinced the intention of receiving the Envoy of Russia with all the honours prescribed by Oriental etiquette. In view of which the English Ambassador at Cabul, Mahomed Khan, had declared that his Government would view such an act as an offence. The Ameer, having persisted in his decision, the English Ambassador had asked for his passports and left Cabul.

M. de Giers said that he knew nothing of this report, and had not even seen it in the Russian press. He considered it as utterly unfounded and of pure invention.

Admitting that the intelligence in question might be greatly exaggerated, I observed to his Highness that I had certain information of General Kaufmann having sent two, if not three, Agents to Cabul, and his Excellency would therefore see how necessary it was, with a view to maintain the engagements with Her Majesty's Government, that General Kaufmann should be instructed to abstain from sending Agents to Cabul, and from entering into official communications with the Ameer of Afghanistan.

His Excellency replied that he could answer for General Kaufmann not having entered into any political negotiations with the Ameer of Afghanistan. He was daily expecting the answer from the General to the question he had addressed to him on the subject of my previous communication, and, on its receipt, would inform me of it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 91.

Extract from the "Agence Russe."

LES journaux Russes disent qu'on télégraphie de Lahore aux journaux Indous le "Rassul" et la "Bombay Gazette," que l'Emir de Caboul a manifesté l'intention de

recevoir l'Envoyé de Russie avec tous les honneurs prescrits par l'étiquette Orientale. Ce que voyant, Mahomed Khan, Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à la Cour de l'Emir, aurait déclaré que son Gouvernement considérerait cet acte comme une offense. L'Emir ayant persisté dans sa décision, l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre aurait demandé ses passeports et quitté Caboul.

No. 92.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December* 12.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 6, 1876.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship copy of a note which I have received from M. de Giers in reply to the note which I addressed to his Excellency on the 12th October last, on the subject of the correspondence between General Kaufmann and the Ameer of Afghanistan, copy of which was inclosed in my despatch of the 13th October.

His Excellency states that the Imperial Government have no knowledge of this correspondence, and have referred to General Kaufmann for information. He denies, however, the existence of any political negotiations between the Imperial authorities of Turkestan and those of Cabul.

His Excellency then refers to information which has reached the Imperial Government from Tashkend, reporting a simultaneous movement of the troops of the Indian army on the one hand into the State of Ahmoud Saib, Ruler of Swat, and on the other hand of Afghan detachments into Darvaez, a small independent State beyond the frontier of Badakshan, and adjoining Karateguine, both being vassal provinces of the Emir of Bokhara.

The Imperial Government have further learnt that considerable armaments are being made at Herat, in view of an expedition against Merv.

His Excellency adds that if these facts should be confirmed, they would constitute an infraction of the understanding of 1872, by which Great Britain engaged to dissuade the Ameer of Afghanistan from any undertaking beyond his frontier, and they entertain no doubts that Her Majesty's Government will use their efforts to prevent any encroachment of such a nature.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 92.

M. de Giers to Lord A. Loftus.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *St. Pétersbourg, le* $\frac{19 \text{ Novembre}}{1 \text{ Décembre,}}$ 1876.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note en date du $\frac{30 \text{ Septembre}}{12 \text{ Octobre}}$ de cette année, par laquelle votre Excellence signalait le prétendu envoi d'un Agent Russe à Caboul, muni d'une lettre du Général Kaufmann et soi-disant chargé de négocier avec l'Émir une allisnce offensive et défensive ainsi qu'un Traité de Commerce.

Le Chancelier de l'Empire a déjà répondu à une question adressée a ce sujet à notre Ambassadeur à Londres par le Principal Secrétaire de Sa Majesté Britannique, en niant catégoriquement l'exactitude de la rumeur susmentionnée.

Votre Excellence m'a fait parvenir depuis par une nouvelle note en date du $\frac{16}{28}$ de ce mois traduction d'une lettre du General Kaufmann à l'Emir de Caboul et d'une réponse de celui-ci.

Le Ministère Impérial n'a aucune connaissance de cette correspondance. Il s'est empressé toutefois de demander à son sujet des renseignements au Général Kaufmann, en le priant d'éclaircir, s'il le peut, les faits qui ont pu donner lieu aux bruits parvenus au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique. Votre Excellence à dû se convaincre, en attendant, elle-même, que la lettre du Général Kaufmann mentionnée dans sa dernière note ne contenait rien qu'un message de courtoisie, et ne justifiait d'aucune façon l'existence d'une négociation politique quelconque entre nos autorités du Turkestan et celles de Caboul.

Le soin que le Cabinet de Londres apporte à veiller à la stricte observation de l'entente établie entre lui et la Russie en 1872 relativement à l'Afghanistan, engage le Minisètre Impérial de son côté à mentionner certaines informations qui lui sont parvenues de Taschkend et qui ont trait à un mouvement de troupés simultane de l'armée des Indes.

d'une part, dans les Etats d'Ahmoud Sahib, maître de Souat, et de détachments Afghans de l'autre, dans le Darvaz, petit Etat indépendant en dehors des limites de Badakchan et du Vakhan, et limitrophe au nord-est du Karatcheguine, provinces toutes les deux vassales de l'Emir de Boukhara.

Nous apprenons en même temps que des armements considérables se font à Hérat en vue d'une expédition contre les Turcomans de Merv.

Si ces faits venaient à se confirmer ils constitueraient une infraction directe à l'entente de 1872, par laquelle la Grande Bretagne s'est engagée à détourner l'Emir de tout empiétement au delà de la zone reconnue comme se trouvant sous la domination Afghane.

Le Ministère Impérial ne doute pas que le Gouvernement Britannique n'exerce toute son influence à Caboul pour empêcher des empiétements de cette nature.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) GIERS.

(Translation.)

M. l'Ambassadeur, *St. Petersburgh,* $\frac{\text{November 19}}{\text{December 1}}$, 1876.

I HAVE had the honour to receive the note dated the $\frac{\text{30th September}}{\text{12th October}}$ of this year, in which your Excellency drew attention to the supposed dispatch of a Russian Agent to Cabul, furnished with a letter from General Kaufmann, and said to be charged to negotiate with the Ameer an offensive and defensive alliance, and also a Treaty of Commerce.

The Chancellor of the Empire has already replied to a question on this subject, addressed to our Ambassador in London by the Principal Secretary of State of Her Britannic Majesty, and has categorically denied the accuracy of the above-mentioned report.

Your Excellency has since transmitted to me in a fresh note, dated the $\frac{\text{16th}}{\text{28th}}$ of this month, the translation of a letter from General Kaufmann to the Ameer of Cabul, and of a reply of the latter.

The Imperial Ministry have no knowledge of this correspondence. They have, however, at once asked General Kaufmann for information on the subject, requesting him to explain, if he can do so, the facts which may have given rise to the rumours which have reached Her Britannic Majesty's Government. Your Excellency, meanwhile, has no doubt convinced yourself that the letter of General Kaufmann mentioned in your last note contained nothing beyond a message of courtesy, and did not give evidence in any way of the existence of any political negotiation whatsoever between our authorities in Turkestan and those of Cabul.

The care which the Cabinet of London devote to watching over the strict observance of the understanding established between them and Russia in 1872 relative to Afghanistan induces the Imperial Ministry, on their side, to mention some information which has reached them from Tashkend, having reference to a simultaneous movement of troops of the Indian army, on the one hand, into the States of Ahmoud Sahib, Ruler of Swat, and of Afghan detachments, on the other hand, into Darvaz, a small independent State beyond the frontiers of Badakshan and Vakhan, and bordering on the north-east on Karategin, both provinces being vassals of the Ameer of Bokhara.

We learn at the same time that considerable armaments are taking place at Herat, in view of an expedition against the Turkomans of Merv.

If these facts received any confirmation, they would constitute a direct infraction of the understanding of 1872, by which Great Britain engaged to dissuade the Ameer from any aggression beyond the zone recognized as being under Afghan dominion.

The Imperial Ministry do not doubt that the British Government will employ all its influence at Cabul to prevent encroachments of this nature.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GIERS.

No. 93.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December* 21.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 16, 1876.

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I have now the honour to inclose to your Lordship copy of a note which I have received from M. de Giers, transmitting a Report in translation from General Kaufmann, in which the Governor-General of Turkestan denies energetically that he has sent any Agent or Agents to Cabul, and affirms that his relations with the Ameer of Afghanistan have been strictly confined to an exchange of civilities.

General Kaufmann further states that his letters to the Ameer once or twice a year have always been forwarded from Samarcand, through the Ameer of Bokhara, to the Governor of Balkh, by whom they were transmitted to Shere Ali Khan, and that these letters bore no other character but that of mere courtesy.

General Kaufmann protests formally against the reports which were referred to in my note to M. de Giers of the $\frac{\text{30th September}}{\text{12th October}}$ last, as being entirely without foundation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 93.

M. de Giers to Lord A. Loftus.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *St. Pétersbourg, le* $\frac{3}{15}$ *Décembre*, 1876.

A LA suite des deux notes de votre Excellence, en date du $\frac{\text{30 Septembre}}{\text{12 Octobre}}$ et $\frac{16}{28}$ Novembre, relativement aux renseignements parvenus au Gouvernement Britannique quant à l'envoi d'un prétendu Agent Russe à Caboul pour conclure un Traité d'Alliance et de Commerce avec l'Emir, j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de vous informer par ma note responsive en date du 19 Novembre, que j'ai demandé des renseignements à cet égard au General Kaufmann.

Je me fais un devoir aujourd'hui de joindre ci-près une traduction exacte de cette réponse qui vient de parvenir au Ministère Impérial.

Votre Excellence voudra bien y remarquer l'étonnement qu'inspirent au Général Kaufmann les renseignements dont le Gouvernement Britannique semble s'être ému, et dont l'exactitude est entièrement récusée par l'administration du Turkestan.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) GIERS.

(Translation.)

M. l'Ambassadeur, *St. Petersburgh, December* $\frac{3}{15}$, 1876.

WITH reference to your Excellency's two notes, dated the $\frac{\text{30th September}}{\text{12th October}}$ and the $\frac{16}{28}$th November, relative to the information which had reached the British Government respecting the despatch of a supposed Russian Agent to Cabul to conclude a Treaty of Alliance and Commerce with the Ameer, I have already had the honour to inform you, by my note in reply, dated the 19th November, that I had requested information on this subject from General Kaufmann.

I now have the honour to inclose herewith an exact translation of this reply, which has just reached the Imperial Government.

Your Excellency will notice the astonishment of General Kaufmann at the information which seems to have disturbed the British Government, and the accuracy of which is entirely denied by the Administration of Turkestan.

Accept, &c.
(Signed) GIERS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 93.

General Kaufmann to M. de Giers.

(Traduction.) *Le 9 Novembre*, 1876.

VOTRE Excellence a bien voulu me transmettre par sa lettre du 8 Octobre dernier traduction d'une note de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre près la Cour Impériale relativement à un prétendu Agent que j'aurais expedié, selon les renseignements du Gouvernement Britannique, à Caboul, pour conclure un Traité d'Alliance, offensive et défensive, ainsi qu'un Traité de Commerce.

Je crois de mon devoir d'informer votre Excellence que depuis mon entrée en fonctions de Gouverneur-Général de Turkestan, mes relations avec Shere Ali Khan se sont bornées à des échanges de politesses, et que je n'ai jamais envoyé à Caboul ni Agents ni même un seul Djiguitte.

Mes lettres ont été toujours expédiées, une ou deux fois annuellement, par l'Emir de Bokhara, qui les faisait parvenir à Caboul ou par un djiguitte de Samarcande à l'adresse du Chef de Balkh, qui les envoyait à l'Emir Afghan.

Ces communications ne portaient jamais d'autre caractère que celui de pure courtoisie, comme votre Excellence peut s'en persuader par les copies déposées au Département Asiatique.

Je m'empresse de constater à cette occasion que ma manière d'agir envers les Khanats, limitrophes ou autres, n'a jamais été un mystère pour le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, et qu'elle a constamment répondu aux ordres suprêmes dont Sa Majesté l'Empereur a daigné me munir lors de ma nomination à mon poste.

Mes convictions personnelles n'admettent la nécessité d'aucune ruse ni d'aucun subterfuge pour l'expédition satisfaisante des affaires, et j'ose espérer qu'une longue série d'années a convaincu le Ministère Impérial de l'absence de toute intrigue politique dans mes rapports avec les Khanats Asiatiques, intrigues contraires à mon caractère personnel, aussi opposé au mensonge dans la vie politique que dans la vie privée.

Son Altesse le Chancelier de l'Empire a entièrement approuvé cette manière d'envisager nos affaires de l'Asie Centrale.

En consequence, j'ai l'honneur de prier votre Excellence de vouloir bien formellement protester contre les assertions, dénuées de toute exactitude, consignées dans la note de l'Ambassadeur de Grande Bretagne.

Je récuse tout caractère d'authenticité de la source à laquelle ces renseignements tout-à-fait erronés ont pu avoir été puisés.

Veuillez, &c.

(Translation.)

(Translation.) *November* 9, 1876.

YOUR Excellency was good enough to transmit to me, in your letter of the 8th October last, the translation of a note of the English Ambassador at the Imperial Court relative to a supposed Agent whom I was said to have dispatched to Cabul, according to information received by the British Government, in order to conclude a Treaty of Alliance, offensive and defensive, and also a Treaty of Commerce.

I consider it my duty to inform your Excellency that, since entering on my duties as Governor-General of Turkestan, my relations with Shere Ali Khan have been limited to interchanges of civility, and that I have never sent to Cabul either Agents or even a single Djiguitte.

My letters have always been sent, once or twice a-year, through the Ameer of Bokhara, who forwarded them to Cabul, or by a Djiguitte of Samarcand addressed to the Chief of Balkh, who sent them on to the Ameer of Afghanistan.

These communications had never any other character than one of pure courtesy, as your Excellency can convince yourself from the copies kept in the Asiatic Department.

I avail myself of this opportunity to affirm that my conduct towards the neighbouring Khanates and others has never been a mystery to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that it has always been in accordance with the supreme orders which His Majesty the Emperor has been pleased to give me since my nomination to my post.

My personal convictions do not admit the necessity of any strategem or subterfuge for the satisfactory transaction of affairs, and I venture to hope that a long series of years has convinced the Imperial Government of the absence of any political intrigues in my relations with the Asiatic Khanates, intrigues contrary to my personal character, which is as much opposed to deception in political as in private life.

His Highness the Chancellor of the Empire has entirely approved this view of our affairs in Central Asia.

I have the honour, therefore, to beg your Excellency to be so good as to protest formally against the assertions contained in the note of the British Ambassador, which are completely without foundation.

I deny that the source from which this entirely erroneous information may have been derived can have any authentic character.

I have, &c.

No. 94.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 27, 1876.

HER Majesty's Government approve the language which your Excellency held to M. de Giers respecting the necessity of instructing General Kaufmann to abstain from sending agents to Cabul and from entering into official communication with the Ameer of Afghanistan, as reported in your despatch of the 6th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 95.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(Received January 15.)

My Lord, *India Office, January 13, 1877.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward herewith, to be laid before Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter from the Government of India, with inclosed Diaries of the British Agent at Cabul from the 17th October to the 16th November last.

In transmitting these papers I am directed to request that Lord Derby's particular attention may be invited to those passages in the Diaries of the 20th and 27th October and 7th November, which relate to the treatment of Mirza Mahomed Yusaf Khan, Mervi, the Russian Envoy at Cabul, and the arrival in Afghanistan of the bearer of a further letter from General Kaufmann to the Ameer.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 95.

The Government of India to the Marquis of Salisbury.

My Lord, *Fort William, December 8, 1876.*

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, urther papers relative to the affairs of Afghanistan.

The attention of Her Majesty's Government is invited to the 4th paragraph of the Diary of the 20th to the 23rd October, 1876, regarding the bestowal of a khillat upon the Russian Envoy at Cabul.

We have, &c.
(Signed) H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 95.

Mr. Macnabb to Mr. Thornton.

October 28, 1876.

SUBMITS copy of translation of Cabul Diary from the 20th to the 23rd October, 1876, inclusive.

Extract from Cabul Diary from the 20th to the 23rd October, 1876, inclusive.

On the 19th instant, at 7 P.M., when the new moon was seen, the Durbar had a salute of eleven guns fired in celebration of the "Id-ul-fitar," and with the permission of the Ameer the following khillats were sent to the Agency Office:—

For the British Agent—
One Cashmeri abrah.
" " shawl.
" " abrah kamarbund.

For Munshi Bakhtiar Khan—
One Cashmeri abrah.
" " shawl.

For one servant of the British Agent—
One embroidered broadcloth chogha.
" " lungi.

The following khillats have been granted on this occasion to the Russian Envoy, Mirza Mahomed Yusaf Khan, Mervi, and to the two Bokhara Envoys:—

To the Russian Envoy—
One Cashmeri abrah chogha.
„ „ shawl.
„ „ abrah kamarbund.

To each Bokhara Envoy—
One Cashmeri abrah chogha.
„ „ shawl.
„ „ abrah kamarbund.
Four dresses for four servants.

Inclosure 3 in No. 95.

Mr. Macnabb to Mr. Thornton.

October 31, 1876.

SUBMITS copy of translation of Cabul Diary from the 24th to the 26th October, 1876, inclusive.

Extract from Cabul Diary from the 24th to the 26th October, 1876, inclusive.

The day before yesterday Moonshee Bakhtiar Khan waited on the Ameer in his private apartment to ask after his health, and His Highness observed that it appeared from letters received from Bokhara that probably the Russians had commenced to collect supplies in Charjoi with a view to undertaking an expedition against Merv-i-Shahjehan; that they had indented for about 4,000 camels, ponies, and carts on Tashkend and Urganj, and intended to attack Merv-i-Shahjehan in the coming winter. Also that the Turkomans make preparations for defence.

Inclosure 4 in No. 95.

Mr. Macnabb to Mr. Thornton.

November 4, 1876.

SUBMITS copy of translation of Cabul Diary from the 27th to the 30th October, 1876, inclusive.

Extract from Cabul Diary from the 27th to the 30th October, 1876, inclusive.

Mirza Mahomed Yusaf Khan, Mervi, the Russian Envoy, receives cooked food twice a day for himself and grass and grain for his horses from the Durbar, but lately 500 rupees has been sent to him for fruit and other expenses. It is reported that he sends several news-letters secretly to Bokhara through traders, and thence his letters are forwarded to Samarcand and Tashkend, and that he is more able and efficient than the former Russian Envoy, Mirza Abdool Karim Khan.

Inclosure 5 in No. 95.

Mr. Macnabb to Mr. Thornton.

November 14, 1876.

SUBMITS copy of translation of Cabul Diary from the 7th to the 9th November, 1876, inclusive.

Extract from Cabul Diary from the 7th to the 9th November, 1876, inclusive.

It appeared that the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan had deputed his Peshkhidmat, Mulla Saifulla, with a murrasilla to the Ameer that the Governor of

amarcand had forwarded the Mulla with a letter from his own part to the Naib of urkestan (Balkh); that he (the Mulla) had arrived at Mazar-i-Sharif, and Naib Sherdil han had sent orders from Sar-i-pul to the Governor of Balkh to send him with a trusted fficial to Cabul. The Naib has submitted the letter of the Governor of Samarcand to the meer.

Inclosure 6 in No. 95.

The President in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury.

Calcutta, December 1, 1876.

CABUL Diary of 9th reports deputation by General Kaufmann of another Agent with letter to Ameer.

Inclosure 7 in No. 95.

Mr. Macnabb to Mr. Thornton.

November 17, 1876.

SUBMITS copy of translation of Cabul Diary from the 10th to the 13th November, 1876, inclusive.

Extract from Cabul Diary from the 10th to the 13th November, 1876, inclusive.

It is reported that the Governor of Turkestan has written (to the Ameer) on the authority of a rumour that the Russians are collecting supplies in Charjoi with a view to making an attack on Merv-i-Shahjehan; that a guard of 3,000 troops has been summoned from Samarcand to Charjoi; that they (the Russians) intimated their wish to the Mir of Kirki to visit his territory to ascertain the depth of the Oxus, but the Mir expressed regret that his people would be opposed to their coming, and that consequently they have abandoned their intention of visiting Kirki. This report requires confirmation; inquiries will be made and result communicated.

No. 96.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 19, 1877.

I TRANSMIT herewith a copy of a letter from the Government of India,* inclosing Diaries of the British Agent at Cabul from the 17th October to the 16th November last; and I have to instruct your Excellency to call the attention of the Russian Government to those passages in the Diaries of the 20th and 27th October and the 7th November which relate to the treatment of Mirza Mahomed Yusuf Khan, Mervi, the Russian Envoy at Cabul, and the arrival in Afghanistan of the bearer of a further letter from General Kaufmann to the Ameer.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 97.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(Received January 31.)

My Lord, *India Office, January* 27, 1877.

I AM directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 22nd and 26th December last, forwarding two despatches from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, inclosing respectively the formal reply of the Russian Foreign Office to Lord A. Loftus' note of the 12th October, relative to the correspondence between General Kaufmann and the Ameer of Cabul, and the explanation which General Kaufmann has furnished to his Government on the same subject.

* No. 95.

Lord Salisbury observes from these papers that the statement that Russian agents have been sent to Cabul with the object of negotiating a Treaty with the Ameer is denied both by the Russian Government and General Kaufmann, and that it is asserted that the General's communications have been merely letters of courtesy sent through the Ameer of Bokhara.

Lord Salisbury has received the assurance given on the first point with satisfaction, but he cannot accept as correct the general view of the correspondence taken by the Russian Government without referring to earlier communications; it is impossible to regard as a mere letter of courtesy General Kaufmann's letter of February last, which contained a detailed account of the Russian conquest of Khokand with justificatory remarks of a suggestive character; while as regards the allegation that the bearers of the different letters have not been Russian agents, but messengers employed by the Ameer of Bokhara, it is enough to observe that they have been viewed at Cabul in the former light, and treated accordingly. The fact that the character, both of the letters and of their bearers, is open to such misconstruction is, in Lord Salisbury's opinion, a sufficient reason for the issue by the Russian Government to General Kaufmann of orders to altogether discontinue his communications to the Ameer.

In his note of the 1st December M. de Giers, after dealing with the immediate subject under discussion, mentions certain statements which have been reported to the Imperial Government from Tashkend, and which he considers of a nature to justify that Government in calling for explanation in its turn from the Government of Her Majesty. These statements are that a simultaneous movement of British troops into the territory of the Ruler of Swat, and of Afghan detachments into Darwaz, a State vassal to Bokhara, either has been, or is about to be, made; and that Afghan armaments are preparing at Herat, in view to an expedition against the Turkomans of Merv.

Lord Salisbury considers that some explanation should be obtained from Prince Gortchakoff of the reference to the alleged British expedition against Swat, which is a valley in the immediate vicinity of Peshawur, on the southern side of the Hindu-Kush, inhabited by tribes whom the Indian Government has often been compelled to punish, but with whom at present it is not on bad terms. In any case his Lordship is at a loss to understand how such a movement, even were it contemplated, could be regarded as a breach of the Agreement of 1872, between the Russian and British Governments, which had reference solely to the relations of the former Government with Afghanistan, and the general obligation which the British Government accepted to use its influence with the Ameer to deter him from aggressive movements beyond his recognized borders. The influence of the Government of India has been consistently exercised to that end. No information has reached this Office, nor is there any reason to believe, either that the Ameer contemplates aggression on Darwaz, or that the preparations which have been for some time past in progress at Herat are in any way directed against the Turkomans of Merv. On this subject, however, the Government of India has been asked for information.

Lord Salisbury would suggest, for Lord Derby's consideration, that Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh should be instructed to reply to M. Giers' notes in the sense of the foregoing remarks.

I am directed to add that the previous correspondence on this subject, as well as your letters under reply, with their inclosures, have been forwarded for the information of the Government of India.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

No. 98.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received February* 3, 1877.)

My Lord, *Tehran, December* 19, 1876.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship translation of a letter which I have received from the Mission Agent at Asterabad, in which he reports that General Llamakin had returned from Khiva and was encamped at a spot about thirty-two miles from Kizil Arvad, the most westerly station of the Téké tribes of Akhal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. TAYLOUR THOMSON.

Inclosure in No. 98.

The Asterabad Agent to Mr. Taylour Thomson.

(Translation.) *November* 21, 1876

ON the 11th October Mahomed Koolee Khan, Chief of the Jaafer Baee Turkomans, addressed a petition to the Prince Governor, saying that the Yar Ali tribe represent that their object in being hostile was that Suleiman Khan, the former Governor of Asterabad, should be dismissed, and now that he is no longer Governor they are ready to tender their allegiance and submission and pay 11 tomans for each family. The Prince Governor has apparently agreed to this arrangement, but the other local authorities say that they ought to pay 25 tomans per family on account of the losses sustained by the people of Asterabad.

The Prince Governor has appointed Hassan Ali Meerza Acting Governor of Asterabad. Suleiman Khan, the ex-Governor, will leave for Tehran in a day or two, and it has been arranged that his creditors are to accompany him and get their money there.

On the 10th instant Mahomed Hoossein Khan, Chief of the Goklan tribe of Turkomans, with 100 of the Elders, arrived at Asterabad and proceeded to the Prince Governor's camp to arrange about paying the annual revenue, bringing the horses for the Prince Governor. His Royal Highness has fixed the revenue at 6,000 tomans per annum, and appointed Meerza Ali Nehher Khan, Serteep of Tindinsh, to be the Daraogha* of the said tribe on the part of the Government, and having presented each of the Elders with a dress of honour, he dismissed them to their homes.

The native merchants who have recently returned from Moscow and Nijni Novgorod state that a considerable quantity of ammunition had been brought to Bakou for transmission to Tiflis, and there was a rumour that Russia intends going to war with Turkey.

General Llamakin has recently returned from Khiva, and is at present encamped eight farsakhs distant from Kizil Arvad. The Russians have covered in a large vessel at Ashoorada, so that, in case of any storm or inundation, those who reside at Ashoorada may take refuge in it.

The exports to Russia from Gez and Meshedi Sur were 5,000,000 roubles last year, but this year they have decreased, and the person who has farmed the Custom-house complains that he has lost about 10,000 tomans on this and other accounts.

No. 99.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 7, 1877.

WITH reference to your despatches of the 6th and of the 16th December, 1876, inclosing respectively the formal reply of the Russian Government relative to the correspondence between General Kaufmann and the Ameer of Cabul, and the explanation which General Kaufmann has furnished to his Government on the same subject, Her Majesty's Government observe that the statement that Russian Agents have been sent to Cabul with the object of negotiating a Treaty with the Ameer is denied both by the Russian Government and General Kaufmann, and that it is asserted that the General's communications have been merely letters of courtesy sent through the Ameer of Bokhara.

Her Majesty's Government have received the assurance on the first point with satisfaction, but they cannot accept as correct the general view of the correspondence taken by the Russian Government. Without referring to earlier communications, it is impossible to regard as a mere letter of courtesy General Kaufmann's letter of February last, which contained a detailed account of the Russian conquest of Khokand, with justificatory remarks of a suggestive character, while, as regards the allegation that the bearers of the different letters have not been Russian Agents but messengers employed by the Ameer of Bokhara, it is enough to observe that they have been viewed at Cabul in the former light, and treated accordingly.

The fact that the character both of the letters and of their bearers is open to such misconstruction is a sufficient reason for the issue by the Russian Government to General Kaufmann of orders to altogether discontinue his communications to the Ameer.

In his note of the 1st December M. Giers, after dealing with the immediate subject

* Agent.

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under discussion, mentions certain statements which have been reported to the Imperia Government from Tashkend, and which he considers of a nature to justify that Government in calling for explanation in its turn from the Government of Her Majesty.

These statements are that a simultaneous movement of British troops into the territory of the Ruler of Swat, and of Afghan detachments into Darwaz, a State vassal to Bokhara, either has been or is about to be made; and that Afghan armaments are preparing at Herat in view to an expedition against the Turkomans of Merv.

Her Majesty's Government consider that some explanations should be obtained from Prince Gortchakow of the reference to the alleged British expedition against Swat, which is a valley in the immediate vicinity of Peshawur, on the southern side of the Hindoo Kush, inhabited by tribes whom the Indian Government has often been compelled to punish, but with whom at present it is not on bad terms.

In any case, Her Majesty's Government are at a loss to understand how such a movement, even were it contemplated, could be regarded as a breach of the Agreement of 1872, between the Russian and British Governments, which had reference solely to the relations of the former Government with Afghanistan, and the general obligation which the British Government accepted to use its influence with the Ameer to deter him from aggressive movements beyond his recognized borders. The influence of the Government of India has been consistently exercised to that end. No information has reached Her Majesty's Government, nor is there any reason to believe either that the Ameer contemplates aggression on Darwaz, or that the preparations which have been for some time past in progress at Herat are in any way directed against the Turkomans of Merv. On this subject, however, the Government of India has been asked for information.

I have to instruct your Excellency to reply to M. Giers' notes in the sense of the foregoing remarks.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 100.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received February 19.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February* 14, 1877.

ON the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 19th ultimo, and in conformity with its instructions, I took an early opportunity to speak to M. de Giers on the subject of the continued presence of a Russian Envoy at Cabul, of his receiving presents from the Ameer, and of the announcement of the expected arrival of the bearer of a further letter from General Kaufmann. I left in his Excellency's hands the inclosed copy of the extracts from the Cabul Diaries relating to this subject as an aide-memoire, and his Excellency promised me to inquire into the matter.

M. de Giers called on me yesterday and, in reply to my inquiry, stated that the name given in the Cabul Diaries of the reputed Russian Agent was the same as that mentioned by General Kaufmann, but his Excellency said that he was not personally employed by General Kaufmann, nor was he personally known to him. The letter of which he was the bearer had been sent by General Kaufmann to the Ameer of Bokhara for transmission to Balkh, from thence it was forwarded to the Ameer at Cabul.

The agent in question was the mere bearer of a letter, was neither selected by, nor personally known to General Kaufmann, and consequently was in no way authorized to assume the character of a Russian Agent or Envoy at Cabul.

M. de Giers stated that he had sent a copy of the extracts from the Cabul Diaries which I had given him to General Kaufmann, and had observed to him that the assumed character at Cabul of a Russian Envoy by this messenger was incorrect, liable to misconception, and consequently to be guarded against for the future.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 100.

Extract from "Cabul Diary" of October 20, 1876.

THE following khillats were granted on this occasion (October 19th) to the Russian Envoy, Mirza Mohamed Yusaf Khan, Mervi, and to the two Bokhara Envoys :—

The Russian Envoy—
1 Cashmeri abrah choga.
1 „ shawl.
1 „ abrah kamarbund.

To each Bokhara Envoy—
1 Cashmere abrah choga.
1 „ shawl.
1 „ abrah kamarbund.
4 dresses for four servants.

Extract from "Cabul Diary" of October 27, 1876.

Mirza Mohamed Yusaf Khan, Mervi, the Russian Envoy, receives cooked food twice a day for himself, and grass and grain for his horses from the Durbar, but lately 500 rupees has been sent to him for fruit and other expenses. It is reported that he sends several news-letters secretly to Bokhara through traders, and thence his letters are forwarded to Samarcand and Tashkend, and that he is more able and efficient than the former Russian Envoy, Mirza Abdool Karim Khan.

Extract from "Cabul Diary" of November 7, 1876.

It appeared that the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan had deputed his Peshkidmat, Mulla Saifulla, with a murrasila to the Ameer, that the Government of Samarcand had forwarded the Mulla with a letter from his own part to the Naib of Turkestan (Balkh), that he (the Mulla) had arrived at Mazar-a-Sharaff, and Naib Sherdil Khan had sent orders from Sar-i-pul to the Governor of Balkh to send him with a trusted official to Cabul. The Naib has submitted the letter of the Governor of Samarcand to the Ameer.

No. 101.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received March 5.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 22, 1877.*

IN conformity with the instructions of your Lordship's despatch of the 7th instant, I have addressed a note to M. de Giers on the subject of the correspondence between General Kaufmann and the Ameer of Afghanistan, in which I have embodied the substance of your Lordship's despatch, and of which I have the honour to annex a copy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 101.

Lord A. Loftus to M. de Giers.

M. le Conseiller Privé, *St. Petersburgh, February 22, 1877.*

I HAVE not failed to transmit to the Earl of Derby, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copies of your Excellency's notes of the $\frac{19\text{th November}}{1\text{st December}}$ and $\frac{3\text{rd}}{15\text{th}}$ December, 1876, relating to the correspondence between General Kaufmann, Governor-General of Turkestan, and the Ameer of Afghanistan, as also a copy of the explanation which General Kaufmann has furnished to the Imperial Government on the same subject.

Her Majesty's Government observe that the statement that Russian Agents have been sent to Cabul with the object of negotiating a Treaty with the Ameer is denied by the Russian Government and General Kaufmann, and that it is asserted that the General's communications have been merely letters of courtesy sent through the Ameer of Bokhara.

Her Majesty's Government have received the assurance on the first point with satisfaction, but they cannot accept as correct the general view of the correspondence taken by the Russian Government, without referring to earlier communications.

It is impossible to regard as a mere letter of courtesy General Kaufmann's letter of February last to the Ameer of Afghanistan, which contained a detailed account of the Russian conquest of Khokand, with justificatory remarks of a suggestive character, while, as regards the allegation that the bearers of the different letters have not been Russian Agents, but messengers employed by the Ameer of Bokhara, it is enough to observe that they have been viewed at Cabul in the former light, and treated accordingly.

Your Excellency will no doubt agree in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that the fact that the character both of the letters and their bearers is open to such misconstruction, is a sufficient reason for the discontinuance of such communications to the Ameer, and that, with a view in future to prevent any such misconstructions, General Kaufmann should be instructed to avoid giving rise to it.

After treating the question of the correspondence between General Kaufmann and the Ameer of Cabul, your Excellency mentions certain statements which have been reported to the Imperial Government from Tashkend, and which your Excellency considers are of a nature to justify the Imperial Government in calling for explanations, in its turn, from the Government of Her Majesty.

These statements are, that a simultaneous movement of British troops into the territory of the Ruler of Swat, and of Afghan detachments into Darwaez, a State vassal to Bokhara, either has been, or is about to be made, and that Afghan armaments are preparing at Herat in view to an expedition against the Turkomans of Merv.

Her Majesty's Government are desirous of obtaining from the Imperial Government some explanations with reference to the alleged expedition against Swat (alluded to in your Excellency's note), which is a valley in the immediate vicinity of Peshawur on the southern side of the Hindu Kush, inhabited by tribes whom the Indian Government has been often compelled to punish, but with whom at present it is not on bad terms.

In any case, Her Majesty's Government are at a loss to understand how such a movement, even were it contemplated, could be regarded as a breach of the Agreement of 1872, between the British and Russian Governments, which has reference solely to the relations of the latter Government with Afghanistan, and the general obligation which the British Government accepted to use its influence with the Ameer to deter him from aggressive movements beyond his recognized borders.

The influence of the Government of India has been consistently exercised to that end.

No information has reached Her Majesty's Government, nor is there any reason to believe, either that the Ameer contemplates aggression on Darwaez, or that the preparations which have been for some time past in progress at Herat are in any way directed against the Turkomans of Merv. On this subject, however, the Government of India has been asked for information.

Her Majesty's Government are convinced that a frank and cordial exchange of opinions between the two Governments on all questions relating to Central Asia will best contribute to their mutual interests, and to the maintenance of those friendly relations so happily subsisting between them.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) A. LOFTUS.

No. 102.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 7, 1877.

HER Majesty's Government approve your Excellency's note to M. de Giers on the subject of the correspondence between General Kaufmann and the Ameer of Afghanistan, a copy of which is inclosed in your despatch of the 22nd ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 103.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received March* 20.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, March* 15, 1877.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith copy of a note which I have received from M. de Giers, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, in reply to the note which I had addressed to his Excellency on the $\frac{10\text{th}}{22\text{nd}}$ February, in conformity with the instructions of your Lordship's despatch of the 7th ultimo.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 103.

M. de Giers to Lord A. Loftus.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *St. Pétersbourg, le* $\frac{21\text{ Février}}{5\text{ Mars}}$, 1877.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser en date du $\frac{10}{22}$ Fevrier.

Le Ministère Impérial partage entièrement l'avis du Gouvernement Britannique qu'un échange d'opinions franc et cordial dans les questions de l'Asie Centrale ne saurait que contribuer au maintien des bonnes et amicales relations actuellement établies entre la Russie et l'Angleterre.

C'est dans cet ordre d'idées qu'il a cru pouvoir donner dans les notes du $\frac{19\text{ Novembre}}{1\text{ Décembre}}$ et du $\frac{3}{15}$ Décembre, auxquelles votre Excellence se réfère, l'assurance que la Russie n'avait essayé de conclure aucun arrangement commercial ou politique avec l'Emir de Caboul, et que les rares relations de nos autorités de l'Asie Centrale avec ce dernier n'avaient jamais eu qu'un caractère de pure courtoisie, conforme aux usages locaux en Orient. En renouvelant aujourd'hui ces assurances, le Ministère Impérial espère que le Gouvernement Britannique voudra bien reconnaître que nous ne nous en sommes pas écartés en pratique, quelque soit, d'ailleurs, l'interprétation erronnée que les communications du Général Kaufmann aient pu recevoir de la part des Gouvernements indigènes Asiatiques et la fausse importance qu'on ait prêtée aux modes de transmission dont il a fait usage. Des malentendus à cet égard étaient presque inévitables vu le caractère peu sûr des populations indigènes de l'Asie Centrale et leur penchant invétéré pour l'intrigue; la seule manière efficace de combattre ce danger réside, selon nous, dans la bonne foi et la loyauté qui, nous aimons à le croire, ne manqueront jamais de présider de part et d'autre à tout échange d'idées entre nous et le Cabinet Britannique.

En réponse au désir exprimé par Lord Derby de connaître à quelle source avait été puisée la nouvelle de quelques mouvements de troupes Indo-Anglaises contre Souat, le Ministère Impérial s'empresse d'informer votre Excellence que ce renseignement ne reposait que sur des bruits parvenus à nos autorités de l'Asie Centrale et auxquels nous avons été loin d'accorder une valeur exaggérée. Le Ministère Impérial accueille, d'autre part, avec une vive satisfaction les assertions contenues dans la note de votre Excellence qu'aucun mouvement militaire dans ces parages ne saurait être dirigé de manière à constituer une infraction à l'entente de 1872 entre la Russie et l'Angleterre, et que le Gouvernement Britannique continue à exercer son influence sur l'Emir de Caboul dans le but de le détourner, conformément à l'entente susmentionnée, de toute tentative en dehors de la région assignée à son action légitime.

Nous nous faisons un devoir de reconnaître, en même temps, avec reconnaissance l'empressement du Gouvernement Britannique à demander au Gouvernement des Indes des informations relativement à des entreprises quelconques médités par l'Emir Afghan dans le Derwaz, ou contre les Turcomans de Merv, entreprises au sujet desquelles aucun indice propre à nous inspirer des craintes ne semble jusqu'ici être parvenu au Cabinet de Londres.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) GIERS.

(Translation.)

M. l'Ambassadeur, *St. Petersburgh,* $\frac{\text{February } 21}{\text{March } 5}$, 1877.

I HAVE had the honour to receive the note which your Excellency was good enough to address to me, dated the $\frac{10\text{th}}{22\text{nd}}$ February.

The Imperial Government entirely share the opinion of the British Government that a frank and cordial interchange of opinions on the question of Central Asia cannot do

otherwise than contribute to the maintenance of the good and friendly relations at present established between Russia and England.

With this view they felt ready to give, in the notes of the $\frac{19\text{th November}}{1\text{st December}}$ and the $\frac{3\text{rd}}{15\text{th}}$ December, to which your Excellency refers, the assurance that Russia had not endeavoured to conclude any arrangement, commercial or political, with the Ameer of Cabul, and that the rare relations of our authorities in Central Asia with the latter had never borne any other character than one of pure courtesy, in conformity with local usages in the East. While now renewing these assurances, the Imperial Government hope the British Government will recognize that practically we have never swerved from them, whatever may have been the erroneous interpretations placed by the native Asiatic Governments on the communications of General Kaufmann, and whatever false importance may have been attributed to the method of transmission adopted by him. Misunderstandings on this subject were nearly inevitable, considering the uncertain character of the native populations of Central Asia, and their inveterate inclination to intrigue; the only effective way, in our opinion, of meeting this danger, lies in the good faith and loyalty which, we are glad to think, will never cease to influence, on either side, any interchange of views between us and the British Cabinet.

In reply to the desire expressed by Lord Derby to know from what source we derived the information of some movements of Anglo-Indian troops against Swat, the Imperial Government loses no time in informing your Excellency that this information was only based on rumours which reached our authorities in Central Asia, and to which we were far from giving an exaggerated value. The Imperial Government has received, on the other hand, with sincere satisfaction, the assertions contained in your Excellency's note, that no military movement in these countries could be conducted in such a manner as to constitute an infraction of the understanding of 1872 between Russia and England, and that the British Government continue to use their influence with the Ameer of Cabul, with the view of dissuading him, in accordance with the above-mentioned understanding, from any attempt outside of the region assigned to his legitimate action.

We beg at the same time to recognize, with thanks, the promptitude shown by the British Government in requesting information from the Indian Government respecting any undertakings meditated by the Ameer of Afghanistan in Darvaz, or against the Turkomans of Merv, undertakings with regard to which no indication of a nature to alarm us seems to have reached the Cabinet of London.

Accept, &c.
(Signed) GIERS.

No. 104.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received April* 8.)

My Lord, *Tehran, February* 19, 1877.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of a letter addressed to me by the Mission Agent at Asterabad, in which he reports the return to Krasnovodsk of General Llamakin from Organj, and states that the object of his recent expedition was said to have been to ascertain the practicability of turning the River Oxus into its ancient bed, and thereby opening up direct water communication from the Caspian.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. TAYLOUR THOMSON.

Inclosure in No. 104.

The Asterabad Agent to Mr. Taylour Thomson.

(Translation.) *January* 21, 1877.

THE weather is very mild, and there are no signs of winter. Provisions are rather high in price, but that is on account of the Moharrem and the presence of the camp.

The Prince Governor is at present encamped at Shoogal Teppeh, and engaged in recovering the revenue from the Turkomans of the Kejek Tantaur and Kaun Yookmaz, who have never been paid a farthing of revenue up till now. They have agreed to pay 4 tomans a family to the Prince Governor.

The fact is this, that till the present day no Governor has been so successful in recovering the revenue in this manner from the Turkoman families.

On the 29th December intelligence was received, both from the sea and the Turkoman plains, that General Llamakin and his suite have returned to Krasnovodsk. This time he went as far as Organj, and his object was to inspect and ascertain whether it would be possible to turn the Geihoon River into its former bed, so that its waters may flow into the Caspian at Krasnovodsk. For should the said river be turned into its former bed it will become navigable as far as four stations from Bokhara.

On the 30th December the Russian Commodore sent thirty Persian captives, released from Khiva, to the Acting Governor of Asterabad. On the 1st instant it was telegraphed from Tehran that the Russian Consul had been made Grand Officer of the Order of the Lion and Sun, and that the Vice-Consul had also received the Fourth Class of the same Order.

The Russian Consul has informed the local authorities that, from the beginning of the Russian new year, all duties at the Custom-house will be levied in gold currency, and not in any other money. It is also reported that the Russian railway has been constructed in Turkestan as far as Orum, which is near Bokhara.

No. 105.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received April* 25.)

My Lord, *Tehran, March* 16, 1877.

I HAVE the honour to transmit translation of a further news letter from the Mission Agent at Meshed.

Nothing appears to be known here by the Persian Government respecting the communications said by the Agent's correspondents at Boojnoord to have passed between certain Chiefs of the Akhal tribes and the Russian authorities.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. TAYLOUR THOMSON.

Inclosure in No. 105.

The Meshed Agent to Mr. Taylour Thomson.

(Translation.) *March* 1, 1877.

ABOUT the middle of February, about 1,000 Turkomans of Merv, horse and foot, set out with the intention of making a raid on Deragez. The Elders of Merv, on hearing this, followed and dissuaded them, on the grounds that a number of their Chiefs and Elders were yet at Meshed. They all returned, with the exception of 100 horsemen who would not obey. These made a raid on the Zangat Loo tribe of Deragez, and carried off a considerable number of sheep, with ten or twelve captives.

Allahyar Khan, the Governor, on hearing of the raid, sent a number of horsemen to overtake the marauders. These horsemen came up to the Turkomans near Tezen, and a severe conflict took place. Thirteen of the robbers were killed, and twelve captured, with twenty horses, the sheep and Persian captives also being rescued.

A correspondent at Boojnoord wrote to me on the 30th January that Sirdar Eivez Tookhma, accompanied by several other of the Akhal Chiefs, recently proceeded on a mission to the Russians. They were well received, and khelats were given to all of them, and they tendered their submission.

According to later accounts, the ten or twelve Téké forts which lie between Kizzil Arvad and Kara Kan and Darvan, have submitted to the Russians and agreed to obey whenever the Russians send their Agent.

Hajji Shah Mohammed Khan arrived here yesterday with about twenty of the Akhal Elders.

Sirdar Eyub Khan is at Meshed. Some days ago Peer Mohammed Khan, his Agent at Tehran, wrote to him that the Sefet Salar had told him that a coolness exists between England and Afghanistan.

No. 106.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received April 25.)

(Extract.) *Tehran, March 22, 1877.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 16th instant, I have the honour to report that information has reached me from a trustworthy source of the submission to Russia of several of the Chiefs of the Akhal Turkomans, and the proposed despatch of a military expedition by General Llamakin, with the intention of occupying Kizil Arvad and Bameh Boormeh, and constructing forts there.

No. 107.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 25.)

My Lord, *Tehran, April 17, 1877.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, translation of a Proclamation issued by General Llamakin to the Yemoot Turkoman Chiefs.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. TAYLOUR THOMSON.

Inclosure in No. 107.

Proclamation in Turkish issued by the Russian General Llamakin to the Jaafer Baee Turkomans, and translated into English from the Persian Version.

IT is made known to all the families, Elders, Ketkhodas, Chiefs, and old and young of the Charvas, that is to say, the Yemoot tribe of the Jaafer Baees, who every year and at all times come and reside on the banks of the Attrek within the dominions of the Emperor of Russia; first to Yar Ali Kazee, Aranz Ali Beg, Andeenah Vatee Moolla, Yagaun Mohammed, Allahverdee Moolla, Vatee Mohammed Chakaun, Sattar Maust, Tokkan Karrauveel, Andeenah Aranz Moolla, Siyoon, Mohammed Andeenah Bai, Hajji Bai, Omar, Teecheh, Siyoon Akh, Jooja Kootee, Sheidai Beg, Boorchak Khan, Feizee Bai, Mohammed Kootee Kalta, Saltan, Valee Bai, Daz Nafass Ousta, Andeenah Mohammed, Kooshtee Bai, Ata Mohammed, Ata Khan, Kooljee Bai, Penah Ousta, Beg Jan, Vatee, Dadak, Nefess, Mohammed Andeenah, Karacheh, Autau Bai, Daz Nazar Bai, Koorban Mohammed Bai, Tekka Kizzil, Andeenah Mohammed Kizil, Koofak Bai, Jooja Bauba Moolla, Barkalee Man, Aranz Doodee Shahoo, that as you are aware, the Téké tribes are always plundering and robbing the Yemoots who reside in our neighbourhood, also the Yemoots of Khiva, and they are always killing the members of these tribes, and making captives of your children, and carrying off your camels and sheep. They are constantly engaged in plundering on the routes which we have newly opened between Khiva and Shah Kadam (Krasnovodsk).

Up till now we have endeavoured to impress upon the Téké tribes that they must not annoy those Turkomans who reside in the lands of the Emperor of Russia. We have done our utmost in this respect, for we will never allow that any Turkoman tribes who are living under the protection of the Emperor of Russia should be ill-treated by the others. We are striving that they may be free from all ill-usage on the part of the Téké tribes, and that no one should dare to interfere with our caravans which are travelling to and fro.

Notwithstanding this, those tribes did not listen to us, nor did they accept our advice, and as they have again taken to plundering and annoying you and my other neighbours just as they did at first, this time I have received orders from the Emperor to march upon the Téké tribes with troops, and to erect a fort at Kizil Ervad, and to keep a permanent garrison there. I have therefore sent this paper amongst you, and have given orders to my special servants, the Khans and the Ketkhodas, who will apprize you of the same. I require of you, my good servants, the Khans and the Ketkhodas, that for this expedition against the Tékés, you, who are the Jaafer (Baee) tribe, will give 500 camels and receive their hire. I also require 500 camels from the Ak Atabais. The hire of each camel, you know, is half a rouble per diem, and the pay of a camel driver also half a rouble per diem, each camel driver will have six camels to keep, and to each horseman I will allow ten roubles per mensem.

I have to express my greatest satisfaction to those who formerly supplied camels for the expedition to Khiva. For this expedition, also, I am in great hopes that you will provide 500 camels for myself and troops. These camels must be ready in a month and a half from this time. If those who provided camels on former occasions lost some of their beasts, yet they also profited by the transaction, and can therefore replace the camels they then lost out of the money they received for hire. Whoever assists me in this expedition, and gives camels, I will reckon him amongst my friends. Those who assisted us request that they may be taken into our Emperor's service, and they will be honoured with favours and kindness on part of the Emperor, and will always (be allowed) to reside in the Emperor's territory. Should these people not assist the Emperor and myself in the present undertaking, and refuse to provide camels; they must not expect any honours and favours from the Emperor, and I will never permit them to reside on the banks of the Attrek within the Emperor's dominions. Therefore, when I have finished the (building of the) Fort of Kizzil Ervad, I will return and strenuously endeavour to drive them from the banks of the Attrek. We have no confidence in such people who will give us no assistance in this matter, that we should allow them to remain in the Emperor's dominions. Our Agents will each separately notify the above to your people.

16 *Sefer*, 1294 (*February* 16, 1877.)

(Signed) GERASNADERINSKY.

No. 108.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June* 1.)

My Lord, *Tehran, April* 28, 1877.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, translation of a report from the Meshed Agent, in which he gives further details of the Russian movement at Kizzil Arvad.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. TAYLOUR THOMSON.

Inclosure in No. 108.

The Meshed Agent to Mr. Taylour Thomson.

(Translation.) *April* 17, 1877.

A CORRESPONDENT at Boojnoord writes that the Russian (General) who is at Krasnovodsk has summoned the (Turkoman) Elders of Kizzil Arvad. They went to him, and after much discussion it was arranged that the people of Kizzil Arvad should become Russian subjects, which they did, and that they should give 5,000 camels as a result of their allegiance. The Russian General will leave Krasnovodsk on the 5th April for Kizzil Arvad. His troops are not more than 5,000 or 6,000 men, and he intends building a fort at Kizzil Arvad.

No. 109.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June* 5.)

My Lord, *Tehran, May* 12, 1877.

I HAVE the honour to inclose translation of a letter from the Meshed Agent, reporting that the son of Kousheed Khan, the Chief of the Merv Téké Turkomans, when returning from Herat with his followers, where he had apparently been to offer the allegiance of his tribe to the Afghan Government, had been attacked and captured by the Saryk Turkomans.

He also states that the Akhals of Bam, Boormeh, and Kizzil Ervad had submitted to the Russians.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. TAYLOUR THOMSON.

Inclosure in No. 109.

The Meshed Agent to Mr. Taylour Thomson.

(Translation.) *April* 30, 1877.

RECENTLY several people came in from Herat and Candahar, but they brought no news except that of the coolness existing between the British authorities and Ameer Shere Ali Khan.

Behbood Khan, the Governor of Khelat, has reported to the Prince Governor that, whilst the son of Kousheed Khan was returning with about eighty of the Elders from Herat, where he had gone on a mission to offer his allegiance, and that of his tribe, to Ameer Shere Ali Khan, and to make arrangements on the same subject, he was attacked by 300 of the Saryk tribe, who had laid in wait for him and his party. After fighting and losing five or six lives on both sides, Kousheed Khan's son and party were obliged to surrender to the Saryks, who took them as captives to their encampments.

He and his followers had been very well received at Herat, and they were returning in high spirits, having received presents and dresses of honour, when they were attacked and carried off by the Saryk Turkomans.

I hear from Boojnoord that the Russians were to have come to Kizzil Ervad on the 5th instant from Krasnovodsk, at which date they did not arrive; but it now appears that they will do so on the 24th instant. The Téké Turkomans residing at Bam, Boormeh, and Kizzil Ervad, have submitted to the Russians, as they had no means of resisting.

No. 110.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 9.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June* 4, 1877.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the official Bulletins from the seat of war, published since the date of my despatch of the 1st instant.

In the Bulletin from the Caucasus, of yesterday's date, the Commander-in-chief reports having received intelligence from General Llamakin that he had been attacked at Kizil Arvat by 6,000 Tékés; that the combat lasted four hours, when the Tékés fled, having sustained great losses, the Russians losing one man killed and eleven wounded.

After the fight General Llamakin reports that the Khans and Elders tendered their submission, and that since the 27th May all was going on favourably.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 110.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of $\frac{\text{May } 23}{\text{June } 4}$, 1877.

Télégramme de Son Altesse Impériale Mgr. le Grand Duc Commandant-en-chef de l'Armée du Caucase, en date du $\frac{22 \text{ Mai}}{3 \text{ Juin}}$, 1877.

LE Général Llamakin écrit que son détachement a été attaqué le 12 Mai à Kizyl-Arvat par une troupe de .6,000 Tékés. Le combat a duré quatre heures et les Tékés se sont enfuis après avoir essuyé de très-grandes pertes. Nous avons eu un homme tué et onze blessés. Après cet engagement les khans et les anciens sont venus faire leur soumission et depuis le 15 Mai tout va bien dans le détachement.

No. 111.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(Received June 12.)

(Extract.) *India Office, June* 12, 1877.

WITH reference to this Office letter of the 27th January last, on the subject of the correspondence between General Kaufmann and the Ameer of Cabul, I am directed by the

Marquis of Salisbury to forward herewith, for Lord Derby's information, copy of a letter from the Government of India in reply to a reference made to that Government in regard to an alleged movement of Afghan troops against Darwaz, to which allusion was made by M. de Giers in the note addressed by him to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh on the 1st December, 1876.

Lord Derby will observe that the Government of India have heard of no such movement, and that the Mirakhor Amad Khan, a high official of the Cabul Government, lately at Peshawur, had likewise heard of none.

Inclosure in No. 111.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury.

(Extract.) *Simla, May* 3, 1877.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch dated 31st January last, transmitting copy of further correspondence with the Foreign Office on the subject of General Kaufmann's relations with the Ameer of Cabul, and desiring to be furnished, at an early date, with any information which we may be able to obtain regarding alleged Afghan movements against Darwaz.

There can be no doubt that the communications between General Kaufmann and Shere Ali Khan exceed the requirements of mere exchanges of courtesy; and are regarded as something much more than complimentary by the person to whom they are addressed. The messages from General Kaufmann to the Ameer have not been dispatched, as stated by the General (in his letter of the 9th November, 1876, to the Russian Foreign Office), only "once or twice a year." During the past year they have been incessant. The bearers of them are regarded and treated by the Ameer as Agents of the Russian Government, and on one pretext or another some person recognized by the Afghan Government as a Russian Agent is now almost constantly at Cabul.

We desire to submit to your Lordship's consideration whether our own conduct would be viewed with indifference by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, were the Government of India to open similarly friendly relations with the Khans of Khiva and Bokhara; and if without actually making to them overtures of alliance, we addressed to those Princes frequent letters containing assurances of friendship, coupled with explanations of the policy we deem it desirable to pursue toward the States upon our own frontier.

With regard to Darwaz we have heard of no movement of Afghan troops against, or in the direction of, that Principality, and the high official of the Cabul Government, now present at Peshawur, the Mirakhor Amad Khan, has likewise heard of none, but a reference has been made to His Highness the Ameer upon the subject, the result of which will be communicated in due course.

No. 112.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 13, 1877.

INTIMATION has lately been received by Her Majesty's Government of fresh military movements on the part of the Russians along the Turkoman steppe and in the direction of the valley of the Attrek. A force under General Llamakin is already to the east of Kizzil Arvad, and as it is the proclaimed intention of that officer to punish the Téké Turkomans, it seems not impossible that the pending operations may ultimately end in the occupation of Merv unless positive instructions to the contrary are at once issued by th Russian Government.

Her Majesty's Government have upon more than one occasion impressed upon the Government of Russia the evil consequences which must follow from such a step.

In his despatch to your Lordship dated the 7th January, 1874, which your Excellency communicated to Prince Gortchakow, Lord Granville called attention to the fears expressed by the Ameer of Afghanistan as to the complications in which he might become involved with Russia, were the result of a Russian expedition against Merv to be to drive the Turkomans to take refuge in the Province of Badghees, in Herat. His Lordship thought it right to state candidly and at once that the independence of Afghanistan was regarded by Her Majesty's Government as a matter of great importance to the welfare

and security of British India, and to the tranquillity of Asia. He pointed out that should the Turkoman tribes, then or at any future time, be driven into the neighbourhood of Herat, in consequence of military operations effected by Russian power, the Ameer might labour under a double hardship, first, in the disturbance of his dominions; secondly, if he were held responsible for controlling tribes of that wild race, and restraining them from incursions upon the country from which Russia had expelled them; and his Lordship added:—

"On the one hand, it does not appear how he (the Ameer) could justly be held responsible in such circumstances, and, if he were so held, he would have a strong claim to consideration on the part of all such as rightly appreciate his position. On the other hand, questions might thus be raised which it was the object of the engagement entered into between Great Britain and Russia to obviate, and which it cannot be the interest of either country to revive."

Again, more recently, in the Memorandum which Mr. Doria, in my despatch dated the 28th October, 1875, was instructed to communicate to the Russian Government, and which was drawn up in reply to a Memorandum inclosed in a despatch from Prince Gortchakow, dated the $\frac{5}{17}$th April, 1875, repudiating any intention on the part of His Majesty the Emperor of extending the frontiers of Russia as they then existed, either in Central Asia or in the direction of Bokhara, or on the side of Krasnovodsk and the Attrek, the views of Her Majesty's Government were explicitly stated as follows:—

"Whatever may be the ultimate destiny of Russia in the course of its civilizing mission in Central Asia, it is impossible not to see that, in view of the present conditions of the Turkoman tribes, of the relations in which they stand to the Ruler of Afghanistan on the one hand, and those between the Ruler and the Government of India on the other, that each successive advance of the Russian frontier towards Afghanistan may involve complications which it is equally the interest of both England and Russia to avoid, and may raise up the most serious obstacles to the continued pursuance of the policy which has hitherto guided both Powers alike to maintain intact the integrity of Afghan territory.

"This is an object to which Her Majesty's Government attach the highest importance, and they must reserve to themselves the most complete liberty of action under all future contingencies as to the measures which may, in their opinion, be necessary to secure it. They cannot but feel that such an event, for instance, as the occupation of Merv, which would bring the line of Russian territory into direct contact with Afghan territory, would arouse the susceptibilities of the Ameer to the highest degree, and possibly involve him in a common course of defensive action with the Turkoman tribes upon his borders.

"Under such circumstances it is unnecessary to observe how difficult it might be for the Imperial Government to maintain a policy of strict abstention in accordance with its present assurances, or how impossible it might be for Her Majesty's Government to exert any effectual control over the actions of the Ameer without undertaking responsibilities which they would most reluctantly assume, and which would virtually involve the very result which both Governments desire to avert, viz., the contact of the two Powers in Central Asia."

On the 15th November last, when your Excellency mentioned to Prince Gortchakow the report then current of a projected Russian expedition to Merv, his Highness authorized you to inform Her Majesty's Government that there was no question of such an expedition, nor any idea of occupying Merv.

I have now to instruct your Excellency to make a renewed representation to the Government of Russia on the subject of the movements of Russian troops now taking place on the Turkoman steppe, recalling the above observations to their recollection, and clearly, though courteously, pointing out that the occupation of Merv would be held by the general opinion of the inhabitants of the neighbouring regions of Asia to announce a design on the part of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia to extend his influence, if not his dominion, into territories with which Her Majesty's Government have understood from the Government of His Imperial Majesty that it is not His Majesty's intention to interfere.

Such an impression would impose upon Her Majesty's Government the necessity of making a corresponding advance in order to allay apprehension and to remove misconception from the minds of the people of those countries. They could not, however, look upon so close an approximation of the outposts of the two Empires as in itself desirable, or likely to facilitate the discharge of the difficult duties with which the administrations of each Government are charged.

Her Majesty's Government therefore hope that His Majesty the Emperor of Russia will issue to his officers in those countries the strictest injunctions to abstain, in the course

any operations which the misconduct of the Turkomans may render necessary, from advancing into the neighbourhood of Merv.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 113.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 19, 1877.*

ON the receipt of your Excellency's despatch of the 6th December last a reference was made to the Government of India in regard to the alleged movement of Afghan troops against Darwaz, to which allusion was made by M. de Giers in his note to you of the 1st December.

I have now to instruct your Excellency to inform the Russian Government that inquiry has been made in India, and that nothing has been heard of any such movement either by the Indian Government or by Mirakhor Amad Khan, a high official of the Cabul Government who was lately at Peshawur. You may add that a reference has been made to the Ameer of Afghanistan on the subject, the result of which will be communicated in due course.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 114.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 27.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 22, 1877.*

IN obedience to the instructions of your Lordship's despatch of the 13th instant I have addressed a note to M. de Giers, of which I have the honour to annex a copy, calling the attention of the Imperial Government to the evil consequences which may arise from the movement of Russian troops now taking place on the Turkoman steppe, should those movements lead to an occupation of Merv, and expressing the hope of Her Majesty's Government that His Majesty the Emperor of Russia will issue to his military commanders in those parts the strictest injunctions to abstain, in the course of any operations which the misconduct of the Turkomans may render necessary, from advancing into the neighbourhood of Merv.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 114.

Lord A. Loftus to M. de Giers.

M. le Conseiller Privé, *St. Petersburgh, June $\frac{9}{21}$, 1877.*

HER Majesty's Government have lately received information of fresh military movements on the part of the Russian Commander of the forces at Krasnovodsk along the Turkoman steppe and in the direction ot the valley of the Attrek.

A force under General Llamakin is already to the East of Kizil-Arward; and, as it is the proclaimed intention of that officer to punish the Téké Turkomans, it seems not impossible that the pending operations may ultimately end in the occupation of Merv, unless positive instructions to the contrary are at once issued by the Imperial Government.

Her Majesty's Government have, on more than one occasion, impressed upon the Government of Russia the evil consequences which must follow from such a step.

In the despatch dated the 7th January, 1874, which Earl Granville addressed to me, and which I communicated to Prince Gortchakow, his Lordship called attention to the fears expressed by the Ameer of Afghanistan as to the complications in which he might become involved with Russia were a Russian expedition against Merv to result in driving the Turkomans to take refuge in the province of Badghees, in Herat. Earl Granville thought it right to state candidly, and at once, that the independence of Afghanistan was

regarded by Her Majesty's Government as a matter of great importance to the welfare and security of British India, and to the tranquillity of Asia. He pointed out that, should the Turkoman tribes, then, or at any future time, be driven into the neighbourhood of Herat, in consequence of military operations effected by Russian power, the Ameer might labour under a double hardship: first, in the disturbance of his dominions; secondly, if he were held responsible for controlling tribes of that wild race, and restraining them from incursions upon the country from which Russia had expelled them; and his Lordship then added, "On the one hand it does not appear how he (the Ameer) could justly be held responsible in such circumstances, and, if he were so held, he would have a strong claim to consideration on the part of all such as rightly appreciate his position. On the other hand, questions might thus be raised which it was the object of the engagement entered into between Great Britain and Russia to obviate, and which it cannot be the interest of either country to revive."

Again, more recently, in the Memorandum which in October 1875 Mr. Doria was instructed by the Earl of Derby to communicate to the Russian Government, and which was drawn up in reply to a Memorandum inclosed in a despatch from Prince Gortchakow, dated the $\frac{5}{17}$th April, 1875, repudiating any intention on the part of His Majesty the Emperor of extending the frontiers of Russia, as they then existed, either in Central Asia or in the direction of Bokhara, or on the side of Krasnovodsk and the Attrek, the views of Her Majesty's Government were explicitly stated as follows:—

"Whatever may be the ultimate destiny of Russia in the course of its civilizing mission in Central Asia, it is impossible, in view of the present conditions of the Turkoman tribes, of the relations in which they stand to the Ruler of Afghanistan, on the one hand, and those between that Ruler and the Government of India on the other, not to see that each successive advance of the Russian frontier towards Afghanistan may involve complications which it is equally the interest both of England and of Russia to avoid, and may raise up the most serious obstacles to the continued pursuance of the policy, which has hitherto guided both Powers alike to maintain intact the integrity of Afghan territory.

"This is an object to which Her Majesty's Government attach the highest importance and they must reserve to themselves the most complete liberty of action under all future contingencies as to the measures which may, in their opinion, be necessary to secure it. They cannot but feel that such an event, for instance, as the occupation of Merv, which would bring the line of Russian territory into direct contact with Afghan territory, would arouse the susceptibilities of the Ameer to the highest degree, and probably involve him in a common course of defensive action with the Turkoman tribes upon his border.

"Under such circumstances it is unnecessary to observe how difficult it might be for the Imperial Government to maintain a policy of abstention in accordance with its present assurances, or how impossible it might be for Her Majesty's Government to exert any effectual control over the actions of the Ameer without undertaking responsibilities which they would most reluctantly assume, and which would virtually involve the very result which both Governments desire to avert, viz., the contact of the two Powers in Central Asia."

I may further observe to your Excellency that when, on the 15th of November last, I mentioned to Prince Gortchakow a report then current of a projected Russian expedition to Merv, I was authorized by his Highness to inform Her Majesty's Government that there was no question of such an expedition, nor any idea of occupying Merv.

I am instructed by the Earl of Derby, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, again to invite the serious attention of the Imperial Government to the evil consequences which may arise from the movement of Russian troops now taking place on the Turkoman steppe, and to point out that the occupation of Merv by a Russian force will be held by the general opinion of the inhabitants of the neighbouring regions of Asia as announcing a design on the part of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia to extend his influence,—if not his dominions,—into territories with which Her Majesty's Government have understood from the Government of His Imperial Majesty that it is not His Majesty's intention to interfere.

Such an impression would impose on Her Majesty's Government the necessity of making a corresponding advance, in order to allay apprehension and remove misconception from the minds of the people of those countries.

They could not, however, look upon so close an approximation of the outposts of the two Empires as in itself desirable or likely to facilitate the discharge of the difficult duties with which the Administrations of each country are charged.

With a view to the reciprocal interests of both countries, and to the maintenance of the good understanding now existing between them in regard to the affairs of Central Asia, I am instructed to state that Her Majesty's Government entertain a confident hope

that His Majesty the Emperor of Russia will issue to his military commanders in those parts the strictest injunctions to abstain, in the course of any operations which the misconduct of the Turkomans may render necessary, from advancing into the neighbourhood of Merv.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 115.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received July* 9.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June* 30, 1877.

IN conformity with the instructions of your Lordship's despatch of the 19th instant, I have addressed to M. de Giers a note, copy of which I have the honour to annex, stating, in regard to an allusion made by his Excellency in his note of the 1st December, 1876, that an inquiry has been made in India and that no information has been received of the alleged movement of Afghan troops against Derwaz, either by the Indian Government or by Mirakhor Amad Khan, a high official of the Cabul Government, who was lately at Peshawur.

I added further that a reference had been made to the Ameer of Afghanistan on the subject, the result of which would be communicated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 115.

Lord A. Loftus to M. de Giers.

M. le Conseiller Privé, *St. Petersburgh, June* 28, 1877.

IN your note of the 19th November / 1st December of last year, your Excellency referred to information which had reached the Imperial Government from Tashkend reporting a movement of Afghan detachments against Darwaz, a small vassal State of Bokhara, on the confines of Karateguin.

Her Majesty's Government, on the receipt of your Excellency's note, communicated this information to the Government of India.

I am now instructed by the Earl of Derby, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to inform the Imperial Government that inquiry has been made in India, and that nothing has been heard of any such movement either by the Indian Government or by Mirakhor Amad Khan, a high official of the Cabul Government, who was lately at Peshawur.

A further reference has been made to the Ameer of Afghanistan on the subject, the result of which, when received, will be communicated to the Imperial Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 116.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received July* 18.)

(Extract.) *Tehran, June* 16, 1877.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith translations of two letters from the Meshed Agent, reporting the occupation of Kizzil Ervad by the Russians. The Agent also mentions that 800 Turkomans who had made an attack on the Russians had fallen into their hands, and had been put to death, and he refers to a movement on the Oxus at Chehar Yao, which was causing disquietude to the Tékés of Merv.

A report came a few days ago from Sabzawar that a successful night attack had been made on the Russians at Kizzil Ervad by the Turkomans, but the authority of this information may be doubted.

Inclosure 1 in No. 116.

Meerza Abbass Khan to Mr. Taylour Thomson.

(Translation.) *June* 2, 1877.

FROM Boojnoord I am informed that a number of Russian troops arrived at Shah Kadam from Khiva, that they had 1,500 camels, which they got from Kornak, for carrying their commissariat, &c., that they were joined by two other Russian regiments at Shah Kadam, and marched in the direction of Kizzil Arvad; that the whole force now consists of four regiments and 500 horse, and that they hired 1,000 camels more from the Ata Bai and Jaafer Bai Turkomans.

The Shooja-ud-Dowleh is glad that the Téké Turkomans have not become subject to Persian rule.

Inclosure 2 in No. 116.

Meerza Abbass Khan to Mr. Taylour Thomson.

(Translation.) *June* 8, 1877.

SEVERAL Russian officers recently came to Chehar Joob to make their preparations, and remained there a short time.

The Téké Turkomans are in great alarm on account of the Russians having appeared at Chehar Joob, and the arrival of their troops at Akhal.

A correspondent at Boojnoord writes that the Russians have arrived at Kizzil Arvad. Their baggage first arrived, and afterwards their troops. Intelligence has also been received that 800 of the Téké Turkomans attacked them and were all cut up. The present troops are two regiments, but they will be reinforced. They have 1,000 camels for bringing water, and they intend erecting buildings at Kizzil Arvad. The Governor of Deragez reported to the Prince Governor that the Russians took possession of Kizzil Arvad, that the Téké Turkomans attacked them, and from 5,000 to 6,000 of the Turkomans were killed; that a number of them have applied for permission to come and reside in Persian territory. His Royal Highness has referred their request to Tehran.

By what it appears the Shah does not wish to accommodate the Téké Turkomans, and in secret is favourably disposed towards the Russian designs against Merv and Akhal.

The Merv Turkomans who had come here to negotiate about their allegiance to Persia, feel greatly alarmed since they have learnt the Russian movements, and come to me for advice. I told them I had no instructions on the subject.

No 117.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 19, 1877.

HER Majesty's Government approve the note, of which a copy is inclosed in your Excellency's despatch of the 22nd ultimo, which you addressed to M. de Giers in regard to the reported movement of Russian troops towards Merv on the 21st June.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 118.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received August 8.)

My Lord, *Tehran, June* 20, 1877.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the following information has reached me by telegraph from the Mission Agent at Meshed. Proposals have been made on the part of the Russians to the inhabitants of Karee Kala and Kokhor that they should make a declaration of their allegiance to the Russian Government.

The inhabitants of both districts have been referred to the Boojnoord authorities, who have sought advice from those of Khorassan, while the latter have referred the matter to the capital, and requested to be informed by telegraph as to the course which they

should pursue. The Agent states that he has visited Kokhor, and that there is no doubt as to its belonging to Boojnoord.

With regard to the position of Karee Kala I may add that it lies upon the southern slope of the Akhal range, and is in the possession of a branch of the Goklan tribe from Khiva. The possession of this place by the Russians will open up to them the whole valley of the Upper Attrek as far as Boojnoord and Kaschan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. TAYLOUR THOMSON.

No. 119.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received August* 8.)

My Lord, *Tehran, June* 30, 1877.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that the Government of the Shah have received information confirmatory of the report which had previously reached them of the withdrawal of the Russians from Kizil Arvad.

I have acquainted his Excellency the Viceroy with this information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. TAYLOUR THOMSON.

No. 120.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received August* 8.)

My Lord, *Tehran, July* 5, 1877.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translations of two letters which I have received from the Mission Agent at Meshed, giving in detail the intelligence which has reached him of the proceedings of the Russians at Kizil Arvad and Karee Kala.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. TAYLOUR THOMSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 120.

The Meshed Agent to Mr. Taylour Thomson.

(Translation.) *June* 16, 1877.

ON the 12th instant the Shuja-ed-dowleh, Governor of Koochan, reported to the Prince Governor that about 5,000 or 6,000 of the Akhal tribe having assembled at Kizil Arvad, fought the Russians, but were defeated with a loss of 700 men.

I hear from Boojnoord as follows:—

"The Russian force which is at Kizil Arvad is said to be 10,000 men, but about 5,000 is the real number. About 5,000 or 6,000 of the Turkomans attacked them, but were obliged to retreat, losing from 800 to 900 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners. Afterwards the Russians took the arms and horses from all those who had become captives and then set them free. They have given the Turkomans ten days, during which they are either to tender allegiance to Russia or to leave that part of the country. The Turkomans of Kizil Arvad, Bam, Birmeh, and Arjoomanee have fled away. The elders of Karee Kala have come to Boojnoord, and have applied for land and quarters. The Russians are engaged in laying out a city at Kizil Arvad. There is only one regiment of infantry at Krasnovodsk."

Now that the Akhal Turkomans are in trouble on account of the Russians, the inhabitants of Merv are greatly alarmed, for they feel certain that they will be also visited by the Russians.

Inclosure 2 in No. 120.

The Meshed Agent to Mr. Taylour Thomson.

(Translation.)
(Extract.) *June* 23, 1877.

ON the 20th instant the Governor of Deragez reported to the Prince Governor that the Turkomans had announced to him that the Russian force, which amounted to 10,000

men, had returned to Krasnovodsk, and that the provisions they had collected in their camp at Kizil Arvad had been seized by the people of Akhal, Kizil Arvad, Bam, and Birmeh. The people of Khorassan are surprised at this movement on the part of the Russians. I have also learnt that a number of Russians who had come to Charjouy had immediately returned.

There is a rumour that the Governor of Deragez lately telegraphed to the Persian Minister that the Merv Turkomans intend going to the assistance of the Akhals, and that in order to do so they would have to pass through the Deragez district, and asking what course he was to take. The Shah replied by telegraph that they ought to be prevented and repelled, and if he wanted any aid he was to apply to the Prince Governor for it.

No. 121.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received September 12.)

My Lord, *Tehran, August 7, 1877.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of a letter which I have received from the Mission Agent at Asterabad, reporting the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Kizil Arvad. He states that one-half of the force had gone to Hajee Bayat, and that the rest had returned to Krasnovodsk.

The Russian Minister, here, however, has informed the Persian Government that the entire force has been withdrawn to Krasnovodsk, and that General Llamakin had been recalled to Tiflis.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. TAYLOUR THOMSON.

Inclosure in No. 121.

The Asterabad Agent to Mr. Taylour Thomson.

(Translation.)
(Extract.) *July 29, 1877.*

ON the 3rd instant intelligence was received that the Russian General, having a friend amongst the Téké Turkomans of Kizil Arvad, named Tookhmeh Sirdar, had sent word to the General that a large body of Turkoman horse had assembled, and they intended to make an attack and carry off his (the General's) camels, so that he might not have the means of returning. The General on learning this, and being short of provisions, attacked the Turkomans, and succeeded in reaching Bayat Hajee, where he encamped. From what is stated the General intends keeping the Turkomans in check so that no disturbances may occur in Turkestan. The above-mentioned Turkomans on seeing that the Russian General retreated from Kizil Arvad, crossed into Khorassan and attacked Nardeen. Afrasiab Khan, on learning this, took his horsemen to attack them after he had telegraphed that the pilgrims to Meshed should be stopped at Sharood. Before he encountered the Turkomans they had captured 900 oxen, 2,000 sheep, and 31 men. Afrasiab Khan managed to take 11 of the Turkomans, and 34 of their horses, the remainder escaped with their plunder and captives. The 2,000 sheep they gave on their way to the Turkomans of Karee Kala, as that was the shortest route for them to make good their escape. It is reported that this raid on Nardeen was made at the instigation of the Elkhanee of the Shadloo tribe, Yar Mohammed Khan, the Governor of Boojnoord, so that he may be allowed to return from Tehran sooner.

On the 21st instant news was received from the Turkoman plains that the Russian General had presented 100 gold Imperials to Tookhmeh Sirdar for his recent services; that he has sent half of his troops to Krasnovodsk, and the other half he has kept at Bayat Hajee; he has also retained the camels he had hired.

On the 22nd instant further intelligence was received that the Russian General has left Bayat Hajee for Balkhan. He has given out that he will return and attack the Turkomans with due force.

Should the Téké Turkomans be encouraged by Yar Mohammed Khan, the Eelkhanee of Boojnoord, and Abul Hassan Khan, the son of Ameer Hussein Khan of Koochan, who, according to intelligence now received, have been permitted to leave Tehran, they will make a stand and fight the Russians, for should the Russian General, accompanied by a proper force and commissariat, even advance as far as Merv, he can never feel sure that the country is safe, and that others can march and join him.

Whenever these wild and savage tribes see an opportunity they will be sure to rise and do whatever they can.

No. 122.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received September 12.)

My Lord, *Tehran, August 7*, 1877.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith translations of two letters which I have received from the Mission Agent at Meshed.

His correspondent at Boojnoord appears to be still under the impression that the Russian force has not withdrawn from Kizil Arvad, but from the information given by the Russian Minister here to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, there seems to be no doubt of the fact.

The Akhal Turkomans, who had assembled with the object of attacking the Russians at Kizil Arvad, finding that they had left, made a raid on the Persian district of Nardeen, and carried off a considerable amount of booty.

The Meshed Agent describes the result of the negotiations which have recently taken place between the Persian authorities and the Turkomans of Merv, and states that an engagement has been come to for the Persian flag to be hoisted at Merv, and for the cessation of raids from that place upon the Persian territory. I gather from conversations with the Persian Minister that the Persian Government are of opinion that as the Turkomans who have taken a part in this negotiation are not the principal Chiefs of the tribe there is no reliance to be placed upon their word or engagements, and that in all probability their real object is to obtain money and gifts from the Persian Government and then set the arrangement aside.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. TAYLOUR THOMSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 122.

The Meshed Agent to Mr. Taylour Thomson.

(Translation.) *July 7*, 1877.

ACCORDING to the Reports of the local authorities at Deragez, Koochan, and Boojnoord the Russian force has returned to Krasnovodsk from the Akhal plains, but I have received no letter from the Agent at Boojnoord confirming the same. As there are so many conflicting reports respecting the movement of the Russians, I presume that the news-writer is trying to obtain accurate information as to their movements and then report the same.

The Akhals, having given up all hope of support from the Persian Government, have begun making raids upon the country.

Nasoullah Khan, the Persian Agent sent to Merv, returned here on the 6th instant. He is accompanied by about fifty or sixty of the Turkoman Chiefs, Elders, &c., but they have brought none of the guns they promised to give up. I will ascertain and report the motives of these Turkomans, but, as already reported, the Shah is not disposed to treat either with the Turkomans of Merv or Akhal; in fact, in my opinion, he would prefer their being beaten and overcome by the Russians.

On the 5th instant news was received from Jam and Baukhez that a body of 500 Saryk Turkomans, horse and foot, made a raid upon Kareez, in Herat territory, and carried off a number of cattle and sheep from that place, also killing one person. From there, 200 of their picked men have gone in the direction of Kain, but the result is yet unknown.

Intelligence has also been received from Boojnoord that a body of more than 1,000 Turkoman horsemen advanced and took the village of Husseinabad, near Nardeen, by force. Half of the inhabitants fled to the adjacent mountains, but the other half fell into the hands of the marauders, with all their cattle and flocks. Afrasiab Khan, of Nardeen, on hearing of the occurrence, took his horsemen and followed the Turkomans. He succeeded in recovering part of the captives and plunder after a severe fight, in which several lives were lost on both sides.

Inclosure 2 in No. 122.

The Meshed Agent to Mr. Taylour Thomson.

(Translation.) *July* 28, 1877.

RECENTLY no Cossid* has come in from Afghanistan, but a caravan is on the road.

The Turkomans who arrived here and tendered their allegiance to the Persian Government, on their own part and that of their tribes, have had it accepted on the following conditions:—

That they should take a Persian flag to Merv and hoist it there; fifty of the younger Chiefs are to enter the Persian service and keep the low and mischievous Turkomans of their tribe from making any raids. Thirty of the Katta Khans of Merv are to reside at Meshed; these and the young Chiefs are to be paid by Persia; their salary will come to about 4,000 tomans a-year. If the local authorities of Khorassan put aside their personal enmity with these tribes, the Turkomans will, out of fear of Russia, become Persian subjects.

Two days ago one of my friends came in from Furrah. He reports that the Government of Candahar has been conferred on Ameer Afzul Khan, the (maternal) grandfather of Ameer Shere Ali Khan's heir apparent, and he, having received orders to proceed to Peshany and have cantonments built there, did so, and returned to Candahar. He has also summoned 1,000 horsemen from Furrah. Twelve regiments from Cabul and four from Herat have been ordered to proceed to Candahar.

Five days ago the Hishmet-ul-Mulk, Governor of Seistan, sent a telegram by his own man to the Shah that British troops will advance upon Candahar. He has also notified the same in writing to the Prince Governor.

Several days ago Sirdar Eyoub Khan, at the instigation of some of his party, addressed a letter to his father, Shere Ali Khan, and another to the mother of the heir apparent, acknowledging his faults, and soliciting a free pardon, and requesting the Ameer to send some persons to take him to Cabul. After writing the letters he despatched them by a trustworthy man; but the General and two or three of his party, on hearing this, went to the Sirdar and began reproaching him, and at last made him send a horseman after the bearer of the letters and brought him back from a stage distant from Meshed. The letters on being received were torn up by the General, and at present great disorder exists between Sirdar Eyoub Khan and his suite.

I hear from Boojnoord as follows:—

"There are conflicting reports respecting the Russian movements. Some say that the Russian General has left. After much inquiry I have ascertained that he has not left. What occurred is this: that a fight took place between the Russians and Téké-Turkomans, in which about 500 or 600 Turkomans were killed. After this a courier arrived in the Russian camp announcing that five regiments of infantry were coming to Kizil Arvad, and when they made their appearance the force who were at Kizil Arvad went out to meet them; the Turkomans, therefore, thought that they were retreating. The Turkomans then left and made a raid on Nardeen, in the direction of Kal Poosh, where there is a pasture ground, and as it is summer all the flocks were out grazing. The Turkomans carried off twenty-five captives, 100 mares, some cattle, and a number of sheep, part of the latter belonging to the people of Karee Kala. The Tékés, therefore, gave up all the sheep to the people of Karee Kala, and left for their plains by another route. Afrasiab Khan, on hearing this, took his horsemen and attacked the people of Karee Kala. He took back the sheep and killed some of the inhabitants of that place, also taking some of them prisoners. The Russians are at present within one stage of Kizil Arvad, but they have abandoned the intention of building a town there. They intend, however, building a town at Karee Kala, as there is an abundance of water there, and none at Kizil Arvad. It is now a month that no one has come from the Téké Turkomans. This intelligence was brought by two captives who had escaped from the Turkoman plains. A person has, however, gone to bring authentic news."

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* Foot messenger.

No. 123.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received September 17.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September* 12, 1877.

IN the course of conversation to-day, M. de Giers informed me that the Imperial Government had received information of the mission of an Envoy from the Sultan to the Ameer of Afghanistan, and of his passage through India.

His Excellency stated that the object of the Envoy's mission was to preach a religious crusade amongst the Mussulman population of Central Asia, and, through the Ameer of Afghanistan, to induce the Ameer of Bokhara to excite the populations of Central Asia to revolt against Russia.

The Ameer of Bokhara, his Excellency observed, had proved a faithful ally to Russia, and the Imperial Government placed full confidence in him. But difficulties might arise in consequence of religious agitation between Bokhara and Afghanistan which might compromise the friendly relations between those Rulers. It was, therefore, of importance that seasonable advice should be given to the Ameer of Afghanistan to abstain from any action which could endanger the peaceful relations of the two States.

M. de Giers added that General Kaufmann had been instructed to be guided by the arrangements entered into between Great Britain and Russia in regard to Afghanistan, and to remain strictly within the limits of those arrangements.

I stated to M. de Giers that I should report to your Lordship the observations he had addressed to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 124.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received October 4.)

My Lord, *Tehran, August* 31, 1877.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 7th instant, in which I reported the negotiation which had recently taken place between the Khorassan authorities and the Turkomans of Merv, with a view to their declaring their allegiance to Persia, I have the honour to state that, during a recent conversation which I had with the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, his Highness informed me that the arrangement therein referred to had completely fallen through, but that the Prince Governor of Khorassan had been instructed to send from three to five, but not more, of the principal Téké Turkoman Chiefs who are still at Meshed to Tehran, in order that a fresh negotiation may be opened here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. TAYLOUR THOMSON.

No. 125.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received October 4.)

(Extract.) *Tehran, September 5*, 1877.

I HAVE the honour to inclose translations of two letters from the Mission Agent in Meshed.

The Agent states the nature of the negotiations which, for some time, have been going on between the Khorassan authorities and the Merv Turkomans, but which have now been set aside, as reported in my despatch of the 31st ultimo, pending further discussion of the matter between the Persian Government here and some of the Turkoman Chiefs who are being sent to Tehran.

Inclosure 1 in No. 125.

Meerza Abbass Khan to Mr. Taylour Thomson.

(Translation.)
(Extract.) *August* 4, 1877.

THE Turkomans who came from Merv with Nussullah Khan are still here. By last courier I reported some of the conditions agreed upon between the Saïd Mervees and the

Persian authorities; since then other conditions have been proposed, such as the following:—

A Governor on the part of Persia is to be always at Merv, and the Perisan flag is to be constantly hoisted in that town. One hundred ferrashes are to be engaged at a salary of 20 tomans per annum. These are to act as a kind of police, and prevent any raids from taking place. Should the Persian Government in future require horsemen from Merv, a body of from 2,000 to 3,000 men is to be provided, their salary being 20 tomans, like the pay received by the horsemen of Khorassan. Fifty of the Merv Chiefs and Sirdars are also to enter Persian service on a salary of 50 tomans a year, with subsistence allowance and forage for their horses. Twenty-five of these Sirdars will also reside at Meshed, and be relieved by the other twenty-five after the lapse of several months.

The Persian Ministers have accepted these terms, and the Mervees are ready to carry them out, should no further hesitation take place on the part of the Persian Government and the local authorities in Khorassan.

At the present moment it is very easy to induce the Turkomans of Merv to submit to Persian rule.

Inclosure 2 in No. 125.

The Meshed Agent to Mr. Taylour Thomson.

(Translation.)
(Extract.) *August* 25, 1877.

ON the 16th instant about fifty horsemen came to Meshed at the instance of those Chiefs and Elders of Merv who have been here for some time; the local authorities have granted each horseman a kran per diem.

On the 22nd instant the Persian Ministers ordered the Prince Governor to hold a Council to discuss the advisability of retaining the Merv Turkomans under Persian rule or not. A Council was accordingly called, at which all the local authorities, high and low, were present.

The Mervees were then questioned as to their ideas. They replied that they looked to the Shah to keep and support them, to allow them pay for 1,000 horsemen at the same rate as that received by the Khorassan horsemen, and they would then prevent any Turkoman raids being made upon Turkish territory; they also agreed to let half or a third of these horsemen do duty in other parts of Persia, and to change them when necessary. They agreed to leave about fifty of their Chiefs at Meshed as hostages, on a salary of 50 tomans each per annum. They added, that if these conditions were accepted, they would submit to Persian rule, hoist the flag of Persia at Merv, and coin money in the Shah's name. They were then asked what assurance they would give to show that they were in earnest, for if their conditions were to be accepted 30,000 tomans would be added to the expenditure of the State.

They replied that they could give no assurance, but that they told the truth, and that in future they would also abstain from holding any intercourse with the Russians; that as regards the increase of 30,000 tomans, that sum would be saved through the peace and tranquillity which would ensue through the increase in trade caused by friendly intercourse and also by the increase of the Custom-house revenues collected.

No. 126.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 17, 1877.

WITH reference to your despatch of the 12th September, reporting a conversation which you had had with M. de Giers on the subject of the recent Turkish Mission to Afghanistan, and the passage of the Envoy through India, I have to state to your Excellency that, at the request of the Porte, a Turkish Envoy to Afghanistan was allowed to pass through Indian territory, but that Her Majesty's Government have no reason to suppose that the object of his mission was to preach a crusade in Central Asia.

Her Majesty's Government will continue, as they have hitherto done, to use such influence as they possess with the Ameer of Afghanistan to induce him to maintain peace with Bokhara.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 127.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received October* 29.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 23, 1877.

BEFORE communicating to M. de Giers your Lordship's despatch of the 17th instant, I read his Excellency the report of his remarks on the subject of the Turkish Mission to Afghanistan, as given in my despatch of the 12th September.

His Excellency thanked me for the communication of your Lordship's despatch, and observed that since the date when he mentioned the subject to me no further reports had been received from General Kaufmann relating to the Turkish Mission to Afghanistan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 128.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received October* 29.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October.* 23, 1877.

I INQUIRED the other day of M. de Giers whether any answer had been given to Her Majesty's Government, through Count Schouvaloff, to the note which I had addressed to his Excellency on the $\frac{9th}{21st}$ June, 1877, in conformity with the instructions of your Lordship's despatch of the 13th June, on the military movements of the Russian troops under General Llamakin in the direction of the valley of the Attrek. His Excellency replied that he had addressed a despatch to Count Schouvaloff in reply to my note with instructions to communicate it to your Lordship, but no acknowledgment of it had been received from his Excellency; at my request M. de Giers has been good enough to give me a copy of the despatch referred to, dated the $\frac{18}{30}$th July, which I have the honour to annex.*

M. de Giers further informed me that a second despatch had been subsequently addressed to Count Schouvaloff informing him that General Llamakin had returned to Krasnovodsk.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 128.

M. de Giers to Count Schouvaloff.

St. Pétersbourg, le 18 *Juillet,* 1877.

J'AI l'honneur de transmettre ci-jointe à votre Excellence copie d'une note adressée par Lord Augustus Loftus au Ministère Impérial, en date du $\frac{9}{21}$ de ce mois.

Elle concerne notre colonne expéditionnaire sur Kizil Arvat.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, demande que cette colonne ne s'avance par trop près de Merv.

Je me suis empressé de communiquer la pièce sus-mentionnée au Ministère de la Guerre.

Les renseignements qu'il m'a fait parvenir sont de nature à rassurer entièrement le Cabinet de Londres. L'unique but de notre expédition sur Kizil Arvat est celui de châtier les peuplades Turcomanes qui infestent depuis quelque temps la route de Krasnovodsk à Khiva et menacent nos caravanes.

Ces peuplades appartiennent à une branche de Turcomans entièrement distincte de celle des Tékés de Merv—point distant de 1,000 verstes de Krasnovodsk.

Le mouvement sur Kizil Arvat n'est d'ailleurs qu'une simple expédition militaire comme nos troupes du Caucase en entreprennent tous les ans pour le maintien de la tranquillité sur nos frontières. Les ordres les plus formels ont été donnés au Commandant de la colonne de ne pas dépasser ses instructions dans ce sens.

Les inquiétudes relatives à Merv tombent d'elles-memes en présence de ces franches explications.

Veuillez bien, M. l'Ambassadeur, les porter à la connaissance de Lord Derby, en réponse à la note de Lord Augustus Loftus, et agréez, &c.

* This despatch was subsequently communicated by Count Schouvaloff.

(Translation.)

St. Petersburgh, July 18, 1877.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Excellency a copy of a note addressed by Lord A. Loftus to the Imperial Government, dated the $\frac{9th}{21st}$ of this month.

It has reference to our expeditionary column directed on Kizil Arvad.

The English Ambassador, by order of his Government, demands that this column should not advance too close to Merv.

I at once communicated the above-mentioned note to the War Department.

The information with which it has furnished me is calculated entirely to reassure the Cabinet of London. The sole object of our expedition to Kizil Arvad is to punish the Turkoman hordes who have for some time past infested the route from Krasnovodsk to Khiva, and threaten our caravans.

These tribes belong to a branch of Turkomans quite distinct from that of the Tékés of Merv, a point 1,000 versts distant from Krasnovodsk.

The movement on Kizil Arvad is nothing more than a simple military expedition, such as our troops in the Caucasus undertake every year, to keep order on our frontiers. The most formal orders have been given to the Commandant of the column not to exceed his instructions in this sense.

Any anxiety respecting Merv falls to the ground in presence of these frank explanations.

Have the goodness, M. l'Ambassadeur, to acquaint Lord Derby with them, as a reply to the note of Lord A. Loftus, and accept, &c.

No. 129.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received February 22.)

My Lord, *Tehran, January* 3, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of a Memorandum containing information which has been derived from one of the Merv Chiefs belonging to the Turkoman deputation now here, respecting the compact now being concluded between the Persian Government and the Téké Turkomans of Merv.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. TAYLOUR THOMSON.

Inclosure in No. 129.

Memorandum.

FROM information derived from one of the Merv Chiefs, it appears that the Téké Turkoman deputation have now come to terms with the Persian Government, and that they are to leave Tehran in two or three days for Meshed, in charge of Nasrullah Khan, the Persian Agent sent last summer to Merv, who has accompanied them to the capital.

The arrangement arrived at, which the Téké Chiefs consider on the whole to be satisfactory, is as follows:—

1. The Merv Turkomans declare their allegiance to Persia.
2. They engage that raids by them on this country shall entirely cease.
3. That the Persian flag is to be hoisted at Merv.
4. That a Persian Agent shall reside at Merv on the part of the Shah.
5. That 100 hostages (men of position from the four divisions of the tribe) shall reside at Meshed, but without their families.
6. That a body of 1,000 horsemen shall be sent to Meshed (about 250 from each division of the tribe) to be employed in the service of the Persian Government. These horsemen are to provide their own horses and arms, and to be under the command of their own Chiefs, but they are to be paid by the Persian Government, and they may be employed in any part of Persia where their services are required.

The Persian Government state their readiness to agree to the following points:—

1. They recognize the Merv Turkomans as Persian subjects, and promise them protection and favourable treatment.
2. They agree to defray the expenses of the hostages sent to Meshed, which may be estimated at about 6,000 tomans a-year.

3. They undertake to pay the horsemen furnished by the Turkomans for service in Persia at the same rate as that allowed by the Government to the Khorassan irregular horse, which will amount to over 30,000 tomans annually.

4. They grant permission for 1,000 families of Merv Téké Turkomans to occupy Old Serekhs, and the lands adjacent on the Tejjen.

The Shah has given a Firman to the Chiefs stating in general terms that the Téké Turkomans of Merv have always been, and now are, subjects of Persia; that all disloyal acts committed by them in past years are forgiven; and that in consideration of their now engaging to act as obedient and faithful subjects, His Majesty assures them of his protection and favour.

Four of the Chiefs have received shawl khelats, and the rest cloth dresses of honour, and subsistence allowance, at the rate of two kerans a day for each person, has been paid for the three months during which they have been engaged on their mission to Tehran.

The Prince Hissames Sultaneh, formerly Governor-General of Khorassan, has recommended that Abdul Hassan Khan, the son of the Chief of Koochan, should be sent to Merv on the part of the Shah. The Turkomans would have preferred Nasrullah Khan, had he been a wealthier man, as he has their confidence; but Abdul Hassan Khan has had a good many dealings with the Akhal portion of the Téké tribe, by whom he is esteemed, and they do not object to him, especially as he belongs to a Khorassan family of considerable wealth and position.

The Prince Governor at Meshed is instructed to decide who shall be sent, and to arrange some other matters of detail which have not been settled at Tehran. If these are arranged speedily at Meshed, the Téké families will be sent to Serekhs and the horsemen and hostages to Meshed this spring.

The Chiefs forming the deputation now leaving Tehran are as follows:—

Kooller Serdar, of the Vekeel tribe; Saree Batyr, of the Bakhshee tribe; Anner Doordee, of the Beg tribe; Khellee Vatyr, of the Seechmez tribe—principal Chiefs; Oraz Morad and Merad Alee, of the Bakhshee tribe; Ata Morad, Moollah, and Abeh, of the Vekeel tribe; Niaz Morad, Taj Serdar, Essen, and Koorban, of the Seechmez tribe; Moottee, Dowlet Morad, and Amreh Yellee, of the Beg tribe.

The Merv Chiefs believe that the Akhal portion of their tribe will eventually withdraw from the Akhal country and join them at Merv. They consider that it would be a gain for the whole tribe were they to do so, because the encampments they occupy at present along the line of the Attrek are straggling, and some of them ill supplied with water, and they are divided from each other by tracts of desert, which prevents them from rallying in time to support any portion of the tribe that may be suddenly attacked; whereas, at Merv each camp has the advantage of an equally abundant supply of water with all the others, and an ample extent of fertile land, and all the tribes occupy a compact position on the Moorghab, which is very favourable for defence.

Their lands at Merv are fully sufficient to accommodate more than double the number of those now occupying them. Three branches of the Akhal Tékés, namely, the Beg and Seechmez at Bam and Boormeh, and the Vekeel at Anow, have announced their intention of quitting the Akhal country and removing eastwards to the Tejjen or Merv in the event of their being again attacked by the Russians.

(Signed) RONALD F. THOMSON.

Tehran, December 31, 1877.

No. 130.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(*Received March* 8.)

My Lord, *India Office, March* 8, 1878.

I AM directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to forward herewith, to be laid before the Earl of Derby, copy of a letter from the Government of India, with accompanying news-reports relating to Afghanistan and adjoining countries.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 130.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury.

My Lord, *Fort William, February* 1, 1878.

IN continuation of our despatch dated the 11th ultimo, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of news-reports received through the Government of the Punjab.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
E. C. BAYLEY.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 130.

Extract from Confidential News-letter from a Correspondent at Jellalabad, dated December 19, 1877.

THE Russian Envoy, who had been at Cabul for some time, has returned to his country, and was escorted to Turkestan by Muhammad Aslam Khan, the Kotwal of the town of Cabul. On this road the party met another Ambassador from Russia, who belongs to a very high and rich family of Samarcand. The two Envoys passed a night at one place, and the next morning they proceeded on to their respective destinations The new Envoy has arrived at Cabul, and is lodged in a large building belonging to Sirdar Muhammad Yusaf Khan, and is treated with much consideration.

Inclosure 3 in No. 130.

Extract from Confidential News-letter from a Correspondent at Peshawur.

A MAN who has just come from Bokhara states that the Ameer of that territory has not yet returned to Shahr-i-Sabz from Karshi, where he went to serve the interests of the Russian Government. It is said that His Highness persuades the people residing on the Russian frontier to submit to the authority of the Czar. The Russians show much kindness and consideration to the Ameer in these days; and His Highness, being carried away by their apparent goodness of purpose, has sent both of his sons to Tashkend to learn the Russian language and politics, and the Governor of Tashkend looks after the comforts of the Princes.

No. 131.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(Received April 5.)

My Lord, *India Office, April* 5, 1878.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Marquis of Salisbury, copy of a Secret letter from the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, dated 1st March, 1878, with inclosed copy of news Reports received through the Government of the Punjab.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 131.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury.

My Lord, *Fort William, March* 1, 1878.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of news Reports received through the Government of the Punjab.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
E. C. BAYLEY.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
JOHN STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 131.

Extract from News-letter from Peshawur, received through a Correspondent in Lahore, with his Letter, dated January 28, 1878.

A MAN who has recently come from Cabul states that when the Ameer was questioned as to his intentions about jehad, or the waging of a religious war, and his relations with the English and the Russian Governments, His Highness remarked that a Russian Envoy was staying at Cabul, and one from his Government at the Court of the Russian Governor of Samarcand, both waiting for replies to communications delivered, that the settlement of affairs depended on Turkey's reply, which he expected by Nauroz (21st March), to a communication sent by him some time back; and that if that reply was not favourable to his interests he would then, having well prepared himself in the meantime, engage himself in jehad operations.

No. 132.

Mr. Taylour Thomson to the Earl of Derby.—(Received April 12.)

My Lord, *Tehran, February* 14, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of the Firman addressed by the Shah to the Turkoman Chiefs at Merv, referred to in my despatch of the 3rd January, in which I reported the conditions agreed upon between the Persian Government and the Merv Chiefs on their tendering their allegiance to this country.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WM. TAYLOUR THOMSON.

Inclosure in No. 132.

The Shah's Firman to the Elders of the Téké Turkomans.

(Translation.)

HONOUR to the high in rank, Baba Khan and the other Elders of the Téké tribe residing at Merv; and be it known to them that the Téké tribe has been from time of old amongst the special tribes of this everlasting Government, and it has at all times been treated with respect, honour, and kindness. If latterly they found themselves deprived of the Royal favour and respect, it has been through the evil doings and treason of which the mischievous and corrupt characters of the said tribe have been guilty in their ingratitude and thanklessness. But as the said tribe has again appealed for pardon and forgiveness, and the doors of Royal favour and clemency are open, their guilt and misdemeanours have been forgiven and pardoned, and we have deigned to show our Royal favour and generosity to them. Tajdar Sirdar, Kooler Sirdar, Saree Bahadur, and Androee Bai, who appeared at the Royal Court on the part of the Elders of the aforesaid tribe, have been graciously received and have been duly honoured with Royal

dresses of honour. Other dresses of honour have been also given for yourself (Baba Khan) and all the other Elders. His Royal Highness, our dear brother, Mahomed Takki Mirza, the Ruku-ud-dowleh and Governor-General of Khorassan, having also guaranteed your services to the Royal Court, we have duly informed him of favour which we intend showing towards you and your tribe for the future.

By virtue of this Royal Firman we command and ordain that, as the said tribe has admitted its guilt and engaged to be loyal in the future, it is to be confident in the Royal favour. The Elders thereof are to ornament their persons with the dresses of honour which have been granted to them, and they are to render their services and submission in a suitable manner—in accordance with the text: "Oh, that we were given to understand that we have been pardoned by the Almighty and will be received with favour and grace." Let the said tribe also be engaged in true service and make known all their wishes and representations to our dear brother the Governor-General of Khorassan, to whom the necessary instructions have been issued respecting the duties required of you the Elders and the whole of the Téké tribe. You are all to make known your requests and wants to His Royal Highness, who will duly attend to them.

In expectation of manifold favours and honours from this everlasting Government you will all obey this Royal Firman.

Given in the month of Zeekaadeh 1294 (November 1877).

No. 133.

Lord A. Loftus to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 27.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, May* 22, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship a Memorandum by Mr. Michell containing military intelligence.

I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to the order of the Minister of War of the $\frac{3rd}{15th}$ May, 1878, prescribing the formation of eight battalions of infantry reserves for the reinforcement of the Turkestan military district.

Inclosure in No. 133.

Memorandum.

(Extract.)

BY another Order of the Minister of War, dated the $\frac{3rd}{15th}$ May, 1878, eight battalions of infantry reserves are to be formed for the reinforcement of the Russian troops of the Turkestan military district. These reserve battalions are to be numbered respectively 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. The men are drawn from Western Siberia and the Province of Turkestan.

Out of the hitherto existing Bashkir division of cavalry, consisting of two squadrons, by order of the Minister of War a regiment of Bashkir cavalry is to be formed which will consist of a complement of four squadrons for active service and one reserve squadron. The head-quarters of this cavalry force are at Orenburg.

St. Petersburgh, May 21, 1878.

No. 134.

Lord A. Loftus to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 10.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, June 5*, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith, in translation, from the "Russki Mir," a remarkable article in regard to Persia, and its relative position to Russia and England.

In this article it is suggested that, with a view to counteract an exclusive influence being established over Persia by England, Russia must occupy Merv and Herat, neither of which should be surrendered to Persia, who would be amply compensated by the security thus afforded to her frontier against Turkoman raids.

An immediate advance of Russia in those directions is not advocated, but it is hinted that advantage should be taken of doing so in the event of a war with England.

Inclosure in No. 134.

Extract from the "Russki Mir" of May $\frac{17}{29}$, 1878.

(Translation.)

THE SIGNIFICATION OF PERSIA.—The Russian press has frequently called attention to the fact that the centre of gravity in the settlement of the Eastern Question, so far as British interests are concerned, is not to be sought so much in Turkey as in the newly-created Indian Empire. It is natural that, as England derives such vast advantages from that Empire, she should extend her views to the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, Beloochistan, and Persia. England has long made the latter country her special object of attention, and this without much disguise.

Since 1870 her plans with respect to Persia have become specially plain and unmistakable. The despatch of English officers to Persia and the projection of English railway schemes through that country to India render it very plain that England entertains the idea of establishing an exclusive influence over Persia, and of reducing it to the condition of a province of the Indian Empire. Should England even partly succeed in realizing these projects, she will be able to exercise an influence still more prejudicial to our interests in the East than at present.

In order to counteract these schemes, it is necessary to take advantage of the solidarity of our interests with those of Persia in Asia in respect to the protection of the frontier lines against Turkoman invasions. Not long ago the Turkomans defeated some Persian troops sent to repress a Turkoman robber band, and on this occasion five Persian battalions and ten regiments of cavalry, with a battery of artillery, were utterly routed by a Turkoman force of equal strength. On the strength of this victory the Turkomans began to threaten our frontier along the Attrek. A Russian detachment, which was sent from Krasnovodsk to occupy a fortified position at Kyzyl Arvat, with a view to protecting our trade route between Khiva and Krasnovodsk, was attacked by a body of Téké Turkomans numbering from 6,000 to 8,000 men. The attack was repulsed, but it showed of what unruly elements the Turkoman population is composed.

It is thus evident that Persia and Russia are equally interested in subduing the Turkomans. Our problem consists in rendering our frontier secure against the raids of these roaming tribes. This can only be effected by the occupation of Merv, which is the central point of their camping ground. In orders also to produce a counterpoise against the growing influence of England in Beloochistan, it is necessary that we should occupy Herat.

Both these measures can be more successfully carried out by marching on these two points through Persia. The route from Asterabad to Meshed has been carefully surveyed by the Russian traveller, Ogovodnikoff. The distance between Asterabad and Shahrud is reckoned at 120 versts. The road runs at first through a level and cultivated country; uninterrupted forest then follows, in which an abundant supply of water is to be found. The road then enters a narrow valley extending between two well-wooded mountain ridges; intersects several mountain streams and hollows, and winds up to the Kuzhik heights. This zig-zag ascent was some years ago prepared by some European engineer for the passage of artillery. The road beyond to Shahrud passes alternately through a well-cultivated country, irrigated by mountain rivulets, and through localities poor in vegetation.

Shahrud, however, is situated in a valley surrounded by cultivated fields and gardens. This town serves as a point of gathering for the Shüte pilgrims proceeding to Meshed. The road from Shahrud to Sebsevar, a distance of 285 versts, runs through a country in many respects similar to that which occurs between Asterabad and Shahrud. Nishapur is situated at a distance of 130 versts from Sebsevar, and the road to it runs through rich districts—caravanserais, villages, water, and pastures occurring here with greater frequency. Nishapur is situated in a broad and fertile valley. The distance from it to Meshed is 130 versts. At Meshed a bifurcation on the road occurs, one road running in a north-easterly direction to Merv, and the other south-east to Herat. The road from Meshed to Herat runs through the province of Horassan, so celebrated for its fertility.

The nearest route to Afghanistan is undoubtedly through Persia, and at the same time it is the most convenient one, though the adoption of it need not preclude military demonstrations from the north, that is, from our Turkistan frontier. As a preliminary measure the occupation and retention of Herat will not be difficult of fulfilment. General Khruleff in the Memorandum which has lately been published bears witness to the feasibility of this plan.

Many are opposed to the advance against Herat through Persia, on the ground that we shall excite the hostility of the Afghans by furthering the interests of the Persians. This view, however, is erroneous. Whether we march on Herat through Persia or by another route, our relations to Afghanistan will be the same. After taking Herat we must not, however, surrender it to the Persians as compensation for their co-operation. Persia will already be amply rewarded when her frontier, together with our own, shall have been rendered secure against Turkoman raids. In demonstrating the possibility and facility of a march on Herat and Merv through Persia, we do not, of course, advocate an immediate advance in those directions; we should, however, take advantage of the possibility indicated in the event of a war with England.

No. 135.

Mr. R. Thomson to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 19.)

My Lord, *Tehran, April* 29, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith translation of a letter from the correspondent at Boojnoord, from which your Lordship will perceive that, although the Russians at Krasnovodsk have not as yet made any movement against the Turkomans, they are said to have notified to the Tékés that they intend to march upon them at the beginning of next month.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RONALD F. THOMSON.

Inclosure in No. 135.

Letter received from Boojnoord.

(Translation.) *April* 15, 1878.

THE Russians at Krasnovodsk have not stirred yet, or made any movements lately. The Tékés and Goklans are, however, in communication with them.

The Russians have notified to the Tékés that they are going to march upon them in the beginning of May, and want to know what they have to say for themselves. There is great scarcity amongst the Tékés, wheat being 6 tomans the kharwar.

Several Elders of the Yemoot tribe recently came here from Khiva, and requested the Governor to grant land and quarters for 1,000 families. The Governor asked the reason of their emigration, to which they replied that the Russians at Khiva were taking a census, and that they were alarmed at this proceeding. The quarters were assigned them.

By last post I wrote that the Governor had started against the Yemoot Turkomans, but it appears that they fled on his approach. The Governor then went to the Goorgan, stopping there for twenty-five days, during which he collected the taxes due by the Goklans, and returned to town.

No. 136.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(*Received June* 24.)

My Lord, *India Office, June* 24, 1878.

I AM directed by Viscount Cranbrook to forward, for the information of the Marquis of Salisbury, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy of India, dated the 7th June, 1878, in regard to the alleged approaching visit to Cabul of an Ambassador from the Russian Emperor.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure in No. 136.

The Viceroy of India to Viscount Cranbrook.

(Telegraphic.) *June* 7, 1878.

NEWS letters from Cabul and Peshawur have been received to effect that Ameer has been informed by Russian Agent and by Tashkend Governor-General's letter that Envoy sent by Russian Emperor will shortly visit Cabul as Ambassador.

These reports require verification.

No. 137.

Lord A. Loftus to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 26.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, June* 18, 1878.

BEYOND the reinforcements of the Russian army in Turkestan, as reported in my despatch of the 22nd May, I have not learnt of any fresh military movements in Central Asia.

The military forces under General Llamakin at Krasnovodsk were considerably reduced during the Turkish war in order to strengthen the Russian forces in Armenia, but I cannot state whether these forces have been yet replaced.

I am inclined to believe that since affairs in Europe have taken a pacific turn the military projects which had been under consideration in regard to Central Asia have been suspended, and General Tchernaieff, who was designated for special service in those parts, has been recalled and is at present residing here.

No. 138.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 26, 1878.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a letter from the India Office having reference to the alleged approaching visit of a Russian Ambassador to Cabul,* and I have to request that you will endeavour to ascertain whether there is any truth in this report.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 139.

Mr. R. Thomson to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 5.)

My Lord, *Tehran, May* 20, 1878.

FROM a despatch which I have received from Captain Napier, it would appear that a rumour of the advance of Russian troops upon the Akhal country had reached him from a correspondent at Boojnoord, who is in communication with the Mission Agent at Meshed. The rumour was first mentioned in a letter from that person, which was transmitted to your Lordship as an inclosure to my despatch of the 29th ultimo, and it is now repeated in a further communication from Boojnoord to our Agent, dated the 22nd April, of which I have the honour to inclose a translation.

No confirmation of this intelligence has been received here, and the Asterabad Agent, in his letter of the 14th instant, states that General Llamakin was reported to be at Krasnovodsk with only a small force of 500 men. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has also informed me that not only has his Government received no news of any movement of troops having taken place from Krasnovodsk, but that the Russian Minister here had positively denied that there was any truth in the rumour.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RONALD F. THOMSON.

Inclosure in No. 139.

Letter addressed to Abbas Khan, Mission Agent at Meshed, by a Correspondent at Boojnoord.

(Translation.) *Rabbee-es-Sanee* 18 (*April* 22, 1878).

THE news respecting the Europeans is as follows:—The Russians at Shah Kedem (Krasnovodsk) are intending to advance again upon the Tékés, who are in great disquietude.

Grain is very scarce amongst them. It costs 100 krans for 650 lbs. weight. They have sent 500 camels to this place to purchase provisions. The extreme cold of the 4th January destroyed their grain crops, as it did those of the districts of Khiva. The

* No. 136.

people of the Attrek are in great distress, and some of them have come over to this side.

The Goklans I referred to in a previous letter as being about to go to the Goorgan have not gone yet, but I will let you know when they do so.

The people here are somewhat alarmed at an order which has been issued by the Persian Government to have a census of the population, old and young, taken.

I do not know if you received my letter of March last, in which I told you that five or six regiments of Russian soldiers had moved out from Krasnovodsk, but I now mention it to you again.

No. 140.

Lord A. Loftus to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 11.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July* 3, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 26th ultimo, inclosing a copy of a letter from the India Office, with reference to an alleged approaching visit of a Russian Ambassador to Cabul.

At an interview I had yesterday with M. de Giers, I inquired of his Excellency whether any Russian Representative was instructed, either by the Imperial Government at St. Petersburgh or by the Governor-General of Turkestan, to proceed to Cabul.

M. de Giers replied that no such Mission had been, or was intended to be, sent to Cabul, either by the Imperial Government or by General Kaufmann.

I observed to his Excellency that, for some time past, a Russian Agent had resided at Cabul, and that intrigues had been apparently carrying on with a view to create dissensions between the Ameer of Afghanistan and the Indian Government. I stated that this course was not in conformity with the arrangement entered into between the Governments of England and Russia, and that if it continued it must inevitably produce results prejudicial to the good relations between the two Governments.

M. de Giers replied that there had been a moment when war appeared to be almost imminent, and that, under those circumstances, no doubt the military Commanders conceived it to be their duty to take such measures as might be necessary and serviceable to their country. He denied, however, as far as he was aware, that there had been any intrigues with the Ameer of Cabul of the nature to which I had alluded. He admitted that he had sent M. Bakouline, the Russian Consul at Asterabad, to Meshed to watch the movements of Captains Butler and Napier, who were reported to be inciting the Turkoman tribes to hostilities against Russia. This was the only diplomatic measure he had taken.

I stated to M. de Giers that Captain Butler was a mere traveller, on his own account, and no agent of Her Majesty's Government, and that urgent orders had been sent to him by the Commander-in-chief in India to return forthwith to his military duties.

M. de Giers, who appeared to be well informed both in regard to Captain Butler and Captain Napier, stated that he was aware that Captain Butler had been recalled, but that, nevertheless, he had refused to obey the orders he had received, and was persisting in his intention to visit the Akhal tribes. He referred even to the letter which Captain Butler had addressed to certain Turkoman Chiefs, of which his Excellency had evidently received copies.

I inquired from M. de Giers whether any expedition was intended, or was now being undertaken by General Llamakin against the Turkomans.

His Excellency professed ignorance as to any such intention, observing that it was frequently necessary to repel the attacks of those tribes, or to punish them for raids committed on Russian commerce.

I finally observed to his Excellency that, at a moment when Europe was sitting in Congress for the purpose of maintaining peace, it was advisable to avoid anything which could disturb the harmony and good understanding between England and Russia (the two Asiatic Powers), in other regions where their mutual good-fellowship and co-operation could render such valuable service to the cause of humanity and civilization.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 141.

Lord A. Loftus to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 16.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July* 10, 1878.

THE "Turkestan Gazette" publishes the following "orders of the day" for the formation of corps of operation, which are called "advanced expeditionary detachments," dated Tashkend, the $\frac{14}{26}$th May, 1878.

I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith a translation of these orders from the Russian by Mr. Michell, as also a translation in French, which appeared in this morning's "Journal de St. Pétersbourg."

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 141.

Substance of Article from the "Turkestan Gazette."

(Translation.)

FORMATION OF RUSSIAN EXPEDITIONARY DETACHMENTS IN CENTRAL ASIA.—The "Turkestan Gazette" contains an official order for the formation of the following detachments, which are called "advanced expeditionary detachments."

"*Tashkend, May* $\frac{14}{26}$, 1878.

"In accordance with the orders of His Imperial Majesty conveyed to me by the Minister of War in his despatch of the $\frac{13}{25}$th April, Sub-No. 10, three active detachments are to be preliminarily formed out of the troops under my command; the head detachment at Samarcand, that of Ferghanah at Marghelan, and that of the Amu-Darya at Petro-Alexandrovsk.

"The chief detachment, under the command of Major-General Trotski, is to be composed of the 3rd, 5th, 6th, 9th, and compound Turkestan and 3rd West Siberian line battalions, and of two companies of the 17th Turkestan line battalion; of the whole Turkestan Rifle Brigade and Sapper company; of the 4th compound Orenburg-Ural regiment of Cossacks; of four sotnias of the 2nd Orenburg, and of two sotnias of the 5th compound Orenburg regiment of Cossacks; of the 1st and 3rd battery and half-battery of the 2nd battery of the 1st Turkestan Brigade of Artillery; of the Mobile exercising battery; the 1st and 5th Orenburg H batteries, and one rocket battery.

"The Ferghanah detachment, under the command of Major-General Abramoff, is to be composed of six companies of rifles, two sotnias of the 5th compound regiment of Cossacks, six pieces of the Turkestan hill battery, and a division of rocket battery.

"The Amu-Darya detachment, under the command of Colonel Grotenhelm, is to be composed of six companies, two sotnias, and four guns, to be selected by the Commander of the Amu-Darya district.

"The first detachment is to be concentrated at Samarcand, and to march from thence *en échelons* to Djam, and further according to instructions.

"The second detachment is to be organized at Marghelan, to march through Vuadil to the valley of the Ryzylsu, and further according to instructions.

"The third detachment is to be formed at Petro-Alexandrovsk, and to march along the Amu-Darya to Chardjyi, from whence it will advance according to instructions.

"The time of formation and advance of these detachments will be determined according to exigencies, and will be fixed by special supplementary orders.

(Signed) "KAUFMANN."

Inclosure 2 in No. 141.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of $\frac{\text{June } 28}{\text{July } 10}$, 1878.

LA "Gazette du Turkestan" publie les ordres du jour suivants, qui ont été portés à la connaissance des troupes de la circonscription militaire:—

"*Tachkend, le* 14 *Mai,* 1878.

"Aux termes de l'ordre de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, qui m'a été communiqué par le Ministre de la Guerre le 13 Avril de cette année, les troupes de la circonscription militaire qui se trouve sous mes ordres seront formées en trois corps d'opérations: le principal à

Samarcande, celui du Ferganah à Marguélane, et celui de l'Amou-Daria à Pétro-Alexandrovsk.

"Le corps principal, qui sera commandé par le Général-Major Troïtsky, de la suite de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, sera formé des 3e, 5e, 6e, 9e bataillons du Turkestan, du bataillon mixte (composé de quatre compagnies provenant des bataillons de ligne du territoire de Ferganah) du 8e bataillon de ligne de la Sibérie Orientale, de deux compagnies du 17e bataillon de ligne du Turkestan, de toute la brigade de Chasseurs du Turkestan, d'une compagnie de Chasseurs du 4e Régiment mixte des Cosaques d'Orenbourg-Oural, de quatre sotnias du 2e Cosaques d'Orenbourg, de quatre sotnias du 3e Cosaques d'Orenbourg, de quatre sotnias du 1er Cosaques de Sibérie, de deux sotnias du 5e Cosaques mixte, des 1re et 3e batteries et de la moitié de la 2e Batterie de la 1re Brigade d'artillerie du Turkestan, de la batterie mobile d'instruction, des 1re et 5e Batteries à cheval des Cosaques d'Orenbourg, et d'une batterie à fusées.

"Le corps du Ferganah, qui sera commandé par le Général-Major Abramow, comprendra: six compagnies de Chasseurs, deux sotnias du 5e Cosaques mixte (qui seront nommées à cet effet par le Commandant des troupes du territoire de Ferganah), de six canons de montagne de l'artillerie du Turkestan, et d'une demi batterie à fusées.

"Le corps de l'Amou-Daria, commandé par le Colonel Grotenhelm, comprendra six compagnies, deux sotnias, et quatre canons (qui seront nommés à cet effet par le Commandant du territoire de l'Amou-Daria).

"Le premier corps se concentre à Samarcande et se dirige par échelons sur Djam pour poursuivre ensuite sa route selon les ordres qui lui sont donnés.

"Le second se forme a Manguélane, traverse Vouadil pour se rendre dans la vallée du Kyzyl-Sou et plus loin selon les ordres reçus.

"Le troisième corps, enfin, se réunit à Pétro-Alexandrovsk, suit le cours de l'Amou-Daria en le remontant jusqu'à Tchardjouï et prend ensuite la direction qui lui est indiquée.

"Toutes les troupes destinées à entrer en campagne prennent leurs uniformes les plus neufs, leurs manteaux, deux paires de bottes de rechange, &c. . . .

"Le personnel du quartier-général et le nombre des équipages qui devront suivre les troupes, ainsi que celui des bagages d'officiers seront portés plus tard à la connaissance générale.

"Un ordre supplémentaire sera rendu pour fixer l'époque de la formation et de l'entrée en campagne de ces corps, ainsi que des autres détachements de troupes qui pourront être nécessaires.

"*Tachkend, le* 16 *Mai*, 1878.

"En vue des soins à donner aux malades et aux blessés des corps précités, je propose de former dès à présent trois ambulances de campagne: l'une pour 160 malades, destineé au corps principale et deux pour 50 malades, destinées aux corps du Ferganah et de l'Amou-Daria.

"L'Inspecteur Médical, l'Intendant de la Circonscription Militaire, et les Commandants des troupes des territoires du Ferganah et de l'Amou-Daria, fourniront aux ambulances tout le nécessaire et prendront des mesures pour qu'elles soient pourvues du personnel médical et sanitaire voulu," &c. . . . .

No. 142.

Lord A. Loftus to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 22.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July* 17, 1878.

WITH reference to my previous despatch of 10th instant, reporting the formation of three additional detachments for the Turkestan army, I have now the honour to inclose to your Lordship an article in translation by Mr. Michell from the "Moscow Gazette," reporting intelligence received from its correspondent at Tashkend, dated 30th May 11th June, and giving further details in regard to the expeditionary forces said to be destined against India.

It would further appear from the statement of the correspondent that the Ameer of Bokhara not only sympathized with the advance of the Russian troops through his territory, but had declared his readiness, if required, to afford the Russian authorities every assistance in his power.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

P.S.—I also inclose translation of an article by Mr. Stephen from the "Turkestan Gazette," giving the names of the officers appointed on General Kaufmann's Staff.

A. L.

Inclosure 1 in No. 142.

Substance of Article in the "Moscow Gazette" of $\frac{\text{June } 27}{\text{July } 9}$, 1878.

(Translation.)

THE "Moscow Gazette" of the $\frac{\text{27th June}}{\text{9th July}}$ contains a letter dated $\frac{\text{30th May}}{\text{11th June}}$, from its correspondent at Tashkend, who gives the following particulars in regard to the formation in Turkestan of three marching detachments destined as an Expeditionary Corps against India:—

"The official order so impatiently expected by the local troops for the formation of an Expeditionary Corps has at length been issued by the Commander-in-chief of the Turkestan military district. The arrival of General Stoletoff from St. Petersburgh has in a manner hastened matters. A meeting was held by the Turkestan Town Council on the $\frac{\text{22nd May}}{\text{3rd June}}$, on the subject of hiring the necessary number of native carts for transporting military stores. The orders were also issued for the appointment of members of the field commissariat, and for increasing the soldiers' rations in view of their impending departure. An artillery park, divided into sections, left Tashkend a few days since. The Engineer park will take its departure on the $\frac{\text{30th May}}{\text{1st June}}$, and an échelon of troops will march on the $\frac{\text{1st}}{\text{13th}}$ June. The Head-quarters will take the field on the $\frac{\text{11th}}{\text{23rd}}$ June. The proposed march route is along the Amu-Darya to Sharabat. The military chest, it is reported, is expected from Petersburgh in charge of members of the Ministry of Finance. The town of Tashkend has latterly assumed a very lively aspect. Generals and Chiefs of divisions are continuously arriving from the different military districts. On the $\frac{\text{30th May}}{\text{2nd June}}$, after a religious service had been held, a parade of all the troops took place. On the conclusion of the review the Commander-in-chief congratulated the soldiers on the expedition they were about to proceed on.

"The correspondent further states that according to prevalent rumours the Ameer of Bokhara, in consequence of negotiations carried on by the Russian Government, not only sympathizes with the advance of Russian troops through his territory, if the necessity presents itself, but has declared his willingness to afford the Russian authorities every assistance in his power."

Inclosure 2 in No. 142.

Extract from the "Turkestan Gazette."

THE "Turkestan Gazette" announces that General Kaufmann has appointed as his active field staff the following officers:—

Colonel Grodekoff, General of the Staff, to be Chief of the Staff.

Colonel Polubinski, commanding the 1st Brigade of Turkestan Artillery, to the command of the artillery of the active army.

Bogarffski, to the command of the Engineers.

Major-General Bardofski, commanding a Brigade of Turkestan Rifles, to the command of the Infantry.

Colonel Nicolaieff, to be commandant of the military train.

Privy-Councillor Souvoroff to be Chief Sanitary Inspector, and

Colonel Kurillo to the command of the cavalry.

In addition to these the Staff includes twenty-two other superior officers and a chaplain.

No. 143.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(Received July 26.)

My Lord, *India Office, July 26, 1878.*

I AM directed by Viscount Cranbrook to forward, for the information of the Marquis of Salisbury, copy of a letter from the Government of India, dated 17th June, 1878, with inclosed news Reports received through the Government of the Punjab.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 143.

The Governor-General of India in Council to Viscount Cranbrook.

My Lord, *Simla, June* 17, 1878.

IN continuation of our despatch dated the 3rd instant, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of news Reports received through the Government of the Punjab.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 143.

Extract from Confidential News-letter from the Government Agent at Peshawur, dated April 24, 1878.

KHUDAYAR KHAN, late Khan of Khokand, who, after the overthrow of his principality, was removed to, and for some time detained at, Orenburgh by the Russians, and who then fled from that place and was not heard of for months, reached Mizar-i-Shrif, in the Balkh Division of the Cabul State, having crossed the river Hamun (Oxus) by the assistance of Turkomans of the Saruk clan. The Ameer has now written to his officers in Turkestan to keep the Chief under surveillance, and has applied to the Russian Governor of Tashkend for instructions as to his disposal.

A Toksabah officer and thirty troopers of the Ameer of Bokhara have come to Cabul to receive Abdul Mulk, Torah, the son of their master, on his arrival there, and to conduct him to Bokhara.

Inclosure 3 in No. 143.

Extract from Confidential News-letter from a Correspondent at Peshawur, received through an Agent in Lahore under cover of a Letter, dated April 30, 1878.

IT is reported that a new Envoy from Russia arrived at Cabul a short time ago, and that the Ameer has more than once allowed him long interviews. The only courtiers of the Cabul Durbars present at these interviews were Sirdar Shere Ali Khan, Khandari, General Daud Shah, and the Mustaufi. It is said that the Envoy has brought letters from his Government to the address of the Ameer, and that he has given many assurances and promises to His Highness. The Ameer is reported to have been affected by the cunning discourse of the Envoy, and to have proposed to depute an Agent to Russia to go with the Russian emissary, who had been putting up at Cabul for some time before the arrival of the new Envoy. His Highness intends to send his replies to messages from Russia by this Agent.

The Ameer is again active in making warlike preparations, and His Highness often personally inspects the gun and musket manufactories:

Inclosure 4 in No. 143.

Confidential News-letter from the Government Agent at Peshawur, dated May 13, 1878.

THE following news has been received from ———, who obtained the information from ———:—

Shahghassi Sherdil Khan, the Nazim of Turkestan, wrote a letter to the Ameer and communicated the following particulars to him:—

"As it seemed advisable, I have postponed my visit to Cabul to some other time,

and forwarded my son, Khusdil Khan, to wait upon yonr Highness with presents. Mirza Salahuddin, whom I deputed towards Samarcand and Tashkend to collect news from those directions, has returned and made a statement to the effect that the Russians intend to induce Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan to submit to them a petition setting forth that he has been putting up there under the protection of the Russian Government for a long time; that he has often petitioned them to help him in securing the restitution of his ancestral territory from the Ameer of Cabul, but his prayer has not been acceded to; and that he has now heard that the Russians are preparing to fight against the British Government; that they have sent Envoys to wait upon the Ameer, to request him to allow passage through his country to the Russian troops going to India and returning therefrom, should a necessity arise for such a passage; and that such being the case, he offered his services, in case His Highness refuses to grant the request of the Russian Government, to capture Balkh with a small assistance from the Czar, and then to subdue the whole of Afghanistan, which is not a difficult task. The Russian officer Ibramoff asserts, that should the Ameer refuse to comply with the requests of the Russian Government, the petition of the Sirdar will be forwarded to His Highness to terrify him. This communication from the Shahghassi frightened the Ameer. This official has also informed His Highness that a number of the adherents of Muhammad Yakub Khan, the late ruler of Kashgar, deserted the localities of Yarkand and Kashgar through the oppression of the Chinese, and arrived in the districts of Badakhshan and Balkh, where they were disarmed, and that they seemed to be desirous of proceeding towards Bokhara and Khokand."

The Russian Envoy who recently arrived at Cabul mentioned to Sirdar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, the eldest son of the Ameer, that it was the desire of the Russian Government that his father should conclude a new Treaty with them, whereby the differences which have arisen between him and the Shah of Persia might be removed.

Some person having sent a letter to the Ameer from Peshawur, His Highness, immediately after the perusal of the communication, desired Mirza Abdul Wali, his Mir Munshi, and Mustaufi Habibullah, to prepare a statement of the despatches received by him from the British Government, but to which he gave no replies.

At the same sitting, the Ameer remarked that it appeared advisable to send for all such members of his family whom he had committed to the custody of the British Government. With reference to this remark, General Daud Shah stated that this question had been under the consideration of His Highness for a long time, and that as differences arise between him and the British authorities, it was not desirable that the men should be allowed to continue in their custody.

The Ameer having been informed by some one at Peshawur, or in Cashmere, that the Maharaja of Jammu desired Sirdars Muhammad Sarwar Khan and Muhammad Zahya Khan to raise a troop of Afghans for him, uttered abusive language against the Chief, and remarked that, "Please God, Cashmere too will be included in the Cabul dominions."

No. 144.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(Received August 2.)

My Lord, *India Office, August 2, 1878.*

I AM directed by Viscount Cranbrook to forward herewith, to be laid before the Marquis of Salisbury, copy of a letter from the Government of India, with inclosed diaries relating to rumours of preparations by the Russians in Central Asia for political and military movements towards Afghanistan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 144.

The Governor-General of India in Council to Viscount Cranbrook.

(Extract.) *Simla, June 24, 1878.*

ON the 7th and 19th of this month we telegraphed to your Lordship that rumours had reached us from various sources of preparations by the Russians in Turkestan for movements, political and military, towards Afghanistan. We now transmit the more important diaries and letters which conveyed these Reports.

The information which we have thus obtained is necessarily incapable of precise verification. But it has been received from persons well placed for collecting public news from across our north-west frontier; and, as the different rumours corroborate each other, they produce, taken together, the impression that they have some authentic foundation in fact. We have, therefore, resolved that we should forward these papers to your Lordship, in order that the intelligence, *quantum valeat*, may be used in any way that Her Majesty's Government may think desirable.

Inclosure 2 in No. 144.

Extract from Peshawur Diary by Major Cavagnari, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur, dated June 7, 1878.

A LETTER was received from Turkestan by the Ameer to the effect that the brother of the Khan of Khiva had visited the Governor-General at Tashkend. He was directed to take 800 horsemen and arrange for the protection of the Khivan frontier. He also was directed to hold himself in readiness to accompany a Russian Envoy, who is about to visit Cabul, with full power to discuss every matter with the Ameer.

Between the 21st and 24th May the Ameer dispatched three letters addressed to the Governor of Samarcand, through Shahghassi Sherdil Khan. An Agent has also, it is rumoured, been sent on the part of the Ameer.

Kazi Abdul Kadir has returned to Cabul from Balkh. It is supposed that he went to Samarcand on a secret mission from the Ameer to the Russian authorities.

Up to the present, the Bajaur Chiefs have not left for Cabul. Invitations to attend at Cabul have been received by some of the Afreedees of the Adamkhel.

On the 29th May a kafila of the Shinwaris was seized at Ali Musjid by Faiz Muhammad Khan, and a tax of 4 rupees per mule was demanded; and they were informed that this would be levied until the grain plundered by the Zakakhel Afreedees was paid for.

The Mir Akhor has told the Afreedees of the Khyber not to leave for Tira, as it is likely that the Ameer may require their attendance at Cabul.

The Mir Akhor has been suddenly summoned to Cabul. He has taken with him ome of the Sangu Khel elders.

The Ameer is said to be contemplating summoning all the Chiefs and leading men, to consult with them as to which of the two great European Powers he should ally himself to.

———, ——— has received a letter from Cabul, informing him that the Shahghassi has reported that the Russians have commenced road-making between Badkoya (believed to be somewhere near Khiva) and the banks of the Oxus, and thence to Akcha, and that the brother of the Khan of Khiva, with 800 horsemen, has been directed to protect the working parties; and he is to accompany the Russian Envoy who is about to visit Cabul. The Russian Agent at present at Cabul also informed the Ameer that an Envoy, with equal power to the Governor-General at Tashkend, will shortly reach Cabul. The Ameer was annoyed at hearing this, and wrote to Shahghassi Sherdil to inform the Governor-General at Tashkend that it was not advisable to send a European Agent, as the Afghans are an uncivilized and ignorant race, and might do the European some injury; but before he dispatched this, he received a letter from the Governor-General, informing him that the Envoy was being sent by the orders of the Emperor, and cannot now be detained, and will soon leave for Cabul. An Afghan Agent is required to be located at Samarcand, or at Tashkend if the Emperor wishes it. On this the Ameer got very angry, and, in a petulant manner, exclaimed that it was useless for him to depute an Afghan Agent, nor could he do anything to prevent the Envoy's coming to Cabul. He wrote to the Shahghassi to keep him informed of all the Russian movements. Sayid Mahmud, of Kunar, and the Mir Akhor were summoned to Cabul to consult with the other Chiefs, and advise the Cabul Durbar as to whether the Ameer should ally himself with the English or the Russians. Mir Afzal Khan, of Candahar, has also been summoned, if he can conveniently leave his post. It is considered unlikely that he will attend.

Inclosure 3 in No. 144.

Extract from Peshawur Diary by Major Cavagnari, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur, dated June 16, 1878.

SHAHGHASSI SHERDIL KHAN has reported to the Ameer that, in accordance with his commands, he deputed an agent to Tashkend and Bokhara to ascertain what was going on in those parts, and that the following information has been received:—

The Russians are pushing on the road-making between Khiva and the banks of the Oxus, towards Charjui and Karki, with great activity.

In Tashkend it is rumoured that a force of 80,000 men is being mobilized, and that a portion of it will move viâ Khiva, and the remainder viâ Tashkend, to Charjui and Karki, the two lines of route above mentioned being used in order to facilitate the procuring of supplies.

The Russians have ascertained throughout Bokhara and Khiva the probable amount of supplies and carriage that can be procured.

The full-powered Minister ("Wuzir Mukhtar") who has been appointed by the Russians to proceed to Cabul, will first go to Tashkend, and, after consultation with Governor-General Kaufmann, will proceed to Cabul.

In Tashkend it was openly stated that the Russians say that, if the Ameer of Cabul does not do what they want, they will nevertheless, on a suitable opportunity occurring, proceed with their arrangements for approaching India, and that they are not dependent on the Ameer at all.

The Russian officials are very attentive to Sirdar Abdur Rahman Khan in these days.

The Russians state that, as the Ameer of Yarkand was of no advantage to them, it is a good thing that the Chinese have captured that country.

In order to settle what reply shall be given to the Russian proposals, great efforts are being made by the Cabul Durbar to collect an assembly of all the Chiefs, Khans, and chosen men of the kingdom and its neighbourhood, which will probably take place next month. (The Mahommedan month Rajab will commence on the 28th June.) The Ameer desires that Afghanistan may remain independent, and that there should be no Envoys of a different religion to Mahommedanism in his kingdom.

The Ameer, in alluding on one occasion to the proposals of the Russians, stated that these proposals were adverse to the interests of the British Government, and that it remained to be seen how the British authorities, when they heard of them, would act in their own interests with regard to the Indian Empire. That he adhered to his original determination, and did not want to make enemies of either of the Great Powers; but that, if any one tried to injure him, he would do what he could to withstand them, and that "elevation or destruction is in the hands of the Almighty." Whatever Government approached him in a friendly manner he would make similar advances (meaning, no doubt, if it was entirely on his own terms).

The Ameer alluded on one occasion to the fearless and unceremonious behaviour of the Russian Agent at Cabul, and also to the repeatedly occurring news of the approaching arrival at Cabul of an empowered Agent of the Russians. The Mustaufi stated that he had before this represented to the Ameer that, on account of the excessive strength and shamelessness of the Russians, they would never get on with the Afghan Government, whereas "the moderation and exhibition of moderate power of the English," were such that the Ameer and his successors could get on with them; and he begged the Ameer to think well regarding the future. The Ameer turned to Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan for his views on the subject, and he replied that the Mustaufi had well spoken. The Ameer was silent, and turned the conversation into another channel.

Inclosure 4 in No. 144.

Unofficial Communication dated Peshawur, June 5, 1878.

I HAVE just telegraphed a report which has reached me, and which strongly confirms the information communicated in your Lordship's telegram sent me last month, regarding the mission of Tchernaieff to Krasnovodsk. It is to the effect that the Russian Agent now at Cabul has informed the Ameer that a European Russian Envoy, with full powers, and equal in rank to the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan, will shortly

visit Cabul to discuss and arrange the different matters between the two Governments. The Ameer's first impulse was to send a special message to the Governor-General at Tashkend, saying that it would be inconvenient for a European officer to come to Cabul; but, before the Ameer did anything a letter was received by him from Kaufmann, corroborating the Agent's statement, and adding that the Envoy must be received by the Ameer at Cabul, as he had been sent by the express commands of the Emperor. Shahghassi Sherdil Khan has also written to the Ameer that a road is about to be commenced from some place near Khiva to Charjui, and thence to Akcha on the road to Maimeneh; and that a son or brother of the Khan of Khiva has been told off with 800 horsemen to protect the workmen, and that he is to accompany the Russian Envoy to Cabul. I don't quite understand how Tchernaieff can get across the Kara Kum desert from Krasnovodsk to Khiva, judging from the result of Markosoff's disastrous atempt to use that route during the Khivan expedition; but possibly a comparatively small party may be able to do what was impracticable for an army. I should have thought that, if it was necessary for Tchernaieff to go viâ Khiva, he would have adopted the route taken by one of the Orenburg columns along the west shores of the Sea of Aral. However, by whatever route he intends to come, there seems every likelihood that he is the officer of high rank that is spoken of as about to visit Cabul as an Envoy from the Russians.

Inclosure 5 in No. 144.

Confidential Communication dated Peshawur, June 11, 1878.

I INCLOSE a copy of an intercepted letter intended for Sirdar ——— ———. The latter portion of it tends to confirm the news I reported in my telegram of the 5th instant, as it speaks of a selected Russian officer of great experience in Turkestan about to be sent as Envoy to Afghanistan; and the description given makes it highly probable that General Tchernaieff, regarding whose mission to Central Asia your Lordship telegraphed to me, may be referred to.

If there is any truth in the rumour (and I strongly believe that there is some foundation for it), I imagine that it principally depends on whether there is war between us and Russia whether the Russian authorities will really carry out this intention to send a European Envoy to Cabul or to other parts of Afghanistan; and that, if war does not break out, they will hold back their hand for the present, and deny (if asked) that they ever contemplated such interference in Afghanistan, which has already been declared to be beyond the sphere of their legitimate action.

Inclosure 6 in No. 144.

Confidential Communication dated Peshawur, June 13, 1878.

——— ——— has just sent me a report that the Shahghassi has written to the Ameer to say that the road-making between Khiva and Karki, viâ Charjui, is being carried on with great activity, and that a rumour has come from Tashkend that the Russians are mobilizing a force of 80,000 men, part of which will proceed viâ Khiva and part by Tashkend, to be concentrated at Charjui. He also adds that the Russian Envoy will proceed to Tashkend, and, after consultation with Kaufmann, will be sent to Cabul.

No. 145.

Mr. Plunkett to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 5.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July* 31, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to inclose an extremely interesting account, translated by Mr. Michell, from the "Moscow Gazette." of the mission to the Ameer of Bokhara of M. Weinberg, the Diplomatic Agent attached to General Kaufmann.

Your Lordship will not fail to notice that, while requesting the co-operation of the Ameer, M. Weinberg is reported to have stated that Russia had no ill-feeling towards Afghanistan, and intended dispatching an Envoy to Shere Ali Khan.

The observations which the "Moscow Gazette" makes on this subject reflect very

fairly the average Russian view of the advantages which may be gained by a further advance in Central Asia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

Inclosure in No. 145.

Substance of Article in the "Moscow Gazette" of July $\frac{6}{18}$, 1878.

(Translation.)

THE "Moscow Gazette" of the $\frac{6}{18}$th July publishes the following extract from the "Turkestan Vedomist":—

"The following is an account of the mission undertaken by M. Weinberg, the Diplomatic Agent attached to General Kaufmann, who was furnished with special instructions to negotiate with the Ameer of Bokhara in regard to the passage of Russian troops along the upper course of the Amu-Darya (Oxus).

"M. Weinberg, accompanied by Captain Shlikter, arrived at Karsh on the 21st May, and on the following day was presented to the Ameer, and handed to him the letter sent by the Governor-General of Turkestan, stating that his Excellency, in view of the present state of affairs and the probable advance of Russian troops along the Amu-Darya, relied on the same friendly disposition on the part of the Ameer which he had shown during the Khivan expedition, as also on the co-operation of the Bokharian authorities in the matter of obtaining supplies for the Russian detachments from the inhabitants of the districts through which they would pass. The Ameer, who at the commencement of the interview had seemed somewhat agitated, heard M. Weinberg in silence, and replied that he was perfectly willing to carry out the wishes of the Governor-General, and that he would endeavour, as far as lay in his power, to assist our troops, trusting by these means to strengthen the amicable relations at present existing between Bokhara and Russia.

"In answer to the Ameer's question in what way we intended arranging our affairs with Cabul, M. Weinberg considered it necessary to answer candidly that the Turkestan Governor-General nourished no ill-feeling against Afghanistan, and meditated dispatching an embassy to Shere Ali Khan, by which means our relations with the latter would in all probability become defined one way or the other, either in an amicable or hostile sense; everything would depend on the straightforwardness and good sense displayed by the Ameer. 'We,' added M. Weinberg, 'entertain no ulterior views in respect to him.'

"On the termination of this interview, the Ameer desired to see M. Weinberg on the following day, for the purpose of further discussion.

"The purchase of supplies in Bokhara for our Amu-Darya detachment has been sanctioned by the Ameer."

The "Moscow Gazette" of the $\frac{7}{19}$th July, in a leading article on this subject, says:—

"The time has arrived for Russia to establish her influence over the whole of Central Asia, and this is all the more easy as the Ruler of Afghanistan is not on good terms with England—our foe in Central Asia. The concentration of our influence on the frontiers of the territory of the Empress of India would be only a natural answer to the English seizure of Cyprus and all the approaches to Asia. Such may be the unobtrusive, even peaceable, object of the military operations undertaken by the troops of the Turkestan military circuit. As our correspondent at Berlin truly remarked the other day—'In Asia there are two political Powers confronting each other, and they must inevitably come into collision.' England wishes to be Russia's nearest neighbour in Asia Minor, and it is only natural, therefore, that Russia, in her turn, should desire to approach somewhat nearer to the English frontiers in India.

. . . . . "England was always jealous of our successes in Central Asia; she understood that every fresh step we made—every success, military or political, in Central Asia—hastened the moment when Russia would possess the possibility of establishing her influence on the frontiers of English territory. The present moment appears the most propitious for the attainment of this object, and it is not without good grounds, may be, that the English Government is bestowing itself to diminish the armed strength of her vassal Chiefs in India. England understands that a force of 60,000 British soldiers and 127,000 picked natives is inadequate to crush a revolt in a population numbering 240,000,000 people!"

Since the appearance of the article in regard to the Ameer of Bokhara, the "Russki Mir" states that it reported that Mr. Weinberg, the Diplomatic Agent above referred to, has died suddenly at Tashkend from heart disease.

No. 146.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(*Received August* 8.)

My Lord, *India Office, August* 8, 1878.

I AM directed by Viscount Cranbrook to request that you will be so good as to lay before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the inclosed copies of telegrams received from the Viceroy of India, together with the following observations, which his Lordship desires me to submit for the Marquis of Salisbury's consideration on the subject of the reported arrival of General Abramoff on a special mission at Cabul, accompanied by a Russian military escort.

Lord Salisbury is so thoroughly conversant with the general bearings of the important question now brought to an issue by this open interference of the Czar's Government in Afghanistan, that, as a prelude to the general remarks he has to offer, Lord Cranbrook thinks it unnecessary to do more than recapitulate the declarations which have been made by the Russian Government in respect to that country between the years 1869 and 1876.

On the $\frac{24\text{th February}}{7\text{th March}}$, 1869, Prince Gortchakow wrote to Baron Brünnow as follows:—

"Vous pouvez donc, mon cher Baron, réitérer au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique l'assurance positive que Sa Majesté Impériale considère l'Afghanistan comme entièrement en dehors de la sphère où la Russie peut être appelée à exercer son influence. Aucune intervention ou ingérence quelconque contraire à l'indépendance de cet Etat n'entre dans ses intentions."

On the 28th January, 1874, Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh reported that, in a conversation with the Russian Chancellor, his Highness had expressed himself in the following terms:—

"As regards Afghanistan, his Highness (Prince Gortchakow) repeated to me that the Imperial Government considered that Kingdom to be beyond the sphere of their political action, and that, happen what might in the internal state of that country, the Imperial Government would not interfere."

This intelligence was confirmed by Prince Gortchakow himself in a despatch addressed to Count Brünnow, which was communicated to Her Majesty's Government on the 17th February, 1874. His Highness wrote: "J'ai réitéré à Lord A. Loftus l'assurance positive que le Cabinet Impérial persiste à considérer l'Afghanistan comme entièrement en dehors de sa sphère d'action," a declaration which was quoted by the Prince in a Memorandum inclosed in a despatch to Count Schouvaloff dated 5th April, 1875. Finally, on the $\frac{3\text{rd}}{15\text{th}}$ February, 1876, the Chancellor issued the following instructions to the Russian Ambassador in London:—

"Veuillez dire à son Excellence, d'ordre de notre auguste Maître, que nous adhérons entièrement aux conclusions d'après lesquelles en maintenant, de part et d'autre, l'arrangement convenu quant aux limites de l'Afghanistan, qui demeurerait en dehors de la sphère d'action de la Russie, les deux Cabinets considéreraient comme closes les discussions reconnues peu pratiques relatives à la zone neutre et à la zone intermédiaire."

It is only necessary to mention further that in 1869 Prince Gortchakow expressed to Sir A. Buchanan, then Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, his concurrence with the late Lord Mayo's views, that Russian Agents should not visit Cabul.*

The Russian Government has thus, during the last ten years, stood pledged to an attitude of absolute non-intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan. On the other hand, the policy of the British Government towards that State during the same period has been shaped in an entirely opposite sense; it has been, in fact, to exercise a proper and legitimate influence at Cabul; to encourage Shere Ali in a peaceful policy towards his neighbours; to respect his independence, and, whilst accepting no further responsibility in regard to his action than to press on him, when needful, our friendly advice, to protect him from foreign interference and aggression. In other words, whilst Russia has bound herself to abstain from exercising influence of any kind in Afghanistan, the policy of Her Majesty's Government has been in the interests of peace to exercise an influence which should be unchallenged and paramount.

It is true that the Russian Government has denied the reality of any such step on its part as that now reported.† M. de Giers has formally stated, in fact, to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, that no such Mission as that referred to by Lord Lytton has been, or was intended to be, sent to Cabul by the Imperial Government or by General Kaufmann; he has, with equal emphasis, denied the existence of intrigues

* Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon, November 2, 1869.

† M. de Giers to Lord A. Loftus; Lord A. Loftus to Marquis of Salisbury, July 3, 1878.

between General Kaufmann and Shere Ali. But in the face of the particulars now received from India, corroborated as they are from other sources, Viscount Cranbrook cannot pretend to accept as satisfactory these denials.

Assuming the truth of the fact reported, it appears that, contrary to all engagements with England, a Russian Mission has found its way to the Ameer of Cabul, who has received it, either willingly, or under pressure, without reference to the Indian Government. This Mission is said to be backed by four Russian columns, aggregating some 15,000 men, moving through the Turkoman country, and on the line of the Oxus, and converging on points which may be said to directly menace the safety and integrity of Afghanistan.

To meet this difficulty the Viceroy has proposed, as a preliminary measure, to insist on the reception by the Ameer of a suitable British Mission at Cabul, a proposal which, as will be seen from the telegram quoted in the margin,* the Secretary of State for India has deemed it expedient to sanction.

But Lord Cranbrook cannot consider this step as adequate in itself to the occasion, and is strongly of opinion that Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh should be at once instructed to address the Russian Cabinet upon the proceedings of the Russian authorities in Turkestan.

It is the Russian Cabinet alone which is responsible for the acts of its Agent; and it is the Russian Governor-General of Turkestan, rather than the Ameer Shere Ali, who, with or without authority, is at this moment pursuing a policy of which the effect must be to seriously agitate the minds of Her Majesty's subjects throughout India.

' In view of the gravity of the situation the Secretary of State for India may safely leave to Lord Salisbury, who has a full knowledge of the question, the adoption of such language at St. Petersburgh as he may think best calculated to bring about a result such as the engagements of Russia entitle us to expect.

I am directed to add, in conclusion, that Viscount Cranbrook proposes to submit hereafter remarks on the alleged movements of Russian expeditions in the Turkoman country and on the Oxus, which he is of opinion should form the subject of a distinct and separate communication to the Government of Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 146.

The Viceroy of India to Viscount Cranbrook.

(Telegraphic.) *July* 30, 1878.

BRITISH native medical officer, lent some time ago to Ameer, returned on leave to Peshawur on the 21st instant, reporting that Kaufmann, with troops, had reached Karki, and was personally proceeding to see Ameer. Afghan officials at the Oxus tried to stop him, pending Ameer's orders, but he declined to obey them. Ameer thereupon sent orders forbidding opposition to Russian officers.

Native doctor heard Ameer tell his Minister in Durbar, 7th July, that Kaufmann, or officer of equal rank from Tashkend, had crossed Oxus on road to Cabul, refusing to be stopped.

I refrained from telegraphing this information to you pending confirmation. Have now heard from Peshawur reported arrival of Russian officer at Cabul with large military escort. This, of course, cannot be Kaufmann, and may be native of rank in Russian service, though all accounts as yet point to European officer. If such Mission be authenticated I will telegraph again.

It will be difficult to act or instruct frontier officers without definite indication of views of Cabinet on such conduct on part of Russia and Ameer, having regard to Russia's formal promises, and Ameer's refusal to receive British Mission in any shape. What I shall then require to know, without delay, is, whether this will be treated by Her Majesty's Government as an Imperial question with Russia, or left to us to deal with as a matter between Ameer and the Government of India.

In latter case, I shall propose, with your approval, to insist on immediate suitable reception of European British Mission.

I will communicate with you further on measures which may, in this contingency,

* *To Viceroy, August* 3, 1878 — "Assuming the certainty of Russian officers at Cabul, your proposals to insist on reception of British Envoy approved.

"In case of refusal you will telegraph again as to the steps you desire to take for compelling the Ameer to receive your Mission."

become necessary for securing due permanent preponderance in Afghanistan. The alternative would be continued policy of complete inaction, difficult to maintain, and very injurious to our position in India.

Inclosure 2 in No. 146.

The Viceroy of India to Viscount Cranbrook.

(Telegraphic.) *Simla, August* 2, 1878.

FURTHER confirmation received of presence of Russian Mission at Cabul, headed by General Abramoff, Governor of Samarcand, who is mentioned by name.

Referring to my telegram of 30th, we desire to point out that present situation requires immediate correction. It will soon be known throughout India that Russian officers and troops have been received with honour and are staying at Cabul, within short distance of our frontier, and our largest military garrison, while our officers have been denied admission there.

We have further reports of Russian officers having visited, and been well received, at Maimena.

To remain inactive now will, we respectfully submit, be to allow Afghanistan to fall as certainly and as completely under Russian power and influence as the Khanates.

We believe we could correct situation, if allowed to treat it as question between us and Ameer, and probably could do so without recourse to force; but we must speak plainly and decidedly, and be sure of your support.

It appears to us that the contingency contemplated in Secretary of State's letter of the 2nd January, 1875, has arisen, and we propose, therefore, in the first place to insist on reception of suitable British Mission at Cabul. To this we do not anticipate serious resistance; indeed, we think it probable that Ameer, adhering to his policy of playing Russia and ourselves off against each other, will really welcome such Mission, while outwardly only yielding to pressure. We would thus endeavour to effect arrangements similar to those urged on us by your Lordship's predecessor in despatch above quoted, but avoiding all dynastic obligations.

It is possible we should find considerable difficulty in obtaining Ameer's assent to such arrangements, but in hands of skilful negotiator difficulties might be overcome, and at least it is desirable to make the effort in the first instance.

Ameer is aware we are in position to enforce our demands. Failing in these endeavours to re-establish the preponderance of British influence in Afghanistan, which we believe to be necessary for the safety of India, we shall then have to consider what measures are necessary for the protection and permanent tranquillity of our north-west frontier as indicated in last paragraph of Secretary of State's despatch of 4th October, 1877.

We earnestly solicit an early reply, as situation is urgent.

Inclosure 3 in No. 146.

The Viceroy of India to Viscount Cranbrook.

(Telegraphic.) *Simla, August* 5, 1878.

YOUR telegram of 3rd. Cabul. No hostile action shall be taken without full previous communication with you.

No. 147.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(Received August 9.)

My Lord, *India Office, August* 9, 1878.

WITH reference to my letter of yesterday's date, I am directed by Viscount Cranbrook to forward herewith, to be laid before Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a further telegram from the Viceroy of India, on the subject of the Russian Mission at Cabul.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure in No. 147.

The Viceroy of India to Viscount Cranbrook.

(Telegraphic.) *Simla, August* 9, 1878.

REPORTS from Cabul, July 30th, state Ameer received Russian Envoy in Durbar 26th.

Envoy presented two letters, one from Governor-General of Tashkend, other from the Czar. Contents not stated.

Review of troops ordered for 2nd instant.

No. 148.

Mr. Stanhope to Lord Tenterden.—(Received August 13.)

My Lord, *India Office, August* 13, 1878.

IN my letter of the 8th instant, relative to the breach of Russian engagement involved by the presence of a Russian Envoy at Cabul, I informed you of Viscount Cranbrook's intention to submit, for the consideration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, certain further observations on the movements of Russian troops in the Turkoman country and on the Oxus, which, in his Lordship's opinion, might form the subject of a separate communication to the Russian Cabinet.

In accordance with this intimation, I am now directed to request you to be so good as to lay before the Marquis of Salisbury the views of the Secretary of State for India on this important matter, which has a direct bearing on the declared policy of Her Majesty's Government in Central Asia, on the tranquillity of the north-west frontier of India, and on the relations between the Government of India and that of Afghanistan.

The reports which reached Her Majesty's Government in the spring of the year, announcing extensive military preparations in Russian Turkestan for some object not officially revealed, received practical confirmation in the General Order issued by the Russian Governor-General of Turkestan on the 14th May last. That General Order, which was stated to be based on instructions received from the Russian Minister of War, directed the formation, as a preliminary measure, of three operating columns aggregating some 15,000 men. The principal column, consisting of about 12,000 combatants at full strength, under Major-General Trofsky, was ordered to be formed at Samarcand, to proceed thence to Djam; and further, according to orders, the second column, organized at Marghilan, and consisting of about 1,700 men, was to proceed, under command of Major-General Abramoff, to the Kizil-Su Valley, where it was also to await further orders; the third, or Amu-Darya (Oxus) column, formed at Petro Alexandrovsk, under Colonel Grotenhelm, and amounting to about 1,700 men, was to move up the banks of the Oxus to Chardjui, and further according to orders. In addition to these three columns, a force of five regiments of infantry and some guns, besides 1,000 Cossacks, or some 4,000 men in all, has, according to reports received from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, been organized at Chikishlar on the Caspian, for the occupation of the Akhal country, a measure which, by the latest information received in this Office, is in course of execution, with the consent and assistance of the Persian Government.

Thus, there are reported to be in movement in the trans-Caspian district, and on the Oxus, four Russian military expeditions, comprising nearly 20,000 men, converging on points which directly command Merv and the Akhal country, and menace the northern frontier of Afghanistan.

In the absence of an explanation from official Russian sources, it may be surmised that the object of the Russian Government in originally sanctioning the movements in question, was to anticipate the contingency of a war with England, and consequent danger to Russian Turkestan by seizing strategical positions on the Oxus and elsewhere.

The Russian press is generally so well informed on these matters, that Lord Cranbrook would invite Lord Salisbury's particular attention to the articles referred to in the margin,* which strongly support the view above expressed.

It will be in Lord Salisbury's recollection that when, in the spring of 1875, the Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. James called upon the Earl of Derby to ascertain more clearly than he had yet done the "views of Her Majesty's Government on the Central Asian question," he was reminded of the warning which the

* "Russki Mir," May $\frac{17}{29}$; "Moscow Gazette," July $\frac{7}{19}$.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had already given to him of the great importance which the Indian Government attached to Merv, and of the danger to the relations between the two Governments that would, in Lord Derby's opinion, ensue if that place were meddled with. The private interchange of views which at that period took place resulted, as Lord Salisbury is aware, in the important communication, dated the 5th April of that year, addressed by Prince Gortchakow to Count Schouvaloff, inclosing a Memorandum which reviewed all the correspondence that had passed between the two Governments since 1864. That Memorandum expressed the determination of the Czar not to extend the frontier of Russia beyond its then existing limits, either in the direction of Bokhara, Krasnovodsk, or the Attrek, reiterated in unmistakable language a declaration on the part of the Russian Government that Afghanistan was a State outside the sphere of Russian action, but at the same time concluded by claiming full liberty of action over the countries intervening between the Russian possessions and the latter State.

This claim so gravely qualified the formal and satisfactory assurances given in the earlier paragraphs of Prince Gortchakow's communication that the reply of the English Cabinet was framed in language which could not be mistaken in its import. Whilst frankly accepting the assurances given by the Russian Chancellor, it strongly deprecated any further advance of the Russian frontier toward Afghanistan as being likely to involve complications which might seriously compromise the integrity of Afghan territory, "to maintain which Her Majesty's Government reserved the most complete liberty of action under all future contingencies."

The exchange of views thus carried on between the two Governments in 1875, conceived and conducted in a conciliatory manner on both sides, had no practical result. In spite of the direct engagement recorded in Prince Gortchakow's Memorandum as to non-extension of Russian territory, the Russian Government increased rather than relaxed its activity in the Turkoman country and on the Oxus. On the strength of rights secured in 1873 by Treaties with Khiva and Bokhara, the Governor-General of Turkestan placed steamers on that river, and dispatched exploring parties to Hissar, Kulab, Sherabad, and elsewhere in its neighbourhood; whilst, in direct contravention of orders issued by His Imperial Majesty, the Russian Commander of the trans-Caspian district scoured the country in the neighbourhood of the Attrek with a considerable force. Close upon this renewed activity followed the annexation of Khokand, as well as a marked increase of correspondence (carried by Russian Agents) between the Russian Governor-General of Turkestan and the Ameer Shere Ali, in a tone, on the part of General Kaufmann, which drew from Her Majesty's Government a remonstrance at St. Petersburgh.

In short, far from the Russian Government adhering to its pledges of 1875, the past three years have been marked by a considerable increase of territory, by expeditions into the Akhal country, by secret Missions of Russian Agents both in the Turkoman country and in Western Afghanistan, and, finally, by the present military movements.

Lord Cranbrook is not in a position at this moment to indicate what effective steps should, in his opinion, be taken by the Indian Government in the altered situation created by the proceedings of the Russian authorities in Turkestan; but requests Lord Salisbury to keep him informed of any measures which he may adopt to obtain explanations from the Russian Government, and the result.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD STANHOPE.

No. 149.

Mr. Plunkett to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received August 19.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 12, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship an extract from the "Messager du Turkestan," which, in addition to other news from Central Asia, states that last year a survey was taken and a line drawn of a projected road from Krasnovodsk to the Lake Sary Kamisch. This road, it would appear, is to be utilized by the detachment appointed to watch the route to Khiva. The survey has likewise been made of a road from Bui Kitchick to Kizil Arvad.

Your Lordship will also observe that soundings have lately been taken of the Amou-Daria, or River Oxus.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

Inclosure in No. 149.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of July 30 / August 11, 1878.

L'EXPÉDITION du Colonel Bonsdorf dans les provinces de l'Oural et de Tourgaï, ainsi que vers l'Ourst-Ourt, a été entreprise, au dire du "Messager du Turkestan," dans le but de déterminer la position géographique de quelques points pour la carte de la contrée d'Orenbourg actuellement en préparation. La base pour la détermination des longitudes était la ville d'Orenbourg, les fortifications d'Ak-tub et le poste d'Emba déterminés antérieurement par le Colonel Tillo en 1870 et 1871. Les travaux de l'expédition se divisaient en deux parties ; la première consistait à fixer les points compris entre Orenbourg, Ak-tub, et Emba ; la seconde à parcourir les localités entre Emba et l'embouchure de l'Emba, dans la direction de l'Ourst-Ourt, et à revenir à Emba. L'expédition a duré soixante-dix-huit jours ; vingt points ont pu être déterminés. A son retour à Orenbourg, le Colonel Bonsdorf a pu faire les calculs relatifs à tous ces points de la steppe Kirgise, et établir les conditions astronomiques des localités qu'avait parcourues en 1876 le défunt Colonel Solimani.

La topographie du district de Nicolaïeff, dans la Province de Tourgaï, a été achevée, 4,451 verstes carrées ont été calculées, et 519 points ont été déterminés. La base de ces travaux a été les déterminations astronomiques et trigonométriques antérieures entre les rivières Omein et Tobol.

Huit cent onze verstes entre Ilets, Akmolinsk, Caraboutak, Irghiz, et Tourgaï ont été reconnues.

Les reconnaissances des points habités entreprises en 1876 dans la Province d'Orenbourg ont été continuées ; de nouvelles données relatives au nombre des maisons de chaque village forment une riche matière pour la statistique de la Province d'Orenbourg.

L'année passée a été dressée l'itinéraire de la steppe du Transcaucase à partir de Krasnovodsk jusqu'au Lac de Sary-Kamisch, pour servir à la marche du détachement destiné à observer la route de Khiva. Cette route a des montagnes peu élevées, et des collines couvertes de sable en plusieurs endroits. En outre a été dressé l'itinéraire depuis Bui-Kitchik jusqu'à Kyzyl-Arvat, comme suite des travaux topographiques antérieurs dans le Trauscaucase.

Dans cette même contrée les membres de l'expédition de l'Ouroun-Dar-Jin ont achevé la levée du plan de l'embouchure des canaux Khan-Jab, Laudon, et Daria-Lyk, et aussi de toute la rive droite de l'Amou-Daria depuis Daria-Lyk jusqu'à Laudon et le long du Daria-Lyk.

On a déterminé la profondeur de l'Amou-Daria en plusieurs endroits.

Les travaux de nivellement de l'Amou-Daria ont continué pendant toute la durée du printemps et de l'été de 1877

No. 150.

Mr. Plunkett to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received August 19.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August 14, 1878.*

WITH reference to Lord A. Loftus' despatch of the 3rd ultimo, I took occasion to remind M. de Giers this afternoon of the conversation which Her Majesty's Ambassador had had with him shortly before leaving St. Petersburgh, and I expressed the hope that, at a moment when good relations were being at last re-established between Great Britain and Russia on the graver questions in Europe and in Asia Minor, the Imperial Government would not compromise the growth or maintenance of those friendly relations by pursuing in Central Asia a policy which seemed little in conformity with previous agreements.

Reverting to the explanation which he had given to Lord A. Loftus, that, in view of the probability of a war with Great Britain, the Russian military commanders in Asia had been justified in preparing such measures as they deemed most likely to prejudice Great Britain, I said that peace was now happily secured, and therefore I ventured to inquire what measures had been taken for arresting the march of the Russian colomns which had left Tashkend and Krasnovodsk, and whether it was true that the Russian Envoy or Agent was still residing at Cabul.

After carefully weighing his words his Excellency replied that I must understand that, in questions of military movements, he could not be answerable for the details, with which he was naturally not acquainted; he could only answer for the principles

which had been laid down for the policy of the Government. He could then assure me that it was not true that any Russian Emissary had proceeded to Cabul with any letter from the Emperor to the Ameer. Possibly there might have been a letter from General Kaufmann. Orders had been given to arrest the march of all the columns which had been put in movement from Tashkend, and as a matter of fact he was under the impression, although he could not tell me so either officially or positively, that the troops had already resumed their old stations.

I then inquired whether the column which had left Krasnovodsk under General Llamakin had also returned; but on this point I failed to elicit any distinct reply.

I obtained, however, an assurance from M. de Giers, which he repeated to me twice, that all the special measures which had been taken in Central Asia, and which, M. de Giers said, Russia had as much right to take, in view of the impending risk of war, as Great Britain had had to bring Indian troops to Malta, had been stopped; and he asserted positively that at the present moment no military measures whatever were being taken which could give umbrage to Her Majesty's Government.

I said that I was glad to receive these assurances as regards the stoppage of all military movements; could his Excellency give me equally satisfactory assurances concerning those political steps which had been commenced in view of complications with Great Britain?

M. de Giers at once replied: "Everything has been stopped. The political as well as the military precautions which we thought ourselves justified in taking against you—everything has been stopped."

I have full confidence that in the above assurances M. de Giers correctly conveyed to me the substance of the orders sent from here as far as the Cabinet knows them; but he had warned me that he was necessarily ignorant of many military details, and experience has already shown how elastic Imperial orders become by the time they reach Tashkend

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

No. 151.

Mr. Plunkett to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received August 19.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 14, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a translation by Mr. Michell of an article in the "Golos," showing the supposed destination of the different columns which had left Tashkend for the frontiers of Afghanistan.

These articles are at present interesting, more from a theoretical than from a practical point of view; the opinion is here very generally entertained in well-informed circles, and it is confirmed by the official assurances reported in my despatch of this date, that the contemplated movement in Central Asia has been stopped since the conclusion of the Peace of Berlin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

Inclosure in No. 151.

Extract from the "Golos" of August $\frac{1}{13}$, 1878.

(Translation.)

THE RUSSIAN EXPEDITION TO FRONTIERS OF AFGHANISTAN.—The "Golos" of the $\frac{1st}{13th}$ August reproduces the following letter addressed to the "Politische Correspondenz" from St. Petersburgh:—

"The mystery which has hitherto enveloped the objects of the long meditated and secretly fitted out expedition, already despatched from Tashkend, is commencing by degrees to clear up. Although all the three Russian columns are to operate along the course of the Oxus, each of them has a special task to execute, after which they will act in concert. The troops under General Abramoff, who commands the left wing of the corps of operation, may be regarded as having for their temporary object the establishment of Russian rule over the tribes inhabiting the upper course of the Oxus. Colonel Grotenhelm has received instructions to occupy the Turk Settlement at Merv, while the principal force of the Russian corps is ordered to pacify and subdue the inhabitants of the

region between the Oxus and the Hindoo Koosh. This column is advancing straight on Samarcand, Balkh, Kulm, Bamiam, Cabul, India. The three columns will effect a junction at some point on this route. The work to be accomplished by the principal force presents considerable difficulties. To the south of the Oxus and beyond to the Hindoo Koosh there are, at the present time, five Khanates: Karategui, Shugnal, Darvas, Sarikol, and Vakhan. This last Khanate is indirectly dependent on Afghanistan, whereas Sarikol formerly formed a part of the territory of Yacub Bek of Kashgar; Karategui, Shugnal, and Darvas are perfectly independent Khanates. It is now purposed to subdue these five Khanates and render them accessible to European civilization. On the occupation of Vakhan, the Khan of which prides himself on being a descendant of Alexander of Macedon, the frontiers of Russia will be advanced 400 versts nearer to British Asia, so that these two powerful Empires will be separated in Asia by about 68 German miles; at the same time it is necessary to note that the intervening space is inhabited by people who are imbued with the greatest hatred towards England. If the above operations are crowned with success the three columns will effect a junction in the Khanate of Balkh, so that the whole corps will appear on the frontiers of Afghanistan. It will only be then that the whole plans on which the expedition hinges will become definitely known. It is thought here that the first object is to elucidate the question whether the Ameer of Afghanistan will or will not give his adhesion to Russian policy? In the first case, the Russians will steadily advance to the gates of India; in the second case, General Kaufmann will proceed to subdue Afghanistan. "In this case, naturally, there will arise another question: whether the English will calmly await the nearer approach of the Russian columns, or whether they will oppose Russia's attack on Afghanistan."

According to a letter addressed to the "Golos" from Orenburg, on the $\frac{16}{28}$th July last, the Russian detachment which had left Tashkend "for the purpose of clearly ascertaining the relations between Russia and Afghanistan," were to march, in the first instance, to Djam, where final instructions for their ultimate destination were to be issued to them.

No. 152.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Mr. Plunkett.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 19, 1878.

FROM telegraphic despatches received from the Government of India, it appears that intelligence has reached the Viceroy that a Russian force under General Kaufmann has proceeded as far as Karki, a short distance to the north of the frontier of Afghanistan, and that a Russian Mission, headed by General Abramoff, Governor of Samarkand, has gone on to Cabul, where it has been received by the Ameer.

It is scarcely necessary to recapitulate the occasions on which Prince Gortchacow has disclaimed any intention on the part of the Russian Government to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan. The assurances given by his Highness in this respect have been numerous and explicit, and have been renewed at a very recent date.

On the $\frac{24\text{th February}}{7\text{th March}}$, 1869, his Highness wrote to Baron Brünnow as follows:—

"Vous pouvez donc, mon cher Baron, réitérer au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique l'assurance positive que Sa Majesté Impériale considère l'Afghanistan comme entièrement en dehors de la sphère où la Russie peut être appelée à exercer son influence. Aucune intervention ou ingérence quelconque contraire à l'indépendance de cet Etat n'entre dans ses intentions."

On the 28th January, 1874, Lord A. Loftus reported that, in a conversation with the Russian Chancellor, his Highness had repeated to him that "as regards Afghanistan, the Imperial Government considered that Kingdom to be beyond the sphere of their political action, and that, happen what might in the internal state of that country, the Imperial Government would not interfere." In a despatch addressed to Count Brünnow, which was communicated to Lord Granville on the 17th February, 1874, Prince Gortchacow wrote: "J'ai réitéré à Lord A. Loftus l'assurance positive que le Cabinet Impérial persiste à considérer l'Afghanistan comme entièrement en dehors de sa sphère d'action," a declaration which was quoted in a Memorandum inclosed by the Prince in a despatch to Count Schouvaloff, and communicated to Lord Derby on the 11th May, 1875. Finally, on the $\frac{3\text{rd}}{15\text{th}}$ February, 1876, the Chancellor gave the following instructions to the Russian Ambassador in London:—

"Veuillez dire à son Excellence, d'ordre de notre auguste Maître, que nous adhérons entièrement aux conclusions d'après lesquelles en maintenant, de part et d'autre, l'arrangement convenu quant aux limites de l'Afghanistan, qui demeurerait

en dehors de la sphère d'action de la Russie, les deux Cabinets considéreraient comme closes les discussions reconnues peu pratiques relatives à la zone neutre et à la zone intermédiaire."

It is only necessary to mention further that, as reported by Sir A. Buchanan, then Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, on the 2nd November, 1869, Prince Gortchacow expressed to him his concurrence with the late Lord Mayo's views, that Russian agents should not visit Cabul.

The Russian Government has thus, during the last ten years, stood pledged to an attitude of absolute non-intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan. On the other hand, the policy of the British Government towards that State has confessedly, and with the concurrence and approval of Russia, been shaped, during the same period, in an entirely opposite sense; it has been, in fact, to exercise a proper and legitimate influence at Cabul; to encourage Shere Ali in a peaceful policy towards his neighbours; to respect his independence; and, whilst accepting no further responsibility in regard to his action than to press on him, when needful, our friendly advice, to protect him from foreign interference and aggression. In other words, whilst Russia has bound herself to abstain from exercising influence of any kind in Afghanistan, the policy of Her Majesty's Government has been, in the interests of peace, to exercise an influence which should be unchallenged and paramount.

The Government of Russia have given that of Her Majesty no reason to suppose that they had departed from the line of policy thus indicated. On the contrary, when inquiries were recently made by Lord A. Loftus, as reported in his despatch of the 3rd ultimo, M. de Giers emphatically denied that any such Mission as is now spoken of had been sent, or was intended to be sent, to Cabul, either by the Imperial Government or by General Kaufmann.

But the circumstantial reports now received from India, corroborated as they are from other sources, are of a nature which it is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to ignore or overlook.

Assuming the truth of the facts reported, it would appear that a Russian Mission has found its way to the Ameer of Cabul, who has received it, either willingly or under pressure. This Mission is said to be backed by four Russian columns, aggregating some 15,000 men, moving through the Turcoman country and on the line of the Oxus, and so directed that the Ameer may not unnaturally consider them as offering a menace to the safety and integrity of his dominions.

I must therefore request you to mention these reports to Prince Gortchacow, and to inquire whether there is any foundation for them. You will not conceal from his Highness that proceedings of the kind referred to would cause uneasiness in India and dissatisfaction in this country, and should it prove that there is any truth in the statement that a Russian Mission has proceeded to Cabul, you will express the hope of Her Majesty's Government that it may be at once withdrawn, as being inconsistent with the assurances so frequently received from his Highness.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 153.

Mr. Plunkett to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 21.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 16, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith an extract from the "Agence Russe" of this morning, stating that the military preparations in Central Asia have been stopped since the Congress of Berlin, and I also inclose an extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of this morning, practically to the same effect.

I beg also to submit to your Lordship a translation taken from the "Agence Russe," of an article from the "Golos," which endeavours to prove that the Russian movements in Central Asia are the reply of this Empire to the Anglo-Turkish Convention of the 4th June; but I would venture to remark that, as General Stoletoff, who commands the expedition, was despatched on his mission so long ago as the end of March or commencement of April, the dates of the two events clearly prove the hollow nature of the argument put forth by the "Golos."

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 153.

Extract from the "Agence Russe."

LE "Golos" consacre à ce sujet l'article suivant:—

"Les Anglais ont décidé d'envoyer une mission à l'Emir de Caboul, mission à la tête de laquelle sera placé M. Neville Chamberlain et qui se mettra en route vers le commencement du mois de Septembre, escortée d'un régiment de troupes de l'Inde. L'idée leur en est venue sans doute parce qu'ils ont appris de l'arrivée d'une mission Russe à Caboul et de l'accueil qui lui a été fait par l'Emir Shir Ali. Lord Lytton s'est aperçu, quoiqu'un peu tard, que les affaires d'Afghanistan prennent une tournure susceptible de réagir très-défavorablement au point de vue des intérêts Anglais sur l'esprit des indigènes de l'Inde. Le Gouvernement Britannique a caché, aussi longtemps qu'il l'a pu, les conséquences probables de la marche de l'armée Russe vers le Turkestan—la presse avait le mot d'ordre de ne pas traiter de ce sujet pendant tout le temps que durèrent les séances du Congrès. De même qu'elle avait fait semblant d'ignorer le mouvement d'opinion provoqué par l'idée de la flotte volontaire. La raison de ce silence est compréhensible. Le Ministère avait souci d'empêcher la publication de nouvelles qui auraient pu jeter du froid dans les ovations que le Comte Beaconsfield tenait à savourer jusqu'au bout. Maintenant même ce n'est qu'avec une répulsion évidente que les journaux et les sphères officielles s'occupent de ces faits qui détonnent dans l'harmonie générale du triomphe Ministériel.

"Le Cabinet a voulu préserver le prestige tant que cela a été possible, mais enfin la nécessité est venue de parler de ces sujets désagréables; alors la presse a entamé timidement des relations sur la marche du Général Kaufmann. Puis le Parlement a commencé à s'intéresser à la chose—de là l'interpellation de Mr. Dilke, à laquelle Sir Stafford Northcote a répondu d'une façon, pour ainsi dire, évasive. Cependant la nécessité d'une confession sincère et complète devient de plus en plus éminente. Et, alors on ne sait comment fera le Gouvernement pour s'excuser, lui, qui a su combiner la Convention Anglo-Turque, n'a pas eu la clairvoyance de prévoir que la Russie répondrait à cet acte par des mesures de compensation en Asie Centrale. La presse Russe, au lendemain même du jour où la Convention du 4 Juin fut rendue publique, indiqua le revirement que prendraient les affaires—elle le fit dans des termes assez clairs pour permettre de tirer cette conclusion que la Convention Anglo-Turque serait suivie d'incidents qui ne seraient pas du goût des hommes d'Etat Anglais. Donc, en cachant les faits le Gouvernement, et la presse, qui lui a prêté sa complicité, ont sciemment intercepté une publicité qui pouvait être nuisible au Cabinet."

Inclosure 2 in No. 153.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of August $\frac{4}{16}$, 1878.

ON s'est encore une fois occupé avant-hier, à la Chambre des Communes d'Angleterre, de "l'expédition" Russe au-delà de l'Oxus et de la mission envoyée auprès de l'Emir de Caboul. Nous avons déjà fait remarquer il y a deux jours que c'étaient là des préoccupations parfaitement périmées par la conclusion du Traité de Berlin. Et comme la Session Parlementaire en Angleterre tire à sa fin, il est permis de croire qu'on n'entendra plus parler les sujets que MM. Dilke et Harcourt ont touchés Mardi.

Inclosure 3 in No. 153.

Extract from the "Agence Russe."

St. Pétersbourg, Jeudi soir, le $\frac{3}{15}$ *Août,* 1878.

NOUS voyons par les télégrammes et les correspondances des journaux étrangers qu'on se préoccupe beaucoup à Londres, à Vienne, et ailleurs, des progrès d'une prétendue expédition Russe en Asie-Centrale, ayant plus ou moins en vue les approches de Merv et de Caboul.

Nous avons lieu de croire ces journaux bien tardivement renseignés. Les faits dont ils parlent se rapportent à un moment où, de la part de la Russie, ces faits se trouvaient justifiés par le cas de légitime défense qui lui créaient les préparatifs de guerre de l'Angleterre, mais il va sans dire que depuis le Congrès de Berlin, ces faits ont cessé d'exister avec

les causes qui les avaient crées. Aussi ne serions-nous pas étonnés de voir ces mêmes organes déclarer sous peu que toutes les mesures relatives à une expédition en Asie-Centrale ont été depuis contremandées par le Gouvernement Impérial, et, cette fois, ces organes seront dans le vrai.

No. 154.

Mr. Plunkett to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 21.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 16, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation by Mr. Stephen of an account borrowed from the "Turkestan Gazette" of the surveys which had been made by Colonel Majen in view of the contemplated march of a Russian expedition towards Afghanistan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

Inclosure in No. 154.

Extract from the "St. Petersburg Herald."

THE "Turkestan Gazette" writes as follows respecting the movements of the Russian troops in Central Asia :—

"Lieutenant-Colonel Majen had been told off by the Governor-General (Kaufmann) to make a careful examination of the ways and roads over which our troops were to have marched to the Amou Daria. M. Majen's journey lasted eighteen days. During this time Colonel Majen visited Karshi, where he had an interview with the Ameer of Bokhara relative to the expedition mentioned above. The road from Djam to Tschiraktschi, Karabat, and Gissar were surveyed on the Colonel's way to Karshi. This former place is a large commercial town situated on the spurs of the Gissar chain of mountains, and was chosen for head-quarters during the survey of the road to the Amou Daria. From here two roads were surveyed—

"1. The road to Derbent Schir Abat, and Kara Kaneor, and Kelif, over the Amou Daria ; and—

"2. The road likewise leading over the mountains from Kelif to Gissar.

"This road, as also the mountain way from Schir Abat to Kelif, which M. Majen travelled over, had never previously been trod by an European. In consequence of this journey our maps of the Gissar district have received important additions. The orographic character of the country between Gissar, Karshi, Schir Abat, and Baissun is now much better known. A topographer of the name of Petron accompanied Colonel Majen, surveying all the roads they travelled over."

No. 155.

Mr. R. Thomson to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 30.)

My Lord, *Tehran, July* 1, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to inclose translation of a letter which I have received from the Mission Agent at Meshed, describing the reports which have been circulated in Khorassan respecting a rumoured advance of Russian troops towards Akhal, and in regard to the Mission of the Russian Consul at Asterabad to Meshed.

The Persian Minister informs me that the authorities in Asterabad have no information of the arrival of Russian troops at Krasnovodsk or anywhere on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RONALD F. THOMSON.

Inclosure in No. 155.

The Meshed Agent to Mr. R. Thomson.

(Translation.) *June* 22, 1878.

I ARRIVED at Meshed on the 19th instant. A cossid came in on the same day from Herat, bringing the news that an English and Turkish officer had arrived at Cabul, and had been received by the Ameer with much courtesy. Shah Kasse Shere Dil, Governor of Balkh and Turkestan, and Arsela Khan, one of the Kaleejoi Chiefs, are both dead. The Ameer is peaceably inclined.

About the latter end of May I received a letter from Boojnoord saying that the messenger who had been sent to Krasnovodsk had returned with the intelligence that six regiments of infantry and six guns had arrived, and six other regiments had passed Ashuradeh *en route* for Krasnovodsk. Their intention is to advance on the Akhals. No one is allowed to go amongst the troops except a few of the Yemoot Elders. It is not known when the Russians will start on their expedition. The Akhals are in a great state of alarm, but they have an idea that they will be protected by England.

There was a rumour at Boojnoord that the Russian Consul intends visiting Merv, and that he has 250,000 gold Imperials with him.

No. 156.

Mr. R. Thomson to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received August* 30.)

My Lord, *Tehran, July* 7, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Asterabad Agent has reported to me that he had sent a trustworthy agent to Chekishler to inquire into the truth of intelligence which he had received respecting the arrival of Russian troops there. This man reported, on his return, that five regiments of Russian infantry, with ten guns, had been landed there, and that 1,000 Cossacks had come from the north by land and joined them. The Asterabad Agent added that it was generally supposed among the Turkomans that these troops were destined for Akhal and Merv.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RONALD F. THOMSON.

No. 157.

Mr. R. Thomson to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received August 30.)

My Lord, *Tehran, July* 8, 1878.

WITH reference to my despatch to your Lordship of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of the Asterabad Agent's letter therein mentioned, in which he reports the arrival of Russian troops at Chekishler, near the embouchure of the Attrek River.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RONALD F. THOMSON.

Inclosure in No. 157.

The Asterabad Agent to Mr. R. Thomson.

(Translation.) *July* 2, 1878.

ON the 25th ultimo I was informed that the Prince Governor had received a report that Russian troops had landed at Chekishler. I went to Ak Kaleh myself, and sent a Turkoman friend of mine to ascertain about the matter. He returned after four days, informing me that five regiments, and another General, besides General Llamakin, had landed, and he had also counted ten unmounted guns; 1,000 Cossacks had also arrived by land from Khiva. Their Chief is a Turkoman of the Charva tribe of Jaaferbaïs, who had several years ago been taken prisoner and sent to Russia. The Russian General is purchasing camels, and buys at any price. He sent for Tel Kaldee Khan, who

* The substance of this despatch was telegraphed.

was recently fined 800 tomans by General Llamakin, and turned away from Russian protection. The General told him that 800 tomans would be given to him to purchase and hire as many camels as he could, and another 800 tomans for himself. The Khan, however, excused himself on account of the hardships he had undergone, and managed to get away to the Prince Governor's camp, in the hope that he would take his part; but, as the Prince Governor had received orders from Tehran not to hinder the Russians in any way, he paid no attention to Tel Kaldee Khan. The Russian General, in fact, is in no want of the Khan, for he pays so handsomely that all the Turkomans, even those of the Kejjek and Tatar Turkomans, who reside on the frontiers of Goklan, are ready to sell their camels. Any Turkoman who visits the camp merely to see it is summoned by the Russian General, who, after talking a few words with him, gives him a present of two imperials. Although the General's intentions are unknown, it is generally believed that he will march up the Attrek Valley, upon the Téké country; others say he is going to Merv, and that another force is proceeding by Khiva upon that place.

On the 27th ultimo M. Petrow, who acts for the Russian Consul, arrived here, and was received with the usual ceremonies.

It is said that two regiments and 1,000 horse, from the camp at Shahrood, have been ordered to proceed to Meshed. The Prince's camp is still at Ak Kaleh, but in a miserable state through the dearness of provisions, and no pay being given to the troops. The Turkoman tribes also do not intend paying any taxes, and are only waiting to get in their crops. The Jaaferbaï tribe are so hostile that they do not pay the slightest regard to Hijjij Koolee Khan, who has gone against them with 500 horse and foot; they are unceasing in their endeavours to draw him and his forces into the open plain, when they will be able to beat him easily and plunder his camp.

Asker Khan, an engineer officer, is repairing the fort of Ak Kaleh. The Goorgan River has subsided, and buffaloes can ford it now, so the Persian camp is therefore in danger.

It is currently said amongst all classes that there is great friendship between Russia and Persia, and that Persia does nothing without the advice of the Russian Government.

No. 158.

Mr. Plunkett to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received September 2.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August 27,* 1878.

I HAD the honour to receive yesterday morning your Lordship's despatch of the 19th instant, desiring me to mention to Prince Gortchakow the reports which have reached Her Majesty's Government of Russian military movements towards Afghanistan, and to express the hope that the Russian Mission to Cabul may be withdrawn as being inconsistent with the assurances so frequently received from his Highness.

As M. de Giers, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the absence of Prince Gortchakow, was to leave for the Crimea last night in the suite of the Emperor, and would, therefore, be sure to have his last hours in town fully occupied, I had taken the precaution, in view of the arrival of the messenger, of writing two days previously to ask his Excellency to grant me an interview yesterday; but, although I called twice at the Foreign Department at the hour which he had fixed as the most likely to see him, and also a couple of hours later, I was not fortunate enough to find him. I therefore handed to M. Melnikoff, the Acting Director of the Asiatic Department, the note, copy of which is herewith inclosed, embodying the substance of your Lordship's despatch, and requesting that care should be taken for having it sent to M. de Giers with as little delay as possible.

M. Melnikoff promised to do so at once, and apologized for the absence of M. de Giers, who, he said, had expected to have seen me, but had been kept away from the office by the pressure of other business consequent on his departure for the south.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

Inclosure in No. 158.

Mr. Plunkett to M. de Giers.

M. le Conseiller Privé Actuel, *St. Petersburgh, August* 26, 1878.

IN compliance with instructions which I have received from the Marquis of Salisbury, it is my duty to inform your Excellency that intelligence has reached the Viceroy of India that a Russian force has proceeded as far as Karki, a short distance to the north of the frontier of Afghanistan, and that a Russian Mission headed by General Abramoff, Governor of Samarcand, has gone on to Cabul, where it has been received by the Ameer.

Lord Salisbury considers that it will be scarcely necessary to recapitulate the many occasions on which Prince Gortchakow has disclaimed any intention on the part of the Russian Government to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan. The assurances given by his Highness in this respect have been numerous and explicit, and have been renewed at a very recent date.

On the $\frac{24\text{th February}}{7\text{th March}}$, 1869, his Highness wrote to Baron Brünnow as follows: "Vous pouvez donc, mon cher Baron, réitérer au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique l'assurance positive que Sa Majesté Impériale considère l'Afghanistan comme entièrement en dehors de la sphère où la Russie peut être appelée à exercer son influence. Aucune intervention on ingérence quelconque contraire à l'independance de cet Etat n'entre dans ses intentions."

On the 28th January, 1874, Lord A. Loftus reported to Her Majesty's Government that in a conversation which he had had the honour of having with the Imperial Chancellor, his Highness had repeated to him that, "as regards Afghanistan, the Imperial Government considered that Kingdom to be beyond the sphere of their political action, and that, happen what might in the internal state of that country, the Imperial Government would not interfere." In a despatch addressed to Baron Brünnow, which was communicated to Lord Granville on the 17th February, 1874, Prince Gortchakow wrote:—"J'ai réitéré à Lord A. Loftus l'assurance positive que le Cabinet Impérial persiste à considérer l'Afghanistan comme entièrement en dehors de sa sphère d'action." A declaration which was quoted in a Memorandum inclosed by the Prince in a despatch to Count Schouvaloff, and communicated to Lord Derby ou the 11th May, 1875. Finally, on the $\frac{3\text{rd}}{15\text{th}}$ February, 1876, the Imperial Chancellor gave the following instructions to the Russian Ambassador in London:—"Veuillez dire à son Excellence, d'ordre de notre auguste Maître, que nous adhérons entièrement aux conclusions d'après lesquelles en maintenant, de part et d'autre, l'arrangement convenu quant aux limites de l'Afghanistan, qui demeurerait en dehors de la sphère d'action de la Russie, les deux Cabinets considéreraient comme closes les discussions reconnues peu pratiques relatives à la zone neutre et à la zone intermédiaire."

I would further venture to remind your Excellency that Prince Gortchakow expressed to Sir A. Buchanan, in the year 1869, his concurrence with the views entertained by the late Lord Mayo, that Russian Agents should not visit Cabul.

The Imperial Government has thus, during the last ten years, stood pledged to an attitude of absolute non-intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan. On the other hand, the policy of the British Government towards that State has confessedly, and with the concurrence and approval of Russia, been shaped during the same period in an entirely opposite sense; it has been, in fact, to exercise a proper and legitimate influence at Cabul; to encourage Shere Ali in a peaceful policy towards his neighbours; to respect his independence; and whilst accepting no further responsibility in regard to his action than to press on him when needful our friendly advice to protect him from foreign interference and aggression. In other words, whilst Russia has bound herself to abstain from exercising influence of any kind in Afghanistan, the policy of Her Majesty's Government has been in the interests of peace to exercise an influence which should be unchallenged and paramount.

The Government of Russia have given that of Her Majesty no reason to suppose that they had departed from the line of policy thus indicated. On the contrary, when inquiries were recently made on this subject by Lord A. Loftus, your Excellency said that no such Mission as is now spoken of had been sent, or was intended to be sent, to Cabul either by the Imperial Government or by General Kaufmann.

It now, however, becomes my duty to state that the circumstantial reports which have been received from India, corroborated as they are from other sources, are of a nature which it is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to ignore or overlook.

It would appear that a Russian Mission has found its way to the Ameer of Cabul,

who has received it either willingly or under pressure. This Mission is said to be backed by four Russian columns, aggregating some 15,000 men moving through the Turkoman country, and on the line of the Oxus, and so directed that the Ameer may not unnaturally consider them as offering a menace to the safety and integrity of his dominions.

I have, therefore, been instructed by the Marquis of Salisbury to bring these reports to the knowledge of the Imperial Government, and to inquire whether there is any foundation for them, and I am to remind your Excellency that proceedings of the kind referred to give rise to much uneasiness in India and to great dissatisfaction in England, and should it turn out that there is truth in the statement that a Russian Mission has proceeded to Cabul, I am to express, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, the hope that it may be at once withdrawn, as being inconsistent with the assurances so frequently received from the Imperial Chancellor.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

No. 159.

Mr. Plunkett to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received September 2.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 28, 1878.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 16th instant, respecting the surveys which have been made by Colonel Maeff of the routes towards the Oxus, I have the honour to inclose a translation by Mr. Michell of an article in the "Turkestan Gazette," giving further particulars on the same subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

Inclosure in No. 159.

Substance of an Article from the "Turkestan Vedomisti."

RUSSIAN MOVEMENTS ON FRONTIERS OF AFGHANISTAN. — The "Turkestan Vedomisti" publishes the following particulars of the expedition of Lieutenant-Colonel Maeff, who was dispatched from Tashkend for the purpose of surveying the routes leading through the Hissar region to the Oxus. Colonel Maeff returned to Tashkend in the middle of June last, having collected very detailed information in respect of these routes.

The march-routes drawn up by Colonel Maeff commence at Djam, a point to the south-west of the town of Samarcand. From Djam the road leads to the large town of Gusar, and is 116 versts in length. This route does not present any special obstacles to the movement of a detachment, and may be considered as the easiest portion of the route to the Oxus.

From Gusar to the passage over the Oxus at Kelif there are two routes; the first is 146 versts in length, and the other, through Shirabad, 229 versts in length. Comparing these two routes Colonel Maeff gives the preference, not to the first and shortest, but to the second, viâ Shirabad. The shortest route presents the disadvantage of passing through a district devoid of fresh water, the springs found, and they are but few, giving a brackish water, while the wells contain a bitter salt water. On the second route, however, fresh water is met with in abundance. Similarly the second route has the advantage in regard to supplies, being situated nearer the inhabited localities from whence forage could be obtained in the march from Gusar to Derbent; fuel is also very plentiful. Two populous settlements, those of Derbent and Ser-ob, are encountered in this latter route, and not far distant is situated the Khanate of Baissun, rich in cattle.

In this manner the Gusar-Shirabado-Kelif route, although somewhat longer in extent (67½ versts), affords the possibility of securing forage and fuel for the detachment, is also more convenient for the transport of supplies, and, what is of great importance, a supply of pure spring water is obtainable.

At Kelif there is a convenient passage over the Oxus. The river at this point narrows to the extent of 167 fathoms, which circumstances places the Afghan bank within the range of our guns. Moreover, steamers can easily reach Kelif. The passage over

the river can be performed in Bokharian boats. Although Kelif in itself is not a point of great importance, it is surrounded by cultivated fields and vegetable gardens.

The passage at Kelif leads to the Afghan town of Achtcha or Andhai, a distance of 40 versts from Kelif. Further the route leads from Achtcha to Shiburgan, 40 versts; from Shiburgan to Saripul, 48 versts; from Saripul to Maimeni, 80 versts; the distance from the latter place to Kelif representing a journey of ten days.

No. 160.

Mr. Plunkett to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received September* 10.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, September* 4, 1878.

I WOULD beg to call your Lordship's attention to the inclosed translation by Mr. Michell of an article in the "Turkestan Gazette," stating that the last portion of the expeditionary forces was to have returned to Tashkend by the $\frac{18}{30}$th August, that the telegraph lines were to be pushed on from Samarcand and Djam to Kattakurgan, and that the Ameer of Bokhara had offered, in case of hostilities, to continue the telegraph as far as the Amu-Daria. The Ameer also promised to provide the Russian troops with provisions, and sent an Envoy to Samarcand to compliment General Kaufmann.

The "Turkestan Gazette" states that news has been received from the Mission under General Stoletoff, which had reached Haiben, in northern Afghanistan; that it had been well received by the Afghans, and expected to arrive at Cabul on the 22nd July / 3rd August.

The morning papers of to-day announce the return to Tashkend, on the 30th July / 11th August, from Samarcand, of General Kaufmann and of General Troitzki, the latter being described as Commander-in-chief of the troops in the Amu-Daria district.

The above extracts would seem to prove that it is General Stoletoff, and not General Abramoff, who has been sent as Russian Envoy to Cabul.

P.S.—As the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of this morning contains a French translation of the above article, I inclose herewith two copies of it.

Inclosure 1 in No. 160.

Extract from the "Turkestan Vedomisti" of August $\frac{1}{13}$, 1878.

(Translation.)

THE Russian troops concentrated at Djam, on the frontiers of Bokhara, are gradually returning home in eight echelons. The last echelon will enter Tashkend on the $\frac{18}{30}$th August. The telegraph line constructed from Samarcand to Djam will be removed to Katta Kurgan, and will form the continuation of the line from Tashkend, Hodjent, Ura-tubi, Djizak, and Samarcand.

It is worthy of note that when the Ameer became aware of the Governor-General's intention to continue the telegraph line to the Oxus, he expressed a desire to supply the whole quantity of posts necessary. Moreover, the Ameer undertook to furnish our detachments with forage and provisions during their sojourn in the Khanate, and ordered that large quantities of clover, rye, rice, and sheep should be prepared at Shaar, Kitab, and Tchirakchi. The Ameer encountered no great difficulty in executing the above, in view of the rich harvest of the present year, while it proved of great assistance to the Russian detachments.

Several days prior to the arrival of the Commander-in-chief, General Kaufmann, a special Mission was sent by the Ameer of Bokhara for the purpose of meeting and paying their respects to the Governor-General. The principal member of the Mission was the Bek of Huzar, the son of the Ameer. Among other members were the Beks of Shakrizabz and Ziactdina and a representative of the Bek of Kernim. The immediate representatives of the Ameer were, Durbun Bey and Rahkmetula-Mirahur. Besides these were the Bek of Shaar and Alim Bek Permanachi, both enjoying the favour of the Ameer, and much respected by the people generally. The Mission dispatched by the Ameer on this occasion was particularly brilliant. In response to this attention, the Governor-General intends dispatching a messenger to the Ameer at Karshi, who will be the bearer of a courteous letter.

The commencement of direct relations with Afghanistan must be considered as one of the results of the present condition of things in the Turkestan region. The

mission of Major-General Stoletoff, as might have been expected, will be far from proving a fruitless experiment. The only news received of General Stoletoff comes from Haibek in the Vilayet of Tchahor, in Northern Afghanistan. General Stoletoff was received with great honour and kindness by the Afghan authorities, and expects to be in Cabul by the 22nd July. We hope, in a short time, to be able to publish more detailed particulars of General Stoletoff's travels.

A scientific expedition composed of MM. Oshanin and Neveski (for botanical researches) and M. Radionoff (military topographer) will start shortly from Samarcand for the purpose of exploring the mountainous Hissar region. The expedition will proceed from Samarcand over Shakrizabz, the pass of Segri-Dag to Denau, from thence to Karatag, Dushambey, Kafirnagan, and Harm (in Koretegin), it will then direct its course to the south and issue out on the Pamir, where, in all probability, it will meet with M. Severtsoff's expedition.

Besides the above expedition, M. Maeff intends this summer to explore the mountain roads in the localities between Djam, Shir-abad, and Kelif, with the object of finding a connecting road between the Huzaro-Shir-abad and the Huzaro-Kelif roads. Such convenient connecting routes exist, it is thought, from the Kishlak of Sir-ob to Haz-Kishlak or from Derbent to the River Karchak-Darya.

Inclosure 2 in No. 160.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of $\frac{\text{August}}{\text{September}}\ \frac{24}{5}$, 1878.

D'APRÈS la "Gazette du Turkestan," les troupes concentrées à Djama, sur la frontière de Bokharah, retournent successivement à leurs cantonnements primitifs. Le dernier détachement devait revenir le 18 Août. La ligne télégraphique organisée de Samarcande à Djama sera transportée à Kattakourgan et formera la prolongation de la ligne de Tachkend-Khodjent-Oura-Tubé-Djizak-Samarcande. C'est un fait digne de remarque que lorsque l'Emir a appris l'intention du Gouverneur-Général de faire passer une ligne télégraphique jusqu'à l'Amou-Daria, il s'est engagé lui-même à fournir le nombre de poteaux nécessaires. Il s'est proposé, en outre, à procurer à nos troupes les fournitures de fourrage et de vivres dont elles auraient besoin pendant leur séjour dans le Khanat, et a ordonné de préparer préalablement à Schara, Kitaba, et Tchiaktchi des approvisionnements de riz, de froment, et de moutons. La belle récolte de cette année en avait donné les moyens à l'Emir.

Quelque temps avant l'arrivée du Général Kaufmann à Samarcande, une Ambassade de l'Emir de Bokharah s'est présentée au camp Russe pour saluer le Général au nom de l'Emir. Cet Ambassade était composée des Beks les plus influents et les plus distingués de la Cour de l'Emir. Le Gouverneur-Général envoie maintenant, en réponse, une lettre des plus amicales à Karchi à l'adresse de l'Emir.

Nos relations avec l'Afghanistan se sont établies sur un bon pied. L'Ambassade du Général-Major Stolétoff ne restera pas improductive. On n'a encore que des nouvelles du Général datées de Haibeck (138 verstes de Masari-Scherif). Il a été reçu par les autorités Afghanes avec beaucoup d'honneurs, et le 22 Juillet comptait arriver à Caboul.

Une expédition scientifique a été envoyée de Samarcande pour reconnaître la contrée montagneuse de Hissar. Cette expédition se compose de MM. Oschanine, Nevessky, et du Lieutenant Rodionow. Elle traversera Samarcande, Schakhrisiabz, le défilé de Segri-Dag, le Denau; de là elle si dirigera sur Karatag, Duchambe, Kafirnaghan et Harm, puis passera au sud et ira à Pamir, où elle se rencontrera probablement avec l'expédition Siéverston.

En outre, une autre expédition, dirigée par M. Maïew, fera cette année l'exploration de la contrée montagneuse comprise entre le Djam, Shere-Abad, et Khelif, dans le but de reconnaître les chemins qui unissent la route de Houssar-Schir-Abad et celle de Houssar-Khelif.

No. 161.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(*Received September* 10.)

My Lord, *India Office, September* 10, 1878.

I AM directed by Vicount Cranbrook to forward herewith, to be laid before the Marquis of Salisbury, copies of letters from the Government of India, with accompanying news Reports relating to affairs in Afghanistan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 161.

The Governor-General of India in Council to Viscount Cranbrook.

My Lord, *Simla, August* 5, 1878.

IN continuation of our despatch dated the 22nd ultimo, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the news Reports received through the Government of the Punjab.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 161.

Extract from Confidential News-letter from the Government Agent at Peshawur, dated June 18, 1878.

THE following news has been received from an authentic source :—

The Russian Envoy stationed at Cabul laid before the Ameer the under-mentioned proposals on the part of the Russian Government :—

1. That the Ameer may permit the location of Russian Agents at Cabul and at other places in his territory where it may be deemed necessary to locate such Agents of the Russian nationality, and that the Agents should enjoy the powers of Consuls.

2. That permission be accorded for the quartering of Russian troops at four suitable places on the boundaries of Afghanistan, and that the Ameer should engage to protect those troops.

3. That the Russian Government be allowed to construct a road from Samarcand to Cabul viâ Kata Kurghan, Khoja Salih, and Balkh, then from Cabul to Herat viâ the course of the Hamun River, the plain of Indkho, Bala Murghab, Maruchak, Pandi, and Firoz Koh, and from Herat to Candahar by the Garmsir route.

4. When necessity arises, the Cabul Government may allow passage, by routes it may be desirable to follow, to Russian troops proceeding to India.

5. That telegraph wire be set up between Samarcand, Kata Kurghan, Balkh, Cabul, Candahar, and other places where the Russian troops or Agents be stationed.

6. That when necessary, Russian troops may be supplied with provisions and carriage on payment of reasonable prices.

7. The Russian Government will allow the continuance of the country of Afghanistan to the representatives, successors, and heirs of the Ameer in perpetuity, in accordance with the will (of the last Sovereign) and legal rights.

8. That the Russian Government will in no way interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and the administration of the country.

9. That the Russian Government will ever afford proper aid for the maintenance of peace in Afghanistan and to (assistance against ?) the external and internal enemies of the Principality.

10. The Russian authorities will consider the enemies of the Ameer as their enemies.

11. That if it becomes desirable that the Russian Government should send an expedition to wage war in India, the Ameer should furnish supplies to the Russian troops on payment; and that the Afghan Government will establish Agents at the capital of Russia, at Tashkend, &c.

Inclosure 3 in No. 161.

Extract from Confidential News-letter from a Correspondent in Jellalabad, dated June 16, 1878.

THE following items of news have been obtained from persons who have recently arrived here from Cabul and from the local officials:—

Some time ago a Russian Envoy brought a letter to the Ameer from the Russian Government. This letter contained a number of questions or proposals. With reference to these proposals the Ameer has informed the Envoy that as the Government of Afghanistan is not totally independent in making a choice, and the Ruler of the Principality cannot do any act without assembling and consulting the Mahommedan public, the carrying out of the proposals of the Russian authorities is an impossibility without the acquiescence of the entire body of the Afghans, notwithstanding that he was prepared to agree to the Russian orders or demands; that he had, therefore, addressed all the Grandees of the country residing in Candahar, Herat, Turkestan, and Badakshan, intimating to them the proposals, and asking their opinion, advice, and counsel in the matter, desiring them at the same time to consult their tribes and parties on the subject, and to communicate their replies by letter, the more important of their number coming to Cabul in person with their answers; and that the proposals have created a great excitement among the population.

It is heard from a reliable source that one day the Ameer received intimation that a Christian Russian Envoy, accompanied by Sayad Rahim Khan, the brother of the Khan of Khiva, had left the Russian capital, and was on his way to Cabul to discuss matters with His Highness.

Inclosure 4 in No. 161.

The Governor-General of India in Council to Viscount Cranbrook.

My Lord, *Simla, August 5, 1878.*

IN continuation of our despatch dated the 16th May last, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the confidential diary of the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur, dated the 8th May last, and copy of a statement made by ———, for some time a retainer in the service of ———.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON
R. STRACHEY.

Inclosure 5 in No. 161.

Extract from Peshawur Confidential Diary, dated May 8, 1878.

HADJI ATAULLAH, who has for some months past been staying at Bokhara as an Envoy from Ameer Shere Ali Khan, has returned to Cabul in company with Momin Beg, the Envoy from the Ameer of Bokhara.

Ostensibly the latter has been sent to Cabul, in connection with the return to Bokhara of Abdul Malik, the Ameer's son; but information from an apparently trustworthy source has been received that the Mission has been deputed to consult with the Ameer of Cabul regarding a demand said to have been made by the Russian authorities that Karki should be given to Sirdar Abdur Rahman Khan. Up to the present time nothing has openly transpired to confirm this report. Rumours have been prevalent for

some time that the lately arrived Russian Agent has promised the Ameer of Cabul an extension of territory towards Bokhara as the condition of an alliance with Russia. It is generally believed that the Russians are commencing to put pressure on Bokhara, with the view to acquiring Charjui and Karki.

Some few days after the departure of Munshi Bakhtiar Khan from Cabul, the mother of the Heir Apparent, on hearing that the Mustaufi had been authorized to send a written communication by the Munshi to the British authorities, reproached the Ameer for having permitted this to be done, giving her opinion that this would only widen the breach between him and the Government, as the Ameer should either have had the letter written in his own name, or else have not sent any letter at all, as one sent from a subordinate would most likely be regarded as a breach of etiquette. She succeeded so far as to induce the Ameer to send a special messenger after the Munshi, to try and recall the letter, but it had been delivered by Bakhtiar Khan before the messenger reached Peshawur.

Sirdar Mir Afzal Khan has frequently written to the Ameer from Candahar urging him to elect at once whether to join the English or the Russians. The mother of the Heir Apparent, in consultation with the Mustaufi, has been trying her best to induce the Ameer to summon her father from Candahar, to deliberate on what action should be taken; but the Ameer does not appear inclined to follow this advice.

The Governor of Turkestan has reported to the Ameer that it is rumoured that some Russian officers are wandering about Afghanistan in disguise. The Ameer has given orders for vigilant search to be made, and has ordered the Shahghassi to send back any officers who cross the Oxus, unless provided with letters from the Russian authorities.

Sikandar Khan has written to the Ameer from Europe to the effect that the Ameer should be more circumspect in his conduct, and take precautions regarding the strengthening of Candahar and Herat, as the English will occupy them, and advising him to ally himself at once either with the English or the Russians before it becomes too late. The Ameer laid this letter before the Durbar.

The Shahghassi has informed the Ameer that he has established a friendly feeling with the Uzbegs of the Pamir Steppe, on the frontier of Badakhshan, and also with the Téké and Yamut Turkomans on the western border. He reports that Abdur Rahman Khan has assured the Russian authorities that if the Ameer of Cabul does not do what they may require of him, he can, with a little assistance from them, do all that is wanted.

The Governor of Herat has written to the Ameer that the Turkomans of Merv are alarmed at news of Russian military preparations. He reports that Russian officers go about in disguise, and that it is difficult to detect them.

(Signed) N. CAVAGNARI, *Major*,
Peshawur, May 8, 1878. *Deputy Commissioner.*

Inclosure 6 in No. 161.

Statement made by ———, *for some time a Retainer in the Service of* ———.

LAST year the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan proceeded from Tashkend to Samarcand, for the purpose of meeting the Ameer of Bokhara, who had been invited there to receive a communication from the Czar. The Ameer declined the invitation, as he feared being sent off to St. Petersburgh and detained there, but sent two of his sons, with a retinue of seventy men, to Samarcand. The sons were sent to St. Petersburgh, but one died on the way there, and, on arrival of the other, the Emperor informed him that the Ameer should not have suspected the Russian Government of any evil intentions towards him, as they were friendly disposed to him, in consideration of the assistance he had given the Russian troops during the Khivan expedition. The Ameer's son was then dismissed, and returned to Turkestan, and is now Governor at Hissar.

In the month of Safar 1295 H. (February 1878), the Governor of Samarcand was deputed by the Governor-General to the Ameer of Bokhara, to make the following demands on the part of the Russian Government:—

1. That as there was now no necessity for the Ameer to keep up a large Usbeg army, the Ameer should disband it, and merely retain a body-guard of 1,000 men, and that in the event of any revolt within the Bokhara Kingdom, or of aggression by enemies from without, the Russian troops would provide the necessary assistance.

2. That the Russian Government had received information that the Slave Trade, which it had prohibited, was still carried on at Charjui, and other places within the Ameer's territory, and must be put down at once.

3. That the town of Karki on the Oxus should be made over to Sirdar Abdur Rahman Khan.

4. That as there was no necessity for either of the two Afghan Envoys now at Bokhara—one from the Ameer of Cabul, the other from the Governor of Afghan Turkestan—to remain there, they should be dismissed.

To the first and third demands the Ameer replied that he would give a definite answer in seven months.

Regarding the Slave Trade, the Ameer denied that the report was true, and that it was fabricated by his enemies to create bad feeling between him and the Russians.

To the fourth demand the Ameer replied that the Afghan Envoys were his guests, and that he could not in honour dismiss them, nor was he required by any Treaty obligations with the Russians to do this.

The Russian General was informed that he was at liberty to remain at Bokhara pending the Ameer's reply; but he declined to do so, and went back to Samarcand.

The Ameer then arranged to send an Envoy, Abdul Momin Beg, to inform the Ameer of Cabul of the Russian demands, and to point out to him that the cession of Karki was quite as injurious to Afghan as to Turan interests.

(The informant was at Bokhara while this was going on, and he obtained the Ameer's permission to accompany the Mission to Cabul.)

On the 15th of the month Safar (8th February) the Mission left Bokhara and reached Mazar-i-Sharif, in Afghan Turkestan, on the 12th of Rabi-ul-awal (17th March), and stayed there with the Governor for ten days.

Khudayar Khan, the ex-Ruler of Khokand, who had escaped from the Russians, was at Mazar-i-Sharif. On the 11th of Rabi-us-Sani (15th April) the Envoy reached Cabul. The Ameer sent one of his relatives, accompanied by some Sirdars, to receive him some little distance out of the city of Cabul.

Three days after his arrival the Envoy had an interview with the Ameer, and presented the letter he had brought from the Ameer of Bokhara, together with the customary presents.

The Ameer advised the Envoy to refuse the Russian demands, and that if the Ameer of Bokhara was pressed by the Russians, he would find a place of refuge in Afghan territory.

(The informant did not wait longer at Cabul, but returned to Peshawur, viâ Kuram.)

(Signed) N. CAVAGNARI, *Major*,
Deputy Commissioner.

Peshawur, May 1, 1878.

No. 162.

Mr. Plunkett to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received September* 16.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, September* 10, 1878.

NOT having yet received any reply to the note which I addressed to M. de Giers on the 26th ultimo, the day upon which he left with the Emperor for Livadia, I called upon M. Melnikoff, on the 6th instant, to inquire why I had not yet received any answer to the request of Her Majesty's Government that the Russian Mission should be withdrawn from Cabul.

I pointed out to him that in the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of the previous day there was an account of the progress of the Mission towards Cabul; that after the repeated assurances given to Her Majesty's Government, it was difficult to see what right such a Mission had to go there; and even if, as the Russian Government now tried to argue, such a step was an act of legitimate preparation in view of the then possible war with Great Britain, there could now no longer be any excuse for such a measure, after the signature of the peace of Berlin. I added that the question raised in my note was one which deeply affected the interests of Great Britain, and that I must therefore beg him to press M. de Giers for a reply.

M. de Melnikoff promised that he would immediately inform M. de Giers of my wishes. After objecting to my having quoted any extract from the unofficial portion of the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg," M. Melnikoff stated that the Foreign Department had not been aware of the dispatch of this Mission; that it had been sent by General Kauf-

mann, in the exercise of the discretion with which he is invested as Governor-General of Turkestan; and that the Foreign Department often did not know exactly where the Mission might be, except from what it learnt through the Ministry of War.

To this I replied that Central Asiatic affairs being directly under the Foreign Department, except in so far as regards military details, I could not accept this explanation, for, even if General Kaufmann had taken upon himself, without permission, such a step as to send a Mission to Afghanistan, the Foreign Department were responsible for the acts of their Agents, and might long ago have directed him to recall it.

This morning I received from M. Melnikoff the note, copy of which is herewith inclosed, informing me that M. de Giers has telegraphed to him to tell me that the answer to my note left Livadia on the 27th August, 8th September, and that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London is in possession of instructions which will enable him to furnish Her Majesty's Government with the desired explanations.

Inclosure in No. 162.

M. Melnikoff to Mr. Plunkett.

M. le Chargé d'Affaires, *Le* 28 Août / 9 Septembre, 1878.

JE n'ai pas manqué de faire parvenir à M. de Giers la communication verbale que vous avez bien voulu me transmettre le 23 de ce mois d'ordre de votre Gouvernement.

Par un télégramme que je viens de recevoir, M. de Giers me charge de vous informer que la réponse à la note que vous avez remise au sujet des affaires de l'Afghanistan sera expédiée de Livadia avec le courrier du 27 Août, et que d'ailleurs notre Chargé d'Affaires à Londres est en possession des instructions nécessaires, pour fournir au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique les explications voulues.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) MELNIKOFF.

(Translation.)

M. le Chargé d'Affaires, August 28 / September 9, 1878.

I HAVE not failed to forward to M. de Giers the verbal communication which you did me the honour to transmit to me on the 23rd instant by order of your Government.

By a telegram which I have just received, M. de Giers charges me to inform you that the reply to the note which you have delivered on the subject of the affairs of Afghanistan will be dispatched from Livadia by the messenger of the 27th August, and that, moreover, our Chargé d'Affaires in London is in possession of the necessary instructions to supply the desired explanations to Her Britannic Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) MELNIKOFF.

No. 163.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Mr. Plunkett.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 16, 1878.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 27th ultimo, reporting the steps which you had taken to bring to the knowledge of the Russian Government the contents of my despatch to you of the 19th ultimo respecting Russian military movements in the direction of Afghanistan, and the dispatch of a Russian Mission to Cabul.

I approve the note which you addressed to M. de Giers on this subject, and of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 164.

Mr. Plunkett to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received September 18.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September* 13, 1878.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 10th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship by post a copy of the note which I have

received from M. de Giers this morning, replying to the communication which, in compliance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 19th ultimo, I had addressed to him on the subject of Russian movements in the direction of Afghanistan.

While recognizing the correctness of the promises which I had cited, M. de Giers repeats what he had already stated verbally, viz., that the dispositions of the Imperial Government in Central Asia were affected by the political condition in which Russia was placed by the attitude of England during the late crisis in the East, but that now those dispositions are the same as formerly, and are not of a nature to excite the suspicions of Her Majesty's Government.

M. de Giers adds that the Mission erroneously attributed to General Abramoff is of a provisional and purely courteous character, and therefore does not clash with the assurances which I had cited; and he concludes by expressing the hope that the explanations which M. de Bartholomei has already been intrusted to furnish to your Lordship will have thrown sufficient light upon the situation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

Inclosure in No. 164.

M. de Giers to Mr. Plunkett.

M. le Chargé d'Affaires, *Livadia, le* 27 Août / 8 Septembre, 1878.

CE n'est qu'aujourd'hui que je me trouve en mesure de répondre à la note que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser en date du $\frac{14}{26}$ courant et qui m'est parvenue durant mon voyage.

Tout en reconnaissant la parfaite exactitude des citations faites dans cette pièce, je ne puis que confirmer ce que j'ai eu déjà l'honneur de vous dire, c'est que les dispositions du Gouvernement Impérial dans la question de l'Asie Centrale, dont ces citations reproduisent les témoignages, ont dû nécessairement subir le contre-coup des conditions politiques dans lesquelles l'attitude de l'Angleterre nous a placé durant la dernière crise en Orient. Mais, dans les circonstances actuelles, ces dispositions sont les mêmes que jadis, et de nature à n'inspirer aucune défiance au Gouvernement Anglais.

Je dois ajouter que la mission, qu'à tort vous attribuez au Général Abramow, est d'un caractère provisoire et de pure courtoisie; elle ne peut dès lors porter la moindre atteinte aux assurances pacifiques que vous mentionnez.

J'aime à espérer que les explications que M. Bartholomei a déjà été chargé de donner à Lord Salisbury a ce sujet auront suffisamment éclairci la situation.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) GIERS.

(Translation.)

M. le Chargé d'Affaires, *Livadia*, August 27 / September 8, 1878.

I HAVE not until to-day been able to reply to the note you did me the honour to address to me, dated the $\frac{14}{26}$th instant, which reached me during my journey.

While acknowledging the perfect accuracy of the quotations made in that document, I can only confirm what I have already had the honour of saying to you :—that the dispositions of the Imperial Government in regard to the Central Asian question of which those quotations reproduce the expression, have necessarily been affected by the political condition in which we were placed by the attitude of England during the recent crisis in the East. But, under the present circumstances, those dispositions are the same as formerly, and are not of a nature to give rise to any distrust on the part of the English Government.

I should add that the mission, which you erroneously attribute to General Abramoff, is of a provisional nature, and one of simple courtesy; it cannot, therefore, interfere in any way with the pacific assurances which you mention.

I trust that the explanations which M. Bartholomei has already been charged to give to Lord Salisbury on this subject, will have sufficiently explained the situation.

Accept, &c.
(Signed) GIERS.

No. 165.

Sir J. Pauncefote to Sir L. Mallet.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 20, 1878.

WITH reference to previous correspondence in regard to Russian military movements in Central Asia, and to the Russian Mission recently sent to Cabul, I am directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to transmit to you, for the information of Viscount Cranbrook, copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburgh, forwarding M. de Giers' reply to the representation which has been addressed to the Russian Government on this subject.*

Lord Salisbury infers from M. de Giers' note that his Excellency acknowledges that all the former assurances of the Russian Government in regard to Afghanistan have now recovered their validity.

I am, &c.
(Signed) JULIAN PAUNCEFOTE.

No. 166.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Mr. Plunkett.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 25, 1878.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 10th instant, reporting the substance of your conversation with M. Melnikoff on the subject of recent Russian proceedings in Central Asia.

I approve the language held by you on this occasion, as reported in your despatch above mentioned.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 167.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Mr. Plunkett.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 30, 1878.

IN the note from M. de Giers of the 27th August, 8th September, of which copy is inclosed in your despatch of the 13th instant, reference is made to explanations which the Russian Charge d'Affaires in London had been instructed to offer in regard to the recent proceedings of the Russian authorities in Central Asia.

The communications made by M. Bartholomei have been generally to the same effect as what has been stated by M. de Giers. He has stated that the military and political measures adopted in Turkestan were actuated by the necessities of the situation caused by the state of affairs in regard to Turkey, and were called forth especially by the attitude of Great Britain towards Russia. General Kaufmann's proceedings, he said, must therefore be regarded as the result of a course imposed upon him by the force of circumstances.

As I had spoken to M. Bartholomei of a letter from the Emperor which was supposed to have been transmitted to Shere Ali Khan, he asked the Russian Government for information on the point, and subsequently said that he was authorized to state that there had never been any question of sending such a letter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

Appendix No. 1.

CORRESPONDENCE IN 1865.

No. 1.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Russell.—(Received July 10.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 3, 1865.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship an extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg," containing a translation of that portion of Sir R. Murchison's address to the Royal Geographical Society in the month of May last which had particular reference to the progress of Russia in Central Asia.

In this article, which has no doubt emanated from Prince Gortchakow's Department, great satisfaction is expressed at the language held by Sir A. Murchison on that occasion, which, it is hoped, will tend to dispel the belief in absurd and imaginary projects of aggression on India, which, in some quarters, are still attributed to Russia.

The article further points out that it is the evident interest of Russia not to waste her resources in extending her frontiers by war, but to fix and consolidate them by peace, commerce, and industry.

This language coincides not only with the official declarations made by Prince Gortchakow, but also with expressions which I have lately heard his Excellency use, to the effect that the progress which Russia was making in Central Asia, which had excited so much suspicion, was for the purpose of acquiring, not laurels, but roubles; it was with the view of insuring the safety of the caravan trade of Russia through the Kirghese Steppes and Khokand.

It is impossible not to agree with the writer of this article when he says that at the present date the system of conquests is condemned by the science of economy, not only as unjust and immoral, but as a most detestable speculation, the advance of civilization and interchange of productions being acknowledged to be the only true source of the wealth, power, and prosperity of States.

If the future policy of Russia is in earnest and good faith to be based on such principles as these, this Empire may look forward to an era of progress and to a development of its resources far surpassing the aspirations of its most ardent well-wishers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of $\frac{\text{June } 19}{\text{July } 1}$, 1865.

LE 22 Mai dernier, la Société Royale de Géographie se réunissait à Londres, en séance annuelle, sous la présidence de l'Honorable Sir Roderick Murchison.

Un vif intérêt s'attache à ces réunions. Les sciences géographiques, partout en progrès, ne rencontrent nulle part plus d'attention qu'en Angleterre, où les immenses intérêts politiques et commerciaux du pays embrassent pour ainsi dire le monde entier. Nulle part aussi l'on n'a vu se produire une école plus nombreuse de voyageurs intrépides, d'explorateurs intelligents et de savants illustres qui, unissant la patience de l'homme de cabinet à l'énergie de l'homme d'action, apportent à leur patrie le tribut continuel et sans cesse croissant de notions pratiques sur le domaine de l'humanité. La science

les enregistre, mais le commerce et l'industrie les exploitent aussitôt comme une mine féconde, an profit de la richesse, de la puissance, et de la prospérité colossale que la nation Britannique offre à la fois à l'admiration et à l'instruction du monde.

Voilà pourquoi ces discussions scientifiques méritent également l'attention du Continent.

En passant en revue les hommes éminents qui en Angleterre se sont consacrés au progrès de eette branche importante des sciences politiques, et en analysant leurs travaux, l'Honorable Sir R. Murchison a recontré sur sa route une question qui a pour nous un intérêt direct: c'est l'appréciation, au point de vue Anglais, des derniers événements accomplis dans les régions de l'Asie Centrale voisines de l'Empire Russe.

Voici la traduction de ce passage de son discours:—

"En traitant la question des frontières de la Russie, je ne saurais m'empêcher d'attirer votre attention sur un changement partiel survenu dans une partie de ces frontières, et nommément dans celle qui se trouve entre la ligne primitive des limites de cet Empire et le Khanat de Khokand, d'autant plus que je désire prouver combien les craintes manifestées par une partie, il est vrai, bien petite de nos compatriotes, composée principalement de ceux qui dirigent la presse périodique aux Indes, sont dénuées de toute fondement. Un simple énoncé des faits et de l'immense distance qui sépare toute cette nouvelle ligne Russe du point le plus rapproché de l'Inde Anglaise ou plutôt même de Cachemir, notre tributaire, aurait dû calmer toutes ces appréhensions.

" Il faut se rappeler que bien avant le temps où l'Angleterre avait des établissements aux Indes Orientales, les Czars entretenaient un commerce avec la Chine et les Grands Khanats de Boukhara, Samarcande, etc. Depuis un temps immémorial, les caravanes traversaient les tribus nomades des Kirghises, qui ont été longtemps sous la domination Russe. Dans ces dernières années, ces relations commerciales ont été souvent empêchées par des détachements de Khokands, guerriers et maraudeurs qui, franchissant les montagnes, pillaient les caravanes et les tribus Kirghises le long de cette partie de la frontière Russe qui se trouve située entre le Fort Pérovsky sur le Sur-Darya (anciennement Iaxartes) et le grand lac d'Issikoul, qui s'étend vers la frontière Chinoise. Résolu de punir ces désordres, le Gouverneur d'Orenbourg fit abandonner aux stations de Cosaques la contrée stérile où des troupes ne pouvaient guère être maintenues, et les avança vers un pays plus fertile, contenant la ville de Tchemkend, qui fut conquise, pays qui produit le blé et l'herbe en quantité suffisante pour alimenter une ligne nouvelle de postes de Cosaques entre le Fort Pérovsky et le Lac d'Issikoul. Cette manière d'agir est conforme à la conduite adoptée par notre propre Gouvernement aux Indes, à l'égard de tous les maraudeurs sur notre frontière; mais ces faits ont donné lieu aux plus grandes exagérations, et entre autres à la nouvelle de la prise de Khokand. Or il se trouve que les dix-neuf vingtièmes du Khanat de Khokand restent dans le même état que par la passé, et j'ai entendu dire que les Russes, qui prétendaient à une partie du territoire au sud du Lac d'Issikoul, ont consenti à tracer leur frontière au milieu du lac et à abandonner au Khokand toute la partie méridionale.

"Je vondrais surtout enlever à mes compatriotes, qui n'étudient que des cartes de l'Asie à l'échelle de 100 milles au pouce, cette idée absurde que l'Empereur de Russie, en prenant pour base d'opération cette partie la plus stérile, la plus dépeuplée, et la plus éloignée de son vaste Empire, puisse avoir les moindres desseins contre l'Inde Anglaise.

" Si l'on trouvait moyen, ce que je nie, dans la connaissance que j'ai des steppes Khirghises, de faire avancer une grande armée organisée à travers les déserts de l'Oxus, vers ces parties de la Chine avec lesquelles le peuple Russe a entretenu longtemps des relations commerciales, il n'en reste pas moins vrai que l'on peut affirmer positivement que l'invasion de l'Inde Anglaise, venant de la nouvelle frontière Russe du côté de la Chine, frontière qui n'est occupée que par quelques postes de Cosaques, est une pure chimère, si ce n'est une impossibilité physique. Non-seulement toutes les parties de la nouvelle frontière Russe se trouvent séparées du Cachemir, notre tributaire, par un espace de 400 milles de large, mais de plus, cet espace contient des montagnes élevées, couvertes de neige éternelle, infranchissables, le Thian-Chan de Humboldt, qui, se reliant aux chaînes du Mustagh et du Karakoram, forme la partie orientale des montagnes immenses de l'Himalaya. Ainsi, jamais la crainte d'une invasion de l'Inde par la Russie n'a-t-elle été aussi dénuée de fondement et aussi imaginaire que celle qui a surgi à la suite d'une rectification partielle de la frontière, que nos alliés étaient parfaitement en droit d'exécuter, afin de protéger leurs tributaires et de maintenir leurs anciennes communications avec la Chine, qui leur accorde, par le Traité de Pékin, la faculté d'établir un Consul dans la partie occidentale de son territoire, à Kashgar, où Adolphe Schlagintweit fut assassiné.

"Je retourne aux sujets de pure géographie, après cette digression à laquelle je me suis livré dans le désir sincère de contribuer à rétablir sur une base solide les relations de bonne amitié qui ont heureusement existé pendant des siècles entre la Russie et l'Angleterre, et dont j'ai eu l'occasion de recueillir personnellement bien des preuves."

C'est avec une véritable satisfaction que nous portons à la connaissance de nos lecteurs ce langage loyal et vrai. La question qu'abordait Sir Roderick Murchison était rendue délicate par les préventions enracinées dans l'esprit d'une partie de ses auditeurs et entretenues par la presse avec une aveugle obstination. Il était difficile à un orateur Anglais, parlant à un public Anglais, de s'exprimer avec plus d'impartialité, de bon sens, et de justice. Son témoignage est d'une grande valeur. Personne ne contestera en Angleterre ni l'honorabilité de son caractère, ni l'autorité de sa parole, ni le patriotisme avec lequel il a consacré sa vie à des travaux scientifiques éminemment utiles à son pays. Mais sa pensée s'est élevée à ces hauteurs où l'impartialité devient un culte, et où l'on ne croit pas pouvoir rendre un meilleur service à ses concitoyens que de leur faire entendre la voix de la raison et la vérité.

Sir R. Murchison savait qu'il allait à l'encontre de préjugés invétérés. Il a dû, par conséquent, leur parler le seul langage à leur portée, celui des faits. Il aurait pu sans cela y ajouter des considérations morales dont l'évidence est tout aussi certaine.

Le monde politique subit chaque jour des transformations non moins considérables que celui des idées.

Il y a un siècle, les peuples se faisaient des guerres acharnées pour ce qu'on appelait le système Colonial. Aucun ne croyait pouvoir se passer de cet appendice indispensable afin d'avoir à bon compte les denrées Coloniales et les matières premières qui alimentaient le commerce et l'industrie. On s'est ruiné en luttes formidables à la poursuite de ces richesses imaginaires. L'Angleterre s'est battue pendant des années pour conserver ses Colonies de l'Amérique dont l'émancipation semblait devoir causer sa ruine, et dix années ne s'étaient pas écoulées depuis leur emancipation que son commerce avec les Etats-Unis avait décuplé.

Aujourd'hui elle n'envisage les Colonies qu'elle sème sur tous les points du globe que comme des fruits qu'elle cultive, qu'elle développe, et qu'elle laisse tomber de l'arbre lorsqu'ils sont mûrs. Il y a cinquante ans on se battait pour l'Empire des Indes, et les ennemis de l'Angleterre ne croyaient pas pouvoir l'atteindre d'une manière plus sensible qu'en la frappant dans cette source présumée de sa puissance. Aujourd'hui les Indes ont secouru l'Europe dans un moment de crise considérable en produisant du coton, et il n'y a pas un homme sensé qui ne comprenne qu'en civilisant ces contrées et en mettant en valeur les richesses de leur climat, l'Angleterre rend le plus grand service à tout le monde. Aujourd'hui le système des conquêtes est condamné par la science économique non-seulement comme injuste et immoral, mais encore comme la plus détestable spéculation. Les progrès de la civilisation, de la production, et des échanges sont reconnus comme la seule vraie source des richesses, de la puissance, et de la prospérité des Etats.

En présence de ces révolutions dans les idées, n'est-il pas étrange de voir persister obstinément des préventions et des préjugés d'une autre époque?

Sir R. Murchison n'a guère parlé que des obstacles matériels pour démontrer l'absurdité des projets d'aggression attribués à la Russie contre l'Empire Britannique des Indes. Il aurait pu ajouter la distance morale qui les sépare plus encore que la distance géographique, et l'intérêt évident qu'a la Russie, non pas à étendre ses frontières par la guerre, mais à les fixer, à les consolider par la paix, le commerce, et l'industrie.

Nous irons même plus loin et nous dirons que les esprits retardataires qui, en Angleterre, voudraient parler aujourd'hui le langage d'il y a un demi-siècle, et donner pour base à la politique que tout Etat doit chercher son bien dans le mal d'autrui, manquent entièrement de logique en signalant d'avance les projets ambitieux de la Russie. Ils devraient au contraire l'encourager à s'immiscer dans les querelles des Etats de l'Asie Centrale, à étendre sur eux son influence et sa domination, à entrer enfin dans cette voie indéfinie d'empiétements, d'annexions, de luttes, et de conquêtes à laquelle elle a hautement et irrévocablement renoncé, dans la conviction qu'elle n'a rien à gagner à gaspiller—dans ces aventures lointaines et stériles—des forces et des ressources dont elle a un emploi plus utile à faire sur son propre sol.

Tout cela est d'une telle évidence qu'on est surpris de voir des préventions aussi absurdes trouver encore du crédit chez un peuple aussi pratique que le peuple Anglais.

Nous n'en devons que plus de reconnaissance à Sir Roderick Murchison d'avoir protesté contre ces préjugés illogiques. Le vœu par lequel il a terminé, celui de voir se consolider sur une base solide et durable les relations de bonne amitié qui ont existé pendant des siècles entre la Russie et l'Angleterre, est trop conforme à nos propres convictions pour

que nous n'y applaudissions pas de toutes nos forces. Le meilleur moyen d'y arriver est assurément de rendre, comme il l'a fait, un loyal hommage à la vérité.

No. 2.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Russell.—(Received July 24.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July 19, 1865.*

I TOOK an opportunity yesterday of asking M. de Westmann what truth there was in a report which had reached me that the Russian army in the desert of Khokan was preparing to advance to Kashgar and Yarkand.

M. de Westmann said he should be greatly surprised to learn that any such movement was in contemplation; without having a full knowledge of the details of what was going on in Central Asia, he was sufficiently acquainted with the salient features of the policy of his Government in that country to state that such a movement would be in direct contradiction with the views of the Emperor. Any further advance in that direction would necessitate very great expense without any corresponding advantage.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

No. 3.

Earl Russell to Mr. Lumley.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 31, 1865.*

I HAVE received your despatch of the 3rd instant, inclosing an extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" containing observations on that part of Sir R. Murchison's address to the Royal Geographical Society which had reference to the progress of Russia in Central Asia.

I have to observe that Her Majesty's Government share completely the sentiments of Sir R. Murchison, and are glad to think that the article in the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of the 1st July expresses those of the Russian Government.

Still there are circumstances in the present situation of the British and Russian Empires which might give rise to anxiety, and Her Majesty's Government being fully persuaded of the friendly and pacific sentiments of the Emperor of Russia are desirous to remove every cause of danger which might threaten the future good understanding of England and Russia.

Her Majesty's Government consider it would be useful for this end if the two Powers were to make friendly explanations to each other, based on the present state of affairs.

Her Majesty's Government on their part are determined to respect the present state of possession in Central Asia. Her Majesty's Government will also respect the independence of the Persian Monarchy, will be careful not to encroach upon the territory of Persia, and will act in such a manner as may best support and strengthen the sovereignty of the Shah.

If His Majesty the Emperor of Russia will be prepared to make analogous declarations, Her Majesty's Government think that without the formality of a Convention an exchange of notes might take place which would tend to settle the minds of the inhabitants of Central Asia, and prevent misunderstandings, thereby affording a fresh security for the maintenance of peace between the two Empires.

You will read this despatch to Prince Gortchakow, and you will furnish his Excellency with a copy of it.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 4.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Russell.—(*Received August* 4.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July* 23, 1865.

ON the receipt of your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the 20th instant, referring to the rumour of a Treaty respecting the territory of Khokand concluded between Russia and Bokhara, I applied to a source which, though not favourable to Russia, was likely to afford reliable information on the subject.

From that quarter I learned that nothing was known of such a Treaty, and it was considered very improbable that Russia should bind herself to a man of such proverbial bad faith as the present Ameer of Bokhara for the partition of a territory of which she was well able to take entire possession if it suited her policy to do so.

On Saturday, the 21st instant, I happened to meet M. Stremoouchoff, the Director of the Asiatic Department, on his way to Peterhoff to see Prince Gortchakow, and who, of his own accord, spoke to me of this report.

He said that Russia knew too well how unsatisfactory it was to have dealings with the Khans of Central Asia to think of concluding a Treaty with the Ameer of Bokhara for that or any other purpose; it was worse than useless to enter into engagements with a barbarian who was certain to break them as soon as it suited his convenience, and who could not be punished for his breach of faith without great invonvenience and expense.

Nevertheless, he said, Russia is naturally desirous of turning to the best advantage the progress she has made in Central Asia. A regular post-route is now opened to the furthest point occupied by Russian troops, and the new Governor-General of Arenburg, General Kryjanovsky, has been instructed to conclude certain arrangements with the Ameer of Bokhara for the benefit of the commerce of the two countries, and if the Ameer does not agree to these regulations or infringes them, we have the means of making him amenable to reason by stopping his trade.

M. Stremoouchoff stated further that the Russian Government hoped at no distant period, without occupying Tashkend, to make that place the great entrepôt for Russian commerce with Central Asia.

The position of Tashkend no doubt greatly favours such a project, as steamers can approach it up the Sir Daria to within thirty miles, and it is natural enough to suppose that the Russian troops may take up and fortify a safe position close to that city, which would enable them to overawe it without incurring the risk which would attend the occupation of a large place like Tashkend with a comparatively small force.

As M. Stremoouchoff's observations agreed with information I had received from other quarters, and as I knew Prince Gortchakow would have referred me to him if I had spoken to his Excellency with reference to the rumoured Treaty with Bokhara, I did not mention the subject to the Vice-Chancellor. I had already obtained all the official information I was likely to get, and I did not think it advisable to show too much anxiety with reference to the report.

Prince Gortchakow himself, however, referring to the subjects on which I had spoken to M. de Westmann, as reported in despatches forwarded to your Lordship by the last messenger, said: "I hear from Baron Brunnow that you will be instructed to ask for amicable explanations as to our movements in Central Asia. My reply in that case will also be amicable, but your Government really appears to attach too much importance to the question."

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

No. 5.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Russell.—(*Received August* 4.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, July* 23, 1865.

WITH reference to the report communicated to your Lordship in Mr. Alison's despatch of the 1st instant of a rumoured advance of the Russian force in Khokand on Kashgar and Yarkand, and to my despatch of the 19th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I have had an opportunity of conversing with the Director of the Asiatic Department on the subject of that report. M. Stremoouchoff said that it argued very little knowledge of geography to suppose such a movement to be possible,

since an army invading Kashgar would have to cross three tremendous chains of mountains, to say nothing of the deserts it would have to traverse.

With reference to this observation, I find the following note in Mr. Davies' Report on the trade and resources of the countries on the north-western boundary of British India:—

"From Bashkarwal, the last post (No. 22) on the western slopes of the Kaksal Mountains (which divide Khokand from Kashgar), the road lies in a dreary desert, with no habitations, no water, no grass.

"There is a spring of water at No. 23 (Karawal Mingyal). On the arrival of a caravan at this place, supplies are brought from Kashgar. The name Mingyal, which means 1,000 kos, indicates the distress and hardship which travellers experience on this line from want of water, &c."

So that, without assistance from Kashgar, not even a friendly caravan could reach that city,

Mr. Davies mentions further that a portion of the hilly country on the west of the Province of Kashgar, together with the valley of Birutukka and Ortagh, are now in the possession of Khokand. Should it, therefore, be within the designs of the Russian Government to extend their authority over the whole of the Khanate of Khokand, it is not impossible that Russian troops might still advance in the direction indicated in the report communicated to your Lordship by Mr. Alison, without having the intention of invading Kashgar and Yarkand.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

No. 6.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Russell.—(Received August 20.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August 10, 1865.*

ON the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 31st ultimo, which was delivered to me by Mr. Stephens, Prince Gortchakow being at Peterhoff, I asked by telegraph for an interview with his Excellency.

The Vice-Chancellor, who gave me an appointment for to-day, sent his carriage to meet me, and received me the instant I arrived.

I was proceeding to read your Lordship's despatch to Prince Gortchakow, when his Excellency asked me to let him read it himself, which he did aloud. At the conclusion he said he was very glad to receive these friendly assurances on the part of Her Majesty's Government, which would give great satisfaction to the Emperor, who was always glad when any opportunity offered of improving and drawing closer together the bonds of amity which existed between the two countries; nor should he have any difficulty in replying to them in a similar tone as regarded the substance of this communication, though there might be some as to the form or *rédaction* in which that reply should be drawn up.

His Excellency said, however, that he did not exactly understand what object your Lordship had in view in desiring this interchange of declarations; as a practical man, he did not see what was to be gained by it.

As regarded the policy of Russia in Central Asia, the Emperor's views had been publicly announced, and even published; they were to the effect that Russia desires no extension of territory in that country: what she does desire is a peaceful and settled state of affairs on her Turkestan frontier, such as will enable her to open a safe road for commerce to Kashgar, not for Russia alone, but for the whole world.

There would be no difficulty, Prince Gortchakow continued, in making such a statement as that proposed by Her Majesty's Government with regard to the present state of possession in Central Asia, were it not for the behaviour of the Khan of Bokhara, who had already entered and taken possession of some portion of the territory of Khokand; an intimation of a hostile nature had also been received by General Tchernaieff from the Khan of Bokhara, and it was difficult to say what might arise from the action of the barbarous leaders of the hordes of Bokhara, who seemed prepared to overrun the neighbouring Khanate. This Russia could never tolerate, and measures had been taken, by laying an embargo on the trade of Bokhara, which it was hoped would have the effect of compelling the Ameer to withdraw from the territory of Khokand.

With regard to your Lordship's declaration that Her Majesty's Government will respect the independence and territory of Persia and uphold the sovereignty of the Shah,

his Excellency said he could not understand the connection between Central Asia and the Persian Monarchy which had induced your Lordship to make this declaration.

The declaration itself was of a very satisfactory nature, and one which was quite in accordance with the views of the Imperial Government, but, while receiving it with pleasure, he must say that he had never suspected Her Majesty's Government of any intention of encroaching upon the territory of the Shah.

In conclusion, his Excellency repeated that, although he felt no difficulty in replying to your Lordship as regarded the *fond* of your proposition, he felt somewhat embarrassed as to the *forme* in which it should be made; he would, however, think over how this was to be done, and, as was usual in similar cases, his reply would be conveyed to your Lordship through Baron Brunnow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

No. 7.

Prince Gortchakow to Baron Brunnow.—(Communicated to Earl Russell by Baron Brunnow.)

M. le Baron, *Péterhoff, le 5 Août*, 1865.

JE crois utile d'appeler l'attention de votre Excellence sur un incident.

Depuis longtemps l'Emir de Boukhara convoite le Khokand et Taschkend. Il aura cru le moment favorable pour réaliser ses convoitises à cet effet, ses troupes se sont mises en mouvement dans deux directions. Leurs Commandants ont adressé au Général Tchernaieff une sommation insolente. Nous ne pouvons admettre ni ce langage ni les prétentions de l'Emir. S'il persiste, un conflit est inévitable. Céder serait anéanter l'influence qui nous appartient dans ces parages et que nous ne tenons à exercer que dans un intérêt commercial et dans un esprit de civilisation. Cet incident n'entrait pas dans nos prévisions immédiates. Il ne modifie pas la détermination de l'Empereur de s'abstenir de conquêtes inutiles pour la grandeur de la Russie. Mais il peut introduire dans l'application des principes que nous poursuivons des atermoiements et des modalités indépendants de notre volonté. Si nous sommes contraires à tout agrandissement territorial, nous sommes décidés à poursuivre le but de la sécurité de nos frontières et de l'établissement de relations commerciales solides et regulières. Nous aimons à croire qu'aucune instigation étrangère n'a suggéré à l'Emir cette levée de boucliers, et qu'il ne s'y est aventuré qu'en vue du chiffre peu élevé de notre détachement dans ces parages et des troubles qui ont éclaté.

Quoiqu'il en soit, nous avons été mis en présence d'un état de choses que nous n'avons ni désiré ni amené. Si l'Emir ne se ravise pas, il faudra procéder à son châtiment. C'est une vérité banale pour les Anglais qui ont l'expérience des affaires de l'Orient. Sinon, toute chance d'amener dans ces pays sauvages un ordre régulier quelconque serait étouffé dans son germe et ferait place à une situation intolérable.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) GORTCHAKOW.

(Translation.)

M. le Baron, *Peterhof, August* 5, 1865.

I THINK it desirable to call your Excellency's attention to an incident.

For a long time the Emir of Bokhara has coveted Khokand and Tashkend. He seems to have thought the moment favourable for the realisation of his desires in this respect, and his troops have been put in motion in two directions. Their Commanders have addressed to General Tchernaieff an insolent summons. We cannot submit either to this language or to the Emir's pretensions. If he persists, a conflict is inevitable. To yield would be the destruction of the influence which we possess in those countries, and which we are only anxious to exercise in a commercial interest and in a spirit of civilisation. This incident did not enter into our immediate expectations. It does not modify the determination of the Emperor to abstain from conquests which do not contribute to the greatness of Russia. But it may produce in the application of the principles which we follow delays and modifications independent of our wishes. While we are opposed to any territorial aggrandisement, we are determined to pursue the object of securing our frontiers and establishing solid and regular commercial relations. We trust and believe that no foreign instigation has suggested to the Emir this recourse to arms, and that he has only ventured on it in view of the small size of our detachment in those countries, and of the disturbances which have broken out.

However this may be, we have been placed in presence of a state of affairs which we have neither desired nor occasioned. If the Emir does not change his mind, we must take steps for his chastisement. That is a commonplace truth for Englishmen who have an experience of Eastern affairs. Otherwise all chance of bringing about in those wild countries any kind of regular order would be nipped in the bud, and would be replaced by an intolerable state of affairs.

I remain, &c.
(Signed) GORTCHAKOW.

No. 8.

Prince Gortchakow to Baron Brunnow.—(Communicated to Earl Russell by Baron Brunnow.)

M. le Baron, *Péterhof, le 5 Août,* 1865.

J'AI l'honneur de transmettre à votre Excellence copie d'une dépêche de M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique que nous a communiquée M. le Chargé d'Affaires d'Angleterre.

Notre auguste Maître y a surtout relevé le désir témoigné par Lord Russell de consolider les bonnes relations qui nous unissent au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Ce vœu répond trop bien aux sentiments de l'Empereur pour ne pas rencontrer l'entière adhésion de Sa Majesté Impériale.

M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique exprime l'opinion qu'une explication franche et amicale, sur les vues respectives des deux Gouvernements, relativement à l'Asie Centrale, pourrait contribuer à ce résultat. Son Excellence a indiqué à cet effet les principes que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine Victoria est disposé à prendre pour règle dans ses rapports avec les Etats de cette partie du monde. Ceux qui président à la politique de notre auguste Maître ont déjà été communiqués par votre Excellence à M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Vous pouvez réitérer à Lord Russell l'assurance que nous n'avons dans l'Asie Centrale qu'un seul intérêt, celui du repos, de la sécurité de nos frontières, de l'établissement et du développement de relations commerciales et pacifiques avec nos voisins, dont nous ne serions pas les seuls à profiter. Nous ne poursuivons pas d'autre but; mais nous y attachons une juste importance et nous travaillerons avec persévérance à l'atteindre.

Si M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique vous témoigne le désir d'avoir une copie de la présente dépêche, vous pouvez la laisser entre ses mains.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) GORTCHAKOW.

(Translation.)

M. le Baron, *Peterhof, August* 5, 1865.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency copy of a despatch from the Principal Secretary of State of Her Britannic Majesty which has been communicated to us by the English Chargé d'Affaires.

Our august Master has noticed in it particularly the desire evinced by Lord Russell to consolidate the good relations which exist between us and Her Britannic Majesty's Government.

Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State expresses the opinion that a frank and friendly explanation on the respective views of the two Governments with regard to Central Asia might contribute to this result. For this purpose his Excellency has stated the principles which the Government of Her Majesty Queen Victoria are disposed to take for their guidance in their relations with the States of that part of the world. Those which influence the policy of our august Master have already been communicated by your Excellency to Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State.

You may repeat to Lord Russell the assurance that we have in Central Asia only one interest, that of the repose and security of our frontiers, of the establishment and development of commercial and pacific relations with our neighbours, by which we shall not be the only ones to profit. We pursue no other object, but we attach to it great importance, and we will work perseveringly for its attainment.

If Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State expresses to you a desire to have a copy of this despatch, you may leave it in his hands.

I remain, &c.
(Signed) GORTCHAKOW.

No. 9.

Earl Russell to Sir A. Buchanan.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 16, 1865.

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to thank Prince Gortchakow for the friendly answer which he has given to my despatch of the 31st July, and for the assurances it contains of a wish to consolidate the amicable relations which now exist between the two countries.

In this despatch, of which I inclose a copy,* after referring to a Circular which was communicated to Her Majesty's Government,† his Excellency desires Baron Brunnow to repeat the assurance that the Russian Government has in Central Asia no other interest than that of repose, of the security of the Russian frontiers, and of the establishment of commercial and pacific relations with their neighbours, by which Russia will not profit alone.

These assurances are satisfactory, but it would have given Her Majesty's Government still greater confidence if Prince Gortchakow had replied to the declaration of the views of Her Majesty's Government by a similar declaration.

Her Majesty's Government, however, are willing to accept the explanation of the principles which guide the policy of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, contained in the Circular already referred to, and are quite ready to believe that legitimate desires for the extension of commerce, and the security of the Russian frontiers, and no wish for territorial aggrandizement guide the proceedings of the Government of Russia.

Such an extension of commerce, and the security of the Russian frontiers, will no doubt tend to the advantage of other nations who carry on trade with Central Asia, and of none more than Great Britain.

You may leave a copy of this despatch with Prince Gortchakow.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 10.

Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell.—(Received September 18.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September* 12, 1865.

I CALLED on Prince Gortchakow on Sunday the 3rd instant, the day after my return to St. Petersburgh, to acquaint his Excellency with my arrival, when he spoke to me of the correspondence which had just taken place between the two Governments on the subject of Central Asia.

I said that, as I had only arrived the previous evening and was then on my way from church, I had not had time to make myself acquainted with Mr. Lumley's correspondence with Her Majesty's Government; but that I had seen Baron Brunnow at the Foreign Office, as I passed through London, the day on which he communicated to Mr. Layard his Excellency's answer to your Lordship's despatch of the 31st July last, and that from a hurried perusal of it on that occasion I feared it would not be considered sufficiently explicit to meet your Lordship's wishes, or to remove the apprehensions of those persons in England who look with suspicion on the proceedings of Russia in Central Asia, and who would doubtless attach importance to his Excellency having omitted to respond to the declaration respecting Persia contained in your Lordship's despatch.

Prince Gortchakow answered, he could not believe that an unfavourable interpretation would be given to that omission, as it was impossible for any one acquainted with the policy of the Imperial Government to suspect it of designs against the independence of the Persian Monarchy, and as he had, therefore, considered your Lordship's reference to Persia merely intended to give to the Russian Government the same assurances on the part of Her Majesty's Government with respect to that Asiatic State, which they wished to receive from them respecting the Khanats of Central Asia, he had considered it unnecessary to instruct Baron Brunnow to speak of the policy of the Emperor with regard to Persia, because Her Majesty's Government could not doubt the desire of His Imperial Majesty to promote the independence and prosperity of that Monarchy.

This consideration alone had prompted his silence on the subject, and had induced him to expunge from the original draft of his despatch to Baron Brunnow a paragraph,

* No. 8. † For this Circular see "Central Asia, No. 2 (1873)," Appendix,

which, after alluding to the friendly conduct of Russia towards Persia, expressed the satisfaction of the Emperor at learning from your Lordship's despatch that the policy of Her Majesty's Government towards that Monarchy was based upon principles entirely in accordance with his own. His Excellency, having then sent for the draft, read the paragraph in question, and as I expressed my regret that he had thought it advisable to omit it in the text of the despatch, he replied that if it would afford any satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government to receive confidential assurances from the Russian Ambassador in London, of the firm intention of the Emperor to respect the independence and integrity of Persia, and to promote the interests of the Shah, Baron Brunnow would be instructed to give such assurances to your Lordship, on being asked for them.

Prince Gortchakow, without exactly saying so, seemed to consider that your Lordship entertained unjust suspicions of the honesty of Russian policy towards Persia, and I have since learnt that he has expressed this feeling to other persons. I have, therefore, said to him that as I had not seen your Lordship before I left England, I could not pretend to explain more fully than your despatch itself, the sentiments under which it was written, but that I could only see in it a desire to establish a friendly understanding between the two Governments, as to their future policy with respect to the countries which separate the two empires, and to impress upon the Rulers of those countries that they must not expect to advance their own ambitious designs through the mutual jealousies of the British and Russian Governments.

I understand from his Excellency that he has reported our conversation to Baron Brunnow, and that he has authorized him to address a communication to your Lordship respecting Persia, in conformity with the language which he has held to me.

I think it right, however, to add that, in speaking of the friendly conduct of Russia towards that country, he alluded to the Turkomans as pirates, who were not subjects of the Shah, and whose depredations against Russian commerce it was necessary for the Imperial military and naval authorities to repress and punish.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 11.

Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell.—(Received September 18.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September 12, 1865.*

AT an interview yesterday with Prince Gortchakow I asked his Excellency for some information respecting the relations of the Imperial Government with Bokhara, and he stated that the measures lately adopted against the commerce of that country had induced the Khan to suspend his military operations in Khokand, and to offer to send a Diplomatic Agent to St. Petersburgh.

The Imperial Government had, however, he said, declined to receive a Bokharian Envoy here, and had informed the Khan that all future negotiations between the two Governments must be conducted through the Governor-General of Orenburg.

He said no good had ever resulted from such missions to St. Petersburgh, and he intended, therefore, to adopt the system of Her Majesty's Government in their dealings with Asiatic Princes, with whom negotiations are carried on through the Viceroy of India.

It was also the intention of the Imperial Government to insist on the Bokharian troops being withdrawn from the Khokanese territory, and on Tashkend being declared an independent town.

In answer to my inquiries he stated that the towns of Khokand and Kodjend were now occupied by the Bokharians, whose forces were represented to amount to 40,000 men, which was, doubtless, he said, an exaggerated statement, while those of Russia in Turkestan did not exceed 5,000 men.

I rejoined that the strength of the latter, however, would probably be increased in consequence of late events, and his Excellency replied that only 800 men had been sent to reinforce them.

I then asked whether Russia had at present a factory or a Consul at Kashgar or Yarkand, and his Excellency replied he believed not. He said he personally disapproved of establishing permanent commercial agents in these remote and barbarous countries, and he had, therefore, opposed a proposal to send a Consul to Bokhara, on the ground that such an Agent would not be safe without a regiment to protect him.

It was, therefore, more expedient, he added, that the Chiefs of the caravans which periodically traversed these countries should be themselves the ordinary organs of communication with the local authorities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 12.

Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell.—(Received September 18.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September 14, 1865.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 12th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Emperor was pleased to speak to me of the correspondence which has recently taken place between the two Governments respecting Central Asia, at the audience which His Imperial Majesty granted to me on my return to St. Petersburgh, and he stated that I might assure your Lordship that his Government had no ambitious designs in that quarter of the world, and that their language on the subject was entirely free from reservation or "arrières pensées."

His Majesty said that his Empire was already sufficiently large, and that his sole policy in Central Asia was to encourage commerce and civilization. But that in following this object, it was of course impossible to prevent collisions occurring from time to time between his troops and the inhabitants of these distant and barbarous countries.

His Majesty held much the same language to me as Prince Gortchakow, and as he also explained in the same manner the omission of any reference in the Prince's despatch to the policy of Russia with respect to Persia.

I replied that I had already expressed my regret to Prince Gortchakow at that omission, and that I could only repeat it to His Majesty. The Emperor said that Baron Brunnow had, however, been instructed to give your Lordship satisfactory assurances on the subject, though he could not understand, unless it was merely to meet Parliamentary inquiries, why your Lordship should desire them. In replying to these observations I used the same language which I had held to Prince Gortchakow, and stated that without having received any further explanations of the views of Her Majesty's Government than were to be found in your Lordship's despatch of the 31st July last, it appeared to me that your Lordship's object was to establish an understanding between the two Governments with respect to the States of Central Asia, which would conduce to the future tranquillity and welfare of these countries, and satisfy their Rulers that they had nothing to gain from the mutual jealousies of Great Britain and Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 13.

Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell.—(Received October 16.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 9, 1865.*

I LEARN from Prince Gortchakow that the Governor-General of Orenburg is now at Tashkend, and that he is instructed to confer there with the Bokharian Envoy whom the Khan had proposed to send to St. Petersburgh.

The negotiator in question was sent to St. Petersburgh on a former occasion, and is said to be a sensible person; but Prince Gortchakow, as I have already informed your Lordship, has declined receiving him here, and is of opinion that a negotiation with the Khan of Bokhara will be of little value unless carried on near the frontiers of his Principality.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 14.

Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell.—(Received October 16.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 11, 1865.*

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW will dispatch a messenger to London to-morrow, who will be the bearer of instructions to Baron Brunnow on the subject of the policy of Russia with respect to Central Asia and to Persia,* which will, I trust, prove satisfactory to your Lordship and to Her Majesty's Government.

Although the form of Prince Gortchakow's declaration is not so formal and binding as that which your Lordship invited, it, at all events, gives an assurance that Russia has only commercial objects in Central Asia, and that she will respect the independence of Afghanistan, and that, in common with Great Britain, she will support the Persian Monarchy.

Under present circumstances this assurance may, I presume, be considered satisfactory; and with regard to the eventualities of the distant future, it would perhaps be rash to expect that any declaration, however honest and however formal, Prince Gortchakow might give, would indefinitely restrain this nation from seeking to follow out what many Russians are believed to consider the mission of Russia in the East.

In speaking to me on the subject his Excellency said that Baron Brunnow cannot declare too positively to Lord Russell that all the Russian Government seek in Central Asia is to establish secure caravan routes towards the East, and that with respect to their present measures, they consider it necessary, in order to effect this, that Khohand and Tashkend shall be assisted to maintain their independence of Bokhara.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 15.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 11.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 6, 1865.*

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW has again expressed to me his satisfaction with the reports which he has recently received from Baron Brunnow of his conversations with your Lordship, and he said he trusted the two Governments may be able to carry out in practice the good understanding which he believes to exist between them in theory.

He represented their policy and interests to be the same in all questions of present importance.

England, he said, desires to promote the maintenance of peace and of the present balance of power in Europe, and so does Russia. England likewise desires to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire, but at the same time to secure the Christian subjects of the Sultan against oppression, and so does Russia.

The policy and interests of the two Governments in Europe and in Turkey being, therefore, identical, would it not, he asked, be wise and prudent were they to act together in endeavouring to carry out, by moral influence, their common objects, and to guard against eventualities which may arise at no distant future, of a nature to disturb the balance of power in Europe, or endanger the existence of the Sultan's Empire.

The position of Russia in Central Asia, he said, ought not to be a cause of difference between them, and he trusted that any misgivings which may have been felt in England respecting the late military operations in Turkestan, will have been removed by the explanations which have already been given to Her Majesty's Government, and by the despatches of General Kryjanoffsky which have just been published.

The Governor-General of Orenburg was, he added, as convinced as he was himself of the impolicy of extending the frontiers of Russia towards the East, and General Tchernaieff had recieved orders to return for the present to St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

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* There is no official record of these instructions having been communicated.

Appendix No. 2.

CORRESPONDENCE: 1870-73.

No. 1.

Mr. Melvill to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received August* 3.)

Sir, *India Office, August* 2, 1870.

I AM directed by the Duke of Argyll to forward, for the information of Earl Granville, copy of a despatch recently received from India, dated 24th June, 1870, with inclosed papers, relative to a letter addressed by General Von Kaufmann, the Russian Governor of Turkestan, to the Ameer of Cabul.

I am, &c.
(Signed) JAMES MELVILL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Duke of Argyll.

My Lord Duke, *Simla, June* 24, 1870.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the papers relative to a letter addressed by General von Kaufmann, the Russian Governer-General of Turkestan, to His Highness the Ameer of Cabul.

2. From the Diary of the British Agent at Cabul, ending the 16th May, 1870, your Grace will have been informed of the receipt at Cabul of this letter in Russian, English, and Persian, from General von Kaufmann, and of the difficulty felt by the Ameer in understanding the Persian triplicate, written in an idiom strange to him. The English version was translated into Persian by Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan (a son of the Ameer), but very imperfectly. The Ameer, misunderstanding the purport of the communication from General von Kaufmann, was apparently much disquieted, and forwarded the documents to the Viceroy, with a request that he might be favoured with a translation of the Russian letter into Persian, and that the Viceroy would suggest to him such an answer as might be considered appropriate and advisable.

3. We have been able to obtain a translation of the Russian original, and have transmitted English and Persian versions of it to the Ameer.

4. The original letter in Russian, with the English and Persian versions, have been returned to Cabul, but a photographed copy of the Russian original accompanies this, and also a four-columned paper containing copy of the first translation into French, with the English duplicate, and translations of the two Persian, which, for the purpose of comparison, we have printed side by side.

5. General Von Kaufmann's communication appears to us to be the result of the instructions which, as reported in your Secretary's Secret letter, dated 6th May, 1870, the Court of St. Petersburgh had determined to send to Tashkend, viz., that General von Kaufmann should make it known everywhere in Central Asia that a perfect understanding exists between the Governments of Great Britain and Russia with reference to the affairs and interests of those countries. In answering the Ameer's letter we have taken the opportunity to explain to him the repeated assurances we have received from the Russian Government of their determination to pursue a peaceful policy in Central Asia. We have also informed him that the letters addressed to him by General

von Kaufmann, containing as they do a renewed expression of this policy to the Ameer himself, will doubtless be, when rightly viewed, a source of satisfaction and an additional ground of confidence to His Highness that, so long as he continues the course he has so happily followed since his meeting with the Viceroy at Umballa, it is most unlikely that his territories will be disturbed by Russia, or by any tribe or State which may be influenced by the officers of the Emperor.

6. We beg to refer to the Viceroy's reply to the Ameer for a full expression of our sentiments. A copy in print is inclosed, but the original was sent as usual in manuscript.

We have, &c.
(Signed) MAYO.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
JOHN STRACHEY.
R. TEMPLE.
J. F. STEPHEN.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Major Pollock to Mr. Thornton.

Peshawur, May 26, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to submit Cabul Diary (translation) from the 16th to the 19th instant.

2. Also a letter and inclosures received with the diary to the address of his Excellency the Viceroy.

3. With the above came a forwarding letter from His Highness the Ameer to my address, and one from the Cabul Agent, to the effect that the Ameer was much troubled at the receipt of the letters from the Russian authorities at Tashkend, for the following reasons :—

1st.—What reasons can the Russians have for writing letters in a friendly strain to a State which has already friendly relations with the British Government?

2nd.—Having seated amongst them one of our enemies ("muanid"), why should they write pointing out the fact?

3rd.—What is the meaning of their writing that Asia has no boundaries?

4th.—What do they mean by saying, as a reason for our establishing permanent friendly relations with them, that up to the present time they have had no occasion to be angry with me?

5th.—What do they mean by asking for a reply agreeably to their aims ("mafik apné neeut ké")?

There is room for apprehension, for the King of Bokhara has already submitted himself to, or become a dependent of, Russia, and it would not be surprising to find Russian officials establishing themselves on the actual border of Afghanistan. If (which God forbid) they should so establish themselves on the actual border and harbour our enemies, what hope is there of the borders of Turkestan, Balkh, and Herat remaining on a satisfactory footing without full ("kamil") arrangements being made, and it is impossible that such complete measure can be carried out for the protection of these borders without the help and assistance of the British Government, with which the Afghan Kingdom is allied ("muta ahid"). The Ameer also feels anxiety as to what may have been said by Russia to the British Ambassador at her Court as to her meaning and intention in writing such letters, or what the Ambassador may have learnt as to such intentions, or what action may have been taken, or be about to be taken, by the British Government in the matter. The Ameer defers replying to the letters, meaning to be guided entirely by the wishes and counsels of the British Government. A duplicate set of these letters has to-day reached the Ameer, received through the Meer of Samarcand and the Turkestan officials; the duplicates have been kept at Cabul, and the Ameer's apprehensions have been further aroused by the receipt of the duplicate letters; he wonders why they should be at such trouble in the matter.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Mr. Thornton to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

Murree, May 28, 1870.

WITH reference to letter, dated 26th May, from the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Peshawur Division, of which copy has been forwarded by Major Pollock direct to the Foreign Department, I am desired by the Honourable the Lieutenant-General to forward, in original, the several papers alluded to in the 2nd paragraph of the Commissioner's letter, together with a translation of that addressed to his Excellency the Viceroy by His Highness the Ameer of Cabul.

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

The Ameer of Cabul to the Viceroy of India.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.)

A LETTER has been received from Van Kauf Sahib, the Governor-General of the Russian territory, from the Turkestan direction, and through the Agency of the King of Bokhara, containing references to the concerns of your Excellency's Government.

The letter was written in three different languages, and, since friendly relations exist between us and the British Government, exalted States, and it is advisable to inform your Excellency of all news and information of such a nature, the originals of all the letters (which are in Russian, English, and Persian) have been herewith sent to you.

The translation of the English letter was made by Sirdar Mahomed Yakob Khan, well-beloved and virtuous, the light of my eyes, and the Government translators.

By the favour of God, the letters above-mentioned will reach his Excellency, who, from their perusal, may acquire full information.

Do me the favour to obtain the translation of the Russian letter into Persian, and also I beg that such an answer as may by you be considered appropriate and advisable may be forwarded to me, with a translation into the Russian language, for transmission to the Russian General, who desires an answer.

May your Excellency remember me with favour and honour, and send me news of your welfare.

Dated 17th Sufur-ul Muzufur, 1287, Hijri (*i.e.*, 19th May, 1870), Cabul.

Since the above letter, dated 17th Sufur-ul Muzufur, was written, a duplicate set of the three letters, exactly similar to those inclosed, was received from a man of the Ameer of Samarcand at Tukhtapool, and sent from that place to me. Since they are the precise counterparts of the first, it is not necessary to send them.

Inclosure 5 in No. 1.

Mahomed Alum to the Ameer of Cabul.

(Translation.)

I BEG to mention the state of affairs at this place, that up to Saturday, the 13th of Sufur, I, by the grace of God, passed my time at Gori in offering up my prayers for the welfare and perpetuity of your Government. On Thursday, the 11th Sufur, a letter was received from Cubernaut, the Governor of Tashkend, through a man of the Ameer of Samarcand at Tukhtapool, and, Sirdar Sahib having kept the said man at Tukhtapool, forwarded the letter to me at Gori. I beg to send it for your perusal without loss of time. I beg to assure you that everything is right here. There is nothing new which I deem worth communicating for your information.

A letter from Mahomed Yacob Pekooshbegee is herewith inclosed.

Inclosure 6 in No. 1.

*Copy of French translation, of Russian original, English duplicate and English translation, from Persian versions, of letter from General von Kaufmann to the Ameer of Cabul.**

(Literal Retranslation into English of the Translation made at Cabul.)

Translation (into Persian) of the Letter in English from Military Van Kauf, Russian Governor-General, which reached Huzoor (the Ameer of Cabul) on Monday, the 13th Sufur, 1287, Hijree.

YOU have probably heard that your nephew, Abdoor Ruhman Khan, who, a few years ago, was Ruler of Balkh and other parts of Afghanistan, has now arrived in Tashkend, and I, as a Vakeel on the part of the Russian Emperor, have given him permission to come into Tashkend, and due honour has been done to him. In ordr that I may not have misinterpreted the Sirdar's staying here to Afghans, I, from my customary honesty and sincerity, and out of regard to relations, think it necessary to express that I desire that unity may exist between Russian Turkestan and you.

The countries in Asia which are in the possession of the Russian Emperor have no limits that are at present in your possession. These limits are separated by the River of Bokhara, the Ameer of which place is Syud Muzufur Khan, who has concluded a Treaty with me, and who has been passing his days happily under my protection. It is necessary that no quarrel and disagreement should take place between me and you. Although we are distant neighbours, it is proper that we pass our days in friendship and pleasure. I had a desire for a long time that I might be a "wastah" (mediator) in the Kingdom of Afghanistan, not only because you are under the protection of the British Government, with whom we are also, you are aware, on friendly relations, but also because we did not see any mischievous interference on your part in the affairs of Bokhara. Afghanistan and Bokhara ought not to be in terms of disagreement with each other. It is proper for each party to act in accordance with his own ways, and not to care for the welfare or for the misfortune of his neighbour.

These considerations require this, that when Abdoor Ruhman Khan made a request to come into Tashkend I answered that "our Emperor, from his greatness, shows kindness to all, especially to you, as you are now unfortunate, but you should not hope to receive through me any assistance to wage war." I don't want that I should take part in his quarrel with you, because your behaviour has not been the cause of any complaint. I also hope that our old friendship and unity should continue to exist as before. For this reason I send you this letter. I shall be very glad to receive from you such a reply as may be conformable to my wish and to established usage, regarding the canals† of the rivers of Bokhara, Khiva, and other Ilaquas.

(Literal Translation of the Persian Triplicate sent by General Kaufmann.)

Translation of a Letter from the Russian Governor-General in Turkestan to His Highness Ameer Shere Ali Khan, Ameer of the whole Territory of Afghanistan.

YOU must have been informed that Abdoor Ruhman Khan, son of the late Ameer Afzul Khan, who formerly ruled the country of Balkh and all its cities, has now come into the country of Tashkend. I am a Vakeel and Ruler of this place on the part of the wealthy and powerful White Padshah. I have shown respect and regard to the above-mentioned personage. Do not miscontrue the fact of this Sirdar of the Afghans being in this place. Therefore I inform you by letter. I have written what is true and correct, what relation Russian Turkestan has with Afghanistan, which is now subject to your rule, and the regard which I have for you. The Emperor who has no limits‡ of his own in Turkestan between the two exalted States of Afghanistan and the Russian Kings, Bokhara and enough (*lit.*) The Ameer of that place, Syud Muzufur Khan, has concluded a Treaty of Peace, has thereby become a friend, and also has come and remained under the protection of Ameer Atour Azum (Emperor). This act cannot in any way cause enmity and mis-

* For French translation communicated by Prince Gortchacow, see Correspondence respecting Central Asia presented to Parliament in 1873 ("Central Asia, No. 2, 1873"), No. 58, p. 43.

† "Anhar" in Persian translation. The translator has evidently mistaken the word "khanates" in the English for "canals."—C. U. A.

‡ Here the sentence is confused; but the meaning corresponds with the English version that Russian Turkestan has no common limit with Afghanistan.—H. Le P. W.

understanding between us and you. As we are distant neighbours of yours, permanent peace and friendship will be established between us and you. It is not my wish to meddle with the affairs of the State of Afghanistan. As you are under the protection of the British Government, it is known to you that our Emperor is a friend of the British Government. For this reason you have not now meddled with the affairs of Bokhara. Let there be not anything in common between Afghanistan and Bokhara, let the Masters of both the countries pass their days in peace and tranquillity, and be ignorant and without care for what happens in the neighbour's country. When Abdoor Ruhman Khan applied for leave by letter to come into Tashkend, I granted it to him. As our Emperor naturally gives protection to those who are subjected to misfortunes and troubles, I, before the said Abdoor Ruhman's arrival here, informed him by letter that he should not ask for aid and help to wage war with you.

I do not at all wish to discontinue friendship with you, because as yet your acts have caused no displeasure to me. I earnestly hope that you will bear the same relation with me in perpetuity. For this reason I have sent a letter to you. When you receive this, you will, after understanding the above said contents properly, and regarding them as right, send me such an answer as may be in accordance with my wish, so that I may thereby be satisfied, and be obliged to you as well as be pleased with you. May your life be prolonged. For your honour and for the comfort of those needy men who depend upon you, this letter is written.

Tashkend, March 28, 1870.

(Transcript of the Duplicate sent in English by General Kaufmann.)

To the Ameer of Cabul, Shere Ali Khan.

YOU probably will have heard that your nephew, Abderahman Khan, who a few years ago was Regent of Balkh and of other parts of Afghanistan, is just arrived in Tashkend, and that I, as representative of my gracious Emperor, have allowed him an honourable hospitality. In order that the staying here of the above-mentioned Afghanistan Sirdar might not be erroneously interpreted by you, I suppose it necessary to explain to you, with my accustomary sincerity and veracity, my point of view concerning the relations I should like to see established between Russian Turkestan and you.

The Asiatic possessions of His Majesty the Emperor have no common limits with the country now submitted to your supremacy ; they are separated by the Khanate of Bokhara, whose Ruler, the Ameer Seid Mosafar, having concluded a Treaty of Peace with Russia, stays now in friendly relations to us, and is enjoying the mighty protection of our great Emperor. Between us both there must not be any misunderstandings and vexations at all, and, though distant neighbours, we ought to live in friendship and harmony. I am quite far of longing for meddling with the interior affairs of Afghanistan, not only because you are under the protection of the British Government, with which, as you know, the Russian Government is in the best and most friendly relations, but also because I did not see any infraction from your part in the internal affairs of Bokhara. Afghanistan and Bokhara ought not to have any point of contact together, both of them must go their separate ways without caring for the welfare of the neighbour.

These considerations leaded me, when, having received from Abderahman Khan the request of being admitted to Tashkend, I answered him that His Majesty the Emperor of Russia graciously affords hospitality to everybody, so much the more to an unfortunate, but that he must not in the least reckon on my interference in his quarrel with you, and not expect any assistance from our part. I should not like to be in discordance with you, because your behaviour gave no matter for complaints. I hope also that our mutual relations will remain the same, and therefore I send you this letter, and should be glad to receive from you the assurance that, on your part, the analogue principles of neutrality will be strictly observed concerning the Khanates of Bokhara, Khiva, and other neighbours.

Tashkend, $\frac{\text{March } 30}{\text{April } 11}$, 1870.

The Turkestan Governor-General and Commander of the
Troops of the Turkestan Military Circle,
(Signed) VON KAUFMANN,
General Aide-de-camp.

Pour traduction conforme :
Le Conseiller d'Etat et Gentilhomme de la Chambre,
(Signed) C. STRUVE.

(Translation of Letter sent in Russian by General Kaufmann.)

A son Altesse l'Emir.

VOTRE Altesse a probablement déjà entendu que votre neveu le vénérable Abdul Rahman Khan n'a jamais envahi Balkh et d'autres villes d'Afghan ; il est arrivé il y a quelque temps à Tachkend, et moi, ici comme le Représentant de mon puissant Maître, je l'ai reçu avec honneur et plaisir.

Je ne désire pas que la résidence d'un Afghan Sirdar soit mal compris de vous. Je le trouve nécessaire de vous exposer immédiatement dans cette lettre, avec une loyauté accoutumée et franche, ma vue concernant le Turkestan Russe avec votre puissance dans l'Afghanistan et ces régulations que je dirige dans les relations avec vous.

Les dominions du Czar Blanc dans le Turkestan et les terres aujourd'hui subordonnées à vous n'ont pas de communes frontières ; les possessions du Khan de la Boukharie nous séparent ; l'Emir Said Mouzaphar, le Souverain qui a juré la paix avec la Russie, est en amitié et sous la protection du grand Empereur de Toutes les Russies. Pour cela il ne peut avoir aucune attaque ni malentendu entre nous, et nous, quoique des voisins éloignés, nous pouvons et devons vivre en amitié et en accord. Je n'ai pas l'intention de me mêler des affaires intérieures de l'Afghanistan, parce que vous êtes sous la protection du Gouvernement Anglais, lequel, comme vous savez probablement, est en amitié et en accord avec l'administration du Czar Blanc, et pour cela vous de votre part ne devez vous mêler des affaires de Boukharie. L'Afghanistan et la Boukharie ne doivent avoir rien de commun entre eux, et chacun de ces royaumes doit vivre de sa propre vie.

Une pareille signification j'ai donné à Abdul Rahman Khan, quand celui-ci s'adressa à moi avec la supplication de le recevoir à Tachkend, parce que le grand Souverain ne refuse à personne l'hospitalité, surtout quand un homme est malheureux ; et pour cela je l'ai accueilli aimablement, mais il ne compte nellement sur mon intervention dans sa querelle avec vous, et il n'en suit aucune assistance de notre côté. Je ne désire pas de me diverger de vous, parce que votre efficacité n'a donné aucun sujet de mécontentement.

Dans l'entière espérance que nos relations resteront ainsi dans le futur je vous écris cette lettre, et je serais très-content si je reçois de vous l'assurance écrite que vous avez l'intention de vous tenir à mon programme.

Que le Dieu Suprême prolonge vos jours pour votre gloire et pour le bien-être du peuple !

Le Gouverneur-Général de Turkestan et le Commandant Militaire du District de l'Armée,
(Signé) KAUFMANN,
Le Général Aide-de-camp.

Ville Tachkend, le 30 *Mars.* 1870.

Inclosure 7 in No. 1.

The Viceroy of India to Ameer Shere Ali Khan.

My honoured and valued Friend, *Simla, June* 24, 1870.

I HAVE had the pleasure to receive your Highness' friendly letter dated 17th Safar-ul-Muzafir, 1287, Hijri (corresponding with 19th May, 1870), and thank you for your courtesy and this further token of friendship, in thus sending for my perusal the letters you have received in Russian, Persian, and English, from General Aide-de-camp Von Kaufmann, Governor-General of Turkestan, and Commander of the Russian troops of the Turkestan Military Circle, and also in consulting me as to the reply which it is desirable that you should give.

In compliance with your Highness' request, I send you a correct translation in English and Persian of the letter in the Russian character. You will perceive that General Von Kaufmann's letter states that the frontiers of the Asiatic possessions of the Emperor do not anywhere touch on those of your Highness; it also contains assurances of the peaceful intentions of the Russian Government towards your Highness, their determination to abstain from interference with the territories now in your Highness' possession, and their hope that your Highness will continue the same policy which has hitherto marked your conduct towards the States and tribes lying beyond the frontier of Afghanistan.

My friend, it affords me great pleasure to inform you that I have received intelligence

from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India that, in September last year, Prince Gortchacow, the Chief of the Statesmen to whom the Emperor of Russia has confided the government of his country, assured Her Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs that Russia has no intention of extending her boundary further south. I have also heard from Mr. Forsyth, one of my high officers who visited St. Petersburgh last year, that he had the honour of an interview with the Emperor, when he informed His Majesty of the deep interest which the British Government take in your independence and welfare, in reply to which the Emperor remarked there was no intention of extending the Russian dominions, and that, if the idea of conquest were banished from your Highness' mind, there would be peace in Central Asia. The Ambassador of the Queen at the Court of St. Petersburgh, together with Mr. Forsyth, have also received assurances from the Ministers of the Emperor of Russia, with the full concurrence of His Majesty, that all the provinces that your Highness now holds should be accepted as Afghanistan; and that, whilst the good offices of England should be exerted to dissuade your Highness from aggression, Russia should similarly use all her influence to restrain Bokhara from transgressing the limits of Afghan territory.

I have also been informed that Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh has reported to the Secretary of State that instructions have been sent to General von Kaufmann to the effect that, as the Government of India had taken measures to carry out the understanding come to with Mr. Forsyth, the Russian authorities should act in a similar spirit, and should make it known that England and Russia are agreed as to the policy that should be followed with a view of securing the tranquillity of the countries on their respective borders, and the peace of Asia. I have further received information that General von Kaufmann has informed the Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan (now supposed to be resident at Tashkend) that Russia is firmly resolved not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and that consequently all negotiations with him (Abdul Rahman Khan) are useless, and that General von Kaufmann will once more intimate to Abdul Rahman Khan that he can only be granted an asylum in the territories of Russia on condition of his abstaining from intrigues and political projects, for the realization of which he must not in any way reckon on assistance from Bokhara.

The letter which General von Kaufmann has addressed you contains, as I have already stated, assurances on the part of the Russian Government of their resolution to adhere to this policy of peace; and these letters will, doubtless, be, when rightly understood, a source of satisfaction and an additional ground of confidence to your Highness, because they indicate that, so long as you continue the course you have so happily pursued since the visit you honoured me with at Umballa, it is most unlikely that your territories will be disturbed by Russia or by any tribe or State which may be influenced by the officers of the Emperor.

My friend, these assurances given by His Imperial Majesty himself—by his Ministers of State—and now by the distinguished General who commands His Majesty's Forces in Russian Turkestan, have given to me unfeigned satisfaction. For in these I see a further and an additional security for that which I so much desire, namely, the permanency of your rule, the complete establishment of your power, and the maintenance of a just, wise, and merciful administration throughout the whole of Afghanistan. Further, it is a matter of great gratification to me that the servants of the Queen, both in England and in India, have by the representations made by them in your behalf to Her Majesty's ally, been enabled to contribute in this important manner to the interests of your Highness and of your State.

I therefore suggest for your Highness' consideration that it would be wise that you should reply to General Von Kaufmann to the effect that you are glad to receive his assurances that no interference, direct or indirect, will be undertaken by any officer in the service of His Imperial Majesty in the affairs of Afghanistan, and that no assistance or encouragement will be afforded by them to your enemies; that in pursuance of the counsel and advice repeatedly given you by the British Government, you have instructed your frontier officers that, while they should firmly defend your border and maintain your authority, they must not permit any aggressions to be made on their neighbours, and that they must abstain from interference in the political affairs of countries and tribes beyond the legitimate borders of Afghanistan; and, further, that you are determined to adhere to this policy, not only because you have been advised thereto by the Viceroy of India, whose Sovereign is in strict alliance with the Czar, but also because you are convinced that it is in accordance with the best interests of your kingdom and the welfare of your people.

It will be sufficient to reply to General von Kaufmann in Persian, with which language he or his officers are, doubtless, familiar.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness, and to subscribe myself

Your Highness' sincere friend,
(Signed) MAYO.

Inclosure 8 in No. 1.

Mr. Aitchison to Mr. Thornton.

Simla, June 24, 1870.

I HAVE laid before his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council your letter dated the 28th May, 1870, with the letter from the Commissioner of Peshawur, therein referred to, and its accompaniments from His Highness the Ameer of Cabul.

2. His Excellency in Council has taken fully into consideration the contents of those letters, and has addressed a khureeta, in reply to the Ameer—a copy of which is inclosed for the Lieutenant-Governor's information. Another copy is forwarded for communication, confidentially, to the Commissioner of Peshawur.

3. With the khureeta to the Ameer are sent English and Persian translations of General von Kaufmann's letter to him in Russian, and two copies of the English translation are sent for the information of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, and for transmission to Colonel Pollock.

4. His Excellency in Council desires that, with the Lieutenant-Governor's permission, the Commissioner of Peshawur may be instructed to send on the communication for the Ameer without delay, and by the hand of a special and trusty messenger.

No. 2.

Mr. Melvill to Mr. Hammond.—(Received October 13.)

Sir. *India Office, October* 12, 1870.

WITH reference to my letter of the 2nd August I now transmit to you, for the information of Earl Granville, copy of a letter with inclosures, lately received from the Government of India, relative to the reply which the Ameer of Cabul has been recommended to return to the letter of General Kaufmann.

I am, &c.
(Signed) JAMES MELVILL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Duke of Argyll.

My Lord Duke, *Simla, August* 26, 1870.

IN continuation of our despatch dated the 24th June last, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter from the Government of the Punjab, inclosing translation of a khureeta from His Highness the Ameer of Cabul, in answer to one from his Excellency the Viceroy, a copy of which was sent with the despatch above referred to.

2. We also forward copy of a letter from the British Agent at Cabul to the Commissioner at Peshawur, reporting his proceedings at the interview with the Ameer, at which he delivered the Viceroy's letter.

We have, &c.
(Signed) MAYO.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
JOHN STRACHEY.
R. TEMPLE.
J. F. STEPHEN.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

Mr. Thornton to Mr. Aitchison.

Murree, July 29, 1870.

I AM directed to forward a murrasilla from His Highness the Ameer of Cabul, to the address of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, received through the Commissioner of Peshawur.

Inclosure 3 in No. 2.

The Ameer of Cabul to the Governor-General of India.

(Translation.) *Cabul, Saturday,* 16*th Rubee-oos-Sanee,* 1287 *Hijree*
(After compliments.) (*July* 16, 1870).

THE noble and kind letter which your Excellency, from friendship and unity, wrote to me in reply to my communication, reached me at an auspicious time, and was (to me) an expounder of State matters and of views of primary importance.

The pleasure and thanks which your Excellency, on account of my good intention and sincere nature, has expressed, have proceeded from the firm bonds of sincere friendship, nay, may be said to be the reflection of the mirrors of the hearts of two parties sincere in their mutual relations.

In fact, when the welfare and interest of the two parties, coming out from the circle of contrariety become identical, it is naturally to be expected that the joys of friends shall delight friends. The few paragraghs which have been kindly written to me, containing gratifying assurances that firm and complete arrangements in respect to border matters have been made between the officers of the British and Russian Governments, to the effect that my territories will not be disturbed by any tribe or State which may be influenced by the officers of the Russian Emperor, have laid me and all the people of this country under great obligation. Your Excellency has expressed gratification at the welcome thought (literally, joyful tidings) that the authorities of Hindostan and England take interest in the firm establishment of the rule of the country of Afghanistan.

Such friendly sympathy, which will in reality result in the firm establishment of the authority of my dominion, has led me to expect that my various hopes will be realized in future, and has particularly given a hope of peace and tranquillity to the inhabitants of the country of Afghanistan. For this friendly favour what words can I make use of to express my thanks? The prosperity of the garden of my State always depends on the kindness of the British officers.

Considering that the few lines which were, out of friendship, written at the conclusion of your Excellency's letter, with the view that a reply might agreeably thereto be returned to the Russian Government, would, if adopted in my reply, prove of benefit to the territory of Afghanistan, I have, in accordance therewith, sent an answer to the letter from the Russian Government. A perusal of its copy will show how it is couched from the beginning to the end. I have issued strict orders to the officers in charge of my frontiers to watch and defend always the borders, so that it may be the cause of assurance to the minds of both those who are in the vicinity and those who are at a distance. Further, by the grace of God, great possible exertions will be made according to the wishes of the British officers to keep relations of friendship.

I hope that your Excellency will consider me as a friend, and will kindly continue to gratify me with accounts of your health.

Inclosure 4 in No. 2.

Lieutenant-General Pollock to Mr. Aitchison.

Abbottabad, July 23, 1870.

SUBMITS copy of translation of a letter from the British Agent in Cabul, containing the remarks and acknowledgments of His Highness the Ameer of Cabul on the murrasilla of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India regarding the mode of replying to the murrasilla received by His Highness from the Russian authorities.

Inclosure 5 in No. 2.

Atta Mahomed Khan to Lieutenant-Colonel Pollock.

(Translation.) *July* 11, 1870.

I BEG to acknowledge the receipt, through the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur, of a murrasilla from his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, to His Highness the Ameer of Cabul, regarding the mode of replying to the murrasilla received by His Highness from the Russian authorities. After mastering the contents of the murrasilla, the Ameer expressed himself highly gratified with the British Government, and remarked:—

"Owing to the patronage ('himayut') and kindness of the British Government I was quite assured that they would devise suitable and appropriate measures in regard to the security of the Afghan border, and my protection and that of all the people of Afghanistan from the threats of foreign assailants. I myself and all my officials are unable to express sufficiently our gratitude at the contents of tke above murrasilla. However, I am grateful to state that I have been thoroughly reassured as regards the Turkestan border, and it is desirable that a complimentary murrasilla should be addressed to his Excellency the Governor-General of India in a suitable style; also, a murrasalla should be sent, in accordance with the instructions of the British Government, to the Russian Governor in Tashkend, in reply to the one received from him."

No. 3.

Mr. Grant-Duff to Mr. Hammond.—(Received June .,

(Extract.) *India Office, June* 15, 1871.

I TAKE this opportunity of forwarding, for the information of Earl Granville, copy of a letter from the Government of India on matters connected with Central Asia.

Inclosure 1 in No. 3.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Duke of Argyll.

(Secret.)

My Lord Duke, *Simla, May* 9, 1871.

WITH reference to our Secret despatch dated the 26th August last, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of papers, from which it will be perceived that the Ameer of Cabul has received a reply to the letter which he addressed to the Russian Governor-General in Turkestan in July last.

2. General Kaufmann's letter is, in our opinion, most satisfactory, and the Viceroy

has advised His Highness the Ameer to reply, briefly expressing his gratification at the friendly assurances which it contains.

We have, &c.
(Signed) MAYO.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
JOHN STRACHEY.
R. TEMPLE.
J. F. STEPHEN.
B. H. ELLIS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 3.

Mr. Macnabb to Mr. Aitchison.

Peshawur, March 11, 1871.

IN submtting the inclosed murrassulla received from the Ameer of Cabul, to the address of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, has the honour to annex copy of a letter dated 6th March, 1871, received from the British Agent at Cabul, for information.

Inclosure 3 in No. 3.

Atta Mahomed Khan, Khagwanee, to Mr. Macnabb.

(Translation.) *March* 6, 1871.

ON Friday, the 3rd instant, when the Ameer rode outside the city of Cabul (for recreation), His Highness received a letter at evening by the hand of a messenger of Naib Mahomed Alum Khan from General von Kaufmann, Governor of Tashkend. His Highness sent the original murrassulla of the General in Persian and Russian characters to the Agency Office with his murrassulla to the address of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and both these communications are herewith submitted. The Ameer has dispatched copies of the above murrassulla of the Russian Empire for information to Sirdar Mahomed Aslum Khan, and Governors of Herat and Turkestan, and has deferred its reply until the receipt of instructions from the British Government.

Inclosure 4 in No. 3.

The Ameer of Cabul to the Viceroy and Governor-General.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.) 14*th Zilhijja,* 1287 *Hijree* (*March* 7, 1871.)

A LETTER from General von Kaufmann, a Colonel of the Russian Government, in reply to the one which I formerly addressed him, reached me from Tashkend on Friday, the 11th* of Zilhijja, 1287 Hijree. The original letter, which is in Russian and Persian languages, is herewith forwarded to your Excellency. From the perusal of the letter your Excellency, please God, will learn its contents. Your Excellency will inform me as to the nature of reply which it may be deemed advisable to return, in order that I may send an answer accordingly.

I beg that your Excellency will order your translators to translate the Russian version of the letter, and will forward the translation to me.

I hope that your Excellency will continue to gratify me with accounts of your health. I have nothing else to communicate than to express my wish for an interview.

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* March 4.

Inclosure 5 in No. 3.

Translation of Persian Version of Letter from General von Kaufmann, Governor of Tashkend, to the Ameer of all the Territories of Afghanistan, Shere Ali Khan, the Illustrious, dated December 21, 1870.

THE friendly letter which your Highness sent me reached me at Tashkend on the 29th August of the present year. I have perused it with great attention, and have been able to learn that your Highness has issued strict orders as to how respect and regard should be shown to your neighbours. This written order of your Highness has been in accordance with the wishes of my heart. Indeed, this good sentiment of your Highness will meet with the approbation of our Emperor.

May your Highness continue to be on friendly terms with, and to love sincerely, the Russian Government and its neighbouring territory, as by pursuing such a course you will not on any occasion have cause to regret. Trust me that your habits and ways have tended to increase our friendship. Having had regard to this, I beg to say that experience, acquired by age, has shown that enmity and disunion between two States become the cause of destruction to nations [whereas]. The circumstances of the bonds of friendship and peace between two States being established on a firmer basis will serve to augment the happiness and prosperity of the people thereof. For this reason our Emperor, having always the welfare of his poor subjects at heart, never interferes in their concerns as well as in those of his close neighbours; but, on the other hand, he directs his dependents to keep friendship with them, and desires that the other Chiefs of the neighbouring countries should maintain sincere friendship with Russia.

I offer my prayers to God for your health, in order that by your wisdom and care you may promote the welfare of your poor subjects.

Here follows the name of the Governor of Tashkend in Russian.

Inclosure 6 in No. 3.

Translation of Russian Version of Letter from General von Kaufmann to His Highness the Khan, dated Tashkend, December 20, 1870.

I HAVE read with attention the friendly letter which I received from you at Tashkend on the 29th August of the present year. I have observed with pleasure that the contents of this letter, and the adoption of the resolution to which you have come with regard to your relations towards your neighbours, answer my expectation and naturally merit the approbation of my august master. Believe me, you will never have reason to regret your frank and kindly action towards the Russian power, and with the protector of its territorial neighbours. I hope that time and circumstances will fortify the friendship between us.

It has long been shown by perpetual experiments, that each discord, each act of hostility, never fails to lead nations into misery alone, while, on the contrary, peace and amicable relations between Sovereigns will advance their nations into a most flourishing condition.

For this reason my great master, who is always occupied with the prosperity of his subjects, desires (his servants) to live in peace and in harmony with the neighbouring people, not meddle in their internal affairs, and justly looks for the same frankness and friendly conduct on the part of the reigning princes of other States.

I offer my prayers to God for your health, for your renown, and that He may cause you to guide your people with wisdom.

The Governor-General of Turkestan and Military Commandant
of the Military Circle of Turkestan,
the General Aide-de-Camp,
(Signed) VON KAUFMANN.

Inclosure 7 in No. 3.

The Viceroy of India to Ameer Shere Ali Khan.

Simla, May 9, 1871.

I HAVE had the pleasure to receive your Highness's friendly letter dated the 14th Zilhijja, 1287 Hijree (corresponding with the 7th March, 1871), with which you have forwarded, for my perusal, a letter which you have received from General Kaufmann, Governor-General of Turkestan, in reply to that which your Highness addressed to his Excellency in July last.

It gives me much pleasure to observe that your reply gave the greatest satisfaction to the Russian Governor-General, and that it has elicited from him a renewed expression of the friendly intentions of his Government.

In compliance with your Highness's request I send you a correct translation of the letter in Persian and English, and I beg to suggest, for your Highness's consideration, that you should send a brief letter to General Kaufmann, expressing in general terms your gratification at his friendly assurances, and the determination of his Government to cultivate harmonious relations with its neighbours.

Inclosure 8 in No. 3.

Mr. Aitchison to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

Simla, May 9, 1871.

WITH reference to the subject of your letter, dated the 29th July last, I am directed to forward a khurreeta from his Excellency the Viceroy to the Ameer of Cabul in reply to the one received from His Highness through the officiating Commissioner of Peshawur, and I am to request that the Commissioner of Peshawur may be instructed to forward the khurreeta speedily and with due precaution for ensuring its safe delivery. With it are sent, in accordance with the Ameer's request, English and Persian translations of a letter from General von Kaufmann, in reply to that addressed to him by the Ameer in July last.

2. A copy of the khurreeta, with its inclosures, is herewith forwarded for the information of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor.

No. 4.

Mr. Merivale to Mr. Hammond.—(Received June 8.)

Sir, *India Office, June* 6, 1872.

WITH reference to my letter of the 15th June, 1871, I am directed by the Duke of Argyll to forward, for the information of Earl Granville, copy of a despatch from the Government of India, with inclosed correspondence, regarding the letter addressed by General Kaufmann to the Ameer of Cabul in reply to that sent to him by the latter in accordance with the advice of the Viceroy of India.

I am, &c.

(Signed) HERMAN MERIVALE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 4.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Duke of Argyll.

My Lord Duke, *Fort William, May* 10, 1872.

IN continuation of our despatch dated the 9th May, 1871, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers, from

which it will be observed that the Ameer of Cabul has received a reply to the letter which, in accordance with our advice, he addressed to the Russian Governor-General in Turkestan.

2. We have addressed the Ameer, expressing our gratification at the friendly and satisfactory character of General Kaufmann's letter.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
JOHN STRACHEY.
R. TEMPLE.
H W. NORMAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 4.

Mr. Macnabb to Mr. Aitchison.

Peshawur, December 11, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to forward in original a letter in Russian and Turki-Persian, addressed by the Russian Governor of Tashkend, &c., to His Highness the Ameer of Cabul, received under cover of the Agent's letter of the 4th December, 1871. The Ameer is anxious to obtain a correct translation in Persian of the Russian letter. The return of the original of a Russian letter forwarded for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy, and for translation under cover of Agent's letter dated the 20th July, 1871, is also solicited.

Inclosure 3 in No. 4.

General von Kaufmann to Ameer Shere Ali Khan.

(Translation.) *Tashkend, October* 28, 1871.

AFTER presenting your Highness my friendly salutations, and expressing my good wishes, I beg to state that, while I was engaged in making arrangements for the countries which have been placed in my charge by our Great Emperor, your welcome letter, dated 28th Rubee-oos-Sanee, 1288 Hijree, reached Tashkend, whence it was sent to me at Kuldja without delay. I was at the time engaged in settling the affairs of Kuldja, the irregular proceedings of Abool Ala, Sultan of that country, having rendered it necessary for me again to assemble an army and capture his country. From the contents of your letter I have been gratified to learn that it is your wish to maintain friendship with Russia, as well as with other countries under its protection. If your officers would carry out strictly the orders issued by you not to interfere with the neighbouring country of Bokhara, our friendship would daily increase to the great benefit of the neighbouring people.

Such a state of things is entirely in accordance with the well-intentioned views expressed by our Great Emperor, and would also be in harmony with the good understanding that exists between Russia and the English Government. The Ameer of Bokhara, a firm friend and ally of Russia, has sent intelligence that Mirza Mahomed Tahir has been deputed to that place (Bokhara) as an Envoy from Cabul. Among other tidings brought by the said Envoy is the intelligence that dissensions that had hitherto existed among the Afghans have been brought to an end. It has also been ascertained from the Envoy that your eldest son, Mahomed Yakoob Khan, has sought a reconciliation with you. If this is actually the case, I congratulate you on the happy termination of this miserable business. My sympathies have been with you throughout the affair, since the right was on your side; for God favours not a son who rebels against his father, nor do men wish success to such a one.

Inclosure 4 in No. 4.

Mr. Wynne to Mr. Macnabb.

Fort William, May 1, 1872.

IN compliance with the request conveyed in your letter dated the 11th December last, I am directed to forward herewith a correct Persian rendering of the Russian letter therewith transmitted, which was addressed by General von Kaufmann to His Highness the Ameer of Cabul. I also inclose a letter from his Excellency the Viceroy to the address of the Ameer, with which these translations and their originals are to be returned to his Highness.

2. I am also, as requested, to return herewith the Russian original, together with the original of the previous letter sent with your letter dated the 11th March, 1871. It is believed that this is the letter referred to in the last words of your letter under acknowledgment, as no letter sent under cover of a communication from the Cabul Agent, dated the 20th July, 1871, has apparently been received in this Office.

Inclosure 5 in No. 4.

The Viceroy of India to Ameer Shere Ali Khan.

Fort William, May 1, 1872.

I HAVE the pleasure to return herewith the letter in Russian and Turki-Persian which has been addressed to your Highness by the Russian Governor of Tashkend, and at the same time to send you translations of them in Persian and English.

Your Highness will learn from these translations that General Kaufmann's letter contained renewed assurances as to the peaceful intentions of the Russian Government, and confirmed the assurances on this subject which the late Viceroy communicated to your Highness in his letter of the 24th June last year.

It is a source of much gratification to me to know that the letter of your Highness to the address of General Kaufmann has elicited so friendly and satisfactory a reply.

Inclosure 6 in No. 4.

The Ameer of Cabul to General von Kaufmann.

(Translation.) *Monday, 28th Rubee-oos-sanee,* 1288 *Hijree* (*July* 17, 1871).

YOUR friendly letter, dated Tashkend, the 21st December, giving assurances of friendship between the Governments of Russia and Afghanistan, has reached me, and has served to afford me fresh joy and great pleasure. By it I have been more fully assured than before that the officers of the Russian Government cherish no other wish in their heart than to maintain peace and harmony with the neighbours, and not to meddle with their internal affairs, and further, that they will continue for ever to pursue such course. As to my part, I will act in the same way as I have communicated in the reply which I sent to your letter on Thursday, the 15th Rubee-oos-sanee, 1287 Hijree. In respect to the future, it is also my wish that there should occur nothing to weaken the ties of friendship subsisting between the two Governments, as on such friendship depend the peace and tranquillity of the people.

I hope that you will continue to consider me as ever anxious to hear of your welfare.

No. 5.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Duke of Argyll.

My Lord Duke, *Simla, June* 24, 1872.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with the telegram from the Viceroy to your Grace, dated the 5th instant, we have the honour to forward, for the information

of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of documents relative to the proposed return to Cabul of Sekunder Khan.

We have, &c.
(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
JOHN STRACHEY.
R. TEMPLE.
H. W. NORMAN.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 5.

The Agent at Cabul to Mr. Macnabb.

(Translation.) *May* 18, 1872.

A murrasilla for his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, together with a murrasilla recently received by the Ameer from the Russian Government, and a copy of the khureeta lately written by His Highness in reply to one formerly received from the Russians, arrived to-day in the Agency Office, and the same are herewith submitted. His Highness desires that the original murrasilla of the Russian Governor may be returned to him after perusal.

Inclosure 2 in No. 5.

Mr. Griffin to Mr. Aitchison.

Simla, May 27, 1872.

I AM desired to forward murrasilla from His Highness the Ameer of Cabul to the address of his Excellency the Viceroy, with one from General Kaufmann to the Ameer received this day from the Commissioner of Peshawur.

Inclosure 3 in No. 5.

The Ameer of Cabul to the Viceroy of India.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.) 10*th Rubbee-ool-awul*, 1289 A.H. (*May* 19, 1872.)

I HAVE received your Excellency's letter dated the 1st May, together with the letter from the Russian Governor at Tashkend, and translations of the same into Persian and English. Your Excellency remarks that the letter of Kaufmann contains renewed assurances of amity and friendship, and entirely confirms what the late Viceroy said in his letter of the 24th June of last year. This is indeed remarkable, and confirms the truth of the Arabic proverb: "There is no need to prove what is already evident."

It is clear (*lit.*, "more evident than the sun") that no human being can possibly doubt the friendly and intimate relations* that exist between the great English Government and the Government of Afghanistan, or that the English Government has not always at heart an earnest desire for the welfare of, and sympathy for, Afghanistan.

I send for your Excellency's perusal a copy of the reply addressed by me to the Russian Governor at Tashkend.

I received on the 3rd Rubbee-ool-awul a further communication from the Russian Governor, dated in the month of Feebral 1872, A.D., which is inclosed for your Excellency's information.

Trusting your Excellency will always consider me as a friend, and keep me informed of your health, I offer up my best wishes for your Excellency's welfare.

Inclosure 4 in No. 5.

General von Kaufmann to the Ameer of Cabul.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.) *Feebral*, 1872, A.D.

INFORMATION has lately been received from St Petersburgh to the effect that your nephew, Sekunder Khan, who, as you know, has been for four years in the service of

* Literally, "the oneness for good and evil."

our Emperor, has now quitted the Imperial service, and has left for his native country, travelling through England and Hindoostan. After paying his respects to you, his Sovereign, he hopes to be reinstated in his former position, and to be put in possession of his ancestral possessions; also to have the honour of entering your Highness' service. I make this friendly representation of your nephew's intentions, and trust your Highness will receive him according to his deserts, and regard him with your Royal favour. For three years he has resided at our capital, and rendered honourable service to our Emperor. He will, therefore, doubtless serve your Highness with the same devotion.

Actuated by feelings of friendship, I informed your Highness by letter, four months ago, of the capture by the Russian army of the town and dependencies of Kuldja, but have as yet received no reply. I fear, therefore, that from some cause or other my letter may not have reached you.

Trusting you will favour me with accounts of your welfare, I commend you to the protection of God.

The Russian original of this is in my handwriting.

Inclosure 5 in No. 5.

The Ameer of Cabul to General von Kaufmann.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.) 10*th Rubbee-ool-awul*, 1289 A.H.

YOUR friendly letter, dated the 28th October, 1871, which was a reply to mine of the 28th Rubbee-oos-sanee, 1288 A.H., has duly reached me, and afforded me much gratification. It has given me great pleasure to hear of the victories of the Russian arms at Kuldja, intelligence of which was communicated in your friendly letter.

Your congratulations regarding the reconciliation of Mahomed Yakoob afford a proof of the friendly feeling that exists between the two Governments.

As regards the preservation of the Bokhara boundary, please God there will be no deviation from the arrangements mentioned in the friendly letter* dated the 15th Rubbee-oos-sanee, 1288 A.H. The situation there is still the same.

Inclosure 6 in No. 5.

The Viceroy of India to Ameer Shere Ali Khan.

Simla, June 13, 1872.

I HAVE received your friendly letter dated the 19th May, 1872, forwarding a communication in Persian and Russian from General von Kaufmann, Governor of the Russian Province of Turkestan, in which he informs your Highness of the desire of your sister's son, Mahomed Sekunder Khan, to return to Afghanistan.

It is already known to your Highness that Mahomed Sekunder Khan has been for some little time in London, awaiting permission to return to his native country. Your Highness' views with respect to the Sirdar's return have been made known to me by the British Agent at Cabul. I have accordingly requested the Government of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen to make the inquiries you suggested. On receipt of further information, I will again communicate with your Highness on the subject.

My friend, the expressions in your letter, which show your Highness' appreciation of the interest which Her Majesty's Government takes in the welfare of Afghanistan, have caused me sincere gratification. As Her Majesty's Representative in this country, it will be my continued and pleasing duty to manifest that interest in the way which may best conduce to your Highness' prosperity, and to that of the country over which you rule.

I return the letter from General Kaufmann, and thank you for having sent it for my perusal.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness.

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* This may mean "my letter," or "your letter,"

Inclosure 7 in No. 5.

Mr. Wynne to Mr. Griffin.

Simla, June 13, 1872.

I AM desired to inclose a letter from his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General to Ameer Shere Ali, in reply to that which was forwarded with your communication dated the 27th May, 1872, and to request that instructions may be issued for its delivery through the British Agent at Cabul.

2. Copy of the letter, and translation of the Ameer's murrasilla and of its inclosures, are herewith sent for the information of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor.

No. 6.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Duke of Argyll.

(Secret.)

My Lord Duke, *Simla, August* 5, 1872.

IN continuation of our despatch dated 8th July, 1872, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers relative to the affairs of Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
JOHN STRACHEY.
R. TEMPLE.
H. W. NORMAN.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.

Inclosure in No. 6.

Translation of a Murrasila from the Ameer to the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan at Tashkend, dated 13th Jamadi-ool-Awul, 1289 *H.* (*July* 20, 1872).

(After titles, compliments, &c.)

YOUR kind despatch of "Febral" 1872, every letter and word of which expressed tokens or desire for increasing and confirming the sincere friendship existing between us, reached me in a happy and gratifying time on 3rd "Rabi-ool-Sanee" (corresponding to the 10th June, 1872), and tended to the confirmation of the ties of our mutual friendship and unity. I mastered the contents of the few lines of your letter, inviting me to send a reply to your friendly communication of 28th October, 1871, and giving some information regarding Sirdar Sekunder Khan, and have to state that the reply to your "murrasila" in question was forwarded to you some days before the receipt of your despatch of Febral 1872, *i.e.*, on 1st Rabee-ool-Awul (corresponding to May 1872), I conclude that you must have received it ere this. I hope that you will always consider me desirous of the firmness of friendly relations and cordiality.

No. 7.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Duke of Argyll.

(Secret.)

My Lord Duke, *Simla, September* 9, 1872.

IN continuation of our Secret despatch dated 10th May last, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers from which it will be perceived that a further communication has been addressed to the Ameer of Cabul by the Russian Governor of Turkestan.

2. We would take this opportunity of inviting your Grace's attention to our recent despatch dated the 5th April last, on the subject of the boundary between Afghanistan and Bokhara. We hope that Her Majesty's Government may soon be able to arrive at a satisfactory understanding with Russia on that question. As long as the boundary remains

undefined, we are of opinion that there will be more or less risk of misunderstanding and anxiety between the Ameer and his neighbours.

We have, &c.
(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
JOHN STRACHEY.
R. TEMPLE.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 7.

Mr. Griffin to Mr. Aitchison.

Simla, July 31, 1872

I AM directed to forward copy of a letter, dated 25th July, from the Commissioner of Peshawur, with translation of a letter received from the British Agent in Cabul, together with an original letter from the Russian Governor of Turkestan, and a careful translation of the Persian version of the same prepared in this Office.

2. I am also to forward copy of two letters, dated 25th instant, from the Commissioner of Peshawur, covering translation of the murrasilla, dated 20th instant, from the Ameer of Cabul to the Governor of Russian Turkestan.

Inclosure 2 in No. 7.

Mr. Macnabb to Mr. Griffin.

Peshawur, July 25, 1872.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a translation of a letter received this day from the Agent at Cabul, detailing the observations of the Ameer on receipt of a communication from the Russian Governor at Turkestan, which His Highness has forwarded in original for the perusal of the Supreme Government, and of the Russian version of which he is desirous of obtaining an accurate Persian translation.

2. I inclose a copy of the translation of the Agent's letter for transmission to the Foreign Secretary, along with General von Kaufmann's letter, as nothing would be gained by sending the Agent's letter without its inclosure direct to the Foreign Secretary.

3. There is also another appendix to the Agent's letter, viz., copy of the answer of the Ameer to the last communication of the Russian Government in intercession for Sirdar Sekunder Khan.

Inclosure 3 in No. 7.

Translation of a Letter from Atta Mahomed Khan, Vakeel at Cabul, dated July 20, 1872.

" YESTERDAY a murrasilla from the Russian Governor in Turkestan was received by the Ameer in answer to His Highness' communication mentioned in my petition of 18th May, 1872. I append the original murrasila to this letter. The Cabul Government will then send an answer to it, when it has been perused by the British Government and returned with an accurate translation into Persian. In the meantime His Highness the Ameer has read the murrasilla, and caused a copy to be taken of it, which he has sent to Naib Mahomed Alum Khan, Ruler of Turkestan, with strict injunctions to keep a good look-out along his frontier, and take the greatest care in managing all affairs along the Bokhara border, so as not to give an opening for any ground of complaint on the part of any foreign State. His Highness in private said that he gathered from this murrasila that it was the wish of the Russian authorities to establish a regular and frequent correspondence with the Cabul Government. What demands careful thought in their inconsiderate language is, that notwithstanding that the Russian Government must have thoroughly apprehended and been convinced that the weal or woe of the Afghan State is entirely bound up in and associated with that of the British Government, still when writing about boundaries they make use of this unguarded expression, which may indicate God

knows what intentions in their minds, viz., "for as much as the slightest alteration in intention leads to displeasure between parties, it destroys entirely the harmony which may exist between them."

Further, when the Governor of Turkestan writes in his letter that the instructions of his Sovereign are to avoid all interference with or annoyance to his neighbours, it is a cause of astonishment that the Russian interpretation of harmony with neighbours is a strange one, for in but a few years they have extended their possessions from the foot of the throne of Russia to the borders of Bokhara, and now style the Afghan State "their neighbours," oblivious of the fact that Bokhara and Khiva intervene.

If (which may God forfend) the country of Bokhara and Khiva becomes theirs, and their frontier is extended without the intervention of any buffer ("pardah") to the limits of Afghanistan, which may indeed be truly styled the frontier of Hindustan, God only knows what line of policy or demeanour they will adopt towards Afghanistan, and what troubles may be in store for the Afghan and English Governments.

On these considerations he was induced to hope that when the British Government has read and understood the drift of this murrasila, they may bestow even more serious attention than they have hitherto done on the establishing and maintenance of the boundaries of Afghanistan.

This day His Highness the Ameer wrote the answer to the letter of the Russian Governor forwarded to the English Government with his murrasilla of the 18th May, 1872, in which the Russian Governor intercedes for Sirdar Sekunder Khan, sister's son of the Ameer, now in London. The answer has been sent to Naib Mahomed Alum Khan, to be forwarded to its destination by the hand of some of his dependents, according to custom. I append a copy of it.

Inclosure 4 in No. 7.

The Governor of Turkestan to the Ameer Shere Ali Khan.

AFTER wishing the friendship and welfare of your Highness.

Your letter dated the 1st of Rubee-ul-Awul, 1289 (corresponding to the 28th April, 1872, Russian year) having been received, I have been happy to become acquainted with your good health. I have derived boundless delight from the receipt of your letter. The advantages of the interchange of letters are first, that the circumstance argues existence of mutual good feeling; next, it becomes the cause of strengthening reciprocal friendship, and the respective subjects of both parties becoming comfortable, it indicates the preservation of reciprocal engagements up to date.

Your Highness has mentioned the lands forming the boundary between yourself and Bokhara. This matter was placed and confirmed on its former footing, on receipt of your former letter. God willing, it is hoped that no change will take place in this. I trust that the old status will be maintained in perpetuity, for the slightest changes causing displeasure to both parties, destroys manifestly the comforts of both.

And let it not be concealed that before the receipt of your reply to my letter, about four months ago, Pod Folkonik Sekunder Khan, your "jen," came from Petersburgh really with the intention of going to see you. I gave a letter to him, and have sent it by the hand of Mahamud Jan, a servant of his, to you. It is hoped that he has delivered it.

Regarding you as my friend and neighbour, I inform you that the people in the territories entrusted to my charge by the great Imperateur, my Sovereign, are all comfortable. At the present time perfect friendship and amity exists between ourselves and all our neighbours. From the bottom of my heart, and in perfect sincerity, I desire that God may preserve you also in comfort, and I sincerely believe you also to be my friend.

Your wisdom and sagacity will doubtless have taught you by the study of history, that the Great God wishes that King to rule who, preserving his subjects in comfort, maintains friendship with his neighbours.

May God preserve you in health and safety, during years innumerable, and believe me that I am anxious to see friendship maintained between us.

The original letter was signed at Tashkend on the 16th June (1872, Russian year) and 23rd of Rubee-oos-Sanee, 1289 of the Mahommedan era, by the Gubernator of Turkestan, General Adjutant von Kaufmann, and the signature is witnessed by me—Islateki Savepuk General Istrode.

Inclosure 5 in No. 7.

Mr. Macnabb to Mr. Griffin.

Peshawur, July 25, 1872.

FORWARDS, for the information of Punjab Government, translation of murrasilla, dated 20th July, 1872, from the Ameer of Cabul to the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan.

Inclosure 6 in No. 7.

Translation of Murrasila, dated 13th Jamadiul-awul, 1289 *H. (July* 20, 1872), *from the Ameer to the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan at Tashkend.*

(After titles, compliments, &c.)

AFTER titles, compliments, &c., your kind despatch of Febral 1872, every letter and word of which expressed tokens, a desire for increasing and confirming the sincere friendship existing between us, reached me in a happy and gratifying time on 3rd Rubee-ul-sanee (corresponding to the 10th June, 1872), and tended to the confirmation of the ties of our mutual friendship and unity.

I mastered the contents of the few lines of your letter, inviting me to send a reply to your friendly communication of 28th October, 1871, and giving some information regarding Sirdar Sekunder Khan, and have to state that the reply to your murrasilla in question was forwarded to you some days before the receipt of your despatch of Febral, 1872, *i.e.*, on 1st Rubee-ul-awul (corresponding to the 9th May, 1872). I conclude that you must have received it ere this. I hope that you will always consider me desirous of the firmness of friendly relations and cordiality.

Inclosure 7 in No. 7.

The Viceroy of India to the Ameer of Cabul.

Simla, September 7, 1872.

I HAVE received through my Agent at Cabul the original letter in Persian and Russian, dated 23rd Rubee-oos-sanee, 1289 A. H., addressed by General von Kaufmann to your Highness. I have also been favoured by the perusal of your Highness' reply to the previous communication of the Russian Governor. For these further tokens of your Highness' courtesy and friendship I beg to express my acknowledgments.

With regard to the reply which it would seem advisable to return to General Kaufmann's letter, I would suggest, for your Highness' consideration, that you should simply acknowledge its receipt with an expression of thanks for the friendly sentiments which it contains. Your Highness might add that you have already, in your letter dated 15th Rubee-oos-sanee, 1287 A. H., and subsequent communications, explained the peaceful policy to which it is your Highness' intention to adhere, and that your Highness confidently looks to General Kaufmann for the maintenance of the same friendly relations on his part, and for the fulfilment of the repeated assurances with regard to Afghanistan which have been given by His Imperial Majesty the Czar and the high officers of the Russian Government to the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of England.

My friend! since the date of my lamented predecessor's letter to your address of the 24th June, 1870, I have no reason to believe that any change has taken place in the views and policy of the Russian Government. On the contrary, I confidently believe that the assurances given by the Russian Government, of which your Highness was informed in that letter, will be strictly and faithfully adhered to.

The original letter from General Kaufmann is herewith returned, and I hope by an early opportunity to forward to your Highness an accurate translation into Persian of the Russian version of that letter.

Inclosure 8 in No. 7.

Mr. Wynne to Mr. Griffin.

Simla, September 7, 1872.

I AM to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 31st July last, giving cover to an original letter received through the Commissioner of Peshawur from the Russian Governor of Turkestan to the address of His Highness the Ameer of Cabul, together with other inclosures.

2. A khureeta from His Excellency the Viceroy to the address of the Ameer is herewith inclosed, and I am to request that it may be forwarded to the Commissioner of Peshawur for early transmission to His Highness. A copy of the khureeta is forwarded for the information of his Honour the Lieutenant Governor.

No. 8.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Duke of Argyll.

My Lord Duke, *Simla, October* 10, 1872.

IN continuation of our despatch, dated the 9th September last, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers regarding two Russian and Persian letters written by the Russian authorities at Tashkend to the Ameer of Cabul and his local Governor in Afghan Turkestan, which have created some anxiety in the mind of His Highness.

We have, &c.
(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
JOHN STRACHEY.
R. TEMPLE.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 8.

Mr. Macnabb to Mr. Aitchison.

Peshawur, September 12, 1872.

SUBMITS copy of translation of a letter dated 5th instant from the British Agent at Cabul, together with two inclosures therein mentioned.

Inclosure 2 in No. 8.

The British Agent at Cabul to Mr. Macnabb.

(Translation.) *September* 5, 1872.

THE two letters mentioned in my letter of 2nd instant, as having been received from the Russian authorities at Tashkend,—one to the address of the Ameer, and the other to the address of Naib Mahommed Alum Khan, Governor of Turkestan, and received by me from His Highness the Ameer,—are forwarded herewith in original, and it is hoped that you will inspect them. The Durbar officials, after perusing both papers, remarked as follows in a private conference:—

"It is mentioned in both these despatches that the Russians are satisfied with the friendly relations hitherto maintained towards them by the Government of Afghanistan; that they consider it their pleasing duty to bring this to the notice of their Emperor; and that they desire that the friendly relations existing between them and the Afghan Government should become more firm and consolidated every day. Under these circumstances, it is a matter of anxiety what ultimate consequences these expressions point to, what will be the purport of the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan's communications to this Government on his return from St. Petersburgh, and what designs the Russian Govern-

ment in reality entertains as regards the Afghan State. Notwithstanding that the Russian authorities are well aware that the Government of Afghanistan is united with the British Government, they openly write, unsolicited, letters for the promotion of their friendship with Afghanistan, and do not relax in the frequency of their communications on the subject, and now they have commenced to send letters to the Governor of Balkh also.

Inclosure 3 in No. 8.

The Governor-General of Tashkend to the Ameer of Cabul.

(Translation.) *7th Jumadi-oos-sanee*, 1298 *H.* (*August* 13, 1872.)

BEFORE my leaving the country of Tashkend, your Highness' welcome and friendly letter dated 14th* Jumadi-ool-awul, 1289 H., reached me, and the receipt of this, your exalted communication, gave me great satisfaction. I am now ready to start for St. Petersburgh for the purpose of communicating to my Imperial master the state of affairs of the countries which His Imperial Majesty has entrusted to me, and also the circumstances connected with those territories of the Khans which are situated in the neighbourhood of our possessions. I do not wish that the bearer of your letter should go away without a letter in answer to yours. Whatever I wrote to say in my former letter I repeat in my present communication, that I cherish no other wish in my heart than that for the tranquillity and repose of my neighbours, inasmuch as such desire accords with the disposition of my Emperor. I am more satisfied because your Highness agrees to follow the same course. I consider it my pleasant duty to bring this commendable intention of your Highness to my Imperial master.

I hope that your Highness will never afterwards allow any change to take place in this laudable course. May God grant you health and happiness! It is my constant prayer to the Almighty that all His creatures may live in peace and tranquillity.

Inclosure 4 in No. 8.

Translation of a Letter from† *to Mahomed Ali Khan,*‡ *dated Tashkend, the 9th Jumadi-oos-sanee,* 1289 *H.* (*August* 15, 1872.)

AFTER expressions of friendship I beg to state that Ahmed Naib, whom you deputed, having left Balkh, arrived in the country of Tashkend on the 15th, and delivered to the Governor-General and the Chief Officer of Turkestan the letter from Ameer Shere Ali Khan, intimating his intention to maintain friendly relations with all. The Governor-General having been gratified with the receipt of the above letter, wrote, agreeably to the requirements of time, a hasty reply, made it over to the said Ahmed Naib, and sent him to you to Balkh. The Governor-General hopes that, on the arrival of the letter, you will forward it to the Ameer of Cabul. It is now three days since the Governor-General has started from this place for St. Petersburgh for the purpose of paying a visit to the Great Emperor. He has commanded me to communicate to you his prayer that the grace of God may be with you, and to request that you will, without loss of time, forward the above letter to the Ameer. Further, it is the wish of the Governor-General that the friendly relations subsisting between the Russians and the Afghans should become more firm and consolidated daily, but the maintenance of such friendly relations depends on the peace and tranquillity of the neighbouring countries. Mahomed Ali Khan, you are a respectable servant of the Ameer, and you are carrying out his intention. May you, please God, continue to follow this laudable course.

It is my prayer to the Almighty that you may continue to enjoy health and happiness.

---

* July 21, 1872.
† No name mentioned.
‡ A mistake for Mahomed *Alum* Khan.

Inclosure 5 in No. 8.

Mr. Aitchison to Mr. Griffin.

Simla, September 30, 1872.

I AM directed to forward, for the purpose of their being returned to the British Agent at Cabul, the accompanying Russian and Persian letters received under a docket from the Commissioner at Peshawur, dated the 12th September, 1872.

2. Should His Highness the Ameer allude to these letters, and manifest the apprehensions which his courtiers entertain, the Agent should be instructed to state that the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council sees in them no ground whatever for apprehension, but rather additional reason for believing that the Russian authorities desire to maintain none of the relations but those of amity with the Government of Afghanistan.

COPY forwarded to the Commissioner of Peshawur for information with reference to his Memorandum dated the 12th instant.

No. 9.

Mr. Merivale to Mr. Hammond.—(Received January 31.)

Sir, *India Office, January* 30, 1873.

I AM directed by the Duke of Argyll to forward, for the information of Earl Granville, copy of a despatch from the Government of India, dated the 20th December, 1872, with inclosed copies of Cabul Diaries; and I am to request that, in laying these papers before his Lordship, you will suggest to him the expediency of forwarding a copy to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, a course which his Lordship may possibly consider advisable with reference to this as well as to future correspondence relating to Central Asia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HERMAN MERIVALE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Duke of Argyll.

My Lord Duke, *Fort William, December* 20, 1872.

IN continuation of our despatch, dated the 11th October, 1872, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter relative to the affairs of Afghanistan.

We are, &c.
(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE,
E. C. BAYLEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

Translation of a Letter from the Correspondent at Tashkoorghan to the Agent at Cabul, dated 22*nd Rajab* (26*th September*, 1872).

I WROTE to you before that Sirdar Abdool Rahman Khan had gone to Orenburg. A Lahanee lately arrived at Tashkoorghan from Samarcand on account of the death of his brother at Tashkoorghan. He says that when the Sirdar had gone three stages from Tashkend another Governor-General came from Russia to relieve the former Goovernatt, and questioned the Sirdar for what purpose he had intended to go to Orenburg. The Sirdar said that he would petition the Emperor that he had not come to his dominions to

seek subsistence, or to ask for the grant of any troops, but that he desires that His Imperial Majesty should grant him ten light guns and four lakhs of zangas for expenses as far as the Oxus, as he hopes that, by the grace of God, Afghanistan would fall into his possession. Also, that if the Emperor does not accept his petition, he would request him to allow him to proceed to any direction he should please. The new Governor-General told him to return to Samarcand, and said that he would undertake to obtain a reply for him from the Emperor in forty days regarding the grant of the above-mentioned guns and the money, or for permission to proceed to any place he wishes to go. The Sirdar has, therefore, returned to Samarcand pending the receipt of the above reply.

Inclosure 3 in No. 9.

The Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to Mr. Aitchison.

Peshawur, November 18, 1872.

SUBMITS, for information of the Supreme Government, translation of Cabul Diary, from the 8th to the 11th November, 1872, inclusive, together with its annexures.

Inclosure 4 in No. 9.

Extract from Cabul Diary from the 8th to the 11th November, 1872, inclusive.

THE messenger sent by Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, whose apprehension at Cabul was mentioned in the Cabul Diary of the 7th instant, on being rigorously examined represented as follows:—

"I recollect that three guns, which could be drawn by mules, were cast in the iron factory at Balkh. Of these two were missed from the said factory, and I saw them concealed at Samarcand in the house of Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan. Some of the Meers of Turkestan send rebellious letters from Balkh to the Sirdar. I do not know their names. I have brought no letter from him, except that for Azimudin Khan, Commandant of the Jezailchees in Indrah."

After hearing these representations, the Ameer remarked that, in forwarding a reply to the murrasilla dated the 1st August, 1872, or the 9th Jamadiul Sani, or the 14th August, 1872, from the Russian Governor-General at Tashkend to the address of Naib Mahomed Alum Khan, Governor of Turkestan, which was received at Cabul on the 2nd September, 1872, and to which no reply has yet been sent, the Naib should fully mention the above-described hostile conduct of Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, and that, after transmitting the original letter from the Sirdar to the address of Azimudin Khan to the Russian Governor-General, he should request him to hold the Sirdar answerable for the submission of such communications. His Highness further observed that a copy of the letter received by Azimudin Khan from the Sirdar, together with a copy of the murrasilla, which will be forwarded to the Officiating Russian Governor-General, on the part of Naib Mahomed Alum Khan, should be submitted to the British Government, with a view to their being forwarded to the Russian Government through the British Ambassador, requesting them to adopt suitable measures regarding the hostile behaviour of the Sirdar.

A murrasilla has therefore been sent to Naib Mahomed Alum Khan, to the address of the Russian Governor-General at Tashkend, together with the original letter received from Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan. The Naib will forward them in the usual manner, by hand of one of his agents, to Tashkend, after attaching his seal to the murrasilla. Copies of both of these papers are inclosed by desire of the Ameer. His Highness ordered Mahomed Umar Khan, Baghban Bashi, and Mirza Abdul Haah Khan, trusted agents of Naib Mahomed Alum Khan, to proceed quickly to Turkestan, and wrote to the Naib that he should endeavour as far as possible to arrange for the security of his border, and transfer any of the men of the Hajdahuahri cavalry who may be considered unfit for service in Turkestan, or may be suspected of raising disturbances, &c.

Inclosure 5 in No. 9.

Abstract Translation of a Letter (no date) from Naib Mahomed Alum Khan to the Russian Governor-General at Tashkend.

YOUR predecessor's letter of the 9th Jamadiul-Sani to my address, together with a murrasilla to the address of His Highness the Ameer, reached me in a happy time and gratified me exceedingly. The murrassilla to the address of the Ameer was submitted in the usual manner to His Highness quickly. In accordance with the instructions of the Ameer, I beg to state that, as regards the observance of peace and tranquillity of the two Kingdoms, the system which I have hitherto observed will be upheld in future also, but a surprising event has recently occurred. Notwithstanding that Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan is so distant from our territory as Samarcand, he desires to shake the ties of friendship existing between us, and to disturb the peace enjoyed by the people. He has lately sent a letter in an unbecoming style to Azimudin Khan, one of my adherents, and I submit the same in original to you, hoping that you will properly restrain him from entertaining such evil designs in future, in order that the friendship existing between us and the tranquillity enjoyed by the people may be confirmed. I beg to inform you that, merely on account of the friendship existing between the Ameer and the Russian Government, His Highness did not allow Meer Sarrah Beg Khan, ex-Governor of Kulab, to remain near Turkestan or Bokhara border, but kept him at Cabul. If, in like manner, Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan be kept in a place very far from Afghanistan border, it will tend to the promotion of the friendship existing between you and our Government. To this letter his Excellency has applied his Yakrukha seal, which is always held by his Mustowfee, Abdul Rahman Khan, Toki. The Dorokha seal is used by the Sirdar himself. The bearer of the letter, by name Ahmed, a man with squinting eyes and an impediment in speaking, says that it has been written by Mirza Abdul Majid, son of Mirza Ramsan, resident of Cabul, at present at Samarcand, of tall stature, dark complexion, long beard, and large eyes.

Inclosure 6 in No. 9.

Abstract Translation of a Letter (no date) from Sirdar Rahman Khan to Azimudin Khan.

AS I have been informed that you bear friendship and affection for me, I have taken the opportunity of sending this letter to you. If you desire to propagate the Mahommedan religion, I hope you will gallantly join in partizanship with me, along with your friends, and propagate the Prophet's faith. The world is not always in one condition. You should exert yourself in a manly manner in the propagation of our religion, because Shere Ali Khan is a servant of the English, and will ruin you, the Mahommedans. May I not be held answerable by God or the Prophet? If you exert zealously you will gain both, this world and eternity; you will gain nothing by doing service to Shere Ali Khan; if you render yourself useful to me for a few days you will be exalted in both worlds.

No. 10.

Sir J. Kaye to Mr. Hammond.—(Received August 14.)

Sir, *India Office, August 14, 1873.*

I AM directed by the Duke of Argyll to forward, for submission of Earl Granville, copy of a despatch from the Government of India, Secret, dated the 30th June, 1873, containing a résumé of the past, and suggestions for the future policy of the British Government as regards Central Asia. I am to request that, in laying these papers before his Lordship, you will invite his special attention to the suggestion contained in paragraph 21, to the effect that a copy of the despatch now forwarded should be communicated to the Russian Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. WM. KAYE.

Inclosure in No. 10.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Duke of Argyll, No. 60, Secret, Simla, June 30, 1873.

[See Papers published by India Office, No. 22, p. 103.]

No. 11.

Sir J. W. Kaye to Mr. Hammond.—(Received August 14.)

Sir, *India Office, August 14, 1873.*

I AM directed by the Duke of Argyll to forward, for submission to Earl Granville, copy of a despatch from the Government of India, dated the 30th June, 1873, suggesting that advantage should be taken of the good understanding that at present exists between the British and Russian Governments to arrive at a definition of the northern and western boundaries of Yarkand. I am to state that his Grace is of opinion that it would be advisable, in the first instance, that Lord A. Loftus should be instructed (should Earl Granville concur) to take an opportunity, in the course of conversation, to touch upon the subject with the view of eliciting an expression of opinion as to the spirit in which such a proposal would be viewed by the Cabinet at St. Petersburgh.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. WM. KAYE.

Inclosure in No. 11.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Duke of Argyll.

(Secret.)

My Lord Duke, *Simla, June 30, 1873.*

IN our Secret despatch of this date we have communicated our views as to the general policy agreed upon between the Governments of England and Russia in regard to their dealings with the countries which lie between their respective possessions in the East, and in paragraph 9 of that despatch we have expressed our satisfaction at the acceptance by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh of the views of Her Majesty's Government upon the question of the boundaries of Afghanistan.

2. The line of the Oxus from Khojah Saleh as far as Woods (Victoria) Lake has now been recognized as the northern frontier of the Ameer's possessions.

3. In connection with this subject, we desire to invite your Grace's attention to a representation made by the Yarkand Envoy to his Excellency the Viceroy, regarding the boundaries of Yarkand. From the memorandum of conversation, under cover of our Secret despatch dated 14th March, 1873, your Grace will observe that the Envoy expressed a hope that, in the event of any further discussions between the British Government and Russia with regard to the boundaries of Central Asian States, opportunity would not be lost of obtaining a definition of the boundaries of Yarkand.

4. We were unwilling, during the continuance of the recent negotiations regarding the boundaries of Afghanistan, to give expression to any views which would have the effect of introducing a fresh element into that discussion. Now, however, that those negotiations have been carried to a satisfactory conclusion, we feel ourselves at liberty to represent to Her Majesty's Government the expediency of taking advantage of the good understanding that exists at present between the two Governments to arrive at a definition of the northern and western boundaries of Yarkand. Such a definition we consider would be advantageous to the peace and tranquillity of Central Asia, and would complete the good work which has been so far carried out with the assistance of the Russian Government.

5. Mr. Forsyth will be instructed to collect, during his approaching mission to

Yarkand, the fullest possible geographical information regarding the countries now under the rule of the Ataligh Ghazee.

We have, &c.
(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
R. TEMPLE.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.

No. 12.

Mr. Hammond to Sir J. W. Kaye.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 25, 1873.*

I HAVE laid before Lord Granville your letters of the 14th instant, one inclosing a despatch from the Government of India of the 30th June, reviewing the late negotiations with Russia respecting the boundaries of Afghanistan; the other, a despatch of the same date, suggesting that a proposal should be made to Russia with the view of defining the northern and western boundary of Yarkand; and I am to request that you will state to the Duke of Argyll that Lord Granville would not think it desirable to communicate to the Russian Government, as suggested by the Indian Government, a copy of the former despatch, and so convey to it indirectly an intimation that any aggression by it on Afghanistan would be resisted by Great Britain with force of arms; and his Lordship would not think it expedient to run the risk of raising, without absolute and pressing necessity at the present moment, any question with Russia respecting the frontiers of Yarkand, as suggested in the latter despatch.

Lord Granville, however, desires that the opinions expressed in this letter may be considered simply as having reference to the propriety of present action in either of the points referred to, and not as indicating any desire or tendency to modify the policy which it has been agreed upon to pursue in Central Asia generally, and with respect to Afghanistan in particular.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

CENTRAL ASIA. No. 1 (1878).

CORRESPONDENCE respecting Central Asia.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1878.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

CENTRAL ASIA. No. 2 (1878).

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

CENTRAL ASIA.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1878.

LONDON:
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Further Correspondence respecting Central Asia.

No. 1.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(Received October 2.)

My Lord, *India Office, September 30, 1878.*

I AM directed by Viscount Cranbrook to forward herewith, to be laid before Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copies of further letters from the Government of India, with inclosed News Reports from Afghanistan and adjacent countries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

The Governor-General of India in Council to Viscount Cranbrook.

My Lord, *Simla, August 26, 1878.*

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of News Reports received through the Government of the Punjab.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.
S. J. BROWNE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

News-letter from the Government Agent at Peshawur, dated August 3, 1878.

Statement made by ——— ———.

(Confidential.)

A EUROPEAN Envoy of the Russian Government, attended by two Musahibs (Aides-de-camp) and forty-five attendants, arrived at Cabul on the 21st Rajab (22nd July, 1878), and was received by Sirdar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, son of the Ameer, who went out with General Daud Shah and two troops of cavalry. The Envoy was lodged in the State garden in Balahisar, and Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Sirdar Ibrahim Khan are appointed to look after his comforts. The Envoy had an audience with the Ameer the following day, and laid before him presents consisting of articles of Russian manufacture—arms, a musical box, and a watch, which were accepted. It was learnt at the place of Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan that the Envoy had been entrusted by his Government with certain proposals for the execution of a Treaty between Russia and Afghanistan.

The Envoy stated before the Ameer that friendly relations existed between the

Russian Government and His Highness for some time past, and that the Russian authorities desired that this friendship should be strengthened and perpetuated by the execution of a Treaty of Amity.

The Ameer is said to have remarked in reply that the matter required consideration and consultation with his Ministers and the Grandees of his State, and that a proper reply would be given to the proposal after this had been done.

After this conversation the audience broke up, and the Envoy returned to his lodging.

It is rumoured in Cabul that the object of the Envoy in coming to the Ameer's capital is to try to induce His Highness to break off all friendly relations with the British Government, and to contract an alliance with Russia. The Ministers of the Ameer's Court are generally of opinion that His Highness will not enter into any engagement with Russia which will impose a condition of Russian interference with his country. It is, moreover, said that the Ameer asserts that he would like an English officer of excellence, learning, and acquainted with the affairs of Afghanistan, to come to Cabul for a few days in the capacity of Envoy from the British Government, with whom he may personally discuss the proceedings which passed between him and the English Government within the last few years, when he would acknowledge, without any grudging, any blame which might be justly thrown on him, but at the same time the British Envoy should acknowledge (or give in) if, with reference to the principles of justice, he is convinced of the soundness of His Highness' objections to the proposals made to him by the British Government.

The Ameer further remarks that he is quite aware that the news-writers in the employ of the two Governments (Cabul and the English) have unnecessarily widened the gulf of imaginary differences. His Highness says that a small territory, of which he is the Ruler, lies between the dominions of two Great Powers, and that, as a matter of policy, and in the interests of his country, he will incline himself towards the party whose alliance would be deemed more beneficial to him. It is said that the Chief is now in great anxiety on account of the arrival of the European Russian Envoy at his capital.

An anonymous writer sent a petition to the Ameer from Peshawur, in which he informed the Chief that the British and the Russian Governments were on friendly terms with each other, and agreed in the unity of purpose, that Persia was on the side of Russia, and the Persian territory adjoins the Russian possessions, and that the three Powers desired to somehow take possession of His Highness' dominions and to partition them among themselves. The writer further remarked that it was known that Turkey was first weakened, and that Russia, England, and the other Powers then interfered with the country and encumbered the Turkish exchequer with a large war indemnity; and that, under these circumstances, the Chief should not be lax in the administration of the affairs of his country at such a critical time, but should issue arms and money to the different tribes inhabiting the hills and the plains, and induce them to be ready to engage in a religious war in his behalf.

The petition having been read to the Ameer, His Highness uttered hundreds of abusive words against its writer, and tore it up.

The reporter of this news learnt at Gandmak, while on his way to Peshawur, that Shah Mard Khan, late Hakim of Jellalabad, died at Cabul.

The nobles of Afghanistan are pouring into the capital.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Extract from News-letter from the Government Agent at Peshawur, dated August 4, 1878.

(Confidential.)

A TRADER who has come from Turkestan states that the Russian Envoy, who lately arrived at Cabul, formerly held the office of Hakim of Samarcand. Probably he is General Ibramoff. The man remarks that, in the month of Jamadi-ul-auwal, 1295 (May 1878), the Russian authorities held a Council in private chambers, and proposed that if the Ameer of Cabul displayed a friendly spirit towards them and accepted their proposals the Russian Government will also treat him in a friendly manner; otherwise they would aid Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, the nephew of the Ameer of Cabul, who is now at Samarcand, in subjugating Maimana, Balkh, and Badakhshan as far as the Hindu-kush mountain, and annex the country thus conquered to the Russian dominions, and then help the Sirdar in taking possession of the rest of Afghanistan. When the Russian Envoy alluded to above started from Tashkend towards Samarcand, Balkh, and Cabul, it was proposed by the Russian authorities to remove Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan from Samar-

cand, and to station him either at Cabul or Hisar to frighten the Ameer. The Turkestan trader further stated that when he left Turkestan the Ameer of Bokhara was at Karshi and Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan was at Samarcand. Also, that a detachment of the Russian force was quartered on the road to Karshi to the west of Shaihr-i-Sabz and east of Samarcand. He says that Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan was preparing to start for Cabul and Hisar on the 15th Jamadi-ul-auwal (15th May), and that he was thence to proceed towards Karki and Charjui. The trader left Samarcand on the 15th Jamadi-ul-auwal and arrived at Peshawur viâ Kharoz, Sherabad, Balkh, Cabul, and Jellalabad. He proposes to go to Mecca on a pilgrimage.

——— ———, who arrived at Peshawur on the 4th instant, states that on the evening of the 2nd of the month Faiz Muhammad Khan, Ghilzai, the officer in charge of the fort of Ali Musjid, now at Lohargi, received news from the Ameer of Cabul to the effect that there was a rumour that, by assistance of the Russians, Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan was about to attack Miani and Balkh. The Ameer is said to have intimated to the officer that, if the above report proves to be correct, the troops now stationed at Dhakka will be ordered to proceed to Balkh, and that they will be replaced at Dhakka by irregular infantry, which would be under his command. Faiz Muhammad Khan has, in the meantime, been desired by the Ameer to forward the Elders of the tribes residing in Khyber and Shinwar to Cabul without delay; and he has been told that, as detachments of regular and irregular troops and young men enlisted from among His Highness' subjects are being summoned to Cabul from different parts of the country to impress upon the Russian Envoy the greatness of the Afghanistan Government, he was excused from attendance and was charged with the protection of the frontiers. The Ameer has sent a musket to Faiz Muhammad Khan. The weapon can be fired thirty-six times in a minute. Faiz Muhammad Khan is said to have observed that the coffin of Shah Mard Khan was brought to Jellalabad on the back of an elephant and buried there.

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

News-letter from a Correspondent at Peshawur, dated August 6, 1878.

(Confidential.)

SAYAD ABDUL KRIM KHAN, Ghazi, arrived at Peshawur at 9 o'clock last night. He was accompanied by twenty-five horsemen, and I and the Tahsildar of the Sub-Collectorate took him to Gorakpuri, near the Tahsil House, where he was lodged; and, as desired by the Deputy-Commissioner, every hospitality was shown him. It being previously arranged, we took Abdul Krim Khan to the house of the Deputy-Commissioner at a quarter past 9 o'clock this morning. He rode in a carriage drawn by two horses, and was accompanied by four of his Uzbak horsemen as orderlies. After the Khan exchanged the usual compliments with the Deputy-Commissioner and took his seat, the officer inquired of him the cause of his leaving Cabul for Peshawur, and he made the following statement in reply:—

"Khokand having taken up arms against the Russians, and Sayad Khudayar Khan and his son Nasir-ud-din Khan having been deposed, and Faulad Khan having been killed, the State officials in Farganah appointed me to the Khanship of Khokand, and I waged a religious war against the Russians, and fought with Generals Iskoboloff and Kalpakoff, &c., at Sukh, Chartgh Indijan, Gulshah, Osh, Takht Suliman and Dasht Alai; Abdul Ghufar Beg, Dewanbegi, Abullah Beg, Umar Beg, Suleman Hudaechi, Kurban Beg Hudaechi, Mahmud Beg, Eshak Akasi, and other grandees were with me in the field. At last, having run short of materials for carrying on the war, I and Abdullah Beg arrived at Cabul, while my other companions stopped at Khunduz by direction of the Ameer of Afghanistan. Umar Beg died at Cabul eighteen months ago. I stopped at Cabul for two years, first in the State garden outside the city and then in a State building in the Khabgah street of the town. I had a large number of men with me; but as the Ameer allowed me an allowance of 400 rupees per mensem only, and the amount was not sufficient for the support of the whole party, the majority of the people wandered away. When I lately heard that a Russian General was coming to Cabul with great pomp in the capacity of an Envoy I did not think it advisable to stop there, as I had fought agains the Russians several times. Moreover, the Ameer seemed to be less favourably inclined towards me since he heard the report that the Envoy was coming to his capital, and, as I heard that the Ameer desired to treat me in a different manner, I left Cabul on the pretence that I desired to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca, and have come under the shadow

of the great English Government. I intend to wait upon the Lord Sahib and have a talk with him."

The Deputy-Commissioner heard the above statement of the Khan with great attention. After some other conversation the officer directed, as a matter of generosity that the Khan be allowed a daily allowance of 40 rupees, and 280 rupees were forthwith paid to him on account of one week's allowance. He also informed the Khan that his arrival will be reported to the Lord Sahib, and that if his Honour is pleased to give permission for his waiting upon him he will be sent on.

With reference to the arrival of the Russian Envoy at Cabul, who is said to have reached that place on the 20th or 21st of Rajab (21st or 22nd of July), the Khan stated that the Ambassador did not get there before his leaving the town. He said he reached Peshawur on the twelfth day after leaving Cabul, and that he made halts of a day each at Jellalabad and Lalpura. It appears from this statement that the Khan left Cabul on the 25th July or the 24th Rajab. The difference between the date of the entry into Cabul of the Russian Envoy and the date on which Sayad Abdul Krim Khan left that place is three days. On the Deputy-Commissioner's further questioning the Sayad on the subject, he stated that when he left Cabul preparations were being made there for the reception and hospitable treatment of the Envoy, but that the Envoy's party had not then come in. It is probable that, as the movements of the Envoy between Balkh and Cabul were eagerly watched by correspondents, they reported his arrival there in anticipation, when he was still at a distance of a stage or two from the Ameer's capital. At the same time it may be stated that the Uzbaks are not very expert in remembering the dates on which they leave a place, and so it cannot be said whether the Khan was right in saying that he made up the journey between Cabul and Peshawur in twelve days.

Besides the Deputy-Commissioner and the Khan, the only other persons present at the interview were Sayad Abdul Khan Tarah, Pandit Durga Pershad, the Tahsildar of Peshawur and myself. I acted as interpreter for Turki, Persian, and Urdu, in which the conversation was conducted, and performed the duty thus entrusted to me in a satisfactory manner. The day's proceedings are as reported above.

Inclosure 5 in No. 1.

Extract from Confidential News-letter from a Correspondent at Jellalabad, dated 7th of Shaban, 1295 (August 7, 1878).

(Translation.)

THERE is a rumour that the 3,000 horsemen who came with the Russian Envoy as far as Jam are now quartered at Sherabad. The Ameer has collected (and placed under guard) all the boats available at the several ferries of the Hamun river in his territory. The Russian Envoy has presented the Ameer with 1 lakh of rupees cash and a valuable khillat, which His Highness accepted. The Envoy has been lodged in the Shah garden, and Sirdar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, son of the Ameer, attends to his comforts. No discussions have yet taken place between the Envoy and the Ameer. Mir Akhor Ahmad Khan, the Hakim of Jellalabad, does not yet believe that a new Russian Envoy has arrived a Cabul.

Inclosure 6 in No. 1.

The Governor-General of India in Council to Viscount Cranbrook.

My Lord, *Simla, August* 26, 1878.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of Peshawur Confidential Diaries.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.
S. J. BROWNE.

Inclosure 7 in No. .

Extract from Peshawur Confidential Diary, dated August 7, 1878.

THE Russian Envoy entered Cabul on the 22nd July. In a private letter from Cabul it is stated that the Chief of the Mission is General Abramoff, Governor of Samarcand. Openly the people speak of the Envoy as the "General Sahib." A salute of guns was fired in honour of the arrival of the Mission.

A man has passed through Peshawur on his way to Kashmir, to communicate to Sirdar Yahya Khan that the Russian Envoy, at the request of the Persian authorities, made at the solicitation of Sirdar Muhammad Ayub Khan, has spoken to the Ameer in favour of Sirdar Muhammad Yakub Khan, and that it is thought that the Ameer would do something to meet the Envoy's wishes.

A rumour has been reported that a Persian Envoy is expected to reach Cabul. This cannot be considered authentic as yet, though it is by no means improbable.

A number of the Adam Khel Afreedees, chiefly Jowakis, passed through the Khyber on the 31st July on their way to Cabul. Their object is to try and get some rifles from the Ameer, in accordance with the promise he made them in the spring.

The Russian Envoy is said to have full power from the Czar to arrange a Treaty with the Ameer. He has made his proposals, but the counter-proposals of the Ameer have not yet been decided on. Some Russian troops are stationed between Samarcand and Karshi, and it has been stated that the reason for this movement is to watch the proceedings of certain malcontent Begs of Khokand, who are said to be meditating some disturbances in Kolab and in the vicinity of Shahr Sabz.

The Russian Envoy was received in Durbar at 2 P.M. on the 22nd July. He wore a chogha over his uniform. The Ameer, Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, Sirdar Ahmed Ali Khan, Sirdar Abdulla Jan, and the Mustaufi were present. The audience lasted until 5 o'clock P.M. It took place in the "Seratcha."

One Haji Sofi Bai of Khokand arrived at Peshawur on the 2nd August, and stated that, when at Jellalabad, he heard of the arrival at Cabul of the Russian Envoy with fifty Russian and fifty Mahommedan (Uzbeg) sowars. He heard that it was the Governor of Samarcand. He reported that 18,000 Russian troops* were encamped three stages from the Oxus, and that roads were under construction. He said there were no preparations for making a bridge of boats on the Oxus. He heard it stated that the Russians contemplated war with the Chinese in Kashgar, and also that they intended asking the Ameer of Cabul to concede Turkestan for Sirdar Abdur Rahman Khan. Abdul Malik, the son of the Ameer of Bokhara, is still at Cabul, although the Ameer (Shere Ali Khan) wished him to go to Bokhara.

News-letter from Cabul reports that on Saturday, the 26th July, the Ameer received the Russian Envoy at a private audience, at which Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan was the only Minister present. After this a public Durbar followed, at which the Envoy gave the under-mentioned presents:—

To the Ameer, six rifles and a watch.
To the Heir Apparent, a watch and a musical-box.
To Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, a watch.
To Sirdar Ahmed Ali Khan, a watch.
To Mustaufi Habibulla Khan, a watch.
To Ismatulla Khan, Ghilzai, a watch.
To Mirza Nabbi Khan (Private Secretary), a watch.

The Heir Apparent was prevented through ill-health from attending the Durbar. He had gone to Ali Ahad for change of air. The Ameer received the presents on his behalf.

It is stated that the Ameer is about to call in all the regiments in the neighbourhood of Cabul, probably in order to have a grand review before the Russian Envoy. The Khans and leading men who draw allowances have been ordered to get ready with their followers, no one to have less than ten men.

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* He stated he saw some troops here and there, and heard there were altogether the number he has reported. He had been over two months on the road. (Signed) N. C.

Inclosure 8 in No. 1.

Extracts from Peshawur Confidential Diary, dated August 14, 1878.

ONE ——— ———, of Cabul, on his way to Amritsur, gave information that he was present when the Russian Envoy entered Cabul. Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, General Daud Shah, and the Mustaufi, with some other officials, went out to meet him. The usual military salutes were fired. The Ameer received the Envoy at the "Seratcha." The Envoy and his attendants wore Russian dress. The Envoy talks a little Persian, but he seemed to understand it well. On the same day the Ameer had a long secret interview with the Envoy. Nobody was allowed to enter the Durbar. What took place has not transpired. The people of Cabul think that the Russian proposals will be more than the Ameer can comply with. Some of the Durbar officials are in favour of the English, and some urge the Ameer to comply with the Russian requests.

All the way from Turkestan to Cabul the Russian Envoy was supplied with everything he required; and, since his arrival at Cabul, the Ameer directed food, fruits, &c., to be sent him. The 26th July was fixed for a ceremonial visit to the Ameer in Durbar. Seven elephants were sent to bring the Envoy and his attendants to the Durbar. The "Zirih-posh" (chain-armour) cavalry and the body-guard were drawn up to receive him at the "Seracha" gate. The Envoy made complimentary remarks on the appearance of the troops, and said they were quite as good as he had heard they were. General Daud Shah led the Envoy to where the Ameer was seated. The Ameer rose and shook hands with the Envoy, and seated him beside him, and made the usual inquiries after his health. The Durbar lasted two hours. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon, one of the Envoy's aides-de-camp took the presents intended for the Ameer and his Ministers (another account stated that they were presented by the Envoy in Durbar, which is the usual custom). The Ameer does not allow any one to visit the Envoy, but Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, the Mustaufi, and certain special attendants. The Envoy delivered two letters to the Ameer—one from the Czar, and the other from the Governor-General at Tashkend.

The Envoy had private interview with the Ameer for two hours on the 30th July.

The Russian Envoy inspected the Ameer's workshops. He expressed his satisfaction at what he had seen, and said that the Afghan workmen would become very skilled if Russian artizans were permitted to come and teach them. He also spoke about trade, and suggested to the Ameer to lower the import duties, and permit Russian merchants to travel freely through Afghanistan. The above are the only public proposals the Envoy has made. Some of the Envoy's attendants have given out that it is intended to visit the frontiers of Afghanistan.

A grand review of the troops took place on the 2nd August, but, owing to the heat of the day, it did not last long. On the following day the Envoy visited the Ameer in Durbar. Conversation took place regarding the Ameer's unsatisfactory relations with the British Government. The Envoy replied that he had heard about it. The conversation then turned upon trade, and the Envoy proposed that the Ameer should lower the duties, and allow Russian merchants to visit Afghanistan. Some talk then followed about the Turks, the Russians, and the English, and the Durbar was closed. The Ameer gave the Envoy written replies to the letters that had been brought by the Envoy. Special Russian horsemen, escorted by some Afghan sowars, conveyed them towards Turkestan. It is said that the Ameer requested the Envoy to remain at Cabul until a reply was received to these letters. The general impression is that the Ameer has not concluded any definite arrangement with the Russian Envoy, and that he is trying to gain time, with the view to watching what action the British Government will take.

For some time after the news of the arrival of the Russian Mission at Cabul had reached Peshawur, the matter did not attract much notice. People regarded it at first as one of the ordinary Missions sent by the Russians to Cabul. During the past week it has attracted more attention, and people are wondering what the Government will do.

Inclosure 9 in No. 1.

Peshawur Confidential Diary, dated August 16, 1878.

1. AT the review held in honour of the Russian Envoy, the Ameer wore the uniform of a General Officer.

2. An express from Turkestan brought letters from Samarcand to Cabul from the Russian Governor-General. The Ameer sent it to the Russian Envoy through Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan and the Mustaufi. The Envoy replied that he had heard that the letter had been dispatched to the Ameer's address, and that he would visit the Ameer on the following day and discuss the subject.

3. Excepting the openly expressed proposals by the Envoy regarding trade and artizans for the Ameer's workshops (to both of which the Ameer gave no reply, and changed the subject of the conversation), nothing has transpired regarding any definite proposals made by the Russian Mission. It has been reported that the Envoy has been trying to induce the Ameer to consent to some arrangement by which Sirdar Abdur Rahman Khan should be entrusted with the Government of Balkh. A rumour of a similar kind regarding intercession for Sirdar Yakub Khan has already been reported. It seems somewhat improbable that the Russian Mission, if it desired to court the Ameer's good-will, would have, at such an early stage, put forward proposals which could not but irritate him.

4. In the conversation which took place between the Envoy and the Ameer during one of the late interviews, when the conversation turned on European politics, the Ameer was very bitter against the English.

5. The Russian Envoy left a portion of his escort at each of the stages between Cabul and the Oxus, ostensibly to convey despatches, but really to survey the country. It is reported that they have been very active in this respect, but have exercised a due amount of caution, doing as much as they can by night.

6. At Cabul the Russian Mission conducts all its secret inquiries, and sends messages to Sirdars and others, through merchants who are well known to the Russian authorities.

7. As a precautionary measure, the Ameer has decided to send for the leading men of Jellalabad, Candahar, and Kuram, for fear of their being intrigued with from the British frontier. Some of the Chiefs of the Turis of Kuram have been kept at Cabul on this account.

8. The Ameer tried to persuade the Buner Jirga, which lately visited Cabul, to agree to furnish a number of men to do service on the frontier, promising them that a handsome allowance would be paid to the tribe. The deputation replied that it would consult the tribe.

(Signed) N. CAVAGNARI, *Major*,
On Special Political Duty.

No. 2.

Lord A. Loftus to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 14.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, September* 27, 1878.

ON my passage through Baden-Baden, on the 22nd instant, I had an interview with Prince Gortchakow, who was then residing there.

Although His Highness professed to be ignorant on passing events, he replied, on my referring to the question of Afghanistan, in exactly the same terms as those used by M. de Giers in his note to Mr. Plunkett of the 8th instant, stating that the Mission of General Stoletoff to Cabul was purely one of courtesy, and of a provisional nature, observing that the Emperor could never forego his right of sending complimentary missions to any foreign Sovereigns or neighbouring Princes. "Do not forget," said His Highness, "that the Emperor is an independent Sovereign ruler over 80,000,000 of subjects." I replied to his Highness that I was aware of this fact, as also that our Gracious Sovereign the Queen was ruler over more than 200,000,000 of subjects. "Yes," said his Highness, "but they are dispersed and scattered—the Russian Empire is one and united."

With regard to Afghanistan I observed to Prince Gortchakow that I was returning from a short excursion to Italy, and was, consequently, without any official intormation or instructions. I could not, however, refrain from remarking to his Highness that the very fact of sending a Mission to Cabul was, in my opinion, a violation of the compact and engagements which Russia had entered into with England, adding that it was the more incomprehensible to me, inasmuch as on a late occasion, and only a few days before my departure, M. de Giers had expressly denied to me that there had been, or was, any intention on the part, either of the Emperor or of General Kaufmann, of sending a Mission to Cabul.

Prince Gortchakow merely repeated what he had previously stated that the Mission was one of courtesy, and added that probably M. de Giers, at the moment he gave me the assurance, had not been informed of it. Prince Gortchakow observed that it was true that military measures had been devised when a war between England and Russia appeared to be imminent, but that they had been countermanded and the troops recalled. His Highness then explicitly stated that the Imperial Government would maintain their engagement with England in regard to Afghanistan; that they had no wish or object to interpose in the affairs of that kingdom, and that the Ameer of Afghanistan, in the event of war, would receive no assistance either in arms or money from Russia.

No. 3.

Mr. R. Thomson to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 14.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October* 14, 1878.

THE Asterabad Agent reports that the Russians have retreated, fighting their way from Khoja Kala to Chat. A large caravan of provisions was cut off by the Tekkeh Turkomans on its way from Krasnovodsk. General Llamakin has since retired to Chikislar, leaving a small detachment at Chat and Bayat Hajiki; on the retreat from Chat he is said to have been again attacked, and to have suffered some loss.

No. 4.

Mr. Stanhope to Lord Tenterden.—(*Received October* 18.)

My Lord, *India Office, October* 18, 1878.

I AM directed by Viscount Cranbrook to forward herewith, for the information of the Marquis of Salisbury, copies of letters from the Government of India, with accompanying Diaries and News Reports, in reference to the affairs of Afghanistan and adjacent countries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD STANHOPE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 4.

The Governor-General of India in Council to Viscount Cranbrook.

My Lord, *Simla, September* 9, 1878.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the "Journal of Political Events on the West and North-West Frontier" for the month of August 1878.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.
S. J. BROWNE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 4.

Extract from Journal of Political Events on the West and North-West Frontier for August 1878.

AFGHANISTAN, AND THE COUNTRIES FURTHER WEST AND NORTH-WEST.

1.—*Cabul.*

THE Russian Envoy, whose arrival at Cabul was mentioned in the last Journal, has been received with every honour. He was met by Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, one of the Ameer's sons, and conducted to quarters in the Royal Gardens of the Bala Hissar. Sirdar Ibrahim Khan and the Mustaufi Habibulla have been specially appointed to entertain the Mission.

On the 26th July General Abramoff,(?) with the officers of his staff, paid a ceremonial visit to the Ameer. Seven elephants were sent for their conveyance, and the Envoy was received at the gate of the palace by the Ameer's body-guard.

General Daud Shah then led the Envoy into the presence of the Ameer, who rose and shook hands with him. After the usual formalities General Abramoff (?) presented two letters to the Ameer, one from the Czar and one from General Kaufmann. The Durbar lasted two hours.

On the 30th July the Russian Envoy had a private interview with the Ameer, which also lasted two hours.

On the 2nd August General Abramoff (?) witnessed a review of the troops, comprising twenty-two battalions of infantry and cavalry, with some artillery, and is said to have expressed his satisfaction at their bearing and equipment. Detachments are stated to have been withdrawn from all the outlying garrisons of Afghanistan in order to muster as large a force as possible for the Envoy's inspection.

The next day General Abramoff (?) was received at a second interview, at which he presented his gifts, chiefly consisting of firearms, watches, musical boxes, &c. One account mentions that a lakh of rupees in cash was also given. After receiving the presents the Ameer gave two letters to General Abramoff, (?) one for the Czar and one for General Kaufmann, which were at once dispatched by special messengers to Russian Turkestan.

Various rumours are afloat as to the objects of the Russian Mission. The reports cannot be regarded as entirely trustworthy, but are mentioned *quantum valeant.* Such are the encouragement of Russian trade in the country, the appointment of Russian artizans in the Ameer's workshops, a survey of the country lying between the Oxus and Cabul, and the acquisition of as much information as possible regarding the military strength and resources of Afghanistan. The survey has apparently been already commenced by small parties of men, left by General Abramoff (?) for the purpose, at the different stages of the road traversed by the Mission. According to other rumours General Abramoff (?) has been authorized to press for an alliance which is to give Russia the right of making roads, establishing a telegraph line, and, should occasion arise, moving troops into Afghanistan—Herat, Balkh, and Candahar being mentioned, among other places, as future cantonments—an alliance, in fact, that would completely establish Russian preponderance in the country. In the event of its not being accepted a threat is held out of support to Abdur Rahman. A more recent account mentions that among the chief demands of General Abramoff (?) are the erection of supply depôts in various parts of the Turkestan frontier, and permission to construct roads and move troops through Afghanistan as occasion may require. It is added, however, that the Ameer has been disappointed in not having had the expected offer of a subsidy made to him.

Several news-writers mention that, in discussing the political situation with the Russian Envoy, the Ameer has spoken in a very bitter way of his treatment by the British Government.

Again, he is described by one writer as overcome with delight at the increasing importance of his own position, whilst another depicts him as much distressed by the difficulties of it.

As to the internal condition of the country little is known. The Ghilzai outbreak, in which, according to one account, the troops of the Ameer have been thrice defeated, nevertheless has not spread. A recent telegram from Quetta announces the arrival there of Adam Khan, described as an influential Ghilzai Malik, deputed by the tribe to prefer certain charges against the Ameer, and solicit the interference of Her Majesty's Government. He claims to represent tribes aggregating 95,000 fighting men, who offer their services in any way that may be required. They ask for the presence among them of a

British officer, for whose safety they will give approved hostages. Their complaints against the Ameer allege oppression and increased taxation, and they disclaim connection with the Cabul Ghilzais, whom they represent favourable to the Ameer.

But the event of paramount importance reported during the month is the death of the Heir Apparent, Sirdar Abdulla Jan, which occurred on the 15th August.

In order that the Ameer should not be troubled during the period of mourning which the Mahommedan religion imposes on these occasions, it has been determined to postpone for a short time the dispatch of the British Embassy that was about to proceed to Cabul; and meantime the condolences of the Viceroy have been sent to the Ameer. Numbers of the nobles and Chiefs of the country have arrived at Cabul to condole with the Ameer on his recent bereavement. Sirdar Ahmad Ali Khan, son of the late Sirdar Muhammad Ali Khan, and grandson of the Ameer, is mentioned as being likely to succeed Sirdar Abdulla Jan as Heir Apparent.

Lal Muhammad Khan, the recently appointed Governor of Afghan Turkestan, has, it is said, been directed to muster for immediate service all the available forces under his jurisdiction; and similar orders appear to have been given by the Ameer to the tribal Chiefs recently summoned to Cabul; but nothing is said to indicate the object the Ameer has in view in making these military preparations. Meanwhile, there seems reason to believe that no obstacle will be placed in the way of the British Mission that is shortly to visit Cabul.

2.—*Bokhara and Eastern Turkestan Frontier.*

The latest accounts of Russian movements in this quarter are as follows:—

Three completely-equipped columns, estimated at about 12,000 of all arms, are advancing upon the Afghan frontier; the right column, from Petro-Alexandrovsk, follows the course of the Oxus to Charjui; the centre, from Samarcand, is concentrating at Jam; the left, from Margilan in Khokand, is moving on the Kizzil Su River in the Alai Valley. Their further movements are said to depend on secret orders to be hereafter given. According to more recent news, a portion of the centre column has since advanced to Karshi, and commenced the construction of a bridge of boats across the Oxus.

Inclosure 3 in No. 4.

The Governor-General of India in Council to Viscount Cranbrook.

My Lord, *Simla, September* 9, 1878.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of Peshawur Confidential Diary, dated the 26th August, 1878.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON,
R. STRACHEY.
S. J. BROWNE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 4.

Extract from Peshawur Confidential Diary, dated August 26, 1878.

IT was reported from Cabul that the Ameer was displeased with Sirdar Zakariah Khan, and had deported him, viâ Kuram, to the British frontier. This has turned out to be incorrect. It was scarcely likely that the Ameer would have deported one of the principal Sirdars while the Russian Mission was at Cabul.

The Russian Mission travelled very leisurely from the Oxus to Cabul, marching sometimes only a few miles a day. At each stage enquiries into the state of the country and the people were made.

The Envoy is located in the house of Sirdar Muhammad Sharif Khan.

The Ameer was much embarrassed at receiving reports that the Russian escort halted

at the different stages between the Oxus and Cabul, and had been making surveys and enquiries regarding the country. Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan was directed to inform the Envoy that, unless the Ameer's officials were given orders as to the requirements of the Russian escort, some altercation would sooner or later take place, and it would therefore be better for the Envoy to warn his men not to move about the country, and to inform the Ameer of anything he required. This has caused the Ameer much anxiety.

No. 5.

Lord A. Loftus to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 28.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 11, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith an extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of this day, stating that an order of General Kaufmann, dated the $\frac{16}{28}$th August, has been published in the "Turkestan Gazette" for the demobilization of the reserve troops and dismissal of the levies of 1870 and 1871 in the military circle of Turkestan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 5.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of $\frac{\text{September } 29}{\text{October } 11}$, 1878.

UN ordre du jour du Gouverneur-Général du Turkestan inséré dans la "Gazette du Turkestan" sous la date du 16 Août, prescrit la démobilisation de troupes de réserve et la mise au dépôt des soldats des levées de 1870 et 1871.

No. 6.

Lord A. Loftus to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 21.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, October* 16, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship the following articles in translation by Mr. Michell from the Russian press:—

Imperial order granting furloughs to Russian soldiers.

Article from the "Russki Mir" of the $\frac{\text{3rd}}{\text{15th}}$ October, giving particulars respecting General Stoletoff's Mission to Cabul and the Afghan Embassy to Tashkend.

Inclosure 1 in No. 6.

Extract from the "Official Gazette" of October $\frac{1}{13}$, 1878.

FURLOUGHS TO RUSSIAN SOLDIERS.—By an order of His Imperial Majesty, the troops within the confines of the Empire and in the Caucasus, and which have been reduced to a peace footing, may, at the discretion of their commanding officers, be granted short furloughs to the $\frac{\text{1st}}{\text{18th}}$ March, 1879. These furloughs are, however, not to be granted indiscriminately, but on substantial grounds, and the number of such furloughs granted must not be so excessive as to weaken the effectiveness of the forces.

Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

Extract from the "Russki Mir" of October $\frac{3}{15}$, 1878.

(Translation from the Russian.)

THE "Russki Mir" of the $\frac{\text{3rd}}{\text{15th}}$ October, 1878, publishes the following letter from Tashkend:—

"About 12 o'clock on the $\frac{\text{3rd}}{\text{15th}}$ September the Afghan Embassy arrived at Tashkend.

"In order to explain how the above-mentioned Embassy found its way to us, I must

go back to the $\frac{2nd}{14th}$ July, when Major-General Stoletoff, accompanied by Colonel Rosgonoff, four interpreters, and twenty-two Cossacks, left Samarcand for Cabul.

"From reliable information which I have obtained, I am able to state that the Russian Embassy was dispatched with the object of opening direct commercial relations with Afghanistan as well as with India, and likewise to express to Shere Ali our appreciation of his mode of action in regard to Russia during the Russo-Turkish war.

"On the $\frac{6}{18}$th July our Embassy reached the town of Mazari-Sherif, the Governor of which place was instructed by the Ameer to conduct the Embassy to Cabul, but as the Governor was taken ill on the arrival of the Embassy, it was necessary to await his recovery. On the seventh day after its arrival the Governor died, and the Embassy then proceeded accompanied only by an escort.

"On the 29th July the Embassy reached Cabul, and, in accordance with the Ameer's orders, was lodged close to the Palace.

"On the following day the Ameer formally received the Embassy in the presence of his Ministers and Court officials. According to the accounts of witnesses the Ameer was extremely gracious, and ordered that the Russians should be shown everything of note in the town. Ceremonial dinners were given, and a large parade took place in honour of the Embassy. The total number of troops in Cabul itself amounted, as I am informed, to about 40,000 men. The majority of these are equipped in the English style. In regard to their arms, they are not so bad as the English papers try to represent, on the contrary, all the infantry are armed with English breech-loaders, and the artillery consists of many breech-loading guns.

"Shere Ali, in order to express the extent of his appreciation of Russia's friendship, requested Major-General Stoletoff to inform him whether he considered it possible to take with him some officials which he, the Ameer, would appoint, to Tashkend, in order that they might personally testify to General Kaufmann the great honour which had been done the Ameer by the despatch of an Embassy to him.

"And thus, as stated above, the Afghan Embassy arrived at Tashkend.

"The Embassy consists of Munshi Mahomet Hassan Khan, Minister of Interior. In appearance he is about 40 years old, middle height, dark complexion, and thick black beard.

"The next important person in the Embassy is the Ameer's personal Adjutant, who holds the rank of Colonel; there are also two staff officers and a Treasurer.

"On the $\frac{5}{17}$th September General Kaufmann received the Embassy at his country residence, in the presence of the officials of the Turkestan region.

"The Envoy expresses himself fluently in the Persian tongue, and speaks so rapidly that General Stoletoff found difficulty in translating all that he said into Russian.

"A large parade will take place in honour of the Embassy.

"It is reported that the Embassy will visit St. Petersburgh. I cannot, however, vouch for the truth of this, and can only assert that Major-General Stoletoff left Tashkend for Livadia on the 10th September.

"I have obtained a view of the presents which are to be made to the Embassy. Munshi Mahomet Hassan Khan will receive a silver goblet with a lid; the Adjutant will receive a silver mug; and the two staff officers are to be presented with a silver cup and goblet. The members of the Embassy, being all smokers, are also to receive a silver cigar case.

"Moreover, General Kaufmann has given orders for the purchase of some good cloth, which will also be presented.

"It is not yet known what will be sent to the Ameer."

No. 7.

Lord A. Loftus to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 28.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 21, 1878.

I HAVE learnt that the Turkestan Reserves referred to in my telegram of this date,* although disembodied and disarmed, and consequently demobilized, are still retained and employed in making roads to the Oxus.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

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* Giving substance of information in No. 5.

No. 8.

Lord A. Loftus to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 28.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 22, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship the three following papers, which have been translated from the Russian press by Mr. Michell :—

1. From "Moscow Gazette" of $\frac{6th}{18th}$ October, on the march of a Russian column from Tashkend to Djam.

2. From the "Novoe Vremia," giving particulars respecting General Stoletoff's Mission to Cabul.

3. From "Novoe Vremia" of $\frac{6th}{18th}$ October, on General Llamakin's expedition to the Attrek.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 8.

Extract from the "Moscow Gazette" of October $\frac{6}{18}$, 1878.

(Translation.)

MARCH OF THE RUSSIAN COLUMN FROM TASHKEND TO DJAM.—The "Moscow Gazette" of the $\frac{6}{18}$th October, 1878, contains the following letter from Tashkend on the subject of the march of the main Russian column to Djam :—

* * * * *

"The first échelon of the main column left Tashkend on the $\frac{1st}{13th}$ June. The immediate object of its advance was stated to be Djam, situated on the Russo-Bokharian frontier. According to prearranged march-route, the troops were to march nineteen days. The soldiers exhibited their usual powers of endurance and sprightliness on the march, notwithstanding the terrible heat that prevailed, and the scarcity of water, which occurred between the forts of Chiniaz and Djuzak. The men had to proceed on foot, as the means of transport were inadequate, even for the train and field ambulance. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the number of invalids during the whole nineteen days was very small, and the sick-list only commenced to swell while the troops were stationed at Djam, and on the return journey to Tashkend. The troops easily crossed the Narutin mountain range, famous for the "Tamerlane Gates," which pierce the rocky chain of mountains. At the town of Samarcand the rapid advance of the column was somewhat impeded by the River Zaravshan, which was very much swollen; the soldiers were obliged to cross the river on the croups of the Cossack horses. On account of the rapid current of this river, and the shifting nature of its bed, no other means of crossing it have yet been devised. The passage was effected successfully with the loss of a few rifles, which the soldiers sincerely deplored. The troops reached Djam without any important incident. The ancient Bokharian fortress of Djam owed its importance in former times to its proximity to the frontiers of Bokhara and Khiva; now it is only a picturesque ruin, entirely deserted by the Bokharians. The column encamped at Djam, and awaited the progress of events.

* * * * *

"The real object of the movement of the Russian troops was known to very few persons. Different reports were current. Many supposed that the march was undertaken for the purpose of practical experience, with a view to a future campaign against India, and to disprove the opinion generally entertained as to the possibility of a successful expedition against that country. The feasibility of such an expedition has now been proved."

Inclosure 2 in No. 8.

Extract from the "Novoe Vremia."

(Translation.)

FURTHER PARTICULARS RESPECTING GENERAL STOLETOFF'S MISSION TO CABUL.—The correspondent of the "Novoe Vremia" at Samarcand supplies the following additional information on this subject, under date of $\frac{3rd}{15th}$ September last :—

"It is known that General Stoletoff was despatched from Tashkend in the latter

part of May, in the capacity of Extraordinary Envoy to Shere Ali, Ameer of Afghanistan. This journey, through an almost unknown country, occupied a long time, and rumours of a most unfavourable kind continued to reach us. It was said that General Stoletoff, on arriving at the ferry over the Oxus at Tchardjui, was stopped by Afghan troops, and that Shere Ali Khan would not allow a Russian Mission to enter his territory. All this, however, turned out to be false. General Stoletoff had certainly to wait at the ferry over the Oxus for the arrival of an Afghan Bek, who had been appointed to escort him in the place of the Afghan who had died. A whole month was spent in waiting for the functionary, but our Envoy was eventually received with great honours.

"A special ceremonial exists at Cabul for the reception of foreigners of distinction; an English Ambassador would accordingly receive a salute of 13 guns, a Maharajah 30 guns, and an Indian Viceroy 51 guns. General Stoletoff received a salute of 115 guns, and he was met by Shere Ali in person at a considerable distance from Cabul. That an Ameer of Cabul should go out so far to meet an Envoy is an event without any parallel in the history of the country.

"On the $\frac{\text{31st August}}{\text{12th September}}$, at 11 P.M., General Stoletoff returned to Samarcand, and he was accompanied by the Afghan Envoy and his suite. The Afghan Mission consists of Murza Magdazan, Minister of War, two Colonels, and a Secretary. They have an escort of twenty-one Afghans. From Samarcand the Afghans proceeded to Tashkend, where they were received by the Governor-General.

* * * * * *

"According to the accounts of the members of the Russian Mission the road they journied by to Cabul was very fatiguing, included nine mountain passes, and occupied twenty-one days."

Inclosure 3 in No. 8.

Extract from the "Novoe Vremia" of October $\frac{6}{18}$, 1878.

(Translation.)

LLAMAKIN'S EXPEDITION TO THE ATTREK.—The following information relating to Llamakin's expedition to the Attrek appears in the "Novoe Vremia" of the $\frac{6}{18}$th October, 1878, in a letter written by the correspondent of that journal from the shores of the Caspian:—

* * * * * *

"In a previous letter I informed you that the Turcomans had shown signs of turbulence. At that time our detachment, under General Llamakin, marched eastwards along the Persian frontier. The movement of this detachment was undoubtedly in connection with that of the Turkestan columns. It is said that the object of the latter was to reach that part of the Oxus which lies south of Samarcand, so as to render secure the passage of the river at that point, and to enter into direct communication with Afghanistan. The Krasnovodsk detachment, proceeding at first along the Attrek and then along the Persian frontier, was to have occupied consecutively several points in the direction of Merv. The distance of Merv to the Caspian exceeds 800 versts (533 miles), but no one can doubt the importance of an advance towards that point. By the occupation of Merv we shall completely subjugate the Turcomans and their territory, which will be then encircled by our forts, and order would be established among these semi-barbarous tribes. Direct communication would also be opened with Turkestan. At present our southern frontier in Central Asia is not well defined on the Khiva side. It is necessary to consolidate this frontier, and to establish ourselves on the Oxus and at Merv, before we can think of any serious advance in the direction of Afghanistan and India. The best route to India is by way of the Caspian, but our means of transport over this sea are very limited, and develop but slowly. We have yet to create a flotilla of steamers, without which it is difficult to transport troops. There are at present only twenty schooners on the Caspian, and each schooner can only carry 500 men. The transport of one regiment of Cossacks, with their horses, would require four schooners, and one regiment of infantry of three battalions would require no less than seven schooners."

Inclosure 4 in No. 8.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg."

UNE correspondance adressée des bords de la Mer Caspienne à la même feuille dit :—

"La navigation à vapeur n'est pas très-développée sur la Caspienne : il y a en tout vingt vapeurs et schooners jaugeant en tout 3,280 lasts ; cinq bâtiments jaugent moins de 100 lasts ; cinq autres ont un tonnage de 100 à 150 lasts ; quatre autres ont un tonnage au-dessous de 200 lasts ; six enfin ont plus de 200 lasts. Toute la navigation est concentrée entre Astrakhan, Bakour et les ports du Midi. L'industrie du naphte a donné un essor nouveau à l'activité commerciale. Krasnovodsk et le port de Briansk commencent un peu à s'animer également. Ce dernier port est à l'embouchure du Térek, non loin de Kizliar, connu par son vin de Tchikhir.

"La Société Caucase et Mercure centralise la grande navigation. Le vin de Tchikhir exporté de Briansk entre en Russie ; il y est travaillé puis mis en vente sous le nom de vin de Lisbonne, de Madère (supérieur), &c., Krasnovodsk consomme, mais ne produit presque rien. Les produits de Khiva y sont amenés. Cette année la caravane est arrivée tout droit au port Alexandrovsk, à cause des désordres qui s'étaient produits parmi la population Tourkmène. Les Khiviens ont été désillusionnés à leur arrivée à Alexandrovsk. Un schooner est arrivé dans ce port à leur intention mais n'a pu emporter qu'une moitié de la cargaison prête, et a dû remettre le soin d'embarquer le reste au trajet suivant. C'est ainsi que les marchands de Khiva ont attendu deux semaines, sans savoir comment mettre leurs marchandises à l'abri jusqu'au retour du schooner. Toute cette cargaison était destinée à la foire de Nijni-Novgorod et n'est parvenue à Astrakhan qu'au commencement du mois d'Août.

"Malgré cela il y a tout avantage à prendre la route d'Alexandrovsk au lieu de celle de Krasnovodsk. Outre qu'elle est plus sûre elle est aussi plus courte et le transport par mer est de moitié meilleur marché d'Alexandrovsk à Astrakhan que de Krasnovodsk à Astrakhan. Le seul inconvénient c'est que le premier trajet n'est fait qu'une fois tous les quinze jours par les vapeurs de la compagnie, tandis que le second est fait deux fois par semaine.

"Les désordres parmi la population Turcomane continuent. Notre détachement commandé par le Général Llamakin a longé la frontière de Perse. Le détachement a suivi le cours de l'Attrek, et devait occuper certains points dans la direction de Merv, cette capitale des Tourkmènes. Depuis Merv jusqu'à la mer il y a 800 verstes, mais on ne peut nier que la pacification de cette contrée ne soit très-utile au commerce Russe et Khivien dans ces parages. Des relations directes entre Merv et le Turkestan seraient bientôt établies.

"On sait que notre frontière avec la Perse n'est déterminée d'aucune façon de ce côté. On sait aussi que les Persans ont autant à souffrir que nous des incursions continuelles de ces sauvages nomades et que les provinces du nord et du centre des Etats du Shah sont souvent désolées par leurs bandes ennemies. D'ailleurs les troupes Russes dans ces parages sont depuis longtemps habituées à assurer les voies au commerce en le garantissant contre les Tourkmènes, et depuis longtemps déjà la présence de nos détachements armés est le seul moyen de créer un minimum de sécurité à l'est de la Mer Caspienne."

No. 9.

Mr. R. Thomson to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received October 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October 29, 1878.*

INFORMATION has been received here that General Llamakin has established a camp at Chikislar, and having obtained provisions, winter clothing, and huts there and at Krasnovodsk, has returned to Chat, where a fort is being constructed. It is also reported that the Tekkeh Turkomans have attacked, in the direction of Krasnovodsk, the Khoja Shehee tribe, subject to Russia, and that they are building a fort with ditch and constructed for guns at Khoja Kala, under the direction of Afghans, said to be of the Jamshedee tribe. A certain number of Turkomans from Merv are said to be among them. They are strengthening the passes, and are reported to have 25,000 horses at their disposal.

The Yemoot Turkomans are clamorously demanding pay for their camels and cattle lost in the late Russian expedition.

No. 10.

Lord A. Loftus to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received November* 8.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, November* 3, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith translation by Mr. Mitchell from a Russian newspaper on the following subjects:—

An account by the correspondent of the "Sovremenoi Izvesti" of the march of the expeditionary force destined for Afghanistan, which started on the 20th June, and by way of Tchinaz, Djizak and Samarkand, reached Djam, on the Bokharian frontier, where it awaited the result of the Congress of Berlin, and on an amicable conclusion being arrived at, the troops were ordered to be demobilized.

Inclosure in No. 10.

Letter published in the "Sovremenoi Izvesti" of October $\frac{10}{22}$, 1878.

THE "Sovremenoi Izvesti," of the $\frac{10\text{th}}{22\text{nd}}$ October publishes the following letter from its correspondent who took part in the expedition of the Turkestan detachment to the town of Djam:—

"The expedition which I am about to describe is familiar to the public in its general features. We started on the $\frac{8}{20}$th June on our march to Afghanistan by way of Tchinaz, Djizak, and Samarkand.

"Nothing of importance transpired on the march to Tchinaz. Here we made a halt, and on the following day crossed the Syrdarya. This river is very wide, and the current is so swift that the rafts were carried down the stream for a distance of three versts.

"After leaving Tchinaz we passed the waterless halting places of Malek, Murza-Rabat, and Uch-Toop. At Malek we expected to obtain fresh water, but the men despatched in search of it were met on all sides with the reply that, with the exception of bitter-saltish water, no other was obtainable in the vicinity. Notwithstanding these assertions wells were discovered which contained very drinkable, though slightly brackish, water.

"I may state that the native Oarts did everything in their power to divert us from the localites where the wells were situated. At Murza-Rabat, the next station, not a drop of fresh water was to be obtained. At length we left this waterless district behind us and reached the town of Djizak.

"After halting at Djizak, we proceeded further to Samarkand. For a distance of 25 versts the road leads through mountain defiles. Eight versts from the town of Djizak are situated the two rocks which bear the name of the Gates of Tamerlane. From this point, during a march extending over 20 versts, we encountered as many as ten rivulets which we were obliged to ford, and there still remained to be effected the difficult passage of the river Zaravshan. The road itself was excellent; beyond the mountains which extend for a distance of 25 versts, a level highway commences lined on both sides with trees, so that Samarkand itself for a distance of 80 versts is approached by a shady avenue.

"Here we entered the region of Zaravshan, and considerable animation became visible; numerous kishlaks with large fruit-gardens were frequently met, whereas as far as Djizak a totally bare and waterless steppe prevails. Altogether, the scenery in the Zaravshan region is very picturesque, and this part of the route was certainly the easiest and most pleasant.

"At length we reached the Zaravshan river. This stream flows with a terrible rapidity, and sets large stones lying at the bottom of its bed into motion. It is utterly impossible to stand in the stream, and swimming or battling against the current is out of the question. The river at the ford is not deep, the greatest depth not exceeding 6 feet. At the ford the river is intersected by little islands. When it overflows (which was the case during our passage across), the width of the river would be about 3 versts, and it then forms several arms. Several carts were lost, and their contents carried away during our passage. The officers crossed on horseback,

"After we had effected the passage of the Zaravshan, we halted at a distance of 6 versts from Samarkand. On the following day we proceeded further, and again encountered the steppe under the scorching rays of the sun and a hot wind. After a march of four days we arrived at Sarakul, situated 8 versts from the Bokharian frontier. Here commenced privations which may well be termed diabolical. Imagine to yourself a perfectly level steppe, a heat of 49½ degrees Réaumur, and a hot wind, and it was in this climate that we had to remain for more than a month. We hoped to advance further, but orders were received to await the conclusion of the Congress. The troops were divided into two parts—one body took up a position at Sarikul, and the other was stationed in the town of Djam on the Bokharian frontier.

"The day after our arrival I started for the town of Djam. The road was terrible. I had traversed a distance of 300 versts by stages of 30 versts, and yet here I found myself scarcely able to accomplish a final stage of 8 versts. My horse scarcely kept on its legs, as I had been imprudent enough to set out when the heat was most intense. I rode up to a post on which I read a notification to the effect that that spot formed the frontier of the Russian and Bokharian territory. Half a verst from this spot a portion of the Russian detachment had passed its bivouac, and in the distance I descried a garden with native huts, and that was all.

"And this was the town of Djam!

"Cases of sickness, dysentery, typhus fever, and sunstroke were the inevitable results of a sojourn in such a climate. Soldier's funerals were to be winessed each day. The average number of fatal cases was two per day. A healthier spot was sought for nearer to Samarkand, and a kishlak situated between two hills was selected. We removed to this place in the middle of July. We reached Sarakul on the 26th June, and consequently nineteen days were spent in that place of torment.

"On returning to Aksai, we ascertained that we were to return home. The Congress was amicably concluded, and we only awaited orders for the demobilization of the troops before setting out on our return journey.

"I must confess that we were all delighted to receive the news of the order for our recall. Nothing could be worse than remaining in a state of inactivity, and moreover, in such a terrible climate."

No. 11.

Mr. R. Thomson to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received November 11.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, November 11, 1878.*

IT is reported from Asterabad that the Russian troops which had started from Krasnovodsk have returned there, and that General Llamakin having provided the detachment at Chat with winter supplies, and left a battalion at Chikislar, has now left for Tiflis.

No. 12.

Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterden.—(Received November 12.)

(Secret.)

My Lord, *India Office, November 12, 1878.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 31st October, inclosing translation of an extract from the "Russki Mir" of the $\frac{3rd}{15th}$ idem,* I am directed by Viscount Cranbrook to forward herewith, to be laid before Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copies of telegrams to and from the Viceroy of India, on the subject of the date of the arrival of General Stoletoff's Mission at Cabul.

Copies of the papers referred to by the Viceroy are forwarded herewith.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

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* See Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

Inclosure 1 in No. 12.

Viscount Cranbrook to Viceroy of India.

(Telegraphic.) *India Office, November 7*, 1878.

IN apparently trustworthy letter from Tashkend, Stoletoff said to have left Samarcand 14th July, and reached Cabul 10th August. These dates do not agree with yours. Can you explain discrepancy? Has Nawab Ghulam Hassan any information on point.

Inclosure 2 in No. 12.

The Viceroy of India to Viscount Cranbrook.

(Telegraphic.) *November 12*, 1878.

YOURS 7th. Impossible to verify now by fresh evidence precise dates of Stoletoff's journey and arrival at Cabul.

Ameer certainly mentioned in full Durbar 7th July, that Russian Envoy had crossed Oxus. He reached Cabul about 26th; was certainly received in full Durbar 26th July.

See inclosures to my despatches 5th, 19th August. Evidence is authentic and cumulative; could hardly be strengthened.

[For Inclosures 3 and 4 see "Correspondence respecting Afghanistan," Nos. 48 and 49, pp. 229—231.]

No. 13.

Mr. R. Thomson to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received November 15.)

My Lord, *Tehran, September 26*, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that it is reported that General Llamakin's force has halted in the vicinity of Karee Kala, and is suffering from sickness and scarcity of provisions, whilst there is also great mortality among the camels.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RONALD F. THOMSON.

No. 14.

Lord A. Loftus to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received November 27.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 20*, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship, in translation by Mr. Michell, three letters lately published by the "Moscow Gazette," giving an account of the comparatively unknown Turkoman region nominally subject to Russia, and which extends from Krasnovodsk to Kizil Arvad.

These letters are of interest and importance, as giving geographically a circumstantial description of the zone of the Turkoman steppe, which has hitherto been untraversed by any European traveller, and which is only represented in the best and most detailed maps by a space almost entirely blank.

Politically these letters are of interest as giving, in addition to a minute description of the line of march followed by General Llamakin in July last, considerable information respecting the military capabilities of the country on the right bank of the Attrek, and along the Sambur River.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 14.

"The Moscow Gazette" of the 25th and 28th October (6th and 9th November N. S.), 1878, Nos. 271 and 274, publishes the following letters under the initials of "N. W.," descriptive of the Turkoman country stretching from Krasnovodsk to Kizil Arvad. The author, apparently, is attached to General Llamakin's staff.

(*Translation from the Russian by J. Michell.*)

LETTER I.

July 30 (*August* 11.)

LEAVING Krasnovodsk we proceeded along the shores of the Caspian, and crossing two dry beds in which the Oxus in former days emptied itself into the Caspian, a low sandy plain, separated from the coast by a chain of hillocks, is reached; this plain extends to the Silver Hills,* which is considerably lower than Hassan-Kuli Bay and the mouth of the Attrek. This portion of the Caspian shore, called the Chikishliar littoral, extends in a wide zone for nearly a whole degree between 37° and 38° latitude and 72° and 73° longitude, while the great and shallow expanse of water bears the name of the Chikishliar Bay. The depth of water at a distance of more than 1 verst from the shore is about 2½ feet, and diminishes to 1 inch in shore. In fine weather steamers stop 4 versts from the shore, and during rough weather at a much greater distance. The flat-bottomed boats of the Turkomans approach to within half a verst, and from that distance everything has to be carried on shore by hand, the water reaching to the knees.

We had to remain several days on this coast, from which we were to penetrate into the Turkoman steppe by a road which I think has hitherto never been described, but which is the nearest and most practicable route to the Attrek, the bank of which, from its mouth at Hassan-Kuli Bay almost to Balt Adji, is bordered by inapproachable morasses. The road along which we proceeded runs through territory subject to Russia, and forms almost a straight line from Chikishliar to Balt Adji.

Early on the morning of the $\frac{22\text{nd July}}{3\text{rd August}}$ we broke up our camp; our detachment advanced under the cover of infantry, Cossacks, Kirghizes, local militia, and some guns. The long line of camels, heavily laden with a large quantity of stores, stretched for a considerable distance. As we receded from the shore, the shells, which covered the ground and made it firmer, gradually disappeared, and the vehicles in the rear sank deeper and deeper into the sand. At the seventh verst the ground, instead of being formed of clean sand, now presented the appearance of a salt marsh petrified by the heat of the sun. Verdure between the low mounds is observed at intervals, and the vegetation itself proves that the soil is capable of cultivation. After proceeding about four versts over these salt marshes, the road again reaches a sand bank, vegetation almost entirely disappears, and the wheels sink into the friable sand. This sand, however, does not extend for a long distance, and a depression is reached, which is surrounded on all sides by low hillocks; the ground becomes firmer, and emits under the horses' hoofs a hollow sound, which would seem to indicate a cavity under the upper crust of the soil, suggesting also the existence of a "subterranean basin." All the hollows are covered with a rich vegetation. Plants appear which plainly show the presence of water in the subsoil. A halt was made after a march of four hours along this hollow. It was near 11 o'clock; the heat, scorching rays of the sun, together with the dust and flies, had so exhausted the men that they all threw themselves down on the ground. The poor horses refused the forage, while none of us thought of food; each economized his supply of water, and only moistened his lips and throat. "Samovars" (tea urns), however, soon made their appearance, and the unharnessed camels made for the steppe, where they found forage in the shape of the high grass of the steppe. The Cossacks and Kirghizes collect this grass for fuel. No water was here given to the poor horses, as the wells were still a day's march distant. At 5 o'clock in the evening we again started, the heat had decreased, but the flies, which were in myriads, continued to be very troublesome. The steppe over which the road now ran presented a livelier and more animated appearance; salines, with patches of verdure, became here and there visible; the sand was almost everywhere overgrown with grass; numerous camel tracks and roads were noticed; the soil became firmer, so that even the guns moved along easily. About 9 in the evening we reached Murat-Lar locality, where there are no wells, though, judging from the sounds which the earth emits when struck by horses' hoofs, from the surrounding vegetation, and from the temperature

* White Mountain (?).

of the soil on a sultry day, it may, with safety, be asserted that water is to be found at no great depth.

Early on the following morning we continued our march, and the horses, having received a bucket of water each, advanced with greater spirits. The farther we proceeded, the more verdant did the vegetation become, hillocks and undulations were now frequent, the sand disappeared, and the soil became firmer and argillaceous. About 6 versts beyond Murat-Lar, and in close proximity to the road, traces of old melon plantations and cultivated fields are visible. The Djefarbaï Turkomans, who roam in this part of the country, cultivate the ground here every year, and, after gathering their harvests, remove to other camping grounds. At one place I receded somewhat from the road, and observed clear traces of an old encampment, and also of fields cultivated by means of regular irrigation. We reached the wells at about 10 o'clock in the morning, or after a journey of five hours from Murat-Lar locality. The place where the wells are situated is called Karadji-Batyr, and represents several sandy hillocks surrounded for about a verst by friable sand. These hillocks are easily distinguishable by their contrast to the argillaceous and affluvial soil in the immediate vicinity of the wells. There are here at present twenty-seven wells, and probably as great a number abandoned, and each well gives, if properly attended to, excellent clear and cool water, especially when it is covered up and left untouched for several hours. We remained at these wells for nearly a whole day, and it was near 7 A.M. before we started further. The road took a sharp turn to the right, as though leading directly into the heart of the steppe. The traces of artificial irrigation continued for about 7 versts, and they then diaappeared, reappearing again about 4 versts beyond, though not in the same regular form as at the wells. About 12 versts from the wells we arrived at the gates, as it were, of an enormous wall, which bore a greater resemblance to an artificial structure than to a natural conformation of the soil. Three versts beyond this point the valley of the River Attrek appeared in sight with the river itself winding in zig-zags between high and verdant banks.

To the left of the road, and on a high mound, stands a little stone edifice, which is called Bayat-Adji, and forms the tomb of a Mussulman who had performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. This monument gives the name to the whole of the surrounding country. There are no settlements here, but the Atabai Turkomans, who are semi-independent and semi-submissive, roam in the neighbourhood. Beyond the Attrek is the Persian frontier, and an old fortified camp, which served to protect our detachments in 1869 and 1872, stands on the bank of the river.

$\frac{10\text{th}}{22\text{nd}}$ *August.*—We were compelled to stay at Bayat-Adji a whole week. I rode for a considerable distance down the course of the Attrek, and, in spite of the excessive heat of the last three months, the banks were everywhere covered with luxuriant vegetation. Large bushes, which sometimes approach the size of small trees, grow between the edge of the river and the high shelving banks. Grass grows so abundantly in the valley of the Attrek that thousands of horses might be fed there, and the quality of the grass is very good. About 10 versts below Bayat-Adji the banks begin to be boggy. Here a different vegetation presents itself, and with it reeds appear, which, on being brought to the camp by the Turkomans, the horses ate greedily. About 40 versts from the mouth of the river in Hasan-Kuli Bay the marshy zone merges into an impassable swamp or "tundra," which, from the Russian or right side of the Attrek, is connected with a salt marsh, and from the left, or Persian side, is bordered by steep heights known under the name of the Persian mounds.

Ascending the Attrek, its very steep banks gradually narrow the basin of the river, and the valley opens out again in the form of small islands in places where the Attrek during its overflow separates into two streams.

From Bayat-Adji we proceeded up the Attrek to "Tchat" or "Tchid," but the bed of the river is not seen from the road, and the steppe itself presents a picture similar to that on the road from the hills of Kara-Batyr to Bayat-Adji. We continued to advance along an excellent road, which did not, however, run in a straight line, at times approaching nearer to the river and receding from it at other places. On the first day after our departure we traversed 20 versts, and then made a halt. The head of the column had advanced a considerable distance further; the guide having mistaken the road, missed a turning to the Attrek which led to an open space on its banks, where we should have halted. Notwithstanding the 15 versts that had been uselessly traversed, the column halted about 4 versts from the Attrek on an open plain, which resembled an enormous terrace. We remained at the foot of this terrace until the following morning. The country here is very picturesque, and masses of thick "gribinchuk" border the banks, so that at mid-day it is quite shady. This place, at which we halted for a day and night, is called Yatchny-Ulun. On the following day we again struck the old road, and having

traversed about 20 versts, turned off to the Attrek, and halted until the following morning at Domakh-Olun locality. Domakh-Olun is a very convenient halting-place, and is also somewhat like a terrace, but the descent to it is tedious. The bank is steep to the water on our side, while from the Persian the river is reached by a long wide road. From this place we proceeded for 22 versts more, and halted at Tchat. The road presented no extraordinary features, and runs close to the Attrek in a tortuous manner. The incline from our side, which comprises the bank of the river, is so full of depressions and holes, as to render the cultivation of this bank impossible.

About 10 versts before reaching Tchat, the road turned to the left, receding from the Attrek; on the right side large auls, or settlements, are visible at a place called Bairam-Olun (Holiday Ferry), a beautiful river-terrace animated with abundant verdure, but the descents on each side of the stream are narrow and inconvenient. The large auls, the inhabitants of which did not fly from us (though they belonged to the Atabai tribe, who bear us no love), possess large flocks of sheep. Nearly all the shepherds had white asses of an excellent breed. At length we reached Tchat. This is the most repulsive place along the whole Attrek, although, from a strategical point of view, the most important, because it is here that the River Sumbar flows into the Attrek, and the Delta may, if fortified, be converted into an impregnable position. The Sumbar is that dirty stream which, uniting with the waters of the Attrek, makes the latter turbid; the water in the Sumbar is bitter salt, with a mixture of injurious salts, and its narrow stream is of a dirty green colour. We have been already a week at Tchat. Fifty versts higher than Tchat rise two enormous rocks out of the Attrek, forming a sharp delimitation of the geological structure of the country, as well as of the river itself. This place is called Su-Sium. Above Su-Sium the water in the Attrek again becomes clear, the bed stony, and the banks covered with a rich vegetation; the grass here grows up to one's waist, and whole copses of oak dot the surface of the country. Wild grapes also grow in abundance. Pheasants are also numerous. Unfortunately the road becomes impassable for camels, and 10 versts further on becomes very difficult even for horses. One hundred versts beyond Tchat the course of the Attrek can only be followed on foot, and to make the road practicable three months would at least be required. At the 108th verst beyond the ridge of rocks that rise perpendicularly to the Attrek are to be seen ruins of enormous forts, which must have existed at some distant period. Their names were not accurately known. The local inhabitants call them Komnuk-Kala, and on the right side of the Attrek they are called Oklan-Kala. Traces of irrigation are to be seen at this place on all the neighbouring steppes. The bank itself resembles a series of gardens, and the elevated plateau is abundantly covered with grass. It would be possible to depasture any quantity of cattle here, but wildness and desolation reign around.

For two weeks past the barometer has shown from 35° to 38° Reaumur in the shade. In the sun the temperature far exceeds 40°. In the morning there are only 14°. Rain fell only once for about half an hour in large but few drops. The sky is cloudy only in the morning, and the heat commences at mid-day. The wind, which covers everything with sand, is so violent, especially in the evening, that not unfrequently the tents have been broken. Even inside the tents it is necessary to use lamps for writing at night. The steppe is desolate in appearance from the dust, and the heat, flies, &c., cause no small inconvenience. Life, however, is still possible, even at Tchat.

Letter II.

August 22 (*September* 3), 1878.

In my last letter I informed you that the road along the Attrek, 8 versts beyond Su-Sium, proved inconvenient for pack animals, and that it was, therefore, necessary to abandon the line of the Persian frontier, that is, the course of the Attrek along which we had hitherto proceeded, and to strike a new road. After making the necessary surveys we turned to the left, at a place called Alun-Yak (where there is a ferry across the Attrek, 22 versts from Tchat), and proceeded over the high Sugundag chain, after having crossed the bridge which exists between the Attrek and Sumbar. The Sugundag forms, together with these two rivers, a triangle, the smallest angle of which is at the point at which the Attrek receives the Sumbar, and is equal to about 48 degrees, whilst its opposite side, that is, the line of the Sugundag, presents a distance of 50 versts. This line commences at first with a gentle ascent at Alun-Yak, and then rises steeply over an extent of 24 versts. At the foot of the most abrupt part of the ascent there are springs of excellent water; these springs are called Kabeli-Katje, and are separated from the steep ascent by a deep precipice. Strangely enough, the water in the springs is completely black, and yet its colour does not

affect its taste. The particles of black mud which it holds in suspension are easily precipitated, and the water becomes quite clear. The grasses in the neighbourhood of the springs are very luxuriant, date and pomegranate trees being also found in abundance at this spot. The ascent and descent of the Sugundag, the highest point of which I estimate at 2,000 feet, extends over a distance of 16 versts ($10\frac{2}{3}$ miles), the descent terminates at the small River Chandyr, which falls into the Sumbar. There is a spring of cold and clear water, containing, however, particles of lime, at the point of junction of the Chandyr with the Sumbar. In spring, it is said that the former stream has a very rapid current, but its appearance, as we observed it in the summer, was not at all imposing.

At 25 versts from Tchat we crossed over to the left bank of the Sumbar. The country traversed by us along the right bank of this river is of a similar nature to that of the elevated steppe stretching along the Attrek; the chief features are clay, mud, sand, and deep fissures, and hillocks of various shapes, forming narrow, and oftener broad, defiles through which the road trends. There are no considerable elevations. Receding from the Attrek the soil becomes more and more barren, the vegetation scantier, and yellow in appearance, succulent grasses disappear, and prickly shrubs predominate.

The appearance of the steppe and hillocks is dreary and monotonous; no good water is to be found, that in the Sumbar being bitter and salt to the taste. Our night halt at Har Alun was a very trying one, owing to the scarcity of good water. Commencing from the Chandyr to the point of its fall into the Attrek no drinkable water was found. This can only be explained by the circumstance that both the Chandyr and Sumbar had at this time (August) become dry in many parts of their course, and the remaining water had become impregnated with the saline soil through which these rivers flow.

At Sharol-Daù, 5 versts beyond Har Alun, and a verst and a half below the fall of the Chandyr into the Sumbar, we crossed over to the left bank of the Sumbar. After a very difficult passage over the river (the banks being here very high and precipitous), we continued our advance along the left bank of the Sumbar (between the Sumbar and Chandyr), and reached an elevated mountain called Bek-Tépé, belonging to the spurs of the Kurin Dag. The whole distance traversed by us along the bank from the Sharol-Daù and Bek-Tépé is about 40 versts; the march was a difficult one, in consequence of the scarcity of water and barren soil. It was only at Bek-Tépé that we again struck the Sumbar; the water here was rather better, though muddy, the bitter saltness of taste having completely disappeared. The course of the Sumbar at this point is more rapid, the volume of water greater, the bed harder, and the evaporation of the river less. Here we again crossed over to the right bank, and proceeded along a bad though deeply-trodden camel's path, and again reached the Sumbar, having receded from it about 10 versts in order to strike the head of the defile, which extends between the more elevated spurs of the Kurin Dag, extending perpendicularly in the direction of the Sumbar. This defile, and the locality adjoining the river, is called Ters Akon. Here we finally separated from the Sumbar, and, proceeding through the waterless defiles of the Ters Akon and through the Morgo defile (belonging to the Kaplan Dag range), reached the ruined fort of Hadjan-Kala.

Letter III.

Bent-Essent, September 5 (17), 1878.

Leaving behind us the fortress of Kizil Arvad, where our Cossacks, under Arnoldi, distinguished themselves last year in an unequal combat with the Tékés, we crossed the undetermined though really existing line of frontier between Russian territory and the land inhabited by the Tékés, who recognize no authority over themselves. I consider the extreme point of this line of demarcation to be the fortress of Hadjan-Kala, which is flanked on one side by the Téké fort of Kizil Arvad, and on the other by the Karakala fort; in front, then, is a line of Téké forts, the more important of which are Bami, Buirma, &c.

The road from the River Sumbar, which we left at Ters Akon, to Hadjan-Kala passes through long defiles formed by the spurs of the Kurindag; they are severally known under the names of Dairon, Nishik Sund, Turugai, and Kuvmius. The entrances into these defiles are very narrow, and present the most dangerous places for caravans. The road winds through them along steep ascents and descents, and only two horses can proceed abreast at a time along it. The most dangerous portion of the route terminates at about 12 versts before reaching Hadjan-Kala. It would be neither difficult nor expensive to construct a good road through these defiles; if this were done, the caravans would derive great benefit from it, and the defiles would no longer serve as hiding places for the

marauding Téké bands. Beyond the defiles, in the direction of Hadjan-Kala, the vegetation becomes extremely rich, and wild boar and other game is found in great abundance. In these respects the country is similar to that stretching along the banks of the Atrek.

In close proximity to Hadjan-Kala stands an old deserted earthwork in the shape of a regular quadrangle, flanked by two conical crenelated towers, about 2 fathoms in height The upper platforms of these are protected by a low wall, pierced with apertures for musketry firing. A similar fort, though of smaller dimensions, and with one tower only, is passed at a place 3 versts before reaching Hadjan-Kala. This kala, or small fort, proved to be a Téké habitation ; it was surrounded by cultivated and well irrigated fields, the water being obtained from a small rivulet which flows through the neighbouring bushes and reeds, and ultimately reaches Hadjan-Kala. Not far from the latter place, and in the middle of the so-called Téké oasis, there is a fine spring, which yields an abundant supply of water, and which forms the source of the rivulet that flows on in the vicinity of the small fort 3 versts distant from Hadjan-Kala. At this point, from a hill on the right, is obtained a fine view of the Goklan fort of Kara-Kala, and of the surrounding country, which is well cultivated and thickly populated. Ascending a high hill on the left, at Bent-Essent (which likewise stands high), the whole Téké oasis presents itself to the view, dotted with numerous dwellings. On the immediate horizon is seen the fort of Bami, an awkward structure resembling Hadjan-Kala; beyond again appears fort Buirma. The Téké oasis, although producing cotton in some places, cannot be described as a fertile land ; small patches of cultivated ground alternate with stretches of brushwood and dry sterile salines.

No. 15.

Lord A. Loftus to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received December* 2.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November* 28, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith, in translation from the "Golos" by Mr. Michell, a letter received from Cabul, dated $\frac{2nd}{14th}$ August last, giving a description of the journey to, and reception of General Stoletoff at, Cabul.

I also annex a French translation of the same, published in this morning's "Journal de St. Pétersbourg."

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 15.

Extract from the "Golos" of November $\frac{14}{26}$, 1878.

(Translation.)

THE "Golos" of the $\frac{14}{26}$th November, 1878, contains the following letter addressed to it by a correspondent from Cabul, and descriptive of the journey of the members of the Russian Envoys to the Ameer of Afghanistan. This letter, the "Golos" says, was dispatched by special opportunity soon after the arrival of the Mission at Cabul, posted to St. Petersburgh at Tashkend on the 4th November, and received here on the 25th of the same month :—

"*Cabul, August* $\frac{2}{14}$.

"The Russian Mission, consisting of seven officers (among whom was one general), twenty-two Cossacks, four servants, and fifteen Kirghishor semen, left Samarcand on the $\frac{2nd}{14th}$ July.

"Our route lay through Bokharian territory, and as the Ameer of Bokhara was at Karshi, we proceeded in the direction of that town.

"The Ameer of Bokhara showed the Mission every courtesy, and the members presented themselves to him.

"The road selected for reaching the Oxus was through Huzar, Shirabad, and Chushkogosar, which, though presenting some difficulties, running as it does along a rocky ridge of hills, was traversed in five days. On this route the Mission passed through the famous defile known in ancient times under the name of the "Iron Gates," and now called Burghasse Khana.

"At Shirabad we met an Afghan messenger, who was the bearer of a letter to the Chief of the Mission. In this letter Shir-i-dal Khan, the Governor of Afghan-Turkestan,

asked us to wait ten days at Shirabad, as he had not yet made the necessary preparations for the reception of the 'prized visitors.' He also informed us that he had not yet organized the honorary escort which was to accompany the Mission from the Oxus to Mizar, Sheriff, and, further, to Cabul.

"Notwithstanding this request, General Stoleteff considered it advisable to continue the advance to the Oxus, and there to halt if it were really necessary to do so. The Oxus was crossed by the Mission in very primitive boats. On the banks of this river we waited three days, when we were joined by the Afghan escort, consisting of 200 men and two generals. They were all well armed, and excellently equipped. They received the Russian Mission with great politeness, and apologised for having caused its detention. In order to avoid the great heat of the day, which reached 41 degrees in the shade, it was determined to resume the march at night.

"The advance of the Mission was very picturesque. Two long lines of horsemen, with pennons flying, flanked the Envoy and his party on both sides, and closed the rear. The sounds of drums and trumpets broke the silence of the desert. We progressed all night across a sandy arid steppe, intercepted by hillocks, and next morning reached Karshiak settlement, which is situated in a cultivated country.

"We made three stages before reaching Mizar and Sheriff, and on entering the latter town, which was lined with soldiers in our honour, we were received by Hosh-dal Khan, son of the Governor of the province. A salute of eighteen guns was also made, to welcome our arrival.

"Great crowds thronged the streets, and gazed with curiosity on the people from the distant north. There were no visible traces of fear or fanaticism among the spectators. In this town, where we were to pass a fortnight, we were lodged in the palace of the Governor-General, which was shaded by large Chinar trees. The Governor-General, who was ill when we arrived, and could consequently not welcome us personally, died soon after. The Mission was, under these circumstances, unable to proceed until the appointment of a new ruler had been made.

"After an interval of some days Hosh-dal Khan received his nomination from Cabul as Governor, in succession to his deceased father.

"On the expiration of two weeks we resumed our journey in the direction of Cabul; the escort from this point was still more numerous and brilliantly equipped. The Afghans showed themselves very well disposed towards us by anticipating all our wishes. On reaching a halting-place we always found everything prepared for us; tents were spread and excellent repasts frequently provided, &c.

"After leaving Tashurgan we reached the spurs of the Hindu-Kush, and journied to Cabul during twenty days.

"Ascending at first in gentle slopes, the Hindu-Kush gradually rises higher and higher, forming, amidst its frequent passes, terraces of increasing height.

"After traversing a series of such terraces, we reached the elevated Bamian Valley (8,500 feet), in the proximity of which are the Kalu and Great Tran Passes (13,000 feet).

"A few stages before Bamian we were welcomed by Lal Mahomed Khan, Governor of Bamian, who was accompanied by a numerous suite.

"After passing the famous Bamian idols, chiselled on the face of the rock, we cleared the Great Tran Pass, and then descended from the Ugly Pass into the Cabul Darya Valley. A journey of three days was still before us.

"At Koteashrik village, 50 versts from Cabul, we were met by the Sirdar Nasruddin Khan, the Afghan Minister for Foreign Affairs, and at Kala and Kazy by the Afghan Vizier, who was mounted on an elephant. Here the members of the Mission were also supplied with elephants, each elephant carrying two persons, and in this manner we advanced to Cabul.

"At a distance of seven versts from Cabul we were met by Prince Abdullah Khan, Shere Ali's nephew. He rode on an enormous elephant, of ashy grey colour, and with long gilded tusks. The Prince himself was seated in a basket profusely ornamented with gold. He invited General Stoletoff to seat himself on his elephant, and they then entered the town together. We followed also on elephants, the sowdas of which were ornamented with silver. A brilliant body of cavalry followed in the rear of the Prince. Crowds lined both sides of the road, and even the neighbouring rocks and trees were covered with people. The 'Urus' were the objects of the greatest curiosity, and the blessings of the four Caliphs were invoked on them.

"Entering on a large plain we found it filled with regular troops. On the left flank stood the cavalry, and twelve brass and steel guns, which glistened in the sun, were placed in front. As soon as the elephant on which the Envoy was seated was in a line with the troops, a salute of 36 guns was fired. The mournful, though very original air of the

Afghan National March was struck up, the strains of which were, however, soon drowned by the vociferous exclamations of the crowd, who called down on us, especially on General Stoletoff, the blessings of the first four Caliphs. This greeting is equivalent to the Russian hurrah. Followed by these exclamations we entered the Bassohissar, or citadel of Cabul, and at the gates we were met by its keepers, who wore the Highland uniform. After traversing some of the streets we reached Shere Ali's palace, where everything was in readiness for the reception and entertainment of the Russian Mission. The Ameer himself did not come out to meet us, and it was only on the following day, namely, the 30th July (11th August, new style), that, with General Stoletoff at our head, we were formally received by him in audience in his Hall of State, and in the presence of the highest nobles of Afghanistan. Further particulars of this reception I shall send hereafter."

Inclosure 2 in No. 15.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of November $\frac{16}{28}$, 1878.

NOUS empruntons à la "Voix" la correspondance suivante, reçue de Caboul, en date du $\frac{2}{14}$ Août dernier :—*

"Notre Mission, qui se composait de sept officiers, dont un général, de vingt-deux Cosaques, quatre Brosseurs, et quinze Djighites, a quitté Samarcande le 2 Juin. Le chemin que nous devions suivre traversait les possessions de l'Emir de Boukhara. Comme celui-ci se trouvait à Karschi, nous prîmes la direction de cette ville, où notre Mission fut parfaitement reçue par le potentat à qui elle crut devoir se présenter.

"Nous choisîmes ensuite pour atteindre l'Amou-Daria la route qui passe par Houzar, Schirrabad, et Tchichko-Housar. Cette voie présente des difficultés assez nombreuses, car elle traverse une chaîne de montagnes rocheuses et nous fûmes cinq jours à la parcourir, en devant traverser les anciennes 'Portes de Fer,' qui portent actuellement le nom de Bourgassé Khan (maison de la chèvre, en Persan).

"Nous nous rencontrâmes à Schirrabad avec un Envoyé Afghan, porteur d'une lettre destinée au Chef de la Mission Russe et par laquelle Schir-i-dal-Khan (ce qui veut dire 'cœur de lion'), Gouverneur-Général du Turkestan, Afghan, nous priait d'attendre une dizaine de jours à Schirrabad, vu qu'il n'avait pas encore préparé la réception 'de ses chers hôtes.' Il nous faisait savoir, entre autres choses, que l'on n'avait pas encore réuni l'escorte d'honneur qui devait accompagner la Mission depuis les bords de l'Amou-Daria, par Mizar et Schérif, jusqu'à Caboul. Malgré toute l'amabilité de cette demande de Schir-i-dal-Khan, le Général Stolétoff crut devoir poursuivre sa route jusqu'à l'Amou-Daria et s'arrêter seulement là si le délai demandé était effectivement nécessaire.

"A son arrivée sur l'Amou-Daria, la Mission traversa le fleuve sur des bateaux d'une construction des plus primitives et ne dut attendre que trois jours sur l'autre rive l'arrivée de l'escorte Afghane, qui se composait de 200 cavaliers, avec deux Généraux à leur tête, tous parfaitement armés et portant de très-beaux uniformes. Les deux Généraux firent à la Mission un excellent accueil et s'excusèrent de nous avoir fait un peu attendre.

"Pour éviter la forte chaleur, qui atteignait 14° à l'ombre dans la journée, on ne se mit en route qu'à la tombée de la nuit. La marche de la Mission et de son escorte aux dernières lueurs du crépuscule présentait un tableau saisissant. Deux longues files de cavaliers armés de lances à oriflammes entouraient la Mission et le bruit des tambours et des clairons se perdait dans l'immensité du désert. La traversée des sables arides dura toute la nuit, et ce n'est que dans la matinée que nous atteignîmes le village de Karschiak, qui se trouve dans la zone cultivée.

"Nous eûmes trois étapes à faire pour arriver à Mizar et Schérif. A notre entrée dans cette dernière ville notre Mission fut reçue par les troupes rangées sur la place et par Khosch-dal-Khan (cœur tendre), fils du Gouverneur-Général. L'artillerie tira une salve de douze coups; des masses de peuple se pressaient sur notre passage et examinaient avec curiosité ces hommes du nord, venant de si loin et qu'elles n'avaient jamais vus. Leurs physionomies ne réflétaient qu'un sentiment de forte curiosité et ne portaient aucune trace de fanatisme ni de crainte.

"Une fois dans la ville, nous fûmes installés au Palais du Gouverneur-Général, à l'ombre d'immenses arbres. Le Gouverneur-Général, qui n'avait pàs pu nous recevoir

* Cette correspondance a été envoyée avec une caravane quelques jours après l'arrivée de notre mission a Caboul; elle n'a été expédiée de Taschkent par la poste que le 24 Octobre et la "Voix" l'a reçue le 13 Novembre.

parce qu'il était malade, mourut quelques jours après notre arrivée, et nous dûmes attendre pendant quinze jours la nomination de son successeur, qui fut son fils Kosh-dal-Khan.

" Ce n'est donc que quinze jours après notre arrivée à Schérif que nous nous remîmes en route pour Caboul. Notre escorte, devenue plus nombreuse, était encore plus magnifique. Les Afghans étaient tellement aimables qu'ils prévenaient le moindre de nos désirs. Tout était prêt à notre arrivée aux endroits indiqués pour les haltes. Une grande tente Indienne se trouvait dressée pour nous recevoir et de riches tapis invitaient nos membres endoloris au repos. Nous n'avions pas besoin de nous occuper de nos repas. Le dîner se composait de plusieurs plats, parmi lesquels figuraient en première ligne, au point de vue culinaire, le fameux pilau du monde Musulman et un excellent schaschlyk à la mode de Caboul. On nous offrait en outre force boissons rafraîchissantes, sorbets, &c., et enfin dans la soirée un excellent souper. Tel était notre ordinaire de tous les jours.

Nous avons mis ensuite vingt jours pour atteindre Caboul, en traversant la chaîne de l'Hindoukousch, qui forme une suite de terrasses aboutissant à la plaine de Bamiam (8,500 pieds au-dessus du niveau de la mer). Cette plaine est entourée des pics de l'Hindoukousch, du Kalou, et du Grand-Iran (13,000 pieds au-dessus du niveau de la mer).

A quelques étapes avant d'arriver à Bamiam, nous fûmes reçu par le Gouvernement de cette province, Lal-Mohomed-Khan, accompagné d'une suite très-nombreuse. Nous passâmes ensuite devant les célèbres idoles-colosses de Bamiam, qui sont taillées en haut relief dans le rocher, puis nous traversâmes le défilé du Grand-Iran et celui d'Ougly, pour descendre dans le bassin de l'Océan Indien, dans la vallée du Caboul-Daria. Il ne nous restait plus alors que trois jours de route jusqu'à la ville de Caboul.

Le Serdar Nasreddin Khan, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères d'Afghanistan, vint nous recevoir au village de Kotéaschrik, à 50 verstes de Caboul, et le Vizir d'Afghanistan, monté sur un éléphant, nous rencontra aux villages de Kal et de Kaza. Toute notre Mission prit place sur les éléphants qu'il avait amenés avec lui, deux personnes sur chaque éléphant, et nous fîmes tout le reste du chemin à dos d'éléphant.

A 7 verstes de Caboul, nous fûmes reçus par le Prince Abdoullah Khan, neveu de Schir Ali Khan. Installé sur un énorme éléphant gris cendré et aux défenses dorées, le Prince était assis dans un palanquin tout couvert d'or. Il invita le Général Stolétoff à prendre place à côté de lui et partit ensuite dans la direction de la ville. Le Prince était suivi d'une foule de cavaliers et des deux côtés de l'excellente chaussée que suivait notre cortége se tenait la foule des indigènes, qui nous regardait avec curiosité, et appelait sur nos têtes la bénédiction des quatre Califes.

Nous atteignîmes bientôt un immense plateau où se trouvaient rangées des masses de troupes régulières. Le flanc gauche était formé par la cavalerie, devant laquelle se trouvaient 12 canons dont les flancs de bronze ou d'acier étincelaient au soleil. Quand l'éléphant qui portait le Général Stolétoff passa, devant le front des troupes, une salve de 36 coups de canon accueillit son arrivée et l'on entendit alors retentir la Marche Nationale Afghane, dont la mélodie originale et mélancolique est délicieuse, mais dont les sons furent bientôt converts par les cris de la foule appelant sur nous tous et surtout sur le Général Stolétoff la bénédiction des quatre Califes, cri qui remplace chez les Afghans notre hourra Russe.

C'est ainsi que nous fîmes notre entrée à Bassogissar, la citadelle de Caboul. Nous fûmes reçus à la porte de cette enceinte par la garnison de la citadelle, revêtue d'un costume Ecossais, jupes quadrillées, casques de feutre couverts d'or et d'argent. Après avoir suivi plusieurs rues, nous arrivâmes au Palais de Schir Ali Khan, où tout était prêt pour la réception de la Mission Russe. L'Emir ne vint pas en personne à notre rencontre, mais le lendemain, 30 Juillet, toute la Mission, le Général Stolétoff à sa tête, se présenta à l'Emir, dans la salle du trône de son palais, en présence de tous les hauts fonctionnaires de l'Afghanistan.

Les détails de la réception à une autre lettre.

No. 16.

Lord A. Loftus to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received December* 2.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November* 28, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to report that a correspondent of the "Moscow Gazette," writing from Ashurade under date of the $\frac{7}{19}$th October last, states that General Llainakin had then already returned with his column to Chickishliar after a campaign of two months in the steppes.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

CENTRAL ASIA. No. 2 (1878).

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE respecting Central Asia

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1878.

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

CENTRAL ASIA.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
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BOMBAY BRANCH

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Further Correspondence respecting Central Asia.

No. 1.

Lord A. Loftus to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received December 9.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, December* 4, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship an article, in translation by Mr. Michell, from the "Golos," relating to the reception of the Russian Mission at Cabul by the Ameer of Afghanistan in Durbar.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Golos" of November $\frac{18}{30}$, 1878.

THE "Golos" of the $\frac{18}{30}$th November, 1878, contains the following particulars, contributed by its Orenburg correspondent, respecting the reception of the Russian Mission by the Ameer at a Durbar held by him at Cabul:—

"The Ameer summoned a Durbar at Cabul of 250 loyal Chiefs of tribes. The conference was held under tents specially erected. The day following the arrival of the Chiefs, the War Minister having reported that nearly all the Chiefs had assembled, the Ameer proceeded to the camp where the Durbar was to be held, accompanied by his suite, numbering about 100 persons, consisting of his Ministers, Generals, and principal Ulemas of Cabul. The Ameer was enthusiastically received by the Chiefs, who crowded round their Sovereign with demonstrations of love and respect.

"The Ameer told them that the Russian Emperor Alexander had sent a Mission to Cabul for the purpose of strengthening the bonds of friendship which had long existed between Russians and Afghans. As Russia had always shown hospitality towards the Afghans who frequented with their caravans the Russian markets at Troitsk and Orenburg, at a time when Afghanistan was but little known to other European nations, he, the Ameer, considered it his duty to give a hearty welcome to the Russian Mission, and to receive it with due honour.

"This declaration of friendship on the part of the Ameer towards his Russian guests at Cabul called forth enthusiastic and approving exclamations from the Chiefs present at the Durbar. After this short speech the Ameer ordered his seal-bearer to read a concise Memorandum on the power, glory, and extent of Russia, her troops and subjects, in order that the Afghan Chiefs could be able to form a correct idea of the Power of which Representatives were then at Cabul. The concluding speech of the Ameer was as follows:—

"'Return to your brethren, sharpen your knives and lances, and saddle your horses, so that you may be ready to take the field so soon as I shall call on you to fight the enemies of our country.'

"The Ameer then left the camp and returned to Cabul. The two following sessions of the Durbar were devoted to an examination of the military budget of the country, the distribution of the regiments, a consideration of the forces available for a war with England, and the necessary measures to be adopted for supplying the troops with food and provender. The Ameer was not present at these last two assemblies, which were presided over by the Afghan War Minister. With regard to the stay of our Mission at Cabul, it is known that the Ameer lodged his dear guests in his best palace, or in the Modul Hissar,

formerly occupied by his son Yakub Khan, and endeavoured to surround them with every comfort, and to show them every attention; the warmest welcome was accorded to them without stint of expenditure, notwithstanding the supposed unsatisfactory condition of the Afghan finances. Hunts were also organized for the members of the Mission, and the most remarkable mosques of the city thrown open to their inspection. Whenever the Russians visited these places the natives followed them in crowds along the streets with demonstrations of joy, and threw their caps into the air. After the departure of General Stoletoff to Livadia, Colonel Rozgonoff took his place as Russian Representative, and he has already succeeded in gaining the goodwill of the inhabitants of Cabul."

No. 2.

Mr. R. Thomson to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received December* 12.)

My Lord, *Tehran, October* 14, 1878.

I HEAR from the Asterabad Agent, that on the retreat of the Russians from Khoja Kaleh to Chat they had to fight their way through the Téké Turkomans, who succeeded in cutting off a large caravan of provisions coming from Krasnovodsk.

Since arriving at Chat General Llamakin has retired to Chekishler, having left small detachments at Chat and Bayat Hadji. On this further retreat he was again attacked, with loss.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RONALD F. THOMSON.

No. 3.

Mr. R. Thomson to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received December* 12.)

(Extract.) *Tehran, October* 28, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copies of Reports from the Meshed and Asterabad Agents, and of a private letter from Asterabad, on the subject of the movements of the Russians and other matters of interest.

Inclosure 1 in No. 3.

The Meshed Agent to Mr. R. Thomson.

(Translation.)
(Extract.) *August* 31, 1878.

THE people of Merv are much alarmed at the advance of the Russian troops upon the Akhal country. About twenty days ago twelve Elders of the Saryk tribes petitioned the Khorassan Government to allow them quarters, so as to enable them to quit Pendjeh and become Persian subjects. The people of Akhal also are in great alarm on account of the approach of the Russians.

There is no news from Seistan except that the roads of Yezd and Kernan have become unsafe through the Beloochees having taken advantage of Sirdar Taj Mohammed Khan's escape from Tehran.

I was with the Prince Governor the day before yesterday when Yar Mohammed Khan's letters arrived. He reported that twelve regiments and twelve guns had arrived with the Russian General at Chat, and that they intended building a fort between Kizil Arvad and Karee Kala, and then advancing to Geuk Tuppeh, which is in the centre of the Akhal country, and after erecting a fort there also, they would remain there.

It is said that the people of Merv will not submit to Persia after all, and that there was a rumour that they are going to send out horsemen on a raiding expedition. I think that in reality they are going to send assistance to the Akhal Turkomans; and as this is against the wish of the Persian Government, they have declined to submit to them; in fact, the only reason for their offer of allegiance was that they hoped to obtain their protection for the whole Turkoman community against Russian invasion.

A correspondent from Boojnoord writes, under date of the 26th instant, that three days previously a Russian interpreter came there from the Russian camp with ten Yemoot and Kara Kaleh horsemen; that the whole number of the Russian troops is 25,000 men; of these 12,000 were to have arrived at Khoja Kaleh on the 31st, with 1,000 horse and

thirty guns; that two of the guns are of a heavy calibre and twenty-eight of small bore. Every twenty-five men have one hut and every 200 a kitchen. The remainder of the troops remain at Krasnovodsk and Chekishler. The troops are going to Bam and Boormeh, not to Kizil Arvad, as it appears that the people of Kizil Arvad have submitted. They have obtained 5,000 camels from the Yemoot tribes, 3,000 of which are purchased and 2,000 hired at 5 tomans a-piece. The Yemoot tribes have submitted, and their horsemen are doing duty in the Russian camp. Only 300 families claimed to be Persian subjects. These were told that they must quit their present quarters and go to the Goorgan valley, which they have accordingly done.

Kerum Dondee Eeshan and the other Téké Chiefs arrived at Boormeh from Bala. Horsemen are also continually arriving. It seems as if a fight were likely to take place. It has been decided also that the property of any Chief not coming in is to be given up to plunder. The price of grain there is 6 tomans the kharvar.

Inclosure 2 in No. 3.

The Meshed Agent to Mr. R. Thomson.

(Translation.)
(Extract.) *September* 22, 1878.

THREE days ago the Governor of Kaïn wrote to the Prince Governor, saying that if 600 horse, 2 regiments with guns and ammunition, were not sent to him without delay, Seistan would be lost to Persia, and he would not be responsible for what might happen, because for the last two months he had been continually applying for reinforcements, and none had been sent; and that on the 12th he had received intelligence that Sirdars Taj Mohammed Khan and Shereef Khan, together with the followers of Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, Belooch, and other turbulent characters had entered Seistan and taken possession of all the forts except that of Husseinabad, which was being held by the Kaïn people.

Seven days ago Dowlet Murad Khan, nephew to Allahyar, the Governor of Derehgez, who quitted that place about seven years ago because of his uncle's oppression, and had become a resident of Meshed, suddenly left. In my opinion he has not the means of taking Derehgez, but should he attempt it and fail, he may go over to the Russian camp, and in that case the Russian General will have the advantage of an able and well-informed Chief.

One of the two regiments, lately despatched from Tehran, on arrival at Sabzewar was ordered to proceed thence to Seistan.

On the 21st news was received that Dowlet Murad Khan, not being able to make a stand against Derehgez, has escaped to the Koochan frontier, and to all appearance he is going to join the Russian General. Mirza Khanler Khan, formerly Foreign Office Agent in Ghilan, Asterabad, is the person appointed to proceed to Cabul on a visit of condolence, and to ask that Sirdars Shereef Khan and Taj Mohammed Khan should be given up to Persia or removed from the frontier.

A correspondent at Herat writes to me on the 11th that the usual prayers and lamentations were held for three days on the occasion of Abdullah Jan's death. It appears that the Heir-Apparent had been unwell for some time, and that several days previous to his death he was attacked with typhus fever and other diseases to which he succumbed. The two Russian officers who are on a mission to the Ameer were still there when he died. The day that these officers arrived, the Ameer received them with much honour and distinction, all the troops and artillery were sent out to meet them, and salutes were fired. As yet the nature of their mission is unknown, but there is a rumour that they have asked leave to build cantonments for their troops at two places, one at Herat, and another (somewhere) in Turkestan. The correspondent states that he will have authentic intelligence of their doings in another month, as some of his friends will return to Herat from Cabul by that time.

He also adds that great changes will take place in the internal administration of the country on account of the Heir-Apparent's death. He states that the English authorities are engaged in building cantonments, &c., at Chalcote, that the people of Candahar bring provisions to the camp, work for them, and none of the Afghan authorities interfere.

It is said that Russian troops have entered the city of Bokhara, and have deprived the Ameer of all interference in official matters.

A correspondent at Serrekhs writes to me on the 16th that as Kousheed Khan's son asked for a considerable sum from the Prince Governor to transport his tribe from

Merv, and had received no answer, he was disappointed, but Nasrullah Khan then agreed to pay him 1,000 tomans provided he gave ten hostages, would hoist the Persian flag, and bring his tribe; that the Khan demurred at giving hostages and returned to Merv; that the Octemish tribe had addressed a petition to the Prince Governor sealed by Taj Sirdar, Beg Murad Khan, Aman Neeyaz Khan-i-Seechmaz, Saree Bater, Saree Beg-i-Zakhshee, and Araz Murad Khan, saying that they would come and bring twelve guns; that Kousheed Khan's son had started without their knowledge, and the 200 horsemen who accompanied him were useless characters; that in fact one of them, Shalka Sirdar, was a person who some time ago made an attack upon Serrekhs, and had killed several persons in the attack; that he ought, therefore, to have been seized by the Persian authorities and put to death.

Inclosure 3 in No. 3.

The Meshed Agent to Mr. R. Thomson.

(Translation.)
(Extract.) *September* 28, 1878.

I LEARN that about 2,000 Barbaree families, having sold and disposed of their lands and property in the neighbourhood of Herat, intended emigrating to Persia, but the Herat authorities sent horsemen after them and made them return.

An Afghan merchant, who recently came in from Bokhara, reports that 10,000 Russian troops came as far as Kirkee and Fergan and returned. He also reports that the Russian General asked the Ameer to give up Kirkee to them, but he replied that he had already given it to the Ameer of Afghanistan; that the Russians have dispatched an agent to Cabul, and the chief of the troops was briskly engaged in procuring waterskins and other necessary articles from the Ruler of Bokhara.

Dowlet Murad Khan, nephew to Allahyar Khan, the Governor of Derehgez, has again returned with a number of the inhabitants of Koochan, and has stationed himself at the Fort of Naubandan, a stronghold west of Derehgez, and he may cause great inconvenience in Allahyar Khan's Government. Although the local authorities have sent 300 horsemen to his assistance, yet it would appear that secretly they are encouraging Dowlet Murad Khan to rise against his uncle.

The Itimad-es-Saltaneh has been appointed Chief of the Forces to be sent to Seistan; he starts about the 4th or 5th October with 600 horse and two regiments of foot, one of which had already started from Sabzevar. Thirty thousand cartridges and two rifled guns, and other stores and ammunition, will also be sent after him if found necessary. Up to the present time the Persian authorities have spent 9,000 tomans for this expedition. Two regiments from Kerman are also to join him. Mirza Khanler Khan, the Agent appointed to Cabul, has received 700 tomans on account of his journey, and starts with the Itimad-es-Saltaneh.

I hear from Boojnoord on the 14th that the Russian troops, 12,000 strong, arrived at Bam and Boormeh, that the Téké Turkomans, as far as the Fort of Barzan, had submitted, but the Chiefs beyond that place were prepared to fight. One hundred and fifty families of the Yemoot tribes have taken service with the Russians, each family being paid 10 tomans a-month.

Inclosure 4 in No. 3.

The Meshed Agent to Mr. R. Thomson.

(Translation.)
(Extract.) *October* 5, 1878.

NASRULLAH KHAN, the Persian Agent for arranging the allegiance of the Merv Turkomans to Persia, having finally failed, has returned to Meshed.

I received a message from Boojnoord, saying that the last news respecting the Russian occupation of Bam and Boormeh was premature.

Intelligence has been received that the Téké Turkomans have caused the Russians to retreat towards Chat, and attacked them with 500 horse.

Dowlet Murad Khan has made an attack on Allahyar Khan at Derehgez, in which twenty lives were lost. The former is in force and stationed at Naubandan. Some of the Turkomans from Ishkabad, &c., have joined him. The local Government sends verbal promises of support, but nothing further.

The troops of Seistan are encamped at Takhta, and will start in a few days. The

Persian Agent to Cabul will start at the same time. He has telegraphed for a further grant of 300 tomans, saying that the previous grant of 700 tomans has all been spent in making preparations for the journey.

The Akhal Turkomans having asked for aid from those of Merv, they replied that they had first to repair the dam carried away by the water, and finish their negotiations with Persia.

Inclosure 5 in No. 3.

The Meshed Agent to Mr. R. Thomson.

(Translation.) *October* 12, 1878.

TWO days ago an Afghan merchant came in from Herat. He reported that intelligence had been received there that a considerable body of Turkomans had come with the object of making a raid in the Herat territory, and plundering all caravans coming and going from that place, and that therefore a caravan which had intended starting for Meshed had been delayed and detained only 6 farsakhs from Herat. He also said that the inhabitants of a village near Cabul had revolted, and Ameer Shere Ali Khan had dispatched a regiment of infantry and four guns, under the command of Sirdar Abdullah Khan, former Governor of Herat, to suppress the revolt.

The Commander-in-chief at Herat is very much disturbed as to the future, as he was one of the adherents of the late Heir-Apparent. The Governor, Sirdar Mohammed Omar Khan, is sure of his tenure of office. Before the Ramazan festival (1st Sharval) he sent and asked of the Ameer whether it was to be celebrated or not. The Ameer replied that only an Heir-Apparent had died, and if he chose he could appoint 100 of them in an hour, therefore he was to celebrate the festival more grandly than on previous occasions. This was accordingly done.

The rice crops are better than in former years. Rice is selling at 2 tomans a kharvar, whilst wheat costs 3 tomans.

Two days ago two men came in from Merv, bringing petitions from all the Turkoman Chiefs, saying that they were sorry that they had delayed in submitting to Persian rule, but now they are arranging to send ten or fifteen of their Elders as hostages for their good conduct, but that 1,000 tomans was necessary to transport their families; if that sum was granted their Elders would come.

The Prince Governor has accorded their request, and written to them in that sense to-day.

The Itimad-es-Saltaneh left with his troops from Seistan on the 9th instant. There is a rumour that the people of the Hishmet-ul-Mulk (Governor of Kain and Persian Seistan) had killed and wounded about twenty-five followers of Sirdar Taj Mohammed Khan, and that a considerable number of the inhabitants of Seistan and Beloochistan have collected together.

Three days ago news was received that Allahyar Khan left Mohammedabad with his horsemen to fight Dowlet Murad Khan. After going a short distance, Dowlet Murad Khan's horsemen, who were lying in an ambush waiting for those of Allahyar Khan, suddenly rushed out, when several of Allahyar Khan's men deserted to Dowlet Murad Khan's side. Allahyar Khan, seeing this, became alarmed lest all his horsemen intended to do the same, and immediately fled direct to Kelat. Dowlet Murad Khan's cause has thus been strengthened.

To-day intelligence was received that Dowlet Murad Khan had seized Mohammedabad and all the property belonging to Allahyar Khan, and that 800 Turkomans have joined him. The Prince Governor, on hearing this, began to make preparations for suppressing Dowlet Murad Khan in person, and he will shortly proceed thither with troops and the Musteshar-ul-Mulk. The local affairs of Meshed will be in great confusion during the Prince's absence. In fact, all order has disappeared in Seistan and Khorassan, and if the Merv Turkomans are again disappointed in their overtures to Persia,* and hear of the retreat of the Russian troops, they will make raids on this country in all directions.

The journey of Mirza Khanlar Khan to Afghanistan has been put off, for the present, by a telegraphic order from the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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* As to receiving the 1,000 tomans before mentioned.

Inclosure 6 in No. 3.

The Asterabad Agent to Mr. R. Thomson.

(Translation.) *September* 30, 1878.

THE rice and other crops are very good this year.

The Prince Governor is expecting the arrival of money for the troops from Tehran. Most of the soldiers have deserted from Ak Kaleh, and no one is left there except the officers and a few of the men.

The Daz tribe have also rebelled. Some days ago they attacked Ak Kaleh, killing two soldiers, wounding one, and carrying off five of them prisoners. Nazar Taaneh, Chief of the Atabaï tribe, however, pursued them, and succeeded in liberating soldiers.

On the 28th it was reported that the Russian troops had returned from Khoja Kaleh to Chat, that the Téké Turkomans having made a stand, General Llamakin retreated. Disease is rife amongst the troops, and there is great mortality.

The Turkomans disinter the bodies and strip them of whatever clothes they possess. The Turkomans of Kizil Arvad have opened negotiations with the Russians.

It is further stated that the troops will arrive in a day or two at Bayat Hajji, as they have no provisions, and none have been received at Krasnovodsk.

Inclosure 7 in No. 3.

Private Letter from Asterabad.

(Translation.) *September* 16, 1878.

YESTERDAY a man came in from the Russian camp. He reported that the troops remained three days at Karee Kaleh, and their provisions running short, they sent to the Goklan tribe to procure some. That tribe, however, made excuses, saying that they had no means of transport. They then applied to the inhabitants of Karee Kaleh, who are a mixture of Téké and Yemoot Turkomans; they also proffered some excuse. Afterwards they dispatched 1,000 camels to Chekishler to bring provisions.

Noor Verdee Khan, Chief of the Téké Turkomans, and the Chiefs of Merv and Akhal, have bound themselves to fight. It is also said that thirty persons in the Afghan costume have appeared amongst the Téké tribes; some say they are Afghans, whilst others say they are Englishmen; that two Elders of the Téké tribe recently came with 200 horsemen to the Russian General, but he refused to admit the latter into the camp. The Elders then asked the General why he did not allow the horsemen to enter the camp, upon which General Llamakin got angry, and ordered the Elders to be arrested, whilst the horsemen returned; the General, however, afterwards released the Elders, and made them a present of money.

It appears that the Russians afterwards went to Khoja Kaleh, which is a strong place between Karee Kaleh and Kizil Arvad, and encamped there. The Téké tribes are mustering in great force. The troops are suffering greatly from the brackish water and unhealthy climate.

It is rumoured that General Llamakin has sent word to the Téké tribes that if they allow the Russian flag to be hoisted amongst them, and a garrison to protect it, he would return; but they had replied that as long as they lived they would not allow such a thing, and that they would fight, as the Merv Turkomans and the Afghans were with them also.

Inclosure 8 in No. 3.

The Asterabad Agent to Mr. R. Thomson.

(Translation.) *October* 6, 1878.

AUTHENTIC news has been received that the Russian troops were obliged to make a retreat from Khoja Kaleh. The Téké Turkomans beseiged their camp for two days, and at last General Llamakin retreated fighting. The Tékés then went and intercepted the caravan coming with provisions from Krasnovodsk; they carried off the whole of it, consisting of 300 camels laden with grain. Small garrisons have been left at Chat and Bayat Hajji. The General has returned to Chekishler with the intention of making a second expedition against the Turkomans.

The Daz Davajee tribes have revolted, and the Prince Governor is only waiting for the arrival of money from Tehran to form another camp at Ak Kaleh.

The Oghoorchelee Turkomans, who were under the Government of Mazanderan, have been transferred to that of Asterabad. Their revenue is 1,200 tomans a-year, and the Prince Governor issued orders that any of them found trading in future without his licence would be arrested and fined.

No. 4.

Mr. R. Thomson to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received December* 12.)

My Lord, *Tehran, October* 29, 1878.

I HAVE been informed that General Llamakin has returned to Chat, where a fort is being built, and has established a camp at Chekishler, having procured supplies of food, winter clothing, Turkoman huts, and building implements there, and from Krasnovodsk.

The Téké Turkomans have attacked the Sheikhees, a tribe that are under the Russian rule, and live in the neighbourhood of Krasnovodsk. They are also building a fort with a ditch, and suitable for guns, under the direction of some Afghans, who are reported as belonging to the Jamsheedi tribe. The passes are being fortified, and they are reported as having 25,000 men in readiness.

The Yemoots are pressing urgently for payment of the value of their camels and cattle, which they had furnished to the Russians, and which had been lost during the expedition.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RONALD F. THOMSON.

No. 5.

Mr. R. Thomson to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received December* 12.)

My Lord, *Tehran, November* 6, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to inclose translations of two letters which I have received from the Asterabad Agent, containing information respecting the loss sustained by the recent expedition under General Llamakin to Akhal, and the proceedings of the Russians in the vicinity of the Attrek.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RONALD F. THOMSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 5.

Private Letter from Asterabad, dated October 16, 1878.

(Translation.)

AFTER General Llamakin returned from Khoja Kaleh he came to Chat, and thence went to Bayat Hajji. The Téké horse followed him everywhere, and he retreated fighting until he got to Gumesh Teppeh. He left some men at Chat. The Tékés carried off a caravan of provisions, with the chief of the caravan, as well as two Cossacks. As for the report that seventy of the Turkomans were killed, it is false. Intelligence was received yesterday that a new official had arrived from Russia, with a sum of 12,000 tomans, who is buying up the Pampas grass at the rate of 5 or 6 krans per camel load, and storing it up. They are building a fort at Charkan, and have hoisted the Russian flag there, engaging the Turkomans of that place as servants. They have purchased 100 Turkoman tents, and are purchasing others. They are also building a fort at Chat. The Merv and Téké Turkomans, accompanied by the Jemsheedee Afghans, have come to Khojeh Kaleh, whence the Russians fled, and are fortifying the place and digging a moat round the fort, under the directions of some Afghans. About 25,000 Téké horse are now assembled here, and they are strengthening all the passes. All the Charva Yemoots have removed from those districts through fear of the Téké Turkomans. Some have come to the Goorgan Valley, and some have gone to the Attrek. The Tékés are daily increasing in force and numbers. A report was also received that 2,000 of them have gone in the direction of Boojnoord to make a raid. Affairs are in a bad state at present. It is also said here that the Afghans, having taken Seistan, intend marching upon Khorassan, and that the Téké Turkomans have joined them.

Inclosure 2 in No. 5.

The Asterabad Agent to Mr. R. Thomson.

(Translation.) *October* 21, 1878.

THE Prince Governor recently received 6,000 tomans for the troops—4,000 tomans in cash and 2,000 tomans in bills. He took the cash with him on the 15th to Ak Kaleh. He has full authority to send and bring in all the deserters, and to levy recruits to take the place of those missing, to punish all the culprits, and to repair the Fort of Ak Kaleh.

The Russian troops are dispersed at Chat, Bayat Hajji, and Chekishler. About 400 soldiers have been lost in the present expedition; some have died, and the rest have been cut off by the Téké Turkomans. The latter are felling trees for fortifying Khoja Kaleh, and they are going to throw up such fortifications as will enable them to work guns on them. Most of the Russian soldiers (who died) were killed by the Tékés when they were sent to escort a convoy of prisoners.

The Daz and Davajee tribes have not yet paid their annual taxes to the Prince Governor, nor has he sent anyone to recover them.

No. 6.

Mr. R. Thomson to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received December* 12.)

My Lord, *Tehran, November* 6, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translations of three letters which I have received from the Meshed Agent, containing information which had reached him from Afghanistan, Seistan, the Khorassan districts, and Turkoman territory.

He mentions the arrival in Khorassan from Cabul of the son of the late Shah Newaz Khan, Sirdar Iskender Khan. Shah Newaz Khan's brother, who was in the Russian service for some time after the family was driven out of Herat, and who has for several years resided in London, has lately also arrived in Persia. It is believed that he will apply for and probably obtain the pension hitherto granted by the Persian Government to his late brother.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RONALD F. THOMSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 6.

The Meshed Agent to Mr. R. Thomson.

(Translation.) *October* 22, 1878.

FOUR days ago the son of Shah Newaz Khan arrived here from Cabul with fourteen followers, *en route* for Tehran, by permission of Ameer Shere Ali Khan. His object is to look after his late father's estate. He informed me that the chief Russian officer who went on a mission to Cabul was still there, but that his assistant had returned. He also added that when he was in Kohistan an unknown person appeared, of whom the frontier authorities inquired who he was and whence he came. He replied that he was the bearer of petitions for the Shah and his Ministers from Sirdar Taj Mahomed Khan to the effect that he was a loyal servant and was ready to serve on condition that the Ameer of Kain should have no jurisdiction over him, or else he would take refuge with the English. He also added that the Sirdar had taken possession of Hoossein Abad and seized all the Government property and guns, and arrested the relations of the Ameer of Kain. The frontier authorities had him conveyed to Herat, and await the pleasure of the Governor as to whether he should be allowed to proceed to Persia or no.

I hear from Boojnoord that the Russians had retreated and were building a fort at Chat, that there are not more than 7,000 soldiers and 1,000 horse, and that the Russian General has gone to Krasnovodsk, but will return in a fortnight.

Seven days ago I received a letter from a friend at Serrekhs; he writes that news had been received from Chehar Jong that a party of Russian troops had been seen sailing up the Jaxartes, but that it was unknown whether they were going to Afghanistan or elsewhere.

Yesterday I went to visit the Guardian of the Holy Shrine; while there a letter was received from the Prince Governor, saying that at the onset he had dispatched horsemen with Allahyar Khan, Behbood Khan, the Governor of Khelat, and Kahramon (Khan) of Koochan, to the Fort of Chapeshlar, where the brother of Dowlat Moorad Khan was Governor, but that he fled on their approach. Dowlat Moorad Khan himself, on learning this, fled with forty or fifty Akhal Turkomans to the Fort of Noukhandan, and that he (the Prince Governor) had entered Chapeshlar, so that the affair of Derehgez may be considered as settled. The date of the Prince Governor's letter was the 20th October.

Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

The Meshed Agent to Mr. R. Thomson.

(Translation.) *October* 19, 1878.

A CORRESPONDENT at Herat writes on the 4th that there was an insurrection at Panj Sheer, and that Shere Ali Khan had dispatched Sirdar Abdullah Khan, formerly Governor of Herat, with three regiments, two squadrons of horse, and several guns against that place. There was great tyranny going on at Cabul, and the inhabitants were very weary of it. Three other regiments, accompanied by three ressalas of horse and six guns, have recently arrived at Candahar in order to guard the frontier near Peshany and Chalcote. Mohammed Saïd, son of Syed Shahdad of Peshany, is the Governor of Ghuznee. The aforesaid troops and guns will proceed to Mookr and be stationed there. Sirdar Meer Afzul Khan is the Governor, and Safdar Ali Khan the Commander-in-chief at Candahar, and Sultan Mohammed Khan the Deputy Governor; they intend strengthening the frontier of Peshany.

He also writes that intelligence had been received that a district in the neighbourhood of Meimaneh had also revolted, during which several of the Ameer's troops had been put to death, and that a force had been sent to suppress it. The Turkomans have also entered into Meimaneh.

Affairs at Herat are also in a state of confusion. In the last three days the Governor and the Commander-in-chief have been deliberating, and they have decided to send 2 regiments, 500 horsemen, and 6 mountain guns to Kohistan to guard the frontier, as it was reported that 1,500 Turkomans of the Yoola Tau tribe, horse and foot, intended making a raid into the Herat territory.

The son of Shah Newaz Khan has arrived at Herat from Cabul, *en route* for Tehran.

No. 7.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 13, 1878.

COUNT SCHOUVALOFF mentioned to me, in the course of conversation, on the 10th instant, that though the Russian Envoy who had been sent to Afghanistan had been recalled to Russia, the Russian Mission still remained at Cabul. I expressed great surprise at this statement, which was entirely new to me, and which, I was convinced, would be as new to my colleagues as to myself. I pointed out to him the untenable position taken up by the Russian Government, who admitted that the dispatch of a Mission had been an infraction of the understanding existing between the two countries only justified by the probability of war, but who now continued to maintain the Mission long after friendly relations had been fully re-established; and I earnestly urged upon him the expediency of withdrawing the Mission, the continued presence of which was entirely at variance with the engagements which were still in force between England and Russia. His Excellency admitted that the course followed by the Russian Government was abnormal.

He asked me whether I admitted that we had engaged to respect the independence of Afghanistan, basing his contention that such an engagement had been made by us upon the Memorandum contained in Lord Derby's despatch to Mr. Doria of the 25th October, 1875.

I said that all the engagements which we had taken, or which the Russian Government had taken, in that correspondence, I regarded as still binding; but I could not admit that the words used by Lord Derby went so far as to make the maintenance of the independence of Afghanistan a matter of engagement on our part towards Russia.

The discussion was renewed yesterday.

His Excellency intimated to me clearly that it was the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to withdraw their Mission. At the same time, he again asked me whether he might consider the understanding formerly arrived at with respect to Central Asia to be still in vigour; and whether we admitted that the recognition of Afghanistan as an independent State under British influence formed part of that understanding. He relied especially upon the language of the Memorandum of 1875.

I could only repeat England would adhere to all the undertakings she had given. The Memorandum did not, however, in our judgment, bear the construction which he

placed upon it, and, therefore, I could not admit that we were under any engagement with respect to the independence of Afghanistan; but he might see from the speeches of Ministers in public that the maintenance of Afghanistan as an independent State under British influence was the policy which at present we desired to pursue.

Ultimately his Excellency observed that it might be desirable to reduce the substance of our conversation to the form of a note; a course to which I replied that I saw no objection.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 8.

Count Schouvaloff to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received December 19.)

Mon cher Lord Salisbury, *Londres, le $\frac{7}{19}$ Décembre*, 1878.

VOUS avez exprimé de la surprise en apprenant que la Mission Russe que vous avez cru avoir quitté Caboul s'y trouvait encore. Vous m'avez rappelé la déclarat on faite par M. le Sénateur de Giers au Chargé d'Affaires Britannique, concernant le caractère provisoire de cette Mission, envoyée dans des circonstances exceptionnelles et lorsqu'il était à craindre en effet qu'une guerre n'éclatât entre l'Angleterre et la Russie.

J'ai reçu un télégramme du Prince Gortchacow dans lequel il me charge de vous demander si les arrangements entre la Russie et l'Angleterre, tels qu'ils existaient avant l'envoi de la Mission et tels qu'ils sont consignés dans la correspondance échangée à ce sujet entre les deux Cabinets, sont maintenus par le Gouvernement de la Reine, et s'ils conservent à ses yeux leur caractère obligatoire.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur est disposé, pour sa part, à observer tous les arrangements relatifs à l'Asie Centrale conclus entre la Russie et l'Angleterre, et à rappeler immédiatement la Mission Russe qui se trouve à Caboul.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) SCHOUVALOFF.

(Translation.)

My dear Lord Salisbury, *London, December $\frac{7}{19}$*, 1878.

YOU have expressed surprise on learning that the Russian Mission, which you thought had left Cabul, was still there. You reminded me of the declaration made by M. de Giers to the British Chargé d'Affaires concerning the provisional character of this Mission, which was dispatched under exceptional circumstances, and at a time when it was to be feared that war might break out between England and Russia.

I have received a telegram from Prince Gortchacow, in which he charges me to ask you whether the arrangements between Russia and England, such as they existed before the dispatch of the Mission, and such as they are recorded in the correspondence exchanged on this subject between the two Cabinets, are maintained by Her Majesty's Government, and whether they retain in their eyes their obligatory character.

His Majesty the Emperor is disposed, on his part, to observe all the arrangements relative to Central Asia concluded between Russia and England, and to recall immediately the Mission which is at Cabul.

(Signed) SCHOUVALOFF.

No. 9.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Count Schouvaloff.

My dear Count Schouvaloff, *Foreign Office, December* 19, 1878.

IN reply to your letter of this day's date, I have to state to your Excellency that the continued presence of the Russian Mission at Cabul is the sole obstacle to a full revival of the understanding between the two Powers expressed in the correspondence which has passed between them upon the subject of Afghanistan and Central Asia; and when the Russian Mission is withdrawn, Her Majesty's

Government will consider that all engagements on both sides with respect to those countries retain their obligatory character.

I have, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 10.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 19, 1878.

I WAS informed to-day by the Russian Ambassador that instructions had been sent to the Mission to withdraw from Cabul.

No. 11.

Lord A. Loftus to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received December 25.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 20, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship, in translation by Mr. Michell, an article from the "Golos" of this day, which contains a letter, dated the $\frac{1st}{13th}$ October, from its correspondent at Cabul.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 11.

Extract from the "Golos" of December 20, 1878.

(Translation from the Russian.)

THE "Golos" (No. 339) of the $\frac{8}{20}$th December, 1878, contains the following letter, dated the $\frac{1st}{13th}$ October last, from its correspondent at Cabul:—

"As a caravan is to start to-morrow or the day after, I shall communicate some extracts out of my diary to you.

"General Stoletoff's Mission entered Cabul on the $\frac{29th\ July}{10th\ August}$ under the circumstances already described, and was lodged in the Bala Hissar Palace . . . . . The official visit of the Russians to the Ameer was made on the following day, the $\frac{30th\ July}{11th\ August}$. All the members of the Mission were in gala uniform, and although the Ameer's Palace was only about 50 fathoms distant, they proceeded on horseback to it, escorted by twelve Cossacks and a detachment of Afghan guards. The Ameer received the Mission on an open terrace which faces a garden, and which served as a hall of audience. The reception took place in the presence of a few high functionaries. On the presentation of each member of the Mission the Ameer paid him some compliment, or made a jocose remark. Thus, on the presentation of Malevinski, who was attached to the Mission as English interpreter, the Ameer, with a simulation of anxiety, said he hoped that Malevinski, as an Englishman and interpreter, was not the bearer of fire and sword through Afghanistan. . . . . The Ameer shook hands with each member as he was presented by General Stoletoff, retaining his seat on a gilt chair. The Ameer was very amiable with all. . . . . The audience lasted about an hour, the conversation being very animated and on many topics, ... In the evening the town was brilliantly illuminated, and there was a display of fireworks and Bengal lights.

On the $\frac{31st\ July}{12th\ August}$, at noon, the highest Afghan dignitaries—the Vizier, Dabir-ul-Mulk, and some others, came to inquire after the health of the members of the Mission. Having exchanged compliments, the Vizier and General Stoletoff were left alone for the purpose of negotiation. This order of things was generally observed during the succeeding days; the Vizier and Dabir-ul-Mulk used to appear about mid-day, and work at the Treaty with Stoletoff. Stoletoff went several times to the Ameer, especially when a difficulty arose between the negotiators. The Treaty had general reference to the Afghan system of administration, to the question of succession, the recognition by Russia of the existing political régime in Afghanistan, &c. As regards the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance between Russia and Afghanistan, this is a pure invention on the part o.

the English journalists, who made an elephant out of a fly. I can positively assert that there is nothing of the kind in the Treaty; nevertheless, Russia in this Treaty binds herself morally to support the integrity and independence of Afghanistan. . . . ."

The correspondent then describes the illness and treatment of Abdulla Khan, and his subsequent death.

"The labours of General Stoletoff and the Afghan Representatives proceeded from day to day, but several drafts of the Treaty had to be made before a final understanding was arrived at.

"On the conclusion of the negotiations Shere Ali Khan informed General Stoletoff he had received information that the English were also desirous of sending a Mission to Cabul, and that they wanted to know whether the Ameer would receive it. At the same time the Ameer observed that, in his opinion, the English had nothing to do in Cabul, and that he therefore intended to refuse the English request. The Ameer, however, asked General Stoletoff's advice as to the course he should pursue in the case. General Stoletoff gave an evasive reply, which was neither of an affirmative nor yet of a negative nature. He, nevertheless, gave the Ameer to understand that the simultaneous presence of the Missions of two States, which were at almost hostile relations with each other, would not be very convenient. Thereupon the Ameer decided to answer by a refusal.

* * * * *

"On the $\frac{12}{24}$th August General Stoletoff, accompanied by the Doctor and escorted by ten Cossacks, left for Tashkend, which place we hear he reached on the $\frac{4}{16}$th September, after a fatiguing journey of twenty-two days, and extending over 1,300 versts. The following members of the Mission still remain at Cabul:—Colonel Rosgonoff, Benderski (topographer), Malevinski (interpreter), Sub-Lieutenants Nazaroff and Zaaman Bek, with eleven Cossacks and attendants."

No. 12.

Lord A. Loftus to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 6.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 1, 1879.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, in translation by Mr. Michell, an account given by the "Moscow Gazette" of the movements of the Russian detachment which marched last summer from Petro-Alexandroffsk, along the Oxus, having in view Kizil-Rabat for its ultimate destination.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 12.

Extract from the "Moscow Gazette" of December $\frac{9}{21}$, 1878.

(Translation from the Russian.)

THE "Moscow Gazette" of the $\frac{9th}{21st}$ December, 1878, contains the following account, written by a correspondent, of the movement of the Russian detachment that marched last summer from Fort Petro-Alexandroffsk to the Oxus, having in view Kizil-Rabat for its utimate destination:—

"On the $\frac{15}{27}$th July our detachment, consisting of six companies of infantry, two sotnias of Cossacks, and four guns, left the encampment at Fort Petro-Alexandroffsk.

We were ordered to proceed up the course of the Oxus, keeping to the right bank. On reaching Fort Chardjui, situated on the left bank of the Oxus (south-west of Bokhara) the detachment was to halt and there await further orders. The advance of the detachment did not differ from previous expeditions undertaken by detachments from Turkestan; over the heated sandy plain, encountering violent gusts of wind, which raised large clouds of sand, and, and with the temperature at 42° Reaumur, the soldiers marched as on a parade-ground. The drifting sand proved the greatest obstacle to the advance of the troops: the feet of the soldiers and horses sinking deep into the friable sand at every step; the wheels of the gun-carriages sank almost to the axletrees, so that the horses were continually straining at their loads, owing to the increased force of resistance.

* * * * * * *

"And so we ascended the Oxus along the right bank, gradually approaching

Bokhara. The men were in remarkably buoyant spirits. No doubts as to the practicability of marching to India were entertained; but the famous Berlin Congress pronounced its mandate. We retraced our steps. The extreme point of our advance was Kizil-Rabat."

No. 13.

Mr. R. Thomson to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 16.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January* 16, 1879.

IT would seem that the Russian detachment at Chat, consisting of 600 men, is in a critical position. The place is said to be surrounded by the Akhal Turkomans. They have also attacked Chekishler and carried off all the camels collected there from under the guns of the Ashourada squadron sent to protect the place.

No. 14.

Lord A. Loftus to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 20.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 15, 1879.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship a leading article, of a semi-official character, from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" on the reported intention of Shere Ali to invite the mediation of Europe in his conflict with England, an intention which the article designates as a "generous illusion."

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 14.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of December 29, 1878 / January 10, 1879.

IL se confirme que l'Amir de Caboul a quitté ses Etats et a réclamé l'hospitalité de la Russie. Il ressort des nouvelles mêmes publiées par les journaux Anglais sur les événements militaires, que ce ne sont pas les succès remportés par les troupes Anglo-Indiennes qui ont forcé Shir Ali à chercher asile à l'étranger. Le but du voyage entrepris par ce Souverain est, nous assure-t-on, d'invoquer la médiation de l'Europe, et de rendre les Puissances Continentales juges de son conflit avec l'Angleterre.

Généreuse illusion, s'il en fût! Amir Shir Ali ne s'est pas rendu compte de cette circonstance qu'une médiation n'est exercée que si elle est réclamée ou du moins admise par les deux parties intéressées, ce qui, dans l'espèce, est fort peu probable. Le Souverain de l'Afghanistan se trouve à cette heure sur le sol Russe, et il va de soi qu'il y rencontrera la sympathique hospitalité qui lui est due. Nous ignorons encore si, à la suite des explications et des éclaircissements qui ne sauraient tarder à lui être fournis sur les chances de son excursion, il jugera devoir la continuer.

CENTRAL ASIA. No. 1 (1879).

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE respecting Central Asia.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1879.

LONDON:
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BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
Royal Asiatic Society.
CLASS

CENTRAL ASIA AND QUETTA.

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 20 February 1879;—*for*,

"COPIES of DESPATCHES from the Governor General of India in Council to the Secretary of State, dated the 23rd day of January 1867, No. 15; the 8th day of February 1867, No. 28; the 23rd day of February 1867, No. 42; and the 23rd day of October 1867, No. 162, with MINUTES enclosed, on CENTRAL ASIA and QUETTA:"

"And, of the REPLY of the Secretary of State, dated the 26th day of December 1867."

India Office,
24 February 1879.

EDWARD STANHOPE,
Under Secretary of State for India.

(*Mr. Grant Duff.*)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed*,
25 *February* 1879.

BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
Royal Asiatic Society.
CLASS

PAPERS

RELATING TO

CENTRAL ASIA AND QUETTA.

— No. 1 —

(Foreign Department.—Political.—No. 15.)

To the Right Honourable Viscount *Cranborne*, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord, Fort William, 23 January 1867.

WE beg to forward, for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a correspondence with the Government of Bombay on a proposal emanating from Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry Green, K.C.S.I., Political Superintendent on the Scinde frontier, which has for its ultimate object the occupation of Quetta, at the northern entrance of the Bolan Pass, by a British force.

2. We are unanimously opposed to the project, and have conveyed our rejection of it to the Bombay Government in decided terms.

3. It is the intention of some Members of this Government to set forth in detailed Minutes the objections which they entertain to the scheme, especially in its military aspect. These Minutes shall be transmitted to your Lordship by an early opportunity.

We have, &c.

(signed) *John Lawrence.*
W. R. Mansfield.
H. S. Maine.
W. Grey.
G. N. Taylor.
W. N. Massey.
H. M. Durand.

Enclosure 1, in No. 1.

From *C. Gonne*, Esq., Secretary to Government, Bombay, to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, Calcutta (No. 62), dated the 26th December 1866.

I AM directed to forward to you, for submission to the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, the enclosed copy of a confidential memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Sir H. Green, C.B., K.C.S.I., containing "suggestions for the protection of the North-West Frontier of India."

2. I am also desired to forward copies of Minutes by his Excellency the Governor and his Excellency the Commander in Chief, recording their views on the important subject discussed by Sir H. Green, and to convey the recommendation of this Government that a grant of 50,000 rupees per annum may be placed at the disposal of the Political Superintendent on the Sind frontier for the next two years for the purpose of carrying out the preliminary objects contemplated by him. Dated the 26th November and 6th December 1866 respectively.

3. His Excellency in Council desires me to add that we already possess the power of establishing a Political Officer (who is frequently at Khelat) in the manner suggested by his Excellency the Commander in Chief.

Enclosure 2, in No. 1.

SUGGESTIONS for the Protection of the North-West Frontier of India, with reference to the Advance of the Russians in Central Asia, by Lieutenant Colonel Sir *H. Green*, C.B., K.C.S.I., Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Sind Frontier. Confidential, dated United Service Club, Pall Mall, the 16th August 1866.

HAVING maturely considered the disturbing effects which are being caused along our Indian frontier, and in India itself, by the continuous advance of Russia, I am most decidedly of opinion that it is absolutely necessary that a position be occupied in advance of our present line of frontier, not with a view of attempting to stay Russian progress, but with a view of being prepared to meet her with advantage on our side under any circumstances that may occur.

After a careful study of the letters of the late General John Jacob to Lord Canning,* which are to be found in a book entitled "Views and Opinions of General John Jacob," pages 375 to 398, I have few remarks to offer upon the subject. The arguments in favour of the scheme there proposed, and the details for carrying it out, are so clear and concise that little can be added. I think, however, that it might be to some extent modified, and that a very great object would be obtained by carrying out the occupation of Quetta in such a manner as to prevent the necessity of directing any sudden movement of troops towards the north, which might be construed, in the present excitable state of the public mind in India, as a deliberate advance to attack Russia, or to repeat the occurrences in Affghanistan of 1839 and 1840.

I consider, therefore, that the first object would be to gradually and in a peaceable manner clear the road leading towards the head of the Bolan Pass. To explain the feasibility of such a proceeding it will be necessary to give a slight sketch of the intervening country and its present political status. For a more elaborate description I must refer to Masson's "History of Beloochistan," Vol. 4, and to the Report of the Political Agents to the Bombay Government from 1856 to the present date.

The whole of the country lying to the north of our north-west frontier of Sind, and extending from between Affghanistan and the British territory, is denominated Beloochistan, and is composed of a succession of mountains and valleys, and is inhabited by nomad tribes, whose principal occupation is that of attending cattle and sheep, of which latter they have enormous flocks. They move their encampments according to the seasons and the pasturage. The whole country is portioned out between these tribes, certain lands being reserved for the chief ruler, styled Khan, from the produce of which and from certain transit dues levied upon merchandise passing through his country, he derives his revenue. The Khan exerts a certain amount of control over these tribes, but much depends upon his personal character.

The first relations we had with the Belooch tribes was in 1838, when our army, under Sir John Keane, advanced through the Bolan Pass to Affghanistan, and during which march the troops and baggage were much harassed by Belooch marauders. As a punishment for this misconduct, Sir T. Willtshire, on the return of the army from Cabool, stormed Khelat, the capital of Beloochistan, killing the chief, Merab Khan, father of the present ruler, Meer Khodadad Khan.

It would take up too much time to enter into all the events which followed the fall of Khelat, and which are to be found in the records of Government. It will suffice for the present purpose to state that, after the above event, the political relations between the British and Belooch became gradually of a more and more satisfactory nature, when in 1854, the late General John Jacob, then Commanding and Political Superintendent on the frontier of Sind, proceeded to Khelat, and concluded a treaty with the Khan, the IV. Article of which is as follows: "Should it be deemed necessary to station British troops in any part of the territory of Khelat, they shall occupy such positions as may be thought advisable by the British authorities."

The VIth. Article provided an annual subsidy of 50,000 rupees to the Khan, to aid him in carrying into effect the provisions of the treaty, besides reducing to a moderate and fixed sum the transit duties on merchandise passing through Beloochistan.

At the breaking out of the Persian War in 1856, and at the request of the Khan, a Political Officer was dispatched to his court on the part of the British Government, who remained there during the Indian rebellion, during which period the Khan and people of Beloochistan remained our true and faithful allies, never in any manner taking advantage of our troubles, nor of the reduction of the troops in Sind, and turning a deaf ear to all the overtures of our enemies to cause disturbance or trouble on our frontier.

During the residence of the different Political Agents at the Belooch Court a squadron from the Sind Horse formed their escort, and always moved with them in their tours, made in every part of the country, sometimes accompanied by the Khan, sometimes alone. By this means, and during a period of four years, these officers (Lieutenant Colonel Sir H. Green and Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm Green) became thoroughly acquainted with the people and the country, as well as with its resources; and, from the exact discipline maintained in the Sind Horse, and the payment in ready money for all articles supplied, caused the advent of their camps in any part of the country to be hailed with joy. The tribes

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* *See* Appendix.

tribes also became used to the appearance of British troops, and saw that wherever they appeared peace and plenty followed, and gradually came to understand that the only object of the mission was peace, and that the British Government had no object or wish to annex or take their country from them.

In 1862, at a time when the Political Agent was unavoidably absent, internal dissensions broke out amongst the tribes, which led to the dethronement of the then ruling khan, and the substitution of his cousin; little or no bloodshed, however, took place, and the usurper, having been unable to retain his position for more than a few months, was murdered, and Meer Khodadad Khan again resumed his hereditary position, which he at present retains, and continues to show on the part of himself and people a most marked friendship for the British Government. A confidential agent from him resides at the frontier town of Jacobabad, and every possible means are taken to meet the wishes of the British authorities so far as it lies in the Khan's power.

It must, however, be understood that the influence exerted over these tribes by the Khan is not so great as could be wished, and more particularly over those situated any distance from the seat of his government; but this influence for good would be greatly increased by more assistance and countenance being afforded him by the British Government. Of these tribes the two most warlike are the Murrees and the Boogtees. These are located in the mountains named after them, and which run parallel to the frontier of Sind until they meet the Soolima range, running along the Punjab border, from opposite Mittuncote to Peshawur. Branching north from the northern side of the Sind desert, opposite Jacobabad, they meet at Dadur, the great Brahoe range, which runs nearly due north from Kurrachee, and near the above place (Dadur) form the entrance of the Bolan Pass. Between the upper portion of these two ranges, before they narrow at Dadur, is situated the province of Cutchee, or Cutch Gundava, having a length of about 110 miles and an average breadth of 60. This province forms the richest portion of the Khan's territory, and is capable, under good management, of returning a fair amount of revenue; and as through it and the Bolan Pass the advance to Quetta would have to be made, it will be necessary to dwell upon its character and resources.

It is separated from Sind by a desert of about 25 miles in breadth, but which extends in length up to or beyond Dhera Ismail Khan, on the Punjab frontier. That portion of which we are now speaking, and which extends along the Sind frontier, is yearly decreasing by the extension of cultivation, caused by the irrigational canals, which are carried far into it, and I have every reason to hope that in a very few years the desert of Sind will be a thing of the past.

Having crossed this desert we enter the province of Cutch Gundava, belonging to the Khelat State, as before mentioned; it is situated between two ranges of hills, the Murree and Boogtee to the east and north-east, and the Brahoe to the west.

The province is partly dependent on rain for cultivation, which usually falls during the winter and spring. From the month of April until September the heat is almost unbearable, but during the remainder of the year the climate is cool and pleasant.

The province contains three principal towns, Gundava to the west, situated at the entrance of the Gundava Pass, Bagh about the centre, and Dadur to the north, at the entrance of the Bolan Pass. These three towns and portions of the country around them belong to the Khan, and are what may be called Crown land, the revenue from which is annually farmed to some Hindoo merchant, and forms the principal portion of the Khan's personal revenue. The whole of the remaining portion, with the exception of the north-east corner called Seebee and Kujjuch, belonging to the Affghans, is portioned out amongst the Brahoe and Belooch tribes, who, when the winter sets in the surrounding mountains, migrate with their flocks to the plains of Cutchee, returning again to the hills as the intense heats of summer arrive. The province is, therefore, to them of vital importance.

The whole of these tribes, without a single exception, inhabit the Brahoe or western mountains, of which Khelat is the capital. They are peaceably inclined, thinking of little beyond their flocks, but capable, if irritated by unjust treatment, of combining and causing great disturbances. They can muster about 40,000 armed men.

We must now proceed to the hills styled Murree and Boogtee, which run to the east and north-east of the province, and in which are located a race of freeboters, who, until the arrival of the late General John Jacob on the frontier of Sind, were in the habit of plundering in large bodies of horse and foot up to the very gates of Shikarpore, and who during our advance into Affghanistan harassed our baggage and communications in every way, and whom our troops had constantly to meet in fight, which did not always result in our favour.

The Boogtee tribe, being nearer the frontier, after the conquest and occupation of Sind came first in contact with us, and until 1847 our border was kept in a constant state of anarchy and bloodshed. The first real check that this tribe received was at the hands of the present Colonel Merewether, C.B., who, at the head of a squadron of 1st Sind Horse, met and destroyed nearly the whole tribe, leaving 600 of their best men dead on the field. Since this event, although the tribe at times has made spasmodic efforts to return to its old plundering habits, they have now entirely given in, and the advance of the whole of the Sind frontier posts has rendered any future efforts at evil on their part impossible. There only, therefore, remain the Murrees. This tribe, being located to the north of the Boogtee, has not come so much into immediate contact with our frontier officers as the latter, and although at times it has attempted raids within the British frontier, they have always

always been met and repulsed with such loss to the tribe by the detachments of Sind Horse, that they may be said to have relinquished all hopes of success in the Sind direction. They, however, make up for this by their constant raiding into the province of Cutchee, which they enter in bodies of from 400 to 800 horsemen, laying waste the whole country. These raids generally take place when the Brahoe tribes have returned to their hills at the setting in of the hot season, and the Khan, from the poverty of his exchequer, is unable to maintain a sufficient force to keep his border. The above tribe, then, is the only one with which we should have to deal in Cutchee.

The greater part of this province is capable of excellent cultivation, and even now a very large amount of rich grain of every sort is produced, which is exported into Sind and Affghanistan; and could peace and civilisation be gradually introduced, a great increase would take place, as very much land now lays waste in its most fertile parts on account of the fear of Murree raids.

We now come to the Bolan Pass, but as this has been so often and so fully described by others, it is needless for me to enter into a description. I may, however, mention that I have frequently marched through it, and that there exists no difficulties with regard to the road; and I believe, if the measures I proposed are adopted, its transit may be made as safe from molestation as the most public thoroughfare in London.

Having passed the Bolan, a plain of 25 miles has to be crossed, and we arrive at a small fort styled Quetta, or Shawl.

I have long studied this position, and my Reports from the spot addressed to the Bombay Government will show my opinion formed long since: It appears to me to be a strategical point, remarkably adapted for meeting all comers, as friends or foes, from the west towards the east. If an enemy advance, it forms, as the late General Jacob aptly styled it, the "bastion of the front attack." If friends arrive, it is, without exception, the best possible position to form a mart for the reception of goods from Central Asia, which can pass down the Bolan to meet a future railroad at Dadur, and to be transported thence in 48 hours to the port of embarkation, Kurrachee.

From it nothing can occur in Central Asia of which we should not have immediate knowledge, and be able to provide accordingly. In our present position we are hidden behind a screen of mountains, of the occurrences beyond which we know nothing, and in consequence of our distance from Candahar, Herat, &c., a hostile force might be assembled in those districts without our knowledge, whereas by a telegraphic communication with Quetta any movement inimical to us occurring in almost any part of Central Asia might be immediately made known in Calcutta and London. Our advance would carry with it all the advantages of civilisation, and our presence would cause peace and plenty to follow us where now anarchy and confusion reign. All that is required is, that our advance should be made gradually, and under men who understand the people, have heart in their work, and who are earnestly and truly working for good ends; if such be the case, they will find no difficulty, but every assistance given them, and blessings at every step they advance.

I will now proceed to the measures I would propose for carrying into effect this scheme.

First, we must be most careful not to shake the confidence of the nomad tribes of Beloochistan in the honesty of our purpose towards them, and that we have no intention of taking from them one rood of land, or to introduce any of our laws; and that the whole country will be as ever for them to range over with their flocks and herds. We must make them clearly understand that we merely require a free passage through their country, and that compensation will be given to any tribe on or through whose lands we have to build or make roads. Quetta and the great part of the land around belongs to the Khan, who would only too willingly give us any portion in return for the security we should afford him against an Affghan invasion. All must see and feel that our presence brings peace and plenty; there must be no attempt to try and force on civilisation amongst them: if we set a good example, all that we can desire on this point will gradually follow.

As I have before mentioned, the Murree tribe is the main cause which prevents peace and plenty existing in Cutchee, and with whom it would be first necessary for us to deal before we advanced. There are two methods of dealing with them: one by a direct attack on their hills, and thus forcing them to surrender; the other by taking a part of the tribe into our pay. The first plan offers little difficulty, and if properly carried out and with a sufficient force, little opposition would be met with; but it would be somewhat costly, and we should have for some time to occupy positions in their hills, and I further consider that these little frontier wars ought to be avoided if possible. But these races of freebooters are generally forced to plunder, either in search of food, or from motives of revenge; and I am of opinion that, if the former can be by some means provided, they will soon give up the risk they run of having to provide for themselves sword in hand. I would, therefore, take 200 of their best horsemen, including their most noted leaders, into our pay, and make them the police of Cutchee.

This latter plan has been tried with great success with other tribes, and at one time when our army was in Affghanistan a portion of the Murree tribe was in our pay, and, I believe, behaved very well and with good faith.

They should be stationed under their own hills, and made responsible for raids committed by their own people. One of their principal chiefs should reside at Jacobabad. Long experience of semi-barbarous tribes has proved to me that nothing tames them so much

much as regular pay and food; once having touched this, they seldom return to their old habits, and their families and relations partaking, to a certain degree, of the little luxuries which ready money enables them to procure, urge them to remain peaceable members of society. I believe that by this means the whole tribe might be gradually brought under subjection. The details must be left to the Political Superintendent on the Sind frontier. I estimate the expense at about 60,000 rupees per annum (6,000 *l.*). At the time of taking these men into our pay, I would increase the present subsidy received by the Khan of Khelat, by the addition of another 50,000 rupees, or 5,000 *l.* per annum. During the time of the Indian rebellion this additional sum was granted, and subsequently, in a most impolitic manner, in my opinion, withdrawn. This would bind him still more to us, and enable him to exert in our favour considerable influence over his people, for money gives great power amongst the semi-barbarous tribes, as it does amongst the highest order of civilisation.

Having made the above arrangement, I would allow matters to rest for a time; the Political Superintendent at Jacobabad frequently moving himself, or sending some officer under his command, in whose discretion he has perfect confidence, to move about Beloochistan accompanied by an escort, interfering as little as possible in the affairs of the country. But to effect the above it will be absolutely necessary to make a small increase to the frontier field force by making up the regiment of cavalry to 600, instead of as at present, 500 sabres. By the above means I believe that in one year the province of Cutchee would be as quiet and peaceable as any county in England. I would then take the Bolan Pass in hand by subsidising and forming a police from the tribes which inhabit it. The expense of this would probably amount to another 60,000 rupees, or 6,000 *l.*, per annum. Having accomplished this and secured our communication, a small compact force might be detached from the Sind Frontier Brigade and encamped at Quetta, a spot being carefully selected for the formation of a camp of any extent. No particular notice would then be taken of our proceeding either within India or beyond it, and we might then firmly establish ourselves. In the meantime it is to be hoped that the Governments of England and India would have turned their attention more to the advantage to be derived from the scheme than they have yet done, and that a railroad will have connected Kotree, Sukkur, and Mooltan, and that a branch line will be in progress from Sukkur to Dadur, the foot of the Bolan, by which means, in case of war, Kurrachee would become our basis of operations, and, if peace continue, it would become the harbour of import and export for the whole trade of Central Asia.

In return for our outlay we shall be repaid by increased peace on our frontier, which always leads to an increase of revenue, the advancement of civilisation, and the possession, without an exhibition of physical force or any disturbing causes, of a position commanding the entrance to India, and from which we could observe anything that occurred from outside for or against our Eastern power.

The above is no visionary scheme. I have seen a much more difficult one carried out under my own eyes on the Sind frontier by the late General John Jacob. When he arrived there nothing existed but a howling wilderness; all was anarchy and bloodshed; not a tree grew; drinking water was scarcely procurable; but 20 years of earnest, honest work has created a flourishing town with peace and plenty. The desert is gradually becoming cultivated. The lawless inhabitants are its cultivators, and the bloody deeds for which it was famous are almost forgotten. Why not, then, continue the good work?

I will now take a glance at what will probably occur should we still continue to close our eyes to all that is taking place beyond our border.

It is useless to deny that of late years, and from many causes, our prestige has not fallen, or that the steady advance of Russia, and her frequent successes, have had no effect on the native mind both within and beyond our Indian limits.

I can from experience speak more of that produced beyond, and it is to the effect that Russia is destined to become the dominant power in Asia, and that we fear her; and neighbouring States have long been discussing the question on which side they should range themselves.

Afzul Khan, who has now made himself master of Affghanistan from Candahar to Balk, is a man of strong character, bold, daring, and enterprising, an excellent soldier, and the chosen of all the military restless spirits in Affghanistan. When he has firmly established himself, he will probably look round for the best means of maintaining his position, and will either seek an alliance with us or with Russia; he will probably first come to us, and, on meeting with no encouragement, will side with Russia. Should he meet with success, or without it, he will probably look to increasing his territory, or, what appears at present the fashion, seek a rectification of his frontier.

Beloochistan not many years ago owed allegiance to the Affghans. Should Afzul Khan cast his eyes in that direction, there is nothing to prevent his incorporating it in his own territory, or occupying Quetta and holding it for Russia. In such a position we could no longer hope or expect that the Belooch nation would continue friendly to us, in which case a large increase would have to be made in our Sind force; and from above the Pass any amount of intrigues prejudicial to our rule might be hatched, and when the time suited, probably when the Eastern question is again brought forward, and we may be again at war with Russia and straining every nerve to hold our own in Europe, a great part of our European troops withdrawn from India and unable to be replaced,

we may then have a horde of Affghan and Persian Horse, led by Russian officers, pouring into Sind, and doing more harm in a few days to our prestige than years of success would make up for. Or Russia might ignore the whole transaction; but the harm would be done, and we should have a border war from Kurrachee to Peshawur. Russia could injure us considerably without a regular Russian soldier approaching within 500 miles of our frontier.

There are thousands of wild spirits in Central Asia, with everything to gain and nothing to lose, who only require a leader, and who would be only too eager for a raid into India; and, unfortunately for us, there are thousands under our rule who would be ready to assist them.

I, however, maintain that nothing of this sort could occur would our statesmen turn their attention in time to the defence of our frontier, and take up such a position as to prevent the possibility of anything prejudicial to our rule occurring without our being able to see and counteract it in time.

In conclusion, I would remark that the opinions expressed in this Paper have been formed after 18 years previous experience of the country, and people of which they treat, and a long and careful study of the subject taken from every point of view.

Enclosure 3, in No. 1.

APPENDIX.

EXTRACTS of LETTERS from the late General *John Jacob*, written in 1856, to the late Lord *Canning*, Governor General of India, and Sir *H. Green*.

SUGGESTIONS towards the permanent Defence of the North-West Frontier of India.

IT seems to me that, if arrangements for the permanent defence of our north-west frontier be not speedily applied and manfully carried out, they will have caused the loss of our Indian Empire within the next generation of men.

The first enormous error consisted in not at once, after your report of the state of the Turkish army at Erzeroom, sending a strong force, under an able commander, to that country, and then driving every Russian back to the north of the Caucasian range; the next error was allowing Kars to be taken; and thirdly, after all this had been committed, another egregious error was perpetrated in not making Russia withdraw from Turkish Armenia *before* we moved a man out of the Crimea.

The fall of Kars caused Persia to quarrel with our Ambassador; but the true Oriental cunning, wishing to be prepared for our ultimate success, the Persian Government pre tended that the quarrel was personal only.

Now Kars is still held by Russia, and Persia invades Beloochistan and Affghanistan, being, of course, quite convinced that we have been well beaten and that Russia is all-powerful. This effect is all that Russia proposed to produce by the delay in evacuating Kars, &c. She will now withdraw, and remain apparently perfectly quiescent.

But the result will be that Russia, all-powerful in Persia, will use that country as she pleases, herself unseen all the while; she will, as she is now in fact doing, endeavour quietly and steadily to place Persia in settled possession of Herat, and probably of Candahar, as well as of a considerable portion of Beloochistan.

While firmly securing her hold of these countries by means of the Persian Government, Russia will be recruiting her own strength for another European war. In this it is *possible*, though in my opinion not altogether probable, France may *not* be our ally. If we remain friends with France, the renewal of the war will only be deferred a little; but in any case, whenever the next occasion of war may arise, Russia will, under the policy she is now pursuing in the East, be able to occupy not Herat only, but Candahar, with an army of 50,000 Europeans and as much Persian rabble as she pleases, *before we have begun to think seriously about the matter:* and Russia might then soon be in full possession of the Punjab and Sind, in spite of all the tardy efforts of our stupid and unwieldy, though really gigantic, strength.

It is Ulysses and Polyphemus all over! I would now make the giant mind his eye.

If not, if we persist in our present blindness, and our Rulers, instead of attending to questions of really vital importance, persist in occupying themselves in miserable fidding about the salaries of the hardest working men on earth, while they should be looking the coming danger to the whole empire fairly in the face, then good bye to England's Eastern power; we shall gradually recede further and further, till all be lost.

The time for action is now, and the wise proceeding is that which I have proposed. Nothing short of this will answer, or will be safe.

By the arrangements proposed we should place between us and the enemy several wild and warlike nations devoted to our service, and render it *impossible* for an European army to approach our Indian frontiers with hostile intent.

Ultimately Herat might become an English fortress; but this move would not be required for many years, and long before it had become advisable to make it, all Affghanistan would be devoted to us.

However,

However, looking onward to a great European war, with a fortress at Herat, and a garrison of 20,000 men there (which would not *necessarily* involve any increase to our Indian army, or at least to its cost), India would be as firmly locked in our grasp as if surrounded by the ocean; for no invader could ever enter by any of the paths over the Hindoo Khoosh, &c., without exposing his flank or rear to destructive attacks from a strong force, fresh, vigorous, and well supplied, from the garrison of Herat.

But this is looking far forward to the time when Russia, having been shut out from her long-cherished schemes towards Constantinople, shall have again matured her preparations for advance in a new direction, and have poured her whole strength on our Indian frontier.

At present all that is required to be done is to ensure the certainty of success and security on our frontier.

I have for long past thought over the subject of the arrangements proper to secure our north-western frontier of India permanently in such a manner as to obviate the necessity of any alarm, unusual stir, or hasty operations of any kind, in consequence of movements of enemies, or possible enemies, from without.

At present it appears to me that we are, in a great measure, in the position of a mighty army without any outposts of any kind. The whole host is liable to be perplexed and disturbed to its centre even by any small body of adventurers who may confidently approach its unwieldy strength with impunity.

It seems to me that we now have the best possible opportunity of remedying this state of things; an opportunity offering a combination of circumstances favourable to our purpose, such as must very rarely occur.

Beloochistan is entirely at our disposal, the people being really most friendly towards us, and since the late treaty with Khelat more so than ever; Dost Mahomed and the Affghans generally are inclined to favour our advances, and the fairest possible reason for precautionary measures on our part exists in the Persian advance to Herat and through Seistan, while we have peace throughout the old provinces of India and in Europe, with perfectly settled tranquillity in Sind and in the Punjab.

There are but two great roads into our Indian Empire from the north-west; but two roads, in fact, by which it is possible for a modern army to march.

One of these, the Bolan, lies through an entirely friendly country. The Khelat territory extends to Pesheen, 40 miles beyond the head of the pass, in the table-land of Affghanistan, and is inhabited by Belooch and Brahoee tribes, who are of an entirely different race from the Affghans.

The road through the Bolan is, even at present, generally good, and sufficiently easy for an army to proceed by it with all its artillery, stores, &c. This road is also the shortest from Herat to British India, and is the natural outlet to the ocean of the commerce of a very large portion of Central Asia.

From the foot of the Bolan one continuous and almost dead level plain extends for nearly 600 miles through Cutchee and Sind to the sea.

The only other great road, the Khyber, is very differently circumstanced. The people are unfriendly and barbarous, the country is far more difficult, and the distance greater, while there is already a strong division of our army at Peshawur, so that we are tolerably well secured in that quarter; quite sufficiently secured, indeed, under the arrangements contemplated by me, because from Quetta we could operate on the flank and rear of any army attempting to proceed towards the Khyber Pass, so that, with a British force at Quetta, the other road would be shut to an invader, inasmuch as we could reach Herat itself before an invading army could even arrive at Cabul.

Such a position would form the bastion of the front attack, and nothing could, with hope of success, be attempted against us until this salient were disposed of. We may, I think, then, leave the Khyber without further discussion of the statistics of this road at present, and confine our attention to the Bolan.

The more the matter is considered in all its bearings, relations, and consequences, the more certain it will appear that there should be a good British force at Quetta, a good-made road from that place through the Bolan Pass to Dadur, and thence continued through Cutchee to the British frontier, to connect with the lines of road in Sind. The portion of this road from Dadur to the sea must, I think, eventually become a railway, but probably not till a very long period has passed by.

When we were fairly established at Quetta we might, I think, then subsidise the Affghans with advantage; but *until we were so established*, such a measure would, it seems to me, be unwise. The Affghans would not be true to us if we really required their services, and might probably turn against us the very means with which we had supplied them. Such a proceeding would only be characteristic of the people.

But, in the first instance, on commencing the arrangements for establishing ourselves at Quetta, in addition to the subsidy now payable to the Khan of Khelat under the present treaty, I would take into our pay a body of his troops, both horse and foot, to be entirely under their own officers and managed in their own fashion.

Such wild irregulars are invaluable *when there is a certain force of our own soldiers* to form a nucleus of strength and give tone to the whole. Such a nucleus would be formed by the frontier field force which I have proposed for Sind, and these troops of Khelat would completely connect us with the people of the country generally, a point of great importance. They would take the ordinary escort duties and such like, and would perform all the work which the Cossacks do for the Russian army, which is that which in general

our regular soldiers perform the worst, and which is that by which they are most exhausted and demoralised.

The numbers of these auxiliaries could at any time be increased to any extent thought proper; their employment would make us, in a great measure, independent of the Affghans, while the enjoyment of regular pay by the Khelat people would have great influence on the Affghans generally. All would be anxious to obtain the same advantages, while our evident strength, independent of Affghan aid, in their immediate neighbourhood, would be the best security for their good faith.

We might then, if we pleased, and if it were necessary, safely and with advantage, subsidise all Affghanistan with money and arms; and the propriety of so doing would, under the proposed conditions, be in no way dependent on the success or on the life of Dost Mahomed; nor would there then be much danger or possibility of our subsidy being misapplied to the prosecution of internal feuds, for such abuses could not occur without being immediately known to and checked by the Political Agent at Quetta.

If we really intend (as I always suppose that we do really intend) to be fair and just to all men, and to conduct our public proceedings towards other States and other people according the principles which guide the intercourse of honest men in private life, the true interest of Affghanistan must be one with our own and be felt to be so by all its people.

If all distrust of us be removed from the Affghan mind, as it has been removed from the minds of the Government and people of Khelat, the whole country would aid us heart and hand, and an invasion of India wonld be *impossible*. The invaders would be starved or destroyed in detail.

The confidence in us and the perception of their own interest being identical with ours, which would certainly be engendered in the minds of the Affghans by the development and full operation of the means proposed, would constitute the surest, and, indeed, the only needful, precautions required. The amount of subsidy would be determined by the course of events.

But it is certain that the state of feeling towards us among the Affghans would depend on our real intentions towards them. It is useless to attempt to conceal these from the cunning Affghan; but straightforward honesty and justice, if habitually exercised in accordance with our real nature, exert irresistible control at all times over all Asiatics, and they will do so in this instance, although we must expect at first to have to undo the evil caused by the impressions left by our proceedings and practices during our former invasion and occupation of Affghanistan. But however well-disposed they may be, or may become, towards us, neither Affghan nor Belooch will obey or live at peace with their equals: the tribes have endless and deadly feuds with each other, and if left to themselves, or only supplied with arms and money by us at a distance, they could not be kept to any combined purpose or long-continued effort. The greatest public considerations would always be postponed to the gratification of private revenge or personal pique. No good effect would be produced by our assistance, and the means supplied would be wasted in unworthy quarrels and intrigues.

The English mind, to whose leading all these wild spirits will bow, must actually be present among them, and a sufficient British force be on the spot to support moral power and dignity and to give tone to the whole.

There is nothing in the arrangements proposed by me in the least degree resembling our first proceedings in Affghanistan. History has now justly decided that the former measure was in itself at the very outset a great crime and a great error; and in carrying it out, the principles of common justice, common honesty, and common sense, were at every turn ignored and offended against.

These proceedings were alike foolish and wicked to that degree which must always appear incredible to those who were not, as I was, partly behind the scenes at the time, and in a position to be acquainted with the whole details of the business after its completion.

In the arrangements now proposed we should act in no respect otherwise than as we might be prepared to justify before all good men in the world, or before the throne of God; and those entrusted with the work should be "men with some conscience in what they do," than which nothing has more influence over Oriental minds. To attempt to compete with them in cunning, as did poor —— and ——, is to ensure failure: we command the Asiatics by high moral power alone.

We should in the present case occupy a position in the undisputed territory of an ally with his most cordial assent and approval and to his great advantage.

We should offend or threaten no one whatever, save those who came to attack and invade our Indian Empire. We should have all the people of the country with us.

Our worst enemies could not reasonably object to such a move on our part. Russia, it may be said, might on our move found an assertion of right or necessity of advancing on her side to Khiva or elsewhere. Be it so! I would not make the smallest objection.

Those know but little of Russian policy who imagine that most plausible pretexts would ever be wanting when she thought that she could move with advantage.

If Russia bring with her advance a better civilisation and a higher moral tone, if she introduced European honesty, European ideas, and European commerce into Central Asia, the better for us. All that tends to good must ultimately be for our advantage, for the advantage of free England. But can Russia do this?

Will she, can she, make known to the clever Asiatics a better, nobler, and higher moral power than they are now acquainted with? I much doubt this.

If

If Russia attempt to proceed by violence, injustice, and falsehood, she will exasperate the whole people against her, and will entirely fail or will, at all events, be powerless against us with the people on our side.

In any point of view, and under any circumstances whatever, the arrangement on the frontier of India can never be wise or safe while, *as at present, the undisturbed tranquillity of this vast empire is dependent, not on its own mighty internal strength, but on the forbearance of our enemies or neighbours outside.*

I would remedy this at once, effectually and permanently, by establishing ourselves firmly and in sufficient force in a position the mere possession of which would preclude all possibility of successful invasion, which would give us, by moral influence, a full control over Affghanistan, establish the most friendly relations with us throughout the country, and which would ere long bring down a full stream of valuable commerce from all Central Asia to the sea.

Supposing these views to be approved, and that it were intended to carry the proposed measure into effect, I should propose to arrange the details as mentioned in a separate paper accompanying this letter.

Enclosure 4, in No. 1.

MEMORANDUM of proposed Arrangements in case of a British Force being stationed at *Quetta*, or any other convenient spot above the *Bolan Pass*.

IN the first instance, to enable the Sind Irregular Horse, now forming the frontier force, and the officers there employed to be advanced, some permanent arrangement should be made for the administration of the frontier district of Upper Sind.

This should be constituted, as at present, an entirely separate charge, under an officer in subordination to the Commissioner in Sind, with orders to communicate with the Political Commissioner at Quetta on the political business of the frontier, and to attend to his instructions; this officer to be styled "Superintendent of the Frontier Districts of Upper Sind," and to receive a salary of 1,500 rupees per mensem, with travelling allowance of 10 rupees per diem.

A Lieutenant of Police to be appointed for the Sind Frontier District on the same scale of allowances as the other lieutenants of police in Sind; this officer and the Sind Frontier Police to be under the orders of the Political Superintendent, and quite distinct from the general police of the province. The Mounted Police now employed in the frontier district to be increased to 400 men, and 300 foot police to be raised, and to be armed and equipped like the rural police of Sind, to complete the Frontier Police Force.

A civil surgeon and an assistant surgeon, in charge of the police, to be appointed on the usual allowances. An ample establishment of medical subordinates should be allowed.

No troops to be stationed on the frontier, which would become a purely civil and political charge. No troops to be quartered in Upper Sind at all.

The military stations of Shikarpore and Hyderabad, together with the arsenal at the latter place, to be abolished.

A Political Commissioner on the frontier of India to be appointed with full powers, civil and military, over all departments, &c., to have his head-quarters at Quetta, or any convenient spot above the Bolan Pass, with a staff of—

One Military Secretary.	One Assistant Secretary.
One Political Secretary.	One Private Secretary and Aide-de-camp.

Under the orders of the Political Commissioner it is proposed that there should be a field force organised as follows:—

FRONTIER FIELD FORCE.

Cavalry.

The whole of the Sind Irregular Horse to be moved to Quetta, with 2,000 Belooch Irregular Cavalry, armed, equipped, and officered after the fashion of the troops of Khelat, attached to form the Cavalry Brigade of the proposed frontier field force. Each regiment of horse, with 1,000 Belooch attached, to be under its own regimental commander.

This Cavalry Brigade to be commanded by a brigadier, with a major of brigade and a quartermaster and interpreter of brigade as his staff.

Infantry.

Two regiments armed with Jacob's rifles, each 1,000 strong, with 1,000 Belooch Irregular Infantry attached, formed into one brigade, commanded by a brigadier, with staff, as mentioned for the cavalry.

Artillery.

Two troops of Horse Artillery.	Brigadier and staff as above.
Two horse field batteries.	Ordnance depôt as for a division.

The Artillery to be raised for the purpose, not forming part of the Indian Artillery, or in any way under the authority of the Indian Army.

Engineers.

One executive engineer.
Two assistant executive engineers.

The whole field force to be commanded, under the Political Commissioner, by a brigadier general, with the usual staff of a division.

In case of war or other circumstances occurring to render the proceeding advisable, any number of regular troops might be stationed and accommodated at Quetta.

But in the first instance, the irregular field force above detailed should alone be established above the Bolan Pass. This force should form the solid nucleus of, and give strength and tone to, the subsidiary troops of the native powers; and eventually, all arrangements being previously completed, regular troops might follow when required, their numbers being regulated by the position of affairs and the prospects towards the north west. But permanent accommodation need only be provided for the frontier field force of the strength detailed above.

The resources of the Khelat State are considerable. If the chiefs were united, as they formerly were, against us, they could bring 40,000 good men into the field; but their government and nobles generally are very poor, and their whole social framework was dreadfully shaken by our proceedings with regard to their former head.

Much has, however, lately been done to remedy the ill effects of these proceedings; and the great want now in the Khelat State is an able man to guide the councils of the Khan.

Were we established at Quetta as I have proposed, all the resources of Beloochistan would be completely at our disposal, while none would be wasted. And though assistance in arms and money from us may, and probably will, enable the Khelat people for a time to prevent the Persians from overrunning or establishing themselves in their country, yet I am quite convinced that Beloochistan, if seriously invaded by a regular army of Persians under Russian guidance, will not be able successfully to resist without the aid of European minds from our side to direct its force.

Jalk, or Julluck, is close to the Khelat frontier.

This frontier, wherever the country is inhabited, is sufficiently well recognised; but it is not very definitely marked: the country itself is mostly wild, desolate hills and sands without water; the fertile spots being at long intervals and of small extent.

Nooskee is the nearest place to the frontier where the Khan of Khelat maintains any troops. Even this is a very miserable place; a little fertile plain three or four miles long and of about half that breadth, surrounded by barren rocky hills and drift-sand. There is, however, a good stream of water there, and the spot is well adapted for the first place of assembly of the Khelat troops to resist attack from the north west.

It is quite clear to me that the occupation of the Persian seaports, however valuable a measure as a diversion in aid of other operations, will not suffice really to protect our Indian frontier from insult, even if such proceedings should suffice, as seems to be thought doubtful, to relieve us of the immediate pressure now commencing on the side of Beloochistan.

It is evidently not merely Persia with whom we have now to deal, but Persia guided, moved, and aided by Russia; and from this circumstance the proceedings near our frontier now appear to be of a much more serious nature than any mere Persian occupation or threatenings of Herat, which have been so often made or attempted during the last 20 years. Wherefore, our demonstrations by sea, if no simultaneous proceedings be undertaken by land on our north west frontier, will, it seems to me, have no effect but to make Russia push Persia on the more vigorously in this direction while we are still unprepared.

A descent on the coast of Persia would not now cause such consternation as did our first demonstration in that quarter. The Persians have learned to regard such attacks at their real worth. If an invasion in force of the interior of Persia were not contemplated, the Persians would possibly not regard the capture of a seaport with special dread; and the Russian officers would not fail to perceive (when such is really the case) that our proceedings by sea are really demonstrations only. They would also explain to the Persians that, even if we were to attempt a real advance into the heart of Persia, our movements must be slow and inconsequential compared to the mighty effect of a rapid but steady advance in force on our unprotected north western frontier, whereby the Persians would be able to place themselves in firm and secure possession of Candahar. Such a move, they would argue (and, I think, justly argue, if we did not meditate permanent conquest in Persia), would soon compel us to withdraw our forces from Persia, to concentrate them for a severe struggle with a Russo-Persian army on the plains of northern India; and the Russian argument would be sound and just in proportion as the temporary occupation of Lahore or Delhi by an enemy would be more injurious to us than the like occupation of Ispahan would be to Persia.

I would occupy Quetta, *not merely as a sudden move consequent on the hostile demonstrations of Persia, but permanently, as a peaceful arrangement necessary for our fixed repose.*

I am convinced that no other measures than such as I have proposed can possibly secure our Indian frontier, and that some such measures must of necessity be ultimately adopted.

Unless we do advance in the direction indicated, it is doubtful whether ultimately even Beloochistan may not fall under Persian and Russian influence. And with regard to Affghanistan, if we do not so advance, there can be no reasonable doubt whatever but that Candahar must ere very long become a Persian—that is a Russian—province. The cleverness, activity, watchfulness, and steady perseverance of Russia in such matters are well known; but these powers will fail before us if we proceed with open honesty and *wisdom.*

Success is now in our own hands, and may be commanded with ease. Our position may be permanently secured with perfect safety and with comparatively trifling labour and cost.

But if we remain idly looking on from the valley of the Indus at the movements going on above the Bolan, we shall, it seems to me, be throwing away the fairest possible opportunity of settling for ever the question of the invasion of India by Russia; and the results will be, it seems to me, ultimately such as no English statesman would like to contemplate.

We should not view this question with the eyes of men who served in Affghanistan during the Affghan war. My own service and consequent personal knowledge of the statistics of these countries and people on our frontier have been continuous from our first entrance into Affghanistan to the present time. I am thus well acquainted with the very great changes which have taken place during the last ten years, and which are such as to render altogether inapplicable to the present state of affairs most of the supposed drawbacks to the advantages of the plan of operations on which I propose now to act, however just the objections urged might have been under the conditions formerly existing.

There is as much difference between the question of posting troops above the Bolan at present and formerly, as there would be between now moving troops up the Bhore Ghaut, and doing so under the conditions of the road being as it was up to 1829, and the country above being occupied by a hostile Maratha army and population. The Bolan Pass *presents no difficulties for the party which holds it,* and we should hold it securely at Quetta.

The road through this pass I would improve, so as to make it the easiest mountain road possible for us; but I would make such arrangements that the force at Quetta could *by occupying the pass itself, if necessary,* hold it against all the world.

I would connect the foot of the pass at once by a good road with Sind, and ultimately by a railroad, and by means of the subsidised troops of Khelat acting as police, I would maintain the most perfect security along the whole line.

The British camp at Quetta would not then be in any way isolated; it would, indeed, be as little isolated in reality as are the camp and town of Kurrachee at present, which, owing to the want of connection by canal with the Indus, are still chiefly supplied, even with such things as grass, grain, and firewood, by sea.

As regards the tribes which hang about Quetta, I may observe that for many years past the frontier districts of Sind and the whole plain of Kutchee have been as quiet and peaceable as our old province of Guzerat, or even more so.

The most formidable and most famous of the robber chiefs and their tribes have quietlysettled down into the condition of contented, happy, and most industrious agriculturists.

The former exploits of the old plunderers are fast becoming forgotten, and as the last generation of border riders is passing away, no others are being formed to take their places.

The tribes which formerly overran all Cutchee and Northern Sind, the Boogtees, Doombkees, Jekranees, &c., so far from being now under little control, are, almost to a man, ready to obey my orders to the uttermost. They are our most obedient, humble servants, and have been brought to this state without any loss of self-respect or manliness on their part. The men have actually been reformed, and now feel themselves stronger, better and happier than before. The Kakurs of the Bolan have for years past been perfectly quiet and submissive, while the great mass of Brahoee subjects of the Khan of Khelat, to the westward of Cutchee and the Bolan, are as quiet and peaceable a race with respect to their conduct towards Government as any in the East, although they are by no means unwarlike in their own fashion and under their own chiefs.

The country intervening between our proposed camp at Quetta and Sind would be perfectly occupied and governed for us by the Khelat authorities; more perfectly so, indeed, than it could probably be by our own officers and police; not only without our incurring any odium as foreign rulers, but while we should be looked on as the best of friends.

For the last seven years, in fact, the Khelat territory from the Bolan to Sind has been as much under our influence and real control, for just and useful purposes, as any part of our own provinces.

With regard to the capability of Shawl to support the force which I propose to entertain there, this point was certainly not overlooked by me; for I have always been in the habit of considering such arrangements to be the most important of all in military operations,

tions, and I have had to attend continually to such matters on a sufficiently large scale during a long course of years. . . .

Yet, by acting on what seemed to me to be just principles, I have found that all difficulties disappeared; and, under the steady action of such principles, some hundreds of square miles, even of the desert itself, have been converted into fertile fields, while a town sprang up spontaneously adjoining our camp in a wild desolate region, and contains already more than 6,000 inhabitants quite independent of the troops and camp followers, with a flourishing bazar of some hundreds of shops. This town now affords supplies sufficient for an army, and is still rapidly increasing in size and importance.

I would apply similar principles to those which have been acted on here, with a certainty of the like effect, to my proposed advance to Quetta.

The pecuniary cost of supporting the troops after the first outlay on account of quarters and public buildings would be absolutely nothing beyond their regular pay. The proposed roads and the other arrangements for the forward move, generally, would ultimately be a source of commercial profit; while, as to the other considerations, I may observe that such civil government as we already exert in Cutchee, through the Political Superintendent on the frontier, we should continue to exert; but it would not be at all necessary or advisable to assume in these respects greater power, either in nature or extent, than we now virtually possess and exercise.

Indeed, it seems very probable that it would not be found necessary that any other troops should be permanently posted there; for, with the means of communication and transport which I propose to establish, any force of regular troops which circumstances might call for, could, with ease and rapidity, be sent from Sindh or the old provinces of India to Quetta, where every species of provision would be ready for their accommodation, and which place would then form the point from which military operations would commence.

The road from the frontier of Sind to the head of the Bolan being improved and made available at all times and seasons, and a body of the Khelat troops being subsidised, as I propose, by us, no further public arrangements would be necessary for supplying the irregular field force in Shawl, and no extra cost need be incurred on that head.

The valleys of Moostung, Pesheen, and Shawl produce large quantities of excellent wheat and lucern; sheep are procurable by millions, and all that the neighbouring country could supply would assuredly flow into our camp; while grain and cattle from Cutchee (where the prices are generally very much lower than in Sind itself) would be brought up the Bolan by private traders in any quantities required to meet the demand.

Provision must undoubtedly be made for consumption during the winter season, as is habitually done by all the inhabitants of that country. But no Government commissariat arrangements would be requisite; while, in case of unforeseen accident or any emergent necessity arising, the cavalry, who require the greatest provision, could, during the winter, when the ground is covered with snow, and military operations are necessarily suspended, be moved in a march of six days to Dadur, where supplies are at all times abundant.

However, I consider it to be certain that the establishment of the field force at Quetta would result in the growth of a large commercial town at that place, the resources of which would, as in the instance of Jacobabad, suffice for the wants of an army.

In a financial point of view, as I have already observed, the cost of the proposed measures when compared with the results would be positively trifling; and, in considering the cost of *these* arrangements, *it may be well to bear in mind, also, the cost of such expeditions as that now being undertaken against Persia by sea*, and the value of the stake which the arrangements proposed by me are intended to secure to us. This value is, I am fully convinced, commensurate with that of our Indian Empire.

You wish the red line of England on the map to advance no further. But to enable this red line to retain its present position, to prevent its being driven back or erased from the map, it is, it appears to me, *absolutely necessary to occupy posts in advance of it.* I cannot see how, consistently with safety, it can *ever* be otherwise with regard to a great empire held by a *foreign* government as we hold India.

If our deeds be true and *just*, no consequences whatever need be feared. But supineness on our part now would, it seems to me, be most unjust towards India.

A war *within* our own territory, with a European enemy, might be ruinous to our reputation, and might entirely undermine our strength, although that strength might have sufficed successfully to meet a world in arms in a field *beyond* our own boundary.

The evils even of successful war are terrible, and such evils are undoubtedly most severely felt, are most intolerable, in fact, in those countries the most accustomed to regular civilization and uniform undeviating routine of civil administration.

A severe struggle *within* our own established and long-settled limits with a powerful invader, although attended with immediate success to us, might shake our power in India to its very foundation; might certainly for a while overturn all our civil arrangements, destroy our revenue, and render it necessary to maintain large armies in the field in the interior of our dominions for a protracted period in order to restore that internal tranquillity which might not be in the *least disturbed* even by *many battles* fought *beyond* our frontier, and which would be completely preserved by the arrangements which I have contemplated.

Enclosure 5, in No. 1.

MINUTE by His Excellency the Governor, concurred in by the Honourable Mr. *Erskine*; dated the 26th November 1866.

I HAVE been favoured by Sir H. Green with a perusal of a confidential memorandum which he has drawn up on the subject of Quetta.

Late events have given great additional force to the opinions which Sir H. Green and the late General John Jacob have so long and so consistently urged as to the necessity of taking care that Quetta should never fall into other than friendly hands. I have always considered those opinions as essentially sound, and I feel assured that every day increases the risk of our being forestalled, and of our hearing that some power less friendly than that of Khelat had secured a footing in that position.

It might have been, and was, objected to General Jacob's former suggestions on this subject, that they would have placed a large permanent British cantonment beyond the boundary of British India, and committed us to share in all the purely internal politics of Affghanistan.

No such objection can be raised to Sir H. Green's present suggestions. He would simply secure the power which, with the entire good will of the Khan of Khelat, he has more than once temporarily exercised during the last eight years, of having an outpost above the Bolan Pass in a position which should admit of its being quickly reinforced in case of need, and which will render any hostile occupation of Quetta difficult, if not impossible.

As a preliminary, he would assist the Khan of Khelat to extend to Cutchee and the districts near the Bolan the same system of protection to cultivation and trade which has proved so efficacious in his Highness's districts which immediately adjoin our own border.

Sir H. Green considers that a great deal may be done in this way if 50,000 rupees per annum were placed at his disposal, to be disbursed either through the Khan or in any other way the Political Superintendent may think preferable, for the improvement of this part of his Highness' territory. I would leave the mode in which the money is to be expended to the discretion of the Political Superintendent for the next two years, and would merely require a report on the result before any further grant is made.

This proposition, if concurred in by the honourable Board, might be submitted for the sanction of the Government of India.

(signed) *H. B. E. Frere.*
C. J. Erskine.

Enclosure 6, in No. 1.

MINUTE by His Excellency the Commander in Chief; dated the 6th December 1866.

WHILST distinctly guarding myself from any concurrence in General Jacob's opinions and plan, which would have thrown a British brigade beyond the Bolan Pass, and have removed all supports from it by abolishing the Sind force, I see no objection, and much possible good, by establishing a Political Officer at Quetta, with the full concurrence and good will of the Khan, with power to disburse such a moderate sum as Government may please to allow in benefiting and conciliating the people, provided he keeps clear of being entangled in any domestic quarrels.

No more force should accompany him than a good personal escort.

(signed) *R. Napier.*

Enclosure 7, in No. 1.

From the Officiating Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to Government of Bombay, No. 69; dated Fort William, the 17th January 1867.

I HAVE had the honour to submit to the Governor General in Council your letter, dated 26th ultimo, No. 62, forwarding a copy of a confidential memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry Green, K.C.S.I., entitled "Suggestions for the protection of the North-West Frontier of Sinde, with reference to the advance of the Russians in Central Asia." I have also laid before His Excellency in Council the Minutes recorded on that memorandum by their Excellencies the Governor and Commander in Chief of Bombay respectively, which formed an additional Enclosure of the same communication.

2. The ultimate aim of Sir Henry Green, and (as this Government is led to infer) of the Governor of Bombay also, is the occupation of Quetta at the northern entrance of the Bolan Pass by a British force.

3. The steps towards this end which Sir Henry Green desires immediately to take are—

(I.) The grant of service to 200 of the best horsemen of the Murree tribe, who, at a cost to the British Government of 60,000 rupees per annum, are to be employed as police in the Khan of Khelat's Province of Cutchee;

(II.) The addition of 50,000 rupees per annum to the subsidy of the same amount, which the Khan of Khelat already draws from the British Government under Article VII. of the Treaty of 1854; and

(III.) An increase to the strength of the Sinde Horse at a cost of 60,000 rupees per annum.

4. The total annual expenditure involved in these proposals amounts to 1,70,000 rupees.

5. His Excellency the Governor of Bombay, though prepared apparently to adopt Sir Henry Green's views in full, limits the actual demand upon the public funds to a sum of 50,000 rupees. Omitting the proposals for giving service to the Murree horsemen and for increasing the strength of the Sinde Horse, Sir Bartle Frere looks at present only to giving such assistance to the Khan of Khelat as may enable His Highness "to extend to Cutchee and the districts near the Bolan the same system of protection to cultivation and trade which has proved so efficacious in His Highness' districts which immediately adjoin our own border." And for this purpose His Excellency advises that Sir Henry Green may, for the next two years, be allowed the sum of 50,000 rupees per annum, to be spent either through the Khan of Khelat or in any other way that Sir Henry may think preferable. At the end of two years Sir Henry Green, in His Excellency's opinion, should be required to submit a report on the result before the grant could be continued.

6. On the other hand, His Excellency the Commander in Chief of the Bombay Army is altogether opposed to the idea of throwing a British brigade beyond the Bolan Pass, but thinks there would be no objection to the establishment at Quetta of a Political Agent, attended only by a small personal escort, and empowered to disburse a moderate sum in benefiting and conciliating the people.

7. The subject thus submitted for the consideration of the Government of India may be divided, I am to remark, under the two following heads:—

Firstly. Is the occupation of Quetta so desirable on strategical grounds that preliminary arrangements should now be made for the measure?

Secondly. In case the first question be decided in the negative, is there for other reasons any advantage in spending an additional half lakh annually on the Khan of Khelat?

8. The Right Honourable the Viceroy and Governor General has for years been familiar with all the arguments that can be advanced for and against the first question. In particular the reasonings of the late General Jacob in favour of an advance beyond the Bolan Pass, which Sir Henry Green has appended at length to his memorandum, were fully considered by His Excellency at the time of their original publication, and have not been lost sight of in the subsequent interval. His Excellency has deliberately decided in Council that an advance to Quetta is not desirable, and there is nothing in Sir Henry Green's present statements which would lead the Government of India to modify that conclusion. The measure would create considerable alarm both in Persia and at Cabul, and would eventually lead to further requisitions for troops; for, as pointed out by Sir Robert Napier, it would be a false move to advance troops from Jacobabad to Quetta without supports at the former place. I am to point out, moreover, that it will be open to the British Government to occupy Quetta and subsidise the Beloochees at any future period when the imminence of a real danger to the Indian Empire may render such a step expedient. In the meantime the Governor General in Council is absolutely opposed to the scheme.

9. Sir Henry Green represents that if a British force were stationed at Quetta, we should obtain immediate information of "any movement inimical to us occurring in almost any part of Central Asia." The Governor General in Council admits that what happens at Candahar would be sooner known in India than is now the case; and His Excellency in Council will even concede that from Herat, and the country between Herat and Candahar, more accurate accounts would be received than we now obtain through Cabul and Meshed. But this is all. Of events north of the Oxus, or, perhaps, even north of Ghuznee, the only tidings that the British force at Quetta would receive would be later and more distorted than those which the Government of India now regularly commands through St. Petersburgh and Peshawur. At the present moment the course and issue of the recent Russian war with Bokhara and of the intestine struggles in Eastern Toorkistan, are probably better known to the Governor General in Council at Calcutta than they are to the Sirdars Ufzul and Azim Khan at Cabul, or to the Ameer Shere Ali at Candahar. The information, in fact, which the Government of India obtains under existing arrangements is as full and recent as our political position demands, and as trustworthy as if it emanated from British officers at Cabul and Candahar.

10. Sir Henry Green dilates on the dangers to be apprehended "should we still continue

tinue to close our eyes to all that is taking place beyond our border." The contingency which he apparently means to denote by this expression is that of continuing within the line of our present cantonments; for events beyond the border can be watched, and are, in fact, very carefully watched, by the Government of India, notwithstanding that the Governor General in Council disallows the expediency of Sir H. Green's propositions.

11. Sir H. Green speaks of the effect which the Russian advance in Central Asia has had upon the minds of the people living beyond our Indian limits. This circumstance is perfectly known to the Governor General in Council, as also that "neighbouring States have long been discussing the question on which side" (English or Russian) "they should range themselves." But His Excellency in Council believes that, if the course of events should ever bring us to a struggle with the Northern Power on our India frontier, the winning side will be the one which refrains from entangling itself in the barren mountains which now separate the two Empires, and that the Affghans themselves, foreseeing this result, are likely in the end to throw their weight on the same side.

12. Sir H. Green speaks of the probability that Ufzul Khan may possess himself of Beloochistan and hold Quetta in the interests of Russia. The mention of such a contingency, I am to observe, does not argue much acquaintance with the politics of Affghanistan. Ufzul Khan, so far from being the man of enterprise and ability depicted by Sir H. Green, is in reality a mere tool in the hands of Azim Khan. And neither of the two brothers is "master of Affghanistan from Candahar to Balkh;" on the contrary, they hold nothing but a precarious footing, from which they may be any day dislodged, in and about the cities of Cabul and Ghuznee: all the rest of Affghanistan is in arms against them. Whether they win, however, or lose in the coming struggle is, after all, a matter of no moment; in either case one thing seems certain, namely, that for years to come all Affghanistan will continue divided against itself, and that, consequently, no party in it will have either the means or leisure for foreign aggression against Beloochistan, or in any other direction whatever.

13. In fine, the present state of affairs in Central Asia offers no feature which the Governor General in Council can recognise as any sufficient ground for regarding the occupation of Quetta as a question open to consideration.

14. The second question now remains to be discussed, viz., whether apart from any proximate intention of occupying Quetta, it is desirable that we should double the Khan of Khelat's subsidy. The Government of India, I am to observe, has already had some experience as to the advantages of such a measure, for the half lakh now asked for was, at Sir Henry Green's urgent solicitation, granted to the Khan in 1859, and continued for four successive years. The ground on which the Government of India was induced to make the grant in 1859 was that the Khan might be enabled "to support a good, just, and legitimate Government in Beloochistan, and to reduce to order such of its tribes as may obstinately persist in predatory habits, as, for instance, the Murrees." In February 1862 these very Murrees made a raid into British territory in the Dehra Ghazee Khan District, and when the Government of India called on the Bombay Government to explain how the Khan of Khelat could have allowed his subjects to commit such an outrage, Sir Henry (then Major) Green declared that the Khan was powerless to coerce them, but that the grant had been faithfully applied by the Khan to the maintenance of a police force for the protection of the caravan route to Shikarpore. On the 18th August 1862 a party of plundering Boogtees made an attack upon the British outpost of Kusmore in Sinde, in which several lives were lost. When the news of this second outrage reached the Government of India orders were issued, dated 30th June 1863, directing that "all payments of subsidy, whether ordinary or extraordinary, to the Khelat State be discontinued."

15. About the same time the Khan of Khelat was driven from his throne by an insurrection, which lasted till May 1864. On the 5th November 1864 the British Government recognised his return to the throne, and resumed the former Treaty relations which subsisted with him. By the latter act the payment of the half lakh provided for by the Treaty was revived, but special orders were at the same time issued that the other half lakh, beyond and above the requirements of the Treaty, would not again be granted.

16. Sir Henry Green, in his present memorandum, gives his opinion that the withdrawal of the additional amount under the circumstances above detailed was "most impolitic." The ground on which he now begs that the grant may be resuscitated is the improvement of the province of Cutchee, and he omits to speak of any condition as to the pacification of Murrees or Boogtees.

17. The Governor General in Council has no hesitation in disallowing the proposal. So long as the British Government is hard pressed to find the means wherewith to develop the resources of its own territory and to complete the lines of interior communication throughout the Empire, His Excellency in Council cannot think of expending funds on a project the advantages of which are regarded by the Government of India as inappreciable, if not altogether visionary.

— No. 2. —

(Foreign Department.—Political.—No. 28.)

To the Right Honourable Viscount *Cranborne*, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord, Fort William, 8 February 1867.

We beg to transmit herewith copies of Minutes recorded by His Excellency the Commander in Chief in India and the Honourable Colonel Durand on the projected occupation of Quetta, as promised in paragraph 3 of our Despatch, No. 15, dated 23rd ultimo.

We have, &c.

(signed) *John Lawrence.*
W. R. Mansfield.
H. S. Maine.
W. Grey.
G. N. Taylor.
W. N. Massey.
H. M. Durand.

Enclosure 1, in No. 2.

MINUTE by His Excellency Sir *W. R. Mansfield*, K.C.B., G.C.S.I., Commander in Chief in India, on the occupation of Quetta, as proposed by Lieutenant Colonel Sir H. R. Green, K.C.S.I.

THE Despatch from this Government to that of Bombay is so conclusive in its argument against entertaining the proposals made by Sir H. Green in his confidential memorandum of 16th August 1866, which had been recommended to our favourable consideration by the Governor of Bombay in Council, that I have a difficulty in adding to what has been already so well said.

As, however, His Excellency the Governor General is desirous that the answer to Sir H. Green's political and military views with regard to the occupation of Quetta, which, as mentioned by this officer, are a revival of what the late General Jacob made familiar to us, may be supported by such arguments as occur to me, I overcome my hesitation to offer a few remarks.

I observe with great satisfaction that the Commander in Chief in Bombay indicates a most decided dissent from General Jacob's plan, which would have thrown a British brigade beyond the Bolan Pass, and have removed all support from it.

It may, perhaps, be well to draw attention to the military grounds for such an opinion, although Sir Robert Napier has probably considered them so obvious and well-known, as not to have demanded reiteration from him.

The distance from* Sukkur to Quetta was performed in 20 marches by the columns which advanced under the command of the late Sir Willoughby Cotton and Lord Keane in 1839.

The distance amounts to 257 miles, there being twelve marches from Sukkur to Dadur, a desert being passed before the latter is reached, and eight marches from Dadur to Quetta.

I would here quote two extracts from "The War in Affghanistan" by the late Sir Henry Havelock, who accompanied Sir Willoughby Cotton as aide de camp :—

"Narrative of the War in Affghanistan by Captain Henry Havelock, p. 40, vol. i.

"This is the Bolan Pass, to which we now come in due order. It was the plan of the Supreme Government of India to cause their armies to advance by this durru from Sukkur, which they were to constitute their place of strength and great depôt on the Indus. Shikarpore, which is the next important post, is only two marches further to the northward, and one short stage beyond this the boundary line of Cutchee, or Cutch Gundava, is crossed. There succeeds a considerable tract of desert, but as some wells were always to be found in it, and the number was greatly increased by the British at the villages of Rojhan, Burshoree, Meerpore, and Oostar, there is no insurmountable obstacle to the† passage of a large army by small detachments at a time in the cooler months. After April the desert is swept by a pestilential simoom, and the heat becomes too

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* *See* Hough's Expedition to Affghanistan.

† *Note.*—With regard to the subsequent argument, I invite special attention to the conditions of the passage of an army across the desert tracts, as stated by Sir H. Havelock. (signed) *W. R. M.*

too great for any troops to keep the field in Cutchee; nor is the salubrity increased when the descent of rain converts the low level of the whole province into a swamp of salt marshes. From Oostar there is one march only to Bhag, where the brother of Mihrab Khan holds his Court, and thence again one more to the village of Muhesir, on the Bolan River. This place stands without the first defiles of the Brahoik, or Hala range. They can easily be turned, and are passed when a force reaches Noushuhra. Hence it will have to make but one march more to Dadur.

"The towns of Bhag and Dadur, as well as Shikarpore, are naturally to be reckoned successive places of arms; and an advancing force ought, with a view of securing its water as well as its communications, to establish small posts in the mud fortresses of the villages of Taneedera, Rojhan, Burshoree, and Meerpore. At Dadur commences the labour of passing the mountain range, but the ascent through the durru of Bolan, following the meanderings of its river, is not painful, until the columns approach Siri Bolan, that streamlet's source, and thence one day's effort brings them into the table-land called the Dusht-i-bee-Doulut, or 'poverty-stricken plain.' An army passes easily over that level to Kwote, or Kwetta in Shawl, another excellent place of arms, which boasts a wall of curtains and round towers, a ditch and a citadel, and from it descends to the lower valleys of Koochlak and Peesheen, crosses the Lora, and the range of mountains called Khojah Amran, into the plains beyond, and choosing its road through the not difficult passes of the Gantee hills, reaches the rivers Dooree and Urghesan, the latter of which it may find filled with water, or dry, according to the season; and lastly the plain on which stands Candahar."

Second extract from same work, p. 240, vol. i.

"Let us look back at the Pass, the whole acclivity of which the main portion of the Bengal column has been seen to surmount. The most exact calculations fix the spot on the *Put* or *Dusht* on which the force was encamped near Siriab, at 5,300 feet above the level of the sea, and this might be a few hundred feet lower than the top of the Pass itself. The exertions which had brought our soldiers thither may be generally summed up by stating that each column in succession marched on the first day up a narrow but level valley, 10½ miles to Kohun Dulan; on the second up a wider vale, 11⅛ more to Kirtah, the ascent being still scarcely perceptible, and that the acclivity on the third day was not found much steeper, whilst the troops imperceptibly ascended and traversed yet broader valleys to the distance of ten miles more, until they reached the remarkable Pass of Bebee Nanee. The rise was greater as the columns advanced another 10 miles, whilst loftier mountains closed around them to Abigoom; and the pull up hill had become a very serious matter for artillery horses, as they toiled up to the picturesque spot named Siri Bolan, where are found the gushing and pellucid fountains of the Kanhee. These springs are 11 miles from Abigoom. Two more miles of the same kind of road had to be climbed up on the following day; but then our regiments and batteries plunged at once into the narrow and winding defile of 10½ miles, the ascent of which is, however, very gradual, and which our engineers had shortened to eight miles by cutting a well chosen route into the *Dusht*, instead of leaving us to make our way by the usual road to the Munzilgah, or resting place of trading *kafilas*. According to the above recapitulation, the whole distance from Dadur to our first encampment in the 'unhappy plain,' including three miles from the top of the Pass to our tents on the *Put*, is to be estimated at 66 miles. Thus, then, by tracing up the Bolan stream through the windings of its natural valley to its source, our Bengal force had been carried from the plains of Cutch Gundava into the heart of the Brahoik range, and had passed onward at the foot of a lofty ridge, which runs transverse to that barrier up to the high table land of the *Dusht*, and near the opening of the valley of Shawl we had passed the great mountain ridge, which appeared to fence us out from Affghanistan. Difficulties of another nature now beset our path. It has been related that we had not more than one month's provision in hand when we reached Dadur. There and in the country around we had collected next to nothing; at Kwetta we had the promise of very little; and as our instructions prohibited our advancing for the present beyond that point, we could not hope to get hold of the resources of the valleys of Koochlah and Peshing, which were represented to be eminently productive. A painful crisis, therefore, appeared to be approaching. More than half a month had elapsed, and no source presented itself from which fresh supplies could be derived. Our depôts of Sukkur and Shikarpore were now separated from us by the whole breadth of the dangerous tract of Cutch Gundava, as well as the depth of the mountain range, and we well knew that before the contingent of the Shah and the Bombay force could prosecute their advance they must not only draw largely on the supplies in our rear, but absorb a great proportion of the means of transport which might otherwise have been employed to bring up successive convoys of provisions to Dadur and the valley of Shawl."

Consequently, if we assume the force now at Jacobabad to be thrown forward to Quetta, the same being strengthened as proposed by General Jacob, we should have the spectacle of a British force separated by such ground as that described by Sir H. Havelock from the nearest point on the Indus, and a distance equivalent in time to 20 days without a halt on the part of an advancing force, or to 257 miles.

In addition we must consider the time required to bring reinforcements either from Kurrachee in the south, or from Mooltan in the north, to collect carriage, and to put such

reinforcements in movement from Sukkur. A month for the joint purpose, wherever conducted from, is certainly not too much.

Thus, according to a favourable view, the station of Quetta would be removed by not less than 50 days in time from reinforcement in the event of its being threatened from Candahar, or of its communications with Hindostan being seriously interrupted. I have said a favourable view, because it will occur to every one that amid references and correspondence between Governments and military authorities as forming part of necessary consultation, and with regard to the purveyance of steamers to carry the troops, the 50 days would infallibly swell to two months, and perhaps a longer period, however active the authorities might be. During the hot season it would be almost impossible to march a force from Sukkur to Quetta. It will be recollected that when General Jacob first established himself at Khangurh, since styled by him Jacobabad, he was supported at an easy distance by a brigade at Shikarpore, Sinde being besides very strongly held by Sir Charles Napier, as was required by the facts of recent conquest and of our disturbed relations with the Punjaub, then possessing a Government and a standing army alike hostile to us.

The country between Shikarpore and Jacobabad presents no difficulties.

Now, as shown by Sir H. Havelock, and as is well known to numerous officers in the Bengal and Bombay armies, the tract stretching from Jacobabad to Quetta presents formidable obstacles of insalubrity at certain seasons, of want of water, of desert, of a very long though on the whole not difficult mountain pass, and what is perhaps of more consequence than anything else, of want of cultivation, the hope of local supplies being thus likely to be precluded at many of the halting stations.

We must also recollect that if the force at Quetta were seriously threatened or attacked in front, it is but reasonable to expect that the Pass would be closed in rear by the predatory tribes, whose habits, it is safe to assume, do not differ from those of the generation which gave so much annoyance to Lord Keane.

But, further, Khangurh was a parcel of our own territory when it was occupied, whereas our boundary is passed soon after we begin to advance towards Dadur. Consequently, the analogy drawn by Sir H. Green between General Jacob's operations in former times and those of his successors more recently, and what he would now propose to do beyond our frontier, seems to be entirely erroneous, both in a military and a political sense.

It appears to me, then, that if we were to accede to the measure of a military occupation of Quetta, the force there must not only be sufficient for self protection, but that we must maintain the communication with the Indus by posts at Dadur and Jacobabad, and probably at some intermediate places.

The most ordinary prudence would therefore compel us, with regard to the three requirements, to double the estimate of troops demanded by General Jacob for the cantonment of Quetta.

There is another consideration which did not occur to General Jacob, who wished, I believe, to have an army of his own, without acknowledging the authority of a Commander in Chief, and wrote his letters before the war of the Mutiny.

After our experience of 1857–58, which led to our present military policy, we decline to permit the existence of any considerable force of which the most important element shall not be British proper. Consequently, according to that policy, the force at Quetta and in the supporting posts would demand not less than three British infantry regiments, and four British field batteries, viz., two regiments and three batteries at Quetta, and one regiment and one battery in support.

I think it is clear that such projects would involve an addition to the Army Estimates in the departments, Military and Public Works, which would deter even Sir Henry Green from further pressing these projects on our notice.

I should imagine that they could not be executed with safety with less than 3,000 British infantry and artillery, 4,000 native infantry, and 2,000 cavalry, including a regiment of dragoons, 9,000 in all, or 7,000 in excess of the force which is now found to be more than ample for the defence of the Sind frontier, the same being all native, and therefore comparatively of a cheap description.

Besides the troops cantoned at Quetta, a fort would be required at that place to cover the magazine and treasure, and to be a *point d'appui* in case of accident, when reinforcements were in course of being called up.

It is very questionable whether the outlay would be worth while if the Russians were at Cabul and Candahar, so long as there is peace between Great Britain and Russia, when we consider the defences afforded on our side the Bolan Pass by the difficulties of ground. I should think not myself, as a civilised power does not to my mind present difficulties of management and obstructions to peace, which occur to us in our dealings with the predatory tribes of Beloochistan and Affghanistan.

But it is surely premature to rush into the expense of military occupation of such a country as that described in the foregoing extracts, because the Russians are now involved in the troubles of political extension in Central Asia, which is probably forced on them in spite of themselves.

It appears to me that a point of importance escapes all Russophobists, viz., that if ever the Russians come into contact with our frontiers, the policy of their viceroys and generals will be guided entirely by the relations between the Cabinets of London and Petersburg. The conduct of Russia in dealing with Kokan and Bokhara, or even Persia,

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is entirely different from the conduct of Russia when she meets European powers in the field of negotiation and international comity.

This fact is little appreciated by those who argue like Sir H. Green, and cite as an authority, on which we should act seriously, the gossip of Indian bazaars, or of the Durbars of savage tribes, which can only understand the policy applied to themselves, or to populations and governments as barbarous as they are.

Assuming, however, the worst in the sense of Sir H. Green's argument, I should be inclined to say that the side whence to defend the Bolan Pass is not the western extremity, where the British cantonment would be cut off by a defile 66 miles long through which its supports would have to advance after a painful and exhausting march from the Indus and across a desert, but rather at the eastern extremity. For there a hostile force could be struck on the head before it could have time to deploy, with the heavy material without which a modern army cannot move or hope to move against such forces as we should array against it on any field we might choose between Shikarpore and Dadur. The desert would be in this manner turned into our most useful ally, instead of being a formidable difficulty. The latter would be the case if General Jacob's plan were adopted.

If we dismiss the Russians and turn our attention to what has some reality, viz., the effect on our policy with Affghanistan of such a movement as that proposed, it may, I think, be taken for granted that it could not but entail the occupation of Candahar at no distant date. I do not see how such a consequence could ultimately be avoided with the further final result of an obligation, which would at length come to comprehend the entire country ruled by the late Dost Mahomed.

This was probably General Jacob's intention. It might be asked if Sir H. Green has ever permitted himself to weigh the consequences of the movement he proposes, and the certainty that those consequences would at once present themselves to the Affghan mind, and the minds of Persia, Bokhara, and Russia beyond.

With respect to the establishment of a political agent at Quetta with a personal escort, I am unable to see any possible advantage which can result from it. Such a measure would seem not improbably to lead to a state of things which might compel the Government of India, however unwillingly, to entertain the larger project of military occupation at a subsequent date. It appears to me to be the thin end of the wedge, and that it is intended to be so by the projector.

The further plans of Sir H. Green, as described by himself, are all to a like effect, viz., to commence an occupation insidiously as it were which should creep over the country like a mist, unobserved by the public or those affected by its proceeding.

To show that this description is no exaggeration, I must quote his own words—"no particular notice would then be taken of our proceeding either within India or beyond it; we might then firmly establish ourselves."

Seeing that the country and people thus proposed to be operated on do not belong to us, I would only add that the proposals do not complete my notions of an honourable British policy. I can only hope, therefore, they may never be entertained by a British Government.

If it be necessary to extend British dominion for 250 miles beyond our present boundaries on the west of Sinde, our honour demands that such extension should take place openly and on its merits, without blinding either our own public or the Governments of other nations.

The value of Sir H. Green's suggestion that if his plans were executed, Quetta would afford us a post of infallible political observation of Central Asia, and so forth, may be accurately tested by a reference to the correspondence between Sir W. Cotton and Sir W. Nott, when the former was at Jellalabad and the latter at Candahar in April 1840.

Sir W. Cotton, while expressing his fears of the Russian advance on Khiva, talks of the vague rumours he has long heard, and then announces his real information in the matter, which had reached Sir W. McNaghten from Calcutta, the same having come by the Overland Mail.

In reply, Sir W. Nott says he has no means of getting information on the subject, but that of conversing with merchants, horse-dealers, &c., * "and perhaps much reliance cannot be placed on their accounts."

Now this correspondence took place when Sir W. McNaghten was the virtual ruler in Affghanistan, and had been for some time established at Cabul.

The like may be seen in the present day. Our real news about Russian doings against Bokhara comes from Europe, and not from the despatches of our native envoy at Cabul, who nevertheless reports all that is known about the Russians to Afzul Khan and Azim Khan.

31 January 1867. (signed) *W. R. Mansfield.*

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* Memoirs of Sir W. Nott, vol. i.

Enclosure 2, in No. 2.

NOTE on Projected Occupation of *Quetta*.

THE Despatch to the Bombay Government, No. 69, of the 17th January 1867, has, I hope, disposed effectually for the present of the projected occupation of Quetta, and from the unanimity of the Members of Government on this subject it may be anticipated that any future attempt to revive the proposal will hardly be seriously entertained unless much stronger reasons can be adduced than have as yet been urged in favour of advancing our frontier.

If it ever became advisable or necessary to occupy Affghanistan, there can be no doubt that we are now in a position to execute such a movement with far greater facility and security than when we advanced in 1838, with Scinde in the hands of Ameers, and the Punjab a compact military power under Runjeet Sing, both interposing between the small column launched into Affghanistan and its base of operations. With the Indus frontier from Kurrachee to Peshawur under our rule, we are otherwise circumstanced than was the case when we marched to put Shah Shooja on the throne of Cabul, and we have only to accomplish that which I have always urged to be commercially as well as politically and militarily expedient, namely, the completion of what I have elsewhere termed the Indus group of railways, in order to secure to ourselves such a thorough command of that line of frontier as shall leave it entirely in our own discretion to operate below or above the Passes as might be judged at the time most advisable. As a general rule, I concur in the opinion expressed by His Excellency Sir W. Mansfield in his able Minute with regard to the defence of the Bolan Pass (page 19), but at the same time it is easy to conceive circumstances which might combine to render the partial or the entire occupation of Affghanistan necessary as a theatre for offensive operations on our part in aid of Affghan resistance to invasion from the westward: it is a country admirably adapted for giving the fullest effect to the destructive warfare which Affghans, thus supported, could wage with small loss to themselves against hostile columns. This is one contingency, and a variety of others might be quoted as possible inducements to an advance beyond the Indus frontier. I shall not enter into an estimate of the probability of such remote contingencies, but admitting their future possibility, it will, I think, be all that political and military considerations demand if our lines of rail and river communication on the Indus frontier are rendered as perfect as it is easily in our power to make them, so that without our at present incurring the risk of complications with Affghan or Belooch tribes and politics, it may yet be in our power rapidly to mass and securely to feed and support our forces, whether intended for operations above or below the Passes, wherever they may be sent on that frontier. The bare fact that such was the position of the British Government on the Indus frontier would not only prove a sedative to the turbulence of frontier tribes, but render any aggressive movements upon Affghanistan from the westward, or any hostile attitude on the part of the Affghans towards ourselves, dangerous to those who chose to provoke our power and means of striking.

Whilst, however, I am very strongly in favour of thus securing our position on the Indus frontier, I am as much opposed to the occupation of Quetta now as I was when the late Lord Canning did me the honour to consult me on the same subject when war with Persia was inevitable. At that time General Jacob pressed on the Governor General the expediency of occupying Quetta in force as a demonstration against Persia, and it was hardly concealed that the demonstration might with advantage be turned into something more than a demonstration, inasmuch as General Jacob pronounced that the occupation of the Persian sea-ports was only valuable as a diversion in aid of other operations, and that our demonstrations by sea, if no simultaneous proceedings were undertaken by land on our north-western frontier, would have no effect but to make Russia push Persia on the more vigorously in the direction of India. These arguments had produced some impression, not only on Lord Canning's mind, but on the minds of some of his Council, and there was a manifest disposition to adopt General Jacob's suggestion and to detach a force to Quetta. I opposed this strenuously on the ground that, as a demonstration, it would prove inoperative as against Persia, though very effectual in embroiling us with the Belooch and the Affghan; and that if more than a demonstration were purposed, there must be a corresponding development of means, which would be costly in men, money, carriage, and supplies, even though the force had little else to endure than the friction of operations in so poor and difficult a country, and must necessarily divert a large and valuable part of our force from the more direct and effective operations in the Gulf. With the sea for our base and the command of shipping at our disposal, it was manifestly much more certain of effect to concentrate exertion on a landing in such force in the Gulf as to establish ourselves securely at a point which should make a good base for further operations if the Shah of Persia were not brought to reason by the opening successes against his sea-port and littoral provinces, than to reverse the plan of the campaign by making Quetta the real base of operations against Persia, and the action in the Gulf a mere diversion. Lord Canning finally rejected the suggested movement on Quetta, concentrated his efforts on the Gulf, and coerced Persia easily and at once. He thus avoided frittering away his force by detaching troops to Quetta, and avoided the drain on men and

resources

resources which would have been as protracted as utterly inevitable had he been led into tedious operations across the breadth of the countries which intervene between our Indus and the Persian frontier ; a drain which would have stripped him of the European troops with which he met the events of 1857, and would have imperilled his position in that eventful year even more than was the case, for troops engaged on the projected line of operations from Quetta to Herat and onwards could never have been recovered in time for his necessities in India as were those set free from the successful operations in the Gulf of Persia.

It will be observed by those who have followed during the last 10 years the series of events in Affghanistan that none of General Jacob's prognostications have as to the consequences of the non-occupation of Quetta had effect. On the contrary, had Dost Mahomed lived, he would have consolidated an Affghan kingdom hostile to Persia, holding Herat, and as jealous of Russian as of British influence or control. His death threw Affghanistan into the anarchy of a civil war, but as the competitors for power are thinned off in this fratricidal contest, we may expect the reins to fall into the hands of some one chief of the family who is capable of maintaining himself from Herat to Candahar and Cabul, and will be all the stronger and more fit for his position by the struggle he has had to go through. Be he who he may, the instincts of his race and position will impose upon him the policy of Dost Mahomed, and we shall gain nothing by an aggressive policy on the Indus frontier whether in Scinde or Peshawur calculated to irritate the jealousy of the Belooch and the Affghan. Any intervention now would be ill-timed, and is wholly uncalled for, and the restless longing of the Scinde frontier officers to escape into active life beyond their own proper boundaries must be firmly curbed.

If our position on the Indus frontier be one of unmistakeable strength, it will long paralyze aggressive presumption. I know that we could again seize Affghanistan if it were advisable or necessary, and that with our Indus frontier complete in its communications, parallel and perpendicular, no power on earth could shake us out of that country. I know, too, that, with the Affghans, friendly and cordial, we could, without the actual seizure of the country for ourselves, organise its defence in a most destructive manner against hostile invasions ; but neither alternative is at present imposed upon us as of the smallest necessity, and I am absolutely opposed to precipitating complications and plunging into certain difficulties out of respect for nervous apprehensions, the realization of which is, if it ever take place, remote, and can be met when the time comes whichever way may be most advisable, provided, in the meantime, we so perfect our position on the Indus frontier that offensive or defensive operations, whether above or below the passes, are alike at our command.

Neither the people nor the country have altered since 1838, and any one who knows Affghanistan will not hastily or partially compromise troops in that country or in Beloochistan without any adequate motive, and on purely restless and visionary anticipations, which have in one case been signally falsified, and will, in all probability, be the same in the present instance.

5 February 1867. (signed) *H. M. Durand.*

— No. 3. —

(Foreign Department.—Political.—No. 42.)

To the Right Honourable Viscount *Cranborne*, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord, Fort William, 23 February 1867.

We have the honour to transmit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of a correspondence with the Bombay Government on the subject of Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan's proceedings at Quetta, and the measures necessary to prevent him from compromising the neutrality observed by the Khan of Khelat and the British Government towards the factions contending in Affghanistan.

2. Your Lordship will perceive that we authorised the Bombay Government to require of the Khan of Khelat the immediate extrusion of Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan from Khelat territory ; but that we at the same time expressed a belief that the recent victory of the Cabul troops over the Ameer Shere Ali Khan would tempt the Sirdar to return spontaneously into Affghanistan. Later intelligence from the frontier shows that our anticipations have been realised, and that the Sirdar, immediately on hearing of the Ameer's defeat and flight, marched back to Candahar and occupied that city, in the interests of the victorious party.

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3. The Political Superintendent on the Scinde frontier was desirous to make Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan's presence at Quetta a pretext for our undertaking a military promenade in Beloochistan. We summarily disallowed so unnecessary and impolitic a project.

We have, &c.
(signed) *John Lawrence.*
W. R. Mansfield.
H. S. Maine.
W. Grey.
G. N. Taylor.
W. N. Massey.
H. M. Durand.

Enclosure 1, in No. 3.

From *W. Wedderburn*, Esq., Acting Secretary to Government, Bombay, to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, Fort William (No. 28); dated 25th January 1867.

Memorandum from the Commissioner in Scinde, No. 21; dated the 15th January 1867.

Letter from the Political Superintendent on the Frontier to the Commissioner in Scinde, No. 1326; dated the 28th December 1866.

Letter from the Political Agent in Beloochistan to the Superintendent, Upper Scinde Frontier, No. 1324; dated the 28th December 1866.

I AM directed to forward, for the early instructions of the Government of India, the enclosed copy of correspondence from the Political Superintendent on the frontier of Upper Scinde regarding the proceedings of Mahomed Shureef Khan since his arrival in Beloochistan.

2. In forwarding this correspondence, I am desired to state that the Bombay Government agree in the views expressed by the Commissioner in Scinde in his memorandum* submitting this correspondence, except that they would not give Mahomed Shureef Khan the option of remaining at Kurrachee.

* No. 21, of the 15th January 1867.

3. He should, his Excellency the Governor in Council thinks, be requested either to return to Affghanistan, or to proceed to Mecca, or, if he wishes to live in India, to select some residence away from the Affghan or Belooch frontier.

4. I am directed to request that the instructions of the Government of India may be sent, if possible, by telegraph.

Enclosure 2, in No. 3.

From Lieutenant Colonel *M. S. Green*, C.B., Political Agent, Beloochistan, to Lieutenant Colonel Sir *H. W. R. Green*, K.S.I., C.B., Political Superintendent, Frontier, Upper Scinde (No. 1324); dated Jacobabad, 28th December 1866.

I HAVE the honour to bring to your notice that about two months since a quarrel took place between the Ameer of Affghanistan, Shere Ali Khan, and his brother, Mahomed Shureef Khan, which resulted in the departure of the latter from Candahar, and encamping in the valley of Shalkote (Quetta), the frontier town of Beloochistan towards Candahar, he brought with him about 100 horsemen, and has up to this time been treated as a guest by his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

2. On the first arrival of Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan in Quetta the Khan wrote to the Ameer Shere Ali Khan informing him of the fact, and requesting to be intimated with his wishes regarding him. Mahomed Shureef Khan had, in the first instance, stated that his intention was to proceed to Mecca, *viâ* Khelat and Scinde.

3. The answer from the Ameer to this letter dated from Candahar, 1st December, to the address of the Khan, states that his brother (Mahomed Shureef Khan) was the origin of all the misfortunes which had befallen him, and is a universal mischief-maker throughout Affghanistan; that he was a man of little sense and untrustworthy in every respect.

4. A few days subsequent to the receipt of the above answer at Khelat, Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan writes from Quetta to his Highness the Khan, forwarding two horses as presents and inviting his advice under the present circumstances.

5. His Highness declined to receive the presents on the plea that it was contrary to the custom of Beloochistan to do so when the parties offering them were guests in the country, but he recommended the Sirdar to be reconciled to the Ameer; but should he fail to do so, suggested his carrying out his original intention of proceeding to Mecca.

6. There is now little doubt but that Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan has abandoned the project of a journey to Mecca, if he ever held such an intention, and that his presence

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in the Quetta valley is for the purpose of intriguing with the rulers at Cabul, to the detriment of the Ameer Shere Ali Khan. Recent intelligence from Candahar shows that letters from Cabul to the address of the Sirdar fully approved of his having taken up his residence at Quetta, and directed him to afford every information for the furtherance of the views of the Cabul rulers with regard to the Ameer Shere Ali Khan.

7. Intelligence of a more recent date distinctly states that the Sirdar Mahomed Shureef, although himself a guest in neutral territory, is now attempting to raise a force in the interest of the Cabul rulers from amongst the tribes in the hills immediately adjoining the Khelat frontier, the object being to establish this force for offensive purposes in the rear of the Ameer Shere Ali Khan, whilst the latter should be employed in defending himself against the Cabul rulers in his front.

1. Vernacular letter from His Highness the Khan of Khelat's Naib, in charge of the Quetta district; dated 10th December 1866, to the address of the Khan.
2. Letter from the Khan to the Ameer Shere Ali Khan; dated 17th December 1866.

8. The above state of affairs, together with the continued presence of the Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan at Quetta under other circumstances than that of a fugitive, places his Highness the Khan of Khelat in a somewhat difficult position; this prince has hitherto received and treated fugitives from both sides in Affghanistan with the utmost impartiality, and in all cases becoming the ruler of a neutral State, and the fact of an influential chief notoriously disaffected to the Ameer Shere Ali Khan and in direct communication with his enemies now taking up a position on the very frontier of his country is not improbable to lead to differences between his Highness and whoever may ultimately be ruler in Affghanistan, for, should Mahomed Shureef Khan continue to carry out his intrigues from Quetta for any length of time, the place will soon, in spite of the Khan's endeavours to prevent it, become a centre to which all the disaffected spirits of Affghanistan will be drawn, besides rendering it probable that Beloochistan itself may become a field for the operations of the belligerent forces, which, I need not say, could not well happen without endangering the peace on the British frontier.

Enclosure 3, in No. 3.

From Lieutenant Colonel Sir *H. W. R. Green*, K.S.I., C.B., Political Superintendent, Frontier, Upper Scinde, to *S. Mansfield*, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner in Scinde (No. 1326); dated Jacobabad, the 28th December 1866.

I HAVE the honour to forward a letter* received from Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm Green, C.B., Political Agent in Beloochistan, and bringing current of events now passing in Affghanistan up to the most recent date that intelligence has been received.

* No. 1324, dated this day.

2. I would now most earnestly bring to your notice the proceedings of Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan and the manner in which they are likely to compromise his Highness the Khan of Khelat, unless the British Government exerts its influence with the contending chiefs of Affghanistan, or openly supports the Ruler of Khelat in carrying out its policy of non-intervention in Affghan affairs. Should neither course be adopted, I should fear that the field of contention between the rival chiefs of Affghanistan will be gradually transferred to Beloochistan, in which case our ally the Khan will become most assuredly involved, while it will be almost impossible for the British Government to remain any longer neutral.

3. The difficulty of the position of the Khan of Khelat will be apparent to you. If he drives Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan from within his territory, he will make an enemy of the Ruler of Cabul, who will not fail, in the event of his becoming supreme in Affghanistan, to revenge himself upon his Highness the Khan on the first opportunity; while, should his Highness permit Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan to remain in his present position at Quetta, making it a base of operations against the Ameer Shere Ali Khan, he will in a like manner bring on himself the enmity and vengeance of that Sirdar should he succeed in re-instating himself as Ruler of the Affghans.

4. I would further point out that the presence of Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan so near our border, and within the territory of a Prince over whom our influence is known to exert great power, will most assuredly cause suspicion in the mind of Sirdar Shere Ali Khan as to our good faith in maintaining the strict neutrality we have hitherto done between the rival powers of Affghanistan.

5. To obviate the difficulties, present and prospective, which are likely to accrue both to the British Government and Belooch State from the existing situation of affairs, I would respectfully make the following suggestions:—

6. That the Supreme Government be moved to communicate to Sirdar Mahomed Affzul Khan of Cabul that it will not allow Beloochistan, being situated contingent to the British border, and with which it has so close relations, to be made a base of operations either for intriguing or open war for any party now contending for power in Affghanistan, and that his Highness the Khan has been requested to cause the extradition of Mahomed Shureef Khan from within his territory.

 7. I would

7. I would further most strongly urge the employment of a small British detachment in Beloochistan, in the form of the Political Agent's escort, and which might patrol, accompanied by him, the mountain country between the head of the Gundava and Bolan Passes. The presence of such a force would materially strengthen the Khan in maintaining his neutrality, and those beyond his territory would at once perceive the impossibility of attempting to use it to further their own views, and would in all probability turn their attention towards Herat and Persia.

8. The presence of such a detachment would meet with the support of the Khan and of every Chief in Beloochistan, while the great influence exerted in the country by Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm Green, C.B., combined with his thorough knowledge of the Chief and people, his long experience, and high character, would prevent the possibility of involving the British Government in political complications with either State.

9. The strength of the detachment proposed should consist of a complete squadron of Scinde Horse, four companies of Rifles, and a mountain train, and could be detached from the present frontier field force, provided it were replaced by other troops, as a reduction to the already slender force in Upper Scinde at my disposal would be most impolitic at the present time.

10. To supply the place of the above detachment, and supposing that the exigencies of the State render unavailable an equal number of cavalry from other stations of the Bombay Presidency for service in Upper Scinde, I might be permitted to raise the three corps of Scinde Horse from 500 to 600 each regiment, while one of the Belooch regiments now stationed in Scinde might be ordered to the frontier to occupy the place of the infantry detached. I may here state that there are vacant lines for a complete native infantry regiment at Jacobabad.

11. By the above arrangement the only extra cost to the State would be the raising of 300 cavalry, which I feel convinced would be fully compensated for by the increased security afforded to the frontier and the removal of the chance of being forced to abandon our present position of neutrality towards the contending powers in Affghanistan.

12. In conclusion, I would most strongly bring to the notice of Government the excellent conduct of his Highness the Khan of Khelat; he has never failed to give the frontier political authorities notice on any subject affecting its welfare, and has and does all in his power to loyally meet its wishes and carry out its policy; and I consider that an expression of opinion on the part of the Government of India to the effect that his Highness's conduct meets with its approval, combined with some more substantial mark in the shape of a present of Arab horses, would have a most beneficial effect in encouraging his Highness to continue his present line of conduct, a deviation from which might cause much inconvenience to the State.

Enclosure 4, in No. 3.

MEMORANDUM No. 21.

TRUE copies submitted for the orders of Government.

2. The Commissioner in Scinde is of opinion that the Political Superintendent on the frontier should desire the Khan of Khelat to intimate to Mahomed Shureef Khan that the British Government are anxious that the anarchy that now prevails in Affghanistan should not extend to Beloochistan, and that they are therefore desirous that he should leave Quetta and return to Cabul, or, if he prefers it, take up his residence at Kurrachee.

3. Should Mahomed Shureef Khan refuse to leave Quetta, Colonel Malcolm Green might proceed to Khelat with a small force to assist the Khan in expelling him from his territory.

4. Should this latter contingency arise, the Commissioner in Scinde is of opinion that it will be unnecessary to replace Colonel Malcolm Green's force at Jacobabad with other troops or fresh levies. He believes the frontier was never quieter than at present, and he sees no probability of disturbances on it.

(signed) *S. Mansfield,*
Commissioner in Scinde.

Camp Bukkur, 15 January 1867.

No. 21.

SUBMITS, for orders, correspondence from the Political Superintendent, Frontier, Upper Scinde, respecting the proceedings of Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan.

Enclosure 5, in No. 3.

SERVICE MESSAGE.

From Calcutta, dated the 2nd February 1867.—From Officiating Foreign Secretary.

To Bombay.—To Political Secretary to Government.

"YOUR letter, No. 28, dated 25th January, received.

"The Khan of Khelat should require Mahomed Shureef to leave the Khan's territory. If the Khan is as sincerely attached to the British Government as he is represented to be, the mere expression of his wish will cause Mahomed Shureef to depart without difficulty.

"If Mahomed Shureef desires to enter British territory, he must be given distinctly to understand that he will not be allowed to reside anywhere in Scinde or the Punjab, and that he had better pass through to Mecca. The Viceroy, however, thinks it probable that Azim Khan's recent success against the Ameer will induce the Sirdar to return northwards with the view of joining the Cabul party.

"Beyond advising, and, if necessary, remonstrating with the Khan of Khelat, the British Agent should take no active part in Mahomed Shureef's expulsion from Khelat territory.

"Neither should the Agent stir from his proper station. The Government of India is entirely opposed to the military measures recommended by Sir Henry Green."

Enclosure 6, in No 3.

From *J. W. S. Wyllie*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Acting Secretary to Government, Bombay (No. 129); dated Fort William, the 6th February 1867.

I HAVE received and laid before the Governor General in Council your letter, No. 28, dated 25th ultimo, forwarding a copy of communications from the Political Agent in Beloochistan, the Political Superintendent on the Frontier of Upper Scinde, and the Commissioner in Scinde, on the subject of Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan's proceedings at Quetta, and the measures necessary to prevent his compromising the neutrality which the Khan of Khelat and the British Government have hitherto observed towards both of the contending parties in Affghanistan.

2. Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry Green recommends that the Government of India inform Sirdar Mahomed Ufzul Khan at Cabul of its having called on the Khan of Khelat to expel Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan from Khelat territory; that Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm Green be granted one squadron of Scinde Horse, four companies of Rifles, and a Mountain Train wherewith to patrol the mountain country between the head of the Gundava and Bolan Passes; that to supply the place of this detachment at Jacobabad, the three regiments of Scinde Horse be each raised from a strengh of 500 sabres to 600, and a Belooch regiment be ordered to the frontier; and, lastly, that a present of some Arab horses be made by the Government of India to the Khan of Khelat.

3. The Commissioner in Scinde suggests that the Khan of Khelat should be required to give Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan the option of returning to Cabul or living at Kurrachee; and, in the event of the Sirdar's refusing either alternative, that Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm Green might proceed to Khelat with a small force to assist the Khan in expelling him. The Commissioner, however, does not think it would be necessary to replace Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm Green's force with other troops.

4. The Government of Bombay agrees generally with Mr. Mansfield, but would insist on Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan's either proceeding to Mecca or residing at some place much further distant from the Affghan or Belooch frontier than Kurrachee.

5. I have already conveyed to you by telegram the orders of the Government of India intimating that the Governor General in Council approves of the Bombay Government's opinions as to the expulsion of Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan from Khelat territory, and the limitation which should be imposed on his choice of residence in India; but that his Excellency in Council cannot sanction any steps of active interference being taken by our officers in Beloochistan. I am now to lay down the views of the Government of India in greater detail.

6. On the general question of policy, the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council fully admits the inexpediency of allowing Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan, or any other Affghan chiefs, to find an asylum in Beloochistan, and there to organise measures for the assistance of either of the contending parties in Affghanistan. Such permission would no doubt lead to complications between the Khan of Khelat and the

Affghan factions. But his Excellency in Council, as the Government of Bombay will have already learned from my recent Despatch regarding the proposed occupation of Quetta, wholly disallows the policy advocated by Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry Green.

7. The Government of India sees no necessity for any military promenade in Beloochistan. On the contrary, it considers that such a proceeding would have an injurious effect in Affghanistan, and lead to the supposition that we were desirous of interfering in the intestine struggles to which that country is a prey.

8. The Government of India cannot hear of any proposals for an increase in the strength of the Scinde Horse, or for an addition to the force on the frontier of Upper Scinde.

9. Neither can the Government of India recognise the advantage of entering into any communication at present with the Sirdars in power at Cabul.

The Governor General in Council carefully watches the progress of events in Affghanistan, and is prepared to take, with reference to the affairs of that country, whatever step his judgment may approve.

10. Lastly, his Excellency in Council declines, for the present at any rate, to make any such communication or despatch any such presents to the Khan of Khelat as Sir H. Green advises. The point may be reserved for consideration until the Khan of Khelat shall have carried out the wishes of the British Government in regard to Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan.

Enclosure 7, in No. 3.

SERVICE MESSAGE.

From Bombay, dated the 14th February 1867.—From Secretary to Government.

To Calcutta.—To Secretary, Foreign Department.

"DOES your telegram of 2nd and letter, No. 129, of 6th instant, on Beloochistan affairs, prohibit Colonel Malcolm Green returning to Quetta with escort of Scinde Horse on the same footing as before he assumed charge at Jacobabad during Sir Henry Green's absence?"

Enclosure 8, in No. 3.

SERVICE MESSAGE.

From Calcutta, dated the 16th February 1867.—From Officiating Foreign Secretary.

To Bombay.—To Political Secretary to Government.

"THE recent orders of the Government of India do not preclude the return of Colonel Malcolm Green to Quetta in his former position."

— No. 4. —

(Foreign Department.—Political.—No. 162.)

To the Right Honourable Sir *Stafford Northcote*, Bart., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Sir, Simla, 23 October 1867.

IN continuation of our letters No. 15, dated 23rd January last, on the projected occupation of Quetta, and our political relations on the North West Frontier, and No. 3, dated 3rd ultimo (Secret), on the policy to be pursued in reference to the present state of parties in Affghanistan, we beg to forward printed copies of a paper submitted by Lieutenant Colonel P. Lumsden, Deputy Quartermaster General, Bengal Army, and by Colonel H. Norman, C.B., at the request of the Viceroy.

2. We have taken the opportunity of reviewing generally our position towards Cabul, and ulteriorly Russia. Copies of the Minutes which we have recorded on the subject are transmitted with this Despatch.

3. You

3. You will observe that we are unanimously and strongly of opinion that the prosperity of the country would be placed in jeopardy by any advance beyond our present boundary.

4. The subject has attracted so much attention from the public press, and opinions of a different character are put forth with such confidence and persistency, that we submit to Her Majesty's Government whether it might not be advantageous to give publicity to the present and former papers bearing on this question.

5. The question of giving precedence to railway works, whether by way of the Indus, or between Lahore and Peshawur, will be reviewed in the Department Public Works, in reference to the opinions which have been expressed in these Minutes regarding it.

We have, &c.
(signed) *John Lawrence.*
W. Mansfield.
G. N. Taylor.
W. N. Massey.
H. M. Durand.
G. U. Yule.

Enclosure 1, in No. 4.

NOTE by Lieutenant Colonel *Lumsden*, Deputy Quartermaster General, Bengal Army.

CENTRAL ASIA.

JUST 80 years ago the first Muscovite project for an invasion of India was laid before Catharine of Russia; and although Nassau Siegin's conception has never been executed, it has borne extraordinary fruits in the shape of successive Russophobian panics.

At the commencement of this century, when 40,000 French troops invaded Egypt, our Eastern rulers first turned their attention to the strengthening of our hold on India by alliances, subsidies, &c., and Sir J. Malcolm appeared as our first envoy at Teheran.

A decade of years later, when Napoleon's prospective views embraced the project of subjugating Russia, and following in the steps of the Macedonian Alexander over Persia to India, Malcolm again appeared on the stage of Persian diplomacy, but found that within that time a vast change had occurred in the boundaries of the empire. Russia in one step had encroached 400 miles from the north of the Caucasus to the banks of the Araxes.

Following on this came the knowledge of the secret treaty at Tilsit between Napoleon and the Emperor Alexander, having for its object the invasion of India by 70,000 French and Russian troops, and immediately Elphinstone was despatched to Affghanistan to contract an alliance with that country to assist India in case of invasion from France or Russia. We had but shortly before entered into a like alliance with Persia to assist us in case of an Affghan invasion.

Malcolm, in Persia in 1810, was the first to initiate that lavish expenditure which had for its apparent object the extension of England's political and commercial influence in Asia, but in reality was intended to counteract the growing ascendancy of Russian counsels at the court of the Shah. In the 12 years preceding 1828 no less than 5,300,000 *l.* had been actually expended on this project.

This sum, 5,600,000 *l.*, is taken from Hough's Invasion of India and Army of the Indus, page 14; also *see* Kaye, vol. I, chap. 8.

In 1837, when some 3,000,000 *l.* more had been invested in the same speculation, India was suddenly startled by the announcement that a Persian army of 45,000 men, accompanied by a Russian Officer, besieged Herat.

Ditto. Hough gives total amount expended up to 1838 at eight or nine millions.

Alexander Burnes now appeared at Cabul, not alone, for almost simultaneously the Russian Vickovich challenged his diplomacy on the same stage. Panic, like an electric shock, ran through our Indian Empire. Upwards of 50,000 troops at once mustered in Scinde and the Punjab, 19,000 were thrown through the defiles of Affghanistan; Persia evacuated Herat, and after a calamitous disaster, but little retrieved by future success, Britain retired crestfallen from the Affghan field, where, in addition to hundreds of her bravest officers and men, India had sunk upwards of 17 millions of treasure.

See Hough's Army of the Indus, pages 5 and 6.

Another decade of years and the confines of our dominion had advanced 400 miles, and embraced the Punjab bordering on Affghanistan. In 1856 a Persian army once more besieged Herat. Attacked from the seaboard, the Shah of Persia again withdrew, and Herat stood nominally independent at a further cost of 3,000,000 *l.* to the Indian exchequer.

Vide House of Commons Papers, ordered to be printed. Estimate, Extraordinary Expenses of Persian War, 2,195,000 *l.*, irrespective of ordinary pay and *allowances* to troops, and charges on account of company's ships, &c., &c.

One thousand eight hundred and sixty-seven finds Russia across the Syr, in possession of Kokan, at war with Bokhara, and requiring from her positions for the location of cantonments on the line of the Oxus. At the same time a large Persian force is concentrating

trating at Mushud with its ultimate object still undeveloped, and a growing distrust of Russia is showing itself by appeals through that mighty organ, the press of England, to the Governments of England and India to repeat a policy tested by half a century's experience, and hitherto productive of no result beyond a financial burden on our Indian exchequer of some 30,000,000*l.*

See page 27 of Observations on Affghanistan, Vigne's Cashmere, vol. 1.

Authorities, both at home and in India, urge on the State vast projects with chimerical issues, such as Lord Auckland conceived when, in August 1838, he thus addressed the Secret Committee on the subject of the proposed invasion of Affghanistan:—

"The operations which we are about to undertake will doubtless be attended with much expense; but this consideration must, I feel assured, be held comparatively light when contrasted with the magnitude of the object to be gained, which is no less than to raise up a barrier from all encroachments from the westward."

Policy demands that we should not leave to haphazard the protection of our frontier. India is not England, guarded by her insular locality, and having no independent kingdoms immediately alongside to watch and manœuvre against, but, by the approach of Russia, has become a power in her position not dissimilar to Austria or Prussia.

It is therefore incumbent on us to study the examples of defence developed after all past experience by the great Continental powers, ever bearing in mind our peculiar position in India of conquerors alienated by creed and the advancement of our civilisation from the races subject to us.

This peculiarity renders it necessary that any system of operation in India should involve the double consideration of protection from invasion, as well as defence from interior discontent or disturbance. The difficulty of the problem to be solved is greatly increased by our Indian Government having to meet contingencies unsurpassed by any European Continental complications, with its mainstay on a numerically uncertain body of British troops liable to reduction on any emergency, considered at home to be of more vital importance to England than her Indian interests.

Again, from the impossibility of obtaining a sufficient number of British troops for all our requirements, and the ruinous expense which would ensue, could we procure them, the great numerical strength of our Indian army must ever depend on the native troops. Policy demands that, not only the number of our native troops should be limited, but also that too great a preponderance of the military element should not exist amongst the different populations. The Government of India is, by this consideration, deprived of the great expansive resources available on emergencies to all European Continental powers, viz., conscription; and, therefore, in deliberating on the protection of her frontier, we must limit ourselves to such military forces as the finances and policy of the State can ordinarily supply, and to the theatre in which such forces can be most effectually developed. I do not mean to say that if threatened with invasion, or if the result to be gained could be shown to materially strengthen our position, that the Government should not strain its utmost resources and entail every expenditure, however extraordinary, but that nothing could justify such a policy without some more definite guarantee of positive danger, or certain result, than the problematical issue of an advance from our Scinde Frontier to Herat, or to any other position in front of our present mountain boundary, which seems the course immediately advocated by some politicians.

At such a time our rulers may well profit by the experience of the past, and not forget the prophetic voice of military experience and wisdom as issued from the late Duke of Wellington, before urged by like incitements. Lord Auckland's Government plunged headlong into the last Affghan war. The present Prime Minister of England thus quoted it in his speech on the Income Tax, 11th April 1842:—

Extracted from Vigne's Cashmere. *See* Observations on Affghanistan, page xx, and foot note.

"Triumph you may; confident you may be, as I am, in the gallantry of your troops; but when through your gallantries the victory has been gained, and you have succeeded, then will come your embarrassments."

See this further corroborated in Notes to Kaye's Affghanistan, vol. 1, page 363.

Before the intricacies of the Central Asiatic question can be understood, it is necessary,—

1st. To investigate the probable objects of Russia's advance;

2nd. To understand the strategical geography of the regions separating us, and which must form the theatre of operations;

3rd. To lay down the positive object desired to be obtained.

We have no right to suppose that the onward progress of Russia in Asia has been instigated by any different policy than guided the British Government on the same continent.

Extension of her commerce was the primary inducement to England to establish factories in India, and the necessary protection of mercantile development has resulted in the gradual absorption of the whole country.

In like manner the ablest of our own and of Russia's agents have always attributed every advance of the Muscovite power to the desire of extension and protection to her commerce, and there is every reason to believe that, as from the dusky chambers of Leadenhall-street, order succeeded order not to extend our Indian dominions, so from the

bureaus

bureaus of St. Petersburg, edict has followed edict to prevent further addition to Russia's colossal domains.

But there is the fact that, although a Nesselrode in Europe ignored their actions, yet a Vickovich at Cabul, and Semonich at Herat, were Russian agents acting in political antagonism to the rival interests of England in Central Asia, and that while, on the one side, British India has advanced its frontier from the Ganges to Nepal, and the Sutlej to Affghanistan, so Russia has absorbed Georgia and Circassia, and pushed her frontier southwards to Yarkund and Bokhara.

In looking at this question from Russian points of view, we find that Mouravief, when sent to Khiva in 1819, thus sketched his ideas on the subject:—

"If we possessed Khiva, the people of the heart of Asia would believe in our power, and would establish a road for commerce by Scinde and the Amu Darya as far as Russia.

"Instead of an advanced post which shuts out our commerce, Khiva would become a safeguard which would defend it against the attacks of the tribes scattered over Central Asia.

"This island, in the midst of an ocean of sand, would become the emporium of Asiatic commerce.

"The establishment of a post at Khiva would have shaken to its centre the commercial superiority of these 'masters of the sea,' even in their own Indian possessions."

In extracts of Russian travels, and the views of Valikhanoff, Golubieff, Boutakoff, &c., translated to us by Michell, we learn that, "since the days of Peter the Great, Russia has diligently advanced, and at great sacrifice, through the steppes that barred her progress; she has now passed them and reached the basin of two great rivers, two important water-ways, whose sources flow through fertile and densely-populated countries; she is fully justified in seeking to be rewarded here for her labours and losses extending over a hundred years, and in endeavouring to secure her frontiers by pushing them forward to that snow-capped summit of the Himalayas, the natural conterminous boundary of England and Russia."

And again,—

"With regard to India, the navigation of the Amu Darya (Oxus) must not be considered as a route for the conquest of India; it is time to abandon such an illusion. But it will be advantageous for Russia to meet England on the Indian frontier, to establish a direct and necessary trade with her, and, in case such a trade be impossible, to endeavour at least to procure the transit of Indian goods to Europe by means of Russian iron and water-ways.

"With respect to a military expedition to India, the Amu Darya (Oxus) may be used for despatching a small force to its upper source, not with an idea of conquest, but for making a demonstration with the object of alarming the enemy and diverting his attention from other points. The close proximity of the Anglo-Indian Empire in these parts need not be feared, as it is no easy matter to penetrate to or from Russia from this quarter. From this standpoint, Russia can calmly look at the consolidation and development of British power in India; and these considerations lead me to hope that, should a line of telegraph from Europe to India ever pass through these countries, it will be entirely Russian."

Again, in the instructions given to Butenef, the Russian agent sent to Bokhara in 1839 to watch the effect in that quarter of the British occupation of Affghanistan, the gist of his directions was to convince the Khan of Bokhara of the good intentions of Russia, to abolish slavery in her dominions, and to protect trade to and from Bokhara territory.

From Michell's translations we further derive an insight to the Russian ideas of what, in 1852, was deemed necessary for the protection of trade in these regions:—

1st. To occupy the upper course of the Syr Darya (Jaxartes) by a military force, so as to ensure the free navigation of the whole river, by which means the struggle carried on between Kokan and Bokhara would be stopped.

2nd. To secure a firm footing on the Amu Darya (Oxus) in order to put a stop to the traffic in slaves, and subdue the Turkman tribes camping on the eastern shores of the Caspian.

3rd. To connect the Syr Darya and Kirghiz Siberian lines by a series of forts.

4th. To transfer the Orenbourgh and Siberian frontier lines to the above new military boundaries.

5th. To establish regular steam communication on the Syr Darya.

6th. To dispatch Consuls to those Central Asiatic countries with which Russia maintains commercial relations, and to endeavour to establish Russian factories in those places.

7th. To encourage agriculture among the Kirghiz. When we find the above policy corroborated in the travels of the Hungarian Hadjee Vambery, the latest of European authorities on Central Asia; and, further, when the motives of Russia herself

herself are revealed by the advancement and occupation of Kokan, coupled with the enlistments going on among the Khivan Turkmans, the concentration of a Persian army at Mushud, and the requirements from Bokhara of permission to locate cantonments at Samarkund and Charjooe, the surmises of Burnes, as written at Cabul just 20 years ago on 1st February 1838, seem almost prophetic, and very applicable to the apparent policy of Russia at the present time :—

A Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq., Secretary to Governor General, dated Cabul, 1st February 1838, paragraphs 9 and 10.

"There is much, however, to lead to the belief that Russia's views at Kokan include political as well as commercial ends. A single glance at the map exhibits the importance of Kokan among the States of Turkistan. It is, in fact, the key of the country, and history distinctly informs us that the different conquerors who subdued Central Asia emanated from this locality.

"But Kokan is not only the key of Turkistan, it is on the high road to the Chinese settlements of Cashgar, Yarkund, and Koten, with which it carries on a very considerable traffic, and where the Khan exercises much influence.

"The value of Herat as an emporium, further to the south and west, has been already described, as well as the designs of Russia to convert it to its own purposes. The site of Kokan, if examined, will appear not less useful, and account for the anxieties which have been likewise here displayed in establishing Russian supremacy. Herat has been stated to be the entrepôt of Persia, Turkistan, Cabul, and India.

"Kokan will be found to be an emporium of Tartary and China, of Russia and the northern frontiers of Hindoostan. Attached to Kokan, it will be thus seen, that there is a political influence subsidiary to commerce.

"Russia also seems to conciliate Persia, whose subjects are enslaved in thousands in Khiva, so that anything done against that petty State must be gratifying to the Court of Teheran, the ends of both being, in this instance, very identical."

From Corr., p. 194, as extracted from Vigne's Cashmere.

Sir J. McNeil records on this subject, "Russia becomes, by the possession of Herat, indisputable mistress of the destinies, political and commercial, of all Central Asia, Great Britain having been forced back to the Indus. Khiva and Bokhara must submit; if they are attacked, Persia and Affghanistan will already be entirely at her disposal."

Sir W. Napier's Life of Sir Charles Napier.

Finally, Sir C. Napier, after his Asiatic experience, states: "The north western nations of India have a shorter line for mercantile operations with Europe by the Oxus, which will beat the Indus, and leave us only the north-eastern trade. Persia and Russia, with their great inland waters, will carry off all the rest."

Vambery thus speaks of Russia's political relations with the Khanats of Kokan, Bokhara, and Oorgunj:

Vambery's Travels in Central Asia, page 437.

"The very obstacles which nature has interposed have rendered, indeed, the progress of Russia slow, but perhaps her progress is only on that account the more certain. The three Khanats are the only members now wanting to that immense Tartar kingdom that Ivan Vasilyewitch (1462-1505), imagined, and which he began actually to incorporate with his Russian dominions, and which, since the time of Peter the Great, has been the earnest though silent object of his successors.

Page 442.

"Without plunging into any deep considerations of policy, I may remark that it seems very probable that the Court of St. Petersburgh, in return for her persevering policy of sacrifices pursued across deserts for years and years, at great expense and labour, will seek some richer compensation than is to be found in the oasis of Turkistan. I should like, indeed, to see the politician who would venture to affirm that Russia, once in possession of Turkistan, would be able to withstand the temptation of advancing, either personally or by her representatives, into Affghanistan and Northern India, where political intrigues are said to find always a fruitful soil.

"At the time when the Russian columns under the orders of Peroffsky threw their ominous shadow from the west shore of the Aral Sea as far as Cabul, at the time when the spectre of Vickovich appeared in that city and in Kandahar, the possibility of such complications as those alluded to was foreseen, and cannot that which has once occurred, when the necessity arises, occur a second time?"

From the authorities and evidence adduced it may, I think, be allowed that the object of Russian advance is primarily to consolidate her Empire by the annexation of rich countries, compensating for the immense tracts of desert steppes, as also by the protection or annexation of Khiva and Bokhara, with the possession of Kokan, Yarkund, and Herat, to secure the great highway of inland Asiatic communication, and to unite her Asiatic and European possessions by the command of that route along which the Scythians of old and Hunns of later periods carried the terror of their name to the remotest regions; or, in other words, to make the watershed between the Indian Ocean and the Seas of Aral and Caspian the boundary between Russia and India, to develope its communications, and thereby secure the lines of commerce from Eastern to Western Asia and Europe. Such a frontier, contiguous to India, would also save her commerce from predatory attacks, the bane of all commercial speculation on the Central Asiatic steppes; and in case of European complication with England, on the eastern or any other question, afford her a convenient field from which to attack or threaten our Indian Empire, and thereby lock up a considerable amount of England's available military resources.

Now let us dwell on the second subject for consideration; namely, supposing the object of Russia to be defined, what is the nature of the country now separating us, and which,

under

under any system, must form the theatre of operations, political or military, offensive or defensive?

Ili-Yuldja, or the post of Vernoe north of the Lake of Issikool, and of the Mustagh Mountains, may be considered the left of the Russian line facing the British front, stretching from Kurrachee to Peshawur, with a continuation of the same thrown back to Rawul Pindee, Sealkote, &c. But Fort Vernoé being only a connecting link of a long chain of frontier posts, the later acquisition of Kokan may perhaps be now more appropriately considered as the true left of the Russian position confronting India.

Capt. A. Golubef's Sketch of the Result of the Issyk-kul Expedition, R.G.S. Journal, vol. 31st., 1861.

From Kokan direct to India, except by Bokhara, Balkh, and Cabul, the regions to be traversed are so lofty and offer such difficulties to the advance of an army that, had not Mirza Hyder with Sekunder Khan of Kashgur, in A.D. 1543, invaded and successfully taken possession of Cashmere from Ladakh by the Karakoorum and Leh route, the consideration of it might entirely have been omitted, and our right flank declared impregnable, notwithstanding Mons. Veniukoff's MS. of this mysterious German, George Ludwig Von ——, who took camels and soldiers from Cashmere to Kashgar in 25 days, and the still unfixed highway of commerce said to have existed between north-eastern Asia and Hindoostan, coming direct from Kulja by the Mustagh Pass to Aksu, and skirting the Khotan River by Bostang, Togarak to Khotan, and through Tak to Cashmere or India.

From Kokan to India caravans take three distinct routes,—

1st. *Viâ* Bokhara, Balkh, and Cabul, to Peshawur, a distance of 1,136 miles, on a road in most places traversable by wheeled carriage and camels, but crossing the Hindoo Koosh, which is difficult and closed by snow for seven or eight months of every year. This route, leading to the centre of our line, will be more fully treated of hereafter.

2nd. By Sumarkund, Buduckshan, Pamir, and Cabul to Peshawur, or from Pamir through Chitral Dhyr and Swatt to Peshawur, distances of 1,593 and 1,340 miles respectively. This route is only practicable for lightly laden ponies, and which even have in some of the most difficult passes to be unladen and their loads carried over by men. It crosses over the Pamir steppes at a general elevation of 17,000 feet above the sea, and its character is of so rugged and difficult a nature as to render its further consideration unnecessary.

3rd. By the Terek Pass (practicable for laden camels) through the Mustagh range to Yarkund, the capital of the province of the same name, a distance of about 450 miles, so far of this route is a portion of the direct road to China, of which Yarkund, until last year, formed an outlying province, and has direct communication with Pekin, which is distant a five months' march for regular caravans, and from 17 to 35 days by post and express communication. Yarkund contains a Mahomedan population, until lately held in subjection by a Chinese garrison of 25,000 men quartered in the different towns. Kashgar, Yarkund, and Khotan, all in Yarkund proper, are the most populous, prosperous, and fertile provinces in Turkish China. Each of these three provinces contain extensive tracts of both mountainous and plain level country. The mountainous portion is interspersed with rich valleys, flanked by snowy ranges. Some idea of the wealth of this tract may be formed from its imperial annual tribute alone to the Celestial Empire having consisted, in addition to one-tenth of the whole agricultural produce in kind, of 200,000 pieces of cloth, and an amount in cash equal to 160,032 rupees. The whole country is now in a state of anarchy, having thrown off the Chinese yoke, but not having yet any established government.

Vide Huc's Travels, and Davies' Trade and Resources of Countries on North West Boundary, British India.

From Yarkund to Ladakh there are two routes across the Karakoorum range,—the one known as Zymustanee, or cold weather road, by Kokiar and the Shayok River; and the other summer route, or Tabistanee, which is the shortest and best by Kilian and Susur, both cross over the Karakoorum range at an elevation of 18,600 feet. Provisions with fodder have to be carried on ponies for many marches, as frequently neither water, grass, or fuel are procurable. The distances are 575 and 458 miles, approximately, by these roads to Ladakh, and from thence to Cashmere through a comparatively sterile Alpine tract, a further journey of 243 miles by the Zyogi La, passable only for seven months—from May to November—for laden animals, and from thence to Goojerat, 147 miles, by the Bhimbur route, likewise traversing lofty mountains. Thus, from Kokan to India to threaten our right flank, Russia would have to march 1,300 miles.

From the above descriptions it may be allowed that east of Bamean and the adjacent passes over the Hindoo Coosh, there is no route which an army from the north could traverse for the invasion of India, and our field is therefore confined to the two great highways, namely, through the Hindoo Coosh by the Bamean route, or to Scinde, *viâ* Herat and Candahar, which include in their zones the different minor routes and passes converging on the same lines.

By the former, which has been successively used by different invading armies, the countries of Kokan, Khiva, and Bokhara form the granaries to supply the advancing force with its base resting on the Oxus, and its main depôt at Balkh. Cabul might be considered its first object, and from it an army might have for a final objective either to advance on India by the Khyber or Gooleree routes, or simply, owing to the very great

difficulty of maintaining an extended line of communication through such a difficult country and amongst such a plundering population to occupy this position, threatening such an advance as a demonstration to cover a real attack from the right, as also to protect the flank of an army advancing southwards from Herat or Kurrachee, and cover the communications of the same from the Ghuzni or Cabul direction.

Quartermaster General's Route Book.

The centrical position of Cabul, the capital of Affghanistan, is very convenient for such a disposition; it is 357 miles from Balkh by the Bamean route; 190 from Peshawur by the Khyber Pass; 319 from Candahar by Ghuzni; 491 from Khelat, in Beloochistan, by Ghuznee, Toba, and Quetta; 374 from Dera Ismail Khan by the Gooleree Pass; and 230 miles from Kohat by the Koorum route.

The road from the Caspian to India by Herat, Candahar, and the Bolan is undoubtedly the only one which affords facilities of supply and convenient position for the depôts of an advancing army. Conolly, Ferrier, and other authorities have reported on it in detail, and no one, I think, questions its practicability. This route has especially attracted attention from the fact of its being the one proposed by Napoleon (had he succeeded in his Russian expedition of 1812) for the invasion of India by a combined force of 70,000 French and Russian troops augmented by Toorkiman, Cossack, and other irregular subsidiary allies. The project is thus translated from Mr. de Warren's L'Inde Anglaise, Volume 6, page 129:—

"A land expedition to India ought to take place after the happy issue of the Russian campaign; 35,000 Russians will descend the Volga as far as Astrakhan; they will disembark at this city and occupy Asterabad, where they will await the French army."

"Thirty-five thousand French will descend the Danube in boats as far as its mouth, from thence they will be transported to Taganrog in ships furnished by Russia. They will then ascend the course of the Don by land as far as Paitisliouskaia, from whence they will proceed to Toorilsur on the Volga, and descend that river in boats to Astrakhan. There they will finally embark to join the Russians at Asterabad."

"Thus the French army will arrive unfatigued and fresh at Asterabad, and united with the Russians, advance to the Indus."

"From Asterabad to Herat, by the lovely and fertile valley of Heri Rood, the route offers no difficulty either for water or for provisioning troops; and as far as difficulties of the two routes of the Khyber and Deyra Ismail Khan for the passage, subsistence, and transport of the material of an army of 70,000 Russians and 15,000 irregular horse are concerned, one dare not certainly consider these unsurmountable."

Supposing this line to be the one adopted, Asterabad on the Caspian would doubtless be the base of primary operations, and arsenal for concentration of munitions of war and supply to be pushed forward 380 miles to Mushud and 200 more to Herat, the latter city being the first objective of the advance.

The previous possession of Khiva, and establishment of a Russian cantonment at Charjooe, would materially facilitate such a design by the subjugation of the Turkimans and securement of the nearest line of communication with Bokhara, Kokan, and the troops on the Syr by the Shirrukhs and Merve route. But Herat in possession, some period must elapse before any further movement southwards could safely be undertaken; for Turkistan and the Uzbeg States contain a most restless and marauding population, which would have either to be settled down, or else launched like their ancestors, the ancient Scythians, in hordes on India, a flight of locusts eating up all before them, and leaving a desert in rear. Against such a barbarous host India has nothing to fear; for, smitten by artillery and musketry on its first debouchment from the passes, this mass would recoil, crowd up in rear, surge to and fro, and then scatter and melt, becoming a prey to hunger, and the knife of the bloodthirsty "Affghan," who, from his mountain top, would hover over the host like the vulture thirsting for an approaching feast. That Uzbegistan is a difficult task Persia can testify, and so do the records of Ahmed Shah Douranee, who, on his death-bed, admonished his sons to leave that hive alone, as in it there was no honey, and from it issued nothing but swarms of the most venomous wasps; and such probably would Russia find when she began to meddle with the countries south of the Oxus. However, the task to her would only be one of time, for diplomacy and power would doubtless gradually attach and settle the Uzbeg States from Herat to Balkh and Koondooz. Along this frontier line there is already a well-frequented caravan route connecting Herat with Maimunna and Balkh, a distance of 370 miles, or a month's march for an army.

Affghanistan would, under such circumstances, be the only State dividing Russia from England; but the chess-board is still open before us, and Herat equally distant from India and Russia. Is it desirable then for Britain to make a push for Herat and cry "check"? After mature deliberation of this strategical question, the late Sir C. Napier pronounced that, "As to holding Affghanistan, it would be folly equalling that of the attempt to conquer it"; and such must be the opinion of any judgment founded on the study of the principles of war, or the political economy of States craft. Russia, in advancing at all events as far as Herat, increases her power, wealth, and influence, secures a safer frontier, completes the possession of great lines of water communication by which to convey the agricultural and mineral products of her existing provinces, and of the countries at the head of the Syr and Oxus to the Aral and Caspian, and from thence to the centres of her Empire. Very different is the case with India; every step beyond our present

Vide Sir Charles Napier to Sir W. Napier. Life of Sir Charles Napier, vol. 2, page 183.

present frontier only plunges her deeper into irremunerative regions, and involves additional burdens on her already heavily taxed exchequer; it forces her into military strategical difficulties of the gravest nature, entailing at once a permanent increase of at least 20,000 or 30,000 men to the regular army.

Major H. B. Lumsden's Kandahar Mission.

Again, Affghanistan, in its entirety, as held by the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, and which, including Balkh, has a population of about 2,450,000, is a very poor country, the resources of which, even in the Dost's time, under the ablest management, could never be made to meet the requirements. With an annual revenue of 350,000 *l.*, there was an invariable deficit of from 20,000 *l.* to 40,000 *l.* a year.

In October 1841, the support of Shah Shujah was costing one million and a quarter a year. *See* Kaye, vol. 1, page 619.

With the cost of the addition to the army, and considering the comparative cheapness of Native administration, the most sanguine of the advocates for annexation could not reduce the probable annual budget of the cost of such a measure to less than 1,000,000 *l.* sterling, or very nearly double the amount of the present annual average increase of Indian expenditure.

A very material point in this question is the character of the nation proposed to be embraced into the arms of perpetual friendship and amalgamation. However much mixture and contact with other races may have obliterated the Jewish characteristics of these Affghans, proudly denominating themselves the sons of Israel, they certainly retain in its full pristine development the proverbial Jewish love for "filthy lucre."

Kaye, vol. 1, page 624.

This peculiarity, if we may so term it, was the primary cause of the former reverse to our arms in Affghanistan. The envoy at Cabul, being pressed by the Government of India to retrench expenditure, had recourse to the reduction of subsidiary allowances granted to different chiefs and tribes, and the first touch of that application ignited a spark among the Ghilzies which spread to the whole country, and produced a flame which took all the might of our Indian Empire to extinguish.

Major H. B. Lumsden's Kandahar Mission Report, page 29.

The state of the Affghans in 1857 was thus described by Lumsden: "Quiet and industrious communities are ground to the dust, and their rich and once cultivated lands fast turning to wilderness, while more turbulent races hold their own by sheer force, mercantile classes are ruinously and arbitrarily taxed, and citizens, under the cloak of municipal legislation, are fleeced of their substance without gaining security in their homes. Add to this the fact of all classes being blindly priest-ridden by crafty, bigotted and supercilious ecclesiastics, and a true picture is drawn of the present condition of the Affghan fixed population." Such was Affghanistan in her prosperity under the ablest and best of her rulers; what must now be her state with opposite factions contending for supremacy, and hostile masses continually passing to and fro on every line of her communication. Doubtless, may exclaim the philanthropist, now is the time for England to act and extend her protecting care and nourishing hand to assist this unhappy country; but pause, thou good Samaritan, ere thou recommend a step never to be retraced, and one which, while immediately serving the few, may eventually rend to its core the empire of England's creation.

In the extension of our Indian rule it has invariably happened that the conquered generation have appreciated British Government far more fully than their descendants. The race immediately relieved from the tyrannical thraldom of Native rule appreciate by comparison the certainty and evenness of British legislation, and the impartiality of their newly acquired governors. It is different with their descendants; they have no comparisons with the past, and can only grieve over the shortcomings of the present. Besides, with all due deference to the laws of England, unfathomable in their intricacies even to initiated expounders, perhaps common sense may allow that, to the primitive Asiatic, the application by honest men of rude and impartial though prompt justice, such as applied by a Napier in Scinde, and Edwardes, Nicholson, and Abbott in the Punjab, is much more consonant than the interminable wheels of maturer enactments, which, in addition to learned and wily expounders, require to be greased with expensive fees before law can be delivered.

Hence, although the blessing of a strong government would certainly at first be fully appreciated in Affghanistan, a reaction would ensue, and not many years would elapse before the horrors of anarchy and the oppression of chiefs would be lost in oblivion, and the restless Affghan, recalling only the heroic deeds of Pathan ancestors, like the Highlanders of Scotland, would long for any alliance or power to enable them to shake off a foreign yoke. Should Russia have found it convenient at this critical epoch, common to all subdued races, to push forward her advances, we should indeed find it no easy matter to extricate our armies from a precarious position, with Russia and Persia on front and flank, and a rising Affghan population hovering on our flanks and rear.

The occupation of Herat, and the line connecting it with Hindoostan, would entail a very difficult and anxious military development; for, supposing Herat to be fortified and held in strength, the line of communication to the head of the Bolan, a distance of 430 miles, is exposed throughout its entire left flank. A force of observation being left before Herat, the enemy has open to his choice the different routes from Kirman, Nyband, Birjin, and Yezd, to Kandahar or Furrah, all of which have been at times traversed by invading armies.

Again, in considering this question defensively from our present position, it is evident that a force advancing from Herat without Cabul in possession has its line of communication threatened at Subzwar and Ghirisk direct from Cabul, through Hazara; at Kandahar from Ghuzni; and Quetta from Tobah and the Abistadah route; and that to

cover the two latter it would be necessary to detach a large force either to Kilat-i-Ghilzie or Mookur.

"Saturday Review" Article, Russia and India.

"It would be a step in the right direction to go half way and occupy Quetta," say the disciples of the Jacobean principle, who unhesitatingly propose to locate an outpost, 250 miles in advance of its nearest support, with the Bolan Pass and a desert, the heat of which after April is too great for troops to keep the field, between it and that support, through a country which, on our advance to Kandahar, never at any one place supplied one day's subsistence for even the Bengal column, and where, from scarcity, the force had all to be put upon half rations, and the less daring of its leaders actually suggested a retrograde movement.

Vide Havelock's War in Affghanistan, chap. 6 and 7.

What then is the positive object of our Indian Policy?

Is it to compete with Russia in annexing Asiatic steppes, or to enter the field as her antagonist, opposed to all further progress, and a rival for the supremacy of a vast Anglo-Asiatic empire stretching from the confines of Japan to the banks of the Bosphorus? If so, an Alexander or Napoleon must rise equal to the occasion, and advance with legions of the warlike races bordering on our confines to strike at the centres of Russian power, while, at the same time, the iron clads of England try their might in the Pacific, Black Sea, and Baltic, while Europe is summoned to support the rights of contending powers.

It cannot be denied that there is a definite object in such a scheme, and, moreover, that an advance on Herat, with its necessary accompanying policy towards Persia, might, and with justice, be construed by Russia into a threatened invasion of her empire, or to the development of some such project as above set forth.

Be it remembered that when we last stood temporary masters of Affghanistan, our Envoy there, and who himself was one of the great advocates for frustrating Russia's supposed designs, no sooner mastered the position than he thus immediately projected further advances:—

Vide Kaye's Affghanistan, vol. 1; also chap, 1, book 4 (1840-41).

"Herat may be said to be the pivot of all operations affecting the safety of our possessions and our interests in the East, and thence Balkh and Bokhara would be at all times accessible."

When the object of England is declared to be "the raising up of a barrier against all encroachments from the West" by the occupation of Affghanistan and immediate seizure of Herat, with the construction of a railway from India, 700 miles, to that position, certainly the scheme is so vague and the result so problematical, that, to the uninitiated, it appears to be nothing more than one of those wild mercantile speculations, the conception of which, according to that astute French observer, Monsieur V. Fontanier, can always be traced to the western shores of India. Truly the wildest of Bombay reclamation schemes, or most crushing of her mercantile panics, is a pigmy to the vast ramifications of a project, not of private companies, but of imperial kingdoms.

V. Fontanier, Narrative of Mission to India, vol. 1.

Life of Sir Charles Napier, vol. 2, page 160.

"It was a scheme of money-seeking merchants that caused the war, and we have caught a Tartar," wrote the late Sir C. Napier on the 23rd June 1842, when the news of our Cabul disasters had just reached Scinde, and verily the projectors of this scheme seem to desire nothing else but to repeat the experiment.

Again, another common object adduced is "the extension of our commercial and political influence in Central Asia," and this, at first sight, is a high sounding and great interest, especially affecting mercantile England. The extension of commerce was the ostensible object of Burnes' first mission, despatched from Bombay to Cabul; it was the seed sown in Affghan soil which produced nothing but disaster, and now again the cry is to re-sow the crop, regardless of the report of the last result as given by Burnes himself, who, before his death, when standing on the field, and looking at the harvest of his labours, emphatically declared "that man to be an enemy to his country who recommends a soldier to be stationed west of the Indus." The mythical nature of this Central Asian commercial influence, when compared with the vastness of the projects under review, cannot be better exemplified than by stating the average of the total exports and imports through all the north west passes which, by the latest returns, only amounted to the value of 502,869 *l.* and 527,503 *l.* respectively.

Kaye, vol. 1, pages 500 and 501.

Davies' Trade and Resources of Countries on North West Boundary, British India, page 1, 1862.

It is dangerous, therefore, to allow any delusive fallacy, founded on merely ephemeral opinions, to swerve for a moment the political course of Indian Government.

Granted that no successful policy can be maintained in a passive state, yet active defence may be pursued with equal vigour and greater strength on a principle directly opposed to aggression.

Jomini's Art of War, chap. iii., article 28, page 162.

Thus, why advance beyond the mountains forming our present strong frontier, and make the difficult accessory zones in advance the principal field of operations, thereby complicating our strategic difficulties and doubling the extent of our theatre of operations? This, according to Jomini, was the mistake of the French Directory when, with fatal results, they invaded Switzerland, regardless of the wise policy acknowledged by both France and Austria, which for three centuries had maintained the neutrality of that country.

To maintain the neutrality of Affghanistan, and to secure the natural strategic points of our line of defence, is the only safe policy now to be pursued.

From Copy of Treaty; Aitchison.

This policy requires of us the fulfilment, in its full integrity, of the treaty between the Government of India and the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, Walee of Cabul, and the heirs of the said Ameer as entered into on the 30th March 1855, by which we bound

ourselves

ourselves to respect those territories of Affghanistan, then in his Highness' possession, and never to interefere therein. Towards Persia it necessitates a thorough understanding, that so far as we are concerned, the Government will oppose in every way every attempt at eastward extension, and that persistence in such extension will entail on her, not only the loss of possessions at the mouth of the Euphrates and Tigris and on the Persian Gulf, but also, should Affghanistan solicit our aid, a direct assistance towards the maintenance of Affghan independence.

Towards Russia we have but to pursue a dignified path becoming a civilised nation, and not allow imaginary projects or panics to carry us into undertakings proved to be diametrically opposed to our own interests, and only justified by the dog-in-the-manger policy of rushing at them, because Russia may avail herself of them. It has already been shown that if Russia has advanced, so have we. No Russian army ever appeared on the banks of the Oxus until we had occupied Affghanistan and thrust our agents into Herat, Oorgunj, and Bokhara, when self-preservation required of her a counter movement towards Khiva, which resulted in disaster equal to our own. Russia, like India, requires peace and development, and to secure from her a compact, guaranteeing the independence of Affghanistan and Herat, should be an initiatory measure to further combination for the development of communications, and a general understanding on an Asiatic policy which may be mutually advantageous.

Speaking of policy, our great weakness has hitherto been want of a systematic object and of unity in action. Thus, the diplomatic reins of Persia are guided from England, Scinde speaks the mind of Bombay, and the Punjab that of the Indian Supreme Government. It may be alleged that, after all, the whole must be and is guided by the views of our Home Government; theoretically, this is the case; but practically, there is a mighty difference, and little jealousies, the natural result of divided authority, produce the very worst effect. Thus, what system could tend to create greater distrust than one which from which different channels conveys the views of Government to adjacent states in directly opposite terms, when a Brydges and a Malcolm can be at the same Court, one signing treaties of perpetual friendship, and the other demanding terms on the threat of war; or, to instance a more recent case, what could be more difficult for our officers in Affghanistan in 1857 than to explain delicate questions when the ruler of the state to which they were deputed produced very different versions of the same subject from the political agents variously situated.

As one political channel should convey the views of Government, so one military control should exist along our whole frontier from Peshawur to Kurrachee.

An aggressive policy being condemned as inapplicable to the prosperity of the empire, so in the most emphatic manner must be any defensive system which leaves to chance or time the necessary development of our position and communications. The completion of the Lahore and Peshawur, and Indus lines of railway, should be considered a matter of the most urgent and vital importance, as referring to the military defence of our frontier.

When we inspect that frontier, covered by the very difficult mountainous countries in its front, through which armies must file and bodies can only be deployed in the valleys of the Cabul and Urghundab rivers; and, moreover, when we reflect that armies in eastern Affghanistan during the winter cannot move to support each other, or be strengthened from any reserve north of the Hindoo Coosh, we may rest satisfied with our position; provided we command the strategical key of that country so as to prevent an enemy getting possession of it, and forcing us to detach bodies which might be required to add to our concentrated deployed strength to meet an army debouching from the great western pass into the plains of Scinde.

The key of Affghanistan is Cabul, which is also the great strategical point of the country, the centre of its power and of all its communications.

The present weakness of our frontier, politically and strategically, is that we are not in a position to bring our direct influence to bear, for weal or for woe, in support or otherwise of the *de facto* Government ruling at Cabul.

While protesting against any deviation from the existing terms of our friendship with Cabul, it is incumbent on us, should opportunity offer, to avail ourselves of that friendship to complete, not only our own defensive system, but the only real support without direct interference which we can give to the Cabul Government, and without which, in the present divided state of her ruling powers, it seems impossible that that Government can exist or maintain its independence.

This, it is maintained, can be secured with the greatest possible addition to our frontier development by the Government of India taking over from Cabul the Koorum and Khost valleys, and locating there a force of 4,000 or 5,000 men.

In suggesting such a project, it is allowed that nothing but a perfect demonstration of its primary importance to the existence of Affghanistan itself, and its inestimable strategical advantage to the defence of our North Western frontier, could justify the State in adopting it.

With regard to the first object, it has been already stated that the revenues of Affghanistan in its entirety, as ruled by the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, were found quite inadequate to meet the expenses of its government and maintenance. Consequently, that State being now rent in twain by the division of the rival factions of Mahomed Ufzul Khan and Shere Ali Khan, and Balkh, Koondooz, and Herat severed from the control of the *de facto* ruler, it follows that continued anarchy must reduce the

country either to an uninhabited desert, or to a dependency of Persia, or other power whose exchequer will support the cause of the contending faction most friendly to it.

Such a result, it is evident, must terminate adversely to our interests; for the installed power would naturally look to the friendly hand which supported it in its adversity, and view with suspicion all advances from a neighbour which came forward only to support and own it in the hour of its triumph.

To directly subsidise the State without any power to control the granted aid, has already proved useless, and would result in an increase to the family jaghirdaree allowance of the Barukzie, or other members of the ruling family, without adding to the permanent strength of the Government.

Sir H. B. Edwardes' Koorum Report, 7th February 1857.

Taking upon ourselves the charge of Khost and Koorum, we could afford to pay the revenues of the same to support Cabul, and also relieve that State of the present burden of keeping up the military force required for Koorum's retention. The actual annual amount payable would be about 1,500 *l.*, of which, according to our more moderate system of taxation, we would recover from revenue about 1,000 *l.*, leaving an actual loss of 500 *l.* per annum, with the cost of civil government and military occupation, to be met by the Indian Government.

The result of such an occupation would place us, supposing our cantonment to be located about the centre of the valley, and our border to be defined by the present limits of Bungush and Tooree lands, just nine marches from Cabul, the first four of which would be in our own territory, and last three along the fertile and cultivated lands of Logur. It would give us possession of the Peywar and Shootur Gurdun Passes, the ascent to which from the Koorum side is comparatively nothing, though the descent into Logur, in Affghanistan, is long and very steep.

From such a position we master Cabul, our presence in alliance with the existing Government gives an immense moral and physical strength to it. Without crossing any chain of mountains, we secure a position which would prevent any power from ever contemplating the advance of an army, the flanks and rear of which would be directly exposed by either the Khyber or Gooleree routes.

This is attained by an advance of only four marches along a valley from our present frontier. The country occupied is inhabited by the Bungush and Tooree tribes, the remainder of the former of which are entirely our own peaceful subjects, inhabiting Kohat and Hunjoo. The latter are a tribe of "Koochees" from Neelab on the Indus, of the "Sheeah" sect of Mahomedans. This fact is a perpetual source of discontent between them and their Soonee Douranee rulers.

Koorum is a valley about eight miles broad, laying along the southern base of the Sufeid Koh range which separates it from Cabul; it drains into a river of the same name, and has a general elevation of 4,500 feet above the sea. Edwardes thus graphically describes the country:—

"We were now in Upper Koorum, and the scene was a grand one. Beneath our camp, at the foot of the Durwazah Pass, ran the deep blue river rushing on as if it knew that it had 200 miles of cultivation yet to fertilize before it rested in the Indus. Before us lay the valley, about eight miles in breadth, shelving upwards to the base of the 'Sufeid Koh,' or white mountain, which here springs abruptly from the plain, and rises to a height of 15,000 feet. The distance was shut in by a spur running down from the mountain at right angles to the river, and we learnt that this was the Peywar Pass to Cabul, of which we had so often heard. The plain was dotted here and there with Chenar trees, which once must have been noble, but the Douranee soldiers in the fort had lopped most of them for fire-wood; still they were a new and picturesque feature to eyes accustomed to Indian foliage, and the bracing cold of the climate with the thermometer below freezing point at night, and seldom reaching summer heat at noon, gave us a sense of European enjoyment." Such then would be the position of our frontier station of Koorum, 119 miles from Cabul, 110 from Kohat, and 90 from Bunnoo.

Quartermaster General's Route Book.

The communication with Bunnoo and Kohat respectively would be along the Koorum River to the former, and by Meerwanzie and Hungoo to the latter, while a third line would converge through Terec to Luttummur. All these would diverge from each other at Thull, our present frontier village, and which would form a connecting post 48 miles in rear of Koorum.

In conclusion, admitting that this proposition entails a certain deviation from the existing policy which admits of no interference with the country of Affghanistan, its rulers or its people, yet, when the safety of that kingdom is imperilled and its neutrality threatened, it is urged that no other course is open to us, but to strenghten Affghan rule without involving ourselves in the direct occupation and administration of the country.

As in her prosperity we unjustly invaded Affghanistan, let us not shrink to strengthen her in adversity; to secure for her oppressed subjects the benefits of a stronger administration; and, in acting faithfully in all our dealings, show by example that our Christian precepts are something more than the selfish hankerings of mercantile adventurers.

In Bokhara the Affghan Government used to be upbraided for its Feringhee alliance; let us now, by strengthening that Government, give the Affghan nation cause to be thankful for it, and, by our dealings with the people, associate them more and more with ourselves by a bond of mutual alliance which may, in the hour of need, prove the greatest gain our Indian Government has yet acquired.

With Affghanistan independent and her capital secured and connected with our internal lines,

lines of communication, our right is safe, and an aggressive power could only attack our left.

Moreover, the extreme heat of the climate of Scinde, would prevent such an attack being made, except during the cold season. With our communications perfected, and our base on the sea, there is no reason why we should not be able to concentrate from 70,000 to 150,000 men on the line of the Indus, prepared to prevent the deployment of any columns from the passes in front; and bold indeed would that invader be, who, with hostile Affghanistan in his rear, dared to attack our Anglo-Indian Empire.

(signed) *P. S. Lumsden*, Lieutenant Colonel,
Simla, 15 September 1867. Deputy Quartermaster General.

Enclosure 2, in No. 4.

MINUTE by His Excellency the Governor General; dated Simla, 3rd October 1867.

THE annexed Memorandum on Central Asia has been drawn up at my request by Lieutenant Colonel Peter Lumsden, the Deputy Quartermaster General of the Bengal Army. Lieutenant Colonel Lumsden has paid great attention to the subject on which he has written. He is well acquainted with the geography and history of the countries which form the most important portion of Central Asia, and is aware of the gradual progress of Russia in them. He has served for some years at Peshawur; he has borne a part in several of the expeditions which, from time to time, have been carried out against the adjacent hill tribes; and he has travelled over a considerable part of the border. He was one of the members of the mission which, under the instructions of Lord Dalhousie, I sent to Candahar early in 1857, after the completion of the treaty with Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, of Cabul. He is well acquainted with Pushtoo, the language of the Affghans; and from all these advantages, as well as from frequent conversation with his brother, Brigadier General Henry Lumsden (who also possesses extensive knowledge on these subjects, and great experience of the border), is well qualified to form a sound opinion on the question.

2. Nothing which I have read or heard has ever shaken my opinion that the policy which the British Government adopted in 1838–39 in invading Affghanistan, was very unwise and uncalled for. The pretext of the siege of Herat no longer remained in force; for the Persian army had retired, baffled and discomfited from before its walls. Northern India was never more quiet, nor the Mahomedan population more contented than at that time. I was present at Delhi when a portion of our army, destined for Cabul, marched through the city. I can well recall the pleasure which many of the officers expressed at forming a part of the expedition, the general enthusiasm with which the movement on Affghanistan was hailed by the English in India. I talked with some of the native officers and men, mostly Mahomedans, who were recruited from the district in which I was the magistrate, for one of the newly raised corps of cavalry, which composed part of the expedition; and was consulted by some of their relations as to the character and probable permanence of the service which was then available. But I never heard a word uttered of doubt as to our success, or of anxiety as to the movements of Russia.

3. On the other hand, it has always appeared to me that, however confident our officers in those days were of the sound policy which led to the expedition, the large majority of those who survived that expedition, or who have studied that question, since the war in Affghanistan, since we have obtained a more complete knowledge of its circumstances and resources, of its chiefs and its people, have deprecated very strongly an advance into that country, or any very intimate interference in its affairs. It has been generally said that a large army of foreigners cannot exist in Affghanistan; and that a small one could not hold its own securely. That country could not supply the food for such an army as we should require there, and therefore its supplies must come from a distance. The country can, indeed, scarcely feed its own population, however hardy and abstemious it is known to be. One, perhaps the main, cause of the constant internecine wars which prevail among the chiefs, arises from the circumstance that they cannot subsist themselves in a suitable manner, even though they monopolise so much of the means of subsistence from the population. It is a constant struggle with them to unseat one or other as the heads of tribes and clans, or the rulers of sections of the country. For this, very terrible crimes are often perpetrated even among near kinsmen. The normal condition of the army is in a state of semi-starvation: they are habitually cheated out of a large portion of their scanty pay; and the agriculturists and mass of the people obtain the bare means of existence. A rise of the price of food, to all but the proprietors of the land, becomes a very serious misfortune; and this was one of the various causes which rendered our occupation of the country so unpopular. Ameer Dost Mahomed, when at Peshawur at the end of 1856, speaking of his resources, remarked, "We have men and we have rocks in plenty; but we have nothing else."

4. To endeavour to hold such a country firmly, to try to control such a people, is to court misfortune and calamity. The Affghan will bear poverty, insecurity of life; but he

will not tolerate foreign rule. The moment he has a chance, he will rebel. His nature, his religion, the habits of his life, all tend to foster feelings of independence and hardihood.

5. Whether we advanced into Affghanistan as friends or as foes, would, in the end, make little difference; the final result would be the same. The Affghans do not want us; they dread our appearance in their country. The circumstances connected with the last Affghan war, have created in their hearts a deadly hatred to us as a people; and their feelings are fostered and strengthened by their priests and chiefs.

6. In 1856, during the Persian War when, by the instructions of the Government of India, I was negotiating with Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, and making the arrangements by which the British Government gave his Highness a large monthly subsidy, and a considerable number of arms and accoutrements, one of the points for which I was directed to stipulate was, that we should be allowed to have a mission composed of British officers at Cabul. Hungering, as I may say the Ameer was for our subsidy, he started back at the very mention of such an arrangement. He asked for time to consider the matter, and to consult his chief adherents. On the second day he sent me a message by one of his sons, that it was impossible to concede to this proposal; and when I subsequently saw him, he said that he dared not consent to it. According to my instructions, I pressed the matter, intimating that a refusal would probably lead to my breaking off negotiations and withholding the subsidy. After much hesitation and evident dislike to the arrangement, the Ameer at last consented to the deputation of a mission to Candahar, on the condition that our officers did not take the Cabul route. The Ameer either really feared, or affected to fear, for their lives if they were seen in Cabul. He frequently remarked, "If we are to be friends do not force British officers on me. I have no objection to the presence of a Native Agent at Cabul.

7. Our mission was some months at Candahar, during which time, and for some time afterwards, the Ameer was drawing his subsidy of 10,000 *l.* per mensem. Our officers were all this time in a most precarious position; scarcely for a day were their lives safe, as the news of the progress of the mutiny reached Candahar. Under plea of taking care of them, from their first arrival they were surrounded by spies, and could not move a stone's throw from their residence without an escort, who watched and denounced any man who might speak to them. At last matters got so bad that they were glad to leave Candahar.

8. Brigadier General H. Lumsden, who was at the head of this mission, more than once assured me, after his return, that he had better means of gaining information on Affghan and Central Asian affairs at Peshawur, than when at Candahar; for, at the former city, merchants of all these countries abound, and all will speak freely with an officer who lays himself out for information, whereas at Candahar no one would come near him who had any regard for his life.

9. An opinion frequently advocated by the press in India is that if British officers were deputed simply as commercial agents, and not as our political representatives, they would be readily received at the different courts of Cabul, Merve, Bokhara, Yarkund, &c. But this is wholly a delusion. There would be no security for their good treatment; no guarantee that they might not be insulted, probably murdered at any time. Unsupported by material power, and that so close at hand as to be apparent to all observers, such officers could never be safe. They never would be in so secure a position as to be able to take an impartial and dispassionate view of affairs. They would possess little means of feeling public opinion; no opportunity of hearing the real state of affairs. They would be pressed from time to time to obtain aid of one kind or the other from the British Government; and insulted and even maltreated if they refused or failed to procure it. The wealth and resources of the British Government are considered to be inexhaustible in these barbarous countries; and, in the opinion of their leading men, surely some portion of it might well be placed at the disposal of such trusty allies!

10. I would point to the fate of Colonel Stoddart and Captain Connolly, in Bokhara, as illustrative of the soundness of my views. I might also instance the present condition of our countrymen in Abyssinia, and the expedition that England is now undertaking into that remote country to rescue them, as evidence of the mischief which results from sending officers to barbarous chiefs in territories which are quite beyond our influence. If, under such circumstances, we do not stretch out our hands to assist our representatives, if we do not exert the power of Her Majesty to rescue them, if, in fact, we leave them to their fate, we are lowered in our own estimation and that of others; our prestige is overshadowed, and England's power is called in question. On the other hand, if we determine on decisive action, how many lives and how much treasure must be lavished in the attempt to save them, and how possible it is that the attempt after all may fail.

11. I can well recall to mind the stories I have heard from the late Major D'Arcy Todd and Sir John Login of their treatment by the people of Herat. So long as they had large sums of money to scatter among them, to expend on the fortifications of the city, on anything and everything, and they certainly showed no stint in this way, the

Heratees

Heratees were their humble servants, ready to obey their bidding, to kiss the very dust off their feet. But from the day these supplies ceased, the tone of the people changed. It was then, "What brings you among us? Can't you stay in your own country? What mischief are you hatching now?" And so on. Like the Lumsdens in later days at Candahar, they were only too glad to leave Herat, where their advent had been received with so much honour.

12. In the winter of 1853, if I recollect right, a deputation was received from the Chief of Kokan, headed by one of the Suddozai Chiefs of Cabul, sending some presents for the Governor General, and asking for supplies of arms, guns, and ammunition, and, above all, for English officers to train and discipline his soldiers, and enable them to contend successfully with the Russians. I was at Peshawur when the mission arrived, and had long conversations with the Suddozai Chief, a man of some ability and shrewdness, who had a general idea of our power and resources in India. The conclusion I came to was, that the Khan of Kokan had no army, and no adequate means of forming one; that his troops consisted of the mere militia of the country, badly armed and equipped, with no organization, under little control, and quite unable to meet the Russians in the field. In short, that it was only owing to the physical difficulties of the country, and the long distance of the Russians from their own base of operations, that Kokan had, to a certain extent, maintained its independence. I at once saw that it would, in all probability, be a fatal error sending British officers to such a country, where it was quite impossible that they could be of the slightest service. Lord Dalhousie, however, took a different view of the matter, and instructed me to select a certain number of British officers, with a due proportion of native officers, to proceed to Kokan with the mission. I remonstrated very strongly, pointing out all the objections to the plan, and expressing my conviction that it would certainly lead to the sacrifice of English lives. On this his Lordship was good enough to accept my views, but desired that the native officers should be at liberty to take service with the Khan. On sending for them, however, and asking them what they really wished, not one would consent to go to Kokan. Their idea was, that where British officers were to be sent, it was safe for them to go also; but that if the former were to be kept back, no good would come from native officers accepting such service.

13. Since then the Chiefs of Yarkund and Khotan have made similar overtures, and with like success. Indeed it is only a few months ago that the latter chief, expatiating on the resources at his command, pressed for assistance. And now we have just heard that he and one of his sons, with many of his chief officers, have been murdered by the Khan of Yarkund, and the country taken possession of. Should not such evidence of the utter insecurity of those countries in Central Asia convince the most sceptical of the folly of trusting our officers on such missions. Our officers, however, are burning with impatience, and pining from inaction; and any enterprise which opens a door to distinction and preferment, is acceptable to many of them. Our merchants also are naturally eager to find new marts for their goods, and look with prejudiced eyes on the counsels of prudence and caution, however founded on experience and foresight.

14. The tendency in India also among the English community is to attribute such policy as I have described to parsimony, to a narrow and even mean love of economy. But such opinions are really opposed to the facts of the case. The paramount consideration, in my mind, has always been, and still is, a regard for the true interests of the State. I am convinced that we can gain nothing, but are pretty sure to lose a great deal of prestige, in honour, in the valuable lives of our officers and soldiers, by interfering actively in the affairs of Central Asia; and that so far from strengthening our tenure of India, we may thus shake it to its very foundations. Nor am I insensible, I admit, to the financial aspect of the question. I know well what are the wants of India; how infinite are the material requirements of this country; how limited is the accumulation of capital; how obnoxious is every description of new taxation to all classes of the people. I am, therefore, most desirous not to throw away the public money on expeditions and wars, which may be honourably avoided, and in this view I decline to be led away to engage in a course of policy which too surely ends in such results.

15. Lieutenant Colonel Lumsden has brought together in his Memorandum much valuable information, and a considerable weight of authority connected with our expedition to Candahar and Cabul. He shows the difficulties of the way from Shikarpore, in Scinde, to the gates of Candahar. The heat of the climate, the scarcity of food, and the consequent privations of the army on the march; the character of the adjacent population; the condition of the troops when they arrived at Candahar, and their capacity at that time, if opposed, to have met a really resolute enemy. I recollect the account of an officer who was present with that army. He told me that the cavalry brigade of the Bengal column, which left Meerut with 1,500 sabres, all well equipped horsemen, mounted on the best class of horses which India could yield, could not have mustered 500 mounted men on the approach to Candahar, and could not have got out of their horses a canter of half a mile to have saved their own lives. The army took three months at that city to recruit their strength, and supply their losses of animals of one kind or the other.

16. It may be urged that the occupation of Scinde, and the improvements and extended cultivation since then in that Province, have changed all these things. No doubt some change has taken place; but much of this must depend on the maintenance of peace and

 security;

security; and how little would the resources of the country yield for the support of a large army, its numerous camp followers, and tens of thousands of animals. The climate of the country cannot have altered, nor the character of the population, in any essential degree.

17. Hough, in his account of the Cabul expedition of 1838-39, tells us that in the first year of the campaign the army lost upwards of 30,000 camels. For years afterwards the scarcity of these animals throughout Upper India and Rajpootana, was well known. The war from first to last cost some 13 millions of money; the lives of hundreds of English officers and soldiers; the lives of thousands of native soldiers and camp followers. It destroyed the belief in our invincibility, and rendered our military service among the natives of India much less popular than it had ever been before. But, above all, it created among the Affghans a hatred to our race, which a generation will fail to obliterate.

18. We went to Affghanistan under the assurance that a little aid from us would reinstate a fallen and exiled dynasty, which had still a strong hold on the hearts of the people. But we found, to our cost, that its representative had no real influence in the country, and no capacity for reconciling its jarring interests and rival factions; in a word, no power to maintain himself unsupported by ourselves. Hence we were compelled to continue in that country, until the incurable defects of our position, and the incompetency of our commanders, ended in the ruin of that policy and the destruction of the larger portion of the army of occupancy.

19. Are we then in essentials to repeat that series of errors? Those who advocate an advance into Affghanistan, or, which is really the same thing, are in favour of measures intended to lead to that result, say that we have learnt a lesson from the errors of those days, and would for the future avoid their repetition. But whatever may have been the minor mistakes of that time, the fundamental one consisted in occupying Affghanistan at all. There was no escaping the evils which flowed from that policy.

20. But independent of this circumstance, which, however, should not be forgotten, I myself believe that we cannot advance a force permanently beyond our present frontier, in the direction of Candahar and Cabul, without the Affghans believing that it is intended to be the forerunner of the occupation of their country. Indeed this is the very object which those who encourage such a movement openly avow. Thus the formation of a cantonment at Quetta, a lease of the vallies of Khost and Koorum, are in view to a forward movement. The idea is that in the event of an advance by Russia, we should move on ourselves, and hold Herat and Cabul as important strategical positions. I admit at once that such is a correct description of these places. But I question whether, in the event of such a movement by Russia, it would be our true interest to take the steps indicated. Possibly the day may come when the Affghans may ask us to do so. At any rate, now, they have no apprehension of danger which would induce them to call on us for aid. A response to such a call, if ever made, may well be left to the statesmen and soldiers of the day, when a decision on such a question may be necessary. But, judging from past events and present feelings, I should be decidedly opposed to such a policy.

21. In a political or military point of view, I do not think that we could occupy Herat and Cabul, with any real degree of security, without constructing fortifications for the preservation of our own people, and to overawe the population of those cities. We should also have to hold Candahar and Jellalabad in like manner. Wherever we placed our troops, indeed, as links in the chain of communication, or for the purpose of commanding the country, we should have to construct fortifications of some kind or other.

22. Neither Herat nor Cabul, unless held in great strength, are positions which cannot be turned, or which may not be blockaded by an invading army. To garrison them efficiently, and yet to have a force free to operate in the field and threaten the flanks of the invaders, with the possibility, nay the strong probability, of the people of the country turning against us in the event of a disaster, would require a considerable army; how large, military officers of experience and ability can alone tell. But taking a general view of the circumstances in which the troops would be placed, I do not think that less than 30,000 men, half of whom ought at least to be British soldiers, would be an unreasonable estimate. Let us only then consider what would be the cost of such an army, with its followers and carriage, much of which would have to be kept up ready for field service. If the first invasion of Affghanistan was a strain on the finances of India, what would be the pressure of the second movement into that country.

23. The difficulties and complications which would follow from an advance beyond the passes of the mountains, forming at present the western frontier of British India, are such as no man can foresee, though any one may make a shrewd guess at them. Every particle of ammunition, all the bulk of the supplies for the troops, would have to be sent from India, and at its cost. All, or nearly all, the troops so employed would be in addition to those now garrisoning India. It has been over and over again affirmed, after careful consideration by officers who know the country, that the force in India is barely sufficient for its security. There is little difference of opinion on this point. The troops then to hold Affghanistan must be in excess of this number, and form an additional drain on England.

24. The

24. The composition of such a body of native troops for service in Affghanistan, as would give reasonable grounds for trusting to their fidelity in the event of great difficulties, would be a serious matter. Affghans in any numbers would be out of the question. Ghorkas, beyond the five regiments now on the Bengal establishment, could not be maintained; even those we now have are kept up with some difficulty. Hindostanees and Sikhs would not like such service.

25. I do not pretend to know what is the policy of Russia in Central Asia; what may be her views hereafter in India. But it seems to me that common sense suggests that her primary interest is to consolidate her hold on those vast regions now in her possession, in which there must be "room and scope enough" for the exercise of all her energies and all her resources. Russia has indeed a task before her in which she may fail, and which must occupy her for generations. To attempt to advance until her power is firmly established, is to imperil all she has hitherto accomplished.

26. If we proceed to meet Russia in order to prevent her approach to India, we give her so much vantage ground; for we lessen the distance she has to march her armies, while we increase the interval between our own troops and their true base of operations. Instead then of advancing as the allies and supporters of the Affghans, if we should ever deem it necessary to do so, we should be the party against whom they would seek deliverance. The shoe pinches the wearer only. The side which held Affghanistan is the one against whom that people would probably join.

27. May not also the advance of England into, or even towards, Affghanistan, be looked on as a challenge to Russia? May it not bring on the collision we desire to avoid?

28. I am not myself at all certain that Russia might not prove a safer ally; a better neighbour than the Mahomedan races of Central Asia and Cabul. She would introduce civilisation; she would abate the fanaticism and ferocity of Mahomedanism, which still exercises so powerful an influence on India.

29. But, supposing that Russia has the desire, and possesses the means of making a formidable attack on India—assuming that she can at once place her affairs in Central Asia on so secure a basis, as to justify her rulers in contending with us for supremacy in India—all of which appears to me to be very problematical, is it our true policy to go forward to meet her armies? I should say not. In that case let them undergo the long and tiresome marches which lie between the Oxus and the Indus, let them wend their way through difficult and poor countries, among a fanatic and courageous population, where, in many places, every mile can be converted into a defensible position; then they will come to the conflict, on which the fate of India will depend, toilworn, with an exhausted infantry, a broken down cavalry, and a defective artillery. Our troops would have the option of meeting them either in the defiles of the mountains, or as they debouched from the passes, or at the passage of the Indus; wherever, in short, the genius of our commanders might dictate.

30. If, on the other hand, the invaders do not move by rapid marches, they must occupy the intervening countries on their route; they must forbear drawing any revenue from the people; they must feed their armies and camp followers from their rear; or they must turn the inhabitants against them; and under the most favourable circumstances they must endure much privation from want of adequate supplies.

31. It has been said that to allow Russia to occupy the countries adjacent to our western border, is to give her the opportunity, of which she will assuredly avail herself, of stirring up strife and hatred against us among all the mountain tribes. But will this be her true interest? And if so, will she be able to do us more harm than we can inflict on her in such a struggle? The further she extends her power the greater area she must occupy; the more vulnerable points she must expose; the greater the danger she must incur of insurrection; and the larger must be her expenditure. The major part of the mountain country between our border and Afghanistan consists of narrow valleys and rugged hills, inhabited by races who, though Mahomedan, are as ill-disposed to subject themselves to one master as to another. They have no desire to be ruled by the chiefs of Cabul. There is, perhaps, not one of these tribes who would not earnestly seek our aid against any invader if their leading men found themselves likely to be overmatched. Which party would be best able under such circumstances to win them to its side, we or the Russians?

32. Further it has been urged that the extension of Russian power to our frontier would lead to insurrection in the interior of India. I do not think that this would happen to any serious extent; perhaps it would not occur at all. Much would, of course, depend on the Government of the day, and the contentment of the people. But, at the worst, our troops massed along the border, ready to meet the invaders, would have a greater influence on the discontented people of India than the same troops locked up beyond the mountains in Affghanistan.

33. Or, if formidable insurrection should arise in India, with which the British and Native troops in the country could not cope, what would be the proper action of the rulers in India? Would it not be to recall the army beyond the passes? If, on the other hand, misfortune befell the distant force, we would have only the choice to reinforce it from India, which might be most inconvenient, or to recall it to India; and

what would, in all likelihood, be the fate of that army, encumbered with women and children and numerous camp followers, retreating before a Russian army, and attacked on all sides by the people of the country, for the sake of plunder, if for no other motive?

34. Taking every view then of this great question,—the progress of Russia in Central Asia, the effect it will in course of time have on India, the arrangements which we should make to meet it, I am firmly of opinion that our proper course is not to advance our troops beyond our present border, not to send English officers into the different States of Central Asia; but to put our own house in order by giving the people of India the best government in our power, by conciliating, as far as practicable, all classes, and by consolidating our resources. I am greatly in favour of opening up lines of communication of every kind which, on full consideration, are likely to prove useful, so far as the means will permit; but I strongly deprecate additional taxation to any important extent; and I am equally averse to increasing the burden of our debt on unproductive works.

35. It is said that there is great force in repetition; and no doubt this is the case. People hope by constant reiteration of the evils of non-interference in Central Asia, that the British Government may be stirred up to action. My own belief is that there is even more power in being still and watching events, particularly under such circumstances as those of the present day. We have very good information of what goes on in Central Asia through our own channels of information. I do not recollect anything of importance which has occurred there of which we have not heard in very reasonable time; and we have all which we do hear in due course confirmed, sometimes through Persia, at other times, from Europe itself.

Simla,
3rd October 1867. } (signed) *John Lawrence.*

Enclosure 3, in No. 4.

MEMORANDUM on the Subject of our Policy with respect to *Central Asia.*

THOUGHTFUL minds of our countrymen in India are much disturbed at present by the constant endeavours made through the press, and in other ways, to bring public opinion to bear on those in authority in view to our again entangling ourselves in Affghanistan, under the idea that by doing so we shall best meet Russian encroachments in the direction of India. Those who write on this subject might probably be counted on the fingers, but they are plausible and persevering. Great personal objects are to be gained by our thrusting forward an army into Affghanistan, and the real cause of the agitation going on is what may be styled Brevet-mania or K.C.B.-mania, rather than Russophobia.

The public, however, naturally not well acquainted with the subject, seeing all these arguments about danger to India if we remain inactive within our frontier reiterated time after time, may come to believe in their truth, and a pressure be brought to bear on the executive Government which may in time be irresistible.

I do not admit the likelihood of Russia ever invading India, and I think she will have plenty to do to consolidate her present Central Asian possessions for generations to come. Moreover, Russia and England are great European powers, and any really menacing advance by the former towards India would call forth strong remonstrance, and possibly a good deal more, in Europe; but taking the view of those who are so constantly parading their opinions that Russia has serious intentions of assailing India, and that an invasion of India either before or after a regular occupation of Affghanistan by Russia, is a matter of no very difficult accomplishment, what should we do?

The "Saturday Review" says, occupy Herat, and this, of course, involves the occupation of certain other points in Affghanistan.

Now would this be an improvement on our present policy, admitting, which I do not, that Russia is likely to assail us? I consider that if Russia has strong aggressive tendencies towards our Indian Empire, the policy propounded by these writers is that which would most surely add to all our difficulties and play into the hands of Russia.

I will discuss the matter in its bearings with respect to finance, politics, and military considerations, each of which has an importance of its own; but the one greater than the other in the reverse of the order in which I have written them.

As to finance, it is well known that our Indian revenue is barely kept equal to our growing expenditure. In every department the outlay is increasing. Improved administration means a greater cost for education, for courts of justice, for roads, railroads, canals, &c., and in all these much is now being done.

In the army, better barracks, improved sanitary arrangements, and many measures to ameliorate the condition of the soldier, are yearly adding to the cost; even though, year by year, the actual fighting strength of that army is diminished.

In fact, every year expenditure increases, and the problem of how to increase the revenue has not as yet been very satisfactorily solved by any of the various financiers who have followed each other from England to this country. Indeed, it is most undesirable to increase taxation in a country held as we hold India, and nothing but the most dire necessity should lead us to plunge into a course from which its advocates well know we could

could never withdraw ourselves without disaster, and which would add a permanent heavy charge on our finances.

At a moderate estimate, what would the measure advocated by the "Saturday Review" cost us?

I take it that if we occupied Herat we should have to add at least 30,000 men to our army at once, and I should think even then we were weak beyond the border.

Once there, we would doubtless find it necessary to occupy places not thought of at first, and 50,000 men would come before long to be thought a small and weak force, as, indeed, it would be, holding such a country in face of the power of Russia.

But assuming that we limited our first force to 30,000 men, what cost would be entailed upon us?

An army for such a service would have certainly more than a third of its numbers British, and I will assume that it was composed as follows, allowing each corps to be about 15 per cent. under its complement, a moderate calculation, considering the time it would take for recruits to reach, &c.

British.		Native.	
5 Batteries Horse Artillery - -	650	3 Mountain Batteries - - -	300
8 Field Batteries - - - -	1,040	6 Companies Sappers and Miners -	600
4 Garrison Batteries - - -	260	9 Regiments Cavalry - - -	3,600
3 Regiments Dragoons - - -	1,200	21 Regiments Native Infantry - -	13,240
12 Regiments Infantry - - -	9,000		17,740
	12,150		

Total 29,890 men, and 70 guns.

The cost of this force, exclusive of staff, would be *in Bengal* about 2,062,657 *l.* per annum. To this we may fairly add 50 per cent. as the additional cost of such a force in Affghanistan, for not only would the cost of all stores, &c., be much higher than in India, but the expense of moving recruits and invalids over such a long distance would be great, and the pay of the 17,740 native soldiers would have to be largely augmented.

At least 500,000 *l.* would, I should assume, be absorbed in civil charges, subsidies, &c.; and thus we should have a permanent charge on the Indian revenue of 3,500,000 *l.* per annum, or rather *commencing* I should say at that sum, for no one can doubt that we should find ourselves drawn on by circumstances to extend our sphere, until the whole collapsed with some disaster, which might extend to the heart of our Indian Empire.

A first outlay of, probably, two millions would be needed for barracks, cantonments, arsenals, forts, &c.

To obtain revenue in the country that would pay us the cost of collection, or would compensate for the irritation we should cause, is, I think, out of the question, and where would our Indian financiers obtain their 3,500,000 *l.* annually?

* No one has as yet devised any scheme by which our revenue could be increased by this sum, and if it was possible to raise it, would not the measure be certain to produce the greatest possible irritation, at what the people of India would conceive to be a grievous injustice, especially considering the object with which the tax was levied, viz., to thrust ourselves forward into Central Asia, on a plea of its being necessary to meet Russian designs against ourselves.

Nothing but the direst necessity could ever justify our incurring any large charge on India for the purpose of maintaining troops permanently beyond our Indian frontier, and I think we may confidently say that there is not the shadow of such a necessity.

Looking at the proposals from a political point of view, there seems the strongest grounds for condemning them.

It is well that the people of India should see that we are contented with our present frontier. Aggressions have ceased on our part for several years; and though, to our minds, our former successive annexations of territory might seem forced on us, this was not the impression on the minds of Native Chiefs or the intelligent native people, who often deemed us grasping and ready to snatch at the slightest excuse for seizing the territory of others. This led to a suspicious feeling, which it is hoped is now passing away. Let us not revive this feeling, either within or beyond India, by stepping over the border on the flimsy pretext of meeting Russia more advantageously there than we can within our admirable line of frontier.

As respects the tribes among whom we would thrust ourselves, the measure would be sure to provoke jealousy and hostility, even if made with the avowed approval of their rulers, which might not, however, be accorded. We may depend on it they like us far better out of their country than in it. Once occupying it with our forces, constant sources of irritation would arise with those wild, touchy, vindictive people. Our lines of communication would be sure to furnish a frequent source of quarrel with the robber tribes lying along them. Quarrels would arise between our troops and the natives on innumerable matters, and those who know the Affghans will well understand that blood would often be shed.

In fact, if the Russians came on after we had been four or five years in occupation of our false forward position, they would have the satisfaction of finding us in military occu-

pation of certain posts in the midst of a people hating us, and who would be ready to make common cause against us.

If we remain within our frontier we avoid all these evils, and may from time to time have the opportunity of encouraging friendly relations with the various peoples lying between us and the advanced Russian posts, and information can always be obtained on essential matters as well from within our frontier as from beyond it.

If Russia, in despite of remonstrances, pressed her course towards our frontier in a manner that was menacing, these people would have no grievance to revenge on us, and they would have no object in desiring Russian conquest; while we then could bring to bear the great power at our command of influencing all the tribes to do their utmost to harass and to hinder her advance. Why, the expenditure that would arise from one year's occupation of Herat, &c., would suffice to keep half Central Asia in our pay for a generation; 10,000*l.* would induce the largest tribe to espouse our cause, especially if accompanied by the assurance of another 10,000*l.* as soon as they had given proof of their active sincerity by the performance of some signal service against Russia.

In fact, the position of Russia thus advancing might be made even more difficult by an active use of the Affghan tribes than ours would be, awaiting the advent of Russia at Herat, though that would be bad enough.

I will say nothing of the possible difficulties that might arise in Europe from our thrusting ourselves forward towards Russia and Persia, but, looking at the question solely from the Asiatic point of view, I think it must be clear that the political result of going forward would be disadvantageous in the highest degree rather than desirable.

I now arrive at the consideration of the question in a military point of view, and I will try to disembarrass myself as much as possible of a use of technical expressions often freely used by military writers without much meaning, and very calculated to confuse or to mislead the non-professional reader, who, not understanding the exact scope of what is written, thinks it must be correct, while in reality military considerations are simply founded on common sense, and should be therefore easily explained to all.

The first military objection that I see to the onward movement proposed is, that it would entail an increase to our army in India.

The presence of 30,000 men in Affghanistan would not enable us to reduce a single soldier in India; I think this would be universally admitted by those who have studied the subject. Looking to distant points, how could our holding certain positions in Affghanistan reduce the possibility of trouble in Burmah or at Hyderabad, or lessen the chances of great calls on India for foreign expeditions, such as that of 1860 to China, or of 1867 to Abyssinia? But even going to our very north-west border, the presence of 30,000 men at Herat, &c., would in no way obviate the difficulties of our frontier from Hazara to Scinde, for how could that body of troops so posted influence the Wuzeerees, Afreedees, Momunds, &c.?

I assume, therefore, that whatever force goes to Affghanistan is so much added to our army.

As respects the native troops, I think this would be an evil, for we would have to add largely to one description of our forces, which is, perhaps, quite as numerous now as can be considered desirable (I mean our northern troops, whether Mahomedans or Sikhs), for the troops from Southern India are unfit physically to cope with either the climate or the people of Affghanistan, and the Hindoostani, though rather more fit, is hardly the man for such service.

But an addition to our British forces is, perhaps, still more unadvisable. We are told that already India is draining England too much for recruits, and dangerous endeavours are made on this ground to produce a belief that reductions can be effected. We have fallen to 60,000 men in India, or less, an exceedingly small army for the service it may any day have to perform, and I trust no further reductions will take place; but to have to add 13,000 or 14,000 men to the Indian establishment would be very inconvenient and, perhaps, exceedingly difficult. Indeed, it appears to me that it would be necessary to add to our forces to a greater extent than might be necessary for the actual occupation of places in Affghanistan; for, once committed in that country, we must be prepared with a reserve to move up in support, in case of need, equal at least to the force in Affghanistan, and if we had to do this, India would require to be held with a strong hand and with not less troops than now form its garrison.

Suppose, for instance, we had 30,000 men at Herat, Quetta, &c., could we dare to be content with 13 companies of British infantry in Scinde, or to leave it, as the Bombay Government has now arranged, with but six such companies, for several weeks? Certainly not. We should have to keep at least a strong division of all arms (exclusive of garrisons) in constant readiness to move through the Bolan Pass.

Probably the course advocated by these writers would entail a permanent addition of 25,000 British troops to our army in India. Would this be convenient? Would it be possible?

The necessary increase of force, therefore, whether of Europeans or natives, would be an evil and a difficulty to be avoided, save as a last extreme.

But there remains the larger and most important military consideration.

Do we best meet an enemy by remaining within our frontier, or by going forward to anticipate him?

To this, I, for one, unhesitatingly say we should remain within our frontier.

Placed as we are now, if India is not weakened by withdrawal of more troops, we seem,

seem, humanly speaking, almost unassailable along our line of North-Western frontier. On that frontier, or within 100 miles of it, we have as the usual force,—

8 Batteries of British horse or field artillery,	12 Mountain guns,
1 Heavy field battery,	1 Regiment dragoons,
2 Garrison batteries,	13⅔ Regiments of native cavalry,
3 Punjab field batteries,	7 3/10 Regiments British infantry,
	23 Regiments native infantry,

a force of about 7,000 effective British, and perhaps double that number of native soldiers, say 21,000 men, with 72 horsed or mountain guns.

This body of troops has always proved ample to repel any incursions of the border tribes, and often to enter their hills and punish them.

Indeed, save in an expedition of a very formidable nature, such as that of Umbeyla in 1863, it has rarely been necessary to bring up any troops but those ordinarily on the line of frontier or immediately behind it, as just enumerated. Indeed, I question whether much more serious inroads than have ever yet been made could not be with ease repelled with the force now there. Those who are experienced in mountain warfare, or warfare with mountaineers (which, I may observe, has not been seen in its reality by those officers in Scinde who advocate an advance), know how small a force of our troops in the plains, provided cavalry and horsed guns form part of it, can with ease repulse and disperse a horde of the bravest Afreedees, Momunds, or other hill men, when they venture out of their mountains, and few officers who know this branch of their professional work would hesitate, with 3,000 good infantry, 1,000 good cavalry, and 12 horsed guns, to meet *within* our border any army that Affghanistan could send down. Such a British force, I may remark, *en passant*, might be very seriously harassed and crippled *in the mountains* by one-half of its own numbers of Affghan mountaineers.

But, supposing necessity arose from a very extensive action against us all along the frontier at one time, our 21,000 men and 72 guns could very rapidly be reinforced by sea from Bombay and Poona (as respects Scinde), and from the Lower Punjab and hill stations (as respects the Punjab frontier), by 9 or 10,000 men, 5 or 6,000 of which might be British, and 40 or 50 horsed guns.

With such a force the armies of Central Asia (which, after all, could never be very numerous, owing to scarcity of food beyond our frontier, and impossibility of carrying more than a few days' provision for a multitude) could make no impression whatever, even if aided by Russian gold and directed by Russian officers.

Supposing all along the line we were to be menaced and attacked, there could be no communication between the different bodies in the mountains. To convey intelligence from the left flank to the right through rugged mountains, extending over 800 or 900 miles, and possibly through tracts held by tribes in our pay, would be a work of a month, while the telegraph along our line of plain country would flash the necessary intelligence and orders throughout our line hour by hour.

Placed in our own territory, with our own posts, forts, and magazines, and with abundance of all resources, such an attempt would, I believe, strengthen us in India; for, without endangering us, it would incontestably prove our power, while, I am quite certain, a few weeks of such operations would sicken the Russian officers of the whole affair, and probably end in their destruction by the people they were assisting.

I am imagining what it is almost impossible should occur, viz., that Russia, conciliating *all* the countries beyond our border, managed by great exertions to bring forward, say a hundred thousand men or more with a good sprinkling of their best officers, and perhaps some Cossacks to assail us simultaneously at various points, and to keep them together for a time, which I should say is out of the question. If the hundred thousand men or so were brought at one point, which would probably be more difficult than to bring them down at several, our task would be easier.

But in any case, I think, without weakening India to any appreciable extent, we are quite prepared any day (though we could not be without a warning of some months) for such an onslaught by Russia, which, of course, would lead to a European war, and would not therefore (apart from its own difficulties and small prospects of success) be lightly undertaken by Russia.

I have discussed one portion; first, if the Affghans and border tribes assail us of their own accord; and secondly, if they do so, instigated and backed by Russia, and reinforced by many thousand Tartars, &c.; and lastly, I will refer to the possibility of an army of Russians, aided by Affghans or Tartars, coming to our frontier in view to conquer India.

To produce a real impression on us, a less force than 40,000 to 50,000 Russians would hardly be used, and this might be aided more or less by native tribes; now, would it be better for us to meet these 50,000 Russians at Herat, or at any other place far from support, or within our own frontier, say, at Peshawur or in Scinde? To discuss the possibility of such a force reaching India at all, considering the difficulties of the country, and its want of resources, seems almost a work of supererogation. Indeed, such an operation could hardly be effected unless Russia had been established in Affghanistan itself for years; but if the wonderful feat was accomplished of bringing an army through Affghanistan to India, we may imagine the plight in which it would reach our frontier, from knowing what the army of the Indus suffered before it reached Candahar, with all

the resources of India at its back, and numbering barely a tenth of what I should conceive a Russian army must be to venture to attack us.

With ample notice, and with our annual reliefs from England, which give India the ability always, with warning, to retain six regiments that may be relieved, and possibly with a still larger force from home, a very formidable army could be collected on our frontier, unfatigued and not having suffered from privation, which would have every prospect of encountering this worn-out Russian army with success.

Thirty thousand men placed at Herat and elsewhere in Affghanistan would have every disadvantage, and we would have spared the Russians several hundred miles of marching and consequent diminution of effective numbers before they reached us; while our reinforcements would have a long, weary march, and probably harassed, before they could aid our advanced troops.

Within our frontier the troops would to the very last exercise a sensible influence over the ill-disposed in India; beyond it they would be taken little account of.

Arguments against placing troops in so false a position as that advocated might be repeated *ad infinitum*, but it is time to end this Memorandum.

It is impossible, however, not to feel that no course that is possible to us seems so likely to lose us our Indian Empire as pushing forward our armies into Central Asia.

In protesting against the views I so strenuously oppose, I beg to be guarded against saying that circumstances might not render an expedition into Affghanistan proper, and perfectly feasible. For instance, to dislodge a body of Russians who might have come to Candahar or Cabul, and be engaged in organising measures for the advance of a further force. If, on full consideration, it seemed desirable to drive them out, I do not see why it should not be done; but this should only be done when the necessity actually arises, and be made no pretext for a permanent occupation.

In the foregoing remarks I have not alluded to a modified proposal greatly advocated of late by Sir H. Green, viz., to occupy Quetta. This would be, in fact, simply a commencement of greater and more mischievous proceedings. Our having a brigade at Quetta could in no way check Russia, would embroil us with those we need have nothing to do with, would be very expensive, and would place troops in a position of notorious insalubrity, as was proved during the Affghan war.

Any occupation of places in Affghanistan, apart from what has already been said, offers great objections. I will allude to one, and then conclude. What would be done with the wives of the officers and 12 or 13,000 British soldiers sent into Affghanistan? I presume it would not be proposed to send them into that country; and if not, we should have in depôts in India perhaps 2,000 women separated for three or four years at a time from their husbands—a state of affairs, as is well known, not conducive to the welfare of either party.

(signed) *H. W. Norman.*

5th October 1867.

Enclosure 4, in No. 4.

MINUTE by Major General the Honourable Sir *H. M. Durand*, C.B., K.C.S.I.; dated Simla, the 5th October 1867.

SINCE my Minute of the 5th February 1867, on the projected occupation of Quetta, was written, nothing has occurred to lead me to modify the opinions therein expressed. Certainly the clamour of the press, or rather of a part of the press, both in England and in India, has in no degree shaken my conviction of the soundness of the views I then expressed. I say this without at all shutting my eyes to the military successes and rapid progress of Russia in Central Asia, and the unexplained assembly by Persia of a considerable force at Meshed, and of a smaller one in Seistan, cotemporaneously with the negotiations which have passed between Ameer Shere Ali's son, his deputy at Herat, with the Persian authorities.

I do not pretend to believe that the advance of Russia through poor and difficult countries along the line it has taken has no other significance than that of commercial enterprise in Central Asia regions. As little do I believe that Persia has ceased to covet the possession of Herat. Nor do I ignore the fact that the progress of Russia, the known subordination of Persia to Russian dictation, and the alleged overtures of Ameer Shere Ali to Russia and Persia, have made a considerable impression on the minds of our native subjects in almost every part of India, not excepting our native troops. But, provided we do not defer the obviously necessary precautionary measures which I have persistently and repeatedly urged, I view the attitude of Russia and Persia with respect to India without fear or mistrust of our ability to cope with future contingencies.

We are, however, losing time, and also a favourable opportunity, in neglecting to take advantage of the present for the completion of the Indus frontier group of railways. I think it a mistake to have preferred the Rajpootana line of railway to the completion of the rail communication between Mooltan and Kurrachee, and between Lahore and Attock. I think both might be carried on; but if we are to restrict ourselves to one of the two out of financial considerations, then, instead of throwing upon either the Baroda or the Great India Peninsula lines, whose permanent works and ways do not enjoy

enjoy the confidence of the public, heavy additional traffic, I would, on every ground, except immediate returns, prefer that the Indus lines be not left in a state of disconnection and comparative inutility.

At the same time the river communication should be perfected.

Under existing circumstances, it is impossible to foresee when, or how, we may be called upon to act upon the Indus frontier or beyond it. The important thing is to have prepared, before that time overtake us, every means that can insure rapid and effective action either on or beyond the Indus.

Meanwhile the true policy for us to observe is, to avoid all aggressive occupation of posts in advance of our present frontiers, and to cultivate as good an understanding with Affghan and Belooch rulers as possible. In a word, we should do nothing to excite their jealous suspicion of our power and motives, nor allow them to play on any weak apprehensions of Russia or Persia, in order to engage us as partisans in their fratricidal struggles for power.

Without disturbing the details of administration, Scinde should be subject to the Punjab Government, and thus come under the more direct control of the Government of India. I have elsewhere stated that it is anomalous that, on so important a frontier, we should be liable to have a different policy advocated in Scinde from that pursued at Peshawur; still more anomalous that the military force on the Lower Indus should be under the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, whilst the troops on the Upper Indus and its affluents are under the Commander-in-Chief in Bengal. One Government, one policy, and one command should watch over the frontier from the sea-board to Peshawur. There should, in these respects, be no more disconnection or isolation than in its railways.

(signed) *H. M. Durand.*

Enclosure 5, in No. 4.

MINUTE by the Honourable Sir *G. U. Yule*, C.B. and K.C.S.I.; dated Simla, the 7th October 1867.

I ENTIRELY agree in his Excellency's views as to our policy in Affghanistan, so far as this paper gives expression to them. I am thoroughly convinced that any advance, or attempt to advance, beyond the present frontier could have but bad results for us; and that employing officers at present on missions of any kind to Affghanistan can do but little good, while it is pretty certain to put us in the dilemma either of advancing or submitting to disgrace. But where two nations have it in their power to confer such immense benefits on each other, as the Affghans and we have, surely there must be some means of clearing the field for the free operation of our mutual interests, bringing wealth to them, peace to us. And I should have been glad to see his Excellency, who is so well acquainted with Affghanistan, sketch some plan towards the end I have mentioned, to be carried out patiently, perseveringly, and continuously along the border. It is not invasion, either by Affghans or Russians, I think, that is to be dreaded.

So long as we keep to our present border we must have the upper hand of any invader.

It is the excitement and restlessness within our own territories which would be caused by even a pretence of invasion that we have to fear. Much would of course depend, as his Excellency says, in the event of such an occurrence, on the Government of the day, and the contentment of the people. But I believe it perfectly hopeless to expect on the part of any people conquered and ruled by a foreign race, such a degree of contentment as would deter them from availing themselves of any fair opportunity of freeing themselves; and preparations for an invasion from Affghanistan demanding that the greater part of our strength should be assembled on the border, would afford such an opportunity, and a most favourable one, to our subjects in Hindostan. But how are we to prevent the occurrence of such an opportunity? I do not, I must say, see how it can be prevented; but it may be postponed, and postponement is gain in every way to us, and means may be taken to render it less favourable to our enemies, when it does come, than it would otherwise be.

The present system of watching events without making any preparation for them (I am not aware of any special preparation to this end), the plan of saying "Good morning, Sir, how do you do," to each successive leader who gets to the top, must disgust all the leading men, and prolong indefinitely the ill-will which the nation already entertains towards us. The policy in question has done us very serious injury already, and must continue to do us much more, unless its evil effects are obviated by other measures; for it is not to the policy itself, so far as it goes, that I object, but to its being the whole, instead of only a part of our policy.

Our chief object, it seems to me, should be the conciliation of the nation, of the tribes at large, or as many of them as are within our influence. We have tried the Chiefs; one we have placed on the throne, another we have subsidised; others we welcome in words. By none of these means has our permanent influence been increased; by none of them do I see how it can be increased with such a nation as the Affghans. We have not, so far as I know, ever tried at all, or at least in any systematic way, to get

the people on our side, and until we do get them we are working on sand. Doubtless it will take a long time, much perseverance, much careful attention, to turn the ill-will which our past doings have excited into a friendly feeling, such a feeling as would induce some of the tribes at least to prefer helping to injuring us; but that it can be done, that a poor and proud but very greedy race can be made to entertain friendly feelings towards its wealthy neighbour, in spite of all temptations to the contrary, is surely not impossible. It is not for one so ignorant as I am of the nation to say what steps are best adapted to this end; but the utmost freedom of trade and the greatest encouragement to it by establishing fairs, opening communications, &c., are obviously main agents; and, with this object in view, the construction of a railway from Lahore to Peshawur, as I remarked in my note on that subject, ought to be immediately undertaken and carried out with the greatest speed. At the same time frequent and regular communication between Mooltan and Kurrachee by steamboats should be established and kept up, whether paying or not, until a railway is substituted. Friendly intercourse between our officers and the chiefs should be encouraged; the former should be amply supplied with presents for the chiefs and their people, consisting, not only of those things which the latter may now prefer, but also of those for which we wish them to acquire a taste. These presents should be most liberally distributed in any cases of good conduct, sparingly on ceremonious visits.

The chiefs should be invited to visit Lahore and received in such manner as to induce them to repeat and extend their visits.

Dispensaries should be established along the border at the places where they are most likely to be useful. Medical men, Europeans and gentlemen, should be placed in charge of these dispensaries, and permitted to attend Affghan patients in their own villages when solicited to do so.

But while pressing forward these or such other measures as may be deemed best fitted for the purpose, I would not propose entirely to neglect the leaders, Ameers or Wallees, or whatever title they may assume.

I would not be in a hurry to recognise a man who had ousted his predecessor and seated himself on the throne; but when once recognised something more than words should be given to each man according to his character and condition; little comparatively to one not likely to rule well or long, much to one who promised better.

A great effect might, I venture to think, be produced by discriminating, and occasional assistance in money and even arms, without incurring ill-will or heavy expenditure. If by any payment we could secure light duties and protection to traders passing through any portion of Affghanistan, then economy should be disregarded; but for no other object should regular subsidies be granted. Lastly, a brief description of our policy should be drawn up and widely circulated, and strict adherence to the line of conduct prescribed should be enforced on officers all along the frontier, from the sea upwards. It should be clearly and distinctly stated that we have no intention whatever of advancing beyond our present frontier, that any encroachment on us will be punished summarily and with rigorous severity, that we wish to be friends with our neighbours, and that the surest way of gaining our favour is to assist in forwarding our wish, that friendship improves the welfare of both sides, while enmity only increases poverty, &c. I have written this under the belief that, besides the words of welcome to the new leader, we are doing nothing to improve our position with the Affghans. If this is a mistake, it is one under which I do not alone labour, and its public correction would have a most beneficial effect.

(signed) *G. U. Yule.*

Enclosure 6, in No. 4.

NOTE by the Honourable *W. N. Massey*; dated the 8th October 1867.

As these papers are marked "Urgent," I will not detain them; but why they are so marked, I do not understand.

I cannot conceive of any question less urgent, or more worthy of deliberate consideration, than the question opened in Colonel Lumsden's able paper, and so fully commented on in the Minute of his Excellency the Governor General.

I should like to have time to study that Minute, so full of information of the greatest value, and setting forth views of policy in the soundness of which I cannot too strongly express my concurrence.

At the same time, I incline very strongly to the opinions expressed by my colleagues, Sir H. Durand and Sir G. Yule, as to the expediency of pressing forward the line of railway to Peshawur; and, I think, in connection with this subject, the Secretary of State should be urged to reconsider his decision to postpone this work *sine die*.

I hope to have another opportunity of considering this subject before it is dismissed by the Governor General in Council.

(signed) *W. N. M.*

Enclosure 7, in No. 4.

MINUTE by His Excellency the Commander in Chief; dated the 14th October 1867.

AT the commencement of this year, on the request of his Excellency the Viceroy, I examined the proposal of Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry Green, regarding the occupation of Quetta.*

*See Minute, dated 31 January 1867.

It did not seem to me difficult to show that the policy involved in the proposal entailed military movements false in principle, a lavish expenditure which should not be incurred, and great danger to our relations with Affghanistan, and, perhaps, the powers beyond, viz., Persia and Russia.

The Viceroy now desires that we should consider the larger proposition, which was clearly in Sir H. Green's mind when he wrote his Memorandum advocating the occupation of Quetta, and finds favour with certain public writers in England.

I allude to a British advance in force into Affghanistan, with a view to the annexation of that country.

Such a measure, as being one which, under certain contingencies, might possibly be forced on us, has naturally formed the subject of speculation with men engaged in the military and political affairs of India, since the conquest of the Punjab in 1849.

I believe my opinions about it are known; but, in accordance with his Excellency's wishes, I will once more give expression to them.

It has then ever appeared to me that, in the discussion of such proposals, sound argument has always lain on one side; whilst a popular wish, without any foundation of knowledge or truth, but supported by a good deal of clamour and the vociferation of interested parties, might be discerned on the other. I have thought that the popular wish has sprung, in the first instance, from the hardly disguised military ambition of one or two distinguished officers, and the impatience of inaction which reveals the military spirit, not only of our Anglo-Indian armies, but also of the people of England. We know how easy it is to touch the sensitive points of the latter, and to cause an ignorant excitement accordingly. To this has to be added the eagerness of speculators in trade and other enterprises, which is ever ready to rush in where responsible administrators and statesmen fear to tread.

The question we have then to consider admits of serious investigation from four points of view—the moral, the political, the administrative, and the military.

With regard to the first, viz., the moral aspect of the proposition, I would enquire how English gentlemen, who constantly have justice and truth in their mouths, can reconcile a proposal to themselves involving the gratuitous invasion of an unoffending country with which we are at peace and have been at peace for a long term of years. It is true that a civil war has existed in Affghanistan for some time. But the contending parties, so far from any open tendency to break the peace with us, have been alike desirous of remaining on terms of amity with the British Government.

This desire on both sides has stood the test of the extreme coldness of absolute neutrality, the character of which they cannot but conceive to be indifference to the fate of either one or the other.

The test must be held to be very severe, if the keenness of the civil war be recollected, and the great advantage which would be gained by one party from the semblance of real favour from the British Government in preference to the other.

It is, I think, sufficiently obvious that the existance of civil war in Affghanistan affords a much less reason for interference, than the troubles of Poland in the north of Europe, or of Crete in the south.

But if those who urge us to aggression and interference in the east will sometimes look to European analogy, they cannot fail to recollect that we not only do not interfere because of civil war in Europe, but that we abstain from interference in the jostling of rival powers, unless there be a serious disturbance of the general European arrangement, which is comprehended in the phrase "balance of power," such, for instance, as we saw in the case of Russia in 1853-54.

The hope of territorial acquisition, of adding to our commercial advantages, and the possible advance of other powers at future dates, have long ago been dismissed as reasons insufficient for the commencement of aggressive policy, with its consequences of diplomatic rupture, war, and bloodshed.

It has thus come to be held a principle of British policy that, on moral grounds, we should not commit ourselves to the invasion of neighbouring powers, or to armed interference, except in defence of interests clearly affecting ourselves, whether such interests be concerned with our own possessions, or with the larger questions of international defence of the peace of the Continent of Europe. We may flatter ourselves, perhaps, that other nations have not embraced this principle so securely as we have, but it is certainly undeniable that we stand committed to it.

We may surely then ask if this great moral principle, which may, perhaps, be termed a modern one in the history of England, whilst maintained by the British Government with undeviating firmness in the affairs of Europe and America, is to be set aside in Asia. Are we to have one set of principles in the west, where we are controlled and affected by

the power and diplomacy of other nations, and another in the east, where we happen to be all powerful?

It may be true that this principle was little thought of, and rarely acted on, in the Anglo-Indian proceedings of the last century. But, on the other hand, a close investigation of the means and causes of the British advance from the old coast factories to our existing frontiers beyond the Indus and the Ganges, may show that that advance was at least as much due to the force of circumstances, to the necessity of self-preservation, and to the configuration of the Peninsula of Hindoostan, as to any moral want in the succession of statesmen who gave the initiative, and finally carried the advance to its conclusion.

But I would submit that all such causes are now non-existent, by which, according to the moral aspect, forgetfulness of our duty towards another people could be atoned.

Thus it cannot be said that Affghanistan presents any dangers to the British power. Secondly, there is no force of circumstances impelling us to move forward, as we saw in the case of the Punjab in 1845–46 and 1848–49; and again, with respect to Oudh and Burmah, in the immediately subsequent years. Thirdly, the configuration of the country, that is to say, of the great chains of mountains which have been called, and properly so, the natural boundary of India, and constitute the British frontier, takes away all ground for forgetfulness of the moral principle, whereas it is well known from the lessons of history that, when a superior energetic race sets foot in a plain country such as India, it is difficult to repress the tendency to its spread of dominion, which may be likened to the flood of one of the great rivers of the country.

If, in modern times, we look for another example of this tendency, we find it in the Russian advance from the west over Central Asia, just as ours proceeded in India from the east, in the absence of natural obstacles in the form of vast mountain barriers.

This brings me then to the political view, viz., whether it be expedient to pass those barriers in the search of new enemies, or to make use of the natural defence thus afforded us by nature, since our advance has been completed to the boundary of India.

This point has been so well put by his Excellency the Viceroy, that to dilate on it further, would appear to be needless repetition on my part. But, perhaps, I may say without presumption, that every word uttered by His Excellency has my full and cordial concurrence.

I can conceive no greater political mistake than a course which would unite the whole population of Affghanistan in the most active hostility towards us, and which would compel us further to meet that hostility on ground most favourable to those we should contend against, with a great waste of our resources.

I believe that nothing can be more true than the proposition, that putting the case hypothetically, that Russia and England must at some future time engage for Asiatic dominion, that party will enter on the contest with great advantages which has abstained from forestalling events by the invasion and annexation of Affghanistan.

If we assume that Russia wishes to invade India through Affghanistan, it will become necessary for her to hold that country very strongly when she advances; for otherwise, the population would rise invincibly, and cut off her invading army from its communications. Thus would Russia have to divide her resources in the most dangerous manner, while committed to meeting all the strength of British India on ground very favourable to ourselves.

In this manner would Affghanistan be a cause of weakness to Russia and would become our best ally, whereas in the contrary case, viz., of an invasion of Affghanistan by ourselves, as before stated, she would be our worst enemy. The problem would then be exactly reversed, and all the natural advantages of position having been wantonly sacrificed, we should have to hold Affghanistan with from 40,000 to 50,000 men, and, at the same time, to meet Russia at a great distance from our own resources, and therefore, in a scene most favourable to her and most difficult for ourselves.

It can hardly be doubted that a single defeat in the field, under such circumstances, would cause the most lamentable consequences; in short, it would be to represent over again, on an immensely large scale, that fatal calamity at Cabul, which shook our Indian rule in a manner previously believed impossible, and of which it is not difficult to trace the train of results through the wars of the Punjab, even to the great domestic mutiny of 1856–57.

We may besides recollect with advantage that a British advance into Affghanistan, with a view to the seizure of the fortresses of Cabul and Herat and the final occupation of the country, will more than anything else provoke the conflict with Russia which, even should it prove inevitable for dominion in Asia, according to the views of certain politicians, can hardly take place in less time than a generation, if we credit her with all the ambitious designs so freely laid to her charge, and with absolute success in giving effect to them.

The positive political results therefore to be considered, are a long and deadly war of occupation with the people of Affghanistan, and a great probability of early conflict with Russian power in aid of that country, that power first acting secretly and afterwards openly and in force.

I now come to the Indian administrative point of view. As explained by Colonel Norman in his memorandum, the additional drain on the Indian revenues, caused by the military occupation of Affghanistan, would probably not fall short of three millions and a half sterling per annum. As has been seen in the previous argument this enormous expenditure

expenditure would take place for the purpose of placing us in a dangerous position towards Affghanistan, and a most doubtful one towards Russia.

I make no doubt that if we choose to incur such an expenditure, in support of an aggressive policy, that policy would succeed for a time. I do not believe in the existence of any such powers of resistance in the people of Affghanistan, as would prevent us from fully succeeding in the first aggression, and the first occupation of the country.

But be it remembered that, as we saw before, the real difficulty would commence after the policy of aggression had been completed, and we should be compelled to maintain our occupation of the country by such means of force as the people would alone understand. The expenditure would then be a lasting one, and, so far as we are informed, but very little revenue, probably not more than (300,000 *l.*) three hundred thousand pounds per annum could be expected from the country, with which, in some slight degree, to lessen the vast demand on the revenues of India.

Surely those who have to administer those revenues, must recollect what difficulty we experience in meeting the demands of India herself. Our annual estimates but rarely show a surplus. From year to year our ingenuity is tried in devising resources, or in striking out new schemes of taxation, which shall add to the revenue without creating universal discontent. It is felt that a true policy lies in stretching the demands on the people as little as possible, whilst we afford them the means of modern material development which were unknown to all Native Governments.

In this manner we hope gradually to expand the revenue, notwithstanding that revenue expansion, in the sense understood by a British Chancellor of the Exchequer, is a thing we are precluded from looking for in India.

Nevertheless, we may fairly say that great success has attended this financial policy, and that the administration of the country, the vast modern public works, including railways and canals, as well as the systems of Imperial and local roads in the several Presidencies, the consequent material development of the people at large, the rise of the wages of labour, the enormous increase of trade, domestic and foreign, do afford us the most undeniable testimony that, notwithstanding partial shortcomings, the Government of India has adopted the right course towards the people, and is able to claim the regard of civilized governments for its administration.

Now is this all to be abandoned; is the people to be overwhelmed with taxation; is the debt to be immeasurably increased, to meet an annual drain of more than three millions of money to carry out the occupation of Affghanistan? Are discontent and disloyalty to be spread over the whole land for the purpose of furthering such chimerical schemes as those indulged in by the late General Jacob, and the school of politicians originally called into existence by his writings?

It cannot be too often repeated that the occupation of Affghanistan is, on account of the financial difficulty, in other words, the stoppage of progress in India, and therefore a reversal of the policy towards the people which has been pursued with more or less activity since the series of wars has come to an end, which brought us to the natural boundaries of the country.

The fourth, or the military point of view, includes many important topics, besides the necessary arrangement of the troops in the annexed country, and the incidental professional details.

Thus the Government will have carefully to consider the mode in which our armies will be affected by the execution of the proposal now, and, further, the military effect in India herself hereafter.

It is stated by Colonel Norman that about 30,000 men, including one-third British, or possibly one-half, would be required for the aggression and for holding the country after the operation had been successful. I do not think the figures are overstated in the gross, or that we could do with less than the larger proportion of British troops.

Thus an increase of 15,000 men of the British Army in the several arms would be required from England, and a similar one of the Native Army, and the increase would be a lasting one. It would be for ministers in England to determine, whether such an increase of the British Army in India could be permanently afforded without inconvenience at home. We are hardly in a position to judge of this point out here in India.

I have shown on various occasions, I believe not without success, that the British Army now holding India, the strength being slightly above 60,000* men, does not admit of further diminution. This conclusion has been finally adopted by the Government of India, and apparently acquiesced in by Parliament at Home. I have no doubt in my own mind that the conclusion is correct.

*61,000 men is the number stated in the Adjutant General's letter of 18 March 1867.

But, further, if the public mind were to be agitated for a series of years by a long and wasting war in Affghanistan, we should have another powerful reason for maintaining the British garrisons at their present strength.

It is well known that the Native Army is now at a minimum. The detachment of some 8 or 10,000 troops to Abyssinia has, on this account, been deemed sufficient cause for the Government of India to add 80 rank and file to the several regiments respectively in the armies of Bengal and Bombay, to compensate for the absence of those temporarily removed from India.

This being so, it is clear that every man sent across our border into Affghanistan must be an addition to our existing forces and, therefore, to present military expenditure. We should have no difficulty in finding the recruits at first; but it must be recollected

that foreign service beyond the Indus is probably as distasteful to men recruited in India, as the coast of Guinea would be to British soldiers.

It would, therefore, not only be impolitic to rely too much on these resources for a permanent policy of occupation, but we should find ourselves at length unable to do so without producing serious results amongst those classes of the population of Northern India from which we are in the habit of looking for recruits, and without causing the greatest distaste for the service among the troops themselves.

It seems to be me incontestible that we should then be compelled to rely, for the most part, on troops raised in Affghanistan itself, in addition to the British troops. In short, to attempt to hold the country we had invaded and conquered by an army raised in it.

This might, and probably would, succeed for a time, until domestic insurrection made its appearance, or the intrigues of a foreign power began to be felt. But it will be admitted that the success of our Sepoy armies in India is by no means a measure by which to gauge the probability of a similar organisation answering in such a country as Affghanistan.

Even with all the advantages of the character of the Indian populations, and of the isolation of British dominion in India, unaffected as the latter is by neighbouring powers or foreign policy, we have seen how the experiment of holding a conquered country by a Native Army could break down, and we can hardly forget the near approach of the extermination which threatened us accordingly but ten years ago.

That politician would surely be a bold one who would trust to such means in a mountainous country, filled with the most warlike tribes, where every man is armed and trained to war from his infancy; a country, besides, which has the foreign powers of Persia and Russia to the west and north, and is therefore ever liable to excitement, owing to causes from which India, under the later years of our rule, has been entirely free.

We therefore have to contemplate, not only the enormous increase of expenditure consequent on the occupation, but the failure of the means by which alone the occupation can be maintained, if we except the single element of the British troops, as distinguished from the Native Army raised in India, and such forces as we might enlist in Affghanistan.

But it is clear that the whole difficulty of the problem has been by no means stated as yet.

The object of those who propose the occupation of Affghanistan, is to forestall Persia and Russia at Herat and Cabul; in short, as they put it, to be prepared for a conflict with the latter power beyond the borders of India, instead of awaiting that conflict inside.

If then this conflict is to come, which we are told is inevitable, we must, according to the views of such thinkers, be prepared to move at least two-thirds of the army of Bengal from the stations, where we consider the presence of the corps necessary for the safety and the peace of India, in aid of the distant army occupying Affghanistan, at any moment when the advance from the distant Russian stations in Central Asia might be threatened. We should in such case have to dispose the military forces of the Empire, for the defence of the western and north-western frontiers of Affghanistan, as we should now have to do for the north-western frontier of India.

Consequently, according to these views, it might happen that the whole available military resources of Upper India would be separated from India by the mountain defiles of Affghanistan, and the breadth of that country, all real communication being put in extreme jeopardy.

It may be submitted that our hold of India is not of the nature which would thus allow of the wholesale alienation of our military resources, the spirit of the people towards those who administer to its wants being that of a conquered and subject, though individually free, population.

Therefore, according to the simplest military considerations, we cannot afford to depart from a military policy which keeps our means of defence generally stationed for the purposes of India herself. It is an enormous error to look upon India as a solid base of operations, from whence to pour an army of 100,000 men, as we should do from England in an European emergency, while trusting to the spirit of the people to redeem the difficulties of the Government.

And here it is that, I think, the great mistake is made by those who advocate the proposals I am engaged in combating.

Owing to the profound peace which India generally enjoys and the admirable docility of the people, they forget that she is but a recently conquered country, with much of the feelings and many of the conditions of such a state. It is not for her to rise in defence of her conquerors, or in support of an aggressive policy, though we habitually use her resources for her own peace and defence as well as for our own purposes, including occasional petty invasion of other countries in pursuance of a broad Asiatic policy. Hence all our military arrangements are those of strangers in the land. Accordingly, and it is well to have the truth of this matter constantly present to our minds, we depend solely on the art of administration and on military arrangements, and not on the national feeling and spirit of the people, as a Government may do in a country to which it belongs, as springing from the native population.

Being thus encamped in a foreign country, the commonest prudence forbids us to treat the foreign country as if it were England, for the purpose of invading another, and of sustaining a great conflict with a third power of great strength and prestige at a long distance from its border.

I would

I would therefore again repeat that all the circumstances of India prescribe that that conflict, if come it must in future times, can alone be prosecuted to a successful conclusion by us on our side of the mountain barriers of India.

Such is the broad view I take of the military part of the question, a small part of which I examined in detail in the paper written on the occupation of Quetta. For the purely professional argument I would refer to that paper.

Whilst coinciding with His Excellency the Governor General in his view, that it is inexpedient to expose British agents at Cabul, I am of opinion that so soon as the state of the civil war permit of it, we should by all legitimate means place our relations with the Cabul Court on a substantial and friendly footing.

The measure lately carried through of sending a native envoy to Cabul, seems to me to be an excellent one. It would be well to instruct him, when the proper time comes, to cause it to be well known that the British Government is absolutely opposed to the schemes directed against Affghanistan, which are ventilated in Indian and English newspapers.

I would say one word more. That is, that I trust this discussion may lead to the reconsideration of the construction of the Lahore and Peshawur Railway.

I have strenuously urged this before as a means of the greatest political and military importance to India, and I deplore that other views have prevailed at home.

I would ask leave to repeat the words used by me in a Railway Minute.*

" I need hardly dilate on the additional strength it would give us on the Peshawur frontier, if we had a railway stretching from Lahore to our great garrison of Peshawur, and so connecting the latter with our system of military stations in the North-West Provinces. This additional strength would be felt in Cabul and in Central Asia beyond. It is certainly required for our general system of defence."

*Dated 2 Novem ber 1866.

For the reasons stated in the Minute from which I have quoted, I do not consider the Indus Valley Line of equal importance, whether on military, political, or commercial grounds.

As I have said elsewhere, I can see no advantage, but, on the contrary, great harm, in making a disposition of Scinde different from that which has been attended by marked success. This Province has, under the Bombay Government, been administered separately, as it were, by a succession of able men from the time of Sir Charles Napier to the present day.

The border of Scinde is fairly peaceful, and gives no trouble whatever. The progress of the Province is, I believe, in all respects satisfactory.

The Political Agents as superintendents of the Scinde frontier, have, in truth, nothing to do with Affghan politics, our relation with regard to which can alone be directed by the Viceroy himself. If there should be any improper interference or initiative on their part for the purpose of forwarding individual views, the remedy is of course a simple one, and in our own hands. But I cannot believe in the probability of such an occurrence on the part of experienced British officers.

(signed) *W. R. Mansfield.*

14th October 1867.

Enclosure 8, in No. 4.

MINUTE by the Honourable *G. N. Taylor*; dated Simla, 19th October 1867.

IF anything were wanting to complete the argument so clearly and forcibly set forth by the Governor General in favour of our policy in reference to Affghanistan and Central Asia, it is abundantly supplied by Colonel Norman's Memorandum, and by the admirable Minute of the Commander in Chief.

These papers show, in the clearest and most convincing terms, that, from whatever point of view the question is considered, nothing could be more wrong, nothing more impolitic, or more disastrous to our position and prestige in India, than a military advance into Affghanistan with a view to occupy the country, or any of its prominent posts.

Such a movement, besides being an act of injustice and hostility towards our allies, the *de facto* rulers of Affghanistan, would very naturally and justly be resented by Russia as the deliberate assumption of an attitude of menace intended to counteract supposed designs on her part, for which, I feel persuaded, there is no real foundation whatever.

No one who considers the subject from a clear common-sense point of view, and who is not determined to cherish the delusion of a Russian invasion, could read what is written by the Governor General and by Sir W. Mansfield without being convinced that the military difficulties of such an advance are almost insuperable. A Russian force would be utterly demoralised and so miserably weakened before it could approach our frontier, as to become a really contemptible foe, easy of defeat, and even of annihilation. We may be quite sure that a nation so intelligent and civilised as Russia, however enterprising she may be, and whatever may be her ultimate aim with respect to the regions she has subdued, knows full well that any attempt of the kind would bring serious and irretrievable disaster upon herself.

Within our own formidable border we are almost unassailable. Our true policy, therefore is to consolidate British power by improved internal administration, by completing and perfecting our railway communication to and along the frontier, and by so distributing our military force as to provide the best possible protection to our Government, and the people under our rule.

(signed) *G. N. Taylor.*

— No. 5. —

EXTRACT of a DESPATCH to the Government of India, dated 26th December 1867. No. 15, Secret.

* * * * *

Para. 11. "WITH reference to a particular question which is mentioned in some of the papers which you have transmitted to me,* viz., the occupation of Quettah, I have only to say that Her Majesty's Government entirely concur with your Excellency, that such a measure would be inexpedient both on political and on military grounds, and that in no case should it be taken without their precise instructions."

*The various letters above printed.

* * * * *

(signed) *S. H. Northcote.*

CENTRAL ASIA AND QUETTA.

COPIES of DESPATCHES from the Governor Gener of India in Council to the Secretary of State, dte 23 January 1867, No, 15; 8 February 1867, No. 28 23 February 1867, No. 42; and 23 October 186 No. 162, with MINUTES enclosed, on CENTRAL ASI and QUETTA; and, of the REPLY of the Secretar of State, dated 26 December 1867.

(Mr. Grant Duff.)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed*, 25 *February* 1879.

Under 6 oz.

BILUCHISTAN, No. 1.

PAPERS

RELATING TO THE

AFFAIRS OF KHELAT.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.

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PAPERS RELATING TO THE AFFAIRS OF KHELAT.

No. 1.

No. 57–170, dated Lahore, 7th February 1870.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to Government Punjab and its Dependencies. To C. U. Aitchison, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Referring to previous correspondence ending with your letter No. 1928 P., dated 24th December 1869, regarding the despatch of an exploring expedition to the Shum Plain, I am desired to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copies of a letter and its enclosures from the Commissioner of the Derajat Division, No. 8, dated 11th ultimo, concerning the present state of affairs in the territory of the Khan of Khelat bordering on British territory.

2. The Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor desires me to say that this correspondence is not forwarded with immediate reference to the question recently discussed of locating posts amongst the hill tribes, as that is a matter which can only now be disposed of after the complete local inquiries shall have been made, which have been, for the present, unavoidably postponed; and some portions of the remarks contained in this correspondence might, perhaps, as well have been omitted. But as a reference has, it is believed, been made from Sind through the Bombay Government, as to the course which it may be best for our Government to pursue in regard to the Khelat State, with a view to its tranquillization, his Honor thinks it right thus to place before the Supreme Government the views of the Punjab officials in immediate contact with the hill tribes subordinate to Khelat, the more especially as it may be deemed certain that, if the present state of matters be not speedily brought to a close, the Punjab Frontier, as well as that of Sind, will again become disturbed as in times past.

3. The Lieutenant-Governor has every reason to believe that the opinion of these officers is in accord, for the most part, with that of the Political Superintendent of the Sind Frontier, and if this be the case, the fact that officers of different Governments, viewing the matter from different points, have come to the same conclusion, appears to be deserving of notice.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

No. 8, dated 11th January 1870.

From Lieutenant-Colonel S. F. Graham, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division. To T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to the Government of Punjab.

In connexion with the exploring expedition to the Shum Plain, sanctioned by the Supreme Government in its Secretary's letter No. 879, dated the 25th June 1869 (since postponed), I have the honour to forward copy of a docket No. 420, dated the 14th December 1869, addressed from this office to Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan, and of his reply, No. 482, dated the same day, explaining the manner in which the late and present disturbances in his Highness the Khan of Khelat's territories, on the Sind border, affect our relations with his Highness' subjects bordering on Punjab territory.

2. From my own information and inquiries, I am able to corroborate the account given by Captain Sandeman in his 3rd and 4th paragraphs of the vigorous trade which formerly existed between Central Asia and British India, not only through the Bolan Pass, by Dadar, to Shikarpoor, in Sind, but also by the more direct route, by Tull-Chotiali to Sukki-Surwur and Hurrund, in the Punjab, and of its decline and for many years utter cessation by the latter route.

3. I would especially draw attention to the fact alluded to by Captain Sandeman in the concluding portion of his 4th paragraph as containing, probably, the true reason why the Punjab route has been neglected since British rule.

4. In paragraphs 6–12 Captain Sandeman gives "a brief history of Khelat affairs since the accession of the present Khan," which being taken, for the most part, from the public records, may be regarded as authentic.

5. In paragraphs 13 to 17 Captain Sandeman proceeds to an exposition of our political relations with the above Khanate, which the proximity of his charge to the scene in

question, as well as his frequent intercourse with the Political Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier adjoining enables him to do, but upon which I do not consider myself called upon to comment, especially as Colonel Phayre, the present Political Superintendent, has just addressed a full report on the subject to his Government, which I have perused, and which certainly confirms Captain Sandeman's account.

6. In his paragraphs 18–20 Captain Sandeman justifies the establishing of a British post in the Shum Plain by referring to the fact of a similar post having already been established at Kutch-Gundawa, in the Boogtee (Khelat) territory, from the Sind side, and by presuming that the Shum Plain is a portion of the Khelat territory.

7. There is no doubt about the fact that the country called Dajil-Hurrund, in the plains, which is situated at the point where the trade from Central Asia debouched (and for the protection of which the Fort at Hurrund was erected), has alternately belonged to the Brahooee State of Khelat, or to one or other of the local Governments on this side, whether Mahomedan or Sikh, according as the *then* paramount powers of Cabul or Lahore obtained supremacy; but as regards the Shum Plain, I am inclined to believe that, though the caravan routes may have partly led by this plain, and the possession of it is also important from other considerations, the degree of authority exercised by any of the neighbouring powers over this tract, situated among lawless tribes, owing, or at least paying little or no allegiance to any power, must have been proportionately slight.

8. Still there is the fact (alluded to in the memorandum accompanying this office report No. 125, of 11th October 1869, paragraphs 3 to 5) that the Shum Plain belongs chiefly to the Murrees and Boogtees (nominal subjects of the Khan of Khelat), and to the Goorchanies (mostly British subjects), and that consequently the control over it thus lies between us; and likewise the fact (which was also alluded to in the above memorandum, paragraph 8) that military posts on the Sind side "are already established in Boogtee territory."

9. Besides the Gundawa, there are the Sooee and other Sind outposts, established actually within Boogtee territory, and I believe an attempt was made by General Jacob to establish a colony at Poolagee, still further into Boogtee territory, with the same object; and there is the additional fact (which I was not till lately aware of) that these posts have been established in accordance with our treaty with the Khan.

10. The post proposed by me at Barkam, in the Khetran country, is not alluded to by Captain Sandeman, and it is right I should mention that he is not in favour of it, but chiefly, I believe, on account of the supposed difficulty to be encountered in the fact of this tract, at least being clearly foreign territory.

11. My own opinion is that Barkam is a strategic point which, as being the only vulnerable one in the event of taking up an advanced position, it is especially necessary to occupy; while the matter of its being foreign territory is, in reality, almost nominal in the one case as in the other; the Murrees and Boogtees being, to all intents and purposes independent of the suzerainty of the Khan of Khelat, as of any other power: in point of fact it may be said that the Khetran territory would be far easier of control, in the manner proposed, than any portion of the Boogtee or Murree country, or even the neutral, or, more properly speaking, common ground of the Shum Plain.

12. For the above reasons, probably, this point was selected by Bhawul Khan, as mentioned in paragraph 7 of this office report before alluded to; while, on political, commercial, and administrative grounds, the advantage of our control over this tract cannot, in my opinion, be questioned, when it is considered that the Khetran tribe, from its peculiar position and circumstances, forms, as it were, a link between the Pathan and Belooch tribes; that it is the wealthiest and therefore most reliable of the tribes around; that it is in alliance with the most powerful, wealthy, and influential of our subject tribes, a portion of which has a footing in the country; and that the country itself may be said to be crossed by the routes by which the Central Asian trade reaches our plains.

13. To the above has to be added the disadvantage of excluding these tribes from the advantages conferred on the others by the occupation, leading to jealousies and secret thwartings which it would be wiser to avoid.

14. That the Khetrans, besides being the covert foe to the peace of the border described in paragraphs 12, 13, and 15 of this Office Report, No. 125, can also act openly against us, was unmistakeably shown on the occasion of the Hurrund raid in 1866, when to our surprise, about a fourth (50) of the raiders left dead on the field were found to be our quiet friends the Khetrans.

15. Captain Sandeman concludes with a warm expression of sympathy with the chiefs and people composing the Khanate of Khelat, whom he describes as "discontented, and suffering from anarchy and misrule."

15. I should not have encouraged Captain Sandeman to express such opinions, nor

have submitted them to Government, with this expression of my own, did I not know that a difference of opinion on the subject of the policy pursued on the Upper Sind frontier in regard to Khelat affairs, exists on that frontier itself, and has been lately brought to the notice of the Supreme Government through that of Bombay; and did I not consider it my duty to represent the injurious effects produced by such policy on the Punjab border, where his Highness' territory also adjoins, and where the success of administrative measures and improved political relations with the same tribes (which have been approved by the highest authorities) are constantly exposed to the risk of failure and disruption.

17. Thus, while the best understanding exists between the Punjab officers and the Belooch subjects of his Highness of Khelat, as evidenced by their continuous good conduct, reported from time to time, and ending in the unconditional surrender, only a month or two since, of the Jemadar Khuttoo Khan, absconded from our service, and since a raider into our territory, to be dealt with by our laws, on the Sind side, it would appear that his Highness' chiefs and subjects are in open revolt against his Highness, in which the Murree tribe, possessing the greatest powers for mischief, both on the Sind and Punjab borders, and for molesting the trade by the Bolan, had become naturally involved—the chief noble of the Khelat state having rebelled, and taken refuge with the Bijarani section of the Murrees, an important and troublesome section of that tribe, which we had only just succeeded in conciliating.

18. I believe that the responsibility deduced by Captain Sandeman in his 5th paragraph as resulting from the change of position among the ruling powers of that part of the country, as regards the restoration of the former trade routes by Hurrund-Dajil, will be gladly accepted by the British Government.

19. But I would again draw attention to the 4th paragraph of Captain Sandeman's letter, in which he not only attributes the neglect of this trade by the Punjab routes, to the decline of the Khelat rule, under the successors of Nusseer Khan, and to the fact of the Punjab having remained under the Government of the Sikhs after the annexation of Sind, but also ascribes the direction of Khelat affairs, under our political superintendence, with *sole reference* to its *effect* on *Sind*, to the same cause.

20. I venture most respectfully to suggest that the time has come to apply the same system to the same tribes, occupying the same country on the Punjab-Sind frontier.

21. For many years after the annexation of the Punjab, this joint frontier suffered from the want of accord, on the part of the political officers in charge, produced by the attempt to carry on two different systems, under two separate Governments, on virtually the same frontier.

22. Of late years, the most thorough accord has been established between the officers of Government, but the difference of systems still thwarts their efforts, and the policy pursued on one border is found to act prejudicially on the other.

23. A prominent feature on this frontier is the Khanate of Khelat, the political superintendence of which rests with Sind, though the tribes composing the Khanate occupy the hills adjoining both borders.

24. Formerly no political relations whatever, on the part of the Punjab authorities, with these tribes, was permitted by the authorities of Sind, but of late, in the common effort to preserve the peace of the frontier, this political barrier has given way, with the greatest generosity on the part of the Sind authorities, and relations have sprung up on the Punjab side (with the entire consent of Sind), which have led to our subsidising the hill Belooch portion of his Highness of Khelat's subjects on this side, with results which have received the approbation of the Supreme Government and of Her Majesty's Secretary of State.

25. But the incongruity of the present *double* system is still apparent in the fact that, while the best results continue to flow from our improved relations on the Punjab side, it has just been found necessary to withdraw a subsidy lately granted to the same tribes on the Sind side for misconduct.

26. In regard to the new relations on the Punjab side, it may be remarked that it was scarcely possible to avoid them, considering that the Belooch tribes occupy upwards of 200 miles of the Punjab border, hill and plain, our relations with all of whom are on an excellent footing down to the border of Sind.

27. I will only further remark, in regard to the present and past state of the Khelat Government, that it seems to me in the highest degree impolitic to maintain, by means of the moral and material support afforded by the British Government, a whole people, who from their natural good disposition and amenability, should form an important element of strength, in a state of dangerous discontent on this portion of our north-west frontier.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

No. 420, dated 14th December 1869.

From Lieutenant-Colonel S. F. Graham, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division to Captain R. G. Sandeman, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazee Khan.

Requests that he will submit at as early a date as possible, a brief account of our relations with the different tribes on his border, subjects of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, showing in what way the present disturbances in Khelat affect such relations, and consequently the administration of that portion of the Punjab frontier.

Enclosure 3 in No. 1.

No. 482, dated 14th December 1869.

From Captain R. G. Sandeman, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazee Khan to Lieutenant-Colonel S. F. Graham, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

I desire to acknowledge receipt of your No. 420, dated 14th December 1869 (this day), calling upon me for certain information regarding the political state of that portion of the Punjab border under my charge; more especially with reference to the present disturbed state of Khelat, and the effect it has on the Khan's hill subjects, the Murrees, Boogtees, &c., I have the honor to reply as follows, and will endeavour as briefly as possible, consistent with lucidness, to place before you the present state of affairs:—

2. To do this I must first divide the subject into two heads, and treat of each separately: (1) The present state of the Murree, Boogtee, and other clans, with regard to their connexion with Khelat, and the entire British border. (2) The present position and state of the Punjab and Sind posts with regard to Khelat and each other.

3. But before going further, I desire to recall to your remembrance that at one time (not very long prior to British rule), the whole of Beloochistan, from Hurrund (a town of Dera Ghazee Khan) to the sea, was under the sway of Nusseer Khan of Khelat, a chief noted for his justice and prowess. He kept the Murrees, Boogtees, and other tribes resident along the Kafila route from Central Asia, in as good order as he did the people of the plains; the consequence was that a very much larger traffic than at present exists, at that time came through the Bolan pass into Hindostan. This traffic not only came *viâ* Kutch Gundawa to Shikarpoor and Kurrachee, but I am assured that the greater portion of it passed from Candahar *viâ* Thull Chotiali, and thence through the passes of Sukki, Surwur, and the Chachur, to Hurrund, Dajul, Mooltan, &c. Indeed, it is said that the route *viâ* Hurrund, (the Government of that day erected the Hurrund Fort for the protection of this trade), is the most central, shortest, as well as the most natural route from British India, through the Bolan Pass, to the countries beyond.

4. I further believe that a review of the question from the foundation, will show that this route was abandoned simply on account of the misrule and anarchy which followed shortly after the death of the before-mentioned Nusseer Khan, and also from the fact that none of his successors have for any length of time been able to keep their hill subjects along the route under proper control. Another reason may be traced to the fact that, since the entire border, as well as Khelat itself, came under British influence, and in a measure control also, the value of this Kafila route, through the Cachur Pass, from Dadur and Candahar to the Punjab, has never formed a subject of inquiry or been recognized. A reason for this may also be found from the fact that when the Sind portion of the border came under British control, Hurrund was a Sikh town, and that part of the present Punjab border was then under Sikh management. Besides, since the entire border came under the British Government, Khelat has never been managed with regard to the effect such management might have on the Punjab, but solely with reference to what would result to Sind. This was at one time unavoidable, and I only mention it here, as such ought not, in considering the question, to be forgotten.

5. The contents of the last paragraph being kept steadily in view, I will now call your attention to the present state of Nusseer Khan's kingdom. It is again once more, as in his day, to a greater or lesser extent under one Government, *viz.*, the British. A British officer is stationed at Khelat; Punjab and Sind officers control, to some extent, Khelat hill subjects, the Boogtees and Murrees, while the Khelat district of Hurrund Dajul is Punjab territory. Such being the case, it will now be my endeavour to show that it is a duty incumbent on the British Government to accept the full responsibility of its present position towards Khelat, by placing the Government of that State on a similar footing to

the one it enjoyed during the days of the great Nusseer Khan. I believe the Khelat confederacy, by which the State was ruled prior to British interference, view matters very much in the above light, and that they even now in a measure hold the British Government, with what justice it is not for me to say, responsible for the present unsatisfactory state of Khelat affairs. To do this, a brief history of Khelat affairs since the accession of the present Khan to the throne is necessary.

6. Khodadad Khan, the present Chief of Khelat, was elected as head of the Brahooee confederacy on the death of his brother. At the time of his election he was a mere boy, (about 16 years of age), and had been until the date of his election solely in charge of the women of the palace. As to his character nothing was known.

7. It will be observed that, in talking of Khodadad succeeding his brother, I use the word "election." I do so purposely, for the Brahooee confederacy, by which the Khanate has hitherto been ruled, claim the right, however nominal such may be, to elect their chief. It is also worthy of note in considering this, to mention here, that when Khodadad Khan was replaced on the throne after the death of Sherdil Khan, who had for a time usurped the throne, it was accomplished by Moolla Mahomed of Sarawan, the first chief of the confederacy, with the approval of the second chief, Taj Mahomed of Jalawan, and others.

8. During the life time of Khodadad's brother, our officers in Sinde, very wisely it seems to me, endeavoured, in the interests of all concerned, to control and direct the affairs of Khelat, by making British influence in the State paramount. They set about it in this way:—

9. A treaty was entered into between our Government and the Khelat State, by which the British agreed to subsidise the State on condition of certain commercial and other privileges being conceded to us. The treaty was ratified in the presence of the chiefs of the confederacy, and I believe their consent to it was asked for and obtained. The Khan on his part agreed that a British officer should reside at his Court, to watch British interests, and aid him with advice in the administration of the State.

10. It will also be found on inquiry, that efforts were made, in pursuance of the above arrangement, to conciliate the hill subjects of the Khanate, the Boogtees, and Murrees, and that this was done for a time with success. On the Murree clan an estate in Khelat was bestowed. Police stations for the protection of trade coming from Afghanistan were established at Kahan and Boogtee Dehra, while the Murrees gave hostages for the fulfilment of their part of the agreement. Peace was thus for a time secured to hill and plain.

11. Such, however, did not last long; the hill hostages, from bad treatment, and the want of faith being kept with them (it is said), fled. The confederacy of chiefs expressed loudly their dissatisfaction, and an appeal was made by some of them to arms. Raids into Khelat, the Punjab, and Sind, were once more the order of the day, the result being that the British Government, finding that the terms of the treaty were not attended to, reduced the subsidy by half. I believe the second Rupees 50,000 of it, were granted to enable the Khan himself to protect the Kafila trade, by means of the hill clans, &c.

12. Affairs since then, as far as I can discover, have gone on from bad to worse. The confederacy of Nobles, have at different times appeared in arms against Khodadad, but without success. Once they suffered a real defeat when Taj Mahomed, the Jalawan Sirdar, was taken prisoner and died in confinement. The voice of the country declares he was poisoned. Lately the Jam of Beyla and Moolla Mahomed of Sarawan have both been in arms, and it is said they attribute their want of success in asserting their rights to British interference.

13. Be this as it may, there is no doubt of the fact that the Khanate of Khelat is in a state of anarchy, and it behoves our Government fairly to inquire into the cause. I have endeavoured to discover it, and I will now place before you the result of my inquiries.

14. It is asserted that the treaty our Government made with the State of Khelat was entered into with the Khan and his nobles, *i.e.*, the Brahooee confederacy, but that this was merely in theory; for in practice we failed to carry it out in accordance with the constitution of the Khelat State.

15. For instance, I understand that such nobles as those of Sarawan and Jalawan, declare that in our arrangement for the reduction of the fees taken on Kafilas, the incomes of the chiefs were reduced; while no arrangements were come to for the subsidy being distributed according to the loss each had sustained by such reduction. They further declare that the money thus granted, so far from being employed for the benefit

of the Khanate, is spent by the Khan on mercenary troops, who are a standing menace to them; this being contrary to the constitution of the State. They affirm that these and other like causes have driven them into rebellion.

16. With the above state of affairs before us, it is obvious that our present policy has not succeeded, and that, however much we may desire to act solely with the Khan, treating him as a despot, the constitution of the State does not admit of our doing so. I will now proceed to show how doing so is not a safe policy, and that it has already shook our present successful arrangements with the Murrees to the foundation.

17. I have already mentioned the defeat of the first noble of the state, Moolla Mahomed of Sarawan, and his brother confederate. Since then he has made several attempts to renew the war, but from various causes has desisted. He is described as a chief of excellent disposition, and to have great influence in the Khanate. Since commencing this Report I have heard that he has left Seebee and joined the Bijaranee Murrees, who reside near the Bolan Pass. What will be the result the future will determine. Were he an evil-disposed man, from his well-known influence over this tribe, the results would certainly be very serious. His being a well-disposed amiable chief of high position in the Khanate, makes it all the more essential that his case should be inquired into. It is surely time for our Government to interfere when we find that the Khan of Khelat's mismanagement of his Khanate has led to the peace and administration of that part of the Punjab border being placed in much jeopardy; for such is truly the case.

18. I now come to the second part of my subject, *viz.*, the placing of British posts in Khelat territory, and I trust from what has been already stated, as well as from what I am about to state, it will be apparent that the question is not one of that importance it would at first, without a fair consideration of the real position of affairs, appear to be.

19. By a reference to the treaty with Khelat already alluded to, it will be found that the Khelat State agreed to British posts being established in Khelat territory, should it be necessary to place them within it.

20. If a map showing the Punjab and Sind border is referred to, it will be found that this clause of the treaty has already been acted on from Sind, as the posts on that border are already far into the Boogtee hills. In fact, I believe it would be found on inquiry that the Sind "Gundoe post" is as far into Khelat territory as would be the proposed Shum post from the Punjab were it erected. In fact, this was one reason for my wishing to bring the Punjab posts into Khelat territory, as they would be then more in line with the Sind post, and at about the same elevation above the plains. As it is, the Punjab posts, at present, are in rear of the Sind posts. I would desire to note here that the Shum Plain, and in fact, I believe, all that part of the country, was bestowed on the Khan of Khelat by the conqueror Ahmed Shah.

21. I believe that the advance of the Sind post of Gundoe into the Boogtee hills was made to suit local plans and for the better military defence of the Sind border. Also that as a military post it has succeeded. Like causes make it desirable that on the Punjab side a similar post, or posts, should be established at about an equal distance into Khelat (Goorchanie) territory. The advantages and disadvantages of the one are equally applicable to the other, while the advance is made as much in the interest of the Khanate of Khelat as in those of the British Government. In fact, as I have endeavoured to show, the interests of the two Governments are identical and inseparable the one from the other, and this is as applicable to the advance of these posts as it is with regard to the general administration of the two countries.

22. In conclusion, I will merely add that the whole state of affairs, as placed before you, has deeply interested me and obtained my full and earnest consideration; and that I am of opinion, which I desire to give with great diffidence, that they require equally your own and that of the Government. I can see no reason why the affairs of Khelat, if directed with courage, discretion, and determination, after being placed on a sure foundation, should not be directed as much to the advantage of the Khanate as to those of the British. There seems to me no just cause why a happy and contented people, well ruled according to the old State constitution, should not take the place of a discontented people, suffering from anarchy and misrule.

No. 2.

No. 748 P., dated Simla, 11th May 1870.

From C. U. Aitchison, Esq., Officiating Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, with Governor-General, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to the Government of Punjab.

With reference to your letter No. 57-170, dated 7th February, on the subject of our policy in Khelat, I am directed to state that His Excellency the Viceroy learned from Captain Sandeman, whom he had the pleasure of meeting at Lahore, that it was proposed that a conference between Sir W. Merewether, Colonel Phayre, and himself should take place, at which a joint memorandum on the subject should be prepared and submitted for the consideration of the Government of India. Under these circumstances, his Excellency in Council thinks it preferable to await receipt of the memorandum before passing any orders on the reference made in your letter of 7th February.

No. 749 P.

Copy of correspondence to Bombay Government for information.

No. 3.

No. 249, dated Bombay Castle, 16th July 1870.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., Officiating Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, with Governor-General.

I am directed to forward to you, for the purpose of being placed before his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, the accompanying copy of letters as per margin, from the Commissioner in Sind, submitting for consideration in connexion with recent events in Beloochistan, the questions of (1) the future management of the Murree and Boogtee tribes on the Upper Sind Frontier, and (2) the position of the Khan of Khelat and his relations to his Sirdars.

1. Letter No. 52, dated the 26th January 1870, with accompaniments.
2. Letter No. 337, dated the 17th June 1870.

2. In forwarding these documents, I am desired to state that this Government, while fully approving the policy proposed by Sir William Merewether, are not satisfied that the experiment of enlisting these tribes on the side of law and order might not be efficiently initiated at a less cost than that estimated by the local authorities.

3. The enclosed copy of Resolution No. 1,712, of the 3rd ultimo, will show the general view of the scheme taken by this Government. If the Government of India concur in this view and will sanction the experiment being tried, his Excellency in Council will take care that the arrangements are carried out with the least possible expense to the State.

4. I am to add, with reference to the last paragraph of his letter, No. 337, of the 17th ultimo, that Sir W. Merewether has been informed that this Government did not consider a special and formal conference with his Highness the Khan necessary in order to carry out the measures proposed, but that they in no way object to Colonel Phayre meeting his Highness and conferring generally with him on any matter in which his Highness' co-operation is required.

5. In accordance with a desire expressed by the Honourable Mr. Mansfield, I am desired to enclose copy of a minute recorded by him on these papers dated the 24th May last.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. & C.B. Commissioner in Sind, to the Governor and President in Council, Bombay.—(No. 52, dated 26th January 1870.)

In submitting the accompanying copies of "Outline of Khelat affairs from 1857 to 1869" received from Colonel Phayre, Political Superintendent of Upper Sind, on which he appears to have devoted much care and labour, I have only considered it necessary to add marginal notes, where required, to the narrative part thereof, as the chief portion is on the records of Government, and will have already received full consideration.

With regard to his concluding remarks, and the opinions he puts forth, they require somewhat closer reviewing, and more extended notice.

2. Colonel Phayre appears to attribute all the ills existing, or said to exist, in Khelat territory chiefly to what he terms the "Khanazad" system of government. It will be as well, therefore, in the first instance to have a clear exposition of what that consists. It is not of recent establishment, as the correspondence now submitted might lead to be inferred, but dates back from the earliest dates of Brahooee rule. The most prominent character in modern days—the Darogha Gool Mahomed—was in service in the time of the great Nusseer Khan, and was one of Mehrab Khan's most trusted and most faithful servants. The dislike to the British which he held to nearly the last days of his life, was due to the very strong feeling he had of the injustice done to his master, Mehrab Khan. He went into exile with his master's son, Nusseer Khan, just before Khelat was captured by the British in November 1839; returning with him when that young Prince was placed on the throne by the British Government in 1840; and serving him to the best of his abilities, and according to his light until the horrible tragedy, which is reported by Sir H. Green to have ended that young Prince's most promising career. Whether Gool Mahomed really caused poison to be administered to Nusseer Khan because he was getting too wedded to British interests, will probably never be satisfactorily cleared up; but his well-known and deep-seated hatred to our power gives weight to the tale, and renders it probable that the events happened as told to Sir H. Green.

3. The other Khanazadees who surrounded Mehrab Khan where the four Shahgassee's brothers, one of whom, Noor Mahomed, was killed by Mehab Khan's side in the breach at the Storm of Khelat. The remaining three, Wullee Mahomed, Goolam Jan and Taj Mahomed, were given offices round Nusseer Khan on his ascending the throne. Of these the only one living and holding power now is the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, one of the most true and honest men in Beloochistan; staunchly faithful to his master, and at the same time most sincere and earnest in his desire to, on all occasions, further and promote the wishes of the British Government. He was selected Wuzeer by His Highness the Khan, at Jacobadad in January 1858, in the presence of the Commissioner Sir Bartle Frere and the late General Jacob, who approved the selection; and he was afterwards formally installed by the Khan at Gundava in presence of all the chiefs of Beloochistan. Sir Henry Green, who worked with him for many years afterwards, invariably stated that no better selection could possibly be made.

4. The present Khan, Meer Khodadad Khan, was, on the death of his brother Meer Nusseer Khan in June 1857, elected ruler by the Chiefs of Beloochistan, the Puggree at the installation being tied on his head by the Chief of Jalawan, Sirdar Taj Mahomed. That the Darogah Gool Mahomed was exerting pernicious influence over the young Khan soon became apparent, and his causing the attack on the Sirdars in September 1857, undoubtedly promoted the unfortunate division which has ever since existed between the Khan and leading chiefs of his country. But that the Sirdars were not entirely free from blame then even is shown by Sir Bartle Frere in his letter No. 64 of 19th February 1858: writing about this attack as follows:—"At that time, he (the "Jam of Beyla) joined other chiefs of influence (these had come to Khelat under pretence "of doing homage to the new Khan) who appear to have thought the occasion pro- "pitious for pressing claims upon the Khan, some of which appear to have been "reasonable and well founded, while others were the reverse; but they were urged "in a manner which induced the Khan's advisers to resort to force, to dislodge the "remonstrant chiefs from the garden near Khelat, where they were encamped. They "retired to a short distance from the capital, and thence addressed petitions for redress "to the British authorities, assembling at the same time their own followers with a "view to enforce the Khan's attention to their claims."

5. At the time of the above circumstances there was another counsellor at the side of the young Khan, not a Khanazada, but a Bunniah named Gungaram, who, though never apparently appointed, was virtually Wuzzeer, and who shared with the Darogah an undisguised enmity to the British Government. One general cause of complaint and dissatisfaction was the power usurped by this Bunniah.

6. On Sir Henry Green, at the conclusion of the Persian war, rejoining his appointment as Political Agent at Khelat in 1858, he found it necessary to exert his whole influence with the Khan, backed by the support of General Jacob and Sir Bartle Frere, to check the proceedings of these two men, and to obtain their removal from office. The Bunniah Gungaram was sent away to Sind by the Khan, but the Darogah remained at Khelat, though relieved from his duties. He for some time continued to exercise

some indirect influence over the Khan for evil, but it was much, if not entirely, nullified by the firm and straightforward bearing of Sir Henry Green, who in a measure succeeded in making a friend of the Darogah before death brought the latter's troublesome career to an end.

7. It was hoped then that matters would run more smoothly, and that the divisions that had been caused might be settled favourably. Sir H. Green was able on occasions to report more favourably of the young Khan, but the unfortunately uncertain character of this young Prince, made still worse by his wretched rearing in the seclusion of the harem and immediate difficulties on his first entering public life led to repeated contre-temps. This capriciousness also, each time that it was shown, naturally increased the ill-feeling amongst the principal Sirdars, and on each recurrence of a difference the attitude assumed by the chiefs becoming more objectionable, the breach could not but be widened in spite of all Sir H. Green's efforts to the contrary. That officer reporting on 29th January 1863 writes thus in reference to this point:—"Much of the ill-feeling "towards the Khan is doubtless caused by his capricious and unstable character, but his "chiefs by the unreasonableness of their demands and insolence of their conduct towards "him, render any permanent settlement of their differences most difficult: his power "over them is slight, and although their lands are held by feudal tenure, any attempt "made by his Highness to enforce even the extradition of a culprit, leads to their banding "together and defying his authority."

8. This capriciousness was most infortuitously displayed in one particular case of the grave insult passed by the Khan on Sirdar Taj Mahomed, the principal Chief of Jalawan, in the year before the above was written. The betrothal of the Khan to the daughter of Taj Mahomed had been formally executed before, but in a hasty moment he suddenly married the Sirdar's sister, widow of his brother, the late Khan, and a determined enemy of her brother. This marriage was perfectly justifiable according to Brahooee law, but under the circumstances was a direct affront to the Sirdar. This act materially assisted in bringing about the revolution which caused the attack on the Khan in 1863, and his deposition for the time. At first Sir H. Green was favorably impressed with Taj Mahomed, but further acquaintance caused him to change his opinion, and after his death he wrote of him:—"One thing is however beyond a doubt "that a more desperate intriguer, or a greater traitor, did not exist in any native court "in Asia, and so long as he remained at large, his Highness the Khan's position could "never have been safe."

9. It should be here pointed out that even during the late Khan's reign, and incessantly from the commencement of that of the present one, there have been elements of disorder always at hand in the shape of the ambitious projects of Azaad Khan of Kharan and of the Jam of Beyla. Azaad Khan though once a dependent of Khelat is now a quasi-independent chief, sometimes owning allegiance to Kandahar, sometimes acknowledging the authority of Persia. He was also father-in-law of the late Khan, Nusseer Khan, and after the accession of that Prince formed, and steadily followed out, the intention of obtaining the Khanate for himself. The Jam of Beyla, Meer Khan, is not a Brahooee, but belongs to a Sindee tribe. His father's sister, however, was married to Mehrab Khan, and he himself is married to a full sister of the late Khan, and half sister of the present one. He is a feudatory of the Khelat ruler holding the territory of Lus Beyla, under the proviso that when called on he should furnish a quota of horse and foot for the service of the Khan.

10. These two chiefs are both well-known aspirants to the Khanate, and have been ever ready to take advantage of any quarrels between the Khan and his nobles, to give their assistance to the latter in hopes of the destruction of the former, thereby furthering their own ends. And it is undoubtedly greatly owing to their intrigues and evil advice that the breach between the Khan and his principal chiefs became greater and greater until it is now almost impossible to readjust on any ancient footing.

11. In March 1863 the chiefs broke out into open rebellion; the Khan was suddenly attacked in his camp at Gundava, and cut down by his own cousin, Shere Dil Khan, who was then put on the throne by the chiefs. Khodadad Khan fled, and after some wanderings, accompanied by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, who then stood staunchly by him, he in November following took up his residence in Kutchee at Nusseerabad, close to the border of British territory. Here he remained until May 1864, when Shere Dil Khan having been assassinated by the commandant of the body of troops used as personal guard by the Khans of Khelat, Khodadad Khan was recalled and reinstated Khan, mainly, it should be said, through the support and good offices of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee. Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Malcolm Green, who was at that time Political Agent at Khelat, in reporting on this revolution, brought

to notice "the loyalty towards the British Government which has characterised the proceedings of all parties in Beloochistan," and further that "although the VI. Article "of the treaty between the British Government and Khelat has been for some months "suspended on the part of the former, no instance has occurred or attempt made to use "this fact as an excuse for departing from the original terms of the treaty; and by "increasing the transit dues on merchandise passing through the country to India, to "raise the revenue to the same amount as it was previous to the treaty being entered "into, and thus save the country from the state of bankruptcy to which the late "disturbances have almost reduced it." This was written in January 1864, and speaks highly for the good feeling generally entertained towards the British Government.

12. For nearly a year after Meer Khodadad's re-accession, affairs remained tolerably quiet and his Highness was engaged trying to settle the affairs of his country after the confusion of the previous year. But in March 1865, Sirdars Moolla Mahomed Raisanee and Taj Mahomed Zehree made common cause, for what exact reason is not clearly shown, doubtless offence taken at some injurious act of the Khan, real or imagined, and attempted an insurrection in Kutchee against his Highness the Khan, having for its object the assassination of Meer Khodadad Khan, and putting his infant son on the throne,—*vide* Captain Harrison's demi-official letter, dated 27th May 1869, submitted to Government under Memo. No. 361 of 7th June. The former was made prisoner, the latter fled to Kandahar. Taj Mahomed died at Khelat in confinement in August 1867. Sir Henry Green in reporting this said, "common bazaar report gave out that he had "been poisoned, but as it is seldom a chief of any note dies, either in Beloochistan or "Affghanistan, without such reports being spread, and as no inquiries that I have been "able to make can prove the truth of the report, I place little faith in it;" and again, "from the time of the present Khan's elevation to the throne, I can state on the best "authority that not a single chief of any description has been put to death by his order, "or by that of any of his people in authority, although few princes have had the provo-"cation he has had to put up with." He further reported with regard to Moolla Mahomed, that from the time "Sirdar Taj Mahomed was secured, and Sirdar Moolla "Mahomed had fled, the most perfect tranquillity reigned throughout Beloochistan, "which was only disturbed by the return of the latter chief from Kandahar during last "month,* with the intention of again creating an insurrection; but no "efforts that he could make gained him any support beyond that of a "few chiefs of minor note, and the vigorous efforts of his Highness the Khan and his "officers, after a few insignificant skirmishes, resulting in the loss of a few men on either "side, entirely quelled the attempt, and most of the principal offenders surrendered "themselves with their wives and families to his Highness' officers; while Sirda Moolla "Mahomed again fled with a few followers to the Murree hills, from whence he will "doubtless soon find his position most inconvenient and sue for pardon."

* October 1867.

13. In July 1865 disturbances were recommenced by the Jam of Beyla in concert with Noordeen, the chief of the Mingul tribe. Their forces were met and defeated by those of his Highness, and the Jam and Noordeen were made prisoners, but pardoned some little time afterwards by the Khan.

14. In January 1868 a messenger came to Sir Henry Green from Moolla Mahomed Raisanee and the other chiefs with him, requesting that Sir Henry Green would intercede in their behalf with their master. He very properly declined to interfere in any way, except at the request of his Highness the Khan, and then only on the condition that both sides should abide by his decision. They agreed to this, so also did his Highness the Khan, and the Sirdars were told to reside quietly at Seebee, a small province in the north-east corner of Kutchee belonging to Kandahar, where they would be unmolested until leisure admitted of their case being taken up. This happened on the 10th of April, when the Wuzzeer Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee both came to Jacobabad. Sir Henry Green after hearing the statements of both sides, made a temporary adjustment of the differences such as would prevent any renewal of hostilities, leaving a more permanent arrangement to be carried out the following cold season when his Highness should come down to the plains.

15. Sir Henry Green's departure from the frontier in May 1868 prevented his carrying out the latter part of his programme. Colonel Phayre succeeded him in August of that year, and shortly after his arrival in October was waited on by Mahomed Khan, the Wukeel of his Highness the Khan, with letters from the latter, "to the effect that, "in consequence of the great scarcity amounting to partial famine that now prevails in "Kutchee from want of rain, his Highness had no intention of leaving Khelat this "winter, unless particularly requested to do so, in which case he expressed his willing-"ness to come into Kutchee at once for an interview. The cases of the principal

" Sarawan Chief, Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, and of many others referred to in Colonel " Sir H. Green's last annual report, will thus remain unsettled, unless some steps are " taken to bring them under his Highness the Khan's consideration." In reference to this, I wrote to Colonel Phayre that "I think under the present circumstances of the " very great scarcity in Kutchee, it would be advisable not to press his Highness the " Khan to descend into the plains this season. It would be not only putting him to " very great inconvenience, but as he must bring a considerable number of people with " him, it would only add to the existing distress. With regard to the cases of Moolla " Mahomed Raisanee and the other chiefs of Sarawan, I regret that nothing can be " done for them at present, their business must stand over until an officer is again " appointed to Khelat." The above will show that the Khan offered to come to Kutchee, if desired, and that his not doing so was approved of by me.

16. There were other reasons also, and very strong ones, which were alleged at the time, why he should not leave his capital. These were that the Jam of Beyla was again plotting insurrection, and was communicating with the Sarawan Chiefs in Seebee with the view of getting them to join him. The latter wisely attended to the advice given them by Colonel Phayre, in which I entirely concurred, to keep quiet where they were, and leave the question of their differences with his Highness to be settled according to the promise of Sir H. Green, when they could be discussed personally by the frontier authorities with that Prince. The Jam of Beyla with Noordeen Mingul and others assembled their forces in Wudd in the end of December to press their claims on the Khan; Balooch Khan, nephew of Azaad Khan of Kharan joined with 400 horse and 1,000 foot. Azaad Khan, who had returned from Kandahar where he had been for some time residing, announced his attention of joining the rebels. His Highness the Khan moved from Khelat with all his available forces and met the rebels in Baghwana, some skirmishing took place, but negotiations were entered upon, and the chiefs ultimately retired with their forces to their respective homes. They stated in letters to Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, sent by that Sirdar to Colonel Phayre, that the Khan promised them what they asked, to be given in two months time, and on these assurances they went to their homes. Nothing however of this sort is mentioned by the Khan in letters from him to his Wukeel with Colonel Phayre, which were delivered to that officer. The outbreak was checked for a time, I believe, in consequence of Moolla Mahomed not having joined it, but it was clear the cessation of disturbances would be only temporary.

Vide Commissioner's letter No. 534, dated 23rd November 1868.

17. Captain Harrison was appointed Political Agent at Khelat under orders received by telegram from your Excellency in February 1869. After my visit to the frontier districts in that month, and March, Colonel Phayre with my concurrence summoned Moolla Mahomed to Jacobabad. He arrived about the 16th of March. Alla Dina Khoord, another of the discontented nobles, was also present, and the two submitted the following statement of their grievances, which were taken down by Captain Harrison and afterwards forwarded to me with a demi-official letter by Colonel Phayre:—

STATEMENT of MOOLLA MAHOMED RAISANEE.

" In former Years, the Khan and his ancestors used to consult with his Sirdars, and act on their advice. We Sirdars between us held about half the territory, and the Khans from their own lands used to give us pay in the following proportions:—

	Rs.
" Sirdar Moolla Mahomed - - - -	1,000
Sirdar Taj Mahomed - - - - -	1,000
Sirdar Noordeen - - - - -	1,000
Sirdar Mahomed Khan - - - -	1,000

" The minor chiefs used to get allowances at what rate I don't remember.

" After the way Sirdar Taj Mahomed was treated by the Khan, I went to Kandahar,* the Khan then withdrew and confiscated my lands. Three years have elapsed since I left. The Khan confiscated all my property, about 700 camels and 80 mares.

* First joining in an unsuccessful attempt at rebellion with Taj Mahomed as before described. —W. L. M.

" The Khan has just released my brother, Hybut Khan, after a captivity of three years. He came with a message from the Khan's mother that if I did not come myself, to send my son to make his salaam, and all my paternal estates would be then restored. I did not place any confidence in these promises and preferred that any thing that could be done for me should be done through the English Government. I don't wish to be too profuse in my complaints, and will therefore briefly state what redress I think I am entitled to.

" 1st.—The restoration of all my paternal estates.

" 2nd—Restoration of property.
" 3rd—The grant of lands which the Khan gave me at Tehree, Mushkab and Kalora.
" 4th.—Compensation for the death of the following people—
Sirdar Taj Mahomed Jalawan.
Kamal Khan Mahomed Hussaino ka Sirdar—
Hubeeb Khan Roostumzai.
Rawut Khan Roostumzai, and his son Meeah Khan.
Mahomed Lehree and Mahomed Khan Lehree.
" 5th.—The right of river water at Dadur.

" In conclusion, I would beg to state that we are discontented at the influence of Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, and that the revenue is devoted to keeping up mercenaries.

ALLA DINA KHOORD'S STATEMENT.

" About five years ago, owing to a difference with Shahgassee Wallee Mahomed, I " fell under the displeasure of the Khan. I hold my ancestral property, Murrow and " Dusht, in Khorasan " (that is above the Bolan), " as also one near Shawl, which I purchased for Rs. 1,000 from Ashlum Khan Patan ; also an estate in Mustoong purchased for Rs. 400.

" I claim in Kutchee the following lands which the Khan took from me when I left his service on account of the way he treated Sirdar Taj Mahomed :

" Nowshera, purchased by Wuderah Adam Khan Bungoolzye and myself for Rs. 6,200 ; we drew the revenue from the land for five years.

" Four of us claim Bahooer, it having been presented to us by the Khan :—
Wuderah Adam Khan Bungoolzye,
Alla Dina Khoord.
Syud Khan and Mahomed Shah Jehangeer Lehree.
" We four were also allowed right of river water at Dadur."

18. In addition to the above statement officially recorded, *Moolla Mahomed informed* Colonel Phayre in the course of conversation that when the Khan was *in exile in 1863,* he wrote a declaration in a Koran to the following effect dated Nusseerabad, 9th October 1863 :—

" At this time, I, Meer Khodadad Khan of Khelat Ahmedzye, swear upon this holy Koran, and declare to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, and his family, that you are free from blame in the injury that has happened to me,* and that by the favor of God you have done well. Nothing of what has happened is on your head, because I did not listen to your advice, and was separate from you. Now you must exert yourself for me with all your heart and life, and if you do so, the original lands which you have enjoyed in Kutchee and Kohistan shall be yours, and in addition to these, I grant you in perpetuity the towns of Kullora, Mushkab and Tehree; also I promise that the son of Naib Moolla Mahomed Hussein,† and the son of Moola Mahomed Ameen (brother of Mahomed Hussein) shall continue to enjoy as much land as they have received in Enam from the Government, and I agree to give them any service that may appear to you, Moolla Mahomed, to be proper.

	Rs.
Kullora worth about in good season -	2,000
Mushkab - - - - -	4,000 or 5,000
Tehree - - - - -	2,000
	R. P.

" I also promise that I will not transact the civil and military business of the country without your consent and advice.

" Whoever is my enemy is yours, and do you regard him as your enemy ; and I will regard any enemy of yours to be my enemy.

" After writing the words of this oath, if you do not support me with your heart and life, you violate this Koran, and if I do not carry out the words of this oath, I shall violate it.

O Seal of Khodadad Khan."

* This refers to his dethronement by Shere Dil Khan.—W. L. M.

† The traitorous Wuzzeer of the young Nusseer Khan.—W. L. M.

19. In no official document does Moolla Mahomed say that the Khan broke this agreement, or that the lands given him were withdrawn until after he fled to Kandahar, and then the reason assigned by the Sirdar for " leaving the Khan " was on account of the latter's treatment of Sirdar Taj Mahomed. The lands were confiscated by the Khan because Moolla Mahomed projected a rebellion in concert with Taj Mahomed, having for its object the assassination of the Khan, and when detected fled to Kandahar.

20. In addition to the statements officially taken down from Moolla Mahomed and Alla Dina Khoord, Colonel Phayre gathered from the former that the following were points which the chiefs generally wished to settle with the Khan. For convenience my remarks are given opposite each point raised :—

"1*st*. They claim that the Khanate shall be constituted, as to laws and government, as it was in the days of the first Nusseer Khan."

1*st*. This has become more and more difficult, owing, in a great measure, to the unreasonable proceedings of the principal chiefs themselves, and the intrigues and designs of the ambitious ruler of Beyla and the Khan of Kharan.

W. L. M.

"2*nd*. They complain of the entertainment of a large body of mercenaries, who are fed from the proceeds of lands and other sources of revenue of which they and their children are deprived."

2*nd*. This has become a necessary sequence of the Khan not having the feudal services of his barons. The sources from which the mercenaries are paid have yet to be truly shown; as, however, these troops supply the place of the barons and their retainers, it might not be considered altogether unjust if a portion of the revenues they received for feudal services were appropriated to the payment of their substitutes.

W. L. M.

"3*rd*. They claim compensation for the murder of Taj Mahomed, the Chief of Jalawan."

3*rd*. This is tantamount to demanding that their Khan should declare himself, if not actually implicated in, responsible for the murder.

W. L. M.

"4*th*. They object to the innovation of the Khan's appointing his own infant son as heir to the chieftainship of Jalawan, the appointment being by right and ancient privilege in the hands of the Jalawan Sirdars themselves, subject to confirmation by the Khan; and that a son of the ruler is not eligible to the position; and, that such a measure cannot fail to perpetuate the present divided condition of the Khanate."

4*th*. This, if ever entertained by him, was a hasty and unwise act of the Khan, said to have been done in the beginning of March 1869. The death of the infant soon after settled the point however it was, and Captain Harrison in his demi-official dated 27th May (submitted to Government) reported "the future Jalawan chief is to be the next of kin, Taj Mahomed's cousin."

W. L. M.

"5*th*. They claim the right of appointing their own Wuzzeer, and want a change of ministry."

5*th*. This was never the case. From the earliest times the Khans selected their own Wuzzeer, and never from among the nobles but from some outside party. At first it was hereditary in the family of the Tajiks, a race well known in Affghan history, usurped for a while in the time of Mehrab Khan by a low born Ghilzie, who was murdered and succeeded by Moolla Mahomed Hussein, son of the previous Tajik minister, and who was removed in the reign of the young Nusseer Khan for treachery, and died in confinement. Gungaram, the Bunniah, then acted as Wuzzeer for a short interval, after which the present Wuzzeer, the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, was appointed.

W. L. M.

"6*th*. They claim to have a voice as of old in the civil and military councils of the Khanate."

6*th*. This is fair enough and would be assented to by the Khan, if the chiefs would be reasonable and not grasp at too much power.

W. L. M.

"7*th*. They say that the treaty of the British Government is with the Khan as ruler of Beloochistan, as the head of the Brahooee confederacy, not with the individual Khodadad Khan, who they say has become their enemy by departing from the rules and laws of their confederacy."

7*th*. The treaty is undoubtedly with the Khan as responsible ruler of Beloochistan, and not merely as head of a confederacy. This is one of the unfortunate errors the chiefs will persist in.

W. L. M.

20. Having heard from Colonel Phayre on the 22nd March that Moolla Mahomed purposed going to Beyla before proceeding to Khelat, I telegraphed as follows:—"It would be better if Moolla Mahomed Raisanee went direct to Khelat and not by Beyla. He will learn nothing good there, and his visiting the Jam first will not tend to improve his position with the Khan. If it can be so arranged, Moolla Mahomed should follow Captain Harrison direct." And again on the 25th idem, "I am still strongly of opinion Moolla Mahomed should not go to Beyla, his doing so would seem like a sanction from us of combination by nobles against the Khan. Moolla Mahomed has behaved most wisely and excellently* hitherto, it would be a pity to lose him that position. They have undoubtedly much just cause of complaint, but we cannot countenance combination to extort concession from the Khan. Our advice to the Khan to act justly will not be wanting. If he fails to listen, we should then withdraw, and leave matters to take their course. The Khan knows what the result would be."

* Alluding to his having remained quiet at Seebee and not joining the Jam's rebellion in October 1868.

21. It ended in Colonel Phayre, at the earnest request of the Sirdars, consenting to their going *viâ* Baghwana to Khelat, their object being to have an interview with the Jalawan Sirdars there before they passed on. This also had better have been avoided, but before any steps could be adopted, the Sirdars had left Jacobabad, and proceeded on their way. No sooner, however, had they started than, disregarding Colonel Phayre's instructions, they proceeded straight to Beyla. After arrival there, the murderous attack on Sirdar Alla Dina Khoord and his sons took place, which the Sirdars hastened to declare was prompted by the Khan. My opinion of this assertion, and how it should be received by the British authorities on the frontier, is given in my letter No. 266 of 1st May 1869, and quoted in Colonel Phayre's statement of events, so need not be re-stated. Conceiving that Colonel Phayre was attaching too much weight to the statement made to him by the disaffected chiefs, and that he was unintentionally drifting into unsuitable interference on their behalf with the Khan, I warned him against such a course. To this he replied in his quoted letter of the 4th of May, but has not given my reply thereto, dated 7th May which, though it was forwarded to your Excellency in my letter No. 35 of 5th June, it may be as well to re-produce here. It was to the following effect:—

"In acknowledging the receipt, to-day, of your letter of the 4th instant, I have the honour to observe that the whole tenor of your letter No. 703, of the 27th ultimo, seemed to convey that you were so impressed with the necessity of some more decided measures being adopted in behalf of the Sirdars of Beloochistan, in respect to their differences with their Sovereign, and that you were so disposed to consider we were bound to interfere more directly for them than had hitherto been the case, that I felt it incumbent on me to point out to you that our relations with the Khan rested with him alone, and that we had no right to accept any of the assertions of his chiefs as to how they considered the treaty to bear, or what they reckoned their rights to be. We have only to deal with the government for the time being, the mode of conducting that abides with the head. We may endeavour indirectly to improve his position and benefit the country generally by proffering good advice, but it should be most carefully done, so that it may not be supposed that we are siding with those who are in opposition to the ruling power, or intending to interfere with the internal government of the country.

"Every little act of ours is watched so closely by these people, and significance attached often in a way least intended, that it is of the first importance to be most guarded against any demonstration of a leaning one way or the other. I am therefore glad of your assurance that your views are not as I supposed, and certainly consider that in the present stage no further communications received from the Sirdars should be acted upon by you, the only reply to any that may occur being that the matter is in the hands of their sovereign, the Khan, who would doubtless act in the manner best suited to the interest of his country generally, and with that justice which should guide all rulers."

22. The events which occurred at and near Khelat in May, the very offensive attitude assumed by the Sirdars, and the liberal, moderate procedure of the Khan, are fully described in the accompaniments to my letter No. 439 of the 30th June to your Excellency. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee obstinately rejecting the favourable conditions allowed him by the Khan, left abruptly with the intention of going to Jacobabad, but Colonel Phayre hearing of his approach, very properly refused to allow him to enter that place. These matters were reported in the letters from Captain Harrison and Colonel Phayre, forwarded under my endorsement No. 414 of 22nd June 1869. I would call attention especially to Captain Harrison's remarks on Moolla Mahomed, and his proceedings as given in his letter No. 10 of the 10th June, quoted in extenso hereafter in para. 29. The Sirdar then passed on to Seebee, where he continued to reside till a

short time back, when hearing of the defeat and flight of the Jam of Beyla, he fled into the Murree hills, pretending that he did not consider himself safe at Seebee. Of the other Sarawen Sirdars, Alla Dina Khoord, Wuderah Adam Khan Bungoolzye, and the Raisanee, next in rank to Moolla Mahomed, separated from the Jam and showed themselves ready to take gratefully what the Khan would give them. Azaad Khan of Kharan was present in the camp of the chiefs, and did all in his power to bring on hostilities which he trusted would assist his plans. The Jam and Noordeen Mingul returned to their respective homes, but only to prepare for what they hoped would prove a more successful rising in the following cold season. Further correspondence on the subject of procedure with respect to Khelat affairs took place with Colonel Phayre, which was forwarded under endorsement No. 416 of 22nd June, and the course laid down by me for adoption was approved by your Excellency and the Government of India.

23. The Jam purposely kept one point of dispute between him and the Khan open, to work when it suited his purpose. This was the question of the ownership of the Kemal Khan property in Baghwana. Captain Harrison's letters on this subject, with accompaniments, were forwarded to Government with my letter No. 757, of 13th November last. From the Jam's proceedings it was clear he intended to make one more most desperate effort to overthrow the Khan and his Government, and to spare no means of trying to induce others to join. Of the Khan's wise promptitude in this crisis, despatching his trusted Wuzzeer with forces on the 25th September; of the latter's rapid advances to Wudd, taking the Minguls by surprise before they were ready for action; of his subsequent defeat of the combined forces of the Jam and Noordeen Mingul, and final occupation of Beyla; as well as of the flight of the Jam into Sind, your Excellency has been informed. Since then, the Wuzzeer in a letter recently received, translation of which is appended, informs me of his having quitted the district of Lus, induced the people to return who had fled from Beyla and other places, in consequence of the Jam's followers having taken to plunder (on being deserted by their leader), and of his having been able to cause the restoration of a good deal of the plundered property, after which he was about to proceed to Mekran to reinforce his Highness' Naib at Kedj, who was alarmed at reported aggressive movements from the Persian side.

24. Captain Harrison, thinking that his presence with the Khan during the above operations might possibly lead to complications which it was well to avoid, very judiciously took the opportunity of visiting the districts of Moostung and Shawl, and descended by the Bolan Pass into Kutchee, where, or at Jacobabad, he has since remained. His reports on his Highness the Khan's proceedings and the Shahgassee's movements, Nos. 42, 44, and 48, were forwarded to Government under No. 789 of the 27th November 1869.

25. The above completes the narrative of events down to the present time. I have endeavoured to treat on them as briefly as possible, and to avoid as much as I could repetitions of what appears in Colonel Phayre's statement, but in some places the latter has been unavoidable with a due regard to clear exposition of what has really passed. The Khanazada (literally "sons of the house") government which the chiefs prominently bring forward in their complaints as the main cause of the evils existing in the country—and this statement Colonel Phayre appears fully to have accepted—has been shown to have existed long previous to the reign of the present Khan (who has the sole credit of the remaining portion of the evils); and a careful review of the events which have occurred during that reign will point to the fact that the Khanazada administration has, except for a very short time at the commencement, been conducted in a far less objectionable manner, and by less objectionable people, than was the case before. The present Khan came to the throne in 1857. The most powerful person at Khelat then, as before in the late Khan's reign, was Daroga Gool Mahomed, but through the manly and firm bearing of Major (now Sir Henry) Green, this man's evil designs were successfully defeated, and early in 1858 he was removed from the councils of the Khan, dying not long after. Before his death even, his hitherto unrelenting hatred to everything British gave way before the uprightness of the English gentleman, for though deprived of his former power, he expressed himself in friendly terms to Major Green. The next in influence and with equal dislike to us left to the new Khan by his predecessor, was not a Khanazada, but the Bunnia Gungaram, who had been employed as *de-facto* Wuzzeer and Treasurer by the late Nusseer Khan, after the deposition of Moola Mahomed Hussein, whose treachery to his master had been exposed by General Jacob. Gungaram was removed from his post and the country after the interview of the Khan with Sir Bartle Frere and General Jacob, at Jacobabad in December 1857, on which occasion the Khan fixed his choice on Wullee Mahomed Shahgassee as Wuzzeer, and his selection was fully approved by those two representatives of Government. For the character and con-

duct of Wullee Mahomed since then I cannot do better than to call attention to Sir Henry Green's last report, written in April 1868, before leaving the frontier. Nothing could be higher than the terms in which that officer spoke of the Shahgassee, who had then served the present Khan as Wuzzeer faithfully and most ably for ten years. Having held charge of the frontier during General Jacob's absence in 1856 and 1857, and again after his death from the beginning of 1859 to the middle of 1862, during which time I had the best opportunities of judging of the character and conduct of the Shahgassee, I can most fully endorse all that was said of him by Sir Henry Green, and would add my opinion that no sovereign ever had a more trusty servant, or one who had the interests of his master and country more sincerely at heart. Besides the Shahgassee, the only other Khanazadas holding offices about the Khan, are the two sons of the Daroga Gool Mahomed, but these have neither the talent, influence, nor venom of the old man, and may be said to take no prominent part in the administration. The real working is by his Highness the Khan and the Wuzzeer.

26. With regard to his Highness the Khan, the defects in his character have been repeatedly brought to the notice of Government, some of them are such as are particularly unfortunate in a Prince called on to rule over proud and headstrong nobles, and a wild race of people. Capricious, and occasionally vindictive, as he has displayed himself to be, he has also shown that he could act with firmness and generosity, as was evinced in the several rebellions of the Jam of Beyla and the various outbreaks headed by Moolla Mahomed Raisanee. He met all these boldly and vigorously, defeating each attempt as it was made, and afterwards treating each with almost undue leniency. He twice pardoned the Jam of Beyla and his confederate Noordeen Mingul, and last spring of his own accord gave to Moolla Mahomed Raisanee most favourable terms, in spite of the hostile attitude assumed by that Sirdar, and of his leaguing with the Khan's most inveterate enemies, the Jam of Beyla and Azaad Khan of Kharan.

27. On his first ascending the throne, the Khan was styled "a lad of weak intellect." The real fact is, little or nothing was known of him at that time, his existence had never before been officially notified, and confined strictly to the seclusion of the harem, he was not likely to have much chance of displaying intellect, or having any natural manly powers at all developed. The question of weak intellect may be dismissed, for he has since shown that, whatever may have been the first opinion formed, he has displayed on occasions much shrewdness and aptitude for public business. There can be no doubt, however, that his early education among only women and slaves, had a most injurious effect on his character, while the reputation he came first on the public scene with, led others to suppose that a creature was given to them to be moulded to the will of the party having the greatest power in the State. Hence came the scramble for that power, which took place from the very first, between the Daroga with Gungaram, and the chief Sirdars of the country. On the two former being removed, it was continued directly against the Khan himself by the Jam and Azaad Khan, and afterwards openly joined in by Taj Mahomed, the leading chief of the southern portion of Beloochistan, and Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, head of the northern part. That the Khan failed to draw his barons around and to him, and by his own conduct helped to increase the differences that had arisen between him and them, is indisputable, but it must be recollected at the same time that his position was an exceedingly difficult one, unusually so, for even the head of the wild clans of Beloochistan, and some credit may be accorded to him that he has not entirely failed in all respects. In January 1863, it was recorded "much of the "ill-feeling towards the Khan is doubtless caused by his capricious unstable character, "but his chiefs by the unreasonableness of their demands render any permanent settle-"ment of their differences most difficult." Such it was from the first, and such, owing to the infusibility of the materials, it has continued to the last. In one respect his Highness the Khan has never changed, and that is, his sincere desire to act to the best of his ability and power in accordance with the wishes of the British Government, and with the treaty made with his brother and continued with him. This has been proved in many ways, and reported on many occasions, and being the main point with which we are concerned, he has received the support of the British officers politically connected with him.

28. Of Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, the Chief, who Colonel Phayre still seems to think has been oppressively and unjustly treated, I can only say that like Sir Henry Green (and Colonel Phayre now), I had originally formed a high opinion of him, and considered him quite as likely to prove the most stable pillar of the State. My first acquaintance with him was in the beginning of 1854, when he accompanied the late Khan, Meer Nusseer Khan, to Jacobabad. He was then quite a young man, just passed 20, handsome, frank, and of most gentlemanly demeanour. The last time was in 1860,

on his own estate in Kutchee, at Mittree near Dadur. The impression left then was still most favourable, but judging from recent events, it would appear that increase in years and the bad example of others have led to a great change for the worse in him, and to the entertainment of ambitious ideas and greed for power which was incompatible with his position as a noble and with his loyalty as a subject of the ruler of the Khelat State. Captain Harrison's demi-official and official reports on what occurred at Khelat in May last, show clearly how fully he was convinced, by the facts adduced by the Khan and the Sirdar's own demeanour, of the wrong course the latter was pressing, and of the mistaken view that had been entertained of his present character and designs.

29. I would here quote a portion of Captain Harrison's letter, No. 9, of the 9th June last, which is not given in Colonel Phayre's statement, but which is of great importance when the character and action of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed are being considered. Captain Harrison's local experience of eleven years' work on the frontier of Upper Sind gives his opinion much weight.

"With reference to the 6th para. of letter No. 266 from the Commissioner, it will be only necessary to allude to two or three statements of the Sirdars put forward by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, and by comparing them with what actually occurred, a fair idea of their truthfulness or otherwise may be arrived at.

"The chief statement is that they, the Sirdars, had not done anything to warrant the treatment they had received at the Khan's hands. That he was jealous of their power and influence, and that he was persuaded by Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed that he would never have a strong government until he drove them out of the country.

"Against this are the following facts:—Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, aided by Sirdar Taj Mahomed and other chiefs, organised the rebellion in which the present Khan was wounded and had to fly for his life. Shere Dil Khan was then elected Khan in his place, and was tolerated so long as he had money and land to give away. These turbulent Sirdars then murdered him, and reinstated Khodadad Khan, and virtually became the rulers of Beloochistan. Their greed and oppressive acts at last aroused the anger of the well-disposed Sirdars, and they insisted on the Khan asserting his authority. The Sirdars Moolla Mahomed and Taj Mahomed then organised another conspiracy to murder his Highness, and place his infant son on the Khanate. This being discovered just in time, the Sirdars, with the exception of Taj Mahomed, managed to escape; subsequently Taj Mahomed died in confinement.

"A second statement of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's calculated to mislead is, that owing to his being exiled, 20,000 of his followers have also shared his fate, and are in actual want.

"The Sarawans are composed of several tribes, of which the Shawanees and Raisanees have at one time or another been the head. The late Nusseer Khan, for an act of rebellion on the part of the Shawanees, took away their standard and gave it to the Raisanees. The total strength of this latter tribe is only about 200, of which number 150 are with Sirdar Moolla Mahomed. The rest of the Sarawans are loyally disposed, and his Highness, taking into consideration the treacherous character of the Raisanee chief, has once more elected the Shawanees as head of the Sarawans.

"The Sirdars have talked rather freely regarding Taj Mahomed's mother being kept a prisoner by the Khan.

"This is not the case; she lives in a neighbouring village and constantly goes to call upon his Highness. She has no sympathy whatever with the Jam's party, and states that her son's ruin was entirely owing to the evil influence of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed.

"From the above there can be no doubt of the utter want of truth in Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's statements, furthermore that they were only made to bring the Khan into disrepute. His unparalleled treachery can only elicit one opinion, that any hardship or any privation he may have undergone is only what he deserved. As regards the minor chiefs who have been in exile, they preferred conspiring with Moolla Mahomed against their sovereign to remaining loyal and true, and have therefore no one but themselves to thank for the sufferings they may have endured during the past three or four years.

"Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's behaviour, since I met him at Baghwana, convinces me that his previous history has not been overdrawn or exaggerated, and I look upon his having refused to take up his hereditary lands as a fortunate circumstance for the Khan and his country.

* * * * * *

"The latter part of this report will, I trust, show that the Sirdars were not exiled without very good reason, and that their character is not quite what they would wish people to believe."

Again, on the 10th June, Captain Harrison wrote :—

" I have the honor to report for your information that I have just received a letter from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, stating that he is *en route* to Jacobabad, with the view of giving of giving you his version of the policy that has been followed in connexion with himself and other Sirdars.

" I would most respectfully urge that the opinion of his character recorded in my report was not written without due consideration and a perfect conviction of its truth; it may add to the strength of my present opinion to state that until recent events no one was more favourably impressed than myself with Sirdar Moolla Mahomed. This Sirdar's character is dishonest and untruthful in the extreme, and I think the way he perverted your* instructions will convince you that such is the case. Instead of using his influence to persuade the other Sirdars to meet me in a friendly spirit, it was at his instigation than the Jam marched an armed force to within a few miles of Khelat, and it was this Sirdar that told me in Durbar that if they did not get what they wanted they would fight for it.

* Colonel Phayre's.

" It may perhaps be thought that the late trouble I have had with the Sirdars may have prejudiced me against Moolla Mahomed : such is not the case, and this Sirdar's character may be appreciated at its real value when his late allies and confederates, Sirdar Alla Dina Khoord, Wuderah Adam Khan, and others, say that they regret the day they allowed him to be their guide and counsellor.

" Sirdar Alla Dina Khoord, who is by no means a scrupulous person, stigmatizes the Sirdar's having come with an armed force as a most disgraceful proceeding.

" I am most anxious to do the best I can for this country and so far solicit your support that when Sirdar Moolla Mahomed presents himself you will let him know that instead of representing the true feelings of the Sirdars and people in Beloochistan, he is simply looked upon as a discontented exile with a few followers, and that as he has refused the fair and equitable terms that were offered to him by his Highness, he cannot possibly expect further aid or sympathy.

" I was aware three weeks ago that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed would be likely to pay you a visit. My moonshee was discovered writing to the Sirdars and advising them that if they did not get what they wanted, to report me to you and the Commissioner in Sind, and that everything would then be made right.

" It is with this idea that some of them refused the Khan's terms."

Colonel Phayre very properly, and in accordance with the instructions conveyed to him in May, refused to see the Sirdar, and in positively declining either interview or further intercourse, added " that I had fulfilled my promise when I first came to Jacobabad in continuation of Sir Henry Green's, that I would use my good offices with the Khan on his behalf, that he had declined the Khan's offer, and therefore that I did not see what more could be done for him."

30. Captain Harrison, in his annual report now being submitted, writes in further reference to Moolla Mahomed :—

" His Highness, whilst occupied in punishing those who for years past had been trying to subvert his authority, was not forgetful of those who were anxious to return to their allegiance. Sirdar Alla Dina Khoord and Sirdar Adam Khan Wuderah went to Seebee after they had parted with the Jam, and gave as their reason that no one would believe they had been forgiven. His Highness hearing this sent them a written order sealed by him, stating that they might return to their country and live amongst their own people, and that if their conduct was such as met with his approval, that he would look upon them as his Sirdars. The whole of the Raisanee tribe sent Hybut Khan, the elder brother of their Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, to Nawab Mahomed Khan,* saying that they did not wish to join in any intrigues that might be got up against the Khan, and only wished to be allowed to remain quietly at Mittree. His Highness wrote two very kind letters to Hybut Khan, saying that he had no wish to interfere with them, and that no one should harm them so long as they adhered to their present good intentions.

Moolla Mahomed is with the Bijaranee Murrees, and it has been reported from the Boogtee Hills that these Sirdars fled after him. Inquiries will be made.—R. PHAYRE.

* His Highness's Wukkeel at Jacobabad.—W. L. M.

" Directly Sirdar Moolla Mahomed heard of the defeat of the Jam of Beyla and of Sirdar Noordeen, he fled with six followers to Kahun† (only one of whom was a Raisanee). The rest of the tribe elected to remain quietly at Mittree under Hybut Khan."

† Headquarters of the Murrees.—W. L. M.

31. The fears expressed by Moolla Mahomed were, I am certain, quite unfounded, and given out merely as a reason for his going to the Murrees, and with the hope of enlisting their sympathies. The district of Seebee is foreign to Beloochistan, and belongs to Kandahar; the Khan would not therefore venture to molest the Sirdar there,

even if he troubled himself about him at all now, which is very doubtful. There was another object which struck me immediately I heard of the flight as the most likely thing the Sirdar had in view, and that was hearing an expeditionary trip was about to be made from the British frontier into the Hills, and that the Murree chiefs would be summoned to meet it, he hoped through them to get an opportunity of being again received and listened to by the British authorities. I at once cautioned Colonel Phayre against this. Very recently the surmise has been shown not to have been incorrect, for I have heard from Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazee Khan, that he had received a communication from the Murree chiefs, in which they asked permission to bring the Sirdar to him. I have informed Captain Sandeman by telegram that this should not be allowed, and that no communication should be held with the Sirdar.

32. I have entered at length into the facts relating to the Khan and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, that the whole circumstances may be before your Excellency without the necessity of reference to numerous documents. With reference to the other rebellious chiefs, I need only repeat that the Jam is now with his son and ladies of his family an exile at Kurrachee, Sirdar Noordeen is said to have fled to Kandahar, but his younger brother is with the Jam. Alla Dina Khoord and Wuddera Adam Khan Bungoolzye have been told they may return to their own lands, and probably have done so. To show the exact state of the present relations between his Highness the Khan and his chiefs, I requested Colonel Phayre to obtain from Captain Harrison lists showing those who were well- and those who were ill-disposed towards his Highness. These lists are appended. From them it will appear that there are 51 of the former to 12 of the latter, not counting the Murrees and Boogtees, whose position is peculiar, and who have had little to do ever with the course of events going on at Khelat. Of the 12, six belong to the one tribe of Minguls, who have for years past given themselves entirely over to the direction of the Jam of Beyla.

33. The last on the list is Azaad Khan of Kharan, the never-ceasing fomenter of disturbances in Beloochistan for more than 20 years past. Finding his objects could not be obtained through the Jam and Moolla Mahomed, he left them in June last and went back to Kandahar, where he endeavoured to interest the Ameer, and Sirdar Shere Ali Khan, Governor of Kandahar, in his behalf. Captain Harrison reports: "A lengthy "correspondence received on this subject between the Khelat and Affghanistan Governments. His Highness' replies were dignified and appropriate, viz., that he should be "most happy to restore Azaad Khan the land that he held for doing his Highness' "service, when he chose to account to him for having plundered the village of "Punchgoor, and other aggressive acts."

34. At the same time that the list of Sirdars was called for, I requested also that a report might be submitted on the numbers, composition, and behaviour of the force of mercenaries, so freely abused by the discontented Sirdars, and so constantly referred to by Colonel Phayre, but about which no precise information was given, or indeed anything beyond hearsay statements. Copy of Captain Harrison's report is appended, also of Colonel Phayre's forwarding letter.

The numbers shown are:—

Artillery	78
Cavalry	200
Body Guard Infantry	400
Regiment of Infantry	800
Total	1,478

Colonel Phayre points to a further body of household cavalry mounted on the Khan's horses, and styled the Khan's Umlah. The numbers of these are not given, but Colonel Phayre concludes they make up the 2,000, or 522 more. This could scarcely be; the Khan would hardly have at his disposal that number of horses. But whether it is so or not, is a matter of little importance to the general question, that it is unnecessary to delay over it. This force of "regulars" as it was called at first, consisted only of 400 in the time of Meer Nusseer Khan, the late Khan. He found such a body necessary, and probably judged so from what he had seen in his early youth of the advantages gained by our regular paid soldiery. His selection of material does not, from Sir Henry Green's account, appear to have been happy. The severe discipline, however, recommended by that officer, and seen to have been put in force, may have had a good effect on even such a band of roughs. The 400 was increased since 1856 to nearly four times that number, for reasons which need no elaborate description, being simple, and the natural consequence of events described above. Cavalry and artillery were added. Of

the whole Captain Harrison speaks in more favourable terms than was said of the ancient 400, and I should be inclined to think justly, for if so much larger a body had not some approach to good order and discipline, and were not made to behave decently, it must have fallen to pieces long ere this, or been utterly destroyed, when scattered about in small detachments amongst a population every male of which nearly bears arms. Colonel Phayre takes exception to the favourable report, and quotes an instance under his own knowledge of gross insolence on the part of a captain, which he accepts as conclusive proof that the whole are bad. With regard to payment of these levies, Captain Harrison distinctly denies the statement brought forward by the discontented chiefs that it was made from confiscated lands. He says, " I am in a position to state that such is not the " case, his Highness has sufficient revenue from his lands at Baghwana, Khelat, Mus- " toong, Kutchee, and other places, besides the transit dues, to support his small force. " the only Sirdaree lands estranged are those of the Raisanee chief, and I showed in my " letter of the 10th June that his Highness was quite willing to restore them. The " actual income of this Sirdar, taking everything into consideration, used to be about " Rs. 6,000 per annum."

The monthly cost of his Highness the Khan's force is Rs. 9,583, or annually Rs. 1,14,996.

35. With regard to maintaining this force, the Khan is I conclude the best judge as to its necessity, and considering his life was once nearly taken, and he was violently deposed by the very barons it is recommended he should call again to his side without any new power of control over them, it is not surprising that the Khan should desire to keep by him some support, in which he has at all events some confidence. Exactly the same course of events that occurred in Beloochistan is now passing in Affghanistan. His Highness the Ameer finding it impossible to trust any longer to the doubtful support of his nobles, and their treacherous levies, is putting an end to the feudal system, and forming a regular paid army, and I hold we have no more right or reason to interfere with the proceedings of his Highness the Khan of Khelat in this way, than we have with his Highness the Ameer of Cabool.

36. Colonel Phayre, however, in spite of the views of Government communicated to him by order of your Excellency last summer, and in spite of the clear evidence of the gross misconduct of the chiefs of Beloochistan, which was laid before him by the Political Agent, Captain Harrison, still conceives that some further interference than has hitherto been exerted should be employed, and that the chiefs being a grievously ill-used set of people, measures should be adopted to compel his Highness the Khan to treat them in a different manner. I need hardly say that I entirely differ with Colonel Phayre in his estimation of the state of affairs in Beloochistan, and particularly so in regard to the light in which he holds our relations with that State. It is not quite clear what course exactly he would pursue, but it would seem that his first move would be to address his Highness the Khan on the part of Government with a threat that, unless he behaved better to his nobles, and gave them the share of power in his kingdom which they thought they should have, the British officer at his court would be withdrawn, and he would be left to his own devices. Colonel Phayre lays stress on this being the policy of Lord Elphinstone's Government in 1858, but that was only enunciated on a very adverse report on the Khan's personal character, and it was never considered requisite to carry it into effect.

37. It is scarcely necessary to point out that this would now be a style of interference totally opposed to the orders of Government, and unjust to his Highness the Khan himself, who has ever staunchly adhered to that part of the treaty under which he bound himself " to act in subordinate co-operation with the British Government, and to enter " into no negotiation with other States without its consent," and has steadily endeavoured in spite of great difficulties and most adverse circumstances, to carry out to the best of his ability and power the other terms of the treaty. It would also be a very false move, for it would be setting ourselves in direct antagonism to the Khan. It would destroy his power for good as a ruler of the country, and it would infallibly lead to greater dissensions than had ever occurred before, a scramble for power, ending in the country being parcelled out amongst a number of rival chieftains, jealous of and hostile to each other, and ready to hand their services over to the highest bidder who looked for them. It was with such a result in view that I wrote as I did in January 1861, when it was proposed to withdraw the political officer from Khelat.

38. I will not take up your Excellency's time with further remarks on Colonel Phayre's proposal, but will now briefly allude to what I consider the exact state of affairs in Beloochistan, and the course I would recommend for adoption.

39. With regard to the former, there can be no question that the present position of

his Highness the Khan is stronger now than it has ever been before. By his moderation and judgment displayed last May, aided by the good advice and countenance of the Political Agent, he defeated the designs of the combined assemblage of the few discontented Sarawan and Jalawan chiefs with Azaad Khan, and their separation followed. He acted with suitable promptitude and energy when the Jam of Beyla again broke into open rebellion in September, and his forces defeating the Jam and his associates, drove them from the country. All the chiefs of Beloochistan—with the exception of 12, of which five are of the same tribe—have given in their allegiance to him, and he has shown himself disposed to be lenient to the latter, in spite of their rebellious and ungrateful behaviour. At the same time he is most willing and ready to act on judicious advice when offered to him, or given on his asking, thus proving that he has the desire at least to rule well. After the plan for subsidising the Murrees fell through, owing chiefly, I believe, to its too limited scope, his Highness caused excellent arrangements to be made, at considerable expense, for the protection of merchants traversing Kutchee, and though more than usual have passed down the Bolan this season, I have heard of no instance of outrage having been committed since these arrangements were established.

40. As to the course that should be adopted for the future, there is no one who feels more than I do the value and necessity of having a strong and friendly power in Beloochistan, a country that covers so large a tract of our western frontier, and that is likely at any time to be of such vital importance to us. It is for that very reason that I would recommend that no change should be allowed in the policy hitherto followed towards the Khelat state, that the same instructions should be given to our Political Agent at that court to abstain from all direct interference in the affairs of the internal government of that country, though at the same time to be ever ready to give such advice to his Highness as will assist him in his endeavours to place his rule on a solid basis, and to give his moral support to all such acts of his Highness as may be conducive to that object. I would also recommend strongly that an early interview should take place between his Highness the Khan and Colonel Phayre, at such place as may be most suitable, with a view to a better understanding of the real state of affairs being arrived at, and at which Colonel Phayre would be able personally to explain to his Highness the present desires and wishes of Government.

41. On this occasion the question also of the future management of the Murree and Boogtee tribes might be fully discussed, and a sound plan inaugurated, less liable to the fluctuations and mishaps that have attended those hitherto devised. The only injury to trade, and only jeopardy to the Punjab frontier, arises from the restless and lawless habits of these two tribes, who reside in the hills immediately adjacent to the southern Punjab line. A portion of both these tribes has been taken into the service of Government under the officers on that frontier, and since then plundering has in a measure, if not entirely, ceased. There is, however, one defect in this arrangement which I think should be remedied, as it is otherwise likely to prove troublesome,* and that is, that it is carried on direct with these tribes, who are subjects of his Highness the Khan, and not through the officer to whom political relations with that court are entrusted. This is apt to lead to complications which had better be avoided, and I would therefore recommend that in whatever new plan is proposed, the Punjab arrangements should be embodied in their integrity, and their carrying out be entrusted to the Political Superintendent on the frontier of Upper Sind, who acting in cordial co-operation with the officers on the Punjab side, would at once cause to be corrected any faults complained of, or attend to any suggestions offered.

* Uncivilised tribes like the Murrees and Boogtees are apt to consider that when they can refer to different authorities, that the influence of one may be used to counteract the policy of the other. This of course would not be the case, the respective officials being in strict accord, but the idea would nevertheless be entertained by the tribe as has been lately exemplified. Communication with Moolla Mahomed Raisanee having been broken off by the Political Superintendent on the Sind frontier, that Chief resorts to the Murrees, and gets them to address the Deputy-Commissioner, Dera Ghazee Khan, in his behalf.

W. L. M.

42. Instructions were issued not long ago by his Excellency the Viceroy for an expedition to go into the hills north of the Sind and west of the Punjab frontier, to examine and report on the country, as well as on certain propositions that had been suggested by the Punjab Government. Colonel Phayre submitted a letter to me putting forth his ideas as to the best means of carrying out those propositions, to which I replied, and have now the honour of appending both letters for your Excellency's consideration. It will be observed that I consider advancing our frontier line into the Boogtee Hills a mistake. It would protect the Boogtees certainly, who are now more tractable than they used to be, but it would have little or no effect on the Murrees, whose hills lie beyond the Boogtees, and who are in reality the only people near us who continue to follow freebooting habits. Occupying the Boogtee Hills would give nothing, while it would be placing our posts in a less favourable position than they have at present. There is

less objection to advancing a post from the Punjab frontier into the Shum plain, if it was found desirable, as that would not be far in advance of the supports, and would be in a locality where the troops could readily act.

43. A simpler plan by far, one that would be less expensive, and one that would involve us in no new complications, would be that at the interview with his Highness the Khan, Colonel Phayre should be instructed to consult with him as to the best and surest means of inducing the Murrees and Boogtees to give up plundering entirely, and that Colonel Phayre should then submit a project accordingly. As a basis to work upon, I would suggest that the plan, which has so far succeeded well on the Punjab frontier, should be taken, viz., that the principal chiefs and certain members of the Murree and Boogtee tribes should be taken into pay. This, however, should be done in the name of the Khan, and whatever money had to be paid to these tribes should be disbursed through the Khan's officers at Jacobabad, in presence of the Political Superintendent or his assistant (should the Political Agent at Khelat not be there, as would probably be the case), the chiefs coming in themselves, or deputing suitable substitutes to receive their stipends each month. A certain number of each tribe should also always remain at Jacobabad to keep up communications, being occasionally relieved. The object of this is, that it would instil habits of regularity and order into these wild people, would give them a feeling of confidence in the arrangement, and help gradually to civilise and improve them. All this, and the regular payment of hard cash distributed amongst these two tribes, would assist most materially (if it did not at once produce it) in bringing about their pacification and settlement, which has ever been a matter of anxious desire and consideration. One long existing cause of difference between the British and Khelat Governments would be put an end to, and the trade traffic from and to Affghanistan would be free from all molestation, from the top of the Bolan Pass to the sea.

44. To effect this, the following might be taken as a scale for guidance. The Boogtees have already some of their tribe employed in the service of Government on the Sind and the Punjab frontier, the Murrees only on the latter. I would propose that in addition to the above, Goolam Murteza, chief of the Boogtees, should receive Rs. 100 per mensem personal pay, and provide—

2 Jemadars, at Rs. 20 each - - -	Rs.	40	0 0
50 Sowars, at Rs. 15 each - - - -	„	750	0 0
Total per mensem,	Rs.	890	0 0

The Murrees being now divided into two distinct bodies, residing respectively at Kahun and Kote Moondaie, and the breakdown of the late plan being owing chiefly to its having been carried out with only one branch, that at Kahun, I would recommend that a quota should be taken from each of these divisions of the same strength and on the same principle as from Goolam Murteza Boogtee.

Thus to Guzzun Murree, Chief at Kahun, personal allowance - - - - -	Rs.	100	0 0
2 Jemadars, at Rs. 20 each - - -	„	40	0 0
50 Sowars, at Rs. 15 each - - - -	„	750	0 0
Total	Rs.	890	0 0
To Kurreem Khan Murree, Chief at Kote Moondaie, personal allowance - - - -	Rs.	100	0 0
2 Jemadars, at Rs. 20 each - - -	„	40	0 0
50 Sowars, at Rs. 15 each - - - -	„	750	0 0
Total	Rs.	890	0 0
Making a monthly total of - -	Rs.	2,670	0 0
Annually - - - - -	„	32,040	0 0

I take the rates of Rs. 20 and 15, because those now prevail for Belooch jemadars and sowars on the Sind frontier, and any difference would cause discontent. On the Punjab frontier there are 20 Murrees and 20 Boogtees engaged, but at Rs. 20 per mensem. These might be assimilated to the others, and by giving a slight increase and introducing the rank of Jemadar, discontent would be avoided here too. They might be from the Murrees at Kahun, to which the Punjab is nearest, and not of Kote Moondaie.

1 Jemadar - - - - -	Rs.	20	0 0
30 Sowars, at Rs. 15 each - - - - -	„	450	0 0
Total	Rs.	470	0 0

From the Boogtees—

1 Jemadar - - - - -	Rs.	20	0 0
30 Sowars, at Rs. 15 each - - - - -	„	450	0 0
Total	Rs.	470	0 0

Total of both per mensem - - -	Rs.	940	0 0
Total per annum - - - -	„	11,280	0 0
Add charges on the Sind frontier - -	„	32,040	0 0
	Rs.	43,320	0 0

or, given in round numbers, Rs. 44,000 per annum.

45. Were the above arrangements approved and sanctioned, I am confident that the best results will follow. There would be uninterrupted peace on the Punjab frontier, from Sind to Dera Ghazee Khan, and opportunity given for the resources of that part of the country being developed undisturbed. On the western side of the Murree and Boogtee Hills the country would be freed from the harassing attacks of the hitherto inveterate marauders occupying those hills; while the trade line down the Bolan Pass and across the plains of Kutchee into Sind would be free from molestation, and the British provinces to the south would largely benefit by the trade which would annually increase, and follow that line to the sea.

46. I have before expressed my opinion that Rs. 50,000 per annum paid to his Highness the Khan under the Treaty, in lieu of the higher duties formerly levied from merchants passing through his territory, does not reimburse that sovereign for the loss he sustains in the reduction of the transit dues as collected under that Treaty. It should also be borne in mind that under the 5th article, in addition to the fixed duty, his Highness " binds himself, his heirs, and successors, to prevent all plundering or other " outrage by his subjects, within or in the neighbourhood of British Territory, to protect " the passage of merchants to and fro between the British dominions and Affghanistan, " whether by way of Sind or by the seaports of Mekran;" and that to aid in the fulfilment of these obligations, the grant of Rs. 50,000 was to be applied as well as to the other stipulation. I trust, therefore, I shall not be considered presumptuous or unreasonable in earnestly recommending that the further sum above mentioned of Rs. 44,000 may be annually granted to aid the Khan in acting up to his engagements. Applied, as suggested, it will check cattle lifting and intertribal quarrels, for any party offending in either of these respects would have its subsidy withheld from it, until restitution and reparation were made; it would afford the protection to trade which does not exist now, or when it does, it is at such an outlay on the Khan's part that he is unable effectually to maintain it; and it would enable his Highness to turn his undivided attention to the consolidation of his power and the good government of his country, at a time too when affairs look more promising for his success in this respect than has ever been the case before.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

From Colonel R. Phayre, C.B., Political Superintendent on the Frontier of Upper Sind to the Commissioner in Sind,—(No. 1579, dated 8th November 1869.)

The time having nearly arrived for carrying out the orders of his Excellency the Viceroy in Council, as directed in the Government of India's letter, No. 879, dated 25th June last, I have the honour to submit for consideration the following views as to the aim and scope of the proposed alterations in our arrangements on this part of the frontier, in connexion with the objects detailed in the 8th paragraph of Mr. Seton Karr's letter.

2. The accompanying sketch map shows the tract of country under reference, viz., the hilly area included between Dera Ghazee Khan and Dadur (at the foot of the Bolan Pass) by route of Barkhan and Mundahee on the north, the Sind frontier districts on the south, Kutchee on the west, and Dera Ghazee Khan districts on the east.

NOTE.—The Kandahar territory of Seebee and Kujjuck is of course excepted.

3. I would submit that the geographical position of this tract with reference to our border interests, as well as our communication with the Affghan highlands, either by the Bolan, or direct from Dera Ghazee Khan, establishes its political and strategical importance; more particularly the northern and western portions of it, inhabited by the Mundahee Murrees.

4. In time of war it might be necessary to use the direct route from Dera Ghazee Khan to Dadur through Barkhan, Tull, Chotiali, &c.; at all events it is highly desirable that we should know more

of that tract than we do; and as the Mundahee Murrees are by far the most troublesome section of that tribe, any political and military arrangements that failed to provide for civilizing, and if necessary, coercing them, would, I submit, be faulty and liable to break down.

5. The boundaries of the Goorchanees, Lasharees, Khetranees, Murrees, and Boogtees are roughly shown. Their accuracy or otherwise, however, must be verified by local inquiry.

6. Kutchee is the extensive plain tract lying to the westward of the Murrees and Boogtees. It is the eastern portion of it, extending from Dadur to Shahpoor, that is so frequently overrun with impunity by the Mundahee Murrees and other plunderers, caravans travelling from Affghanistan are generally plundered in the northern part of it between Bagh and Dadur.

7. Nominally the Murrees and Boogtees are within the scope of his Highness the Khan of Khelat's rule, but so far from his exercising any real power over them, he has hitherto been unable to protect his own territory in Eastern Kutchee from their murderous and predatory attacks.

8. I would respectfully submit that there are equally urgent political, military, and commercial reasons for our using every effort to civilize and reform these restless neighbours.

9. I use the expression civilize, because it has been shown in former reports that they are quite prepared to accept civilizing influences; the chiefs and headmen themselves, of both the Murrees and Boogtees, having asked us to advance our outposts into their territory for the purpose of putting a stop to their internecine feuds, and thus to afford each tribe an opportunity of cultivating its own excellent lands. Moreover, as tribal rulers, each asks for countenance and support in coercing sections of their own followers who may insist upon disturbing the general peace by misconduct.

10. The fact is that these Murrees and Boogtee chiefs, the former particularly, are placed in a very delicate position, which well deserves our favourable consideration.

11. They see plainly that eastward as regards the Punjab, and westward as regard Kutchee and the Bolan Pass, they have naturally incurred relations and responsibilities towards the British Government, which they cannot avoid if they would, and they foresee that, sooner or latter, their lawless followers must cease to be obnoxious not only to ourselves, but to our neighbours and allies, or else they will assuredly draw down severe measures upon the tribes collectively; hence their expressed desire, through our aid, to establish firm tribal Government so as to avoid giving offence to us.

12. Other reasons also have promoted this desire. They have witnessed the improved condition of the Belooch, who have lived under our border administration for the last 20 years; and being well aware of the thriving and steadily increasing trade in cattle and grain that exists between the Punjab, Upper Sind and Kutchee, they begin to understand the value of such highly fertile tracts as the Shum, Murrow and Pat plains, &c., which conjointly offer to their industry a rich culturable area of about 700 square miles.

13. Their urgency therefore in seeking through our aid to enjoy the same privileges of peace and quietness that their brethren within our border do, in order that they may cultivate these valuable lands, is not to be wondered at; particularly as they know the boon to be beyond their reach without the actual presence of troops to overawe the unruly, and of an English officer to advise them how to lay the foundations of, and carry out, their work of reform.

14. I would here explain that our Upper Sind Belooch, just alluded to, viz., Boogtees, Dhoombkees, Jekrannes, Joomalees, Kosas, Boordees, Oomranees, and Mazarees, are the same warlike race as of old; the only difference in them being that they are now under control, and have no reason for plundering, being well off. Without constant care, however, they would soon relapse into their old habits, and will, I think, continue liable to do so during the present generation, if neglected.

15. For this reason I could not, in connexion with the objects under discussion, recommend the withdrawal of any of the outposts noted in the margin, which have in their rear the dense jungles of Boordeka, extending from Kusmore for some 50 miles south-west to the right bank of the Beagaree Canal, and are inhabited by portions of the Belooch tribes above named. In their immediate front those outposts have the Boogtee hills, where the greater part of that tribe still live. So long as the latter behave themselves properly (which they generally do), free intercourse between them and their brethren inside our border is permitted, but at the beginning of this year, I found it quite necessary to order the outposts to patrol to their rear in the Boordeka jungles, as well as to their front, in order to remind all of the actual presence of troops, and that some cattle-lifting and acts of criminal violence that had taken place must cease. These measures, combined with a few convictions at the Quarter Sessions have, I am happy to say, had the desired effect.

Soonee.
Kusmore.
Toj.
Sunree.
Goranaree.

16. I trust it may appear clear from this that though, in order to advance a line of posts, I might reduce and convert the present outposts into supports, I could not withdraw them altogether, without endangering the peace and good order of the whole border, inside as well as outside our territory. This point will be referred to when discussing the detailed military arrangements which it is proposed to make.

17. Similarly, with regard to the Murrees, they will not obey their chiefs properly, until they see that the latter have it in their power to punish them. They are at present at peace with the Boogtees, owing to our influence and advice; one case of cattle-lifting however may bring that to a sudden end and cost a score of lives. This truce, moreover, has not admitted of either side cultivating their extensive outlying lands.

18. Under all the circumstances brought forward, I would submit that a conciliatory policy towards them is preferable to either a neutral or an intimidatory one, so long as it will answer the object sought. The latter was tried about 11 years ago, when Colonel Sir Henry Green arranged for a force of Brahooées under his Highness the Khan of Khelat, in person to march into the Murree hills for the purpose of punishing the tribe. The Murrees never faced this force, but fled before it into the distant northern ranges. They were severely punished and impoverished by a large quantity of their grain, and about 8,000 head of their cattle being captured. The chiefs eventually came into the camp, and tendered their allegiance to his Highness the Khan, begging for mercy, which was extended to them on promise of good behaviour. The entire force was then withdrawn, and the result was that the tribe being left to itself soon forgot its severe lesson, and relapsed into former excesses, the chiefs being quite unable to restrain their starving followers.

19. My object in quoting this instance, is to show that the effect of even a successful campaign soon wears off with these tribes, unless constantly reminded of it by the actual presence of troops against them; and that even a conciliatory and highly liberal policy, such as we have under contemplation, would utterly fail without that support, because the greater part of each tribe, being under little or no moral control, would soon succeed in re-opening old feuds.

20. I have thus endeavoured to state what I submit may be fairly urged in favour of the proposed measure in a civil and political point of view. Resting upon the broad basis of a desire to serve the real interests of others as well as our own, I venture to hope for its successful issue if carefully carried out. The concurrence of his Highness the Khan of Khelat will, I feel sure, be readily accorded to the independent arrangements, should the Government be pleased to sanction them. Indeed, they will tend to promote his Highness' interests and those of his subjects in Kutchee, quite as much as they will those of the hill tribes themselves. It will, however, be carefully explained to his Highness that any arrangements we may make will not supersede the necessity for his taking precautionary measures for the safety of Eastern Kutchee, which, if not defended by a line of outposts may prove too great a temptation for the Mundahee Murrees, and lead to excesses which would defeat the whole plan.

21. With regard to the Military arrangements which it has from time to time been proposed to make, both by the Punjab and Sind Frontier Officers, in support of the above object, I would summarise them by stating that they aim at establishing a cordon of posts on the east, south and west sides of the tract in question, as shown by the dotted red line in the map.

22. The positions proposed to be held are—

The necessity for each will form a part of the inquiry about to take place.

1st.—Luggaree Barkhan.
2nd.—A central point in the Shum plain.
3rd.—Deyrah Beebruk.
4th.—Sungseela.
5th.—Phoolajee, or any point near it.

For the remaining fifty or sixty miles between Phoolajee and Dadur, his Highness the Khan of Khelat would be requested to provide a line of posts, about 10 miles apart.

23. The principal and most important post of all would be that in the Shum plain, where, and on the neighbouring Murree mountain, during the hot season, a political officer would reside.

24. It would be premature to enter into further details at present. I beg, however, respectfully to assure the Government that every point noted for inquiry shall be thoroughly sifted, and a full report made thereon.

25. I shall be quite ready to march when the present Sessions at Jacobabad are concluded, which will be towards the close of the present month. I mention an early date for the march, owing to the necessity of my having to attend at the High Court in Bombay, probably in February next, or whenever the spring Sessions may take place, in connexion with the trial of the European public servants in Upper Sind, who stand accused of having committed criminal breach of trust as such.

26. As one of the charges against John Barron is for stealing my Toshakhana allowance of this year, amounting to Rs. 2,000, which sum in currency notes has been traced by the numbers of the notes to his banker's account, I would solicit that I may be allowed to expend a similar amount in presents to chiefs during the exploring expedition under report. I know of no other expenses likely to be incurred, except it be for feeding such chiefs with a few followers who will of necessity accompany us.

27. A copy of this letter will be forwarded to the Secretary to Government in the Punjab, and as soon as I have, in communication with the Punjab Government, and Colonel Graham, the Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan, fixed a date that will be mutually convenient, we will proceed to carry out the orders with which we are charged.

Enclosure 3 in No. 3.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I., & C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.—(No. 785, dated Camp Mora, the 25th November 1869.)

In acknowledging the receipt of your letter No 1579 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to call your attention to the following points:—

1st.—The line you propose to adopt for the advanced posts is a continuation in a westerly direction of the suggested post from the Punjab Frontier in the Shum plain. It will be within the Boogtee Hills. will protect to a certain extent and control that tribe, but it places us in no better position for holding in check the Murrees than we possess at present.

2nd.—That by placing advanced posts at Deyra and Sungseela, we take upon ourselves new responsibilities and establish our troops in a confined country more unsuited to cavalry than they are now in, and where they will be separated from their supports by a hilly tract only penetrable by difficult passes, or by crossing a mountain some 3,000 feet above the level of the plain.

3rd.—That while it is undoubtedly a most desirable object to civilize the Boogtees and Murrees, and reclaim them for their long existing habits of plunder and inter-tribal sanguinary quarrelling, will the plan you propose have that effect beyond the limited extent of enabling the Boogtees to cultivate in peace the small portion of arable land near Deyra and Sungseela, with perhaps a portion of the Murrow plain, and to complete the civilizing process?—will it not be necessary to occupy the Murree country as well, establishing posts at Kahun and Kote Moondaie, for the protection and management of that tribe also?

4th.—The safety of the Sind border being already amply provided for will the presence of a post at Phoolajee improve the position as regards the protection of the road taken by merchants coming from Affghanistan through Kutchee into Sind?—or must we depend, as now, on arrangements to be made by the Khan of Khelat for that purpose?

5th.—Can the advanced posts of Deyra, Sungseela and Phoolajee be given from the existing Frontier Force, or will an increase of strength be required, which is pronounced in the 5th part of the 8th paragraph of Mr. Seton-Karr's letter as considered by his Excellency in Council to be highly undesirable?

6th.—The effect on the power of his Highness the Khan of Khelat which our presence in his country and direct interference with the affairs of a portion of the inhabitants thereof, his subjects, will have.

2. The above points will give you a general idea of the views I hold on the question under consideration, but I will, to explain myself more fully, discuss each separately.

3. 1st.—By going into the valley of Deyra we bring ourselves into close contact with the Murrees, who hitherto have been at a far distance, and excepting in concert with the Boogtees have never attempted to interfere with the British possessions. The concert of Boogtees would be prevented it is true, but our presence at Deyra would be a constant menace to the Murrees, without our being able to act effectually against them, in consequence of the hilly and difficult nature of their country. They might if they chose bid us defiance, harass our posts and our protegés, and continue to plunder as they have hitherto done in Kutchee. To resent and put an end to such a state of affairs, an expedition on a large and expensive scale into the Murree territory would sooner or later be rendered compulsory.

4. 2nd.—By occupying Deyra and Sungseela, we accept the new responsibilities of protecting the Boogtee tribe from their hereditary enemies, the Murrees, and of insisting on the good behaviour of the Boogtees, performing in fact the Police duties to that tribe, any dissatisfied member of which has only to slip into the Murree country to swell the ranks of the unruly there and laugh at our attempts to recover him. This is a situation which I hold would be neither dignified nor satisfactory. The Boogtees no doubt would in the main highly approve of it, as it would certainly be to their benefit. But it would be a false position to place disciplined troops, whether in a strategical or any other point of view. We hold now an admirable line for our frontier posts, on the edge of an extensive plain, where cavalry can act to the best advantage. Should any band of plunderers attempt to enter Sind, they must pass within this line of outposts, and subject themselves to the almost certainty of being intercepted on their return. In 1845 a post was placed at Shahpoor, more to protect the Kyberees, a tribe replaced by us on their own lands at Chuttur, Tahar-ka-Gote, Phoolajee and Koonree, when the Jekranees were removed from the same locality by Sir C. Napier, as also because it was considered a good advanced point from which to check attempts by the Boogtees to maraud in Sind. In June 1848, however, when experience proved this outpost was unnecessary, and it was found more expedient to have the posts only along the Sind border, it was withdrawn, and detachments were placed to the eastward of Jacobabad, at Dil Morad-ka-Ghurree, Hassan-ka-Ghurree, Tungwanee, Kund-Kote Koomree, and Kusmore, with a small party of Belooch guides at Mittree. The post of Belooch guides at Gundooee was added afterwards. This was all sufficient then. Everything was kept safe within this line, and in front was an open plain extending for miles, on which cavalry could act with the greatest advantage against any parties of robbers who ventured to leave the hills. In course of time, and owing to the security enjoyed within the line of outposts, cultivation extended outside, and it became necessary to advance. A new line was ably selected by Sir H. Green, and at his recommendation was adopted. The Kusmore post was taken 4 miles to the north and lessened in strength. The Koomree post was strengthened and advanced 20 miles to Sooee, an admirable position, at a point where a river (dry, excepting after rain in the hills, and then only flooded for a few hours) which had always been a favourite way of exit for plunderers, passed out of a low range of hills into the plain. This forms a most complete check to any attempts against Sind. The Kund-Kote post which was located in the thick jungles of Boordeka, was changed to Toj, 10 miles to the front, and in the plain outside the jungle, and where cultivation had extended to. The Tungwanee and Hassan-ka-Ghurree posts were changed to Sunree and Goranaree, respectively 13 and 11 miles forward, and across the plain, and at the southern edge of the low and insignificant range of hills, which lies between the desert tract and the Mutt plain. Dil Moorad had been abandoned as a post some years before. For the protection of the Sind frontier nothing could be better than this line, and no Boogtees, or Boogtees and Murrees combined, would ever dream of running such a clear risk of capture or destruction, as must be theirs, if they ventured to pass to inside of it. By leaving this and moving into the Deyra valley, we abandon the plain country, go beyond the small range of hills above mentioned, the Mutt plain, and put the high mountain, called the Zeen, between our advanced posts and their nearest supports at Sooee, Sunree and Goranaree. To reach the Deyra valley, there are only two ways of even tolerable approach from the south for horsemen, viz., by the River Pass at Doodza Khoostuck, or over the Zeen from Gundava by Mund. From Kutchee there are two other means of reaching the valley, one from Phoolajee by the Tejwagh and the "Suggaree-ke-Ganta," a very difficult pass, quite impracticable for horsemen if defended by only a few men, the road for three miles being only the bed of a water-course, wide enough for but four horsemen abreast, with perpendicular cliffs on either side several hundred feet high; clearing this, there is immediately a most awkward and steep ascent; afterwards the road is fair enough. The other entrance is by the Ghoree river, a little to the north of Phoolajee. This turns and avoids the "Suggaree-ke-Ganta," but has the Murree country on the left flank. Being in the Deyra valley, then we do not prevent the Boogtees and Murrees from plundering in Sind one bit better than we do from our present position. But we take our troops into worse ground for using successfully such as are at our disposal, and we have to afford protection to a wild tribe, which begins to find itself unable to hold its own against its neighbours, the Murrees.

5. 3rd—With regard to the civilizing process. This undoubtedly is a matter of very great importance, but I question much whether the means proposed will have the desired effect. The extent of arable land at Sungseela and Deyra is not such as to be sufficient for this purpose. Moreover the land is held by the Boogtees under the Khan of Khelat, and all claims in respect to it and its division would have to be settled through his Highness' officers. This would be a delicate matter to manage unless we took the arrangement into our own hands, which I gather is in no way intended by Government. As an instance of the diversity of rights likely to be brought forward, I may mention that the Dhoombkees of Lehree lay claim to a share in the produce of the lands at Sungseela. The Murrow plain might be brought under cultivation, but to render the produce secure from the Murrees, a post would be necessary at Keychee-ke-Ghuree, to which there is a very fair road direct from Kahun, the one which was generally used by the Murrees in passing towards the Punjab territory. But all these arrangements, supposing them to be perfected, merely provide for the civilizing process as regards the Boogtees. The Murrees are still left to their own devices, and to provide for the cultivation of their

lands at Kahun, Moondahee, &c. This they can do now if they choose, for no attempts have ever been made to molest them, either by Boogtees or others. But the life of a border rider, with all its attractions of apparent freedom and perilous adventure, has more charms for them, and until all means of engaging therein are completely closed to them, they will preserve their old habits and leave chance cultivation as now to the non-combatants of the tribe. The presence of our troops protecting and favouring the Boogtees, will excite the jealousy and discontent of the Murrees, will be a standing war menace without helping to overawe them, and if it have any effect on them, will, instead of civilizing, cause them to concentrate their power all the more to harass the trade of Central Asia, by making raids on the Kafilahs as they pass through the Bolan and Kutchee, a part of the country which they already among themselves describe as their "Shikargah" or hunting ground. Unless therefore the Murree country is occupied, as well as the Boogtee, the civilizing process will be only half completed, while the main object of protecting the trade will be rendered more distant.

6. The 4th point refers to the proposed post at Phoolajee. Phoolajee is 50 miles nearly due north of Jacobabad. A detachment here would be in the same line nearly as those at Sungseela and Deyra, but it would be of little use to co-operate with the former, the nearest to it, the interval between consisting mainly of ravines, rocks and hills, where a few determined footmen might defy the best cavalry in the world. If it is intended to prevent the Murrees leaving the hills to attack Kafilahs passing down from Dadur, it would be so far from the part of the country where these attacks are usually made, as to be quite useless. The locality called their "Shikargah" by the Murrees, is the low range of hills near Mittree, known in former years to our army as the "Chota Bolan," and from that to Hajee-ke-Shehr, and their line of approach almost always by Mull. To enable the Phoolajee post to act effectively against a body of plunderers that were known to have left the hills, or of whose attack on a Kafilah in the above locality intelligence had been received, it would have to proceed with all speed to Mull, a distance of 39 miles, to find the enemy had regained the hills, for the Murrees knowing the detachment was at Phoolajee would take care not to risk being intercepted. In your letter I observe you propose leaving the protection of the Mittree and Hajee-ke-Shehr line of road to the Khelat authorities. This might equally be done without our having a post at Phoolajee. I believe arrangements have been made this season by his Highness the Khan for this purpose, and levies placed by his officers at Lehree, Mull, and Mittree. This is as it should be, and if the scheme is properly carried out by the Khelat authorities, it will ensure all that is required.

7. The 5th point is, can the new posts be given from the existing force now on the frontier? You state in your letter, and in this opinion I quite concur, that it would not be advisable to withdraw the posts of Kusmore, Sooee, Toj, Sunree, and Goranaree, the new posts then will be so much additional duty imposed on the force, and will certainly require two squadrons or two-thirds of a regiment of cavalry. Knowing as I well do that the reductions in 1862 brought the frontier force to as low a mark as it was possible, and the necessity of regular reliefs in such duty as it has to carry out, I question the possibility of the arrangement being made, and shall be glad of a report from you on this point particularly.

8. The 6th point is a very important one, and one which has, I think, escaped due attention. It has always been, and naturally must ever be, as long as the Khan of Khelat remains a free and independent sovereign, our great object to increase his influence, and strengthen his power within his country as much as we can. To relieve him of constant complaints by us regarding lawless acts committed by certain refractory portions of his subjects would doubtless be in some respect satisfactory; but when that end is only to be gained by so public an acknowledgment of his weakness, one so likely to have the worst effect on the remainder of his subjects, his wisdom in accepting such relief would be most questionable, and for us to recommend it, would be abandoning the policy we know to be right and most sound, the whole subject of the protection of our western frontier being taken into consideration. As long as the Khanate of Khelat is in the hands of one person, and that one as at present only desirous to act in accordance with the wishes of the British Government, we need feel no concern about the safety of our frontier from north to south. But once let his powers be destroyed, and the country fall into the hands of a number of petty chieftains with little control over their followers, then the principle which is proposed for the Boogtee country will have to be carried out the whole way down to the sea.

9. In place then of supporting the advance now under discussion, and which I certainly consider would be a false move, I should be more disposed to urge earnestly on the Government of India the advisability of closely scrutinising the position of the kingdom of Khelat, as it affects us now, and as it will far more a few years hence; and whether in place of assuming to ourselves a portion of the prerogatives of the Khan, we could not more easily, and at a smaller expenditure, so improve his position as to render all direct interference on our part unnecessary, and ensure our territory remaining thoroughly and completely undisturbed.

10. Presuming it to be allowed that the northern frontier of Sind is sufficiently protected by the present line of outposts (and I gather that is not questioned for a moment,) the sole point left for consideration of the Sind authorities is the safety of the merchants passing through the Khan of Khelat's territory from Quetta to Sind. Your proposals involve that the Khan of Khelat should be called upon to provide posts to protect the Kafilahs along the line where they are supposed to be liable to attack by the hill tribes, viz. from Dadur to Phoolajee. Such is all that in reality is required, and our advance to Deyrah would not relieve him from this part of the programme. Most willingly would the Khan undertake this and more, were it not that the impoverished state of his finances renders it impossible for him to do so for a continuance, or in such an effectual manner as to make a successful result certain. What is needed then is that sufficient funds should be at his disposal to enable him to devote them solely to this purpose. Were these granted he would not only place posts at the points mentioned, but he would take portions of the Murree and Boogtee tribes into his pay again, as a bond for their good behaviour, and would place officials on behalf of his own Government at Deyrah, Kahun, and Moondahee, to see that the conduct of the tribes was such as he demanded.

11. The annual cost of this would not amount to more than 50 or 60,000 rupees. It would be a most valuable means of supporting and improving the Khan's authority. It would effectually give safety to merchants passing through the country, and above all, it would not involve us in any new

complications, or entail on us any new responsibilities. Further, it would help materially towards the civilisation of the Murrees and Boogtees. The temptation of the hitherto almost unprotected "Shikargah" being taken from the former, and the retention in service of levies from their tribe being dependent on their good behaviour, they would, from a sense of self-interest, gradually give up their old habits and look about for other means of obtaining a livelihood. The Boogtees being restrained by the same powerful bond would try to live at peace with their neighbours; and the presence of the Khan's officers among these tribes would allow of their submitting their grievances to be settled for them instead of resorting to the old plan of adjustment by hostilities. These tribes, with all their wildness and tetchy nature, have a great respect for authority and especially for that of their own rulers. They would themselves prefer and feel more honoured by regular payment through their own Government than through any other.

12. If at the same time that this plan was introduced, increased means* of irrigating the plain between the Sind frontier, the hills, and Kutchee were given, opportunity of peaceful livelihood by cultivation would be afforded to all members of the hill tribes, who had a desire that way, and a healthy civilizing process would be initiated, which could not fail to bear good fruit.

NOTE.—26th January 1870.
* General Jacob's proposed Desert Canal would provide this perfectly.—W. L. M.

13. In the 4th paragraph of your letter you allude to the old trade route from Hurrund to Khelat. This is not a very important one I think, though it did once hold a name a hundred and odd years ago, when the then Khan of Khelat, the great Nusseer Khan, had possession of Hurrund and Dajul, and his sway was undisputed and dreaded throughout the Murree and Boogtee hills. Let the Khan's power be so again established, and this trade line would reopen, if required.

14. The above remarks all refer to the question under review simply as it affects the Sind border. I will now discuss it as it affects the neighbouring frontier of the Punjab. Under the arrangements I propose, the Murrees and Boogtees would be equally bound down to respect the British territory and harmless traders on that side as much as on the side of Sind, and for that purpose the arrangement with them entered into by Captain Sandeman, and which has hitherto answered so well, might be continued, with this difference only that, as it is undoubtedly advisable that all transactions with the subjects of the Khan of Khelat should only be carried on by one responsible person, and that one, the officer who has charge of the political relations with the Khan, viz. the Political Superintendent on the frontier of Sind, it would be best that all payments to the hill tribes, and all references regarding them, should be made through the Political Superintendent. In the full discussion of all these matters which I fortunately had with Captain Sandeman a few days ago at Hydrabad, and from a letter since received from him, it appears to me that he himself would advocate this course. Such being the case, the matter could easily be arranged between you.

15. With regard to placing a post in the Shum plain, to which Captain Sandeman attaches great importance, I see no reason why it should not be done to strengthen that frontier line. The objections against the Deyrah plan do not exist in this case. From what Captain Sandeman said, I understood that the proposed post would be only about 12, at the furthest 15 miles, in advance of the existing frontier posts, close therefore to its supports, and that there was easy intercommunication between these points, the road being good and through no difficult pass. Advancing so far would take in no new tribe or involve the Punjab troops in any way with the hill people. It would give additional power of interception of any bodies breaking the peace, and so reduce the temptation to them to do so. It would be in fact merely establishing on the Punjab side a similar post to the Sind one at Sooee. It could also be placed there without it being necessary to have posts from Sind at Deyrah and Sungseela.

16. The occupation of Barkhan (Lugharee) is a question which I do not feel competent to discuss, having only a very general knowledge of that part of the country. Captain Sandeman urges it, because it will enable the authorities at Dera Ghazee Khan to include a minor branch of the Lugharee tribe, which is now outside our boundary and which occasionally gives trouble from being beyond direct control. Captain Sandeman is the best judge of the necessity of this part of the plan, as also of how far it would involve us with other tribes. The country is beyond the limits of Khelat territory, and this point may be left to his greater experience of those parts for elaboration, while his opinion will deservedly have greatest weight.

17. In conclusion, I have only to add that, while clearly of opinion that the occupation of the advanced line from Sind would be a grave mistake, I am strongly in favour of the trip through the hills being carried out, as desired by the Supreme Government. By means of it the officers of both lines of frontier will be brought together and become personally acquainted, to the advantage of future cordial co-operation, and they will gain useful knowledge of the country and its inhabitants; at the same time the latter will see that we can move about among their hills, and they will learn a useful lesson in watching the movements of disciplined troops, and the power that accompanies orderly procedure.

18. With reference to the last paragraph of your letter, I regret that I am unable to sanction the expenditure of the sum you apply for, as I have no funds left at my disposal. This, however, is not of so much consequence. as taking into consideration the circumstances under which you are going, and your having last January, on your first introduction to the Murree and Boogtee chiefs, liberally treated them with presents, it will be unnecessary to do so again, and as any chiefs who accompany you will be moving through their own country, there will be no necessity for your causing them and their followers to be fed.

Enclosure 4 in No. 3.

From Colonel R. Phayre, Political Superintendent, Frontier, Upper Sind, to the Commissioner in Sind,—(No. 1725, dated 6th December 1869).

In connexion with the orders of his Excellency the Viceroy in Council conveyed in the Government of India letter No. 879, dated 25th June last, and in continuation of my report as per margin, I have been led to examine closely the records of this Office, in order that before the British Government enters upon any fresh arrangements

No. 1579, dated 8th November 1869.

with the Murrees or other Khelat subjects, it may have before it an historical outline of the principal events which have occurred from the commencement of the present Khan's reign to this time.

2. It is solely from a deep sense of the national importance of the questions under discussion that I would thus subject the occurrences of the past year in the Khelat State to the test of previous history, reading them in the light which that history throws upon them as continuous events inseparable from it.

3. The opinions expressed are offered with the greatest deference, in a spirit of fair inquiry. I find that there is nothing new in the generality of them, for though formed from personal observation, and independently of the records quoted from 1858 to 1863–64, which I have only lately seen, they coincide with those expressed in the Commissioner's (Mr. Frere's) letter No. 232, dated 31st May 1858, and the reply of Lord Elphinstone's Government, No. 2265 of 1858, dated 14th June.

Mr. Frere's report of 19th February 1858 alone excepted.

4. As Political Superintendent on this frontier I both have carried out, and will continue to give effect to whatever orders may be issued. I, however, solicit that the evidence of the records now produced may receive consideration.

Enclosure 5 in No. 3.

Abridged Narrative of Events.

Narrative, November 1869.

It being absolutely necessary in connexion with the revision of our arrangements with the Murrees and other tribes on the frontier to review the exact state of our relations with the Khan, his chiefs, and people—

The following abridged narrative of those relations from the commencement of the reign of Khodadad Khan to the present time is drawn up for the information of Government, in order that the causes of the distracted state of the country may be traced with the view to their being remedied.

2. Our original object and intention in entering upon the treaty of the 14th May 1854 will be briefly stated, in order that an opinion may be arrived at as to how far those objects have been realized, or are likely to be so under a continuance of the internal disorders which convulse Beloochistan throughout from the Bolan to the Mekran coast.

3. Public documents only will be quoted, so that if fuller information be required upon any point separately, it may be gathered from perusing the original of any of them.

4. When Brigadier General Jacob offered the treaty of May 1854 for the acceptance of the late Khan of Khelat, he endeavoured amongst other matters to impress the following upon the mind of the Khan :—

Extract from General Jacob's Heads of Conference with the Khan.

"From the first day of my receiving charge of the frontier of Sind, I have exerted every effort in my power to bring about the establishment of order and good government in your Highness' neighbouring dominions. But I laboured to ittle or no purpose, because I was always secretly thwarted by your Highness' officers." * *

Secret hostility of Khelat officials.

"My sole object and that of my Government in this business is that there may be a strong and friendly Government established throughout the dominions of your Highness. To bring this about it is necessary that the officers of your Highness should be faithful, active, and united." * * *

"Justice should be strictly administered to all men. Cultivators and traders should be encouraged and protected, roads made safe and easy, and no private transit or such like exaction should be allowed to either great or small. All this cannot be accomplished without exertion, but if your Highness attend to this advice and act on it, the State of Khelat will, under your Highness' rule, by God's blessing, become rich, powerful, respected; but without some such arrangement and efforts from *within*, no amount of external assistance alone will make it really strong and flourishing * * Such measures only can lead to the happiness and prosperity of your Highness, your nobles, and your people."

About two years after this Major (now Sir Henry) Green was appointed Political Agent at Khelat, and he commences his report, quoted in the margin, by saying that he formed a very high opinion of his Highness Meer Nusseer Khan, but not of his advisers, one being a merchant by name Faiz Ahmed, and the other a bunyah named Gungaram.

Major Henry Green's report, dated 4th December 1858.

He first joined him in December 1856, but in January 1857 had to leave to join the Persian Expeditionary Force, and did not return to his Khelat appointment until November 1857.

In those few months the old Khanazad Darogah, Gool Mahomed, the bitter enemy of the British Government, being unable to gain over Nusseer Khan to his traitorous designs, conspired with the Beebee Cudjiss, the mother of the present Khan, a woman of low birth and infamous character, to murder his half-brother Nusseer, on the understanding that he (the Darogah) should be confidential adviser of his successor Khodadad.

Sir Henry Green's report of 4th December 1858.

In May 1857 the Meer Nusseer Khan was travelling from Gundava to Khelat; and about the middle of the Moolla Pass was seized with an attack of the malady from which he suffered, viz., stone in the bladder. He was, however, improving in health, and marched on to Angera, where he received a packet of letters from the Darogah Gool Mahomed by the hand of a confidential servant of the Darogah's, a barber by trade, who also brought some medicine for his Highness. This barber administered some of the medicine, when alone with the Khan, after which he left.

Conduct of Khelat Khanazads simultaneously with the outbreak of the mutinies.

Within a very short space of time, however, the poor Khan called in some of his attendants and ordered them to secure the barber, as he felt sure that he had been poisoned. Soon after the Khan expired in great agony, declaring that his intestines were on fire.

Murder of Meer Nusseer Khan.
Sir Henry Green's report of 4th December 1858.

In course of time the chiefs of Beloochistan assembled, and they elected his heir apparent, a youth of 16, of "weak intellect," to succeed his murdered half brother.

Khodadad Khan, the present ruler, ascends the throne.

Attached to the household of the Khans of Khelat are Khanazads or household slaves. The Khan has power of life or death over them. They hold the most confidential and important offices about his person, these offices being hereditary. That of Wuzzeer, however, is not so. Thus it happened that the Darogah Gool Mahomed and his * two sons, Mahomed and Atta Mahomed: Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, the present Wuzzeer, and his two brothers, Taj Mahomed and Goolam Jan; also Abdool Azzeez, Naib of Moostung, being all Khanazads, seized the principal posts about the young Khan's person. The Darogah Gool Mahomed's first object was to sow distrust between the young Khan and his chiefs, who were then encamped outside the walls of the city, and also to set them against each other by means of bribery, &c. This was gradually accomplished, and when the Darogah "considered that everything was ready for a *coup d'état*, he suddenly and without warning, at daybreak on the morning of the 17th September 1857, sent the Khan's artillery and a body of 400 regular infantry, in the pay of the late Khan, out of the fort, and caused them immediately to open fire on the camp of the chiefs. The chiefs were totally unprepared, and having but few of their retainers with them, could offer but little resistance, and were driven from the valley with loss!

Iniquitous designs of the Khanazads.

* These men still hold office in Khelat.

September 17th, 1857. Colonel Sir Henry Green shows how the chiefs of Beloochistan, including the Jam of Beyla, became rebels.

Sir Henry Green, 4th December 1858.

The Khan's mercenary troops.

"Those who happened at the time to be on the side of the Khan felt themselves bound to remain so. Thus father and son became opposed to each other. The Darogah thus repeated the *very same act* which he had performed upwards of 40 years before in the days of Mehrab Khan.

"The young Khan (Khodadad) was informed that these men were plotting to dethrone him, and the Chiefs, enraged at their treatment, assembled with their retainers at Sorab, about 40 miles south of Khelat, to the number of 5,000 or 6,000 men; but not finding provisions there, they returned to Khozdar, one of the Khan's granaries, which they plundered, and where they levied taxes on the bunyahs and shopkeepers. They were here also joined by Azaad Khan of Kharan."

It was at this crisis that, on the request of the Vakeel of the Khan residing at Jacobabad, Lieutenant Macauley (now Major) was despatched by Major (now Sir William) Merewether to Khelat.

On his arrival at the top of the Moolla Pass he was met by a messenger of the rebel chiefs, forwarding a petition to the British Government. This messenger Lieutenant Macauley "sent back with an "answer that he would neither receive letters from, nor hold communication with, men in arms against "their King, and if they wished him to receive their petition, it must come through the Khan. "Lieutenant Macauley then proceeded to Khelat and joined the Khan, the rebel chiefs and their "retainers dispersing."

Affairs were at this stage when I joined his Highness in November 1857. I cannot say that I formed a high opinion of his Highness. I had much conversation with Lieutenant Macauley, and requested his Highness to introduce me to the rebel chiefs. Lieutenant Macauley appears to think *that they had no alternative but to have acted as they had done, that they were most respectful*, and pointed out that none of their lives would be safe, nor could the country ever be quiet, if the young Khan were to retain such advisers as Gool Mahomed and Gungaram.

The chiefs not held to be rebels by British officers on the spot.

Sir Henry Green now turned his attention to the best mode of ridding the Khan of the murderer Gool Mahomed, and Gungaram, as his chief advisers, and it was ultimately arranged that the Khan should proceed to meet the Commissioner, Mr. Frere, who at this time (December 1857) was at Jacobabad.

Sir Henry Green's Report of 4th December 1858.

Paragraphs 40 to 53 of Mr. (now Sir Bartle) Frere's letter to the Bombay Government, No. 64 of 1858, dated 19th February, gives a complete account of all that took place at Jacobabad on that occasion.

The Commissioner, Mr. Frere's report to Government, February 1858.

Notwithstanding the arrangements then made, viz., the exclusion of Darogah Gool Mahomed and Gungaram, and the selection of Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed for the post of Wuzzeer which he now holds, Sir Henry Green after his return to the Khan's camp at Gundava, says, "soon after my return, I perceived that the former evil "influence was at work again, and that little advice of mine was "attended to, and that the Khan had taken a personal dislike to "Wullee Mahomed."

February 1858.

Wullee Mahomed was not installed regularly for many months.

By the 27th April (1858) the heat at Gundava became very great, and a move to Khelat was commenced by the Khan, the Political Agent marching to Chutter. That evening Sirdar Taj Mahomed, the chief of Jalawan, who was in rebellion against the Khan for the reason before stated, called upon Sir Henry, and after some conversation said, "if order be not restored in this country, and the rights of the chiefs of Beloochistan "attended to, harm will come to you. I asked if he dared to threaten me, a servant of the British "Government, and told him that he had better lower his tone and leave my tent before harm came "to himself. He immediately apologised, saying he was a rough mountaineer, and meant nothing "wrong."

The Chief Sirdar of Beloochistan.

Sir Henry then proceeded towards Khelat, and the Khan joined him at Sorab on the 13th May. His Highness begged, through Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, that he might be helped in his difficulties, and Sir Henry then addressed Sirdars Taj Mahomed and Moolla Mahomed, reminding them that Khodadad Khan was their legitimate Sovereign, and advising them to tender their allegiance and be true to him.

The Sirdars replied that, notwithstanding their wrongs and the treacherous treatment they had received in the previous September, they would follow Sir Henry's advice, and at once manifested their

loyalty by proceeding against some refractory chiefs in Mekran, whom they punished and brought to Khelat to be disposed of by the Khan's Government.

Notwithstanding this obedient conduct on their part, as desired by the Political Agent, the Khanazad Darogah Gool Mahomed, who had re-asserted his influence over the young Khan, succeeded in sowing the seeds of discord between him and his chiefs.

On this subject, Sir Henry says, "It was clear to me that I stood on most treacherous ground; that "while a pretender to the throne was close to the capital, and also that the Khan was disliked by his "chiefs on account of Gool Mahomed, that my proceedings would be most closely and zealously "watched by the Sirdars, *the real strength* of the country, and that I must be most careful neither to "do injustice to them, by siding with the Khan, nor to him, by taking part with the chiefs against "him."

Associated with Gool Mahomed was a man by name Shere Khan, holding the position of commandant of the Khan's infantry regiment, "a Punjab Mussulman by birth, and who formerly served in "the 4th Punjab Infantry, from which he was dismissed in disgrace, and then proceeded to Candahar,

The character of Shere Khan, the leader of the mercenary troops.

"taking service there, and again dismissed. He then came into "the service of late Nusseer Khan, who kept him at his distance "in his proper position. His men were composed of about 400 scoundrels of sorts, deserters from our "Belooch regiments, Pathans and Affghans, with men from all parts of Central Asia. The Darogah "saw that these men were regularly paid and cared for, they were permitted uncontrolled license, and "were a scourge to the country around.

"These men were ready to commit any crime, and, if necessary, had merely to proceed across the frontier to Affghanistan to escape the consequences. The Darogah's two sons, Atta Mahomed and Mahomed Ali, of course supported their father.

The men are now in power at Khelat.

"Reports now began to spread of something desperate being about to be undertaken by the Darogah. I was warned to be careful. I could see that my men were uneasy. I observed that when I went up to the citadel to visit the Khan, that if I were five minutes later than usual in returning, the men of my escort were assembled in clusters about my tent, and that as soon as they saw me returning they dispersed.

"The Darogah had some time before sent me a plate of apricots, but I was advised not to touch them, and did not. Shere Khan, the commandant of the Khan's Pathan Infantry, I had desired never to be allowed to enter my camp.

"Some few days afterwards I was informed that Shere Khan, the commandant of infantry, had been seen coming at midnight to the lines of my escort for the purpose, as I ascertained, of trying to 'tamper with the men of the Sind Horse." * * * * *

"The chiefs of Beloochistan were now within a couple of marches (on their return from Mekran referred to above), and I strongly advised the Khan now that they had proved their fidelity in his service *beyond a doubt*, to receive them worthily, to reward them, and to forget that they had ever been in rebellion against him.

"On their arrival I complimented them on their fidelity to the Khan, and before him presented the principal chiefs with slight presents to show my appreciation of their services. This took place with the sanction of, and in presence of, the Khan.

Treatment of the chiefs by the Political Agent.

"I had hoped that he would follow my example, but in this I regret to say I was disappointed. The chiefs, however, behaved very well; they thanked me for what I was trying to do for them, &c., &c.

The treatment by the Khan.

"Generally from the chiefs of Beloochistan I have received the greatest assistance; in fact had it not been so, it would have been impossible to have kept the country quiet. The chiefs are a wild not-headed race, but I found that patiently reasoning with them had its full effect."

In addition to the above facts, which show the present ruler of Khelat and his noble chiefs in their true colours respectively, the following extract from Mr. Frere's report to Government, as per margin, is prophetic of all that has since occurred up to the present time:—

No. 217 of 1858, 21st May.

"With regard to the Khan's character, I fear there can be little doubt that it is unpromising in the extreme. Not that he is without some good traits, probably in an inferior position as the petty chief of half a dozen villages he might pass through life unnoticed and unblamed, but even Major Green, who would gladly have taken the most favourable views of his character, is drawn to the conclusion that he is mean and low-minded, wanting in courage and openness, and totally destitute of that frankness and spirit which are the first requisites in the ruler of so many half-wild tribes, and which would, if he possessed them, atone for a multitude of grave faults.

"I would not have reiterated my opinion on this subject, were it not necessary to explain one of the great difficulties of Major Green's position, and the hopelessness of our getting from his Highness, in return for all that we do for him, any but negative results."

The remainder of this paragraph is most important and sound.—W. L. M.

In 1858 Sir Henry Green described his policy as follows:—"During the time I have been in the "country, my policy has been to distinctly side with neither party, "but to faithfully and scrupulously act for what I considered the "good of the whole. To allow myself to be biassed by no party feeling, or to enter into or acknowledge any intrigue."

No. 712 of 1858, dated 29th December.

Again, at the end of May, Mr. Frere wrote, "My own impression is that our first object should be "to set ourselves right with the chiefs of Beloochistan, and let "them see that it is no part of our wish or policy to support a bad "or deservedly unpopular ruler." * * * * *

H. B. Frere, Esq., to Government, No. 232 of 31st May 1858.

"I need not remark that when left to themselves they have a very summary way of correcting mis-government."

" But my hope of his Highness voluntarily following the good advice given him by Major Green has daily diminished, and though it is even less practicable now than it was six months ago to withdraw our influence which alone preserves some kind of order, and even more impolitic to leave the coast clear for Azaad Khan and his Persian allies, I am convinced that our first care ought to be to obtain some assurance before we further support the Khan, that his future Government shall be such as to give reasonable satisfaction to his chiefs and subjects."

After proposing to assemble the chiefs, Mr. Frere would point out to all in his Highness' presence, " That we have supported his Highness as the lawful heir to the throne, deliberately recognised as " such at his accession by all the great chiefs, and that our only object in all we have done has been " the peace and good government of Beloochistan; that we are prepared further to support his " Highness if we have only reasonable ground for hoping that he will justify our support by governing " well, according to Belooch customs; and I would let the Khan and his chiefs clearly understand " that we will not again be deluded by promises of reformation, to be evaded as soon as the crisis has " passed."

No. 2,265 of 14th January 1859.

Lord Elphinstone's Government replied to the above letter in paragraph 3, &c., as follows:—The Right Hon. the Governor in Council is of opinion, and he believes that it is in accordance with that of the Government of India, and of the home authorities, that we should interfere as little as possible " in the concerns of our Belooch " and Affghan neighbours, and that we are more likely to acquire the influence over them which we " wish to possess, if we leave them to settle their domestic affairs to their own liking."

(4.) " In the present case the Right Hon. the Governor in Council fears that we may be going " further than we ought in supporting a ruler who does not appear to possess the respect of his " subjects, and I am desired to state that his Lordship in Council fully agrees with the remark of your " letter of the 31st May, that our first object should be to set ourselves right with the chiefs of " Beloochistan, and let them see that it is no part of our work or policy to support a bad or deservedly " unpopular ruler."

(9.) " If Khodadad Khan is the worthless man that he is represented, the Right Honourable the " Governor in Council considers that the sooner we leave him to his fate, the better, but I am desired to " request that you will have the goodness to instruct Major Green to make a last effort to rouse him to " a sense of his duty, and if this fails, that you will instruct Major Green to return to Jacobabad. The " Right Honourable the Governor in Council cannot think that we should be justified, even in the event of " the Khan's promising reformation, in authorising Major Green to take any measures which seem to him " necessary to defend Khelat, and to defeat the designs of the rebels. His Lordship in Council considers " that this would be in fact identifying ourselves with the cause of Khodadad Khan, and this Government, " I am desired to state, is not prepared to recommend such a measure to the Government of India."

(Part of para. 11.) " The Right Honourable the Governor in Council considers that unless Major " Green can succeed in the very unpromising task of bringing the young Khan to a sense of his duty, " and of rallying the great body of his chiefs around him, the sooner Major Green leaves him the better."

Report for 1859-60, No. 6, dated, 14th June 1860.

In March 1859 Sir Henry Green proceeded with the Khan on his expedition into the Murree Hills, and in April again proceeded *viâ* the Bolan Pass to Quetta and Moostung, at which last place he arrived at the middle of July 1859.

Sirdar Moolla Mahomed.

" During my stay at Kanar I had several Interviews with Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, who is the principal Chief of Beloochistan, and a most intelligent young man. He quite agreed with me as to the necessity for the Khan's going to Mekran, stating that unless he did so, the whole of that country would fall into the hands of his enemies,"

The report then goes on to show that, owing to the influence of a Kandahar Vukeel, and some of those by whom the Khan was surrounded, the project of going to Mekran was thwarted, as they " from " selfish and interested motives were greatly opposed to British influence being exerted over the Khan.

" Nothing therefore was done until the winter had set in, when his Highness informed me that the whole of his chiefs had refused either to accompany him, or furnish their contingents, and begged me to assist him.

" Sir Henry Green explained to Sirdar Taj Mahomed, the chief of Jalawan, what was required, and he readily offered every assistance; at the same time explaining that from the Khan's conduct to the chiefs and people, since his receiving the Khanate, he could expect no hope for better assistance from them." Both Sirdar Taj Mahomed and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed obeyed Sir H. Green's summons, and under their help the expedition was carried out.

(Para. 35.) " On our return to Khelat, I seriously pointed out to his Highness the absolute necessity of his earnestly turning his attention to the affairs of his country, and that he must no longer look to me for assistance beyond advice. I only wish I could hold out hopes that he would rule his country as it ought to be ruled."

The following is an extract from the letter which Sir H. Green wrote to his Highness on this occasion:—

Khelat, 6th April 1860.

After Compliments,—In the year 1854, the late General Jacob, in the name of the British Government, made a Treaty with your brother, by which he was to receive for the exemption of certain transit dues, and for securing the safety of the roads and merchants travelling through your dominions to the British frontier, the yearly sum of Rs. 50,000. When I arrived in your country, I soon perceived that this sum of money was the cause of much discontent amongst your chiefs, who believed that they had a right to a certain share of it. After your return from the Murree campaign, I read the Treaty to you and the principal chiefs, and pointed out that this money was solely for your use, and that they had no claim to any part of it. I however wrote to the British Government to place another Rs. 50,000 at my disposal. This was done, and I had hoped that if I also placed the sum at your disposal, you would see the necessity of being generous towards your chiefs, and to come to some satisfactory arrangement with them, without the necessity of my bringing the matter to your notice. You are in the position of a father to a family, and as you prosper and grow rich, so your family hope to share a portion of your

riches ; but in this respect you appear to think differently, and that however rich you may become, your people must remain poor and hungry. I have pointed out to you this state of your country. I will now state what steps I consider necessary to remedy the present evils. You are aware that it has been the custom for ages in your country for a register to be kept, in which the name, position, and wages of each chief is distinctly laid down. This book, with many others, was destroyed when Khelat was taken by a British force. I now propose that another should be written out, so that each chief may know the exact position and account of wages, and to assist you in carrying this into effect, I am prepared to place at your disposal from the extra Rs. 50,000 allowed by my Government whatever sum may be deemed requisite for the purpose. This I hope will put an end to the bickering and trouble caused by your chiefs in making constant claims for wages. Whatever remains I will either present to you or dispose as I consider best for your welfare and that of your country. The Rs. 50,000 which you receive by Treaty, you will continue to receive, provided you carry into effect the articles of that Treaty, the substance of which are that the roads between Shawl and the British frontier, both *viâ* the Bolan and Khelat, be kept clear and safe for traffic, and that only the taxes laid down in that Treaty be allowed to be exacted from merchants.

In arranging the wages for your chiefs, I would recommend the following stipulation being agreed to:—

1st.—That any chief misconducting himself should, after proper inquiry, forfeit the amount of his wages and be otherwise punished as may be deemed suited to his crime.

2nd.—That on their services being required, the wages of those not attending should be forfeited for the year and divided amongst those who do. I would further recommend that you firmly establish Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed as your Wuzzeer, making him the usual present on the occasion; place the collection of your revenues in his hands, and in every way assist him in supporting your authority.

3rd.—That you daily, or not less than three times during the week, sit in open Durbar for the purpose of listening to, and settling, disputes amongst your subjects and dispensing justice.

If you think fit to keep up a small force of regular sepoys as a guard of honor to enforce your orders I see no objection, always bearing in mind that a force of this kind requires the strictest discipline, otherwise *it merely becomes a tool for oppression.*

You should place over this force a respectable man, and not the disreputable person who has been dismissed in disgrace from the service of the British Government.

I would advise this force to consist of—

29	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned Rank and File of Artillery.
100	Cavalry.
267	Infantry.
Total 396	

Should you consider the above arrangements for your benefit, I would advise that you at once proceed to carry them into effect. Should you consider otherwise it will then be unnecessary for me to solicit from the British Government the extra Rs. 50,000.

A British officer is not placed in my position merely for the purpose of protecting you against injury from your own subjects, caused by your own mis-government. The friendship of one individual is of little service to the British Government, but that of a contented and well-governed country on its frontier is of the utmost service. * * * *

(Signed) HENRY GREEN.

In March 1861, Major (now Sir William) Merewether wrote to the officer commanding in Sind, paragraph 9—"Having a friendly power steadily growing strong next to us, admits of this frontier "and Upper Sind being held by a weak brigade, instead of a division being required. If that power "become hostile to us, or unmanageable from internal dissensions, we should have to defend the "western frontier of Sind, not against a few hundred Belooch robbers as is sometimes supposed, but "against thousands of most hardy and determined enemies, viz., the whole Brahooee nation. And "again, when they by these quarrels and divisions had fallen to pieces, the Affghans would only too "readily take advantage of their weakness to possess themselves of their country."

In 1861 Sir Henry Green went on leave, and Captain Dickinson replaced him on the 21st of May that year ; the following are extracts from Captain Dickinson's report dated 23rd January 1862:—

"On the 18th June, having made the third march within the Moolla Pass, I received intelligence that Sirdar Taj Mahommed Zehree, the Chief of Jalawan, had assembled his tribe and was intending to plunder the country.

"The character of this chieftain, the second in rank in Beloochistan, had been described to me by Major Green as hasty, headstrong, and inclined to intrigue ; he was one of the Sirdars who rebelled against the Khan shortly after his accession, and has never since been on very good terms with the ruler, but the Khan having demanded his daughter in marriage, it was hoped that by means of this alliance a more happy feeling might be induced. This expectation was however defeated by the act of his Highness, who disregarding his betrothal immediately after his return to the hills, and during the short period that he was separated from the influence of the Political Agent, married the widow of his brother, the late Nusseer Khan, who, although the sister, is inimical to the Jalawan Sirdar.

"This act on the part his of Highness was regarded by the Brahooee tribes as dishonourable and insulting, and several of the chiefs were prepared to take up the quarrel for their compeer ; and even the Khan's personal adherents admitted that their master had by such an act given deep reason for resentment.

"On the 20th June I received a letter from the Khan's brother-in-law, Sirdar Syud Khan informing me that the Jalawan chief was in revolt, and offering to assist me with the force at his disposal. I declined his offer, and requested that such might not be repeated, as I considered it likely to aggravate a matter already sufficiently serious.

Attempt to embroil us with the chiefs.

"On the 21st a messenger from Taj Mahomed arrived in my camp bearing apologies for his master for not personally meeting me, which he was unable to do in consequence of the assembly of the tribes.

"On the following day I received a letter from the Sirdar, a translation of which is appended.

"On arrival at Khelat on the 2nd July, I visited his Highness the Khan and he returned the ceremony on the following day. On the latter occasion I caused Sirdar Taj Mahomed's letter to be read to him. He candidly acknowledged that he had deeply injured the Sirdar, and said that his fate caused him to do so, and with the view of avoiding discussion, he constantly harped on the injury which he considered himself to have received in some of his grain having been plundered by the Sirdar's followers. Ultimately his Highness agreed to concur in any measure I might propose, after consultation with the Wuzzeer and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed the chief of Sarawan.

"Subsequent inquiry convinced me that his Highness' complaints regarding the injury done his granaries by the Sirdar's followers were greatly and designedly exaggerated.

"On the 5th July I had an interview with the Wuzzeer and the Raisanee chief.

"The former is the Khan's best and most trustworthy servant; he said that he deeply deplored the rash step his master had taken.

"Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, the Sarawan Sirdar, also said that so deeply did he feel that his brother chief had been deeply injured, that he felt quite prepared to side with him. After much discussion it was determined that the chief, accompanied by the Akhoond and another officer, should proceed to the Jalawan Sirdar and try to adjust matters amicably.

"They did so; the assembly of the Zehree tribe was broken up, and Taj Mahomed returned to his village, where he has since quietly remained. It cannot however be disguised that a feeling of hatred still exists on the part of His Highness towards the Sirdar, and he *openly professes vindictiveness to an extent perhaps incredible to one unacquainted with his character; and so lately as the day before yesterday he declared to me that, were it not for English restraint, he should immediately carry matters to extremity, and to quote his own words, 'by the assistance of God and the Prophet he would quietly exterminate 'an enemy whom he would trace even though they were to meet before 'the judgment seat of their Creator.'*"

This was about six months after.

The threat was fulfilled afterwards.

"The Sirdar likewise has not forgotten the injury; his letters display a captious and querulous spirit, and so great is his resentment that, when his Highness on his march down to Kutchee in November last encamped for several days in the vicinity of Zubree, he could be induced by neither persuasion nor advice to pay his respects to the Khan, and now only remains quiet in deference to the Political Agent."

Report No. 60, *dated 29th January* 1863.

(5.) The relations which have existed between the Government of his Highness the Khan of Khelat and that of the British have been of the same cordial nature as heretofore, every effort has been made by him to meet the wishes in all subjects, and more particularly with regard to the electric telegraph line now in course of construction through his dominions on the coast of Mekran; at the same time I regret to be compelled to state that his relations with his chiefs still remain in an unsatisfactory state and open rebellion is with difficulty prevented by the presence of a British officer at his court, and the personal influence exerted by him over the chiefs and people. Much of the ill-feeling towards the Khan is doubtless caused by his capricious, unstable character, but his chiefs by the unreasonableness of their demands, and insolence of their conduct towards him, render any permanent settlement of their differences most difficult; his power over them is slight, and although their lands are held by feudal tenure, any attempt made by his Highness to enforce even the extradition of a culprit, leads to their banding together and defying his authority. The above has been for years the state of the country; and the position of the Political Agent at the Court of Khelat, situated beyond the British border among barren mountains, and surrounded by so many elements of discord, is a most difficult one; he stands between the Khan and his feudal chiefs, both parties look to him to listen to and redress their grievances, and he must keep a just equilibrium between the two parties, and to his personal influences gained by his reputation among those semi-barbarian tribes for courage, unscrupulous good faith, and justice, much of the tranquillity of this part of the British border depends. I can with pleasure, however, state that the individual character of an Englishman stands so high amongst these wild races, that the life and property of a single officer amongst them is safer than in the most civilized countries in Europe. Within the last few months an European merchant proceeded from our border with several camel loads of valuable silks across Kutchee and through the Gundava Pass to Khelat, he was totally without any guard, and merely held a letter from the political officer on the frontier to the Khan, and one or two chiefs, through whose country he would pass; he met throughout with the greatest civility and kindness, sold his merchandize, and returned through the whole length of Beloochistan to Kurrachee, at the time there was no political officer residing at Khelat.

Neutrality of the Agent.

Report No. 19, *dated 4th January* 1864.

(8.) My great object has been apparently to interfere as little as possible in the affairs of the Khelat State, and to leave every thing in the hands of the chiefs, at the same time using all my personal influence to guide them in a right course, and maintain peace. I felt and knew that to oppose the popular will at the commencement of the rebellion would have at once placed the British Government in an antagonistic position to the whole of the Belooch nation, I therefore temporarily withdrew the Political Agent from Khelat.

(9.) During the past month an emissary from the Candahar chief arrived at Khelat, and proposed to the present Khan support, on condition that he should make over the valley of Shawl (Quetta) and Mustoong, as well as the town of Dadur to the Affghan nation. This would have given them entire command of the Bolan Pass. The Brahooee chiefs at once refused their consent to such propositions, and the Affghan returned to Candahar.

(10.) It is with great satisfaction that I have to report the great assistance that I have met with from the principal and most influential chiefs in Beloochistan, as well as from Meer Khodadad Khan, the deposed prince. This young man has steadily refused all assistance from foreign powers, and on my pointing out to him that his attempting to maintain a hopeless position with a few followers would be liable to create disorder on the frontier border, he at once dismissed his retainers, and cheerfully accepted a place of residence close to the British frontier, and has never failed to assist me with any influence he may still retain to maintain peace. Shere Dil Khan, who was elected Khan, and who has since his election resided in the strong fortress of Khelat, but with whom I have as yet declined to hold communication, at once left his strong position on hearing that I had expressed a wish to see him.

The present Khan.

(11.) Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, the principal chief in the country, and by far the most intelligent and influential, has been of the greatest possible service, and from the time I entered Beloochistan as Political Agent in 1856, has never failed to render me the greatest assistance, and more particularly when rebellion was raging in our own provinces, and every inducement was held out by the disaffected to induce him and other chiefs to side against us.

Character of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed. Eight years good service.

(12.) I am sanguine that within a short period a peaceable solution of the affairs of Beloochistan will be brought about.

Colonel Malcolm Green's report No. 1, *dated 1st January* 1864.

(2.) You are fully aware that almost from the date of the accession of his Highness Khodadad Khan to the throne of Khelat, constant quarrels and dissensions have taken place between himself and the chiefs of Beloochistan.

(3.) The cause of these quarrels may be traced in a great measure to the Khan himself who, relying on foreign support and the fidelity of a few so-called regular troops, had invariably treated the chiefs of the country with neglect, almost amounting to contempt, and on one occasion committed a very great insult on the family of the powerful Jalawan Sirdar, Taj Mahomed, who would have avenged it at the time, had not the influence of the English officer resident at Khelat prevented him; but the feeling of revenge has never left him, and to this I mainly attribute the disturbance which occurred at the commencement of the year 1863.

The present Khan and the origin of his quarrel with Taj Mahomed who went into rebellion.

(4.) I must here recall to your remembrance the incessant remonstrances of yourself, whilst Political Agent to his Highness, both verbally and in writing, as to his bearing towards the chiefs of the country, and your constant warnings of the catastrophe which, did he not change his conduct towards them, would ultimately lose him the throne.

(10.) At the end of April 1863, having recovered from his wound, Khodadad Khan moved through the Gundava Pass to Kozdar, and there collected a small force from amongst the Southern tribes, and in June advanced towards Khelat; was deserted by the greater portion of the army when within two marches of the place, and finally reached the Mustoong valley, where he was hospitably received and treated, with the few adherents still with him, by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, the principal chief of Beloochistan, under whose guidance the revolution was, and is still progressing.

Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, the benefactor of the present Khan in his adversity.

(11.) In November last Khodadad Khan, accompanied by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and a few adherents, arrived in Kutchee, and he has since been residing at Nusseerabad, a small village in his Highness' territories, distant about 10 miles from Jacobabad.

(16.) There now remains to show the state of the country at the present time. Although the most influential chiefs and tribes adhere steadily to Shere Dil Khan, there exist a small party who still acknowledge the deposed Prince Khodadad Khan as the proper ruler of the country; it has therefore been proposed by the chiefs, with a view of finally settling and securing the peace of the country, that there shall be a conference held, and that each chief shall give his vote and opinion, and should the majority show themselves in favour of Shere Dil Khan, he should be elected accordingly.

The rights of the chiefs as part of the confederacy.

(17.) I have now the honour to bring to your notice the loyalty towards the British Government which has characterised the proceedings of all parties in Beloochistan, from the time Khodadad Khan was wounded in March last to the instant of his arrival, under the care of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, at your camp at Shahpoor in November, and the deference shown to the wishes of Government in obtaining your concurrence previous to his taking up a position so near the British frontier. You are already aware that, although the VI. Article of the Treaty between the British Government and Khelat has been for some months suspended on the part of the former, no instance has occurred or attempt made to use this fact, as an excuse for departing from the original terms of the Treaty; and by increasing the transit dues on merchandise passing through the country to India, to raise the revenue to the same amount as it was previous to the treaty being entered into, and thus save the country from the state of bankruptcy to which the late disturbances have almost reduced it.

Vide letter in Political department, No. 2304, dated 22nd July 1863.

Government Resolution No. 867 *A of 6th April* 1865, *para.* 1.

RESOLUTION.—The continued maintenance of peace in Beloochistan during the past year, marked as it has been by important political changes, is a matter of congratulation. The Honourable the Governor in Council feels sure that this satisfactory result is mainly due to the constant vigilance and judicious tact exercised by the Political Agent at Khelat, in reconciling the conflicting interests of the Belooch chiefs, aided by the advice and experience of the Political Superintendent on the frontier.

Government approves of the Political Agent reconciling conflicting interests.

Report No. 30, *dated* 1*st January* 1866.

4. His Highness the Khan of Khelat has been employed during the year in settling the affairs of his country after the confusion of the year 1863-64, and for this purpose he remained during the past cold season at Khelat. An attempt to create disturbances was made in July by the Jam of Beyla and Noordeen, the chief of the powerful Mingul tribe, but the forces were met by those of his Highness the Khan near Kozdar in Jalawan and totally defeated; both the Jam and Noordeen were captured in the retreat, and have since resided under surveillance at Khelat.

Report, 14*th April* 1868, *from Sir Henry Green.*

1. I have the honour to submit a report of the political state of the Sind frontier and adjoining countries for the year 1867-68.

2. As reported by me, in my letter under date the 1st November 1867, No. 1407, disturbances broke out in Beloochistan in October last caused by the return of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, the Raisanee chief to the country from Candahar, where he had been residing in exile since his flight from Beloochistan in 1865. The object of his return was, there can be little doubt, to cause a rebellion in the country, and on his presence being known, he was joined by three of the minor chiefs, by name Adam Khan Bungulzye, Alla Dina Koord, and Mahomed Khan Lehree, with about 200 of their immediate followers; they were however met by his Highness the Khan with most energetic measures, he having at once despatched Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed with the small regular force which his Highness has at his disposal, and the different tribes as they were collected. The Shahgassee at once attacked and dispersed the rebels wherever assembled, and after a few efforts to maintain their position in which they were not joined by the people of the country, they fled for refuge to the Murree Tribe, begging from them an asylum and assistance; the former was afforded according to the ideas of honour entertained by all semi-barbarians, but all assistance in prosecuting these rebellious intentions was refused.

3. During the month of January last, I proceeded patrolling, accompanied by the 2nd Sind Horse, and skirted the Murree mountains, visiting the province of Kutch-Gundava in the territory of his Highness the Khan of Khelat; while there I received a message from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and the chiefs who were with him begging me to intercede in their behalf with their master the Khan, and to allow them in the meantime to reside near the British frontier, or in any place that I might name. I however declined to interfere in any way between them and his Highness, except at the latter's request, in which case both parties must agree to abide by my decision, they on their part consented to do so. I then wrote to his Highness the Khan who was at Khelat, pointing out that these chiefs had received severe and well-merited punishment at his hands, and suggesting that it would be for his benefit and for the well-being of his country if they were forgiven and allowed to return to their homes. In due time I received a reply from his Highness, saying that he placed everything in my hands, and that he would agree to any arrangement I might suggest. I then informed the Sirdars that they were at liberty to reside at Seebee, the N.E. corner of Kutch-Gundava, until I had leisure to meet them; and at the same time I informed the Shahgassee that they were not to be molested, on which he dismissed the assembled tribes to their homes. This occurred in February last, and I felt confident that no attempt at disturbances would be made by the chiefs until I could attend to their business.

9. On my return to Jacobabad on the above date, I sent a messenger to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed his Highness the Khan's Wuzzeer, or principal adviser, as also to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, requesting their attendance on the 10th of the month. I may here mention that with both these individuals I had become intimately acquainted during a residence of four years as Political Agent in Beloochistan. The family of the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed had held from time immemorial confidential posts near the Khan of Khelat, and his brother Noor Mahomed had died sword in hand by the side of his master Mehrab Khan at the storming of Khelat by the British in 1839—an act since proved to have been of questionable justice—while the females of his family were destroyed at the same time according to Belooch custom, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the victors. He himself escaped from the citadel in charge of the son of Mehrab Khan, the late Khan and brother of the present one, and was the principal instigator and actor in the rebellion which dethroned the Khan-Sha-Newaz, elected by the British Government after the death of Mehrab Khan, and caused the election of Meer Nusseer Khan and death of the Political Agent, Lieutenant Loveday. Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed during the many years in which I have been acquainted with him, has never failed to offer the best advice to his Highness the Khan in all matters, and to his firmness and loyalty towards the British Government, and influence amongst the chiefs and people of Beloochistan, I mainly ascribe the peace which prevailed on the Sind frontier during the worst period of the Indian rebellion, and when the Khan, then a boy of 15 years, was being urged by Persian and Affghan intrigue to side against the British power and create disorder on its frontier.

10. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, the chief of Sarawan, and the head of the Raisanee tribe of Brahooees, fled in 1865 from Beloochistan to Candahar, owing to his implication in a plot, the object of which was the assassination of the present Khan, and in which the late Sirdar Taj Mahomed was the chief instigator; this latter chief, the most powerful in Beloochistan, had, on a former occasion in 1862, more successfully led a rebellion against his master, in which the latter was severely wounded by his cousin Shere Dil Khan, who was elected Khan, and his victim sought refuge close to the British border; the usurper did not long retain his position after. For a time being made the tool of the chiefs who plundered Khelat, he was murdered in the Gundava Pass by some men of the Zehree tribe, of which Sirdar Taj Mahomed was the chief, and who at the time was close by, being beyond a doubt again the prime mover.

11. The present Khan then again resumed his legitimate position, but it may well be understood that he placed little confidence in his chiefs, more particularly in Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and Taj Mahomed. As before stated, these two chiefs again leagued against him, but this time he was beforehand with them, and the Zehree chief was seized and confined, whilst the chief now under notice fled to Candahar. These occurrences happened in the month of February 1865, and from that date up to the time of he events now under report, Beloochistan enjoyed a periodof profound peace.

12. In August 1867, Taj Mahomed died at Khelat while in confinement, and reports were spread of his having been assassinated at a feast, but these were utterly false: and that other means were employed to cause the death of the chief, my most minute inquiries have failed to elucidate. One thing is however beyond a doubt, that a more desperate intriguer or a greater traitor did not exist in any native court in Asia, and so long as he remained at large his Highness the Khan's position could never have been safe.

13. As reported in the month of November last, Sirdar Moolla Mahomed returned from Candahar, with the view of again creating a rebellion; but his former companion was no longer ready to aid him, and in the meantime his Highness the Khan had done everything in his power to strengthen his position. I knew of this chief's intentions, and having a regard for him, which I had gained from frequent intercourse on sporting excursions in the Belooch mountains, where I had on many occasions partaken of his hospitality, I warned him to desist from his intention; the results of his not doing so have been shown in my second paragraph.

14. At the appointed date, the Wuzzeer and chief attended at Jacobabad, each escorted by a small party of retainers, and after hearing the complaints of both parties, I was enabled so to adjust the differences as to remove all chance of a renewal of hostilities between his Highness and his chiefs, and on the return of the former to the plains next winter a more permanent arrangement can be made.

Sirdar Moolla Mahomed went to Seebee and waited there until the time for making the permanent arrangement here referred to arrived.

With the Jam of Beyla on the point of again rebelling he could not well do so.

W. L. M.

In a great measure brought about by their own acts.

W. L. M.

On the 8th February, in the first instance under instructions received by telegram from Bombay, but not gazetted till March. He however entered on the duties in February. Captain Harrison had served on the frontier for 11 years, and having been at Khelat with Sir Henry Green, was already personally acquainted with the Khan and some of the chiefs.

W. L. M.

Sir Henry Green was succeeded as Political Superintendent on the frontier of Upper Sind by Colonel Phayre, who arrived there in the month of August 1868.

On the 14th October it was reported that the Khan of Khelat, whom the Political Superintendent had expressed a wish to meet in Kutchee for the purpose of discussing the affairs of the Khanate, would not move down from Khelat that season. In fact, his Highness had not left Khelat since 1865.

The Vakeel of his Highness, who brought this intelligence from his master, came full of complaints as usual against the chiefs; he informed me "that "the Khan had recently intercepted correspon- "dence between some of these chiefs and Sirdar "Moolla Mahomed, which had tended to heighten "his feelings of resentment against them.

Letter No. 1222, dated 14th October 1868.

"Indeed, it appears that his Highness expects "some fresh outbreak of rebellion, and therefore "does not wish to leave Khelat; in this he is "wise perhaps, until he has adopted measures "to do them justice by redressing their real "wrongs.

"It is certainly scarcely to be wondered at "that, when in addition to the deprivation of "landed property, absolute want of the neces- "saries of life affects men of rank and influence "like Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, and others, some "such effort to relieve themselves as that hinted "at by the Vakeel should develop itself."

Captain Harrison was appointed Political Agent at Khelat in March 1869. One of the first matters he was requested to undertake being to reconcile Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, the Jam, Noordeen, and others, with the Khan.

The Jam and Noordeen had been out in rebellion at the end of 1868, but Sirdar Moolla Mahomed had not joined them under promises from me that, if he remained quiet in his place of exile at Seebee until Captain Harrison could present him at Khelat, his case would be represented in a proper manner.

No specific causes of grievance had ever been elicited from any of the chiefs; one of the first measures therefore which I adopted was to write down everything as expressed in the following letter to Sir Wm. Merewether, dated 23rd March 1869:—

"I received your telegram regarding Sirdar "Moolla Mahomed and his "followers late last night.

Col. Phayre's letter of 23rd March 1869.

"My first plan regarding him was that he should go to Khelat with Harrison, but as Har-

rison did not appear to like that, it was abandoned. I then proposed the same plan that you now suggest, viz., that he should go to Khelat direct, arriving a few days after Harrison.

"To this Moolla Mahomed replied that he would do just as I might decide, but that as this is a matter that nearly concerns the whole of the Brahooee chiefs and people, whose rights and very means of livelihood are at stake, he wished to join the Council of the Confederacy which was to meet in Jalawan, to draw up a petition to the Khan representing all they had to say.

"I replied to Moolla Mahomed that according to the original and proper organisation of the Khelat State, the assembly of a council of chiefs was unobjectionable, and that under all the circumstances of the case, I would not object to his going, as he wished to do so; but I told him, and also wrote to the Jam of Beyla, that a respectful representation to the Khan of all reasonable grievances would meet with support from the Political Agent, Captain Harrison, but that violent measures would injure their cause.

"Sirdar Moolla Mahomed quite assented to this; he said moreover that were he not to go, it would place him in a most awkward predicament with all his own people, inasmuch as they would conclude that he had secretly abandoned their cause under promises from us.

"Now, as we have given him nothing whatever for all his services, and as he and his people have gone through an immense amount of actual want during the past two years, and remained silent by our advice, I did not feel authorised under our present policy of non-interference, to throw the apple of discord between him and his own people.

Note by Colonel Phayre.

I could have secured the services of this Sirdar for very little.

R. P.

Note by Sir W. Merewether.

But of course such a plan was impossible, while the Sirdar remained at variance with the Khan.

W. L. M.

Military confederacy can scarcely be correctly applied to the Khanate of Khelat, no more than to England in the time of the Plantagenet. The Khan is clearly a sovereign, and the chiefs possess lands and rights on feudal tenure.

W. L. M.

"I have gained a good deal of information lately which quite confirms our views as to the sinister aims of the Khan at the original organisation of the Khanate as a Military Confederacy, which is the form to which we wish to restore it, if possible, but which cannot be carried out without speaking very plainly and decidedly to the Khan, and showing him that in return for our support of him as ruler of the State, and securing the throne to him and his successors, we look for the fulfilment on his part of the objects we have always had in view from the first, as communicated to him by Jacob. We never intended that the Khan should become a despot in violation of the rights and privileges of his chiefs and people, and yet the whole of the troubles that have come upon the country for the last few years have arisen from his assumption of despotic power; to support which, he has surrounded himself by upwards of 2,000 mercenaries of the lowest description, who commit fearful tyranny in the country, as the Sirdars assert, and who swallow up more than half of the revenues of the State, viz., two lakhs per annum, that being, I am told, the cost of their maintenance.

Khanazad despotism.

It can scarcely be said the Khan was alone in fault, as this would convey. The Khanazadas had held office about the Khans in previous reigns, but it was reserved to the reign of the young and weak ruler Khodadad to see the development of struggle for power between the Khanazadas and nobles. The formation of a mercenary force was the necessary sequence.

W. L. M.

"Remonstrances against this unlawful system were unheard, and armed resistance to it has been called rebellion, leading to the confiscation of property on all sides.

"I enclose for your information memorandum of two statements taken by Harrison from Sirdars Moolla Mahomed and Alla Dina Koord.

"I also have ascertained that the following are points which the chiefs generally wish to settle with the Khan:

With some reason, when the demands of the nobles were such as the Khan could not comply with.

W. L. M.

"1st. They claim that the Khanate shall be constituted as to laws and government as it was in the days of the first Nusseer Khan.

He ruled absolutely, and being a very able man, kept his nobles in order better.

W. L. M.

This is tantamount to calling on the Khan to acknowledge the murder (a disputed point) and his own complicity.

W. L. M.

This is a fair grievance. It has since been settled by the death of the Khan's son.

W. L. M.

This has never been conceded. The present Wuzzeer is the best and most true man in Beloochistan, and his appointment was approved by our Government.

W. L. M.

This was only the case with head chiefs of Sarawan and Jalawan, the Raisanee chief and Zehree chief.

W. L. M.

This is quite wrong.

W. L. M.

Because as the Jam was in rebellion it would be flying in the face of the Khan, and render the Sirdar's reconciliation more difficult.

W. L. M.

He did, however, go straight to Beyla from Jacobabad, disobeying instructions given to him, having for their object the fulfilment of Sir H. Green's promise to bring about his reconciliation with the Khan. He afterwards accompanied the Jam towards Khelat.

W. L. M.

Note by Colonel Phayre.

Disadvantage of listening to no one but the Khan's own agents.

R. P.

Note by Sir W. Merewether.

The Khan himself should have been heard before conclusions were formed.

W. L. M.

This is merely the statement of the Sirdars and requires confirmation.

W. L. M.

A later report from Captain Harrison speaks differently as to the conduct of these mercenaries.

W. L. M.

" 2nd. They complain of the entertainment of a large body of mercenaries, who are fed by the proceeds of lands and other sources of revenue, of which they and their children have been deprived.

" 3rd. They claim compensation for the murder of Taj Mahomed, Chief of Jalawan.

" 4th. They object to the innovation of the Khan's appointing his own infant son as heir to the Chieftainship of Jalawan, the appointment being by right and ancient privilege in the hands of the Jalawan Sirdars themselves subject to confirmation by the Khan; and that a son of the ruler is not eligible to the position, and that such a measure cannot fail to perpetuate the present divided condition of the Khanate.

" 5th. They claim the right of appointing their own Wuzzeer, and want a change of ministry.

" 6th. They claim to have a voice, as of old, in the civil and military councils of the Khanate.

" 7th. They say that the treaty of the British Government is with the Khan of Khelat as ruler of Beloochistan and the head of the Brahooee Confederacy, [not with the individual Khodadad Khan, who they say has become their enemy, by departing from the rules and laws of their Confederacy, &c., &c.,

End of letter 23rd March.

* * * *

" Moolla Mahomed demands :—

1st. The restoration of all his paternal estates.

2nd. Restoration of property.

3rd. Restoration of the Enam lands at Tehree, Mushkab, and Kolara.

4th. Right of river-water at Dadur."

Sir William Merewether objected to Moolla Mahomed going to Beyla, and on the 26th March Colonel Phayre again wrote :—

" Sirdar Moolla Mahomed will not go to Beyla in consequence of your being opposed to it. He will precede Captain Harrison by a day or two to Kozdar, on the direct road to Khelat, where the Jalawan Sirdars have been invited to meet Captain Harrison in about 20 days time. Captain Harrison will thus hear all they have to represent, as he has done in the case of the Sarawan Sirdars. He will then proceed to the Khan, and it will remain for his Highness to decide as to the course he will take.

" I beg to enclose a copy of a letter I have addressed to the Khan on the subject of the affairs of the Khanate generally, which are in a much worse condition than we supposed them to be, whilst labouring under the disadvantage of communicating only with the Khan himself and his agents.

" For instance, I have only now ascertained from the Sirdars that what the Khan calls his regiment has swelled into a standing force of 2,000 infantry, 300 horse, and three or four guns, which cost the State nearly two lakhs out of a revenue of $3\frac{1}{2}$. That this force is mainly a body guard quartered at Khelat; that it is composed of a set of lawless Mekranees, Pathans, &c. who are under no wholesome control whatever, and commit fearful tyranny in the country. At my earnest remonstrance with the Khan a few months ago, regarding the insecure state of the high road from the Sind Frontier to the Bolan, he sent a detachment of 60 or 70 men of this body to Bagh, which

The mercenary brigade.

This depends on whether the feudal system can be restored on a sound and safe basis. I question it very much, and if it cannot, a well organised regularly paid force would materially aid in the formation and maintenance of good government.

W. L. M.

In consequence of the hostile attitude of the leading Sirdars. It was originated in the late Khan's reign.

W. L. M.

This is the statement merely of the Sirdars, who are still in direct hostility to the Khan.

W. L. M.

As other Khans did before him.

W. L. M.

Mekran is held by a firm ruler, Naib Fukeer Mahomed, who refused to join the discontented nobles.

W. L. M.

Because the service is not rendered.

W. L. M.

Note by Colonel Phayre.

When I wrote this, I had not read the early history of this reign, and did not dream that assassination was likely to be attempted.

R. P.

Note by Sir W. Merewether.

This note would point to the Khan having originated or authorised the attack on Alla Dina Koord at Beyla. There is nothing to support this, beyond the bare assertions of the rebellious Sirdars, and such a supposition should not be hastily entertained.

W. L. M.

My desire was that Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, the Chief of Sarawan, should follow Captain Harrison to Khelat without joining first the Jam of Beyla, who, with Noordeen Mingul was known to be conspiring against the Khan, feeling sure that the Jam's evil influence would affect Moolla Mahomed injuriously, and render the latter's reconciliation with the Khan, which Sir H. Green had promised to aid in, more difficult. Unfortunately this course was not followed, and Moolla Mahomed afterwards at Khelat under that evil influence rejected most liberal and just terms which the Khan offered him.

W. L. M.

is utterly useless for the purpose for which it was detached, never attempting to do anything against the Murrees or other border plunderers, but as usual with such rabble, tyrannising over the poor people of the neighbourhood, and committing many of the gang robberies on Kafilas that are laid at the door of the Murrees and Brahooees.

"It will be in your recollection that the former commandant of this body, when it consisted only of some 700 or 800 men, murdered the last Khan (Shere Dil Khan), and there can be no doubt that unless measures are taken gradually to get rid of, or considerably reduce it, it will sooner or later give us a good deal of trouble. It is in fact the nucleus of a similar force to what the Rohillas under the Nizam have now attained, and I respectfully submit that I can conceive no more dangerous or mischievous element than this, which has crept into the administration of the Khanate of late years.

The mercenary brigade.

"The Sirdars affirm that, were it not for the evil influence of this body guard, they would all be holding their proper places in the State. That Sirdar Taj Mahomed would not have been murdered, and that their own lives and property and those of their children would not be in constant danger.

"Thus, in order to arrogate all power and concentrate it in himself at Khelat, Khodadad Khan has taken Khanazads for his advisers and deputies, and a lawless ribald soldiery for his body guard, with whom he has shut himself up in the Fort of Khelat. His districts are never visited. His Sirdars cannot approach him for fear of their lives.

"If we look to Mekran, we find the effects of this misrule. If we look North and N.E. to the Belooch tribes of Murrees and Boogtees, we find the same. If to Kutchee and the whole border from Larkhana to Kurrachee, the same. Lands confiscated. Money allowance for feudal service stopped and swept into the Crown Treasury, to be expended upon this embryo army of foreign mercenaries.

"With regard to the immediate combination of the Sirdars for coercive measures against the Khan, I have so repeatedly impressed upon Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and all, that they will get nothing by violent and intemperate conduct, that I have every reason to hope and believe that nothing of the sort will take place. Indeed, I am perfectly certain that it will not, if the Khan will be reasonable and follow our advice. But on the other hand, it is quite certain that the state of suspense, agitation, and distrust, which has rendered the condition and circumstances of the chiefs absolutely intolerable, cannot last."

Colonel Phayre then wrote the following letter, dated 26th March 1869, to his Highness the Khan:—

AFTER COMPLIMENTS,

Letter to the Khan.

"IT has now been arranged that Captain Harrison will leave Jacobabad on the 30th instant, and he will meet the Jalawan and Sarawan chiefs when he arrives in Baghwana. After that he will proceed to join your Highness at Khelat.

"I enclose copy of a letter that I have addressed to the Jam of Beyla in reply to one recently received from him.

"I have heard all that the Sarawan Sirdars have to represent, and without pronouncing an opinion upon any specific case, or accepting all to be as stated by them, yet I offer your Highness the sincere advice of a friend, that it would be for your own good, that all these differences should be

settled, in accord with the established rules and customs of the Khanate.

"One complaint of the Sirdars is, that some of their possessions have been confiscated, and that a body of foreign mercenaries is maintained by your Highness with the proceeds. If this be true, it is not accordant with the usual custom of any king or ruler.

"Amongst the objects of the British Government in originally entering upon a treaty of friendship and support with the ruler of Beloochistan and Kohistan, were these:—

"That the just and *reasonable* rights and privileges of every chief and ryot should be respected, and justice generally be administered; also that life and property should be secure; yet at this time the principal Sirdars of the Khanate affirm that through your Highness' unkindness in this respect, they are driven to stand aloof from you.

"I hope your Highness may resume your kind way of dealing with your chiefs, that they may all become loyal and obedient subjects. Thus, in the midst of a contented people, your Highness will not need many, if any, foreign mercenaries, and your own Sirdars and people would then do good service against border plunderers.

"It may be in your Highness' recollection what the late General Jacob told you, viz. that in administering justice to, and respecting the rights of all your chiefs and people, you would not only secure the peace and prosperity of your country, but receive the full support of the British Government in your measures to that end.

"There can be no doubt that when the greater part of the nobles and people of any country are in absolute want, *where the means of plenty exist*, that there cannot be tranquillity or prosperity in that country, until such want is removed.

"The welfare and interests of 100,000 people are involved in your Highness' decision in this matter."

End of letter of 26th March.

R. PHAYRE.

Now occurred an event which effectually changed the aspect of this whole attempt at reconciliation; for whilst Captain Harrison was awaiting the arrival of the Sirdars at Baghwana, he received intelligence of the attempted assassination of Sirdars Moolla Mahomed and Alla Dina Koord. He at once wrote the following letter to the Khan upon the subject:—

The attempt was made on 17th April 1869.

From Captain Harrison to H. H. the Khan.

"Baghwana, 22nd April 1869.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.

"It should be known to you that when the Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee and other chiefs left Jacobabad, a man who gave his name as Mairab Jumalee, an inhabitant of Door-Mahomed's-Gote, stated to the Sirdars that he had a petition to make to your Highness, and solicited their permission to accompany them to Khelat. His petition was not only complied with, but he was treated as a guest, and went with them to Beyla.

"On the night of the 17th June, when every one was asleep, Mairab took the sword of a man who was asleep, and proceeded towards Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's tent; but seeing a sentry alert, he went to Sirdar Alla Dina Koord, and succeeded not only in wounding the Sirdar and his two sons, Nubbee Buksh and Yusuff Khan, but unfortunately *killed* his second son Janee Khan.

"From the above, your Highness will perceive that the work of this assassin could not have been from per-

Not an act of personal malice.

sonal enmity, but must have been done at the instigation of a third person.

" From the vernacular letter herewith forwarded for your information, your Highness will see that the murderer attempted to save his life by stating that this cruel and cowardly act had been done by order of your Highness.

" As a report of this kind may be very injurious to your Highness, I would suggest that every effort be made to find out at whose instigation the crime was committed.

" This unfortunate event has quite unsettled the minds of the Sirdars who were coming to pay their respects to you, and I trust that by a kindly interest in their present misfortune, you will disabuse their minds of the statement made by the assassin Mairab."

Its effect upon the Sirdars.

C. H. HARRISON.

In reporting this event to the Commissioner in Sind, the Political Superintendent observed as follows:—

No. 703 of 27th April 1869.

" 3. Under these circumstances I would solicit a review of the events connected with the causes of dispute between the Khan and his chiefs, dating from my letter No. 1,222 of 14th October last, from which it will appear that the deliberate outrage now reported, has so intentionally widened the breach between the two parties, as to render it very difficult for us to mediate successfully as we had reasonably hoped to do; for, on the one hand, the Khan will of course repudiate all knowledge of the act, whilst the Sirdars on the other will as strenuously uphold their view, quoting it as an additional evidence of their oft-repeated charge, viz., that Khodadad Khan is step by step, and year by year, destroying the constituted form of Government of the Khanate, for the purpose of establishing despotic power in his own person and family.

" Against this tyrannical invasion of their civil and political rights, the chiefs naturally, and I believe justly, claim our protection, asserting that the treaty of alliance and friendship on the part of the British Government is with Khodadad Khan as head of the confederacy of Beloochistan, not with Meer Khodadad Khan Ahmedzye as a despotic prince; and they urge with truth that, excepting on the strength of the British alliance, and the power and status which it has conferred upon him, Khodadad Khan would never have ventured to assail their hereditary rights, and endeavour to subvert the constituted Government of the Khanate, as he has deliberately done for some years past.

" These Sarawan chiefs have, as you are aware, been living in exile and actual want for more than two years, but under the hopes held out to them by my predecessor, Sir Henry Green, and latterly by myself, they waited patiently till the time for respectfully representing their case to the Khan should arrive. The present outrage, therefore, instigated as it undoubtedly was by the Khan's party, would seem to indicate the determination of the latter to prevent a reconciliation and refuse them justice.

" I would, therefore, respectfully submit for consideration what course it would now be desirable to pursue. On the one hand, our relations with the Khanate, both in Mekran and on the Sind frontier from Kurrachee northwards, are so intimate, that we are precluded from withdrawing our support from its ruler, even temporarily; and yet, on the other hand, we cannot permit him to use the power derived from that support in a way that we never intended and that we cannot justly

There should be very clear evidence before this should be accepted and used in argument.

W. L. M.

The treaty is clearly and distinctly with the Khan of Khelat as ruler of the country, and the course followed by previous Political Superintendents has been strictly in accordance with that view, as being the policy intended and ordered by Government.

W. L. M.

The terms sent by the Sirdars last spring were very far from respectful.

W. L. M.

The terms given by the Khan to Moolla Mahomed were most liberal and just, and the Khan was even prepared to make concessions to the Jam, his inveterate enemy and intended supplanter in the Government, but the Jam retired to Beyla to try and mature a more successful rising for the next cold season. In this he has been signally defeated, and he is now a fugitive in British territory.

W. L. M.

countenance, consistently with the welfare and interests of the nobles and people generally.

" Whilst these matters are under consideration, Captain Harrison and I will do our utmost to pacify the chiefs and prevent them having recourse to arms. I would submit, however, that without other means at our command than friendly advice and persuasion (which in consequence of hope deferred have well nigh lost their power), it is quite impossible to foresee what men of rank and influence in the country with many thousands of discontented retainers may not be driven to do, under the exasperated state of feeling occasioned by this fresh outrage under report."

R. PHAYRE.

Sir W. Merewether replied as follows:—

No. 226, dated 1st May 1869.

" I have to express the regret with which I have heard of the unfortunate occurrence which took place at Beyla.

" While fully sympathising with the sufferers from this dastardly act, and equally feeling with you the importance that may be attached to it by interested people, I must caution you to be most careful how you accept or appear to accept even any statement intended to involve the Khan i this outrage. When a ruler and his influentia subjects are at variance, any act against any o the latter would at once be set down both by them and their followers as originating from the source whence they consider all their trials to come from. It is manifestly therefore the more necessary that any report received from them should be accepted with most extreme caution. Moreover, I need hardly remind you, that it would be highly unbecoming and most unsuitable for us to allow that we could for an instant give credence to so grave and dishonouring a charge against a ruler of a country, and that it would require the most conclusive evidence before such an accusation should have the slightest countenance.

" The statement made by the dying assassin, as communicated by Moolla Mahomed Raisanee to you, cannot be considered of any weight whatever, and bears the stamp of untruth on it clearly. The man, residing as he did previously at Noor Mahomed Jamalee's village, near Rojan, could not have received any orders from the Khan direct, the latter being at Khelat, and if any evil-disposed person ventured to instigate him to the deed, as one which might be approved of by the Khan—and his dying words would seem to have had reference to that—I need scarcely point out to you how unjust and unseemly it would be to hastily consider the Khan personally implicated in the deed. Direct information received here from Beyla mentions that the assassin was a known madman. Be this however as it may, I consider that we are bound to indignantly scout the idea of his Highness the Khan's complicity, until unmistakeable proof is adduced distinctly declaring it.

" I must now advert to the principles generally shown in the third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs of your letter, and in the first place, I must disagree with you as to your estimation of our political relations with the Government of Khelat. It is true that his Highness the Khan is the head of a Confederacy, but it is as such only that we have to do with him, and that in reality we have no business to interfere in the least between him and any of his subjects, whether baron or peasant. I must therefore request that in all your proceedings with reference to that Government, you will carefully bear in mind, that our communications are strictly speaking to be solely with the Khan,

Note by Colonel Phayre.

The preparations for the chiefs going to Khelat had been made in January and February 1869.

R. P.

Note by Sir W. Merewether.

The subject of the chiefs going to Khelat was discussed by me with Col. Phayre while I was in the frontier districts in February and March. I left them on the 11th March from Kusmore. Col. Phayre did not have his interview with Moolla Mahomed till his return to Jacobabad after that. On the 26th March, according to Col. Phayre's letter of that date, the route to be followed by Moolla Mahomed was decided to be to Kozdar, not Beyla. The Sirdar, however, disregarding his instructions went to Beyla.

W. L. M.

and that as regards the mode of governing his country, he alone is responsible, and to him alone we must look.

"From long connexion with the Khelat Government and earnest desire to assist in establishing it on a firm and secure basis, we have been in the habit of freely giving the best advice we could, but the acceptance of it, and acting upon it, rests with the Khan. Should he obstinately refuse to accept our good offices, it would then become a matter for consideration whether the Political Agent should not be withdrawn from the court.

"For some time past there has been no British officer resident with him, and until Captain Harrison arrives at his court, we are only in a position to judge by hearsay of what his motives have been, and what his present course of action is likely to be; of what has occurred for the last year or two, we are mainly dependent for direct information on the statement of those who felt themselves aggrieved, rightly or wrongly we are not in a position as yet accurately to judge, and under that sense of wrong attempted to obtain by force of arms what they considered their rights, but which his Highness for reasons of his own, which we have yet fully to learn, found himself unable to grant. They failed in their attempt, and had to suffer the privation and exile you allude to.

"It will be manifest to you from what is above written, that the policy I would wish you to follow, is that of friendly counsel to his Highness the Khan as the *sole person* in Beloochistan with whom we have any right or reason to communicate. That we are in no way entitled to interfere directly between him and his nobles and subjects; and to carry out this policy fairly and justly, it is above all things most important that it should in no way be shown that we are meddling in the affairs of the country by identifying ourselves openly with the cause of those who are acting in opposition to him.

"I have in conclusion to request that you will strictly adhere to the principles herein set forth, and that you will forward by the quickest means a copy of this letter to Captain Harrison for his guidance."

W. L. Merewether.

On the 4th May, Colonel Phayre replied as follows:

"Adverting to your fourth paragraph I would submit that there has been no other interference on my part between the Khan and his chiefs than has been occasionally carried on by my predecessors, whenever they deemed it to be emergently necessary.

"In the present instance, this interference has merely consisted in giving friendly advice to the Khan, expressive of the hope that he would for his own, and his country's sake, listen to what his chiefs had to represent to him; and to the latter, my invariable advice has been that they should submit a respectful representation of their grievances to his Highness, *wait patiently* for redress, and *on no account* whatever have recourse to arms.

Note.—I did this in several letters. One is given above.

"This timely intervention allayed their excitement, and inspired them with a hope, which, as all acknowledge, saved Kutchee from being plundered last December, and also restrained such of the Jalawan chiefs as had assembled at Baghwana for hostile operations against Khelat.

"Thus, up to the present time, such efforts have fully answered their object, having had a most beneficial effect upon our own interests, as

well as those of the Khan and his people generally, and I trust that as, ere this, the Sirdars have met Captain Harrison at Baghwana, his Highness will accept our mediation regarding them as originally arranged.

"For the future, however, under the instructions contained in the seventh paragraph of your letter under reply, no direct communication will be held with the Sirdars as heretofore for pacific or any other purposes, and Captain Harrison will be directed to consider his Highness the Khan as his sole medium of correspondence with them or any one else in the Khelat State."

R. PHAYRE.

These orders reached Captain Harrison about the 10th May, about which time the Sirdars, whose minds were very "unsettled" owing to the attempted assassination of the Sarawan chiefs, had arrived.

Captain Harrison then reports on the 13th May from Camp Zooroo :—

"On the 11th and 12th instant I met the Sirdars and clearly impressed on their minds that the English Government had satisfied itself that there was no truth whatever in the report that had been spread regarding the assassination of Sirdar Alla Dina Koord's son.

"I also informed the Sirdars that I had come to meet them, as the mutual friend of the Khan and themselves, and that if they had to make any request to his Highness, it must be made by themselves in a respectful manner, and that I would use any influence I might have with his Highness regarding the restoration of their hereditary lands, &c.

"I am sorry to say that what was anticipated by the Commissioner in Sind in his telegram has come too true. The Sirdars as you are aware met at Beyla. They did not come as you anticipated in a friendly manner,* far otherwise, they have come accompanied by a considerable force of about 3,000 men, and have one fixed determination, viz., to demand the dismissal of the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, and disbandment of his Highness' regiment. I told them that his Highness and the English Government had a very high opinion of the Shahgassee, and that I did not think their request a reasonable one. Regarding the regiment, I said I had no doubt it would be reduced when they (the Sirdars) showed that they had the interest of their Khan and country at heart. In the meantime I recommended that they should rest satisfied if their estates, &c., were restored.

The Khan had about 7,000 troops present at Khelat at this time.

"I left Baghwana this morning, and the Sirdars have gone to Zehree and intend waiting there until the Khan intimates his wishes to them.

"From the above you will see that I have been placed in a most unenviable and critical position. I shall however use my best endeavours to avert hostile proceedings on the part of the Sirdars, and show them that though asked to a friendly meeting, there is no intention of taking part with them against his Highness."

C. H. HARRISON.

On the 18th May, Captain Harrison reached Khelat, and thus reports what occurred there:—

* * * "I paid a formal visit to his Highness on the 21st ultimo. I had a long interview with him, during which he gave me a brief sketch of the conduct of the Sirdars, and then asked me if I could conscientiously state that it was for the benefit of himself and country to receive them back into

No. 9, dated 9th June 1869.

Note by Colonel Phayre.

* I gave up all hope of their doing so after I heard what had happened.

R. P.

Note by Sir W. Merewether.

Whatever good intentions Moolla Mahomed may have had, (and from previous personal acquaintance with that Sirdar, I believed him however fully capable of forming them ;) they would certainly be modified, if not entirely set aside when he joined the Jam and his party. For this reason I wished he should go direct to Khelat, following Captain Harrison. The report from Captain Harrison, dated 10th June 1869, No. 10, does not speak favourably for the Sirdar, as he shows himself now.

W. L. M.

favour. I was obliged to say that they had no claim to his kindness or consideration, but as they had suffered three years' exile and privation, he might find clemency on the present occasion not misplaced. His Highness then of his own free will wrote to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed in the kindest way, stating that he was prepared to restore all hereditary rights.

" The next thing that was heard of the Sirdars was, that they were marching with their full force on Khelat. Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed came to me with an urgent request that I would write to the Sirdars in such a way as to prevent further encroachments on their part. I demurred at this, as I had received positive instructions on the subject; as however both his Highness and the Shahgassee thought I was bound to act in the matter, I ventured to depart from the rule laid down in Commissioner's letter, No. 266. The spirit of the order however may be considered to have been carried out, as no letters have been sent without being perused and approved by his Highness and the Shahgassee.

" My letter was to the following effect: That they (the Sirdars) were to move at their peril another step towards Khelat. That they would be allowed two days leave either to come in with 300 followers, or go back to their respective homes. That should they advance, it would be looked upon as a declaration of hostilities against his Highness.

" The answer to this was, that they did not feel safe coming in with so small a party. I then, with full concurrence of his Highness, sent a Native officer of my escort and 12 men, inviting them to tender their allegiance, and stating that I would hold myself personally responsible for their safety. They were also distinctly ordered by his Highness not to go to Cupota. The Sirdars refused this invitation, and told the jemadar all they wished was that I would remain neutral, and allow them to settle their differences by force of arms. This message was only a reiteration of what the Sirdars had written.

Non-intervention solicited.

" In spite of the Khan's expressed wish, and all the injunctions the Sirdars had received not to move, they marched on Cupota and took up a strong position on two hills, running up walls and small bastions at the weak points.

" Under these circumstances, the following arrangements were made. Part of the regular troops and levies were sent to Iskulkole to prevent a surprise from that point, the rest of the troops and levies accompanied me to Zaweh. I left them there, and marched to Cupota and sent for the Sirdars.

" As they had behaved so badly, I did not hesitate to tell them in very plain language what I thought of their behaviour, and what they might expect if they did not change their mode of proceeding. Seeing that matters had gone too far, and that I was determined not to be trifled with any longer, they asked permission to consider over what I had been saying. After an hour they returned, saying that they did not wish to moot the questions regarding the Shahgassee and the regiment, and they had given up all intention of fighting for what they wanted, as they appeared to think that his Highness might make further concessions if properly represented by them. I agreed to meet them the next day, and marched back to the Khan's camp.

" On the following morning we re-assembled at Cupota, and I could get nothing definite settled until five in the afternoon. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed then agreed to return to Khelat with me with 50 of his men.

Note by Colonel Phayre.

The Belooch say that the Sirdar had lost all faith in the Khan, and his promises.

R. P.

Note by Sir W. Merewether.

This is merely hearsay. But even if true, it cannot in any way justify the Sirdar in bringing forward frivolous and insulting complaints before his sovereign.

W. L. M.

This might be considered liberal and just enough under all the circumstances.

W. L. M.

"On the following day I went with Sirdar Moolla Mahomed to call upon his Highness, and arranged for a business interview on the following morning. At the particular request of the Sirdar I was present, and the Khan insisted upon the conversation being carried on in Hindustani, so that I might understand the rights of the case. Moolla Mahomed read out a list of complaints that had been framed by his worthy associates. Most of them were frivolous and insulting. The Khan kept his temper admirably, and gave an answer to every thing, and when these various points had been settled, his Highness briefly defined his intentions, viz., that if they (the Sirdars) expected to get anything, they would have to behave in a becoming manner, and that he would then restore all hereditary rights. Free grants made by himself were declared forfeited by rebellion, and only restorable when they had shown by future good conduct that they were worthy of these tokens of regard.

"Compensation for defunct Sirdars was positively refused; two having died a natural death in confinement, and the rest having met their death fairly when fighting against him.

"In conclusion, he said that if they behaved well, they would have no reason to regret it. On the other hand, if compulsion were attempted, he would not give them a farthing, and was quite prepared to defend his rights and assert his position. Considering the behaviour of the Sirdars all through this business, I think his Highness deserves the greatest credit for having consented to restore hereditary lands, supplemented with a promise that their interests would be further attended to if they showed themselves worthy of further favour.

"After this interview, Sirdar Moolla Mahomed returned to Cupota, and as the chiefs would not make up their mind one way or another, I wrote to them at the request of his Highness, saying that the force at Zara had finished all the grass and water, and would be obliged to march on Cupota the following morning, so that if they (the Sirdars) wished to avoid coming into collision with his Highness' troops, they had better fall back and march on their homeward route. To this a speedy reply was sent, asking me to come alone and have half an hour's conversation with them, and that they would then either return with me, or go peaceably to their homes.

"I accordingly requested the Shahgassee to delay his march until I had given the Sirdars one more opportunity. On reaching Cupota all the Sirdars came to see me, except Azaad Khan, and he did his utmost to compromise the Sirdars beyond all hope, by sending repeated messages saying that the Khan's army was in sight, and close upon them. I told the Sirdars that I could see what Azaad Khan intended, and that they might rest assured that as I had told them I would come alone, the Khan's army would not move a step until they heard the result of my present visit. After a little talk, they agreed to go back quietly the following day, if I would give them a written pass. This I did, and guaranteed that they would not be molested if they abstained from plundering.

The chiefs and their followers retire quietly to their homes.

"Sirdar Moolla Mahomed would have accepted the Khan's terms, but was too weak-minded to sever from his evil advisers, the Jam and Noordeen. * *"

After the Sirdars had gone to their homes, Captain Harrison thus continues to report another matter:—

"His Highness came to see me on business yesterday regarding the Village of Kummul Khan in Baghwana, which, as you know, has been the source of dispute between the Jam and himself for some time past.

Kummul Khan's Village.

"Being aware that I knew on what grounds the Jam framed his pretensions, as also the rule in Beloochistan regarding intestate estates, his Highness asked me to write to the Jam from him, with the view of avoiding all further disputes for the future. The letter on the subject is marked A, and attached to this report, and from its perusal I hope it may be thought that I have arrived at right conclusions."

To the Jam of Beyla— from Captain Harrison.

After Compliments.

"It should be known to you that the English Government has sent me to Beloochistan to benefit the country by giving advice to his Highness in different matters.

"From all that has happened I see that until the dispute regarding the village of Kummul Khan is settled, that there will always be dissension between the Khan and yourself. His Highness has therefore asked me to write to you on the subject, and to settle the case from my knowledge of the circumstances.

"1st.—You say that you are entitled to the village by right of your mother.

"2nd.—That you inherited the property in the time of the late Nusseer Khan, and have had possession of it during part of the present reign. This his Highness positively denies.

"Regarding these claims one stultifies the other. Had you enjoyed the property in the late Khan's reign there would be no necessity for urging your claim through the female branch of your family.

"In the time of the great Nusseer Khan, at the request of all the Sirdars in Beloochistan, the Mahomedan law regarding the right of females to inherit property was cancelled, and as this Belooch law is still in force, I do not see how you can have any claims through your mother.

"The statement that you held the property in the late Nusseer Khan's time, and during part of his Highness' reign, was distinctly denied by the Khan in presence of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, and that Sirdar was directed to invite you to come in person and prove whatever claims you might have, and that if the proofs were satisfactory, further opposition on his part would be withdrawn. It is generally known that his Highness at the end of last year allowed you to receive charge of the village, only however on this proviso, that you would come at an early date to Khelat and substantiate the claim you say you have.

"As you have declined both invitations, it can only be considered that you have voluntarily resigned your pretensions. Under these circumstances, I think it would be advisable for you to withdraw any agent you may have placed there, and consider the village as belonging to his Highness, the lawful heir, until such time as you feel disposed to prove your right to the same."

C. H. Harrison.

On the 3rd June Sir W. Merewether conveyed his approval of Captain Harrison's proceedings* as above reported, as follows:—

"Capt. Harrison's proceedings have my fullest approval and unreserved commendation. In a position of great difficulty and delicacy, he has shown admirable firmness and sound judgment. The interference he was called upon to engage in was forced upon him, and I cannot too strongly express

* In respect to the Sirdars.
W. L. M.

my high opinion of the coolness, firmness, and excellent tact he displayed throughout. Though actively interfering, he did so in a thoroughly systematic manner; always working with, through, and for the Khan, and for the best interests of the country his Highness has to rule over. It will afford me great pleasure to bring his valuable services to the notice of his Excellency the Governor in Council. * *

"The sole object of my letter of 1st May and subsequent correspondence was to caution you against what appeared to me—unintentionally I conceived on your part—a too active interest in and partisanship with the Sirdars, whose tale you had heard, and with whom your generous feelings were leading you to join against the Government with whom alone we really had to do. The events that have taken place clearly establish the correctness of the opinion formed as to the designs of the recusant Sirdars, and I cannot help adding that had you adhered to the same course you so aptly adopted last October, in advising Moolla Mahomed Raisanee to keep aloof from the Jalawan party, that the latter would have earlier seen the hopelessness of opposing their sovereign. * *

"With regard to the foreign mercenaries, I do not see that we can interfere. Were his nobles true and staunch to him he would not require such. * * * * *

"The Khan has undeniable faults of character, as I have before stated, but undoubtedly on this occasion he has shown well." * * *

W. L. MEREWETHER.

The subsequent proceedings of the Jam, in the Kummul Khan affair, are before Government in the papers as per margin. The Khan, roused by these open threats, assembled a force under the Shahgassee, and attacked the Jam before he had time to organise any efficient force, and the result is that he has been defeated, whilst the victorious troops have proceeded to his head quarters at Beyla to plunder it.

Captain Harrison's letters Nos. 38 and 39 of 27th September 1869, and accompaniment.
No. 40, dated 20th October 1869, and accompaniment.

The Jam himself has taken refuge with some of his followers in the hills between Beyla and our border, west of Sehwan, where it is supposed the Shahgassee will not attempt to follow him.

Having thus brought the narrative of the leading events in the reign of Khodadad Khan down to the present year, I would respectfully offer the following remarks regarding them.

It appears the original intentions of Government as expressed in the treaty, and explained by General Jacob personally at the Conference with the Khan which preceded its ratification, have not been fulfilled up to the present time, so far as concerns the protection of life and property in the Khanate; the protection of cultivators and traders; safe and easy roads; and finally the administration of justice to all—nobles and people.

General Jacob's definition of a strong friendly Government.

Any honest attempt to establish a "strong friendly Government" on such a basis would be indeed worthy of our support, but instead of that we find that no sooner did Nusseer Khan—who was the sincere friend of the British Government, and beloved by all his chiefs and people—show an honest determination to act up to the treaty, than he incurred the implacable hatred of the chief Khanazad, the Daroga Gool Mahomed.

Sir Henry Green's report dated 4th December 1858.

This enemy of the British Government finding that British influence was stronger than his own

This is an assumption and not a fair one. The truth now appears to be, that the Jam's troops and followers, it is said by his order, plundered Beyla before the Shahgassee could reach it. When he did he set to work to restore order.

W. L. M.

The Jam fled to Kurrachee, reaching it on the 8th December. Sirdar Noordeen Mingul has gone, it is said, to Kandahar, his brother accompanied the Jam to Kurrachee.

W. L. M.

The terms of the treaty have been on the whole well adhered to by the Khan. The advice given by General Jacob is a separate thing. Close attention to it has been as much if not more defeated by the misconduct of the chiefs, than by faults of the Khan.

W. L. M.

Afterwards removed from power and since dead.

W. L. M.

Of this weakness the chiefs showed an early intention of taking advantage.

W. L. M.

This was only the case in the time of the Daroga Gool Mahomed and Bunnia Gungaram; and has ceased entirely since 1858.

W. L. M.

The said-to-be perpetrator has long since disappeared.

W. L. M.

A fair review of the course of events and later acts of the Sirdars show the contrary.

W. L. M.

At this time even the Sirdars commenced preferring unreasonable demands.

W. L. M.

The whole circumstances should be taken into consideration in forming a judgment here.

W. L. M.

There is nothing to show they are allowed uncontrolled license now. Were they, much more would be heard of them than is the case. A late report from Captain Harrison points to the contrary. It has arisen in consequence of the disaffection and misbehaviour of the chiefs.

W. L. M.

The circumstances do not bear out this conclusion.

W. L. M.

in the councils of the Khan, and perceiving that his master's mind could not be moulded into their treacherous designs towards us, resolved upon, and finally accomplished, his murder in the manner related by Sir Henry Green.

May 1857.

We then learn that the present ruler Khodadad Khan, "a youth of sixteen, of weak intellect," was taken from the harem in Khelat, where he had been confined up to that time, and became the helpless tool of this faction of household slaves who, from that moment have marched steadily to power, secretly yet surely thwarting every one who has opposed them, commencing with General Jacob and Sir Henry Green.

The time and circumstances under which the foul murder of Nusseer Khan was committed ought never to be forgotten, because there can be little doubt that it had some connexion with the general outbreak which occurred in Hindoostan during that time, the primary object of the Daroga being to retrieve his lost power, at a moment when he fervently hoped that the British power in India would be crushed for ever. The faction therefore that revolutionised the country at that critical moment, depriving us of a real friend, and Beloochistan of a beloved sovereign, would no doubt repeat this act, were a similar opportunity to occur again.

The Khanazads during the mutinies.

The Sarawan and Jalawan chiefs on the other hand were staunch and loyal to us, as their murdered master had been; cheerfully obeying Colonel Green's calls upon them, in spite of the bad treatment they had received from the new Khan Khodadad's party. Indeed, with the single exception of the Jam of Beyla, their conduct contrasts most favourably with that of the Khanazad Government throughout the whole of the period under reference.

Sirdars Moolla Mahomed and Taj Mahomed during the mutinies.

Sir Henry Green relates how the first act of the faction, after the accession of the new Khan, was to make the base and treacherous attack upon the unsuspecting chiefs, who had assembled at Khelat to elect a head, and were at that time encamped outside the walls with only a few of their retainers.

Treacherous attack of September 1857.

This diabolical act laid the foundation of all the fighting and mischief that has since occurred, by sowing the seeds of eternal feud between Khodadad and his chiefs, nullifying at one stroke all that General Jacob had worked so hard to establish. The cowardly deed was effected by a force, which then upheld and still constitutes the strength of Khanazad Government. In 1857, Sir Henry Green characterised it as a "band of about 400 scoundrels "of sorts; deserters from our Belooch regiments, "Patans and Afghans, with men from all parts of "Central Asia."

Khanazad ideas of a "strong government."

This permanent force has now grown into a brigade of upwards of 2,000 men, and if the original 400 of these ruffians were, as Sir Henry says, "permitted uncontrolled license, and were a "scourge to the country around," what, we may ask, must not a brigade of 2,000 of them be?

In it we have the mainspring of the Khanazad Government of Khelat, and it may readily be believed that the chiefs and people of Beloochistan only suffer it to exist, owing to the unqualified

The proceedings at Khelat have been very carefully watched and well understood for many years past.

W. L. M.

Very different in many respects. The Government officials of Khelat have been very different to what they were before 1858, as good as could be, and in spite of very adverse circumstances the Government now promises to be stronger than it has ever been.

The severe course pointed out by Lord Elphinstone's Government, here alluded to, was in consequence of most unfavourable opinions passed on the Khan himself by all the authorities in Sind, such is not the case now.

W. L. M.

That is, only of the chiefs and some few others, who are distant from the scene.

W. L. M.

The acts of the Sirdars, since the commencement of the present Khan's reign, have certainly not helped to remedy this state of affairs.

W. L. M.

The appointment of a member of Taj Mahomed's family has been arranged for.

W. L. M.

The treaty entered into by General Jacob had reference to the prevention of attacks on our border by subjects of the Khelat state, and protection of merchants. He gave his advice freely and soundly besides to the then Khan, and that his advice has not been followed, is due as much to the mischievous behaviour of the chiefs, as to the system of government they persist in attacking without reason, and complaints against which they always bring forward.

W. L. M.

It would be expedient first of all to establish clearly that such is the case, and next to learn what amount of interference Government considers it right to adopt in the matter of the government of an independent sovereign.

W. L. M.

Sir Henry Green's opinion referred to the first levy—12 years ago. It by no means follows that opinion should be applicable now, and recent reports show it is not. Moreover, Sir Henry Green latterly changed his views entirely with support which we give to the present ruler, through which they are intimidated.

I doubt if the real character and unquestionable tendency of this system has attracted the attention which it deserves. The circumstances now are precisely what they were in 1858, excepting that all is on a far larger and more serious scale. The whole of the despatches to and from Lord Elphinstone's Government in 1858, from February to December, show what was going on. Those of June are particularly applicable to the present time.

That the Khan himself soon imbibed the spirit of his Khanazads is clear from his vindictive speech regarding Taj Mahomed to Captain Dickinson, which showed beyond denial what he was capable of; and we know that a spirit of that sort laying hold of the young ruler of a semi-barbarous State "of weak intellect" is not easily extinguished, and, therefore, in the words of Mr. Frere's despatch, above quoted, "I am convinced "that our first care ought to be to obtain some "assurance before we further support the Khan, "that his future government shall be such as to "give reasonable satisfaction to his chiefs and "subjects."

The murder of the good Nusseer Khan, the treacherous attack on the chiefs of September 1857, the reputed murder of Taj Mahomed, the attack on the Sarawan chiefs of last spring, are all attributed by public opinion to the Khanazads, and there certainly is a consistent aim and consequent action observable in all, that renders it difficult to controvert the assertion of the Sirdars that Khodadad Khan desires to exterminate them and to usurp their rights and their property. The Khan last year appointed his infant son to the vacant chieftainship of Jalawan, in violation of all rule; but the child died and Jalawan is yet without a head. Had Sirdar Moolla Mahomed been killed last spring, Sarawan also would have been without a head. Now, indeed, it virtually is so, Moolla Mahomed having been obliged again to flee the country.

I respectfully submit that nothing could be further from the objects and intentions of General Jacob's treaty than a government like this. Our object was, and still is, to civilise, reform, improve, and thus attach to us a grateful contented people who in the hour of need, would take the honourable and faithful part in the defence of the empire that these noble races are capable of, if well led and properly handled; yet, instead of such results, after 11 years of work of the Khanazad system of government, nothing but anarchy, confusion, discontent, and indeed all the natural fruits of the crimes with which the reign was inaugurated, prevail.

Thus, apart altogether from higher principles it would be well, as a matter of mere policy to remonstrate with a power which, having in the first instance treacherously drawn the nobles to save their lives by measures of self-defence, has persisted in calling them rebels, and confiscating their estates ever since.

Again, in another point of view, if Sir Henry Green has rightly characterized the Khan's force —and it was only 400 strong when he wrote—it is scarcely to our interest, or that of the country either, that a brigade of trained though utterly

regard to the entertainment of the mercenaries, considering it now necessary for the due maintenance of order.

W. L. M.

It has first to be proved that the system is a bad one. Any government with a lot of ambitious chiefs fighting for power would indeed be a dangerous matter in the country next to us.

W. L. M.

It is therefore the more necessary there should be a strong government in Beloochistan under one head, and not that the country should be parcelled out amongst a number of uncertain chiefs.

W. L. M.

Note by Colonel Phayre.

The Jam of Beyla has just taken refuge in these hills.

R. P.

Note by Sir W. Merewether.

This Jam of Beyla has been at the bottom of all the mischief in Beloochistan for the last 12 years.

W. L. M.

Quite so, if there was not a responsible ruler to prevent such.

W. L. M.

It is with the view of avoiding this that the power of the Khan should not be destroyed, and the country left to the chance fancies of a number of factious chiefs.

W. L. M.

This is most true and has always been borne carefully in mind by me, and is so still. The letter from which this is quoted was written by me in reply to a reference from Government, whether it was advisable or not to retain a British officer at Khelat, and I strongly urged the necessity of it, and am of the same opinion still.

W. L. M.

To this I do not assent, as shown in all my above remarks.

W. L. M.

This is not sound doctrine; is a very dangerous course to follow; and contrary to the principles laid down by Government.

W. L. M.

Note by Colonel Phayre.

Impolicy of having a brigade of mercenaries on our frontier.

R. P.

Note by Sir W. Merewether.

It depends on how and for what purpose it is used. If to strengthen a friendly government and maintain order, its value would be great. Colonel Phayre's supposition that it is for the contrary, is I think a mistaken one. Papers on this point are appended.

W. L. M.

Note by Colonel Phayre.

It is stronger than the Jacobabad field force.

R. P.

Note by Sir W. Merewether.

The Jacobabad field force numbers :—

Cavalry -	- 1,479
Infantry -	- 712

W. L. M.

licentious soldiery should be the vanguard of British India upon the left flank of the most important face of the frontier.

Looking at the accompanying sketch map, which shows the whole frontier from Peshawur to Kurrachee, the strategical and political importance of Beloochistan are too apparent to require comment here. Apart therefore, as I before remarked, from higher principles, it can hardly be to our national interest to support the brigade of mercenaries in Khelat, and the system which they upheld in such a manner as to incur the odium of the 30,000 or 40,000 Brahooees outside, who, with an equal number of Belooch, constitute "the real "strength of the country."

Supposing, for argument sake, that war had broken out with Russia or Persia, or both, one of our first anxieties would be the safety and independence of that long weak line of Indus valley communication for 300 miles between Kurrachee and Sukkur: broken only by a weak garrison at Hydrabad, which has its own responsibilities to protect.

The whole of that tract as far as Jacobabad is flanked by a rugged hilly country, inhabited by Brahooees and Belooch, the subjects of Khelat, many of whose chiefs have been and still are in so-called rebellion against the present Khanazad government.

Might not one resolute leader amongst them, with 300 daring followers, seriously interrupt this main artery of communication? in some instances harassing and in others absolutely impeding extensive operations that might be dependent upon it?—Is it not then worth an effort at kindly intervention on our part to avoid making deadly enemies of men occupying such a strategical position as that? Men, too, of whom Sir W. Merewether wrote in 1861—"If that power become hostile to us, or unmanageable from internal dissensions, we should have to defend the western frontier of Sind, not against a few hundred Belooch robbers, as is sometimes supposed, but against thousands of most hardy and determined enemies, viz., the whole Belooch nation."

Extract from Sir W. Merewether's report.

I respectfully submit that the first part of this apprehension is in danger of immediate fulfilment, unless we step in to prevent it. Internal dissensions are fast reaching their culminating point, as the events of the last few months prove. It is quite as much our right according to Treaty, as it is to our national interest, to separate the factions, and do for them what they cannot do for themselves.

Again, looking at Khelat in another strategical point of view, as an important centre with reference to the Bolan and Moolla passes on our frontier, and to Persian Mekran, Persian Seistan, and Kandahar on the opposite border, is it not a dangerous position in which to nurse such an element of weakness to ourselves, as a mutinous mercenary brigade, composed partly of the scum of our armies, and partly of Persian and Central Asian spies and emissaries? No one seems to know anything about this force, or how it has quintupled itself since 1857. It has always been represented that the Khan was so poor, that he had to live from hand to mouth, and yet this costs a considerable amount of ready money annually. The chiefs complain that they and their children have been robbed and impoverished to maintain it; and if that be true, it is a serious matter, because it can only be done in the strength of our support. Sir Henry Green fixed it at 400 strong (in 1857), yet it now outnumbers the Jacobabad field force,

General Jacob's object was to see a good and strong government formed in Beloochistan, and gave the best advice to that effect. That it did not happen as he proposed was owing to the force of circumstances, and to none more than to the misbehaviour of the leading chiefs of the country.

W. L. M.

Neither the treaty nor its accompaniments warrant direct interference. But our best advice, as was given at the time of the treaty being first made (and it should be borne in mind that the accompaniment was not the treaty, or part of it, as inferred by Colonel Phayre) should always be readily accorded.

W. L. M.

Quite so—but to do that, by forcing refractory chiefs on the ruler, would not be in accordance with the views of Lord Elphinstone's Government, of justice, or of sound policy.

W. L. M.

When penning this, the events that occurred at Khelat in May last seem quite to have escaped Colonel Phayre's recollection. His Highness the Khan then acted as Lord Elphinstone's Government and Sir Bartle Frere would have desired. In spite of extreme provocation, he readily listened to the advice of the Political Agent, showed great toleration and moderation, but his clemency was insolently rejected by the fractious chief of Sarawan.

W. L. M.

All depended on the "if," and neither Sir Bartle Frere, General Jacob, myself, or Sir Henry Green, found it expedient or just to carry out the extreme measure Lord Elphinstone's Government pointed out as dependent on that "if."

W. L. M.

This chief was afterwards proved to be an inveterate intriguer and determined enemy of the Khan, which would account in a great measure for the Khan's feelings against him. Not that I mean to defend such feelings for a moment.

W. L. M.

This, as before stated, was distinctly contradicted by Sir Henry Green, than whom there could be no better authority.

W. L. M.

Sir Henry Green, with his intimate knowledge of Khelat affairs, thought he could manage without a Political Agent with the Khan. I think this was a mistake, as the presence of an English officer and would infallibly be made a bad use of in the time of war, as seen in 1857.

I am the more earnest upon this point, because it cannot be denied that the fewer Sittanas we have upon this frontier the better.

I respectfully submit, without fear of its being controverted, that this force and the system of which it forms the basis, constituted no part of General Jacob's policy, sanctioned by Lord Dalhousie's Government in 1854. It was intended by that policy to mould both Brahooees and Belooch to our purpose, through their affections; never by the harsh mode of treatment into which the Khelat Government have drifted. I merely solicit with the greatest deference that the principles of the treaty and its accompaniment may be quietly but consistently inculcated and supported, without alarming the Khan or his advisers. No faction should be allowed to predominate in the State, whether Khanazad or aristocratic. Our object and our desire is to see justice done to all—nobles, as well as people. We may be sure that, to use the words of Lord Elphinstone's Government in 1858, "to right ourselves with the chiefs and people of Beloochistan," is a step in the right direction, and that each step gained in advance on that basis, and properly used when it is gained, will soon allay all the revolutionary fermentation that now distracts the country, unsettling everything, and everyone connected with it.

Policy advocated.

I need scarcely say that had I known the whole of the facts now produced, before assuming the task in March last of trying to reconcile the Khan with the Jalawan and Sarawan chiefs, and to obtain justice for them, I should not have attempted using the ordinary means of representation for that purpose. I should have been convinced, as the Commissioner, Mr. Frere, expressed it "of the "hopelessness of our getting from his Highness "in return for all that we do for him, any but "negative results," by such means, and I should have asked for permission to give Captain Harrison the same orders that Lord Elphinstone's Government issued for Major Green's guidance, in paragraph 4 of their letter No 2,265 of 1858, already quoted above.

Paragragh 9 of that letter runs as follows :—

"If Khodadad Khan is the worthless man that he is represented to be, the Right Hon. the Governor in Council considers that the sooner we leave him to his fate the better; but I am desired to request that you will have the goodness to instruct Major Green to make a last effort to rouse him to a sense of his duty; and if this fails, that you will instruct Major Green to return to Jacobabad."

It was so long as *three* years after this very distinct command had been given, that the Khan unconsciously unveiled his real character, when he ventured to say to the British Agent at his court regarding the second chief in the Khanate whom he had done all he could to drive to desperation, that "by the assistance of God and of the Prophet "he would quietly exterminate an enemy, whom "he would hate, even were they to meet before "the judgment seat of their Creator."

Within about two years of that time Taj Mahomed died suddenly at Khelat where he was a prisoner, and the general belief amongst all the Brahooees and Belooch is, that he was poisoned by the Khanazads.

I now understand why Sir Henry Green did not recommend the Khelat appointment being filled up, when his brother resigned it and went home; because I do not believe that, under the present

with the Khan, ready to afford advice at the moment it is needed, is of the first importance. I do not share Colonel Phayre's doubts as to the Agent being independent. Though reported of "weak intellect" when he first came to the throne, the Khan was greatly improved in this respect; and no one now knows better than he does the advantage of having a British officer at his court, or the danger to himself and his country that would be involved in his withdrawal.

W. L. M.

This was when the Daroga was working against him, and for the time all powerful. Such a state of affairs no longer exists, nor is likely to recur. Should it, it would then be time enough to consider the advisability of withdrawing the Agent.

W. L. M.

Nor has he now.

W. L. M.

The circumstances last spring were totally different, as the events clearly show.

W. L. M.

The Murrees do, because they themselves are in a *quasi* state of rebellion against the Khan, and are only well acquainted with Moolla Mahomed's version of what has occurred. But even their sympathy is limited, for, on the first occasion of the Sirdar taking refuge with them, they refused to give him any assistance in his projects, and would do so still. The Boogtees, Rinds, Dhoombkees, Mugzees, and other Belooch have little sympathy with him.

W. L. M.

The Sirdar's late flight to the Murree Hills was quite unnecessary. He was in no danger at Seebee. I believe his object in going to the Murrees was the hope of, through them, getting again to the British authorities.

W. L. M.

Since writing the above, I have learned from Captain Sandeman that the Murrees have addresed him on behalf of Moolla Mahomed.

W. L. M.

Even these brought on partly by their own unreasonable demands, as pointed out by Sir Bartle Frere.

W. L. M.

tone maintained at Khelat on the strength of the brigade of mercenaries, the Political Agent with a troop of cavalry for his escort, is in a sufficiently independent position. He most certainly is not, if he should happen to be charged with orders to insist upon an unpalatable observance of the Treaty, in regard to doing justice to all, as already adverted to. Sir Henry Green himself describes that, when the mercenaries were only 400 strong he was not independent, until his brother reached Khelat with about 200 of the Sind horse; consequently, now that the same body numbers upwards of 2,000 men, the position is more untenable than ever, with a small escort; and I feel sure that, whatever may be the orders of Government as to the future, none but "negative results" will be obtained, unless we manage to put a stop to the practice of hunting down or exiling chief after chief, as is now the case.

In describing the difficulty of his position at Khelat, and the relief that followed the arrival of a strong escort, Sir Henry Green says "the "Detachment arrived at Khelat on the 1st August, "much to the delight of the poor, the merchants, "and lovers of peace; but to the disgust of the "evil-minded. I now felt that I had gained "*sufficient influence amongst* the people and chiefs, "and backed by 200 Sind horse, I could take a "higher stand with the Daroga."

We here see what stress Sir Henry lays upon his having the chiefs and people with him, when about to strike a blow for them, by getting rid of the Head of the Khanazad faction.

In those days the Khan was not strongly enough backed by Military force to accuse Sir Henry of heading rebellious subjects, whilst merely advocating just rights, in fulfilment of a Treaty.

This scene illustrates precisely what I aimed at last spring, without my having known what had occurred in this and other instances of a similar kind.

The whole of the Belooch, the Murrees in particular, sympathise with the cause of the Jalawan and Sarawan chiefs and people, and I respectfully urge that it is not wise or politic to ignore the existence and secret effect of such sympathies amongst an excitable and impulsive population, such as this is. Even whilst I am writing I have received a report which may bring about serious complications. I allude to the fact of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, with his family and nearest relatives, having through fear of the Khan taken refuge in Kahun, the head quarters of the Murree tribe; and we know that those mountaineers will protect them to the utmost of their power.

Had the original cause of quarrel with the Khan been an act of their own, we could have justly told the Sirdars that they had brought all their misfortune on themselves; but Sir Henry Green has shown clearly that the original cause of all was the treacherous attack of September 1857, followed by gross insults; since which the Khanazads have, in their own interests, used the implacable character of the Khan, as an effectual bar to any lasting accommodation being brought about.

There is therefore, I would submit, a natural opening for us to interpose with our good offices.

In the correspondence we see that the Political Superintendent on this frontier and the Political Agents at Khelat have always been allowed to exercise their own judgment as to whom they would receive, and whom not. This was in fact the only safety-valve which the chiefs had. The

The correspondence will show that this restriction became necessary. It was most reluctantly put in force, and would only apply to the Sirdars, who were deliberately plotting against their sovereign, with whom it was unbecoming that the British authorities should hold communication, or give any countenance to, while they were behaving in the way reported at the time.

W. L. M.

Captain Sandeman has no political relations with the Government of Khelat. His direct action with the Murrees and Boogtees has been approved; but as soon as proper arrangements can be made, in conjunction with his Highness the Khan, for the proper management of those tribes, it will be unquestionably proper that all communications with the Murrees and Boogtees, including Captain Sandeman's, should only be through the Political Superintendent on the frontier.

W. L. M.

This opinion is formed on altogether wrong premises, as shown in marginal notes above. If the course involved in it was followed, an amount of interference with an independent government must take place, such as was never contemplated by Government, or the country would be given up to a state of anarchy and confusion as would lead to most lamentable results.

W. L. M.

No one doubts it for a moment, and if Colonel Phayre has an opportunity—as I hope he soon will have—of discussing these matters more generally with the Khan and other Sirdars of Beloochistan, he will find that the designs of Moolla Mahomed, the Jam of Beyla, &c., are better understood than he now supposes.

W. L. M.

After establishing the late Khan Meer Nusseer Khan on the throne in 1841, our connexion with the Khelat State was very limited. Our troops evacuated Beloochistan and Kutchee in October 1841, and never again returned to it, except during Sir Charles Napier's hill campaign in 1844–45, extracts of correspondence show that Sir Henry Green, Major Macauley, Captain Dickinson and Major Malcolm Green, always received the chiefs, even though they were in so-called rebellion; heard what they had to say, and recorded their petitions for the information of Government; but now this privilege, which the Chiefs themselves called "the last door of hope," has been closed to them by recent orders, which I respectfully solicit may be modified, so as to leave it optional with the Political Superintendent to act according to circumstances.

Commissioner's letter, No. 266, dated 1st May 1869.

Under its action the Khelat Political Agent is reduced to the position of a mere partisan of the Khan's, and it has operated prejudicially to my own authority and influence in the vicinity of Jacobabad, being opposed to the free action observed towards the Murrees and Boogtees by Punjab officers; indeed, without this freedom, Captain Sandeman could never have gained the confidence of those tribes, and laid the foundation of their reclamation, which the Punjab Government, the Government of India, and the Home Government, have so fully eulogised and supported.

On this frontier, from Peshawur to Kurrachee, we are in the presence of foreign powers, who are accurately informed of all that is going on at certain important centres, of which Khelat is one. Nothing could play into their hands more completely than any system which would alienate the affections of the bulk of the people from us; and therefore I am humbly, but strongly, of opinion that it is lowering the British prestige that its representatives in Beloochistan should be expected to see, hear, and speak, *solely*, under the inspiration of a faction of household slaves, who, as the records of the last few years prove, have unjustly seized the reins of Government.

The natural effect of this will be, that in a very short time, instead of our moulding the Khan and the present Government to our purpose as we want to do according to treaty, we shall be inevitably moulded to theirs; and when the hour of need comes, the real strength of the country will be against us.

Instead of weakening, it would really strengthen the Khan's government, if under our good advice and influence it can be brought to govern on enlightened principles; because the people of the country would then feel and see that we do not intend our powerful support to be used against their proper rights any longer.

We may rest assured that Belooch and Brahooees will never submit to a harsh rule, and it is an undeniable fact that the present rule would not stand for a day, were our support withdrawn from it. Hence our responsibility for its character. This was pointed out in 1858, and since that matters have become worse.

We ought to bear in mind that both Belooch and Brahooee chiefs discuss these matters much more clearly and reasonably than many give them credit for.

In conclusion, I am induced to mention that I am not now passing through my noviciate in Beloochistan history and politics. Out of the first ten years of my service in Sind and Affghanistan, commencing nearly thirty years ago, the first two or three were passed in Kutchee, Moos-

when the operations were entirely confined to the Eastern portion of Kutchee in the Boogtee hills. It was not till after General Jacob went to the frontier in 1847, that attention was much drawn to the adjoining state. He was appointed Political Superintendent in February 1848, but it was only after the visit of the Wuzzeer Moola Mahomed Hussein to Jacobabad on the 11th March 1851 that Khelat affairs began again to command any marked attention

W. L. M.

A careful study of this reign is necessary for Government to arrive at just conclusions. During the first part, the Wuzzeer Moolla Mahomed Hussein was all powerful, but conspiring to be Khan himself, his treachery was exposed by General Jacob to the Khan, and he was imprisoned. The Daroga and Gungaram then assumed the chief management, and held it till the Khan's death.

W. L. M.

It might have been, had the chiefs not—presuming on the supposed weakness of the Khan—essayed to grasp all power for themselves.

W. L. M.

The Khan has only lately shown every desire to be tolerant and merciful, but his offers were rejected. The Khan shows no desire to act against our remonstrances. It would certainly not strengthen his power to support factious subjects against him.

W. L. M.

Alluding to Mahomed Hussein, the Wuzzeer, who was removed. Since the removal of the Daroga and Gungaram in the subsequent reign, there has certainly been no thwarting by officers.

W. L. M.

Yet it was never found necessary or right to carry out the alternative mentioned by Lord Elphinstone's Government, nor is it now. The friendship of the people of Beloochistan will be best secured by giving them order and quiet which, owing to ambitious dissensions, they have not hitherto enjoyed.

W. L. M.

The cause or causes are simple and plain enough. Since March 1865 the Jam of Beyla has been unceasing in his attempts to overthrow the Khan's power, also aided by Azaad Khan. Unless absolutely called for, the Khan would have been unwise to leave the capital of his kingdom, tung, Khelat, and Quetta with my regiment; the remainder were in Sind under Sir Charles Napier and Lord Melville.

We held Khelat for about six months in 1841, during which one or two brother officers and myself were on terms of personal friendship with several of the Brahooee chiefs of that day, who showed us excellent sport with their well-bred greyhounds, which we returned by inviting them to rifle matches at our camp.

Colonel Stacey of the Bengal Army was the Political Agent at Khelat at that time, and it was under the genial influence of his treatment of the chiefs as gentlemen, which as a rule they are, naturally, as well as by birth, that the cordial relations to which I allude existed, giving a tone to the young Khan's position, which lasted up to the hour of his sad fate, as recorded by Sir Henry Green.

One and all—Belooch and Brahooees, chiefs and peasants—declare how happy they were under the "strong friendly government" of this prince. The reason was that his rule had the paternal and patriarchal elements in it. Nusseer Khan had a just regard for the right of property, and never robbed his nobles and retainers of their lawful share in the State revenues.

If we could persuade the present Khan to do the same, he might save the cost of his brigade, and confer incalculable good on all, including the British Government and its interests. I would submit that the whole question admits of being summed up in a very few words.

On the one side it is sought to establish a "strong government" by unqualified support of the Khan, irrespective of the character and popularity of his rule. This policy secures the Khan himself and his Khanazads, but is gradually alienating the chiefs and people from us.

On the other hand I advocate the support of the Khan also, but would make him strong by acting upon those principles of government which our Treaty provides for, viz., support in sound and good measures, but remonstrance against such as are faulty and bad.

This was General Jacob's policy, for when ratifying the Treaty in 1854, he says "from the first "day of my receiving charge of the Frontier of "Sind, I have exerted every effort in my power "to bring about the establishment of order and "good government in your Highness' neighbour-"ing dominions, but I laboured to little or no "purpose, because I was always thwarted by "your Highness' officers."

This was also the policy of Lord Elphinstone's Government in 1858, and was communicated to Sir Henry Green for his guidance, and acted on by him ever since, because he repeatedly shows throughout his reports that the Khan's friendship must not be purchased at the expense of his people's; which is the sum total of all that I contend for.

We should not blind ourselves to the significance of the fact that Khodadad Khan has shut himself up in his citadel of Khelat since 1865. He moved out with a force for a month or six weeks at the end of last year, for a short distance against the Jam, but he remained several miles away from the scene of operations. There must be a cause for his thus shrinking from visiting his districts for such a length of time, and I submit that we ought to be fully satisfied as to what that cause is, whilst giving unreserved support to a rule which en-

which was centrally situated, and nearest to his greatest enemies.

W. L. M.

Captain Harrison reports also that the Jam was doing his best to tamper with the Khan's followers and adherents, but it does not at all follow that they would have joined him, though he might have thought it worth while risking the chance of their doing so. The easy way in which the Jam was overthrown in October last would lead to the conclusion that his cause was not favoured.

W. L. M.

These Brahooee levies "were the chiefs and their followers."

W. L. M.

genders such an unmistakeable sign of unpopularity and indeed fear of his subjects.

Many circumstances warn us not to make enemies of the chiefs and people. For instance, when the chiefs were at Khelat last May with 3,000 armed followers, there were altogether 7,000 men with the Khan; and yet Captain Harrison reports that the chiefs expressed the wish "that I would remain neutral, and allow them to "settle their differences by force of arms. This "message was only a reiteration of what the "Sirdars had written."

It is scarcely possible, I think, that such a request would have been preferred in the face of double numbers, had not the chiefs been assured that if a *mêlée* had ensued, a portion at all events of the Khan's levies would have joined them.

When Sir Henry Green returned from the campaign against the Murrees, he found that treachery had existed amongst the Brahooe levies of the Khan; he says, "I saw quite enough to con- "vince me that a force composed of tribes of the "same race, and having a fellow-feeling with the "Murrees, could never be entirely successful in "acting against them, more especially as these "Murrees are in the habit of giving protection to "malefactors, &c."

Report No. 354, dated 26th May 1862.

All history proves that in the long run "the real strength of the country" will cause themselves to be heard. I would therefore during the present time of peace anticipate them by removing their grievances and settling the country as soon as possible through the medium of their rightful sovereign.

Enclosure 6 in No. 3.

From Colonel W. L. Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier,—(No. 825, dated 15th December 1869).

In reference to your letter No. 1725 of the 6th instant, with accompaniment, I have the honour to request that you will furnish me with complete and detailed information regarding the following:—

The nature of the so-called regular force maintained by the Khan; of what countrymen it is composed.

The exact numbers and conformation thereof; whether artillery, cavalry, or infantry, the numbers of each being shown separately.

The total cost of the force, mode of payment, amount of pay of each soldier, also from what source the funds are provided.

Whether any, and if so, how many, of this so-called regular force accompanied each of the bodies lately despatched from Khelat,—the one in the direction of Lus Beyla, under the Wuzzeer Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, and the other towards Mekran, under Atta Mahomed.

In your memoir you give the numbers from hearsay as upwards of 2,000 men, this information being derived from the Sirdars Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, and Alla Dina Khoord. It is very necessary that clear knowledge should be obtained on the above points, and the Political Agent, Captain Harrison, will now probably be in a position to give it. I would request therefore that you will call on that officer to draw up a full report on the subject.

2. Also that you will obtain from him a statement showing the names and tribes of the chiefs of Beloochistan now paying obedience to, and on good terms with, his Highness the Khan of Khelat; and of those who are associated with Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, or with the Jam of Beyla, in opposition to the Khan.

3. These matters are not sufficiently clearly explained, and in a matter of such great importance, it is most necessary that nothing should be left vague.

Enclosure 7 in No. 3.

From Col. R. Phayre, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to the Commissioner in Sind,—(No. 1839, dated 31st December 1869).

I have the honour to forward Captain Harrison's report No. 57, dated 28th instant, giving the information called for in your letter No. 825, dated 15th idem.

2. It will be seen that Captain Harrison states the Mercenary Brigade to be as under, viz.:—

Regular Cavalry - - - - -	200
Artillery - - - - - -	78
Body Guard Infantry - - - -	400
Regiment of Infantry - - - -	800
Total - -	1,478

3. On receiving the above, I had a conversation with Captain Harrison and his Highness' Vakeel upon the subject of numbers and cost, and reminded the Vakeel that my having previously stated the strength of the Mercenary Brigade to be about 2,000 men was not put forward on the exclusive report of the Sirdars; but that in presence of the Sirdars themselves, he (the Vakeel) had admitted the strength and cost then given to be correct.

5. Having explained this, I was informed that Captain Harrison had not included the Khan's "Umla," a body of Household Cavalry, composed of Pathans and Belooch mounted on the Khan's horses. I could not ascertain the exact numbers of this body from Mahomed Khan on the present occasion.

5. Thus it appears that the information given by the Sirdars was substantially correct. Indeed, we have yet to learn whether it was understated or not.

6. With regard to the character of their troops, the information which Captain Harrison himself gives in his 4th paragraph shows, that out of the 800 men of which the body was composed at the time referred to (1864–65), 600 supported the usurper Shere Dil, and only 200 remained faithful to their master, the present Khan (Khodadad), thus proving how completely the Khan, whoever he may be, is in their power.

7. In fact, not long afterwards, the leader of the body killed Shere Dil himself, which combined with Sir Henry Green's strongly expressed opinion of them, seems to decide the question of character as a whole.

8. Captain Harrison, however, speaks well of a "great number of the body guard," and states that "the cavalry" are for the most part Hindustanees and Sikhs, who were "well behaved and respected." Nothing, however, is said of the character of the "Fighting Regiment," who do the detached duty in the country.

Strength of Body Guard - -	400
Cavalry - - - -	200

9. My own experience of these troops verifies Sir Henry Green's, so far as it has gone. I allude to what occurred last spring during the negotiations with the Murrees, when I had occasion to request his Highness' Vakeel to write to the "captain" commanding at Bagh, to request him to be so good as to restore the arms and mares treacherously taken from the Murrees, and that proper compensation would be given for them at once. The insolent and insubordinate reply which the Vakeel received was, "that when Rs. 300 were paid down in ready money the arms, &c. would be given up—*not before.*" I threatened to write to the Khan reporting this "captain," but refrained from doing so at the earnest solicitation of the Vakeel, who said that it would ruin him (the Vakeel) for having shown me the man's letter. Thus I directly obtained evidence of the character of one commander of a body of men, whose character throughout the country has been already described; and when the time comes for inquiry, we shall know to whom the Murree chiefs refer as inviting and aiding plundering parties in Eastern Kutchee.

10. Captain Harrison states, that during the time he was at Khelat "only one or two people "complained that the Sepoys had pilfered their fruit."

11. It seems strange that even "one or two" complaints reached Captain Harrison, because, *as a rule,* none would either be made to, or received by, him against any of the Khan's servants at the capital; the Khan himself being present—particularly too, after the orders issued in your letter No. 266, dated 1st May 1868, which positively prohibited his receiving any complaints whatever except through the Khan himself.

12. For the same reason I do not consider that either he or I are in a position at present to offer a reliable opinion as to what Sirdars and tribes are really friendly to the Khan as a despotic ruler, in contravention of the organisation of the Khanate as a Military Confederacy, and what not; but I am quite clear as to which of these forms of Government is best suited to British interests; and from what I know of the feeling of the country which I have watched quite independently during the revolutionary crisis of the last 18 months, I think it would be very dangerous for us to reason ourselves into the belief that the present calm is that of contentment, or that a despotism of Khanazadas will ever govern Belooch and Brahooees in the proper sense of the term.

13. Captain Harrison, in the 6th paragraph of his letter under reply, when advocating the continuance of the present strength of the Mercenary Brigade, states that "the disaffected considered "themselves strong enough to cope with the said force on several occasions."

14. Bearing in mind Sir Henry Green's experience in the Murree tribes, I believe that "the disaffected" knew perfectly well what they were about, and that in an actual *mêlée* they would have received support against the mercenaries, otherwise the 3,000 under the Jam at Khelat in May last would never have ventured to entreat Captain Harrison to remain neutral, and leave them to fight out their quarrel against the more than double numbers on the side of the Khan.

15. In conclusion I beg to quote for your information paragraphs 13 to 17 of a report No, 482, dated 14th December 1869, from Captain Sandeman, to the Commissioner of the Derajat Division, from which it will be seen that Khelat affairs are viewed by Punjab officers in the same popular light in which I have endeavoured to lay them before the Government for consideration.

Extract above referred to. Captain Sandeman's report.

"13. There is no doubt of the fact that the Khanate of Khelat is in a state of anarchy, and it behoves our Government fairly to inquire into the cause. I have endeavoured to discover it, and I will now place before you the result of my inquiries.

"14. It is asserted that the treaty our Government made with the State of Khelat was entered into with the Khan and his nobles, i. e., the Brahooee confederacy; but that this was merely in theory, for in practice we failed to carry it out in accordance with the constitution of the Khelat State.

"15. For instance, I understand that such nobles as those of Sarawan and Jalawan declare that in our arrangement for the reduction of the fees taken on Kafilas, the incomes of the chiefs were reduced, while no arrangements were come to for the subsidy being distributed according to the loss each had sustained by such reduction. They further declare that the money thus granted, so far from being employed for the benefit of the Khanate, is spent by the Khan on mercenary troops, who are a standing menace to them, this being contrary to the constitution of the State. They affirm that these and other like causes have driven them into rebellion.

"16. With the above state of affairs before us, it is obvious that our present policy has not succeeded, and that however much we may desire to act solely with the Khan, treating him as a despot, the constitution of the State does not admit of our doing so. I will now proceed to show how our doing so is not a safe policy, and that it has already shook our present successful arrangements with the Murrees to the foundation.

"17. I have already mentioned the defeat of the first noble of the State, Moolla Mahomed of Sarawan, and his brother confederate. Since then he has made several attempts to renew the war, but from various causes has desisted. He is described as a chief of excellent disposition, and to have great influence in the Khanate. Since commencing this report I have heard that he has left Seebee and joined the Bijaranee Murrees, who reside near the Bolan pass. What will be the result the future will determine. Were he an evil disposed man, from his well known influence over this tribe the results would certainly be very serious. His being a well disposed amiable chief of high position in the Khanate renders it all the more essential that his case should be inquired into. It is surely time for our Government to interfere, when we find that the Khan of Khelat's mismanagement of his Khanate has led to the peace and administration of that part of the Punjab border being placed in much jeopardy, for such is truly the case."

Memorandum by Colonel W. L. Merewether, Commissioner in Sind.

The first part of this letter only reiterates Colonel Phayre's views on the Khelat Government question, formed after an experience of 18 months at Jacobabad.

Referring to the latter part of this letter, quoting from Captain Sandeman's report, I would observe that that officer residing at a distance from Khelat, and hearing only casually of its politics, has greater difficulties in forming a correct opinion than those who have been intimately concerned in the events connected with that country for many years past. The jeopardy he alludes to proceeds from the lawless acts of the Murrees and Boogtees, which have been in play for fully half a century; to ascribe it solely to the present administration is not correct therefore. The question of successfully controlling and managing hereditary cattle-lifters is no easy one, and has puzzled more powerful Governments than that of Khelat. His Highness the Khan has however done his best to remedy this evil, and is prepared to continue his efforts on a good plan being shown to him.

Enclosure 8 in No. 3.

From Captain C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to the Political Superintendent, Frontier, Upper Sind.—(No. 57, dated 28th December 1869).

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th instant, and to annex returns giving the information called for in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th paragraphs of letter under reply.

2. Regarding the 4th paragraph, 100 rank and file of the body guard, one field-piece, and one mortar comprised the strength of the regular horse that accompanied Daroga Atta Mahomed on the Mekran expedition. The major part of the fighting regiment and the regular cavalry, with four guns and a proportionate amount of artillerymen, accompanied the Shagassee.

3. The Khan's force being larger than was supposed, I propose to show the circumstances under which the old regiment was sub-divided and increased.

4. When his Highness was deposed by his cousin Shere Dil, part of the old regiment elected to go over to the new Khan, whilst about 200 accompanied Khodadad Khan to Nusseerabad in Kutchee. On his being re-elected to the Khanate, bad feeling existed in the regiment from their having espoused different causes. His Highness then formed those who had remained true to him into a body guard, and the remainder into a fighting regiment, increasing both to their present strength.

5. Some of the discontented having stated that his Highness supported his regular troops from confiscated lands, I am in a position to state that such is not the case. His Highness has sufficient revenue from his lands at Baghwana, Khelat, Mustoong, Kutchee, and other places, besides the transit dues, to support his small force. The only Sirdaree lands estranged are those of the Raisanee chief, and I showed in my letter of the 10th of June that his Highness was quite willing to restore them.

The actual income of this Sirdar, taking everything into consideration, used to be about Rs. 6,000 per annum.

6. Except under peculiar circumstances, the fighting regiment would furnish about 300 men for the protection of Quetta and Kutchee, and as it is his Highness' intention to establish a post at Kozdar for the protection of Kafilahs, and the people in the neighbourhood, only half of the regiment would be available for any emergency. Whether this force distributed in this way is more than his Highness requires, may be open to discussion. Taking into consideration the formidable combination against them, and the disciplined men and persons that the Jam of Beyla had at his disposal; as also that the disaffected considered themselves strong enough to cope with the said force on several occasions, I do not think that his Highness' force has been in excess of his requirements: and now that his chief difficulty is over, I think that his regular troops, if judiciously employed in giving detachments for the protection of trade and his people, could scarcely be thought excessive. His Highness states that it would be more economical and satisfactory than keeping up levies, as the latter cannot be depended upon to stay from their homes for any length of time.

7. The list of friendly Sirdars that I have had the honour to attach, appears to be very excessive, in comparison with the disaffected. I have, however, seen and conversed with most of them, and can vouch for the accuracy of the list up to the present time. The disadvantage however that his Highness labours under, is, that his well wishers are so far apart that time must elapse to enable him to collect them together. On the other hand, the evil disposed have great facilities of combining, from the Mingul tribe being so near Kozdar.

8. During the time I was at Khelat, only one or two people complained that the sepoys had pilfered their fruit. On his Highness being made aware of what had occurred, arrangements were made to prevent recurrences of these petty thefts.

9. A great number of the body guard are men holding certificates of good conduct from the 1st and 2nd Belooch Regiments in which they had served for five years.

10. The cavalry are for the most part Hindustanees and Sikhs, who served for some years in the Sind Horse, prior to the reduction that took place in 1860 or 1861. They are well behaved and very much respected. The annual cost of his Highness force' is Rs. 1,14,402.

Strength and Pay of his Highness' Infantry Regiment.

No.	Rank.	Pay per mensem.	Rs.	Caste.	How paid.	Remarks.
		Rs.				
1	Commandant - -	- - -	50	Half of these are Patans, the rest Belooch.	From his Highness' private resources.	During the time I was in Beloochistan I only heard one or two complaints against these men for pilfering fruit, and this was put a stop to by his Highness. Annual cost of this Regiment Rs. 60,912.
8	Native officers - -	15 each	120			
8	Ditto - -	10 „	80			
32	Havildars - -	9 „	288			
32	Naiques - -	7 „	224			
719	Sepoys - -	6 „	4,314			
800		Total Rs.	5,076			

His Highness' Body Guard.

1	Native Commandant -	50	50	Most of these men are Belooch, a few Patans.	From his Highness' private means.	Many of these men enlisted in the Belooch regiments for five years, and on taking their discharge entered his Highness' service. As a rule they are well behaved. Annual cost Rs. 30,720.
4	Native officers - -	15 each	60			
4	Ditto - -	10 „	40			
16	Havildars - -	9 „	144			
16	Naiques - -	7 „	112			
359	Sepoys - -	6 „	2,154			
400		Total Rs.	2,560			

Strength and Pay of His Highness' Cavalry.

No.	Rank.	Pay per mensem.	Rs.	Caste.	How paid.	Remarks.
2	Native officers - -	30 each	60	Hindustanees and Sikhs.	From his Highness' private means.	The majority of these men have served in the Sind Horse, and joined his Highness on the reduction of the frontier force. They are very well behaved and much respected. Annual cost Rs. 18,120.
2	Ditto - -	18 „	36			
2	Ditto - -	12 „	24			
8	Duffadars - -	10 „	80			
8	Naiques - -	8 „	64			
178	Sowars - -	7 „	1,246			
200		Total Rs.	1,560			

His Highness' Artillery.

1	Native officer - -	20	20	—	From his Highness' private means.	These men are distributed at different places, Quetta, Dadur, Bagh, and Gundava; in addition to their pay they get two pounds of flour pe diem.
2	Ditto - -	15 each	30			
25	Men - - -	4½ „	112½			
50	Belooch Brahooees, Juts slightly instructed in artillery practice -	4½ „	225			Annual cost Rs. 4,650.
78		Total Rs.	387½			

Jacobabad, the 28th December 1869.

C. H. HARRISON, Captain,
Political Agent, Khelat.

List of Sirdars well disposed towards his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

No.	Name.	Caste.	Residence.
		JALAWANS.	
1	Sirdar Meah Esan -	Gitchkee - - -	Punchgoor.
2	Do. Azum Khan -	Ditto - - -	Ditto.
3	Do. Bahei Khan -	Ditto - - -	Kedj.
4	Do. Kaisah Khan -	Moozanee - - -	Ghat near Zeree.
5	Do. Faquir Mahomed -	Bezonjao - - -	Naib of Kedj.
6	Do. Meah Kerah -	Ditto - - -	Nal.
7	Do. Meah Khan -	Meerwanee - - -	Kolewah.
8	*Do. Kaisah Khan -	Mugzee - - -	Jull.
9	Do. Khan Mahomed Khan -	Kubranee - - -	Khelat.
10	Do. Moheem Khan -	Goorugnaree - - -	Zehree.
11	Do. Kumal Khan -	Lotanee - - -	Ditto.
12	*Do. Chakur Khan -	Mishk - - -	Juttuck.
13	*Do. Jahan Khan -	Mahomed Hussanee - -	Mushka.
14	*Do. Pahar Khan -	Safsoolies - - -	Kozdar.
15	Do. Keechee Khan -	Ditto - - -	Ditto.
16	Do. Peer Bux -	Haroonee - - -	Soorab.
17	*Do. Gool Mahomed -	Nutwanee - - -	Kozdar.
18	Do. Saleh Mahomed -	Daizar - - -	Nal.
19	Do. Attah Khan -	Khanzai - - -	Huttajee.
20	Do. Gazee Khan -	Ditto - - -	Ditto.
21	*Do. Sakur - -	Sajee - - -	Nal.
22	Do. Shere Khan -	Moondranee - - -	Ditto.
23	Do. Bahee Khan -	Samalee - - -	Near Kharan.
24	*Do. Sudeek - -	Oomranee - - -	Mahomed Abad Soorab.
25	*Do. Dost Mahomed -	Moogairee - - -	Near Bagh.
26	Do. Abdool Kair -	Ubrah - - -	Mungool near Bagh.
27	*Do. Muddut Khan -	Pundranee - - -	Near Khelat.
28	*Do. Abdool Ahud -	Neecharee - - -	Khelat.
		SARAWANS.	
29	*Do. Abdool Kadur -	Shawanee - - -	Mustoong.
30	*Do. Rehman Khan -	Zugger Mingul - - -	Nooshkee.
31	*Do. Adam Khan -	Bungoolzai - - -	Ispilungee.
32	*Do. Imaum Bux -	Rhind - - -	Near Gundava.
33	*Do. Hybut Khan -	Raisanee - - -	Mittree.
34	*Do. Alah Deenah -	Koord - - -	Moorao.
35	*Do. Syud Khan -	Mahomed Shai - - -	Mustoong.
36	*Do. Hubeeb Khan -	Shahwanee - - -	Iskulkote near Khelat.
37	*Do. Moobaruk Khan -	Ditto - - -	Ditto.
38	*Do. Jehangeer -	Lehree - - -	Nurmook.
39	*Do. Shadad Khan -	Bungoolzai - -	Ispilunjee.
40	*Do. Aktah Khan -	Koord - - -	Ditto.
41	*Do. Kadur Buksh -	Surpurah - - -	Mustoong.
42	*Do. Sorab Khan -	Dhoombkee - - -	Lehree.
43	*Do. Rahimdad -	Lungao - - -	Mungoochur.
44	*Do. Saleh Mahomed -	Mingul - - -	Near Much.
45	*Do. Peer Buksh -	Sumanalee - - -	Near Abgoom in the Bolan.
46	Do. Muzar - -	Ditto - - -	Ditto.
47	Do. Hybut - -	Ditto - - -	Ditto.
48	*Do. Koortub Khan -	Satukzai - - -	Near Quetta.
49	Do. Kushmeer -	Peer Khanee - - -	Zehree.
50	*Do. Gohur Khan -	Rodanee - - -	Soorab.
51	*Do. Goolam Murteza -	Boogtee - - -	Beebra-ka-Deree.

The names marked * are the Sirdars that Captain Harrison is acquainted with.

Disaffected Sirdars who have connected themselves with Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and the Jam of Beyla.

No.	Name.	Caste.	Residence.
	SARAWANS.		
1	*Sirdar Moolla Mahomed -	Raisanee - - -	Kanuk.
2	*Do. Mahomed Khan -	Reestumzai - - -	Do.
3	Do. Sumundah - -	Lehree - - - -	Nurmook.
	The whole of the Murree tribe.†		
	JALAWANS.		
4	*The Jam of Beyla - -	Loonreah - - -	Lus Beyla.
5	*Sirdar Noordeen - -	Mingul - - - -	Wud.
6	Do. Ebraheim - -	Do. - - - -	Do.
7	Do. Essan Khan - -	Do. - - - -	Do.
8	Do. Meah Mahomed - -	Do. - - - -	Do.
9	Do. Futteh Khan - -	Do. - - - -	Do.
10	Do. Kheir Mahomed -	Do. - - - -	Do.
11	Do. Essoo Khan - -	Mahomed Hoossanee - -	Mushka.
12	Do. Azaad Khan - -	Patan - - - -	Kharan.

* Sirdars that Captain Harrison is acquainted with.
† With the exception of those in the Bolan.

Enclosure 9 in No. 3.

From Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to the Commissioner in Sind,
(No. 1,828, dated 24th December 1869.)

In forwarding the accompanying report, No. 54, dated 23rd instant, from the Political Agent, Khelat, containing a precis of his several reports quoted, I have the honour to invite attention to paragraph 4, which, so far as I have been able to discover, is scarcely borne out by the facts on record in this office.

For instance the Government correspondence as per margin pronounces his Highness the Khan's campaign against the Murrees in the winter of 1858–59 to have been a complete success, and no mention whatever is made of the Jam's conduct at Kahun in 1858, until May 1862, when Major Henry Green in excusing the Khan's omission to coerce the Murrees, notwithstanding the extra Rs. 50,000 paid to him for that purpose, wrote as follows to Mr. Mansfield, the Commissioner :—

Bombay Government Letter No. 2,084, dated 25th May 1859, and Resolution of Government.
Government of India Letter No. 3,569, dated 13th June 1859.
Political Superintendent's report No. 52, dated 28th January 1860.

* * * "but although I was aware at the time that treachery existed amongst the Khan's forces, I was not aware of the extent until afterwards, or that the present Jam of Beylah when at Kahun (the Murree headquarters) proposed in open Durbar, uniting with that tribe, then turning the whole force on Jacobabad, which station had been still further weakened by a squadron under Captain Dickinson having been ordered to Nuggur Parkur. Notwithstanding, however, this treachery, the expedition was so far successful, and the arrangement afterwards made, so far satisfactory, that the British territory, until the raid now complained of, has remained free from Murree incursions." * * *

The Jam's conduct was inexcusable, but it does not appear, as put by Captain Harrison, "that his "most successful intrigue was that which caused the failure of his Highness' campaign against the "Murree tribe some 11 years ago."

Had Major Henry Green viewed the matter in this serious light he would no doubt have reported it as soon as he became aware of it.

In paragraph 11 of the report under reply, Captain Harrison says that "he (the Jam) has no hope "of being allowed to resume his rule in Beylah is apparent from his having plundered his people "before seeking safety in Kurrachee."

Owing to this allusion, I deemed it right to ask Captain Harrison upon what grounds he based the above opinion. His reply is given in letter No. 55, annexed hereto.

The following correspondence regarding the Jam in 1858–59 appears to afford the clue to his original misdoings :—

1. Complaint of the chiefs of Beloochistan, 24th September, and 25th November 1857.
2. Brigadier General Jacob, No. 183, 7th April 1858.
3. Mr. Frere, Commissioner, „ 215, 19th May „
4. Secretary to Government, „ 1,723, 7th „ „
5. Mr. Frere, Commissioner, „ 1,025, 21st „ „
6. Brigadier General Jacob, „ 258, dated 24th May 1858.
7. „ „ „ „ 343, „ 21st June „
8. Mr. Frere, Commissioner, „ 267, „ 19th „ „
9. Government letter, „ 2,139, „ 4th „ „
10. Mr. Frere, Commissioner, „ 257, „ 14th „ „
11. Government letter, No. 2,500, dated 25th June 1858.
12. „ „ „ 2,569, „ 1st July „
13. „ „ „ 2,619, „ 7th „ „

14. Mr. Frere, Commissioner, No. 1,548, dated 23rd July 1858 with memorandum of the Jam's grievances.
15. Government letter, „ 3,027, „ 13th August „
16. „ „ „ 406, „ 15th February 1859.
17. Political Superintendent, „ 605, „ 29th October „
18. Major H. Green, dated 8th September and 10th October „
Also more recent correspondence in 1868-69.

General Jacob gave the following report of the Jam's position and responsibilities in his letter No. 343, dated 21st June 1858 :—

* * * "The Jam of Beyla is the sovereign prince of that province; he is a feudatory of the Khan of Khelat, to whom he owes allegiance, military service, and some trifling specific dues.

"The Jam and his subordinate chieftain Oomed Ali are, as I have long since reported, in rebellion against the Khan of Khelat, but the Jam of Beyla has an undoubted right to levy any taxes he may think proper within his own territory, except transit dues on general merchandize passing through Beloochistan."

No. 50, 31st January 1861.

In January 1861, the then Political Superintendent, Major (now Sir W.) Merewether, described British relations to Khelat in the following terms :—

"As regards good faith, I would observe that since the day (1842) on which the British Government by the hands of the then Political Agent, Major Outram, placed the late Nusseer Khan on the throne of Khelat in the presence of the whole of the chiefs of the Beloochistan, the people of the country, as well as the surrounding nations, have considered the Belooch State more or less under British protection, and the subsequent Treaty entered into by the late General Jacob in the year 1854, and then the deputing of a British officer to the Khelat Court, confirmed them in this belief."

I would particularly call attention to the whole of this letter. The views expressed therein I hold still, and they are as applicable now as then.
W. L. MEREWETHER.

Our support to the Khan and his Government should certainly be most carefully watched, so that direct interference with the detail arrangements of that Government may be avoided. Otherwise our support would only tend to weaken, not strengthen as desired. This is quite understood even by those whose interests make them pretend to think the contrary, and who are merely trying to get our aid to promote their ambitious objects, not the good of their country.
W. L. MEREWETHER.

The Khelat Government being at the present time in full enjoyment of our support, its acts are regarded by the people as having our approval; hence the necessity of our carefully watching their character.

The information required in your letter No. 826, dated 16th instant, is given in Captain Harrison's report under notice.

P.S.—I omitted to remark, with reference to the Bolan arrangements for Kafilahs, that the traders pay "black mail" for this protection in addition to the "Khan's transit dues." Captain Harrison has sent to make inquiries how much is charged per maund, or per load, as the case may be, but it will be some time before a reply can be obtained.

No complaints about this have ever been made by merchants to me, nor has Colonel Phayre brought it before to my notice. Captain Harrison's inquiries will clear up this point.
W. L. MEREWETHER.

Enclosure 10 in No. 3.

From Captain C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier—(No. 54, dated 23rd December 1869.)

My report No. 10 having embraced all matters of interest in Beloochistan up to the 10th of June, I propose to briefly review subsequent events as reported from time to time.

2. The main objects that engrossed his Highness' Government during my residence at Khelat were the intrigues of the Jam of Beyla and the Mingul Sirdar, as also the probability of aggression by the Persian Government towards Kedj.

3. As the Jam of Beyla's conduct will occupy a prominent part in my present report, it may not be amiss to briefly allude to his antecedents. Before the time of the great Nusseer Khan, Beyla was not under Belooch rule, being a weak power, they had to succumb to this well-known ruler. Beyla was left in charge of Meah Khan, the then Jam, and his Highness gave him his daughter in marriage, and thus made him a friendly tributary of the Khelat Government; things went on in a peaceful and uninterrupted manner until the present Jam's accession to power. During the past ten years he has done everything he possibly could to weaken the Khan's Government, either by intrigue or organizing forces against the Khelat Government "to take part in disputes that were no concern of his."

4. His most successful intrigue was that which caused the failure of his Highness' campaign against the Murree tribe some eleven years ago. Regarding "armed resistance against the Khan;" these occurrences can scarcely be enumerated. To give some idea of their frequency, it may be as well to mention the Jam's having organised three forces against the Khan during the past twelve months.

5. My letter No. 10 showed the ostensible cause of dispute and my advice to the Jam on the subject; as the ill-feeling still continued, I attempted to define in my letter No. 27 who were the rightful heirs; the continuation of this letter No. 28 reported that the Jam had withdrawn his agent from the village in dispute. A few days later I had to continue the subject in No. 31, and to report that an agent of the Jam's with an armed force of Minguls had not only removed the Government revenue from the village of Kumal Khan but from Mahomed Khan's village. His Highness was very much annoyed at this, but with the view of keeping peace and quiet said he would overlook the insult if they returned the grain; this they declined to do, and stated they were prepared to take the consequences. His Highness then made arrangements that his Shahgassee should go as soon as practicable to

punish these rebellious chiefs; other reasons for this active policy were shown in my letters, Nos. 39 and 40, viz. the receipt of four treasonous letters from the Jam of Beyla to his Highness' chiefs as also the appeal for protection from the Sassoolies, Hootmanzais, and other people residing at Bhagwanah.

6. The Khan had intended going in person and asked me to accompany him, but bearing in mind the repeated instructions I had received not to interfere actively in the Government of the country, I told his Highness that it would do him more harm than good my being mixed up in the business, for, if success attended his present measures, the disaffected would state that he, the Khan, could never have managed it without aid from the English Government. His Highness appeared to appreciate what I said, and quite understood that no active aid would be given to him on this or any other occasion.

7. The cold weather having set in, necessitated a move towards the plains, so I determined to return viâ the Bolan, as by so doing I should not come in contact with the Khan's force, or the rebel chiefs. On arriving at Mustoong, I heard that emissaries from the Jam and Sirdar Noordeen were trying to persuade the Shawanees, Koords, and others to join them: this report was never confirmed. I, however, thought I might indirectly benefit the Khan and the people, so stopped a month. During my stay I heard that the Prime Minister had started for Bhagwanah; his movements were so rapid that no combination could take place, and as no serious opposition was to be feared, he pushed on at once to Wud; the Minguls had only just time to escape with their families into the neighbouring hills.

8. From Mustoong I proceeded to Quettah, and after remaining there a few days, marched down the Bolan and proceeded to the large and wealthy town of Bagh, where I stopped some days, as the people were greatly alarmed at passing events in Beloochistan.

9. On the 24th October, the Jam marched a force with seven guns to aid the Minguls, and took up a position at Furruk Burr, being joined on the 26th by Sirdar Noordeen and the Minguls; as no advance was made upon them, they concluded that the Shahgassee must be afraid, so marched to within three miles of his camp; occasional skirmishing took place, the Shahgassee delaying in hopes that a force from Kolewah might act in combination with him; the Jam and Sirdar Noordeen appear to have realized what plans were under contemplation, and were meditating flight, so the Shahgassee marched on the 15th ultimo to dislodge them from the hill they occupied. After some hours' fighting, the Jam and Sirdar Noordeen's force fled, leaving seven guns and all their ammunition and camp equipage on the ground. About 30 or 40 were killed.

10. A letter received by the Shahgassee from the principal men of Beylah, marginally noted, stated that the Jam and Sirdar Noordeen, after having plundered Beylah, had fled to Kurrachee, "that they themselves were harmless, inoffensive people, and were quite ready and willing to place themselves under his Highness' protection." In connexion with this letter the Shahgassee requested his Highness to write to the following Roongas in a kind and friendly manner (Ali Khan Chungool and Mettah).

Chungool.	Aladad.
Ali Mahomed Wakeel.	Ala Ruckia.
Saleh Mahomed.	Esau.
Mahomed Roongee.	Moosah.
Abroo Bukah.	Dahood, &c.
Ismael.	

11. The Jam's career down to the present time shows him to have been the scourge and pest of Beloochistan for years past; and that he has no hope of being allowed to resume his rule in Beylah is apparent from his having plundered his people before seeking safety in Kurrachee.

12. Before leaving this subject, I would beg to state that, in consequence of a letter received from his Highness, I directed the Shahgassee on arrival at Beylah to send some responsible person to report himself to the Commissioner in Sind to ascertain his wishes; particulars were stated in letter No. 51; when writing I asked the Shahgassee to use his influence to prevent the poor and inoffensive people of Beylah from being ill-used and plundered.

13. The second subject of political importance to the Khan's Government was, as stated, probability of Persian aggression at Kedj; at first his Highness was inclined to think that his Naib, Faquir Mahomed, had exaggerated the difficulties of his position, but on reading the Naib's letters, I felt convinced that no man would have written as he had done without urgent cause, and am glad to say that his Highness had taken this view of the case before the receipt of telegram acknowledged in my letter No. 34.

14. My letters Nos. 34 and 37 will show that his Highness was more or less hopeful that the English Government would afford him active aid and supply him with material to protect his territory on the Mekran Coast. My reply to him was that the Persian Government being on friendly terms with the English, it would be impossible to assist him actively, and that giving him ammunition for war would be misunderstood, that he must act independently and rest assured that we would try and relieve his present embarrassments by diplomacy with the Shah of Persia.

15. His Highness after taking into consideration what I had said, detached his Darogah Atta Mahomed with a force as detailed in my letter No. 34. Before, however, they had proceeded far on their way, his Highness wrote and directed that they were to consider themselves under the Shahgassee's orders and act in combination with him if possible.

16. A short time ago it was reported that Ibrahim Khan, the Serhind of Bumpoor, who had caused all these difficulties at Kedj, had died. I am not however in a position to state whether this is reliable information.

17. Having duly discussed the two subjects noted at the commencement of my letter, I will endeavour to touch upon other matters that may be of interest.

18. In my letter No. 14 I afforded the explanation called for in Government Resolution, Political Department, dated 15th March 1869, regarding Oomer Khan Gitchee, and showed the Khan's anxiety to forward his interests; from Naib Faquir Mohamed's letter attached to No. 37, it appears that Oomer Khan, whilst expecting consideration at his Highness' hands, was at the same time offering to go over to those who had acknowledged the Persian supremacy, under the proviso that they would make him Naib of Kedj and Toomb.

19. At Khelat, Mustoong, Quettah and other places, I had many opportunities of seeing Kossids, Kafilas, and other people passing through; the only information, however, that I thought might not have been communicated through other sources was the apparent distrust of the present Affghan

Government against the Persians—Shere Ali Khan, the Sirdar of Kandahar, having written to the Zuggur Mingul tribe stating that aggression on their part might be anticipated sooner or later, and recommended mutual support. Another subject I considered worthy of report was a conversation that I had with an Afghan merchant, who had been trading in Kokan and Bokhara between Tashkend and Samarkand; the particulars of the conversation were detailed in my letter No. 47, under date 11th November 1869.

20. At Quettah, as a rule, his Highness generally stations a company of his regiment to protect the people against the Patans, Kakurs, and Doomars; these people occupy the hills about Quettah, Siriab, and the Dusht. The Satukzais, a branch of the Koord tribe, also live in the hills about Siriab and the Dusht and have intermarried with the Doomars.

The Minguls, under their Chief Hybut, occupy the hills from Much to Abgoom.

The Muzeranees Koh Murree live in the hills to the right of Beebee Nanee under their Chief Shere Dil, and the Koochuks at Kertah under Pilloo Khan.

21. Each tribe taken individually is of little or no importance; the Naib at Quettah acts in conjunction with Shere Dil Murree; as far as the safe transit of Kafilas through the Bolan is concerned, he has at his disposal 500 effective fighting men and gets a certain percentage on each Kafila, varying from Rs. 10 to 40. His capability of conducting this duty seems to be acquiesced in by all the tribes inhabiting the Pass; some I believe are subsidized, others he is prepared to punish if they interfere with him in any way. No attempt is made to furnish each Kafila with a large escort, only one or two of the Murree tribe are in attendance, and I think if the records are consulted it will be found that the system works well, and that obstruction is rarely or ever offered in the Pass itself; in fact all the Kafilas and Kossids that have lately come down say that they have not the slightest fear about passing through the Bolan; they, however, dread the depredations that may be committed in the low hilly country between Dadur and Hajee-ka-Shere; to obviate this difficulty, Nawab Khan has stationed Belooch levies at both these places, and Kafilas are escorted backwards and forwards in perfect safety. Of course these levies would not be able to hold their own against raids on a large scale, but are quite sufficient to protect property against the depredations of smaller parties; for the safety of the people in the plains, mounted Belooch Sowars have been posted at the places marginally noted.

The merchants pay "black mail" for this protection in addition to transit dues.
R. PHAYRE.

Reply to Commissioner's letter No. 791, dated 27th November 1869.

Lehree.	Bagh.
Poolajee.	Kundah.
Shahpoor.	Gundavah.
Bushooree	

22. The arrangements in the Pass and on the plains of Kutchee, small as they are, appear to answer admirably, and his Highness only requires aid to continue and develope the plan; there is no doubt that with a little trouble the traffic would increase to a great extent. Kafilas appear to be coming down in unusually large numbers this cold season, and merchants who have not frequented the Bolan route for some years say that they only came hearing that a Political Agent had been appointed; the greatest part of the traffic would I fancy always go to the nearest seaport, Kurrachee, *viâ* Khelat, Kozdar and the Hubb. Horse Kafilas for Bangalore, dried fruits and other merchandise for Shikarpoor, Ahmedabad, Baroda, and other places, would always select the Bolan route.

23. At Lehree I had a long conversation with Sorab Khan, the Sirdar of the Dhoombkees; owing to the dread of Murree raids there is but little cultivation. His Highness grants him 13 kurars of jowaree per mensem, equivalent to about 350 rupees; this being inadequate to keep up his position, he is anxious to increase his means by taking up land in the frontier districts on the same favourable terms that have been accorded to other Belooch.

24. Referring to the correspondence regarding the Belooch Rehmutoolla, forwarded under your endorsement of the 7th August, as also Government Resolution No. 2,816, Political Department, dated 31st August, I have the honour to inform you that I have requested his Highness to have the movements of this Belooch carefully watched. At Quettah a Hindustanee, who could not give a satisfactory reason for wandering through Beloochistan, was arrested, as it was thought he might be acting in conjunction with this Belooch. After a careful search he was released, as only a few harmless letters were found in his possession addressed to people at Hydrabad and Kurrachee.

25. His Highness whilst occupied in punishing those who for years past had been trying to subvert his authority, was not forgetful of those who were anxious to return to their allegiance. Sirdar Alla Dina Koord and Sirdar Adam Khan Wuderah went to Seebee after they had parted with the Jam, and gave as their reason that no one would believe that they had been forgiven. His Highness hearing this sent them a written order sealed by him, stating that they might return to their country and live amongst their own people, and that if their conduct was such as met with his approval that he would look upon them as his Sirdars; the whole of the Raisanee tribe sent Hybut Khan, the elder brother of their Sirdar Moollah Mahomed to Nawab Mahomed Khan, saying that they did not wish to join in any intrigues that might be got up against the Khan, and only wished to be allowed to remain quietly at Mittree. His Highness wrote two very kind letters to Hybut Khan, saying that he had no wish to interfere with them, and that no one should harm them so long as they adhered to their present good intentions.

Moolla Mahomed is with the Bijaranee Murrees, and it has been reported from the Bcogtee hills that these Sirdars fled after him. Inquiries will be made.—R. PHAYRE.

26. Directly Sirdar Moollah Mahomed heard of the defeat of the Jam of Beylah and Sirdar Noordeen, he fled with six followers to Khan, only one of whom was a Raisanee, the rest of the tribe elected to remain quietly at Mittree under Hybut Khan.

27. Azaad Khan, after leaving the Jam and Sirdar Moollah Mahomed in June last, saw that the object he had in view could not be attained through their means, so went to Candahar and tried to interest the Ameer and Sirdar Shere Ali Khan of Candahar in his behalf; a lengthy correspondence ensued on this subject between the Khelat and Afghanistan Governments. His Highness' replies were dignified and appropriate, viz., that he should be most happy to restore Azaad Khan the land that he held for doing his, the Khan's, service, when he chose to account to him for having plundered the village of Punchgoor and other aggressive acts.

28. Two or three Afghan Sirdars being displeased with Ameer Shere Ali Khan, passed through

Khelat en route to Persia, Sirdar Surwur Khan was the first who arrived, and I at once requested Nawab Mahomed Khan to ask his Highness to follow the usual policy towards these fugitives, viz., after showing them hospitality, to request them to seek an asylum elsewhere than on his frontier or in Beloochistan.

29. In concluding this report, I wish to bring Doctor Bowman's very valuable services before the Government. From the 15th April to 20th November 7,405 people were treated, of this number 2,815 were either surgical or serious cases of illness that necessitated admission into hospital. Dr. Bowman gained such repute amongst these wild people as a surgeon and oculist, that they came any distance to consult him. During the few days we were at Quettah, the attendance at hospital was very large, Afghans, Patans, and various other people having come more than 50 miles for treatment. Seeing the great advantage that is derived from having such a zealous and highly qualified officer in this Agency, I am naturally anxious that his pay should be drawn on the old scale, as recommended by the Government of Bombay in their Resolution, Political Department, No. 3,354.

Enclosure 11 in No. 3.

From Captain C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier,—(No. 55, dated 24th December 1869).

With reference to your letter of the 23rd instant, alluding to the 11th paragraph of my report No. 54, I have the honour to inform you that I have no further reasons to offer for the conclusions arrived at than my personal knowledge of his Highness and the Jam of Beyla.

2. The whole tenor of my letter was to show the Jam's intention, either by intrigue or armed opposition, to upset his Highness' Government, and I endeavoured to point out that the Jam during the past 12 months had by treasonous correspondence and armed resistance endeavoured to upset the Khelat Government and dethrone the present Khan.

3. His Highness having by his own personal efforts subdued this tributary, who for years past has done his utmost to disorganize his country and Government, would not voluntarily reinstate such a person. That the Jam is of this opinion may be inferred, as no man having any hope or intention of returning would have deliberately plundered his own people before seeking safety in Kurrachee.

4. Paragraph 10 of report No. 54 gave substance of letter from the principal men of Beyla to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed. I have now the honour to attach copy of letter received on the 2nd instant.

5. Replies to other letters will be forwarded with as little delay as possible.

Substance of letter received by Captain Harrison from Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, dated Beyla, 11th December 1869.

After salutations,—I arrived at Beyla on the 2nd of December, and all the principal Lussees came to make their salaam.

Sirdar Noordeen and the Jam of Beyla had plundered Beyla before I arrived, and have gone to Koneraj.

I have done everything that could be done to re-assure the people; those who had fled have come back and are living peaceably in their houses, and I have promised to try and recover the property that was taken from them by the Jam and Sirdar Noordeen.

Abstract translation of a letter from Wullee Mahomed Shahgassee, to the address of the Commissioner in Sind, dated 30th Ramzan 1286, [illegible]zri.

You are aware that I came here by order of his Highness the Khan of Khelat to fight with Jam and Noordeen. I found that before my arrival Noordeen had gone to Wudd. I proceeded there, and Jam and Noordeen also came to that place with their armies to fight a battle. By the grace of God, and majesty of his Highness the Khan they fled by night and we obtained the victory. They left behind some guns and property, and of these I took possession. I then left Wudd for Lus Beyla, and arriving there was informed that Jam and Noordeen were in Guzraj. I was going to that place to arrest them; when on the way I was informed that the Jam had gone to Kurrachee, and Noordeen to Kah Saroor. It was at first my intention to go in search of Noordeen and make other necessary arrangements, but I learnt from a letter written by Faquir Mahomed, Naib of Kedj, that Ibrahim Khan Banpoor Wullah intended to commit mischief at Kedj. This has been his intention since one year, as you are well aware of. My wish is that I should go to Kedj. Now that the Jam is under the protection of the British Government he should be considered to be as in that of his Highness the Khan, for both the Governments are on friendly terms with each other. As Noordeen was a companion of the Jam, the latter should be called on to produce him. Before my arrival at Beyla, the people of that place, and Minguls, had laid waste Lus Beyla. From the day I arrived here I commenced making arrangements and giving the people presents. After a few days I went to punish the Minguls, and they all submitted and made obeisance; and of the property that they had taken by force from the people of Lus Beyla, a portion has been recovered and returned to the owners. The rest will also be returned. When I will proceed to Kedj I will leave a small force with Ghoolam Mahomed, Naib of Jhellanee, at Lus Beyla. I have written this for your information.

Enclosure 12 in No. 3.

Minute by the Hon. Mr. Mansfield, dated 24th May 1870.

THE arrangement, proposed by Sir W. Merewether involves a grant of Rs. 44,000 to the Khan of Khelat. The Government of India have on more than one occasion refused to sanction any additional grant to this chief, and will not, I am afraid, entertain the present proposal, unless some reduction is made in the Jacobabad force to meet the extra expense. The subsidising of a certain number of Murrees and Boogtees, subjects of the Khan, would no doubt have great effect in restraining these tribes from plunder, and if the mounted force of Jacobabad were reduced 150 men, with the proper proportion of native officers, funds would be available for the arrangement, and I should like to have it carried out.

The force now at Jacobabad is much larger than is necessary, unless some great convulsion took place in the neighbouring States, and threatened an invasion of British territory, and might be reduced with safety.

Enclosure 13 in No. 3.

No. 1712, dated 3rd June 1870.

Resolution by the Government of Bombay, Political Department.

Read—

The Commissioner in Sind, No. 52, dated the 26th January 1870.—Submits, with remarks, copies of "Outline of Khelat affairs from 1857 to 1769," received from Colonel Phayre, Political Superintendent of Upper Sind.

RESOLUTION.—In this correspondence two main questions come up for consideration: 1st, the future management of the Murree and Boogtee tribes; and 2nd, the position of the Khan of Khelat, and his relations to his Sirdars.

2. With regard to the first question, the object is to induce these robber tribes to give up plundering, and to settle down permanently to peaceful occupations. This object has for some years been attained with regard to the corresponding tribes residing within the Sind frontier; and there seems no reason why a similar policy should not now be successful with regard to the Murrees and Boogtees. It was found mainly by experience during the earlier years of our connexion with Sind, when anarchy and bloodshed prevailed along the whole border, that in order to deal properly with these mountaineers repressive measures were not alone sufficient. Military operations in the hills were found to be hazardous and costly; and even when successful tended little to the pacification of the tribes. For the utmost that could be effected by a campaign was to destroy the villages of the offenders and drive off their cattle; and though this no doubt overawed them for a time, it in the end tended to aggravate the evil, for the general impoverishment which followed weakened the authority of the chiefs, who alone could be made responsible, while their followers were driven to fresh acts of plunder in order to save themselves from starvation.

3. The chief aim of General (then Captain) John Jacob's policy in pacifying the frontier of Sind, was to withdraw the bulk of the tribes from the hills and settle them to agriculture in the plains. The success which attended this experiment will be seen from a perusal of his report printed at page 123, Government Selections No. XVII. "Province of Sind." The results he describes as follows: "Soon afterwards the "Belooch settlers took to manual labour in their own fields with spirit, and even pride. "From that time they were really conquered, and commenced to be reformed; they are "now the most hard-working, industrious, well-behaved, cheerful set of men in Sind. "Their numbers amount to about 2,000 adult males; but for three years past not a "man of them has been convicted, or even accused of any crime whatever, great or "small; yet seven or eight years ago they were the terror of the country, murderers and "robbers to a man." This arrangement disposed of the bulk of some of the larger clans, but the hills along the border will always furnish an asylum to a certain portion of robber tribes; and with these Captain Jacob dealt in a different way. He saw that they could be only successfully managed through their own system of tribal government, and therefore took into British pay the leading chiefs and the best behaved of their followers. These men became thus themselves enlisted on the side of law and order,

while they acted as a sort of border police for the protection of the peaceable settlers, and suppression of petty inter-tribal feuds.

4. This is the policy which it is now proposed to make systematically applicable to the Murrees and Boogtees; regard being had to the fact that these tribes are nominally subjects of the Khan of Khelat, and that the plains on which it is proposed that they should settle are in Khelat and not British territory.

5. It appears from paragraph 44 of the present report of the Commissioner in Sind that there are now a certain number of Boogtees in the pay of Government on the same frontier, but the number is not stated. On the Punjab frontier there are already 20 Murrees and 20 Boogtees on pay of Rs. 20 per mensem. Sir W. Merewether now proposes that the total force on both frontiers should stand as follows :—

ON SIND FRONTIER.

I.—Boogtees.

Chief of the Boogtees - - - -	Rs. 100	per mensem.	
2 Jemadars, @ Rs. 20 - - -	„ 40	„	
50 Sowars, @ Rs. 15 - - - -	„ 750	„	
Total - -	Rs. 890	„	

II.—Kahun Murrees.

Chief of Kahun Murrees - - -	Rs. 100	per mensem.	
2 Jemadars, @ Rs. 20 - - - -	„ 40	„	
50 Sowars, @ Rs. 15 - - - -	„ 750	„	
Total - -	Rs. 890	„	

III.—Kote Moondaie Murrees.

Chief of Kote M. Murrees - - -	Rs. 100	per mensem.	
2 Jemadars, @ Rs. 20 - - -	„ 40	„	
50 Sowars, @ Rs. 15 - - - -	„ 750	„	
Total - -	Rs. 890	„	

ON PUNJAB FRONTIER.

I.—Kahun Murrees.

1 Jemadar - - - - -	Rs. 20	per mensem.	
30 Sowars, @ Rs. 15 - - - -	„ 450	„	
Total - -	Rs. 470	„	

II.—Boogtees.

1 Jemadar - - - - -	Rs. 20	per mensem.	
30 Sowars,—Rs. 15 - - - -	„ 450	„	
Total - -	Rs. 470	„	

The total cost of this force would be, for Sind, Rs. 2,670, and for the Punjab, Rs. 940 per mensem = Rs. 3,610 per mensem, or Rs. 43,320 per annum.

6. This is the additional sanction asked for by Sir W. Merewether; but in estimating the additional cost he has not taken credit for the 40 Sowars already in British pay on the Punjab Frontier. The amount of their pay, Rs. 400 per mensem or Rs. 4,800 per annum, should be deducted from the total shown in the above statement. It is also presumed that the Boogtees already in Government service on the Sind Frontier are included amongst those shown in the statement. The number and pay of these Boogtees should therefore be shown, and a credit taken for their cost. Government desire also to be furnished with some information regarding the location of the Murrees and Boogtees now in Government service, and the nature of the duties required from them.

7. But before recommending the grant of an additional sanction, this Government must be satisfied that the numbers proposed by the Commissioner in Sind are the lowest

compatible with the attainment of the object in view. Sir W. Merewether is aware how difficult, at the present time of financial pressure, it is to obtain sanction for any new charge. He should therefore be requested to consider whether any part of the proposed cost might not be met from local sources. From paragraph 21 of Captain Harrison's report, No. 54 of 23rd December last, it appears that a precentage varying from Rs. 10 to Rs. 40 on each Kafilah is now levied in the Bolan Pass in addition to the sanctioned transit dues. When this exaction on the part of the tribes is put a stop to, as it no doubt will be when permanent arrangements are made, it will perhaps be found that a moderate toll may, without injuriously affecting the traffic, be levied from each Kafilah by way of contribution towards the expenses of keeping the pass open and safe. Perhaps also the Khan of Khelat, when partially relieved from the necessity of furnishing escorts, would be willing to pay a share of the new charge.

8. It must also be borne distinctly in mind that the entertainment of these Sowars should be regarded as an arrangement entirely subsidiary to the main object which Government have in view, viz., the settlement of the tribes be peaceful and especially agricultural occupations.

9. Colonel Phayre should therefore be requested to report as to the practical steps which should now be taken to carry out this policy. When it has been ascertained what portion of the tribes may probably be settled down to cultivation, and what is the least number of Murrees and Boogtees that must be taken into pay in order to secure freedom from plundering, Sir W. Merewether will be in a position to submit to Government a revised scheme based upon the instructions contained in this Resolution.

10. It is desirable that the payments should be made to the tribes in the Khan's name and through officers at Jacobabad on the part of the Khan, as proposed by Sir W. Merewether.

11. It may be pointed out in this place that while his Excellency in Council cordially approves of the policy suggested for adoption by the Commissioner, he does not think the proposal that the Political Superintendent should meet the Khan and confer with him as to the steps required to carry it out necessary. It should also be stated that the nominal subjection of the Murrees to the Khan appears to make it desirable that the carrying out of the whole scheme proposed should be in the hands of the Sind Frontier officers.

12. The second question, viz., the position of the Khan and his relations to his Sirdars, will be considered in a separate Government Resolution.

13. The Commissioner should be asked for an early reply to this Resolution, so that Government may at once communicate with the Government of India.

Enclosure 14 in No. 3.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. & C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor and President in Council, Bombay, —(No. 337, dated 17th June 1870).

In acknowledging the receipt of Government Resolution No. 1,712, of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to state that the general principles which guided the late General Jacob in his management of the frontier and its tribes are most aptly and concisely shown in the second and third paragraphs thereof; but to place the present state of affairs in a perfectly clear light before your Excellency for submission to the Government of India, it is necessary to add a few elucidatory remarks, which I will make as brief as possible.

2. The Belooch tribes which harassed the Sind frontier previous to Sir Charles Napier's hill campaign in 1844–45 were the Jekranees and Dhombkees, who resided not in the hills but in the plains, the former near Shahppo at Chuttur and Sahar-ka-Gote, the latter at Lehree and Phoolajee. These places are all to be found in the map appended to Colonel Phayre's letter No. 1,725 of the 6th December 1869, with the exception of Sahar-ka-Gote, which lies between Chuttur and Phoolajee. They are all situated on the north side of the desert which separates Jacobabad from Kutchee and in Khelat territory.

3. On Sir Charles Napier crossing the desert the Jekranees with the main portion of the Dhoombkees retired into the adjacent Boogtee hills, and afterwards surrendered at Trukkee, an important stronghold immediately to the north of Deyrah. They were then transported into Sind and located on lands close to Khanghur now Jacobabad. These are the people alluded to in the third paragraph of the Government Resolution, as having been so thoroughly reclaimed from their former lawless habits, by the excellent

system introduced by General Jacob after he took charge of the frontier in 1847. They were residing immediately under his control, and civilising influences could be brought directly to bear upon them. A portion of the Dhoombkee tribe, which was not considered so much implicated in the outrages, was left at Lehree where they still are.

4. As long as the Jekranees and Dhoombkees, who were the most powerful of all the Belooch tribes, held the lands at the foot of the Boogtee hills, they monopolised the plunder of the Sind border, but on their removal in 1845, the way was left open to the Boogtees, and they commenced a similar course of irritation. General Jacob assumed charge of the frontier in January 1847, and at once adopted an offensive attitude against these freebooters. By a well-arranged plan of outposts and incessant patrolling, it was rendered almost impossible that any robbers should leave the hills for the purpose of plunder with impunity. The result was, that in the autumn following the Boogtees driven to desperation, entered the plain near Shahpoor in force, were encountered by a detachment of Sind Horse and completely overthrown. It was reckoned that one half of the fighting men of the tribe were killed or taken prisoners on that occasion. Shortly afterwards the whole tribe, finding themselves beaten at every point, surrendered and were located near Larkhana. Owing to ill treatment they received at the hands of Native Government officials, a portion fled back to the hills in March 1848, and again attempted to follow their old life, but being foiled they sued for mercy, and in 1851 the strength of the tribe being found to be thoroughly broken the remainder were allowed to return to their hills. Some of the best men were taken into Government employ to act as scouts and guides.

5. The Murrees, living in the hills behind the Boogtees, and consequently further from Sind, seldom interfered with that province, excepting in joining in small bodies with the Boogtees, in their attempts. This course they also followed against the lower portion of the Punjab frontier.

6. I mention these circumstances to show that though it is undoubtedly most desirable that the same excellent civilizing influences should be brought to bear on the Boogtees and Murrees, as were on the Jekranees and Dhoombkees, it cannot be managed directly, because the former are located so far off, and altogether beyond the British border, as well as the immediate supervision of the authorities. The same influences can therefore be only indirectly extended to them; that it can be successfully, I have not the least doubt, though the process will not be so speedy, and it was with this object that I ventured to submit the proposal contained in my letter No. 52 of the 26th January 1870.

7. It must also be borne in mind that the Jekranees and Dhoombkees being transferred into Sind became British subjects, whereas the Boogtees and Murrees, as noticed in the fourth paragraph of the Government Resolution, being still in Khelat territory, are subjects of our ally, his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and in working towards them his interests must also be consulted.

8. The numbers of Boogtees and Murrees proposed to be now taken into pay on the Sind frontier are in addition to the Belooch Horse now entertained, who have specific duties, which could not for the present certainly be neglected.

3. The strength of those hitherto employed is as follows:—

3 Ressuldars	on Rs. 50	each	-	-	-	Rs.	150
12 Jemadars	„ 25	„	-	-	-	„	300
300 Sowars	„ 15	„	-	-	-	„	4,500
			Total per mensem		-		4,950

One ressuldar, four jemadars, and 100 sowars are reckoned as attached to each of the three regiments of Sind Horse, and they are stationed in small parties at all the outposts held by detachments of those regiments, with a reserve at headquarter, to give reliefs, and afford changes for sick. Their duties are very many, being to act as scouts in obtaining intelligence by actual reconnaissance, of movements of any bodies of marauders attempting to leave the hills. On acquiring any, they despatch information to the nearest outposts and watch the enemy until bodies of troops arrive. In this way they are incessantly employed. They have repeatedly attacked and boldly engaged small bodies of robbers that they have come across when so employed, as the records show. They officiate as guides to all patrolling parties and to detachments of troops in active movement against the enemy, being well acquainted with the different watering places and usual haunts of the robbers. One ressuldar, two jemadars, and 50 horsemen hold by themselves the advanced post of Gundooee at the foot of the Zeen mountain. The greater portion of the sowars in Government employ are taken from the Belooch tribes

residing within the British border, viz., Jekranees, Dhoombkees, Cosahs. The Gundooee post of 50 men is alone drawn from the Boogtees. They were placed there after the final surrender in 1851.

10. I cannot recommend that the services of any of these men should be dispensed with. Until the new arrangements lately submitted have had time to produce the results anticipated, it will be manifestly impossible to remit any of the precautions or vigilant action which it has been found requisite to maintain on the frontier heretofore.

11. The proposed entertainment on the Sind side of 50 extra Boogtee and 100 Murree horsemen with salary to chiefs and Jemadars must therefore be an additional charge of Rs. 2,670 per mensem, or Rs. 32,040 per annum. It will be observed that the number of Boogtees recommended to be employed are less than those of the Murrees, because the former have already men engaged in Government employ.

13. It was accidentally omitted to take credit for the Sowars already in pay on the Punjab side, and who will be incorporated in the new arrangement. This will make the new monthly charge for services on that side Rs. 940—400, only Rs. 540 per mensem, or Rs. 6,480 per annum, and so reduce the total annual sum asked for to Rs. 38,520, or say, roughly, Rs. 40,000 per annum. The numbers and arrangements may not be carried out exactly as I gave them in my former letter. It would be preferable, I think, that the details should be left to the discretion of the Political Superintendent, and for that reason it will be as well to leave a slight margin to meet any contingencies that may arise.

13. The only Murrees now in Government employ are those (twenty) entertained by Captain Sandeman on the Punjab side. They are chiefly used by him as a means of communicating with the chiefs in the hills, part of them remain with him generally, the remainder in the hills. He has 20 Boogtees similarly employed. On the Sind frontier the only Boogtees engaged are those above mentioned as holding the Gundooee outpost. To the Murrees a subsidy of Rs. 600 was granted last year to the chief of the Murrees, conditional on the good behaviour of the tribe; but owing to the arrangement being considered as only binding on one section, and other branches ignoring it, the subsidy had to be withdrawn.

14. The grant of this additional sanction was only asked for by me after most careful and mature deliberation, and with the firm conviction that it is the most economical arrangement that could be entered into, something more than at present exists being undoubtedly called for. The Sind frontier I consider to be thoroughly and efficiently protected, but for some years past there have been complaints of aggressions on the Punjab frontier by portions of the Boogtee and Murree tribes. These have been fewer of late owing to temporary arrangements made, and skilful management on the part of the officer in charge of that district, Captain Sandeman. But they are liable to recur, and unless some fixed and clearly defined system meeting all probable chances is estabished, will infallibly happen again.

15. I should myself prefer that the bold policy of General Jacob, which has proved so successful on the Sind border, should be continued in its simple integrity and extended to that of the Punjab. But this would cause greater expense by calling for the presence of more disciplined troops in the latter district and the change of arrangements hitherto prevailing, which I believe were adopted chiefly for economical reasons; I allude to the practice of using the inhabitants of the district partly for the purposes of defence. This latter has undeniable defects, inasmuch as it tends to perpetuate intertribal feuds and that martial unsettled state among our own subjects which it is far better should be discouraged. It has, however, the advantage of cheapness. The efforts also of Captain Sandeman to win over the Boogtees and Murrees by taking a few men into pay, have been approved and hitherto have worked well. But they are on too small a scale, and unless enlarged will not produce lasting results.

16. The proposal in paragraph 43 and 44 of my letter of the 26th January last, is merely an elaboration of this last-mentioned plan, which will not only provide for the safety of the Punjab frontier, but will also assist in reclaiming the two above-mentioned tribes from their habits of plunder and violence. By taking the chiefs and a certain number of men into regular service, we have a certain bond for the good conduct of all, as the ill-behaviour of any portion of the tribes will cause the entertainment of all, the members of that tribe being immediately annulled. Their being brought more into contact with us, and during their visits, which will be made as frequent as possible, their seeing the advantages others gain from living under good rule and settled order, will tend gradually to civilize them and create in them new wants which their old state could not possibly give them.

17. Another of the conditions of their continuance in employment will be that they, the Murrees especially, shall in future abstain from harassing the Kafilahs which pass down the Bolan and across the plains of Kutchee into Sind. It is true that this duty of protecting these Kafilahs belongs more correctly to his Highness the Khan of Khelat; but it has been before explained that owing to the distance of the Murrees from his capital the strong nature of and difficulty of access to their hills, and his own very limited means, his Highness is unable to establish his power over such unruly characters, though most ready and anxious to carry out all in which he is bound to the British Government Fostering and promoting this trade to the utmost is of such great importance, especially at the present time, to us, that I have no hesitation in most strongly urging the sanction of my proposal on that ground particularly. In the returns following the better development thereof, Government, I am confident, will receive good return for the outlay now suggested.

18. It has also been already pointed out to Government that the assistance thus rendered to his Highness the Khan in establishing order and security in one portion of his dominions will enable him to consolidate his power more effectually in the remainder, and facilitate his forming a strong government, which more than ever now it must be an object of the first importance to us to see established. During the past year he has successfully crushed rebellion in his country, and help now will be all the more opportune.

19. With regard to the question, whether any part of the proposed cost might be met at once from local sources, I regret to say I am unable to offer any expectation of such being the case. The arrangements mentioned by Captain Harrison in the 21st paragraph of his report No. 54 of 23rd December 1869, made by the Naib of Quetta, the Khan's representative there, and the toll which the Murree chief receives is, I conclude, so much out of the dues which would otherwise go into the Khan's exchequer. Colonel Phayre added a marginal note to Captain Harrison's statement, "that the merchants pay black "mail for this protection, in addition to transit dues," but I have received no complaint on this subject from any of the traders who have passed through Sind, and had they been subjected to such a heavy new impost they would assuredly have represented it. Colonel Phayre also alludes to the same in the postscript of his letter No. 1823 of 24th December, but no further information has been submitted. I infer, therefore, that my first impression was the correct one. But be this as it may, when I drew out the proposals, it was with a knowledge of the existence of that toll and with the intention that while the new arrangements provided for the safety of the Kafilahs after they had entered the plains of Kutchee, his Highness the Khan should be left to see to the security of the Bolan, and his existing arrangements which had proved successful should remain undisturbed. I cannot therefore say that anything may be realized from this source What may be done hereafter when the working of the system has proved successful is a different matter, but for the present I can only say that recompense must be looked for in the peace and security of our borders, in the improvement and encouragement of trade, and in the better government of the country immediately next to our own.

20. The subject of the 8th paragraph of the Government Resolution has been borne in mind both by Colonel Phayre and myself, and the necessity of providing means of resorting to agricultural pursuits, for those who are disposed to follow them, has not been forgotten. The Maksoodwah, in the first instance, merely a short canal four miles long, intended to give fresh water and to give boat communication from the Indus to the town of Kusmore and the lines of the Sind Horse outpost, has gradually been converted into a valuable irrigational medium. Sir H. Green commenced its enlargement several years ago, and the extension has since been gradually carried out until the canal has now a length of some 40 miles, and supplies water for the cultivation of thousands of acres of land where 20 years ago armed men used to go with caution. Mr. Bolton, the deputy collector of the district, has, under the direction of Colonel Phayre, done much this last season to improve the canal, but it has become so important a work, both in respect to yielding considerable revenue and affording a handy field for the settlement of any of the hill people desiring to take to cultivation, that I requested Colonel Phayre to submit a report showing the present dimensions of the canal, its cost hitherto, the revenue already realised, the amount of land brought under cultivation and the further extent that could be, and the superintending engineer will be requested to give it his best consideration with a view to its further improvement on a larger and more systematic scale before next inundation.

21. The canal almost follows the line of the great desert canal so wisely proposed by the late General Jacob, but which has unfortunately been postponed from one cause or another. Passing as it does just along the frontier line, it not only fertilises a tract

of country that had never before been touched by the plough, but being in the neighbourhood of the hills it affords an excellent opportunity of displaying under the very eyes of the mountaineers the advantages to be gained from habits of peace and honest labour, and of giving land to any who wish to change their way of living from that of a marauder to a respectable cultivator. The beneficial results of such procedure have been proved as regards the formerly wild Belooch residing within our territory, and there can be no doubt that the hill men will gradually be drawn within these same civilising influences. But I would deprecate the expectation of its succeeding so rapidly with them as with the others. Some Boogtees have already got lands on the Maksoodwah, and as the supply of water is increased, more grants will be given to others who are quite ready to take them up. The Boogtees are immediately adjacent, the Murrees are beyond them again, and not so easily reached. Every encouragement, however, will be given them, and they will certainly sooner or later join too, especially as the canal gets extended further to the westward and nearer to them.

22. Although I have said in the 19th paragraph that no help towards the proposed extra expenditure can be given from local means, I would here point out that much will be gained hereafter from this canal. Similar works on the frontier district have returned 800 per cent. on the original outlay, giving steadily an average of 50 per cent. annually for 16 years. Supposing, owing to portions of land having to be given free as encouragement at first, that only half that percentage is obtained, it would be a most profitable arrangement, and worth for itself alone the expenditure of Rs. 40,000 a year to ensure its being brought about.

23. I shall not delay the submission of this report to refer to Colonel Phayre, but copy of it and the Government Resolution will be sent to him for any remarks he may have to add in reference to paragraph 9. The numbers of Boogtees and Murrees that should be taken into pay have been already given by me, and I have no hesitation in stating that I cannot recommend less. Their distribution and the management of their engagement may require some modification. This should be left to the judgment and discretion of the Political Superintendent, who will be the best judge of who should or should not be entertained.

24. One of the principal objects I had in view in recommending that the Political Superintendent should meet the Khan and confer with him, was that Colonel Phayre should have the opportunity of becoming personally acquainted with the Khan, after which the transaction of business would be so much more easy and satisfactory. I never anticipated the Khan not immediately and completely complying with and accepting any wish expressed by the British Government. His unvarying conduct in this respect prevents any doubts ever being entertained on the subject. But if it is your Excellency's desire that the interview shall not take place next cold season, it can be deferred.

No. 4.

No. 287—1056, dated Murree, the 8th September 1870.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

WITH reference to your letter No. 1266P., dated 20th July, I am desired to forward copy of letter No. 578, dated 2nd September, from Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, reporting on the case of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Khan, of Khelat.

Enclosure in No. 4.

No. 578, dated the 2nd September 1870.

From Captain R. G. Sandeman, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazee Khan, to the Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your No. 893, dated 1st August 1870, with enclosures, directing me to submit, for the information of the Government of India, my opinion on the statements made by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, of Sarawan, to the Amir of Cabul, in a petition dated the 14th Mohurrum (16th April 1870). To enable me to

do this it is necessary that I should give briefly a short history of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's career, and how I came to have political relations of any kind with a Sirdar in open rebellion against the Khelat Government.

2. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed is, as the Government is doubtless aware, next to the Khan of Khelat himself, the most influential chieftain of Beloochistan, and is the hereditary Sirdar of the province of Sarawan.

3. On the death of Nusseer Khan (13 or 14 years ago) the confederacy of the nobles placed Khodadad, his brother, on the throne of Khelat. I believe the consent of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed had to be obtained to this, and I merely mention the fact to show the influential position this Sirdar holds in the Khelat State.

4. About six months after Khodadad's election to the throne a dispute arose between him and his nobles. The particulars are as follows:

5. Khodadad was betrothed to the daughter of the second chief of the State, Sirdar Taj Mahomed, of Jalawan, but he also wished to espouse Taj Mahomed's sister, who was widow of his own brother, the late Nusseer Khan of Khelat. Not only were the nobles disgusted at this, but it is said that the widow herself was also so, and that rather than submit to the indignity she declared that she would destroy herself.

5. Notwithstanding this, Khodadad, seizing a favourable opportunity, got possession of the person of his late brother's widow, and it is said married her in spite of her wishes to the contrary.

7. On the news becoming known, the nobles of Sarawan, Jalawan, Mingul, Khoord, &c. all assembled their forces and expelled Khodadad, placing his cousin Sher Dil Khan on the throne.

8. After this Khodadad Khan sought the protection of Moolla Mahomed, and received an asylum with him. This displeased Sher Dil Khan, and it was agreed that Khodadad should seek protection in Jacobabad and await there the turn of events. This was done.

9. About six months after this Sher Dil Khan was murdered by his own troops, and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed exerted his influence, and on certain terms got the other nobles to restore Khodadad to the throne. The dispute about Taj Mahomed's sister was also at an end, as she had died during these disturbances, and Khodadad made Taj Mahomed happy by marrying his daughter.

10. During the above-named troubles, the minister Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed got a very bad name with the Chiefs, and I believe that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed incurred his enmity from having supported Sirdar Taj Mahomed in his demanding of Khodadad Khan that he must dismiss this minister before restoring him to the throne. The promise was given, but was never carried out.

11. On this becoming known to Shahgassee, he at once commenced to intrigue, his object being to secure his own safety at the expense of the nobles. He had every opportunity to do this, as he was favoured by our officers at Jacobabad, he having, on their recommendation, been made prime minister by the Khan.

12. The result of it all was that the breach between the Khan and his nobles widened daily, until a rebellion broke out. The nobles were defeated, and the Sirdar of Jalawan made a prisoner. It is said he was poisoned by Shahgassee's orders in prison. The Sirdars of Sarawan fled to the Murree Hills.

13. Shortly after this Colonel Sir Henry Green sent for the Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, who had complained of his grievances and of the conduct of the Shahgassee, who is a household slave by birth, and pointed out to Sir Henry that unless some arrangements were come to, the nobles of Khelat could expect no mercy at his hands. Colonel Green promised that he would arrange with the Khan to settle matters, who would meet them in the cold weather for the purpose, and the Moolla was directed to retire to his estates, which he did.

14. The cold weather came and went, but no arrangements were made, and Colonel Green was succeeded in office by Colonel Phayre, who also, I believe, promised this Sirdar that he would do his best to settle matters between the Sirdars and their Khan at a personal interview.

15. A few months after this Captain Harrison was appointed Agent at Khelat, and was directed by Colonel Phayre to do his best to settle matters between the Khan and his nobles, and I believe that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's demands were that the Khan should make good his promises made to the whole of the nobles when they restored him to the throne on Sher Dil Khan's death.

16. This object was not obtained, and the Sirdars declare that the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, by treacherously attacking them separately with the Khan's army, in violation of all promises and agreements, defeated them one by one.

17. The Sirdar Moolla Mahomed during the last cold weather fled to the Murree Hills, and sought aid from the Hill men.

18. The Hill Belooch appealed to me, sending a deputation to Dera Ghazee Khan and asking my advice. I strongly advised them not to aid Moolla Mahomed with men, but to try what negotiation would do. The Moolla finding this out went to Candahar to Amir Sher Ali, and laid his grievances and that of the other chiefs before him. The Jam of Beyla and other Sirdars are also refugees.

19. I am of opinion that his Highness the Khan of Khelat has not kept his promises made to his nobles, and I further think, from all I have heard, that the interference of the British in the affairs of Beloochistan has up to the present time caused the impression that we have not been faithful to our agreements. It is even said that the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed is the real ruler of Khelat, and that the Khan himself is not opposed to a fair settlement being come to between himself and his nobles; but that the minister, who has every cause to fear this coming about, opposes it with all his might.

20. I think myself that the affairs of Khelat are in a most unsatisfactory state, and that it is a great pity, for State reasons, that a reconciliation between the Khan and his nobles is not brought about. It might at any moment be a great source of weakness, for the nobles are too powerful and have too much influence in the country to admit of either the British Government or the Government of Khelat ignoring their grievances.

21. I believe that the Khan himself, if properly managed and guided, is quite reasonable, and I think further, there are real grounds to show that the Chiefs have cause for acting as they have done, which they, justly or unjustly lay at our door, and that if our Government will only influence that of the Khan's, as it very easily could, to inquire into and settle such, that the result would be greatly to our own interests as well as to those of the Khelat State.

No. 5.

No. 2,123 P., dated Fort William, 6th December 1870.

From C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 249, dated July 16th, 1870, and of its enclosures, relative to the future management of the Murree and Boogtee tribes, and the relations between the Khan of Khelat and his Nobles.

2. In regard to the first of the subjects dealt with in this correspondence, the Bombay Government has expressed its general concurrence in the recommendation of Sir W. Merewether that instead of advancing the present line of outposts, as proposed by Colonel Phayre and the local authorities of the Punjab, the British Government should endeavour to ensure the tranquillity of the border by entertaining more levies of Murrees and Boogtees in its service. The Commissioner in Sinde has computed the cost of such additional levies as would in his opinion be sufficient for this purpose at Rupees 40,000 a year in round numbers. The Bombay Government has undertaken, if the experiment be allowed, to see that it is carried out with the least possible expense to the State, and is not without hope that it might be initiated at a less cost than that estimated by the Commissioner. But whilst advocating the adoption of this measure, it has impressed on him that the maintenance of the levies must be regarded as an arrangement subsidiary to the main object of Government, namely, "the settlement of the tribes in peaceful and especially agricultural occupations." This object Sir W. Merewether has also been bearing in mind, for he has enjoined the Superintendent on the frontier of Upper Sinde to report specially on the possibility of improving and extending the Maksoodwah Canal, from which the Beloochees who live immediately within the British border have already derived so much benefit. It is the wish of the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council that a copy of this Report may be forwarded for his consideration with the views of the Commissioner in Sinde and of the Government of Bombay.

3. The local authorities in Sinde and the Punjab differ greatly in opinion concerning the mutual relations of the Khan of Khelat and his nobles. Colonel Phayre holds that the Khan is no more than the head of a confederacy, and he considers that the present chief has throughout his reign been steadily striving to make himself independent of the constituted form of Government. He believes that without the countenance of the British Government, the Khan's rule would, owing to the unpopularity of his Highness

and the pervading spirit of anarchy, soon be overthrown. These views are generally shared by Captain Sandeman, the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan, and by Colonel Graham, the Commissioner of the Derajat. Sir W. Merewether, on the other hand, and Captain Harrison, the present Political Agent at Khelat, believe in the supremacy of the Khan, and dissent from Colonel Phayre's opinion that internal disturbances, dangerous to the power of the British Government, are fast culminating. On the contrary, they adduce reasons for considering that a large majority of the nobles are well disposed to the Khan, and that order prevails generally in the country. They deprecate any change in the policy which is at present being pursued towards Khelat. In its Resolution, No. 1,712, dated the 3rd of June last, the Bombay Government promised to record its views on this subject. So far no intimation of them has been received. But his Excellency in Council trusts that they may shortly be communicated, and that also at the same time a reply may be given to the reference which was made hence in July last concerning the application of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed to the Ameer of Cabul for aid in recovering his confiscated estates and lost position in Khelat.

4. It appears to the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council that it would tend much to the settlement of the questions which form the subject of this letter if the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, who has already commenced his march along the frontier, and the Commissioner in Sinde were to meet during the present cold season either at Dera Ghazee Khan, or at some other convenient place on the confines of the two provinces. It is desirable also, in the opinion of his Excellency in Council, that Colonel Phayre and Captain Sandeman should be present on the occasion, in order that his Honour and Sir W. Merewether may be able to avail themselves of their local knowledge and experience. It is expected that Sir H. Durand will reach Dera Ghazee Khan towards the end of January next. Accordingly, I am to request that you will, with the permission of his Excellency the Governor in Council, put yourself in communication with the Punjab Government for the purpose of giving effect to the wishes of the Government of India. The Viceroy and Governor-General in Council trusts that when these questions have been considered in all their bearings on the spot, the Lieutenant-Governor and Sir W. Merewether will be in a position to make such proposals, both in regard to the treatment of the Murree, Boogtee, and other frontier tribes, and in regard to the status of the Khan of Khelat and the members of the Belooch confederacy, as will enable the Supreme Government to reconcile existing differences of opinion, and to decide on a strictly uniform line of policy for the Sinde and Punjab frontier.

5. A copy of this letter and of the correspondence to which it is the answer will be sent for the information of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

No. 6.

No. 36—110, dated Lahore, 4th February, 1871.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to the Government of Punjab and its Dependencies, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I AM directed by the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor to state, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy, the results of a conference held yesterday at Mittunkote between the Lieutenant-Governor and Sir William Merewether, Commissioner in Sinde, in accordance with the instructions conveyed in your letter No. 2124P., dated the 6th of December, 1870.

These instructions were passed on a communication of the Government of Bombay, No. 249, dated 16th July last, submitting for consideration certain proposals of the Commissioner in Sinde, contained in his letters No. 52 and No. 337, dated the 26th January and 17th June, and with reference to the question of the future management of the Murree and Boogtee tribes, and the position of the Khan of Khelat and his relations to his Sirdars, directed that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and the Commissioner in Sinde, having discussed these questions on the spot, should submit such proposals as might enable the Supreme Government to reconcile existing differences of opinion, and to decide on a strictly uniform line of policy for the Sinde and Punjab frontier.

2. The Punjab officials who took part in this conference, in addition to the Secretaries to Government in the Civil and Military Departments, were Brigadier-General Keyes, Commanding the Frontier Force, Lieutenant-Colonel Graham, Officiating Commissioner of the Derajat, and Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan.

Sir William Merewether and Colonel Phayre, Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sinde, represented Sinde in the conference.

3. His Excellency will not consider it desirable or necessary that a full narration should here be given of the series of events which have terminated in the present conference; voluminous reports have from time to time been submitted to the Government of India, both through the Government of Bombay and that of the Punjab, on the affairs of Khelat, the management of the frontier tribes, and the system to be adopted on the frontiers of the Punjab and Sinde, and it is needless to repeat in this place what has already been submitted to Government in full detail.

4. The first point upon which any discussion was held was the advantage of placing the direction of frontier affairs, so far as the management of the Murree and Boogtee tribes was concerned, in the hands of one officer, so as to secure the carrying out of the same policy on the frontiers of the Punjab and Sinde.

As his Excellency is aware, hitherto the action of the authorities of this province and of Sinde has been altogether independent of each other.

The direction of the relations of the British Government with the Khelat State has always been in the hands of the Sinde authorities, and they, considering the Murree and Boogtee tribes as the subjects of the Khan, however turbulent and rebellious they may be, have always attempted to control them through the influence of their legitimate Chief. The Punjab officers, on the other hand, had no official relations whatever with Khelat, and their only frontier policy for many years, as far as the Murrees and Boogtees were concerned, was to drive back their marauding parties, and endeavour to obtain compensation for damage committed in British territory through the Political Superintendent of Upper Sinde.

5. It was only in 1867 that the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan entered into direct relations with these tribes. They had made, in January 1867, a combined raid into British territory, had attacked the Fort of Harrand, burned several villages, and killed several British subjects. Captain Sandeman, the Deputy Commissioner, applied to Sir H. Green, then the Political Superintendent of the Upper Sinde Frontier, for compensation; but that officer held the Khan of Khelat to be free from responsibility, that the Murrees, although nominally subjects of the Khan, were virtually independent of his authority, and that he could not be expected to control them.

6. The Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan was thus compelled, in self defence, to take action himself, and, entering into direct engagements with the chiefs of the tribes in question, and taking a certain number of them and their followers into the service of Government, he enlisted them on the side of order, and from that time to this the tribes have adhered faithfully to their engagements, and the peace of the Southern Punjab border has been preserved.

7. This policy, which, as far as the Punjab border was concerned, proved eminently successful, was unsatisfactory from other than Punjab points of view. There was no unity of action between the Punjab and Sinde; the engagements which bound the tribes to respect the Punjab territory had no force in Sinde; while the tribes seemed to consider that their peaceful behaviour in one direction gave them a certain right to plunder on a more extensive scale in another; and their depredations in Khelat territory and in the plains of Kutchi, down to the Sinde Frontier, diminished the revenues of the Khan of Khelat, weakened his authority, and so disturbed the trade routes through the Bolan Pass, that caravans and merchants were compelled to give up the use of the most convenient and direct road into British India.

8. Every year it became more evident that if the Belooch tribes were to be reduced to order, and the security to commerce through the Bolan Passes restored, united action from the direction of Sinde and the Punjab was essential. No good result could be hoped while the tribes were treated, at the same time, on two different systems, or when, as was lately the case, a rebellious tribe was punished for its depredations by exclusion from Sinde territory, while, in the Punjab, its chiefs and their followers were in receipt of allowances from Government, allowances which could not be suddenly stopped, as the Sinde officials desired, without endangering the peace of the border from Harrand to Kasmor.

9. The Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor and the Commissioner in Sinde, in discussing the best means of securing united action on the frontier and efficient control of the Belooch tribes, have unreservedly accepted as the basis for such discussion the treaty engagements of the Khan of Khelat with the British Government, and the necessity to observe them so long as they have not been expressly modified or cancelled. The treaty of the 14th May 1854, under which the Khan receives an annual subsidy of

Rs.50,000 engaging in return to protect the trade routes through his territories, and levy reasonable and stipulated rates of toll on merchandize, has always been held to place on the Khan the obligation to prevent plundering and outrages on the part of the Murrees and Boogtees. These tribes, it is true, have given to the Khan a very doubtful allegiance, while he has wished to disown as subjects tribes whose occupation was plunder, whose raids devastated his country, and whose depredations he was called upon to make good. But, however doubtful the allegiance of the tribes, and however anxious the Khan might be to renounce them as subjects, it is certain that from the date of the Treaty of 1854 the Murrees and Boogtees have invariably been assumed by the British Government to be the subjects of the Khan, who was, under the treaty, bound to keep them in order, if possible, and an extra subsidy was actually granted him for several years for this very purpose. To deal now with the tribes independently of the Khan, to make arrangements with them ignoring his authority, nominal though it may be, would be undoubtedly in opposition to the policy which has hitherto been maintained, and which has received the sanction of the Government of India and of the Secretary of State.

10. I am desired to state, moreover, that the Lieutenant-Governor and the Commissioner in Sinde are entirely agreed as to the advantage to the British Government of effecting arrangements with the frontier tribes through the Khan of Khelat. Even did Treaty engagements not influence the consideration of the question, it would still be the interest of the Government to strengthen in every way the Khan of Khelat, to teach him by assistance and wise council, to look to the British Government as his best friend, and to aid him to put down brigandage, and make the caravan routes from Afghanistan passing through his territory secure. The Khan is represented by those officers who have been most closely connected with him to be well affected to the Government, and to have endeavoured, though with indifferent success, to carry out faithfully his engagements. His power has not been equal to his good-will, and the outrages of the Murrees and Boogtees, repressed on the British border, have continued without any interruption in the Kutchi and along the caravan route. This is in duty a reason that, in any arrangement with the tribes, the name and authority of the Khan should be used, and the security and peace of the Khelat territory be considered as well as the tranquillity of the British border. The Government has a direct interest in the security of the important roads which pass through Khelat territory, and their maintenance in the hands of a strong and well disposed Chief. Unless the British Government continues its support to the Khan of Khelat, he will be unable to maintain his position, and the country will fall into a state of anarchy, the battle-ground of numerous petty chiefs, and there will be no one across our border whose friendship would be worth acceptance, or whose influence would suffice to keep open the most important commercial and military road on the North-western frontier.

11. Such being the views of the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor and Sir William Merewether, and which, it is understood, are shared by the Government of India, it appeared absolutely necessary that the management of frontier affairs in their relation to the Murree and Boogtee tribes should be in the hands of one officer only, who should consider the requirements of the Punjab, Sinde, and Khelat together, and be able to maintain a consistent policy towards the frontier tribes. The experiment of independent action by the Political Superintendent of Upper Sinde and the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan has been tried for several years, and though, from one point of view, successful, could hardly be pronounced so when the question is considered in its entirety, and the interests of the Punjab, Sinde, and Khelat assumed to be one and the same, which they undoubtedly are.

12. His Honor and the Commissioner in Sinde accordingly propose that the whole direction of the relations with the Murree and Boogtee tribes be placed in the hands of the Political Superintendent, Upper Sinde Frontier, and that the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan *qúa* the above-named tribes, be under the orders of the Political Superintendent, and not under the orders of the Commissioner of the Derajat, who will be relieved of all responsibility, so far as our political relations with these tribes are concerned. It would appear evident that if the political control is placed in the hands of one officer only, the Political Superintendent at Jacobabad, from his standing in the service and experience, must be the officer selected. The Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan has managed the tribes in the interests of the tranquillity of the Punjab border with great ability and success, which is readily admitted by the Commissioner in Sinde; and although he is now prepared to be placed under the orders of the Political Superintendent, it is by no means desirable nor intended that the interference of the latter officer should extend to matters of petty detail. His control will be general, and only such as to secure a uniform and consistent policy of management. The acquiescences of

both Colonel Phayre, the Political Superintendent, and Captain Sandeman, the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan, in the proposed arrangement, and their conviction that it will at once dispose of many of the difficulties which have given so much trouble, and have formed the subject of so much correspondence, are in the opinion of his Honour and the Commissioner in Sinde strong arguments in favour of its adoption.

13. The arrangements agreed upon by his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor and the Commissioner in Sinde for the pacification of the Murrees and Boogtees, and securing the tranquillity of the border and of Khelat territory, are detailed in the letter of Sir W. Merewether dated 26th January 1870, to the Government of Bombay, and which was submitted for the consideration of his Excellency the Viceroy in letter No. 249, dated the 16th July last, of the Government, Bombay. In these proposals of the Commissioner in Sinde the Lieutenant-Governor concurs, and, believing that they will have the desired and anticipated results, he would recommend them for sanction. These proposals are, in short, to take into pay certain of the Murree and Boogtee chiefs with their followers. With the object of strengthening the Khan of Khelat, the service would be given and the allowances made in his name; but in order to secure the due payment of the sums, and to prevent dispute and difficulty, the actual disbursements would be made at Jacobabad by the Political Superintendent and the Khan of Khelat's officers. The quotum allotted to the Punjab sections of the tribe would, in the same manner, be paid by the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan. For the allowances thus given the tribes would be bound to maintain horsemen, to keep open communications, and to abstain from all plundering in the territories of the British Government or of the Khan of Khelat. Should they in any place or in any direction break this condition, and commit outrages, their whole allowances would be liable to stoppage.

14. The Lieutenant-Governor and the Commissioner in Sinde consider that without an arrangement such as that proposed, it is altogether vain to expect the tribes to remain quiet. The strong administration within British territory may, with difficulty, and by the exercise of constant vigilance, preserve the peace of the border, but these wild tribes will then turn to other and easier fields of plunder and inflict, in the Kutchi and the Bolan, upon British interests, injury as great though less direct. By taking the tribes into pay, by giving them a direct interest in the preservation of order, can their pacification alone be expected. Plundering has been the profession of these people so long, and peaceful occupations have been so long neglected, that it is unreasonable to expect them to abstain from plundering unless some inducement which they can understand is offered them.

15. It would not be reasonable to insist upon the Khan of Khelat coercing the Murrees and Boogtees in consideration of the subsidy he receives, nor would it be of the slightest use to make such a demand. The subsidy does not more than cover the losses sustained by the Khan in the low tariff of charges levied under the treaty on goods taken through Khelat territory, and he is quite unable, without further aid from Government, to subsidize or reduce to order the frontier tribes. Satisfactory arrangements cannot be made without some expense; but this must fairly be borne by the British Government, and will be repaid in increased commerce and reduction of military expenditure upon border expeditions. The change is not altogether a new one, but is a resuscitation in another form and in a reduced amount of the subsidy granted the Khan for the purpose of keeping in order the turbulent tribes on the border, and the withdrawal of which, however just, appears to have had a very unfortunate result on the tranquillity of Khelat.

16. The amount asked for by Sir William Merewether in the letter above quoted was Rupees 43,320 per annum, which sum included Rupees 11,280 for the Punjab frontier. But no additional sanction for the Punjab is required, and the amount for which the sanction of the Government of India is asked is consequently only Rupees 32,040 for charges on the Sinde frontier, including Kutchi and the Bolan Pass.

17. It is at the same time necessary to state that the present expenditure on the Punjab border in allowance to the border tribes, Murrees, Boogtees, Khetrans, and Haddianis, amounts to about the same sum as is now asked for the Sinde border, viz., Rupees 32,400; but the greater portion of this has been raised locally, and only Rupees 7,920 has been required annually from imperial funds. These local funds, it is believed can continue to supply the money needed under the new arrangements without any assistance from the Imperial Treasury.

18. The two local sources from which the funds are drawn are the salt contract and the tirni, or grazing tax.

The former of these previous to the arrangements of 1867, by which the hills were

opened to trade, was ordinarily sold for Rupees 900 for a term of three years. The subject of the contract was the earth salt manufactured in the plains. When the hills were opened up the contract sold for a term of three years for about Rupees 22,000, and the increase in the amount of the contract proceeds, which was solely due to the arrangements concluded with the tribes and the payments made them, was expended by the Deputy Commissioner in maintaining the arrangements. Rupees 7,200 a year is expended from this source on the pay of troopers, the balance received being credited as miscellaneous revenue.

It would be more regular and satisfactory were the total proceeds from the salt contract credited to Government, and a grant of Rupees 7,200 a year made from Imperial revenues to meet the cost of horsemen entertained; and such an arrangement may appear to the Government of India preferable to that now in force.

19. From the grazing tax, which is variable in amount, but which may be expected in the future to average Rupees 18,000, a sum of Rupees 17,280 is paid for the service of 72 horsemen.

This tax was recently increased in the Dera Ghazee Khan District with special reference to the arrangements now in question, and the increase sanctioned by the Government of India, the actual disposition of the money being one of the questions deferred for the consideration of the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor during the present tour.

20. The amount, therefore, requiring the present sanction of the Government of India to complete the proposed arrangements, and leaving the greater portion of the Punjab charges to be met, as at present, from local resources, is Rupees 32,000, which the Lieutenant-Governor and the Commissioner in Sinde earnestly trust his Excellency the Viceroy may be pleased to sanction in the manner and for the objects proposed in the letter of the Commissioner in Sinde, No. 52, dated 26th January 1870. If this is done, and if his Excellency in Council agrees to the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan being placed in questions relating to the Murree and Boogtee tribes under the orders of the Political Superintendent of Upper Sinde, the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor and Sir William Merewether trust that the difficulties and dangers arising from divided authority and inconsistent policy will cease, and that quiet will be maintained both on the British border and in Khelat. It is, moreover, hoped that early intimation of sanction having been accorded may be conveyed, as it is very desirable that arrangements should be made and the Kutchi visited in company with the Khan of Khelat, who is now in Kutchi, but is not expected to remain there very long.

21. In conclusion, I am directed to state that the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor and the Commissioner of Sinde, after full deliberation, have decided to submit to his Excellency no joint representation on the subject of the internal condition of the state of Khelat and the relation of the Khan with his subordinate Chiefs and Sirdars. The Lieutenant-Governor and Sir William Merewether have felt that, in abstaining from any recommendations on this subject, they best follow the instructions of the Government of India, which only desired that their views and decisions should be recorded where it would be possible to draw from them some practical conclusion. But this is impossible with regard to the internal affairs of Khelat. The direction of the political relations of the State having rested entirely with the Sinde authorities, under the orders of the Bombay Government, the Government of the Punjab has never been in possession of information which could enable it to understand clearly the position of affairs. The Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor is consequently unwilling, on imperfect information, to commit himself to views which, were the whole circumstances of the case known to him, he might have occasion to modify or abandon.

No. 7.

No. 412P., dated Fort William, 24th February 1871.

From C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

No. 36.110, dated 4th February 1871.

With reference to the letter from this Office No. 2123P., dated 6th December 1870, I am directed by the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council to forward a copy of a letter from the Secretary to Government, Punjab, which contains a full report of the conference lately held between the Lieutenant-Governor and the Commissioner in Sinde, and to state that his Excel-

lency in Council would be glad to be favoured with the views of the Bombay Government on the proposals therein made, viz.—

1st.—That the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan should be placed, as regards the management of the Murree and Boogtee tribes, under the orders of the Political Superintendent of the Sinde Frontier.

2nd.—That in addition to the sums now spent in entertaining levies of the Murree and Boogtee tribes, a further sum of Rs. 32,040 be given for additional levies to be entertained and paid in the name of the Khan of Khelat by the Political Superintendent of Upper Sinde.

2. His Excellency in Council is quite prepared to sanction the first proposal; but before agreeing to the second, he wishes the question to be carefully considered by the Bombay Government, and to be favoured with the opinion of his Excellency the Governor in Council as soon as may be convenient.

3. It appears to his Excellency in Council that this proposal is virtually a revival in another form of a subsidy to the Khan in addition to the subsidy of Rs. 50,000 paid under the Treaty of 1854. His Excellency in Council is unable to find in the correspondence relating to the negotiation of the Treaty, or in the papers relating to the extra subsidy guaranteed in 1859 and subsequently stopped, anything to countenance the idea which appears to be entertained by the local authorities, and to have first found expression in Sir William Merewether's letter of 11th September 1868 that the subsidy was intended as compensation to the Khan for loss of revenue sustained by the tariff of 1854. On the contrary, it was given on condition of the faithful fulfilment by the Khan year by year of his Treaty obligations, and among others of his engaging "to prevent "all plundering or other outrages by his subjects within or near British territory; to "protect the passage of merchants to and fro between the British dominions and "Afghanistan, whether by way of Sinde or by way of Soumeeanee or other seaports of "Mekran, and to permit no exactions to be made beyond an equitable duty to be fixed "by the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan," &c. The subsidy is liable to be suspended if in any year these conditions are not faithfully fulfilled.

4. It seems to be admitted that the Khan has failed to act up to his obligations, not wilfully, but because he lacks the power to fulfil them. To strengthen his hands and preserve the peace of the frontier, the British Government already spend on local levies Rs. 91,800 a year,* in addition to the subsidy paid to the Khan. It is now proposed to increase this expenditure by Rs. 32,040, raising it to Rs. 1,23,840, or nearly 2½ times the subsidy to which it is additional.

*In Sinde	-	Rs. 4,950×12=Rs. 59,400	
In Punjab, Imperial Revenue	-	„ 7,920	
Salt contract	-	„ 7,200	
Grazing tax	-	„ 17,280	
			32,400
		Total Rs.	91,800

5. In the opinion of his Excellency in Council it is worthy of serious consideration whether the additional expenditure now proposed should be made in the Khan's name without a corresponding reduction in the amount of subsidy to be paid to him direct, or if it be inexpedient to reduce the subsidy, whether the payment should not be made to the chief tribes directly in the name of the British Government. His Excellency in Council is anxious to do everything that can reasonably be expected for the purpose of strengthening the hands of the Khan and enabling him to consolidate his authority, but he is unable to sanction any course which would impair the responsibility imposed on the Khan by Treaty, or would countenance the notion that the subsidy is granted for any other purposes than those which the Treaty sets forth.

6. His Excellency in Council will come to no final decision on the question till he is in receipt of the deliberate views of the Bombay Government after weighing the considerations above set forth. While anxious to meet the reasonable wishes or expectations of the Khan, to support his dignity and strengthen his power, his Excellency in Council is of opinion that the question must be decided on broader grounds than such personal considerations.

7. You will perceive that no opinion has been offered by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab on the relations of the Khan with his Nobles; as the Lieutenant-Governor did not consider himself to be sufficiently well informed to be able to understand clearly the position of affairs. On this subject as also on the possibility of extending the usefulness of the Muksoodwah Canal in the interests of the tribes bordering on Sinde, his Excellency in Council still awaits the views of the Bombay Government.

No. 8.

No. 2529, dated Bombay Castle, the 14th June 1871.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

WITH reference to the correspondence noted in the margin, I am directed to forward a minute, dated the 10th February last, by his Excellency the Governor, which expresses the views of this Government regarding Khelat affairs.

Government of India letter (Foreign Department) No. 1194, dated the 26th August 1869, and previous correspondence.
Bombay Government letter No. 548, dated the 17th December 1869, and previous correspondence.

Enclosure in No. 8.

Minute by his Excellency the Governor, dated the 10th February 1871.

THE questions brought to notice by these papers are:

(1.) The policy to be pursued towards the State of Khelat, more especially with reference to the relations of the Khan towards his Sirdars.

(2.) The communication addressed to the Government of India by the Ameer of Cabul with regard to the case of Moolla Mahomed.

(3.) The difference of opinion which has occurred between Sir William Merewether and Colonel Phayre and the correspondence that has taken place between those officers.

2. With regard to the latter, whatever may be the views of the Government as to the policy to be pursued as regards the first two questions, nothing can justify the tone of Colonel Phayre's correspondence.

3. At the time when the command on the frontier was, on the representations of General Jacob, separated from the Sindh Division, the Political Superintendent and Commandant Frontier Field Force was, in his political capacity, distinctly made entirely subordinate to the Commissioner in Sindh, and such he has always remained.

4. Colonel Phayre says that none of his predecessors have been addressed by any former Commissioner as he has been addressed and controlled by Sir William Merewether. This may be so; but the reason is that no former Political Superintendent has attempted to establish a policy of his own in direct opposition to his superior, and in this instance there is the less justification for the course Colonel Phayre has pursued, because he was aware that the views of Sir William Merewether had obtained the distinct sanction and approval of the Government.

5. I most willingly acknowledge Colonel Phayre's zeal and singleness of purpose; but he must be reminded that he is subordinate to the Commissioner in Sindh, and cannot be permitted to act on his own opinion in opposition to the clear instructions of his superior.

6. I have refrained hitherto, from regard to Colonel Phayre, from proposing his removal; but I think it would be for the public interest, if, on a fit opportunity, another appointment were found for Colonel Phayre, and his place in Sindh supplied by the selection of another officer. It would be my duty thus to record my disapproval of Colonel Phayre's proceedings and correspondence, even if, upon a full consideration of the events of the last few years in the Khelat frontier, I had found reason to re-consider the opinions I have heretofore expressed as to the policy which should be pursued with reference to Khelat affairs.

7. I have again read over most carefully the whole of the voluminous papers on the subject, and have minutely considered them; and the result is that I am forced to repeat my concurrence in all points with the views of Sir William Merewether.

8. The Government of India remark on the differences of opinion that exist between the Sindh and Punjab authorities as to the relations between the Khan and his Sirdars, and the policy which should be pursued in reference to them. As regards past events or the present state of affairs, as for instance as regards the disposition and loyalty of the chiefs and the ability of the sovereign to control them, I think the greatest weight must clearly be given to the views of officers such as Sir William Merewether and others who are nearer the scene, who have been for years conversant with political events in Khelat, and have been well acquainted with the principal actors in them.

9. As to questions of policy, it is to be borne in mind that the point of view from which this Government must regard the affairs of Khelat necessarily invests them with a greater importance than that which they are likely to possess in the eyes of others. We

not only look to the importance of maintaining our frontiers in tranquillity, of preventing border raids and tribal feuds, and of establishing secure routes for trade. Such considerations are doubtless of great importance, and are of common interest to our frontier officers as to the officers of the Punjab Government. To us the position of Khelat with regard to Persia and the ability of the Khan to maintain his frontier intact and secure from Persian encroachments is of paramount concern and daily becomes more important. The considerations which would influence our policy in the one case are not necessarily the same as those which may guide us in the other. Having said this it will be convenient to consider the position and antecedents of the various persons who are brought prominently before us in these papers.

10. The Jam of Beyla in the time of General Jacob was described by him as a sovereign prince with an undoubted right to levy any taxes he may think proper in his own territories, but still as feudatory to the Khan of Khelat, to whom he owes allegiance, military service, and some trifling specific dues. He is now a refugee in British territory, and his State is under the administration of the Khan. His present position is the consequence of his defeat by the Khan's troops in October 1869, when he raised the standard of rebellion in concert with the chief of the Mingul tribe. Of this chief Captain Harrison writes that Beyla affairs went on in a peaceful and uninterrupted manner until the present Jam's accession. During the last ten years he has done everything he possibly could to weaken the Khan's government, and to give an idea of the frequency of these occurrences, it is mentioned that the Jam organized three forces against the Khan in twelve months. It may be said that he has for years been at the bottom of every disturbance in Beloochistan, that he was an avowed pretender to the throne, and to secure his objects on every occasion united himself to the declared enemies, foreign or domestic, of his sovereign. Such a man is justly visited with the confiscation of his States and deposition from authority, and he ought not to be permitted to return to Beloochistan.

11. I would say in passing that the reports so industriously disseminated, and which Colonel Phayre seems to have adopted, of the oppression and violence exercised by the Khan's officers and troops in Beyla, appear to be without any foundation. The plunder and violence to which the inhabitants were subject after the flight of the Jam were, it is shown, committed by his own adherents, and at his own instigation, and tranquillity and order seem to have been promptly restored by the Khelat commander.

12. The chief in whose favour Colonel Phayre is most earnest in his representations is Moolla Mahomed. This chief was concerned in the rebellion of 1863, when the Khan was suddenly attacked by the Sirdars in his camp at Gundava and cut down by his cousin Shere Dil Khan, who was then placed on the throne. He next appears as a warm supporter of the Khan, when he was reinstated on the throne in 1864, after the assassination of his cousin, but in March 1865 he made common cause with Taj Mahomed and attempted an insurrection in Kutchee having for its object the assassination of the Khan and placing his infant son on the throne. The insurrection, however, was put down. Moolla Mahomed fled to Candahar, and his estates were confiscated. Of this period, Sir H. Green writes that from the time Taj Mahomed was secured, and that Sirdar Moola Mahomed had fled, the most perfect security reigned throughout Beloochistan.

13. In October 1867 Moolla Mahomed returned from Candahar, with the intention of again creating an insurrection; but being supported only by a few minor chiefs, the attempt was speedily quelled, and he again fled with a few followers to the Murree hills. In December 1868 troubles were again raised by the Jam of Beyla, in which Moolla Mahomed took no part; but a few months afterwards, notwithstanding the advice and instructions of Colonel Phayre, he proceeded with others to Beyla and marched upon Khelat, where a collision was only prevented by the prudence and tact of Captain Harrison. Under the wise guidance of that officer, the Khan offered to restore to the Sirdar his hereditary lands and to forgive the past, with the promise that the lands which had been before granted to him by the Khan himself, but which had been resumed on his rebellion in 1865, should be restored to him upon his continuing to be loyal and well-behaved. The Sirdar, however, refused these temperate conditions, insisted upon the unconditional restoration of all the lands which had been resumed, and ultimately retired to Seebee, from whence, on hearing of the defeat and flight of his former confederate, the Jam, he again fled to the Murree hills.

14. He has since made an appeal, to which I shall presently advert, to the Ameer of Cabul, in which, in derogation of the rights of his own sovereign, he says that Beloochistan has always been subject to Afghanistan, and all rules and regulations for it have always been framed by that kingdom.

15. Of the minor Chiefs, Alla Dina Koord, Adam Khan Bungoolzye, and the Raisanee Chief next in rank to Moolla Mahomed, it is unnecessary to say more than that

they submitted to the authority of the Khan, and were told that they might return to their lands, and they are now enumerated by Captain Harrison among those who are well disposed towards his Highness.

16. Azaad Khan, of Kharan, although his name figures frequently in the history of Khelat affairs, can scarcely be called a dependent of Khelat. His connexion with the State is mainly owing to his being allied by marriage to the late Khan, on the strength of which he entertains pretensions to the Khanate. He may be rather considered, however, as a semi-independent chief, a restless intriguer, who has at one time acknowledged the authority of the Shah, and at another professed himself subordinate to Candahar. He has allied himself with the enemies of the Khan, and must take the consequences of defeat.

17. It is necessary to distinguish only one other Chief, Sirdar Noordeen of Wud, Chief of the Minguls. He appears to have been concerned in every attempt to subvert the authority of the Khan that has occurred since the death of Nusseer Khan. It does not appear to be alleged that he has any particular grievance to complain of, and his disaffection seems to have arisen chiefly from his connexion with the Jam of Beyla. After his defeat in 1868 he fled to Candahar, from which place he does not appear to have yet returned.

18. As regards the remaining Chiefs of Beloochistan, it appears from the report of Captain Harrison that only eight Chiefs, of whom five belong to the Mingul tribe, are found to take part with Moolla Mahomed, while a list is given of 51, including Moolla Mahomed's brother, who are well disposed towards the Khan and submit to his authority.

19. The Khan himself is spoken of, on coming to the throne, as a lad of weak intellect. This appears to have been a hasty judgment, based upon his want of education and his long seclusion in the harem, which no doubt unfitted him on his first accession to power to deal with the turbulent people he had to govern.

20. He is since described by Sir H. Green as being of a capricious and unstable character, and Sir William Merewether speaks of him more than once as an unsatisfactory ruler.

21. It must be observed, however, that he has had the wisdom to select and give his entire confidence to a most able minister, described by Sir William Merewether as one of the most true and honest men in Beloochistan, whose appointment was warmly approved by General Jacob, and of whom Sir H. Green has said that no better selection could have been made.

22. It is recorded of the Khan by Sir H. Green that from the time of his accession to the throne not a single chief of any description has been put to death by his order or by that of any of his people in authority, although few princes have had the provocation he has had to put up with. Accusations have been made against him of having removed his enemies out of his way by assassination; but, apart from the fact that such charges are invariably made under Oriental Governments whenever any one of eminence may happen to die, in the two prominent instances of Taj Mahomed and the attack on Sirdar Dina Koord, subsequent investigation has brought to light nothing to show that the accusation had any foundation. Whatever his other faults may be, the Khan may be considered a temperate ruler, who has shown himself clement in the hour of success and invariably willing and anxious to be guided by our advice. On the whole he may be considered, I think, a favourable specimen of an oriental sovereign, and quite as good as any other with whom we have to deal. It is always possible that he may be led into acts or to the adoption of a policy that might be disapproved or condemned by us, but nothing is so likely to lead to such a result as the manifestation by our chief political authority on the frontier of a ceaseless hostility to his Government and the encouragement of those who have for years been bent on the subversion of his authority.

23. I fail to see in the circumstances now detailed any claim the chiefs named can have for our interference, even if the Khan had treated them with severity, after they had risen in rebellion against him. No doubt the Khan would be stronger if he had the united support of all his feudatories, and it is a proper exercise of our influence to counsel moderation in his dealing with them. Such advice has been given and followed. But Colonel Phayre seems to consider that the chiefs have rights which it is our duty to see maintained, and he quotes from despatches written at various times by General Jacob in support of his views. But the state of affairs in General Jacob's time, or even a few years ago, was very different from what it is now. In truth the change appears to be taking place in Beloochistan of which history gives so many examples in the old world, when feudal relations between a sovereign and his chiefs are, from force of circumstances, from the growing power of the sovereign, from his ability to maintain a regular force,

and in consequence to suppress rebellion, succeeded by a regime in which the power of the sovereign becomes paramount and his feudatories take the diminished rank of powerful subjects. I do not believe it to be our policy to prevent this result. These papers show what the inevitable consequence must be of the continuance of feudal relations among an unruly and armed population.

24. The slightest provocation, personal or political, has been the signal for immediate rebellion. Sir H. Green writes that "while much of the ill-feeling against the Khan is "doubtless caused by his capricious and unstable character, his chiefs, by the unreason-"ableness of their demands and the insolence of their conduct towards him, render any "permanent settlement of their differences most difficult. His power over them is "slight, and although their lands are held by feudal tenure, any attempt made by his "Highness, even to enforce the extradition of a culprit, leads to their banding together "and defying his authority." In more than one instance in these papers we find a chief who has been unsuccessful in his rebellion inviting the interference of a foreign power, the latest example of which may be seen in the case of Moolla Mahomed, who declares all Beloochistan to be subject to the ruler of Cabul, as Azaad Khan had before acknowledged the supremacy at one time of Candahar, at another of Persia.

25. Is this a state of things which we should seek to perpetuate? It appears to be undoubted that not many years ago the principal Chiefs claimed, and perhaps were entitled to, a voice in matters affecting the general state. It would, perhaps, be advantageous if the relations between the Khan and Sirdars were such that he applied to them for their advice in matters of grave importance, but that is a very different thing from our recognising and attempting to enforce a claim to share in the administration. I believe that nothing is more embarrassing than that we should thus tie ourselves down to one unvarying principle of action in cases such as this. The circumstances of the people with whom we have to deal are changing every day, and our relations change too, and it is the height of unwisdom to stereotype our policy with reference to them. We have numerous examples of this. In past times we have entered into guarantees in many instances that rights then existing should be preserved, and thus we find ourselves now bound to maintain a state of things inconsistent with the altered conditions of the country, and which, if we had now to consider our position, we should never dream of establishing. Our guarantees in Kutch and Katteewar are instances of this, are sources of embarrassment now, and are not unlikely to be still more embarrassing hereafter.

26. With reference to the Khelat nobles, Colonel Phayre does not claim that they have an actual guarantee from us, but he deals with the question as if they virtually were entitled to one. In my opinion we must accept the state of affairs which is being gradually developed in Beloochistan, and while I would not ignore and put out of consideration the ancient relations that existed in former times between the Khan and his nobles, because they undoubtedly must colour and influence to a certain extent popular feeling among the tribes, I believe that to refer to those relations as establishing what Colonel Phayre calls constitutional rights would be retrogressive and impolitic.

27. I believe that while our Agent should be instructed to lose no opportunity of counselling moderation and conciliation, and earnestly and urgently impressing on the Khan the importance of such a policy, we should allow events to take their course and the solution which appears impending to be accomplished, which will consolidate the power of the Khan and establish his supremacy. Twenty years ago our policy might have been different, but twenty years have changed the relations of parties, as well as the external relations of the Khelat State.

28. I must not, however, be understood to speak confidently of the result of the Khan's policy towards his feudatories. Any interference from outside (such as Colonel Phayre's if persisted in), the appearance on the scene of some man of marked force of character, or some unexpected event may alter the aspect of affairs. In anticipating the establishment of the Khan's supremacy on a firmer basis, I speak only of what appears probable and what it is not our interest to prevent.

29. The policy therefore to be pursued seems to be that recommended by Sir W. Merewether and already approved by this Government, to acknowledge no authority but that of the Khan, to recognise the chiefs in no other capacity than his subjects, to abstain from all interference otherwise than by counselling forbearance and consideration, and to refrain from any recognition of feudal rights, which it is neither for our advantage nor the advantage of the country to perpetuate.

30. As regards the arrangements which should be entered into with regard to the Chiefs of the Murrees, we have already on more than one occasion expressed our views to the Government of India. To those views I still adhere, and would only add that I think it essential that all our communications with the tribes should be made by one

officer, and looking to the importance of the political relations of this Government with Khelat, that officer should be, in my opinion, our Political Superintendent at Jacobabad.

31. All payments should be made in the Khan's name by his agent in the presence of a British officer.

32. It remains only to consider the reply which should be given to the Ameer of Cabul. It should be clear and unmistakeable that we recognise the Khan of Khelat as an independent sovereign with whom we have treaties of alliance, but with whose proceedings we do not desire to interfere beyond giving him friendly advice; that we should always counsel clemency and moderation in his dealings with his chiefs; but that in the case of Moolla Mahomed, who had been engaged in repeated rebellions against his sovereign and had refused to accept the moderate terms on which pardon for his past offences and restoration of his hereditary property was offered, we see no reason to disapprove of the Khan's conduct. Finally, that we do not doubt that on these grounds the Ameer will concur with us in discountenancing appeals which, if entertained, could only lead to complications with a state which, though small, we desire to uphold, and to whose independence the British Government attaches much importance.

(Signed) W. R. S. V. FITZGERALD.

P.S.—Since writing this memorandum I have had an opportunity of seeing Sir H. Green. I gather from him that on one point to which I omitted to refer, viz., the possible embarrassment that might arise to us from the entertainment by the Khan of the small body of half-disciplined troops referred to by Colonel Phayre, he entirely differs from the views of that officer. They could never, in his opinion, be or become an embarrassment to us, much less formidable. They are of service to the Khan as against those who have no troops with the slightest discipline whatever, but against any British Indian force they are not worth thinking of.

No. 9.

No. 2813, dated Bombay Castle, the 28th June 1871.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. LePoer Wynne's letter, No. 1,180 P., dated the 8th instant, and in reply to refer the Government of India to the letter from this Office, No. 2529, of the 14th idem, which conveys the opinion of this Government on the representations of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Khan of Khelat (*vide* paragraph 32 of his Excellency the Governor's minute).

No. 10.

No. 3167, dated Bombay Castle, the 15th July 1871.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I AM directed by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 24th February last, No. 412 P., forwarding a copy of a letter from the Secretary to the Government for the Punjab, containing a full report of the conference lately held between the Lieutenant-Governor and the Commissioner in Sindh, in accordance with the instructions conveyed in your letter, No. 2123 P., dated 6th December 1870.

2. The Government of India have requested the opinion of this Government on two proposals made at the conference regarding the management of the Murree and Boogtee tribes, viz., first, that the Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan should be placed, as regards the management of the Murree and Boogtee tribes, under the orders of the Political Superintendent of the Sindh frontier. It is observed that his Excellency the Viceroy in Council is prepared to sanction this proposal; and I am directed to state that the Right Honourable the Governor in Council entirely concurs* as to the propriety of the proposed arrangement.

* *Vide* paragraphs 10 and 11 of Bombay Government Resolution, No. 1712 of 3rd June 1870.

3. The second proposal is that, in addition to the sums now spent in entertaining levies of the Murree and Boogee tribes, a further sum of Rs. 32,040 be given for additional levies to be entertained and paid in the name of the Khan of Khelat by the Political Superintendent of Upper Sindh.

4. Besides the financial objections to so large an increase of expenditure the Government of India have noted several points for consideration, namely (*a*) whether a corresponding reduction should not be made in the Khan's subsidy; (*b*) whether if the Khan's subsidy be not reduced it would not be expedient to pay the tribes directly in the name of the British Government; (*c*) whether the proposal may not impair the responsibility imposed on the Khan by treaty; and (*d*) whether it would not countenance the notion that the Khan's subsidy is granted for any other purposes than those which the treaty sets forth.

4. After weighing the considerations noticed by the Government of India, his Excellency in Council is of opinion that the subsidy granted to the Khan under the Treaty of 1854 should not be reduced. The ground for withholding the subsidy would be if the Khan had not (*vide* Article VII.) "faithfully performed" the conditions of the treaty. But the local authorities report that he has done his best to keep these tribes in order. The task is beyond his power, and as he has apparently done all he can reasonably be expected to do towards fulfilling the conditions of the treaty, it would hardly be fair to inflict upon him the penalty. It would also not be expedient to adopt a measure which would weaken his power for good, while it would no doubt tend to impair the friendly feeling which now exists.

6. With regard to the point (*b*), his Excellency in Council has already expressed his opinion that the payments of these tribes, which have been hitherto regarded as Khelat subjects, should be made in the name of the Khan. The services for which they are entertained are almost entirely to be performed in Khelat territory. And while, on the one hand, no special advantage to Government appears to be derivable from direct payments, on the other hand, the authority of the Khan will be consolidated if these tribes are practically taught to look to him as their lawful sovereign. Direct payments would tend to reverse the policy, which has been acted on for many years, under which these tribes have been regarded as the Khan's subjects.

7. His Excellency in Council does not anticipate any practical inconvenience on account of the matters noticed in points (*c*) and (*d*). But, if necessary, the Khan could be formally addressed on the subject, so that no possibility of future misapprehension should exist.

8. With reference, however, to the remarks contained in paragraph 3 of the letter now under reply, to the effect that the local authorities appear to entertain the idea that the subsidy of Rs. 50,000 was intended as compensation to the Khan for loss of revenue sustained by the tariff of 1854, it is to be observed that in the report of the conference (paragraph 9) it is distinctly recognised that the Khan is by treaty bound not only to reduce the tariff, but also to protect the trade routes, and prevent plundering. The same principle is laid down in paragraph 46 of Sir William Merewether's letter, No. 52, of 26th January 1870.* The local authorities do not apparently deny the liability of the Khan to prevent outrages. But they point out (*vide* paragraph 15 of the conference report) that the subsidy does not more than cover the loss caused by the reduction in the tariff; so that the position of the Khan as to ability to control the tribes is not materially improved by the existing treaty.

* Copy forwarded to the Government of India with Bombay Government letter, No. 249, dated the 16th July 1870.

9. With regard to the financial aspect of the case, this Government were disposed to think that a smaller outlay than that now proposed might have been sufficient, especially at the beginning. But as the matter has been fully discussed at the conference by the officers best acquainted with the details of the subject, his Excellency in Council will not propose that the amount shall be reduced. The possible reduction of expenditure in future years should, however, not be lost sight of; and the Political Agent at Khelat should report from time to time what measures have been taken to induce the Murrees and Boogtees to settle to peaceful occupations in Khelat territory.

10. The special report from the Commissioner in Sindh, regarding the Muksoodwah canal is awaited, and will be forwarded on receipt to the Government of India.

No. 11.

No. 3969, dated Bombay Castle, the 24th August 1871.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I AM directed to forward herewith, for submission to the Government of India, copy of correspondence from the Political Superintendent, Upper Sindh frontier, regarding the state of affairs at Khelat, received under endorsement from the Commissioner in Sindh.

Enclosure 1 in No. 11.

No. 682, dated Camp Murree, the 12th July 1871.

From Captain R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazee Khan, to the Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sindh.

HEARING of the very serious raids that have lately been made by the Murree clan into Kutchee in Khelat, and Kurrum Khan, the Chief of the Bijaranee Murrees being with me here in camp just after the late one, in which it is said 45 men were killed and 1,600 head of cattle carried off, I took the opportunity of ascertaining how it was that he and his section of the tribe took such a prominent part against his Highness the Khan. As his replies to my questions put to him in general conversation may prove of value, I have the honour to submit them for your information.

2. Kurrum Khan declares the principal reason is because the Khan has quarrelled with his chief subjects, the Brahooees, which has weakened his power; that the Murrees knowing this, and having also their own cause of complaint against him still unsettled, that they take the only means they know of to show their resentment. Were it not for these causes, he considered, as far as I could discover from our conversation, that the Murrees would be powerless to raid into the Kutchee did his Highness desire to prevent it.

3. When I say "did his Highness desire to prevent it," I do not write so without well having considered the meaning of the words, for this expression was prominently brought to my notice by Kurrum Khan using it repeatedly. I desired him to explain his meaning. He replied, "The Khan does not desire to quarrel with us outright; for now that he is at enmity with the Brahooees, he may have to come to us for aid any day."

4. I grant you that the position is a difficult one to understand; but as the intricacies of the hill politics are well known to you, I have thought it worth while to place the above particulars before you for your information.

No. 1162, dated Jacobabad, the 22nd July 1871.

Memorandum by Colonel R. Phayre, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sindh Frontier.

COPY submitted to the Commissioner in Sindh for information with reference to Political Superintendent's report, No. 1107, dated 13th instant.

2. This report is spontaneous on Captain Sandeman's part, but it confirms what the Political Superintendent had himself recently heard respecting the Khan's unpopularity in Kutchee after his recent long visit there.

3. Nawab Mahomed Khan was, however, mentioned as the main cause of it; all in consequence of his illiberality towards the people. The Khan's own avarice has, however, been the subject of general comment, and many stories about it are flying about the country, which, as is usual in such cases, are no doubt exaggerated. This trait in the Khan's character is well known, and would not have been referred to now had not the cause of recent excesses in Kutchee been touched upon by Captain Sandeman.

Enclosure 2 in No. 11.

Dated Kurrachee, the — August 1871.

From Colonel W. L. Merewether, Commissioner in Sindh, to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sindh Frontier.

In acknowledging the receipt of Captain Sandeman's letter, No. 682, of the 12th July, forwarded under your endorsement, No. 1162, of the 22nd idem, and your remarks on the subject of Captain Sandeman's letter, I have the honour to inform you that the conduct of Kurrum Khan, the chief of the Bijaranee Murrees, in openly vaunting the attacks by members of a portion of the Murree tribe, will be taken into consideration on receipt of the orders of the Government of India on the conference held in February last at Mittunkote, and which may shortly be expected. At the same time I have to request that you will cause it to be intimated to the Murree chief, Kurrum Khan, Bijaranee, that his openly boasting of deliberate opposition of his clan to the sovereign of the country is viewed with strong disapprobation, and, unless discontinued, as well as the outrageous acts of the clan, will infallibly cause the withdrawal from him and them of the favour and countenance of the British authorities.

2. It would have been more correct and more in accordance with the relations existing between the British Government and his Highness the Khan of Khelat, if Captain Sandeman had at the time remarked as above to Kurrum Khan; for it must be remembered that whatever grievances the Murree tribe may fancy they have, they are the subjects of his Highness the Khan; and it is not in accordance with the policy which has been approved by Government, nor is it just to a ruler with whom we are in alliance, that openly proclaimed opposition to that ruler's power, and the declaration of premeditated outrages within his dominions, should be heard by British authorities without immediate expression of marked disapprobation.

3. Unfortunately Beloochistan has for a long time been disturbed by internal dissensions, and it is only very recently that his Highness the Khan has been able to assert his authority in a more complete manner than in the earlier part of his reign. It therefore behoves all officers on the frontier having communication with subjects of the Khan to use their best endeavour to support him in the restoration of order, and the establishment of a firm and well-constituted government. I need hardly point out to you both that the first essential to this latter is, that the subjects of that government should show a proper sense of respect for, and obedience to, the orders of the ruler, to which action such as that of Kurrum Khan is most directly opposed.

4. I am well assured that the non-notice of Beejar Khan's want of respect towards the Khan, and of the misconduct of the clan members, was an oversight on Captain Sandeman's part; and that after being placed in possession of the above remarks that I may confidently trust to his ready co-operation in so important a matter; I have therefore to request that you will communicate to him copies of these four paragraphs.

5. With regard to the second and third paragraphs of your endorsement, I would observe that when a ruler is restoring peace and order in his country, where hitherto there has been anarchy and confusion, there will necessarily be reports of his having done some unpopular acts; but the greatest care should be taken how these are received, and every endeavour should be made to cause the speakers to recollect that it is their head they are declaiming against, and that their showing discontent only renders his position more difficult, their claims less easy of adjustment, and the restoration of desired quiet more distant. A true and respectful submission of any just claims they may have will assuredly receive due attention from his Highness the Khan; but it as likely as not, considering the state of affairs that has hitherto existed in Kutchee, that claims have been advanced to which there is no valid title, and only careful investigation can prove how far they are just. With this, however, we have nothing directly to do, and I only mention it here to show how necessary it is on the part of our officers to be very careful not to give encouragement to discontent by appearing to receive and attach weight to complaints, the truth or otherwise of which we have no right to inquire into.

6. In respect to Nawab Mahomed Khan, he is his Highness's representative at Jacobabad, and if any specific charges can be brought against him, showing that by his misconduct he is endangering the peace of the frontier, it may then be a question whether the subject should not be laid before Government with a view to his Highness the Khan being addressed as to the propriety of removing him and appointing a more suitable person. But something more than mere rumour will be required before such a course should be adopted.

No. 12.

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

No. 2248 P., dated Simla, the 19th October 1871. READ—The under-mentioned correspondence relative to the future management of the Murree and Boogtee tribes, and the position of the Khan of Khelat and his relations to his Sirdars.

Proceedings, Political A, May 1871, N. 193–196.

From Government of Bombay, dated 14th June 1871, No. 2529.

From Government of Bombay, dated 15th July 1871, No. 3167.

RESOLUTION.—As regards the future management of the above-named tribes, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and the Commissioner in Sind, at a conference held in the early part of the present year, made two distinct proposals, viz. :—

1st.—That the control of the relations of Government with those tribes should be placed in the hands of the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, and that the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan, in respect of the said tribes, should be placed under the Political Superintendent, and not under the Commissioner of Derajat, who will be relieved of all responsibility, so far as those relations are concerned. The Viceroy and Governor General in Council entirely approves of this proposal and authorises its being carried into effect.

2ndly.—It was proposed to grant an additional sum of Rs. 32,040 a year for the entertainment of certain horsemen of the Murree and Boogtee tribes for purposes of protection. As to the mode of paying this amount three distinct proposals have been made (*a*) that it should be paid to the Khan of Khelat; (*b*) that if additional sums are considered necessary for preserving the peace of the frontier, they should be paid to the chiefs in the name of the British Government; and (*c*) that the amount should be handed over to the chiefs in the name of the Khan, and that it should be considered an addition to the subsidy of rs. 50,000 a year, at present paid to the Khan. The last course is that which commends itself to his Excellency in Council, and it will accordingly be recommended to the Financial Department for sanction.

2. But looking to the large sums that are yearly paid for securing the peace of the frontier, and for the protection of trade, and to the small results obtained for this outlay, his Excellency in Council is clearly of opinion that, for the present, this additional amount of Rs. 32,040 shall only be granted for one year, and on the distinct understanding that the whole question, connected as it is with the administration of the Sind and Punjab Frontier, may be taken up shortly and discussed in all its bearings.

3. As regards the relations of the Khan of Khelat with his nobles, the Governor General in Council concurs generally in the views expressed by his Excellency the Governor of Bombay in his minute dated the 10th February last, paragraphs 8 to 29. The Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, and the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan should shape their attitude to the subjects of the Khan accordingly.

As regards the petition of Moolla Mahomed, his Excellency in Council considers that after the lapse of this interval of time it is not needful to make any communication regarding it to the Ameer of Cabul.

ORDER.—Ordered, that a copy of this resolution and the papers read, in original, be forwarded to the Financial Department for the purpose indicated in paragraphs 2 and 3.

(True extract.)

(Signed) C. U. AITCHISON,
Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 13.

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Government of India in the Financial Department.

No. 4603, dated Simla, the 21st October 1871. READ—Extract from Proceedings in the Foreign Department, No. 2248 P. of the 19th instant, recommending the grant for one year only of an additional sum of Rs. 32,040 for the entertainment of certain Murree and Boogtee levies for the purpose of protecting the Punjab and Sind frontier, in addition to the subsidy of Rs. 50,000 a year at present paid to the Khan of Khelat, the amount to be handed over to the Chief in the name of the Khan.

RESOLUTION.—Sanctioned for one year, on the distinct understanding that the whole question of this grant, connected as it is with the administration of the Sind and Punjab frontier, shall be taken up shortly and discussed in all its bearings.

ORDER.—Ordered that a copy of the foregoing Resolution be forwarded to the Foreign Department, and that the original papers received from that Department be returned.

Ordered, also, that a copy of the Resolution be sent to the Accountant General, Bombay, for guidance.

(True extract.)

(Signed) R. H. HOLLINGBERY,
Assistant Secretary to the Government of India,
Financial Department.

No. 14.

No. 2336 P., dated Simla, the 27th October 1871.

From C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department.

IN forwarding, for the information of the Government of Bombay, a copy of the Resolutions noted in the margin, I am directed, with reference to recent events in Khelat, to request that his Excellency the Governor of Bombay in Council, before giving effect to the measures now provisionally sanctioned, will take into consideration the expediency or inexpediency of at present making payments to the Murree and Boogtee tribes. If his Excellency in Council decides that the disbursements to the Murree and Boogtee tribes can now be properly made, his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council hopes that the payments will be so arranged that, on the one hand, the British Government will not be committed to taking any part in the struggle now going on in Khelat, and, on the other hand, that the money will not be used to assist any of the Khan's subjects in their rebellion.

Resolution to Financial Department, No. 2248 P., dated 19th October 1871.
Resolution from Financial Department, No. 4603, dated 21st October 1871.

2. I am to request that a general report on the question referred to in paragraph 3 of the Foreign Department resolution of 19th of October, may be submitted within a year from this date.

No. 15.

Government of India. Foreign Department. Political. No. 185.

To His Grace the Duke of Argyll, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE, Dated Simla, the 31st October 1871.

WE have the honour to forward for the information of Her Majesty's Government a copy of documents* relative to Khelat affairs, and showing the measures that we have sanctioned for the better management of the tribes on the Sinde and Punjab frontiers. With regard to the lamentable insurrectionary movement in Khelat, we have asked the Commissioner in Sinde whether, in his opinion, it is so serious as to endanger the rule of the Khan. On receipt of his reply we purpose to address your Grace again.

We have, &c.

(Signed) MAYO.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
R. TEMPLE.
&c. &c.

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* Nos. 1 to 14.

No. 16.

No. 5286, dated Bombay Castle, 31st October 1871.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to Government, Bombay, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, with Governor General.

I AM directed to forward to you, for submission to the Government of India, the enclosed copies of papers, as per margin, from the Commissioner in Sind, relative to the disturbances in Mustoong and Quettah, in Khelat territory.

Letter from Commissioner in Sind, No. 647, dated the 16th October 1871, with accompaniments.

Enclosure 1 in No. 16.

No. 647, dated Kurrachee, 16th October 1871.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to his Excellency the Right Honourable Sir W. R. Seymour V. FitzGerald, G.C.S.I., Governor and President in Council in Bombay.

IN reference to my telegrams of the 12th instant and to-day, I have the honour to forward herewith copies of reports from Colonel Phayre, Political Superintendent on the frontier, and of Captain Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, with translation of a vernacular letter submitted also by the former.

2. The fact of his Highness the Khan having deputed his Wuzeer, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, with only 200 sowars, leads me to conclude that he does not consider the outbreak of any great importance, and that Captain Harrison's anticipations will prove correct. Two of the sirdars mentioned, Jehangeer Lehree and Moobaruk Khan Sawanee, are members of two of the leading tribes in Sarawan, and therefore of some influence; but unless they are joined by the majority of their clans, which is not mentioned, their proceedings will not have much weight, and the prompt action of the Khan will probably bring the matter to a speedy and favourable issue. The difficulty, however, will be increased should Moolla Mahomed Raisanee appear on the scene from Afghanistan, as is thought likely by the people who wrote from Mustoong.

3. Such disturbances as those now reported will for some time to come be liable to recur, but if quickly met and crushed in the outset by means of the increasing power of his Highness the Khan, it is to be hoped they will happen at longer intervals each time. It is a matter of satisfaction to note that, with the exception of some petty disturbances in Lus Beyla, and an occasional foray by the Murrees into Kutchee, the peace in Beloochistan has been well maintained for the last two years.

4. The Moondahee Murrees being in deliberate opposition to the Khan, it is natural that they should receive all fugitive rebellious Sirdars, such as Alladina Khoord, and that the latter should resort to the Murree Hills when it suits his purpose. But I do not consider that his going there is likely to cause any particular additional difficulty, because the utmost the Murrees would attempt would be raids on Kutchee, which they carry on as it is, and I do not concur in the opinion of Colonel Phayre as to the existence of the feeling mentioned in his sixth paragraph. The majority of the people are, I think, getting wearied of the selfish attempts of these Brahooee Sirdars to excite disturbances, and are becoming less and less inclined to sympathise with them.

5. Our disapproval of such disturbances should on all occasions be clearly and pointedly expressed, and to this I have called Colonel Phayre's attention.

6. I quite agree with Colonel Phayre in what he says in his third paragraph, with regard to the proceedings of the Dhoombkees at Lehree, and have requested him to take an early opportunity of conveying to the Chief of the Dhoombkees the certain disapprobation with which such acts will always be viewed. They only tend to keep up the hostility existing between the tribes of the plain and those of the hills, and provoke reprisals which the former are not from the circumstances always in a position to meet successfully. The course pointed out by Colonel Phayre of acting solely on the defensive and in an energetic way is the one they should alone be encouraged to adopt.

7. The proposals in paragraphs 7 and 8 of Colonel Phayre's letter have already been approved by me by telegram and again by letter. It will have the effect of calming any excitement that may exist and induce the Murrees to be careful how they enter the plains, while there will be no risk of our being involved in any circumstances affecting the general political aspect of affairs in Beloochistan.

Enclosure 2 in No. 16.

No. 1782, dated Jacobabad, 12th October 1871.

From Colonel R. Phayre, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, C.B. and K.C.S.I., Commissioner in Sind.

IN continuation to my telegram of this date, I have the honour herewith to forward report No. 73 of 1871 dated 5th October, received this day from the Political Agent, Khelat. I also attach copy of a vernacular letter brought for my perusal this morning by his Highness the Khan's vakeel at Jacobabad.

Vernacular letter from certain inhabitants of Mustoong to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

2. In my letter No. 1746, dated 5th instant, to your address, I made a mistake in saying that about 100 Dhoombkees had gone to *join* the Murrees from Lehree. It appears that they went to plunder the Murrees in retaliation for raids recently committed by that tribe near Lehree, but as some of the Dhoombkees had not long ago declared that they would either join the Murrees or come into these districts if not protected, I concluded that they had carried their intention of joining the Murrees into execution.

4. It is foolish in them to attempt to retaliate by going into the hills to plunder because the Murrees are far too powerful for them there, but if they showed a good defence in the plains they would have a fair chance unless against overwhelming numbers.

4. As matters now stand the vakeel informed me to-day that the report is current through the country that the rebel Brahooees referred to in Captain Harrison's letter have plundered both Mustoong and Quetta.

5. The immediate cause of the outbreak was connected, it is believed, with the alleged severe treatment of a popular Syud near Moostoong, named Alee Mahomed, who held office under Sheredil Khan, the usurper of the throne of Khelat, a few years ago, but Captain Harrison's next report will clear up this point. I believe, however, that the flight of Sirdar Alladina Khoord to the Murrees with his whole family just before the news of this outbreak transpired indicates that it had been previously planned, though perhaps it took place sooner than was intended.

6. The Moondahee Murrees always sympathize with these Brahooee Sirdars, as indeed the whole border do more or less, and I have felt for some time past that the feeling in their favour would probably find expression sooner or later in something of the kind that has now taken place.

7. At present a good deal of excitement prevails in Kutchee, and if I am permitted to detach a regiment of cavalry to patrol along the border of Eastern Kutchee to Lehree and Bagh, it will, I hope, hold the Murrees in check, and reassure the people of that province, who are in a great fright, and would probably fly into these districts unless supported in the way suggested.

8. Should a regiment go they would not, of course, only patrol in the plains, but protect the people and country by attacking any body of hill marauders they might come across there.

Enclosure 3 in No. 16.

No. 73, dated Khelat, 5th October 1871.

From Captain C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to Colonel R. Phayre, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

I HAVE the honour to report for your information, and that of higher authority, that disturbances have occurred in Mustoong and Quetta, but to what extent has not been ascertained.

2. His Highness the Khan received intelligence a day or two ago from Candahar that certain Brahoocees had combined to assassinate him, and that some of his sepoys were implicated.

3. Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed proceeds at once with 200 sowars to the scene of disturbance.

4. I do not anticipate any serious result, but will keep you informed of what is going on.

Enclosure 4 in No. 16.

From Moolla Mowladad, Sultan Mahomed, and Mahomed Saleh, to (no name is mentioned in the letter, but titles are as if to his Highness the Khan, apparently written from Mustoong).

THAT Brahooees, Jehangeer Khan Lehree, Wussund Khan, Mahomed Shahee, and Mahomed Syud Khan Soondra, have this day (Wednesday) at 12 A.M., taken possession of Mustoong and seized the Government officer, Nubbee Buksh. We have heard that Moobaruk Khan Shahwani has proceeded to Shaul and will take it this day. We would have brought this to your notice had we been informed of this before. It is only now that we came to know this suddenly. We therefore beg to state that we shall come over there if you order us to do so, or if you send your sowars to this place we shall join them.

It is given out here that Moolla Mahomed, who has heard of the Brahooees' proceedings, will also come.

You are aware that we have our families here. We have no other means than to make ourselves useful to Government. We therefore beg to wait for your instructions in the matter.

If we had received the news mentioned above earlier we would have shed our blood at the doors of Mustoong as in honour bound.

We have written this letter in short through haste and hope to be excused. We know this much about the Government official, but no more.

Enclosure 5 in No. 16.

No. 74, dated Khelat, 6th October 1871.

From Captain C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to Colonel R. Phayre, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

WITH reference to my letter of yesterday's date, No. 73, I have the honour to report that as yet no reliable information has been received. It is, however, generally understood that the disturbance has originated through intrigues on the part of Sirdars Moolla Mahomed Raisanee and Noordeen Mingul, and that these chiefs have either arrived or are en route from Candahar. The latter chief, it is said, intends proceeding to Kharan and Nul. Should this be true, I imagine his object will be to create a disturbance in Lus Beyla on Sirdar Meer Khan's behalf.

2. Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed will be at Mustoong to-morrow, and a correct report of this disturbance may be expected on the 8th instant.

Enclosure 6 in No. 16.

No. 76, dated Khelat, 8th October 1871.

From Captain C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to Colonel R. Phayre, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

IN continuation of former correspondence, I have the honour to report that there is every prospect of the disturbance in Mustoong being speedily quelled. Reports received this morning are to the effect that the Shahgassee had dislodged the opposing party from the water at Gooroo, and that half of the Shawani tribe had returned to their allegiance.

2. Sirdar Jehangeer Lehree and Syud Ali Mahomed, of Mustoong, with others, wished to reopen the disputes of 1869, and sent special messengers to Sirdars Moolla Mahomed, Noordeen, Azaad Khan, and their adherents in Beylah, inviting them to join in this rebellion. His Highness' promptitude will, I believe, thwart the intention of creating a general disturbance in this country.

No. 17.

No. 6000, dated Bombay Castle, 12th December 1871.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter, No. 5286, dated the 31st October last, I am directed to forward to you, for submission to the Government of India, the accompanying copies of further papers, as per margin, from the Commissioner in Sindh, relative to the disturbances at Mustoong and Quetta in Beloochistan.

1. Letter from Commissioner in Sindh, No. 684, dated 24th October 1871, with enclosures.
2. Memorandum from " " 727, " 9th November 1871 "
3. " " " 769, " 2nd " "

Enclosure 1 in No. 17.

No. 684, dated Kurrachee, 24th October 1871.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to his Excellency the Right Honourable Sir W. R. Seymour V. Fitzgerald, G.C.S.I., Governor and President in Council, Bombay.

I have the honour to forward copy of a letter from Colonel Phayre, Political Superintendent, Upper Sindh frontier, No. 1867, dated 19th instant, with accompaniments, and to add the following observations thereon:

2. The first part of the letter would seem to be intended to show that Captain Harrison, the Political Agent at Khelat, had failed to give a sufficiently disastrous account of the result of the commencement of the late disturbances in Northern Beloochistan, but I do not see that this idea is borne out by this correspondence or by what was previously received.

3. Captain Harrison, in his letter, No. 77, of the 10th instant, states that the disturbances at Mustoong had been quelled, "not, however, without a most obstinate resistance "in the open country situated between Kud and Mustoong," and that this "only "terminated when three out of the four ringleaders had fallen." He also mentions the loss on the Shahgassee's side to have included two Sirdars and two officers of the Khan's regular army. The excellent Wuzeer, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, always foremost in his master's cause, was wounded. It appears that the Shahgassee had with him some 200 infantry and two guns, in addition to the 200 sowars before mentioned; also that he was joined by some irregulars, a proportion from Mustoong. A severe fight took place, ending in the Shahgassee obtaining possession of Mustoong, which had been occupied by the rebels. Quetta had been promptly secured by the Khan's Naib there before the rebels could reach it.

4. Captain Harrison does not enter into details, because he either thought it unnecessary, the facts he gave being sufficient to denote the severity of the struggle, or, what is more likely, he was not in possession of any detailed official report, and did not think it advisable to give merely local reports. The native officer's letter quoted by Colonel Phayre affords details, but they could only be what he picked up from hearsay, and may or may not be correct.

5. I have now to notice the tenor of Colonel Phayre's remarks in his seventh to fifteenth paragraphs inclusive, and regret exceedingly to have to draw your Excellency's attention to the very dangerous attitude he still assumes in his persistent adherence to the wrong views he has for the last two years entertained with regard to the policy that should be followed in connexion with the Khelat State. In spite of the clear exposition of the principles which should be followed in our relations with Khelat, as set forth in your Excellency's minute of the 10th February last, copy of which was furnished by me to Colonel Phayre, that officer still adheres to the idea that the chiefs of Beloochistan are systematically oppressed by the Khan; that the latter is universally regarded with extreme disfavour by his chiefs and subjects; and that it is desirable that the interference of the British Government should be exerted in behalf of the chiefs, and pressure brought to bear on the Khan to make him carry out Colonel Phayre's ideas.

6. I need not enlarge on the extreme danger which must follow the entertainment of such views as those held by Colonel Phayre at the present time, much more so of course than any other. It is utterly impossible that his opinions should not be widely known, where all actions or expressions of authorities are so closely watched, as is always the case on a

frontier, and have the worst possible effect on the tribes adjacent to the border, as well as on the general community of a state so constituted as that of Beloochistan. Colonel Phayre's telegrams of yesterday, which I had the honour to forward, stated that "the "Jumallies (who resided at Rojan, and near Khyree Gunee, close to Jacobabad) and "other Belooch of the Khan's territory on this border have refused to go against them" (the rebels). I cannot help feeling that this is the effect of the above mentioned, and that had a different course been followed by the chief authority on the frontier than he has systematically adhered to, that the Belooch tribes near us would have been the first to rally round their sovereign when danger threatened.

7. The regiment of Sind horse being sent across the Kutchee was a move in the right direction; but it was scarcely sufficient to do away with the ill effects of the supposition that the British authorities on the spot were adverse to the maintenance of the Khan's power.

8. It is difficult to understand clearly what Colonel Phayre would wish the Khan to do. In former correspondence he complained of the Khan never leaving his citadel (Khelat), and now that he has spent a whole cold weather in Kutchee, and been absent from his capital for eleven months, he discovers apparent reason for blame in the Khan's proceedings on this tour.

9. When a district has not been visited by the ruler for some time, and tenures and supposed rights have to be inquired into, it would naturally follow that all should not be contented with decisions passed. But I hold that even the slightest attention to any expressions of discontent should be most carefully avoided, indeed, promptly discouraged, as matters with which we have no concern, and which should only be considered by the king of the country, to whom his subjects should be enjoined solely to look.

10. That Beloochistan will be liable to a recurrence of disturbances as long as the fugitive rebel Sirdars are at liberty to incite them may be reasonably expected, but the frequency and duration of such will certainly depend very greatly on the manner in which they are regarded by the authorities of the power which immediately adjoins that state. It therefore becomes all the more necessary that such disturbances should only meet with immediate and marked disapprobation, and the chiefs and people of Beloochistan be led to understand that breaches of the peace in their country will never receive the slightest countenance from the British Government.

11. I regret exceedingly to have to point out that all Colonel Phayre's proposals are exactly contrary to the above principles, and, as I before remarked, from it being impossible that his views should not be well and widely known, his entertaining such must tend to bring about the most undesirable results, and fail to produce that peace and prosperity which it is the chief object to secure for Beloochistan.

12. Colonel Phayre invariably brings forward everything that he hears in disparagement of the Khan of Khelat, and as this will all be obtained from native sources, the very fact of his accepting it must have a most injurious effect. On the other hand, with him, the rebel chiefs and discontented subjects are at once assumed to be persecuted and trampled on.

13. I am at a loss to understand how Colonel Phayre can write in his ninth paragraph that the disturbances were "not originated on this occasion by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed or Noordeen," when it had been distinctly stated by Captain Harrison in one of his former letters that it was "generally understood that the disturbance has originated "through intrigues on the part of Sirdars Moolla Mahomed Raisanee and Noordeen "Mingul; and again in his letter, No. 78, of the 10th instant, he reports "that his "Highness has received information from Candahar that Sirdars Moolla Mahomed "Raisanee and Noordeen Mingul had been in communication with Sirdar Jehangeer "Lehree, one of the principal leaders who was killed, and Syud Ali Mahomed, and "that they contemplated returning to their country as soon as they had communi-"cated their intention to his Highness the Ameer." All previous history of the country would at once lead to the conclusion that these fugitive chiefs would be certain to be engaged, especially as the outbreak commenced in the district of Sarawan, of which Moolla Mahomed was formerly the head, and where it would be naturally supposed there would be best prospects of success. Colonel Phayre, however, ignores Captain Harrison's official reports, and is not guided by previous events, but, as suitable to his own preconceived ideas, considers that the outbreak was originated "by other chiefs, "who no doubt have given expression to the feeling which I have been informed now "pervades a large part of the Brahooee nation, viz., that it is better to die than any "longer submit to acts of oppression and injustice worse than death." The above is simple hearsay and assumption, while the latter part might easily be the hasty expression of some discontented person or section, which, however, should not be lightly accepted or have any weight attached to it.

14. The latest intelligence submitted by Colonel Phayre is from Bagh, and needs confirmation, the alarm of the people there leading them to imagine an immediate approach of the rebels. The report is, the latter are plundering at the foot of the Bolan. It is possible some may have come down the Bolan, but, if they have any fixed plan and are still in any collected force, it would be more likely that they would remain above the pass until joined by Mod[illegible]a Mahomed.

15. In reference then to what is above stated, and the attitude Colonel Phayre persists in assuming, so fraught with danger to the peace and quiet of the country next to our border, and so contrary to what is clearly the only proper policy to hold by, I would most earnestly request that an authoritative decision as to the course to be followed may be speedily come to and communicated to me as early as possible, otherwise the difficulties in the suppression of this revolution by the Khan will be very largely increased.

16. I do not consider it advisable that Captain Harrison should be withdrawn from Khelat for the present, or certainly not until better and more clear information has been received in regard to the true extent of the outbreak.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have received a demi-official letter from Captain Harrison, dated Khelat, 17th October, from which the following is extracted:—"No "further disturbance has occurred; it is rumoured that Moolla Mahomed, Noordeen, "Alla Dina, and Azaad Khan* intend joining the discon- "tented in the Dusht.† This, however, I do not believe. "The Mahomed Shahees and a few Shawanees have taken "up a position in the hills close to Mustoong, and have been sending their women all over "the country with Korans trying to get up a general rebellion. The Deenarzai Sirdar "gave them a decided answer in the negative, stating that his son had fallen fighting "for the Khan and he meant to support him; that if anxious to be forgiven, he would "use his interest on their behalf. This they declined after the late lesson. I do not "think the discontented will find many supporters. Two letters have been handed over "to the Shahgassee, evidently written by Moolla Mahomed, but he has been cunning "enough not to attach his seal. The substance of the communication is as follows:—That "as the Ameer will do nothing for them, their last hope was to create a disturbance in "Khelat territory; utmost efforts should be used to get the "Brahooee Sirdars to espouse their cause;‡ names of adherents to "be regularly forwarded to Candahar; and that when the scheme was fully organized, they would come and join their friends. These allies of Moolla Mahomed thought a "favourable opportunity had occurred, from the fact of there only being 200 infantry in "this part of the country. Their original scheme, it is said, was to have been carried "out on Wednesday, the 4th; that is, to assassinate his Highness between Zeearut and "Khelat, and on the same day seize Mustoong and Quetta. My having gone out to "meet his Highness probably deterred anyone from attempting his life, and the Naib of "Quetta got timely intimation of what was up and closed the fort, so a very small part "only of the programme was carried out. They, however, I think, felt convinced that "his Highness would not think of sending the few troops that he had until reinforce- "ments arrived, and that they would have plenty of time to mature their plans for a "campaign against the Khan. The Shahgassee started in a couple of hours, and thi[illegible] "disturbance was fairly quelled on Sunday, the 8th. The fighting was not at all in[illegible] "Brahooee fashion, but an obstinate hand-to-hand engagement. His Highness had 3[illegible] "killed and 70 severely wounded. The loss on the other side was even heavier."

[illegible]am glad to say Captain Harrison mentions that the Shahgassee, so far from having die[illegible] is going on very well. The wound is neither extensive nor dangerous, and he should [illegible] quite well in a couple of weeks.

* Ruler of Kharan.
† Plain at the head of the Bolan, between it and Quetta.
‡ That of Moolla Mahomed, &c.

Enclosure 2 in No. 17.

No. 1867, dated Jacobabad, 19th October 1871.

From Colonel R. Phayre, C.B., Political Superintendent, [illegible]
Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, C.B. and K.C.S.I., Commiss[illegible]

REFERRING to my telegram of yesterday's date, relativ[illegible] and Quetta, I have the h[illegible] tion of Government, the[illegible] which I based that tele[illegible]

Captain Harrison's Report, No. 77, dated 10th October 1871.
Captain Harrison's Report, No. 78, dated 10th October 1871.
Captain Harrison's Diary, dated 10th October 1871.

2. Late in the ev[illegible] Captain Carpendale, of the 2nd Regiment, Sin[illegible]

account of the operations of the Khan's troops in a private letter from a native officer of his own regiment commanding the Political Agent's escort at Khelat, Ressaldar Goolam Mahomed, who is an excellent officer and a man highly respected in the brigade.

3. The following is a translation of that letter :—

"Khelat, 10th October 1871.

"On the 6th October intelligence was received that the Shawanee and Lehree Brahooees had taken Mustoong and had wounded the Jansin (the Khelat Government official in civil charge of the district). On this his Highness the Khan sent the Shahgassee with 500 regular troops and two guns and some irregular forces to the scene of disturbances.

"The force arrived at Mungooshur, about 15 coss from this, and afterwards moved on by night (towards Mustoong). The guides of the Khan's troops were, it is supposed, confederate with the rebels, who were posted (in ambush) at Ghud, about 20 miles on. The rebels then attacked the Khan's troops, who, as they were marching carelessly, were helpless, and fled back towards Mungooshur, and arrived within four miles of it by daybreak, pursued by the rebels.

"The Shahgassee here rallied his force, and having again advanced on the rebels, retook the guns and property which they had captured in the first instance, and finally encamped at Kud. But a tribe of Brahooees, by name Lungoo, who inhabit Mungooshur, helped the Khan's troops greatly, and their Sirdar was killed.

"Next day the Shahgassee marched again at noon, and reached Umeroolla Kurez, about three coss from Mustoong on the Khelat side, and again attacked the rebels. The Khan's forces were fewer than the enemy, who were very strong, and after the artillery had fired two rounds, the rebels attacked in great force and took the guns, and great numbers were killed and wounded on both sides; how many we know not.

"The rebels having no artillerymen, left the guns on the ground, and they were eventually recaptured by the Shahgassee, who drove the rebels up to Mustoong, which town he took. This intelligence of the victory was received on the 9th October, and the Khan fired a salute in honour of it. We now hear that the rebels have reassembled in great force at Pusgirrun, four coss from Mustoong. In this fight the rebels have lost Sirdars Jehangir Khan Lehree, Syud Khan Syudzyo, and Abdool Kadir Shawanee. On the Khan's side, Ressaldar Hyat Khan, and the Commanding Officer of Artillery, Shere Khan, were killed.

(Signed) "Goolam Mahomed,
"Ressaldar, 2nd Regt. Sind Horse."

4. I append the original vernacular letter for your information.

5. After its perusal I addressed the following letter, No. 1866 of this date, to Captain Harrison :—

"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the correspondence noted in the margin, which reached yesterday, and on the authority of which I reported to Government the victorious result of the Shahgassee's operations between Khelat and Mustoong.

Report No. 77, dated 10th October 1871.
Diary to the 8th October 1871, dated 10th October 1871.
Report No. 78, dated 10th October 1871.

"For a day or more previously, however, I beg to inform you that rumours of a very different tenor from that conveyed in your reports under reply had reached me, but I refrained from taking any notice of them, preferring to await further communication from yourself before reporting further to Government on the subject. When, therefore, I received the above-noted correspondence, and found that it in no way confirmed or even alluded to the adverse intelligence which is now rife throughout this whole border, I concluded that it may have been spread by the enemies of his Highness the Khan, and therefore, in telegraphing to Government, I merely condensed your own report of [illegible]rs.

"[illegible]ast evening, however, I was much surprised to hear from Captain Carpendale, of the [illegible]giment Sind Horse under my command, that he had received a private letter from [illegible]r, Ressaldar Goolam Mahomed of his regiment, who now commands [illegible]h I asked Captain Carpendale to place at my disposal for the in- [illegible]n that letter you will see that the Ressaldar gives an apparently [illegible]erations of the Shahgassee between Khelat and Mustoong [illegible]h which your own reports left Khelat, and as that account [illegible]ith the independent rumours referred to in my 2nd [illegible] as generally correct. I should now feel obliged by [illegible]e to me on the 10th instant, you were aware of the

6. It thus appears that really serious events have taken place within 40 or 60 miles of Khelat between the 6th and 9th instant, no details of which are mentioned by Captain Harrison, but of which he merely reports in the first paragraph of his letter No. 77 of 1871, dated 10th instant, that "they have now been quelled, not, however, without "a most obstinate resistance in the open country between Khelat and Mustoong," &c., &c.

7. As a revolutionary crisis has again occurred in respect to Khelat affairs, I feel it to be my duty, as Political Superintendent on this Frontier, and as a British officer of old standing who has his country's interests and those of the Brahooees and Belooch truly and sincerely at heart, to entreat the Government not to disregard as unworthy of their notice, the earnest and perfectly true representations which I have from time to time made during the last two years and upwards, as to the prevalent feeling of the whole country in respect to the present tone of the Khelat rule, and our connexion with it, because I am convinced that unless some early remedy be found, worse than has yet occurred cannot fail to be the result.

8. It is worthy of notice that these events have immediately succeeded the tour which his Highness has just completed. He arrived in Kutchee by route of the Moolla Pass at the end of last year, and remained there till May or June last, when he moved up the Bolan to Quetta. He thence visited Mustoong, and has just reached Khelat.

9. I know from what I have heard, though I have purposely abstained from instituting any inquiries, that his stay in Kutchee increased his unpopularity greatly, owing to the illiberal manner in which he treated his people generally; and we now learn from this correspondence, that almost on the very day that he reached his capital serious disturbances broke out within 50 miles of his rear, not originated on this occasion by either Sirdars Moolla Mahomed or Noordeen, but by other chiefs, who no doubt have given expression to the feeling which I have been informed now pervades a large part of the Brahooee nation, viz., that it is better to die than any longer submit to acts of oppression and injustice worse than death.

10. I merely report what I have frequently heard of late is the climax which Brahooee unhappiness has now reached, and I believe it to be perfectly true—indeed some of the boldest of the chiefs have testified to its truth with their lives, in the correspondence now before us.

11. No one clearly knows what the immediate cause of the outbreak is, and, under the present system of non-inquiry, never will; but I would deferentially ask, whether we can any longer safely ignore a national feeling of the kind referred to, the result of absolute despair. It may, I know, be calmed and allayed by real acts of justice; but more confiscation, more outlawry, more impoverishment, will have a contrary effect, and continue to produce still worse results than they have done during the present reign of thirteen years.

12. It is quite true that the Khan has been repeatedly advised to follow the path of justice and regard for the lives and property of his people, and it is equally true that whilst promising to do all that was required of him in these respects, he has never fulfilled his promises, but kept his wrong way and enjoyed our subsidy equally, as if his conduct as a prince had been all we could have desired.

13. I therefore deferentially submit that until his Highness clearly understands that his failing to follow our advice in essentially important political matters will involve the loss of our support, he will continue to do as before, until finally he will make us and our interests on this border as unpopular as himself.

14. There is not a man of any weight or influence in the country, whether Brahooee or Belooch, who does not feel keenly that our connexion with the Khan involves a certain amount of responsibility for his acts as a ruler, because both the Khan himself and they too are perfectly well aware that, were it not for our support, he must either respect the just rights of his people or lose his throne; and I feel convinced in my own mind, that if we were honestly and decidedly to inform his Highness that he cannot at one and the same time be the friend of the British Government and the oppressor of the fine races subject to him, he would begin to see the absolute necessity of altering his policy, and would shrink from risking the loss of that support on the continuance of which he is well aware his power rests.

15. There is reason to hope that such a policy in the hands of a British officer of weight of character sufficient to initiate and develop it gradually, would redound as much to the power and stability of the Khan's Government as to our own interests on this border; and I venture to hope that the present crisis may be taken advantage of to guide the Khelat Government into so desirable a line of policy, and to confirm them in it.

16. The people of Kutchee are profuse in their expressions of gratitude for the protection which the cavalry regiment recently despatched from Jacobabad now affords them. Its beneficial effect upon the Khelat Government interests at this moment has also been very great; hence I plead the greater necessity for our seriously endeavouring at once to bring good results out of the state of affairs at present impending, which must of themselves afford evidence to the Khan of the impolicy and unpopularity of his acts as a ruler.

17. When the last revolutionary movement took place in Khelat in 1864–65, the Political Agent was withdrawn; and I now respectfully submit for your consideration, whether it is not expedient that Captain Harrison should return to Kutchee by the Moola Pass as soon as possible.

P.S.—20th October 1871.—Since writing the above, the following further intelligence has been received from Bagh, from Uzzeem Jan to his brother Peer Jan Naib at Jacobabad, under date 17th October:—

"Since I wrote about the Shahgassee's fight I have heard nothing from either the Khan or my father (Mahomed Khan), but I have heard that the rebel Brahooees have now reassembled at Nuslee, near Narmook, about 30 or 40 miles from the scene of their defeat. They are undecided as yet what to do, whether to return or fight with the Shahgassee, or to descend into the plains and plunder (this city) Bagh. I send you information of all I know.

"About the fight of the other day, I hear that the Shahgassee himself is wounded though slightly; both sides lost so many men killed and wounded as to be helpless. This I got secretly from the Naib of this place."

Enclosure 3 in No. 17.

No. 77, dated Khelat, 10th October 1871.

From Captain C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to Colonel R. Phayre, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

In continuation of my letter No. 76 of 9th October 1871, I have the honour to report that a disturbance alluded to has been quelled, not, however, without a most obstinate resistance in the open country situated between the Kud and Mustoong. The malcontents closed with the Shahgassee's party to avoid his guns and musketry, and a hand-to-hand combat ensued, which only terminated when three out of the four ringleaders had fallen—Sirdar Jehangir Lehree, Moobaruk Khan Shawanee, and Syud Khan Bungoolzye. "Sirdar Syud Khan Mahomed Shai escaped."

The casualties amongst the Shahgassee's camp have not been fully reported. Sirdar Kaisab Khan Deenarzai and Sirdar Shirbat Khan Bungoolzye, Ressaldar Hyat Khan, and Shere Khan of the artillery, were killed.

Enclosure 4 in No. 17.

No. 78, dated Khelat, 10th October 1871.

From Captain C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to Colonel R. Phayre, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

With reference to my letter No. 74, I have the honour to report that his Highness has received information from Candahar that Sirdars Moolla Mahomed Raisanee and Noordeen Mingul had been in communication with Sirdar Jehangir Lehree and Syud Ali Mahomed, and that they contemplated returning to their country as soon as they had communicated their intention to his Highness the Ameer.

Enclosure 5 in No. 17.

Dated Khelat, 10th October 1871.

Diary by Political Agent, Khelat, from 2nd to the 8th October 1871.

ON Tuesday, the 2nd instant, all the Khelat merchants and zemindars went out to Zeearut to pay their respects to his Highness the Khan, and congratulate him on his return to the capital after an absence of eleven months. Early on the following morning I paid his Highness the usual compliment of going to meet him, and, owing to delay on his part, arrived at Zeearut just as he was about to leave. When within two miles of Khelat the road was thronged with people of all classes, who appeared to be glad to see his Highness again. On Thursday this festive appearance changed to one of gloom and apprehension, it having been reported that disturbances had occurred in Mustoong and Quetta. Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed started at once with about 500 followers, and was met by the malcontents in Kud Mustoong, who disputed his progress "for the twenty miles" that intervene between the above place and Mustoong. They were, however, completely routed, on Friday afternoon, after a most obstinate resistance, in which three of the four ringleaders were killed—Sirdar Jehangir Lehree, Moobaruk Khan Shawanee, and Syud Khan Bungoolzye. "Sirdar Syud Khan Mahomed Shai escaped."

Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed has only reported that his loss in killed and wounded is several; amongst the former, Sirdar Shireut Khan Bungoolzye and Sirdar Kaisab Khan Deenarzai.

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Capt.
Political Agent, Khelat.

Enclosure 6 in No. 17.

No. 672, dated Kurrachee, 24th October 1871.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to Colonel R. Phayre, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 1867 of the 19th instant, and in reply to point out to you that the remarks and views set forth in paragraphs 7 to 15 thereof are entirely at variance with the instructions that have been conveyed to you from time to time in regard to the policy Government desire should be followed in our relations with the Khelat Government, and that your persistence in adhering to and expressing such views after they have met with the marked disapproval of his Excellency the Governor in Council, is not only most unbecoming, but most dangerous in a position such as you hold.

2. Your letter will be submitted to Government for notice, such as it may be deemed to require. But in the meanwhile I have to desire most distinctly that you will wholly and solely be guided, in all transactions relating to the Khelat Government and its subjects, by the principles set forth in the minute by his Excellency the Governor, dated 10th February 1871, copy of which was furnished to you; and that you will be most careful, during the present state of affairs, to let your acts and words only show that no other principles but those can be followed or allowed.

3. There is no necessity at present for the withdrawal of Captain Harrison from Khelat. When such a step is desirable, instructions will be communicated to you.

Enclosure 7 in No. 17.

No. 85, dated Khelat, 21st October 1871.

From Captain C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to Colonel R. Phayre, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

I HAVE the honour to forward the letter alluded to in my diary ending 16th October, with translation, perusal of which will explain the late disturbances in Mustoong.

The above letter, though addressed to Saloo Khan Raisanee, a relative of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, was found in a tattered state in the pocket of the late Lehree, Sirdar Jehangir. I therefore conclude that this epistle was written at Candahar by the Raisanee Sirdar, and has been circulated amongst the Brahooee Chiefs to incite them to rebellion.

Copy of Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed's forwarding letter is attached, as also the letter he received from the Deenarzai Chiefs.

Enclosure 8 in No. 17.

TRANSLATION.

To Saloo Khan, Raisanee.

I HAVE received your letter and am aware of its contents. You write that we people in Candahar have made no attempt to create a disturbance in Khelat territory. What you say is true. Wealth and opportunity are required to carry out such plans. Owing to want of combination I have been obliged to live at Candahar. If all you people will act in conjunction with me we shall attain our object.

I have sent Aladad Khan, son of Naib Mahomed Hussun, to the Ameer, and we shall see what will happen. If you, Saloo Khan, have made any arrangements for me, let me know who your confederates are, and whether the rebellion is to take place in Quetta, Mustoong, or Kutchee; also inform me when it takes place, and I will join you at once.

You write that all the Brahooees are of one accord in this matter. Let me know the names of the Sirdars, as also whether Sirdar Jehangir Lehree and Syud Ali Mahomed are of the same opinion. Lose no time and spare no effort in organizing this rebellion, and I will join you as soon as the arrangements have been completed. Don't rely upon the Afghan Government for any support in this business; we have nothing to hope for from the Ameer. If you can do anything by yourselves, well and good. No assistance will be given from this place, so do not calculate upon our being able to aid you.

Inform me on what terms Khodadad Khan and Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed are, whether they act cordially with each other or not. I have given the cossid eight rupees.

Enclosure 9 in No. 17.

From Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed to His Highness the Khan.

A person in Pussund Khan Lungo's levy found a letter in the pocket of the late Lehree, Sirdar Jehangir, which I send you for perusal of it; you will understand everything.

I sent Choota Khan Khoord as a spy amongst the Brahooees, and he returned with a letter from Sirdar Kaisa Khan and Mahomed Khan Deenarzai, which I also forward to you.

Enclosure 10 in No. 17.

From Sirdars Kaisa Khan, Deenarzai, and Nawab Khan, Deenarzai, to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed.

The state of the Brahooees is as follows:—All their families are collected in the Dosan Hill. Sirdar Syud Khan, Mahomed Shai, Mahomed Khan Giranee, and other people of influence amongst the Lehrees, collected their families. One half of them came to me and the other half to the Khoord's with Korans, asking us to give them assistance and to act in conjunction with them. We accepted the Koran, but declined to join them or give any assistance in this rebellion, stating that we were quite satisfied at one of our relatives having died on Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed's side. We also told them that if they would remain quiet we would petition his Highness the Khan on their behalf; that if they did not agree to this, we declined any further connexion with them. They would not heed what we said, and left my house on Friday. It remains to be seen what will happen.

Enclosure 11 in No. 17.

No. 90, dated Khelat, 24th October 1871.

From Captain C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to Colonel R. Phayre, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

IN forwarding true copy of a letter from Sirdar Azaad Khan with my reply, I have the honour to make the following remarks:

That Azaad Khan implies that I have been writing to him regarding his Highness's claim, whereas I merely stated that his messenger had seen and conversed with his Highness, and he would learn from him what had been stated.

Azad Khan states that his correspondence is carried on surreptitiously. His cossid goes direct to Nawab Mahomed Khan, and the letters, after perusal,* are handed over to him† for his Highness's information, as also my replies to the same.

* By Captain Harrison.—W. L. M.
† Mahomed Khan.—W. L. M.

Nawab Mahomed Khan states that after the fullest inquiry he cannot find out that any kafila was treated in the manner stated; also, that the Hindoos state no restriction has been put on them as regards the sale of cloth, &c., to residents of Kharan.

In conclusion, I would beg to state that in my replies I have avoided all allusions to Sirdar Azaad Khan's numerous statements, as his object is only to bring about a lengthy correspondence on subjects that I have no authority to deal with.

Enclosure 12 in No. 17.

From Sirdar Azad Khan to Captain Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat.

You write that Meah Khodadad Khan has three claims against me—

1st. That I had withheld my daughter from him.
2nd. That I had plundered Punchgoor.
3rd. That I had plundered Sohrab.

You belong to a just Government, so please give attention to my replies.

1st. My daughter had no wishes to marry Khodadad Khan, and I have not forcibly withheld her from his Highness, and it would have been against my religion to force a marriage of this kind on her.

2nd. Regarding Punchgoor, a person called Mahomed Shah Khan, a Persian subject, seized Punchgoor. The Sirdar, Goolam Azum Khan, went to the then Khan, Nusseer Khan and asked him for assistance. Nusseer Khan sent the Sirdar to me, and ordered me to collect a force and turn out Mahomed Shah Khan, and that compensation for casualties would be granted by the Punchgoor people; I have papers on this subject from Nusseer Khan and the Punchgoor people. I collected a force and was engaged fighting for some time in Punchgoor, and succeeded in turning out Mahomed Shah Khan, not, however, without considerable loss of life on both sides.

Khodadad Khan carried off 100,000 loads of grain, camels, cattle, and slaves from my country; some of the latter are still in his possession; in retaliation I plundered Sohrab.

You kindly wrote to me that kafilas would not be interfered with. After its receipt, a kafila laden with dates went to Khelat, and having purchased cloth, &c., were about to leave, when they were stopped and the bunniahs informed that they would be punished if they sold any cloth to residents of Kharan. The bunniahs, however, occasionally send secret supplies; I don't know whether this has been done with your approval, or whether you are ignorant of what has occurred. Khodadad Khan does not act up to the wishes of your Government; no injustice is ever committed on any Sovereign's vakeel; Khodadad Khan hanged Wuzeer Khan,* and no notice has been taken of it for this reason. I don't send any person of influence to visit you for fear he should be hanged like Wuzeer Khan; my letters are sent surreptitiously.

* Wuzeer Khan had committed murder, and was an outlaw from Khelat territory; on his return to it he was arrested and tried for the original crime.

If you don't intend to notice what I have said, please give consideration to the kafila question, if you wish the road closed. I have nothing further to say.

The army of the Ameer has started for Seistan. God knows what is going to happen; I have been sent for. I enclose Sirdar Mahomed Rahim Khan's letter to myself. Let me know what your wishes are regarding kafilas.

Enclosure 13 in No. 17.

No. 159, dated Khelat, 20th October 1871.

From Captain C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to Sirdar Azaad Khan, Nowsherwan.

I HAVE received your letter by hand of Mahmood Kumbranee; it reached me at a happy moment. Regarding what you have written concerning the transit of kafilas between Kharan and Khelat, you will ascertain from your messenger that he experienced no obstruction as to the disposal of his dates and purchasing other merchandise, "and that he left this perfectly satisfied."

I have read the enclosure you sent me, and return the same with thanks.

Enclosure 14 in No. 17.

From Sirdar Mahomed Rahim Khan, Barakzai, to Sirdar Azaad Khan.

I HAVE arrived safely at Soorukdoze and hope that you are well. I send you a letter from my father. In a few days I shall be at Guren Seil; my father has entrusted me with verbal messages for you, which I will deliver when we meet, and after we have discussed the subject we can make arrangements. I am hopeful that on receipt of my letter you will at once proceed to join me, and shall be happy to meet you at any place. If you are prevented from coming, send a trustworthy person to meet me, and he will inform you of what I have told him. Rest satisfied.

Enclosure 15 in No. 17.

No. 86, dated Khelat, 21st October 1871.

From Captain C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to Colonel R. Phayre, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

REFERRING to the late disturbances in Mustoong, I have the honour to report, for your information, that the Brahooees are said to be assembling at Khondlan, at the bottom of the Bolan Pass, and, on being joined by Sirdar Alla Dina Koord, intend to attack Dadur; should they succeed, they intend to plunder the whole of Kutchee, but in case of defeat to retreat into the Murree Hills. As the interests of British merchants and traders would be affected by a disturbance of this kind, I would respectfully suggest that a patrol of the Sind Horse might be sent for a fortnight or so to Dadur or Hajeeke Shere; by that time his Highness will, I expect, have made arrangements for Kutchee.

No. 727, dated Kurrachee, 9th November 1871.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies (with accompaniments and original letter of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed to Saloo Khan Raisanee, found in the pocket of the late Lehree, Sirdar Jehangir), with copies of translations thereof, submitted for the information of Government, in reference to Commissioner's endorsement No. 692, dated 28th October 1871.

Enclosure 16 in No. 17.

No. 94, dated Khelat, 4th November 1871.

From Captain C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to Colonel R. Phayre, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

IN acknowledging the receipt of your letter No. 1866, with accompaniment, I have the honour to state that between the 6th and 10th rumours in the bazar regarding this engagement were so various and conflicting, that I only reported what I considered reliable, viz., information received direct from Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed.

Ressaldar Goolam Mahomed framed his letter to Captain Carpendale on one of these bazar rumours, which subsequent information disproved to a great extent. The Shawanee, Sirdar Abdool Kadur, was not killed. The guns and provisions were never captured. The Shahgassee maintained his position with the infantry, guns, and Lungo levy; 125 discontented opposed the Khan's force, not 3,000 or 4,000. The cavalry were seized with panic during the night attack, and retired on Mungooshur, but rejoined the Shahgassee next morning and took an active part in the fight near Ameenoola, with the exception of eight or ten wounded and deserters who retured to Khelat.

Subsequent correspondence will, I trust, show that the disturbance in Mustoong was quelled, where the discontented had gone to, and what they were likely to do.

As Ressaldar Goolam Mahomed's letter has been forwarded for the information of Government, I should feel obliged by your forwarding the accompanying remarks on the same.

No. 769, dated Hyderabad, 22nd November 1871.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government, in reference to paragraph 4 of Commissioner's letter No. 684 of 24th October 1871.

2. Such communications as those of the Ressaldar in question must, and should always be accepted with great caution. The Political Agent will always give true and complete information (the first of any), and his reports should alone be trusted by the Political Superintendent.

No. 18.

Dated Khelat, 29th October 1871.

Extract Diary by Political Agent, Khelat, from the 23rd to the 29th October 1871.

THE people who created the disturbance in Mustoong having been joined by Sirdar Alla Dina Koord, and Wuderah Adam Khan, Bungoolzye, have taken possession of the village of Nowshera close to Dadur; their object, it is supposed, is to seize the fort at the latter place and commit a general raid in Kutchee. Latest intelligence was from Captain Forbes, who reported the people at Bagh to be in a great state of alarm; that the number of Brahooees assembled was not known, some people stating that there were 300, whilst others imagined that there were 3,000. Directly this disturbance was known Nawab Mahomed Khan was directed to proceed to Kutchee with 150 sowars, but he remonstrated against being sent without a detachment of infantry. "No move could therefore be made," as the Beylah detachment only arrived here late yesterday, the 28th. His Highness wishes to proceed himself to Kutchee, leaving Khelat with his family in charge of the Nooshky Sirdar, Abdool Rehman, and Sirdar Kaisa Khan, Moosanee,* but he will be guided as to his movements by the advice of Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, who is hourly expected.

* The Zehree Sirdar.

* * * * * *

No. 19.

No. 6046, dated Bombay Castle, 13th December 1871.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

WITH reference to my letter of the 12th instant, No. 6000, I am directed to forward herewith, for submission to the Government of India, copy of a further memorandum, with enclosures, from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 798, dated the 3rd idem, relating to the disturbances in Khelat territory.

Enclosure 1 in No. 19.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from Nawab Moolla Mahomed Khan, Vakeel of His Highness the Khan of Khelat, to the address of Colonel Phayre, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, dated 10th Ramzan 1288.

THAT his Highness the Khan of Khelat appointed me to Kutchee. I crossed by way of Thakari and halted near the waters of Kharee. In Khet Thakari I had to face the army of the Brahooees. The battle lasted two days, and the Brahooees being unable to withstand any longer, fled with a loss of some of their number. I sent you full particulars from the town of Kotra (near Gundava), but it appears the letter was intercepted by one of the Brahooees, and therefore did not reach its destination. I then proceeded towards Bagh Waree on the way. I heard that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee had collected an army and was in the fort of Shere Khan, between Jallal Khan and Bagh, prepared to go into the field. I, after traversing the distance, arrived in Mukkan Jallal Khan on Wednesday, the 8th Ramzan, 20th November, and made the necessary preparations for war. Before the battle commenced influential persons interfered and spoke about terms of peace. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed also came and made *salâam* (submitted) and pro-

posed terms of treaty; whatever terms and conditions were agreed to were noted down and the original document given to the aforesaid Sirdar. Copy of it is enclosed for perusal. I have submitted full particulars of this treaty to his Highness the Khan for approval and sanction. If approved, well and good, and if not, the Khan is his own master. To-day I have arrived at Bagh.

Enclosure 2 in No. 19.

Abstract of Treaty entered into.

As Sirdar Moolla Mahomed has now visited me in the town of Jallal Khan, he and I have come to the following terms:—

All inams and jagheers in Sarawan and Jalawan granted to Sirdars Noordeen and Azaad Khan, Nowsherawanee, according to Sunnuds under the seals of his Highness the late Meer Mahomed Nusseer Khan and Meer Khodadad Khan, are to be wholly restored. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed agreed that he absolved his Highness the Khan of all responsibility on account of loss to person and property in Sarawan and Jalawan. That if from this day, Friday, the 10th of Ramzan, any of the Brahooees did any ill or any act of hostility in the territory of his Highness the Khan, he would be given in charge of Moolla Mahomed Vakeel to be punished in any way I liked. That whatever misdeeds Sirdars Noordeen and Azaad Khan have committed are forgiven, and the same would not be done in future. That his Highness the Khan was the sovereign, and they the subjects.

The second question about relinquishing the country of Lus Beyla mooted by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed will be submitted to his Highness the Khan for orders.

These few orders were written down to serve as a document.

Dated 10th Ramzan 1288.

No. 798, dated Camp Salaroo, bank of the Indus, near Halla, 3rd December 1871.
Endorsed by Commissioner of Sind.

ORIGINAL vernacular letter with abstract translations submitted to Government for information.

2. It appears that Moolla Mahomed Raisanee had joined the rebels in Kutchee. It remains now to be seen whether his Highness the Khan of Khelat will accede to the terms asked for by Moolla Mahomed.

3. The Political Superintendent was informed by telegram on the 21st ultimo of Sirdar Meer Khan having been sent to Bombay, and the reasons for the step. He was also requested to communicate the fact to his Highness the Khan through the Political Agent at Khelat, so that his Highness should have been aware of what had been done by the time the terms submitted by the Vakeel reached him.

No. 20.

No. 6158, dated Bombay Castle, 20th December 1871.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN continuation of my letter No. 6046, dated the 13th instant, I am desired to forward to you, for submission to his Excellency the Governor General of India in Council, copies of the further papers connected with the recent disturbances at Mustoong, &c.

Enclosure 1 in No. 20.

No. 95, dated Khelat, 4th November 1871.

From Captain C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to Colonel R. Phayre, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

I HAVE the honour to report for your information that Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed returned to Khelat on Thursday, the 2nd instant, and, after consulting with his Highness, agreed that there was no other course left but for him, "the Khan," to proceed with as little delay as possible to Kutchee.

As far as can be judged everything is quiet in Sarawan, Jalawan, Beyla, and Kedj, but his Highness fears that directly he moves, there may be serious disturbances, *i.e.*, if any reliance can be placed in the following rumours.

It is reported that Sirdar Noordeen has joined Ali Khan Jamote, and that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed has proceeded to Seebee. It is also said that Sirdar Azaad Khan has been trying to induce the Bezonjaos to join him.

The Shahgassee appeared to place great weight in the movements of the Bezonjaos, and Sirdar Faqueer Mahomed has been written to. I also wrote a friendly letter at the request of his Highness, a copy of which is annexed.

His Highness a day or two ago remarked that the suddenness of this rebellion reminded him of what had occurred in English territory in 1857, and wanted to know if the English Government would give him active aid in putting down the disturbance in Kutchee, "as there was no time to collect a force." I replied in the negative, telling him that the English Government looked to him to maintain order in his own territory. During this conversation his Highness said that he believed if he was killed, that Buktawur Khan Barukzai, of Seebee, would be put on the Khanate.

His Highness also asked me if I would remain at Khelat a few days after his departure; that my doing so would be of very great service to him. I have given no definite answer, but, as far as I can ascertain, delay is unavoidable, as there is not a camel to be hired, and we could not proceed down the passes without grain and flour. The whole of Kutchee being in the hands of the discontented, it might be as well, perhaps, if I remained until his Highness could reach the scene of disorder.

Note by Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, dated Jacobabad, 13th November 1871.

The remark in this letter about Buktawur* Khan Barukzai, of Seebee, I never heard before. It is most improbable, I think, that the Brahooees would select a Pathan sovereign. A report has been current in Kutchee that they looked to the Jam of Lus Beyla as their future sovereign, but I do not believe this report either.

Captain Harrison's No. 96 is attached to this.

* His nephew visited Jacobabad a few days ago and stayed two days. I declined to hold any conversation with him upon passing events. He gave me information which led to the accompanying telegrams.

Enclosure 2 in No. 20.

No. 96, dated Khelat, 6th November 1871.

From Captain C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to Colonel R. Phayre, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

SINCE writing my letter No. 95, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed has advised his Highness to remain at Khelat, and to send Nawab Mahomed Khan with 600 men, two guns, and a Belooch levy under the Moosance Sirdar Kaisah Khan.

On the 5th the Sohrab Naib reported that Sirdars Moolla Mahomed and Noordeen had arrived at Kharan, and that Sirdar Azaad Khan was preparing to raid Sohrab.

Enclosure 3 in No. 20.

From Captain C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to Sirdar Faqueer Mahomed, Naib of Kedj.

IT is well known that you and your ancestors have always behaved in a true and loyal manner towards the Khans of Khelat, and that you have always acted loyally towards his Highness.

His Highness has sent you a letter by hand of a trustworthy man, Abdool Suttar Babee, knowing your faithfulness and loyalty. I hope that, on receipt of the above, you and your son Meah Kairah will visit his Highness, for this reason, that people are creating a disturbance in the country, and by coming you will publicly show your goodwill to the Khan. I feel sure that if you have any request to make that it will be favourably attended to by his Highness. I have merely written this to you out of friendship.

N.B.—Meah Kaisur Khan's reply to his Highness the Khan's letter is attached in the vernacular.

No. 21.

Dated Khelat, 5th November 1871.

Diary by Political Agent, Khelat, from the 30th October to the 5th November, 1871.

SHAHGASSEE WULLEE MAHOMED returned from Mustoong on Thursday, the 2nd instant, and agreed that the only course for his Highness to pursue was to proceed himself to Kutchee. On Saturday, however, these plans were altered, and it was decided to send Nawab Mahomed Khan with 600 men, two guns, and the Moosanee Sirdar, Kaisa Khan, with a Belooch levy. This force starts on Wednesday *viâ* Zehree and the Moollah. Nawab Mahomed Khan expects that the rebels will collect somewhere near Kohoo.

The fall of Dadur was reported after a resistance of three days, and the Naib, it is said, was burnt alive. The Rhind Chief, Imam Buksh, wrote to his Highness as follows:—That from time immemorial the Rhinds had been loyal to the Khans of Khelat, and that he proceeded to Bagh and urged his representatives to march to the relief of Dadur; that after consulting amongst themselves they decided to await the Brahooee attack at Bagh; when, however, Dadur had fallen they all left the place. The sepoys also behaved so badly that there was no alternative for him but to retire.

Reliable information was received to-day, 5th instant, from the Naib of Sohrab, viz., that Sirdars Noordeen and Moolla Mahomed had arrived at Kharan, and that a raid on Sohrab was intended.

At the present moment I believe quiet prevails in Sarawan, Jalawan, Beylah, and Kedj; it is, however, rumoured that Sirdar Azaad Khan has been trying to induce Meah Kaisah, Sirdar Faquir Mahomed's son, to join him. The Shahgassee is of opinion that if Sirdar Faquir Mahoned remains loyal to his Highness, no serious disturbance will occur in Jalawan. Nawab Mahomed Khan was directed to write to this chief and tell him that if he came to Khelat, any wish he might express regarding Kedj would be attended to. I also wrote a friendly note to this Sirdar at his Highness' request. The Shahgassee does not anticipate any further disturbance in the Sarawan District. His Highness being obliged to send all available fighting men with Nawab Mahomed Khan, is enlisting men for the protection of Quetta, Mustoong, and Khelat.

The whole of Kutchee being in the hands of the discontented Brahooees, I have thought it as well to remain quietly here until Nawab Mahomed Khan has time to reach the plains; my doing so will probably cause Azaad Khan to defer his raid on Sohrab. Should any disturbance occur we must depend on his Highness to lend us some of his camels, as there are none to be hired.

A horse kafila for Bangalore arrived here on Friday last, and the owner asked me to report his arrival to Colonel Thompson, Remount Agent, Bangalore. I told him that owing to the present disturbance it might be as well if he delayed a few days, but he declined to do so stating that grass and forage were so expensive that it would ruin him to stay here.

A letter I wrote to Captain Forbes was returned by the Rhind Sirdar, stating that he had been unable to forward it. The post contractor, Gohur Khan, Dinaree, has written to say that he is unable to forward our post, the Naibs of Kunda and Gundava having left, as also all the people in his village.

The Pundera Sirdar, Muddut Khan, informed Dr. Bowman that Wuderah Adam Khan, Bungoolzye, had died at Seebee, and that the discontented in Kutchee had been joined by 300 Murrees. This chief has been taken seriously ill, since his arrival at Khelat, with paralysis.

No. 22.

Dated Khelat, 26th November 1871.

Diary by Political Agent, Khelat, from the 20th to the 26th November 1871.

ON the 22nd his Highness received a letter from Nawab Mahomed Khan reporting his arrival at Gundava on the 19th, and that he had been joined by the Mugzees and Rhinds, and had done all in his power to re-assure the few Syuds, Mahomedans, and Hindoos that had remained; they and the inhabitants had suffered much at the hands of the Brahooees, and I have promised in your name that they shall receive compensation for the property that has been plundered. I have also changed the transit on ghee to eight annas per maund, reduced other taxes one fourth, and allowed snuff, bhang, and spirits to be sold without a license. The Brahooees have left Bagh, and I propose going there in a

day or two *viâ* Shorun, as the Lehrees generally occupy that part of the country during the cold season. All the people are very much pleased at the modifications I have made, and pray for your Highness's welfare. Dia Mul Bunniah, resident of Gundava, has given me a list showing that the Brahooees had enforced a ready-money payment of Rs. 688–6–6, and carried off 175 kurwars of wheat (about 1,400 maunds) from the village of Futtehpoor. Please give me a written order, with your seal attached, that this is to be made good to them from your Highness's revenues and tithes.

The Brahooees having left Bagh, I have sent my nephew Khooda Buksh there with Aktur Khan Koord and Nawab Khan Dinarzai. The Rhinds and Mugzees have asked my permission to follow and loot the Brahooees; I have told them to remain quietly with me until we reached Bagh.

On the 21st November Ramzan Nawab Mahomed Khan again wrote to his Highness from a place called Seeanah, as follows:—

Jumal Khan and Baz Khan, Budoozais, were appointed vakeels by the Brahooees, and intimated that they wished to make their salaam, but would only make Anjamor treaty in presence of the English Government, and that I was to remain at Gundava. I replied that I was coming to Bagh, and that if they wished to make terms they might meet me there. I have sent 1,000 Mugzees and Rhinds to join my nephew. Aktur Khan and Nawab Khan, the Mugzees and Rhinds, are most anxious to attack the Brahooees, but I have restrained them, as Sirdar Kaisah Khan, Dinarzai, has written to say that a great number of the Brahooees had asked him to make terms for them.

Sirdar Kaisah Khan is living in his village Moonga, near Bagh. Gazee Khan Budoozai and Malik Dostin Geranee are with him. The Dinaree Chief states that the latter have taken no part in the late disturbances.

A letter from Syud Ali Shah, Syud Morad Shah, and Arab Ala Dittah, residents of Bagh, to Nawab Mahomed Khan, has been forwarded by the latter person for his Highness's information.

The Brahooees have robbed us and the inhabitants of everything; we have neither food or clothing, and our state of destitution is beyond description. Please send aid. Aktur Khan and Nawab Khan cannot hold the place with the few people they have The Brahooees are assembling at Hajee ke Shere and Mittree.

Esau Khan, Meer Dost Mahomed, Meah Attah Mahomed, headmen of the Mingul tribe, have written to his Highness reporting their having joined Sirdar Meeah Mahomed and Naib Abdool Azeez. The two latter report that the Murdooees, Goolananees, and Meer Hajees have been assembled, and that Sudeek Oomranee Lushkur Khan and the Sassoolies have been written to and will probably join in a few days.

A buniah from Kharan has written to his agent stating that Azaad Khan had distinctly refused to give Sirdar Noordeen any assistance, telling him that the Ameer did not wish him to take any part in Brahooee disputes, and that he had done himself a great deal of harm with his Highness the Khan by taking their part in former rebellions. Forty of Sirdar Azaad Khan's men escorted Sirdar Noordeen to Jalawan *viâ* the Rukshan route. This news has been corroborated by the Naib of Mustoong and Jan Sing of Sohrab, both of whom have got correspondents at Kharan.

On Wednesday, the 22nd, I happened to hear for the first time that it was believed at Kurrachee and other places that the disturbances in Mustoong and Kutchee had been caused by some act of his Highness regarding a marriage. I at once made inquiries and found that this rumour had reference to the marriage of his Highness's nephew, Meah Kurrum Khan, with the daughter of a wealthy and highly respectable merchant and horse-dealer, Wullee Khan Mahomed Shai. Being on friendly terms with the latter person, and knowing that he had just arrived from Bangalore, I asked him to visit me, and in the course of conversation mentioned that some people had spread a report that his Highness the Khan had forcibly abducted his (Wullee Khan's) daughter and given her in marriage to his nephew, and that I should be much obliged if he would tell me the real circumstances of the case. In reply, he stated that the proposal regarding the marriage was made in his absence to his son and wife, and cordially agreed to by them and approved of by him; also that the marriage had taken place in the usual way, and nothing had occurred to authorise such an assertion.

Wullee Khan said he had always been well treated by the English Government, so would tell me something regarding this rumour, viz.:

It being well known both in Mustoong and Kutchee that I had left Kurrachee for Khelat, messengers were sent by the Mahomed Shais and Lehrees to meet me; they met me between Wud and Kozdar, and stated that they wished to give some reasons for the raiding in Mustoong and Kutchee, and asked me to write strong and forcible letters to the Commissioner in Sind, and Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, stating

that the Khan had forcibly abducted my daughter, and given her in marriage to his nephew; that the Belooch were so incensed at this conduct of his Highness that they had shown their displeasure by raiding Mustoong and Kutchee. I replied that the marriage had taken place with my full approval, and that I had no intention of acting as they wished, that his Highness had always treated me well, and that I did not believe he had done anything to authorise their having acted as they had done, and they would repent of their foolish conduct ere long.

From this conversation it may be inferred that the malcontents had no real cause for complaint against his Highness, but are anxious to justify their conduct by falsehood and misrepresentation.

Goolam Jan gives a satisfactory account of Beylah in a letter just received. Ali Mahomed Borah, who had always given a great deal of trouble, had made his salaam and been placed at the Hubb with six sowars to protect travellers.

No news from Mekran. Jalawan is quiet; in Zehree the few Belooch that did not accompany Nawab Mahomed Khan are quarrelling amongst themselves. His Highness has sent a small party to restore order.

During the past week two donkey kafilas from Shikarpoor have passed through Khelat *en route* to Candahar, about 100 animals; two donkey kafilas from Candahar, laden with rice and dried fruits, consigned to Khelat merchants; 160 camels from Shikarpoor with piece goods—100 for Candahar, 60 to Khelat; 15 camels from Kharan, laden with dates, consigned to Khelat merchants.

No. 23.

Diary by Political Agent, Khelat, from 27th November to the 3rd December 1871.

On Friday, the 1st instant, the following report from Nawab Mahomed Khan was received:—

I wrote to you from Seronj, and from that report you will have learnt what had taken place. Sirdar Aktar Khan and Nawab Khan Dinarzai had been sent to Bagh, and were to have been joined by the Rhinds and Mugzees; the latter, however, hearing that the Brahooee force were advancing on Bagh, remained at Jallal Khan's Gate.

When I arrived at Goolam Mahomed-ka-joke I heard that Sirdar Moollah Mahomed had left Hajee-ka-Shere and taken up a position at Shere Khan's fort, situated between Jallal Khan's Gate and Bagh, with the intention of making a night attack on my camp. I arrived at Jallal Khan's Gate on Wednesday, and, having consulted with Shuhur Khan and Abdool Rusack, commandants of infantry and cavalry, determined to encamp on the Gaihee Nulla.

Meah Zungee Raisanee and others came to ask for terms. I remained until 5 p.m. talking with them, and then returned to Jallal Khan's Gate.

Beebee Syud, resident of Shahpoor, believing that Bagh was about to be again sacked by the Brahooees, came to offer what protection she could to the inhabitants. When, however, she heard of the defeat of the rebels at Koombee she joined Sirdar Moollah Mahomed and persuaded him to ask for terms, and returned to me with Sumunder Lehree; the latter having heard what I had to say rejoined Sirdar Moollah Mahomed; the latter then met me half way between our respective camps. We wrote a treaty, a copy of which we sent to Colonel R. Phayre, C.B.; a duplicate is forwarded for your information. This treaty is still an open question. If you approve of what has been done, well; if not, I await your orders, and will act upon them.

Sirdar Moollah Mahomed has returned to his camp, and Sumunder Lehree has remained with me.

On the 10th day of the moon I left for Bagh; the poor inhabitants have been ruthlessly plundered by the Brahooees, and have committed such oppression that I cannot describe their acts in writing; they have carried off all cattle, household property, &c., and not left the poor people even clothes to wear. They are utterly destitute, nothing is procurable, and I anticipate great difficulty in procuring food and forage for my party. I have received a letter from Colonel R. Phayre, C.B., regarding Sirdar Meah Khan, ex-Jam of Beylah, which I forward for your perusal.

I hear from my son, Peerjan, that the Lehree detachment with guns proceeded to the Noomeah. I have ordered them to join me, and expect that they will arrive in a day or two.

Roka, or Postscript No. 1.

I HAVE made a treaty with Sirdar Moollah Mahomed subject to your Highness' approval, and am free to act on your instructions.

Sirdar Moollah Mahomed states that if your Highness agrees to this treaty, he and I must proceed to Jacobabad and have the same ratified in presence of Colonel Phayre, C.B., and that if this is not done everyone is at liberty to act for himself. If you approve of this treaty I will proceed to Jacobabad with Sirdar Moollah Mahomed; if not, I will act on any instructions you may give me. I myself approve of the treaty and hope you will do so; if you do please write clearly that I have authority to act and that you will abide by what I do. When I receive this I will proceed with the chief to Jacobabad. If you disapprove I am your obedient servant.

(Signed) MAHOMED KHAN.

Postscript No. 2.

Sirdar Moollah Mahomed states that the personal property of the rebels has been concealed by their friends in Mustoong and other places, and requests that they may be allowed to return and look after their possessions. Kindly write to the Naibs of Mustoong and Quetta, directing them not to interfere, and that these people are at liberty to look after their property.

(Signed) MAHOMED KHAN.

Postscript No. 3.

I have reappointed Hyut Khan Lehree Jan Sing of Dadur, and have sent him to join with 50 horsemen and 50 foot.

Postscript No. 4.

Containing Terms of Treaty.

Sirdar Moollah Mahomed has visited me at Jallal Khan's Gate, and the following terms were submitted:—

1st. That the Sarawans, Jalawans, and Sirdar Azaad Khan should have all inam lands as shown by Sunnuds from the time of the Great Nusseer Khan until the present Khan's reign, latter inclusive.

2nd. Sirdar Moollah Mahomed, on behalf of the above, agrees to drop all claims due for blood money, loss of property, &c.

3rd. That if any Brahooees after the 10th instant commit any improper acts, Nawab Mahomed Khan is at liberty to punish them in any way he may deem fit.

4th. That no notice is to be taken of former rebellions caused by Sirdars Noordeen and Azaad Khan, and that for the future they will take no part in any disturbance, for this reason that his Highness is by ancient descent king of the country. In future we will, as in former years, always do his service, and never be guilty of any disobedience.

5th. Sirdar Moollah Mahomed wishes your Highness to give up possession of Beylah. I have replied that I will petition you on this subject; that if you agree, well; if not, you are sovereign.

Written by me on the 10th Ramzan 1288.

(Signed) MAHOMED KHAN.

Vernacular copies of the above correspondence are attached.

The above reports, with accompaniments, reached his Highness just before paying me his usual weekly visit. From his Highness' conversation he was greatly incensed at Nawab Mahomed Khan's conduct, as prior to leaving Khelat he had agreed that the acts of the rebels in Kutchee had been of such a nature as to preclude any possibility of anjam or treaty. His Highness further stated that Nawab Mahomed Khan's conduct regarding this treaty had been to actually acknowledge Sirdar Moollah Mahomed and the rebels as the ruling power in Beloochistan; that other districts would naturally follow the example that had been set them, and that he would be unable to restore order unaided; that he and his brother Nusseer Khan had always considered themselves as dependents of the English Government. If this country was of any value to us as a boundary to our own territory, the time had now come for us to take possession or give him assistance, and that if we were indifferent as to what took place he would do the best he could, but might eventually have to seek protection from either Afghanistan or Persia.

Naib Abdool Azeez writes from Bhagwana to his Highness as follows :—

Morad Ali Mingul has sent a man to inform me of Noordeen's arrival at Lukerjee, close to Wud, and that he had sent to the bunniahs of the latter place to supply him with 200 maunds of wheat.

Lushkar Khan, Humzan Morad, and Hyder, Minguls, are in the fort at Wud, Sirdar Meah Mahomed being with me ; they are prepared to fight should Noordeen attack them.

Some of the Minguls have joined Noordeen; the latter has tried his utmost to induce Sirdar Faquir Mahomed to espouse his cause, but this chief has given him a decided answer, viz., that if he, Noordeen, wished forgiveness for past faults he would accompany him to Khelat and petition his Highness to pardon him. Noordeen replied that he would go if your Highness would give up Beylah. Sirdar Faquir Mahomed then informed him that if he talked in such a way he should look upon him, Noordeen, as an enemy.

Certain chiefs of the Bezonjao tribe, viz., Humlanees, Tumlanees, and Sakur Sajdees, urged Sirdar Faquir Mahomed to support Noordeen as he had come to his door for assistance. Sirdar Faquir Mahomed replied that he had never joined in any rebellion and never meant to.

Your Highness need not have the slightest anxiety regarding Sirdar Faquir Mahomed's fidelity.

I have sent Sirdar Meah Mahomed, Nubbee Buksh, Cherezai, and five Pathan sowars to Nul, that they may accompany Sirdar Faquir Mahomed to Khelat. I have done this to show respect to the Bezonjao chief.

(Signed) ABDOOL AZEEZ.

The above information is confirmed by letters from Sirdar Faquir Mahomed to various people, viz. :—

From Faquir Mahomed to Naib Abdool Azeez.

Meah Esau Mingul will tell you what is going on; if anyone states that I am nimuk haram, false to my salt, he is a nimuk haram. The present crisis will show who are true and who are false to his Highness. I have never been false and never mean to be.

From Faquir Mahomed to his Highness the Khan.

It will soon be apparent to your Highness who are loyal and who are false. You have no kindly feeling to the Brahooees. I am by cast a Brahooee, but not in feelings towards yourself. You know that I was loyal and true on a former occasion, and my loyalty will be apparent at the present time. Whenever you require my services you will find me true and ready to perform any duty that may be required of me.

From Faquir Mahomed to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed.

Noordeen arrived at Koormistan, close to Nul, with some of Azaad Khan's sowars, and sent some of them to me, stating that he intended getting up a rebellion. I replied that if he wanted forgiveness I would ask his Highness to pardon him, but would not assist him in any other way. His answer was that he intended to fight. Some of the Minguls and Judgals will join him, and I believe it is their intention to create a disturbance in Beylah. Two sowars of Azaad Khan's came to me and said that their Sirdar would join in the rebellion if I would, but that if I did not he would have nothing to do with the business. I replied that I relied on God and his Highness and had no other support.

You, Shahgassee, may depend that any tribe amongst the Bezonjaos who obey me will arm for his Highness. Some of my tribe on the borders of my district may be induced to join ; for instance, on the last occasion, most of the tribe were with you whilst a few joined Sirdar Meah Khan, late Jam of Beylah.

Meah Allum Khan, the Bezonjao Chief close to Beylah, has promised to act according to my wishes. You will soon see who are false and who are true. I have also sent to the Bezonjaos who reside at Poorali in Beylah, to support Shahgassee Goolam Jan in any disturbance that may arise.

You have written and asked me to come to Khelat, and to send my son Meah Kairah to Bhagwana. You know that I am an old man and could not stand the cold at this season of the year. I will send my son either to Bhagwana or Khelat, whichever you think best.

Azaad Khan's men told me that if their chief made any move it would be against Punchgoor.

Don't have the slightest doubt as to my fidelity.

I also received a friendly note from Sirdar Faquir Mahomed informing me of his intention to support his Highness. All these letters have been just received, Sunday, and the Bezonjao Sirdar's conduct has done much to reassure his Highness the Khan.

Gohur Khan Zurukzai, who created a disturbance in Lehree after the departure of Nawab Mahomed, wrote to his Highness that he had appointed himself Chief of Jalawan vice Taj Mahomed, and requested that a khillut might be sent to him, as also the barak or standard of the tribe. Prior to the receipt of this note, the Zuggur Mingul, Sirdar Abdool Rahman, with his followers and fifty infantry, were sent with the Darogah to restore order. Gohur Khan tried to hold the narrow pass against them; in the skirmish that ensued the Zurukzais lost four men, and Gohur Khan fled. His Highness' party then took possession of his village, Kurgan, and property.

During the past week 21 camels laden with wool have passed through en route to Kurrachee, and 34 camels with piece goods from the latter place en route to Candahar.

Owing to scanty forage I propose proceeding to Kozdar in the course of a day or two.

His Highness has, I believe, written to Nawab Mahomed Khan regarding his treaty with Sirdar Moollah Mahomed, and refused to sanction the same.

No. 24.

Dated Soonasing, 10th December 1871.

Diary by the Political Agent, Khelat, from 4th to the 10th December 1871.

SIRDAR MEAH KAIRAH, son of the Bezonjao Chief, arrived at Khelat on Wednesday, the 6th instant, and visited me on Friday. From conversing with him it was apparent that the loyalty proposed by these Sirdars.* Father and son expect large grants of inam land or valuable appointments. The former has applied for the half of the Foorbut districts in Kedj as a reward for past services, and the latter has implied that he ought to be made Naib of Beylah *vice* Shahgassee Goolam Jan. His Highness is very much incensed at these chiefs trying to sell their services to him, and states that they would not have dared to make the requests they have done except under the present trying circumstances, and that come what may he will not yield to their demands. His Highness attributes this change of demeanour on the part of the Bezonjaos to Nawab Mahomed Khan's dilatory and unsatisfactory conduct in Kutchee.

* *Sic* in orig.

Forage being scarce I left Khelat on Saturday en route to Kozdar. At Soonasing a severe shock of earthquake was felt about 9 p.m. on the 10th instant.

A large kafila about 250 camels laden with wool left Khelat with me en route to Kurrachee.

Gohur Khan Zurukzai and Dad Mahomed, who attempted to create a disturbance in Lehree, have joined Noordeen Mingul.

Thirty sowars of Azaad Khan's, under command of Jumal, having escorted Noordeen into Wud on their return homewards, plundered a kafila of thirty camels at Shereenzur, near Mushka. These camels belonged to people at Geedur, near Sohrah, and were laden with dates.

His Highness, anticipating a disturbance in Beylah, wrote to Darogah Attah Mahomed some time ago to reinforce Shahgassee Goolam Jan. The Darogah has, however, written to say that it would be very ill advised his doing so, as the people in Mekran are in a very unsettled state having heard of the disturbance in Kutchee.

The Nowsherwanis had plundered a kafila at Punchgoor, and in the fight that took place a nephew of Azaad Khan was killed. The latter threatened to attack Punchgoor if Kootabooddeen was not given to him as blood money. The Darogah at once sent 100 men of his detachment to occupy the place and proceeded with the remaining 200 to Kedj.

At Rodenjo I received a letter from Shahgassee Goolam Jan, informing me that Ali Khan Jamote had occupied Oothul, but that he intended, if well enough, to attack him in the course of a day or two.

No. 25.

Diary by Political Agent, Khelat, from the 11th to the 17th December 1871.

ARRIVED at Bhagwana on Friday, the 15th instant, and move our camp to Kozdar on Tuesday, the 19th.

The Naib of this place informs me that a few days ago a sowar from Sirdar Moollah Mahomed joined Noordeen Mingul, informed him of the anjam or treaty that was under consideration, and directed him, Noordeen, to lose no time in attacking Beylah.

For the last ten or twelve days all communication between Kozdar and Beylah has been stopped by the Minguls. Noordeen left Wud with 200 men, and has, I believe, been joined by several branches of the Mingul tribe. A few of the Rezonjaos have also accompanied him; it is stated that they sent a messenger to Shahgassee Goolam Jan, asking him to surrender Beylah as he had no chance of holding it against them. The Shahgassee replied that as long as he had life he would protect Beylah and his Highness the Khan's interests.

Sirdar Faquir Mahomed has just sent me a letter reported everything quiet in Nul.

The climate here is comparatively mild, not much colder than Kutchee at this season of the year.

Sirdar Faquir Mahomed's messenger states that Noordeen Mingul had arrived at Asiab, and that Ali Khan Jamote had advanced on Dund; also that the Roonjas had joined Noordeen, and that the Shahgassee's detachment had refused to fight. This report requires confirmation.

Asiab is about eight miles from Beylah on the Khelat side, and Dund is about the same distance on the Kurrachee side.

No. 26.

No. 68, dated Bombay Castle, 8th January 1872.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I AM directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a memorandum from the Commissioner in Scind, No. 816, dated the 9th ultimo, and of its accompaniments, regarding the entrance into the talookas of Kumbar and Soojawal, of the Shikarpoor District, of large numbers of the subjects of his Highness the Khan of Khelat who have fled from the Brahooee marauders who are in insurrection against the Khan.

Enclosure 1 in No. 26.

No. 498, dated Shikarpoor, 8th November 1871.

From C. McIvor, Esq., District Superintendent of Shikarpoor Police, to Commissioner of Police in Sind, Kurrachee.

INSPECTOR Khan Bahadoor Taj Mahomed Khan reports to me that large numbers of the subjects of his Highness the Khan of Khelat have entered the talookas of Kumbar and Soojawal, having fled from the Brahooee marauders who are in insurrection against the Khan.

The majority of the refugees have only escaped with their lives, their property having been plundered and destroyed by the insurgents.

The inspector is at Gote Shaho Jumalee on the Khelat frontier, and has taken the necessary steps to preserve order among the refugees.

I have placed a body of armed and mounted police under his orders.

From the latest information the Brahooees are committing depredations in the villages near Bhang, about 80 miles from British territory.

I do not anticipate that they will plunder any towns within our frontier, but as I consider it advisable that I should be present to superintend any arrangements which may be found necessary to protect the interests of our subjects, I am about to proceed in the direction of Shadadpoor.

I shall submit a further report on receipt of more reliable information.

Enclosure 2 in No. 26.

No. 525, dated Camp, Shadadpoor, 25th November 1871.

From C. McIvor, Esq., District Superintendent of Police, Shikarpoor, to Commissioner of Police in Scind, on circuit.

In continuation of my letter No. 498, dated 8th instant, I have the honour to report that I visited Shah Jumalee and several of the villages adjacent, in order to satisfy myself that effective measures had been taken for preserving order amongst the numerous refugees from Khelat territory; and I beg to state that the arrangements made for this purpose by Inspector Khan Bahadoor Taj Mahomed Khan appear to be most judicious.

Eleven temporary police outposts have been stationed at the following villages, viz.:—

1. Gote Butchul Lugharee.
2. „ Mahomed Khan Khund.
3. „ Lukho Gudro.
4. Putt.
5. Gote Rhya Mujsee.
6. „ Khawundne Roree.
7. Tiloo Mugsee.
8. Gote Meer Mahomed Huonani.
9. „ Imam Bux Nuthrani.
10. „ Shaho Jumalee.
11. „ Meer Mahomed Sumananee.

At each of these posts there are from three to four constables from the armed and mounted police. The whole are superintended by a chief constable, who has received all necessary instructions.

Armed men crossing the frontier are, on entering British territory, immediately disarmed, and there are at present 65 muskets, 132 swords, and about 52 shields and ammunition pouches in charge of the police.

In all cases in which the owners recross the border the arms are returned to them.

Police detachments have chiefly been stationed here to prevent annoyance or inconvenience to the inhabitants of the isolated squattings, which have become so numerous here, and to dissipate any sudden panic which may occur, as I am well informed that there are many disorderly and turbulent characters fully prepared to augment and take advantage of the slightest disturbance.

Even the residents of towns as far removed from the frontier as Soojawal and Kumber entertain groundless fears about the security of their property. The whole of the country immediately within the western boundary of the talooks of Kumber and Soojawal swarm with refugees, and places which were formerly wretched hamlets have now become respectable villages in size.

Many of these persons are in extremely destitute circumstances and suffer considerably from hunger and cold; numbers are, however, returning to their homes, though they may probably be compelled to re-enter our territory, as from the latest intelligence it appears that Sirdars Noordeen Khan Mingul and Moolla Mahomed Raisanee are both raising men to oppose the Khan.

I would beg to take this opportunity of bringing to your notice the very praiseworthy conduct of Peer Bux Kohawur, Zemindar of Shadadpoor, who has exerted himself most creditably in aiding the police in procuring and communicating intelligence.

I am also informed that he has done much to relieve the sufferings of the unfortunates who have fled from Brahooee marauders, and I would therefore respectfully urge that his services may be suitably recognised.

No. 3538, dated Shikarpoor, 29th November 1871.

Endorsed by the Magistrate of Shikarpoor.

FORWARDED in original to the Commissioner of Police in Scind.

No. 816, dated 9th December 1871.

MEMORANDUM.

IN reply to his endorsement No. 3538, dated 29th ultimo, the Magistrate of the Shikarpoor district is informed that the proceedings reported by Mr. McIvor on behalf of the refugees from Khelat territory are entirely approved.

2. The conduct of Peer Bux Kohawur is viewed with much satisfaction, and the Magistrate is requested to convey the Commissioner's approbation and thanks to that Zemindar.

3. Means for affording subsistence to the refugees will be open on the public works now in course of construction on the Seer and Sukkur and canals, and the Collector and Magistrate is requested to communicate with the Executive Engineer in view to this being arranged.

(Signed) W. L. Merewether, Colonel,
Commissioner in Scind.

No. 27.

No. 8 C.P., dated Camp, Delhi, 11th January 1872.

From C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to Secretary to Government of Bombay.

With reference to the correspondence ending with the telegram of the 9th instant from his Excellency the Governor of Bombay to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General, I am directed to forward copy of a telegram, dated the 7th instant, from the Commissioner in Sind, and to communicate the following remarks and instructions of the Governor General in Council on the subject of affairs in Khelat.

2. It appears that nearly the whole country is in the hands of the revolted Sirdars. Kutchee was in rebellion many weeks ago. Lus Beyla has fallen into the hands of Ali Khan Jamote. Within the last few days Kedj has thrown off allegiance, and the position of the Khan's representative there appears to be untenable. His Excellency the Governor General in Council views this successful rebellion with great anxiety. The spread of disorder in Khelat is most prejudicial to British interests, and his Excellency in Council, while impressed with the urgent necessity that exists for bringing the present disorders to a close, sees very little hope of the Khan being able to establish his authority while he maintains his attitude of uncompromising demand for the unconditional surrender of the rebels.

3. It is difficult to believe that the Sirdars who have taken the lead in the present insurrectionary movement could have maintained their position so long and so successfully if they had not some well-grounded grievances against the Khan's government, and to a considerable extent enlisted the sympathies of the people on their behalf. Admitting that, in former years, many of the Sirdars may have proved themselves to be turbulent and intriguing men, and may have been the cause of much anxiety to the Khan and weakness to his Government, his Excellency in Council nevertheless doubts whether the policy is altogether sound which refuses to receive their overtures except upon unconditional surrender. If the Khan were in a position to assert his authority by force of arms the case would be very different, but this he seems quite unable to do. On the other hand, the British Government could not consent to assist him with a British force under any circumstances to coerce the Sirdars, nor can help of other kind be given unless his Excellency in Council is fully satisfied that they will receive proper treatment at his hands, and that their rebellion has not been caused by aggressions upon their just and ancient rights.

4. I am therefore to suggest for the consideration of his Excellency the Governor of Bombay in Council, whether it would not be proper that the Commissioner in Sind, when calling on the Sirdars to submit, should assure them that their complaints will be thoroughly inquired into, and that such rights as they may be found justly to claim will be secured to them by the Khan. At the same time the Governor General in Council considers that the Khan should be required to put his affairs entirely in the hands of the Commissioner, and to abide by his mediation with the Sirdars. If the Khan would undertake to abide absolutely by the terms which the Commissioner might mediate, to remedy all the grievances of the Sirdars in regard to confiscation of property, resumption of jaghires, and oppressive taxation, which the Commissioner might decide to be well-founded, and if he would consent eventually to such a change in his administration as would give the principal chiefs a due share in the government of the country and an interest in the maintenance of order, and lead to the establishment of a system which would give a reasonable hope of permanent peace—on these conditions his Excellency in Council would not be indisposed, after the terms have been satisfactorily arranged and

accepted, to give the Khan pecuniary assistance to the extent of a lakh of rupees, or more if necessary, to enable him to meet his most pressing demands and give his administration a fair start.

5. Under no circumstances will his Excellency in Council consent to send a force into Khelat to assist the Khan or suppress internal revolt. Nor will his Excellency in Council assist the Khan with money unless assured that substantial justice is done between the Khan and his Sirdars, and such arrangements are made as give a fair prospect of permanent peace and firm government. The mediation of the British Government on the above condition seems, therefore, to be the most advisable course, and if the Bombay Government concur in these views, his Excellency the Governor General in Council authorises action to be taken on them at once. If his Excellency the Governor in Council has other suggestions to make, I am to request the favour of their submission at an early date.

I am to state that, in the opinion of his Excellency in Council, the extremely opposite views of policy which have prevailed between the Commissioner in Sind and the Superintendent of the Frontier have not been without an injurious effect on the state of affairs in Khelat, and if the Commissioner, with the liberal discretionary powers that have been given to him, is unable to mediate with advantage, it will be necessary to consider whether other arrangements for the control of our relations with Khelat ought not to be made.

6. With respect to the remark in the telegram of his Excellency the Governor of Bombay, that he regrets that his minute of February was left unanswered as he hesitated to remove Colonel Phayre, and now ascribes most of the present difficulties to his present and known sympathies, I am to point out that the Government of India were never asked to direct the removal of Colonel Phayre. In his minute of 10th February 1871, his Excellency the Governor of Bombay stated that he had refrained hitherto, from regard to Colonel Phayre, from proposing his removal, but thought it would be for the public interest if, on a fit opportunity, another appointment were found for him. This was a matter which it was entirely within the competency of the Bombay Government to deal with, and in regard to which it has not hitherto been usual for the Government of India to interfere. In my telegram of 24th February 1871, you were informed that, before deciding on the affairs of the Sind frontier, the Viceroy would await a reply to my letter No. 412 P., of that date, in which the views of the Bombay Government in regard to the Murree and Boogtee tribes were called for. The reply to that letter was not furnished till 15th July. In my letter No. 2336 P., dated 27th October, the policy proposed in the minute of his Excellency the Governor was provisionally sanctioned, and in expressing approval of this policy his Excellency the Governor General in Council considers that he did all that was needed to enable the Bombay Government to give effect to their views under the conditions laid down by the Government of India. If the permission of the Government of India, which had never hitherto been asked in respect to appointments in Sind, was considered necessary before Colonel Phayre could be transferred to another appointment, it ought to have been specially asked for.

No. 28.

No. 264, dated Bombay Castle, 15th January 1872.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Referring to previous correspondence regarding the affairs of Khelat, I am directed to transmit herewith, for submission to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council, copy of a letter (and of its accompaniments), No. 868, dated 30th ultimo, from the Commissioner in Sind, reporting his proceedings at Jacobabad, and submitting his views as to the present rebellion in the Khelat territory, and the mode in which assistance should be given to his Highness the Khan in dealing with his nobles.

2. In submitting these papers I am desired to express the concurrence of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council in the views and recommendations submitted by Sir William Merewether. His Excellency in Council is still of opinion that pecuniary aid should be given to the Khan, not on the ground that his resources are exhausted, but to prevent their being so.

Enclosure in No. 28.

No. 868, dated Camp, Jacobabad, 30th December 1871.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I., C.B., Commissioner in Scind, to His Excellency the Right Honourable Sir W. R. Seymour V. FitzGerald, G.C.S.I., Governor and President in Council, Bombay.

I HAVE the honour to report that I reached this place on the 21st instant. On the 19th idem, when en route from Sukkur, I received the following telegram from Colonel Phayre, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier :—

"Nawab Mahomed Khan has written in to his Highness' Vakeel here, that he is coming "to Jacobabad with the Sirdars about making terms. But in the Khelat Diary sent to "you yesterday, Captain Harrison reports that the Khan is averse to making terms and "asks us to aid him against the Sirdars. Shall I let Mahomed Khan come to Jacobabad. "Please let me know quick, as from the letter just received he appears to be en route." I replied at once, "Mahomed Khan should be directed immediately *not* to bring the "Sirdars into Jacobabad. He should leave them on the border, and come in himself to "Jacobabad, where I shall be on Thursday morning."

2. Colonel Phayre again telegraphed, "Referring to my telegram of this morning, I "have just learnt that Nawab Mahomed Khan has arrived "at Mamool,* two coss from this, with the Sirdars, and "wants to come in to Jacobabad this evening." To this was sent—"Mahomed Khan "should leave the Sirdars at Mamool and not bring them within British territory. He "should not have brought them so far without permission first obtained. He should "himself come to Jacobabad, and be there when I come on Thursday."

* In Khelat territory.—(Sd.) W. L. M.

Colonel Phayre further reported on the 19th, "I have given your orders to Mahomed "Khan and he has written to tell them. He tells me they did not travel with him—were "behind.

3. The Khelat diary referred to in Colonel Phayre's first telegram reached me on the 20th, having gone to Sukkur (copy in full appended). It contains the following:—"The "above report with accompaniments† reached his Highness "just before paying me his usual weekly visit. From his "Highness' conversation, he was greatly incensed at "Nawab Mahomed Khan's conduct, as prior to leaving "Khelat he had agreed that the acts of the rebels had been "of such a nature as to preclude any possibility of anjam or 'treaty.' His Highness "further stated that Nawab Mahomed Khan's conduct regarding this treaty had been to "actually acknowledge Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and the rebels as the ruling powers in "Beloochistan. That other districts would naturally follow the example that had been "set them, and that he would be unable to restore order unaided. That he and his "brother, Nusseer Khan, had always considered themselves as dependents of the "English Government. If his country was of any value to us as a boundary to our own "territory, the time had now come for us to take possession or give him assistance. "That if we were indifferent as to what took place, he would do the best he could, but "might eventually have to seek protection from either Afghanistan or Persia."

† From Nawab Mahomed Khan to his Highness the Khan, giving an account of his proceedings and the terms he had received from the rebel Sirdars.
Copy of these terms was forwarded under my memorandum, No. 798, of 3rd December 1871.—(Sd.) W. L. M.

4. The view taken by the Khan of the demands of the Sirdars was undoubtedly the correct one. They were not terms respectfully asked for, but arrogant dictations, which could not be accepted by a sovereign without conveying a public acknowledgment that he was helpless, and virtually abdicating his power and position as ruler of the country. The Khan indignantly refused to receive these terms, and wrote to Nawab Mahomed Khan as follows:—"I have perused your letter and the terms of peace sent by you. I was "greatly astonished at reading the contents. You remember very well that I asked you "in the presence of Major Harrison whether you would go and fight or make peace, and "you replied that the time was not for making peace, that peace was not advisable, the "time for that had passed. I inquired again from you and Sukkur Khan,‡ and received "the same reply; you stated fairly there was no resource but "to go to war. When you put to flight the rebels at Sunn "and Laskaree they were compelled to proceed to the town of Jallal Khan and ask for "peace. You should at first have given me information of the wish of these rebels and "then have carried out my instructions. It was quite wrong on your part to have "inclined to the side of peace in opposition to your very clear statements to me. What "is the reason of this procedure? You were my vakeel; when you did not wish to fight, "you should have made such terms as would have been consistent with my high dignity "and honour, and I would have given my consent. I am at a loss to understand for "what reasons you have agreed to the terms you mention. If you have done it for

‡ Commander of the regular troops. (Sd.) W. L. M.

" security of the country and people, and peace to the subjects, where are those people " and that country? By this arrangement the return of the people who have left the " country is impossible, but there is every probability of the flight of those who have " remained when they come to know of it. There should be distinction between the " ruler and the ruled. You should think for a moment and pay great attention to the " fact that the Brahooees have caused great disturbances and have inflicted very great " injury on the subject people, who have on that account been obliged to take refuge " in another country. The British Government, on hearing of these improper acts of " the Brahooees, were greatly dissatisfied and expressed disapproval, and have in conse- " quence imprisoned Meer Khan Jamote and sent him to Bombay. The British officers " will not now, taking into consideration what has already passed, approve of those " terms of peace. Noordeen* was turned out of Kharan by " Azaad Khan, to whom he had gone for assistance. Meer " Fukkeer Mahomed and Kairiah † also remained faithful and " have given the same refusal of aid to Noordeen. Meer Kairiah will himself come into " my presence. Noordeen, who has met with disappointment everywhere, has gone to " the Minguls for protection of his person from injury, but his entreaties have proved " unsuccessful. None have given him refuge, and all have kept aloof through fear; why " have you now shown such an inclination for peace? This is not good that you want " to do, but is evil. A poet has said—' War and peace out of time and season are " ' useless. The rose remains in its own place, and the thorn in its own. The time is " ' not yet passed, and it is not too late, you should gird up your loins and show your " ' courage, and try to perform such acts as may be remembered for ever, and may " ' not be forgotten by lapse of time.' I approve of your sending for the son of Naib " Wullee Mahomed from Dadur, what instructions have you issued to Hyat Khan " Lehree, whom you have appointed to the Naibship of Dadur as formerly, and how will " he perform his duties? What property will he take care of? Had you taken the " country by force and appointed Mahomed Hyat Khan also by force, it would have " been better and have looked nicer. All is well here; continue to give particulars of " the state of affairs with you without fail."

* Mingul Chief and in rebellion.
† His son.

5. On the day of my arrival here Nawab Mahomed Khan paid his respects, and communicated to me the contents of the above letter. He also briefly informed me of his proceedings to the effect that after reaching Jellah Deera,‡ his forces and those of the rebels were on the 20th November drawn up opposite each other, to try the issue of battle, but he thought that, taking into consideration the injury the country and people had already suffered from these disturbances, he would consult his master's interests best, and those of the country generally, if he endeavoured to make peace. Rebel Sirdars came into his camp, and the result was the terms of peace were drawn up as already explained. He then proceeded to Bagh, the rebels occupying Hajee-ka-Shere. The distance between is about 16 miles. On the 13th December he received reply from his Highness the Khan respecting the terms. He still, however, thought peace on these terms most desirable, and determined on coming into Jacobabad to lay the whole matter before the Political Superintendent, Colonel Phayre, and bringing the Sirdars also. The Sirdars did not accompany him, but followed. On receiving my orders he arranged for the Sirdars to remain at Mamool and Nusseerabad, places in Khelat territory on the border, four and seven miles respectively from Jacobabad.

‡ Six miles west of Bagh.

6. By bringing the Sirdars with him he evidently thought there might be a chance of his proceedings being approved by the authorities here, and that arrangements might be made under which the terms he had received might be ratified, while at the same time he extricated himself personally from a difficult position in which his pusillanimity and disregard of his master's and country's best interests had placed him.

7. As the least recognition of these Sirdars, and of their demands, would, I felt sure, be fatal to the present and future power of his Highness the Khan, I at once informed Nawab Mahomed Khan that he had acted most improperly in bringing them in this direction, and that he must immediately intimate to them that I could hold no communication whatever with them as long as they were in arms against their sovereign, and that they must abandon their hostile attitude before I could listen to any statements in regard to them. That as regards himself, he had received the instructions of his Highness the Khan, and should proceed accordingly.

8. In acting thus I was guided by the conviction that direct interference from this in the present disturbances was most unadvisable; that it was most necessary to let the Sirdars understand that they would receive no countenance in their rebellious proceedings,

and that if the Nawab chose to act vigorously and with proper courage, he had ample means in Kutchee to defeat the rebels and bring them into submission or drive them out of the country.

9. The Sirdars were duly informed, and left Mamool and Nusseerabad that night for Hajee-ka-Shere, Nawab Mahomed Khan intending to follow afterwards to Bagh.

10. It appeared to me to have been conclusively shown, by what had passed, that the Khan's interests and the peace of the country must inevitably suffer gravely in the hands of so weak and timid a person as Nawab Mahomed Khan. I therefore addressed the following letter to his Highness the Khan, to inform him how I had acted, and to induce him to speedily depute a more worthy person to manage his affairs in Kutchee.

" I have to intimate to your Highness that I this day (21st December) arrived at Jacobabad.

" I had previously heard from Colonel Phayre, C.B., the Political Superintendent on the Frontier, of what had passed between your Highness' vakeel, Moolla Mahomed Khan, and the chiefs who have been lately acting in opposition to your authority, and that the vakeel was on his way to Jacobabad, accompanied by the chiefs, for the purpose apparently of having his proceedings countenanced and approved by the British authorities.

" I requested Colonel Phayre to inform the vakeel that, while he himself should come into Jacobabad, the chiefs could not under the circumstances be allowed to enter British territory.

" The vakeel has to-day paid his respects to me, and I have heard from him a statement of what had occurred as well as of your Highness having disapproved of the terms he had taken on himself to make with the chiefs.

" I at once informed him that such arrangements as he had entered into could not be listened to by me, and he should immediately inform the chiefs that I could hold no communication with them as long as they were in arms against their sovereign.

" It is necessary now that I should point out to your Highness that I do not consider that your interests and those of the country and people you rule over have been properly regarded by the vakeel, and that the stability of your Government, the peace and prosperity of your country, which it is the earnest desire of the British Government to see firmly established, are liable to suffer while in the hands of Vakeel Mahomed Khan, especially as regards the present state of affairs.

" I would therefore earnestly urge on your Highness that you should, with the least possible delay, despatch your Wuzeer, the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, to Kutchee, with full powers to act in your Highness' name, and with authority to confer with me on such points as you or he afterwards may deem it advisable he should seek my advice.

" That advice will always be most freely and readily given, and I trust results favourable to the good of your country will speedily follow from the course now recommended.

" Major Harrison has received instructions to remain above the passes, so that he may be near your Highness, and be able to afford you the benefit of his advice, when required, and as I have the fullest confidence in his judgment, I trust you will cordially accept his counsel.

" With assurances of sincere friendship for your Highness, and of regard for the welfare of yourself and country, I subscribe myself, &c."

11. The Wuzeer Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed is one of the bravest and most true servants the Khan has about him, and is, at the same time, a man of good sound sense as well as very just. If he can be spared from Khelat for a little while, I have little doubt of matters being satisfactorily arranged.

12. The above letter was forwarded for delivery to his Highness the Khan by the Political Agent at Khelat, through the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to whom I wrote :—

" I have the honour to forward herewith a letter addressed to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, with copy of the same in English, for your information and record, which I request you will be so good as to despatch by the quickest route to Major Harrison, for delivery to the Khan.

" 2. I consider that the conduct of the Vakeel, Moolla Mahomed Khan, has been most blameable. He was sent down by his master to attack and bring into subjection the chiefs who had taken up arms against the Khan's authority ; on the very first occasion that he gets near them he proceeds at once to arrange terms with them, and finally accedes to their actually dictating the terms on which they will be pleased to behave themselves

better in future. These he forwards to his Highness the Khan for approval, but without waiting to receive answer* he takes upon himself to bring these chiefs towards this place, apparently with the object of having his proceedings approved, and the terms he had arranged acknowledged by the British authorities.

* It appeared afterwards he had received a reply from the Khan. (Sd.) W. L. M.

"3. It is clear from a letter written by his Highness the Khan to the Vakeel, and which the latter has shown me, that he has acted entirely at variance, both with the orders he received and his own professions at the time of leaving the Khan, and in the worst possible manner for the good of his master and country. He behaved most improperly also in attempting to bring these chiefs to the British authorities without the sanction and instructions of the Khan, and before even he knew whether what he had done was approved of by the Khan. Until such approval had been received, and the Khan had expressed a wish that these chiefs should be allowed to visit the British authorities, it was manifestly most unbecoming that the Vakeel should have thought of bringing them to Jacobabad. It should also have been equally manifest to him that no communications could be held by the British authorities with men who were in arms against the ruler of the country. When the Vakeel attended to-day you were present. I informed him that intercommunication would not be allowed as long as the chiefs remained in armed opposition to their sovereign, and that he should act accordingly.

"4. It is most necessary that some person of more courage and better judgment than Moolla Mahomed Khan has displayed should be entrusted with the management of affairs in Kutchee, and Major Harrison should urge his Highness the Khan to depute at once his Wuzeer, the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, whose courage and integrity have been so often proved, to conduct the affairs of Kutchee and bring matters to a more satisfactory condition. I believe the state of affairs in Jalawan, and generally above the passes, will allow of this measure being adopted, and I trust the Khan will not hesitate to carry it out.

"5. Major Harrison, as mentioned in my former letter, should remain, for the present at all events, above the passes, and, as arranged with you to-day, his escort be relieved, the relief being provided with everything necessary to meet the severity of winter there. He should select the best place as regards obtaining forage, merely keeping in view the desirability of being within easy communication with the Khan.

"6. I have to request that you will transmit a copy of this letter to Major Harrison, with copy of the English version of the letter to his Highness the Khan, for his information and guidance."

13. The Sirdar left on the night of the 21st, the Nawab on the evening of the 24th. The latter, before quitting his party, who were encamped a little north of Bagh, had given instructions that they were to engage in no hostilities during his absence unless they were attacked, in which case they were to do their best. Information has now been received that, during the night of the 23rd instant, the rebels attempted to surprise the camp of the Nawab's troops. These, however, were on the alert, met the attack, and, when day broke of the 24th, assailed the rebels so vigorously that they quickly and completely defeated them. The rebels fled in the direction of Null, as if intending to seek shelter in Seebee or in the Murree Hills. They are said to have had 120 killed, while the loss of the Khan's troops was only three sowars and two foot soldiers killed, and one of the latter wounded. Sheekkur Khan, the Commander of the Khan's troops, followed up the rebels, and afterwards took possession of Hajee-ka-shere and Mittree, finding in the latter of which much of the property that had been plundered by the rebels.

14. It is not clearly ascertained as yet whether the attack on the Nawab's camp was ordered by the Sirdars after they had been told they would not be received here, but it most probably was, and instructions might easily have been sent by them in advance in the hope of catching the Khan's troops careless. In this they were completely foiled by the good conduct of the latter and their commander. This success, if followed up by good arrangements, should bring the present disturbance in Kutchee to a close.

15. From the southern part of Beloochistan the intelligence is not, I am sorry to say, so satisfactory as before reported. Ali Khan Jamote had succeeded in getting possession of Beyla, the Shahgassee Golam Jan having had to abandon it, owing to the troops with him misbehaving and refusing to fight. What has become of the Shahgassee since he fled from Beyla is not yet known, but he completely abandoned his charge, though the force coming against him was very insignificant. Noordeen, the Mingul Chief, failed to obtain assistance from Azaad Khan. He then entered his own country of Wud, and having got a small body of men together proceeded to Beyla and joined Ali Khan Jamote.

16. Fakheer Mahomed Bezonjao, the old Naib of Kedj, held aloof on all former occasions from any of the rebellious movements that took place. He appears on the present occasion to have shown the same fidelity towards the Khan, and if he continues to do so Noordeen's power for mischief will be nothing great.

17. After most careful inquiry made since my arrival here, and mature consideration, I am quite satisfied that the late disturbance arose conjointly from dissatisfaction felt by a few chiefs of Sarawan with certain acts of the Khan, and the working of the two fugitive Sirdars, Moolla Mahomed Raisanee and Noordeen Mingul, who had been residing at Candahar. The Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, his Highness the Khan's Wuzeer, in whose honesty and truth, from an acquaintance of many years standing, I can fully trust, stated to Major Harrison that these disturbances had not arisen from any act of the Khan, but he allowed that, though the Khan had not been unjust, he had not favoured his chiefs with much affection. They certainly have not done much to win it. Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, it will be recollected, fled to Afghanistan after he had rejected the liberal decision passed on his case by the Khan in May 1869. Alladina Khoord, another chief of Sarawan, also cast in his lot with Moolla Mahomed, but remained at Seebee or in the Murree Hills without proceeding to Candahar. Noordeen Mingul, a chief of Jalawan holding formerly possession in Wud, joined the Jam of Beyla (whose connexion he is by marriage) in his attempted hostilities against the Khan in the end of 1869, and when the Jam escaped into Sind he was accompanied by a younger brother of Noordeen who is still with the ex-Jam's family at Hyderabad, but Noordeen himself fled to Candahar and joined Moolla Mahomed Raisanee. From there these two watched events. An appeal they made to his Highness the Ameer appears to have met no favourable response, and they waited until some opportunity should offer for reviving disturbances in Beloochistan.

18. This appeared to have come to pass the other day, and the absence of the main body of the Khan's troops in Mekran, Beyla, and Kutchee seemed to make it a favourable one. The Khan of Khelat during last cold season made a tour through Kutchee, which he had not done for many years, and remained there for some time. He then proceeded up to Quetta by the Bolan and by Moostung to Khelat, staying awhile at both those places, and not reaching Khelat until the 2nd October. During his progress his Highness thought fit to make inquiries into the nature and extent of tenures which during former disturbances had been either irregularly obtained possession of, or been improperly enlarged. This of course he had a just right to do, and it was proper he should do so when present himself in person. But it was a delicate task, and one in which liberal views and decisions would have greatly added to his popularity and power. Unfortunately Major Harrison was not near him at the time to give him the benefit of advice, and there were others who did not counsel him well, so that a too precise course would seem to have been followed, which did not give satisfaction to those whose actions were closely looked into. Still there was nothing which occurred in Kutchee, as far as I have yet learned, the Khan had not a perfect right to do as sovereign of the country, if he considered it necessary.

19. At Moostung there was a man named Syud Ali Mahomed, who during the time, 1863–64, when the present Khan Khodadad Khan was driven from his throne, and his brother Shere Dil Khan was made Khan, took an active part against the former and officiated as Wuzeer to the latter. While the Khan was at Mustoong he went through the revenue accounts and discovered that the Syud had misappropriated some 8,000 rupees, besides making payments without authority. Major Harrison happened to join the Khan shortly after, and directly he heard of the above he strongly advised the Khan not to try and recover what his cousin had taken no notice of, as doing so would lead to discontent and disturbances. The Khan's excellent Wuzeer gave the same advice. Syud Ali Mahomed had also in his possession a letter bearing Shere Dil Khan's signature, which made over Quetta to the Afghans.

20. Unfortunately the advice tendered had come too late. The Khan having proved the misappropriation made the Syud repay the money. He also made him deliver up the letter of Shere Dil Khan's giving away Quetta, and his Highness has it now in his possession. That causing the refund of the money by Syud Ali Mahomed was an impolitic act is plain enough, particularly as so many years had been allowed to pass without any notice having been taken of it, and that it caused the Syud to become discontented is undoubtedly true, but still such circumstances would not have caused the outbreak of rebellion had there not been other agency at work, and the Sirdars at Candahar not been ready to take advantage of any ill-feeling they might hear of.

21. Syud Ali Mahomed used his best endeavours to work on others, and succeeded too well with some, especially with Jehangeer Khan, the head of the Lehrees, and one of

the most determined men in that part of the country. Moolla Mahomed also addressed Jehangeer Khan from Candahar, as was shown afterwards in the letters found upon his person. Jehangeer Khan had much to be grateful to the Khan, for in 1869 he had sided with Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, and had been seized and imprisoned by the Wuzeer Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, but had been released and pardoned by the Khan without any penalty being exacted. When, however, the Khan was in Kutchee, his Highness examined the Sunnuds under which Jehangeer Khan held his lands there,* and finding he had encroached on Government lands, directed that revenue should be collected on the latter; Jehangeer declared he would either keep what he had got or take nothing. Jehangeer Khan being a man of note for courage was the leader of the rebels at Mustoong and fell in the fight.

* The principal part of the Sirdars of Sarawan and Jalawan, though their chief possessions and places of residence in summer are above the passes, have large grants of free lands in Kutchee and spent the greater part of the cold season there, as less inclement than in the upper country.

22. Moobaruck Khan Shawanee, another leader, and who was also killed, had for some time hoped the Khan would nominate him head of the tribe in place of Abdool Kadar, who is an imbecile. But this had not been done, and the Sirdar had further learned that the Khan intended examining his Sunnuds also. These seem his only reasons for joining the others.

23. Syud Khan Bungoolzye, the third who was killed, was a wealthy merchant, and it is not stated that he had anything to complain of whatever. The fourth, Sirdar Syud Khan Mahomed Shahee, escaped. He was, it is said, dissatisfied with some decision of the Khan in revenue matters.

24. The design of these chiefs was to seize on Mustoong and Quetta, cause the Khan to be assassinated, and being joined by Sirdars Moolla Mahomed and Noordeen from Candahar, to take possession of the country. What was to follow afterwards does not appear to have been taken into consideration by them, but there would undoubtedly have been anarchy and confusion throughout the whole of Beloochistan. Meer Khan, the ex-Jam of Beyla, would have attempted to return to his old position, and would have immediately resorted to his old intrigues to obtain the supreme power. This would never have been allowed by the Brahooees and Belooch, for though he was related to the Khan of Khelat by marriage, he is by birth a Sindee, whose rule the others would not submit to.

25. Quetta was saved by the fidelity and ready action of the Khan's Naib there, who placed himself in the fort with the troops he had. The rebels gained temporary possession of Moostung, but were defeated and driven from it by the promptitude and courageous attack of the worthy old Wuzeer. The rebels being scattered proceeded down the Bolan, and, recruiting near Dadur, succeeded in getting possession of that place by the treachery of people inside. They were then joined by such people in Kutchee who had nothing to lose, and might gain by plunder, and the Khan's officers having shamefully fled from Bagh it was occupied by the rebels, and Gundava afterwards, where the Khan had no troops. There was no organization, each person of any position formed himself a free agent and plundered on his own account; such would always be the case were there no ruler in Beloochistan.

26. Sirdar Alladina Khoord joined the rebels in Kutchee, and dissensions immediately commenced between him and Summunder Khan, the Lehree chief, who had succeeded Jehangeer Khan. These, however, were repressed by the appearance of Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, whom all acknowledged as head, and who arrived about the same time that Nawab Mahomed Khan reached Kutchee with the Khan's troops.

27. When Nawab Mahomed Khan agreed to discuss terms there were present in the rebel camp the following chiefs:—

Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee.
" Jundoo Shwanee.
" Mahomed Khan* Rustomzye.
" Alladina Khoord.
" Summunder Khan Lehree.
" Syud Khan Mahomedshahee.
" Shadee Khan Bungoolzye and his son.
" Adam Khan.
" Ittibar Khan Gheranee.

Add to these—

" Noordeen Mingul.
" Ali Khan Jamote.

A minor chief—

" Gohur Lehree.

* Brother-in-law of Moolla Mahomed.

And these are all that are in open opposition to his Highness the Khan. Syud Ali Mahomed is said to have fled to Cabul.

28. The unpopularity of any acts of the Khan during his tour in Kutchee and afterwards may, I believe, be justly attributed to the baneful counsel of Nawab Mahomed Khan. The office this person properly holds is that of Vakeel for his Highness at Jacobabad. But of late years he has been much with the Khan, leaving his son in charge here. This should not, and will not, be allowed in future. Mahomed Khan is a clever man, but he is a thorough courtier, and endeavours to gain influence with his master by concurring in all his proposals and agreeing in all his views, no matter how injudicious they might be, instead of remonstrating and pointing out their impolicy, as the old Shahgassee invariably has done, when necessary. This induced the Khan to lean more on Nawab Mahomed Khan than on the Wuzeer, and to carry out illiberal measures which the latter would have certainly advised him against. The Nawab introduced octroi duties into Moostung without the Wuzeer's knowledge. These the Shahgassee repealed after the fight there. The Nawab is also sadly deficient in courage, while delighting in petty intrigues. He is, therefore, the worst person to be near the Khan, who, as a despotic sovereign, might easily be led away, especially when he has reason to be justly offended with people who have so systematically and continuously opposed his authority.

29. I regret also that I must add my conviction that these Sirdars felt a confidence in their actions, which they otherwise would not have had, from their knowledge of the views the Political Superintendent, Colonel Phayre, has unfortunately held for the past two half years in regard to their position and duty towards their sovereign. The existence of this was, I have often reported, well known throughout the country, and most seriously adds to the difficulties experienced by the Khan in controlling his unreasonable barons. They assume to themselves the right of doing whatever they please, and disputing his wishes and orders on all occasions.

30. That this is the case is, I think, plainly proved by their recent proceedings, when the Nawab consented to enter into terms with them. They dictated such as no ruler could possibly accept, and then desired and persuaded the Nawab to bring them into Jacobabad to get the assistance of the British authorities there in having them ratified by the Khan, and to get them ratified also by those authorities. They would never have ventured to propose such a thing had they not thought they would have received support, and the evil effect of such a belief I cannot too strongly remark upon. The recent orders of the Government of India have clearly laid down the policy that is to be followed as regards relations with the Khelat Government, but it will take years to remove the damaging influence the above has caused.

31. There now only remains to be considered what should be done for the future. The rebels have been dispersed for the present, and may not be able to re-collect in Kutchee or elsewhere, But owing to the temporary success that has attended Ali Khan Jamote's advance on Beyla, and the junction with him of Noordeen, there are still elements of disorder afloat, and it is most desirable that something should be done to re-establish on a sound basis and strengthen the power of the Khan, unless we are contented to let his government fall to pieces and anarchy, with subsequent estrangement from the British Government to follow. His Highness the Khan, in his conversation with Major Harrison, as detailed in that officer's diary, pointed out that he would be unable to restore order unaided, and appealed first to the British Government. Failing to obtain assistance there, he would in the end have to apply elsewhere, either to Afghanistan or Persia. This may read as a threat, but I do not believe for a moment it was intended as such by the Khan, but was the wearied exposition of real helplessness by one who was at last driven almost to despair by the incessant troubles he had been involved in from the time he ascended the throne, and who naturally turned to that power he had most confidence in, and to whom he felt he might yet be of value could his unfortunate country be brought into a settled and prosperous condition.

32. The Khan may not be the best of rulers, but taken as a Native Sovereign he will bear comparison with most. He has had more than usual difficulties to encounter, for from the very first he has had to contend against the unceasing endeavours of turbulent barons to wrest all powers from his hands; of one thing, however, there is and can be no doubt, that he has been unswervingly true in his faith towards the British Government, and in his desire to act on all occasions in the way which he thought would best meet its wishes.

33. I would therefore most strongly urge that both in justice to the Khan for the way he has acted throughout, and as certainly a course of sound policy, that his present appeal should not pass unheeded.

34. I would not for a moment recommend armed intervention now, though I clearly foresee that such will become necessary before very long for the safety of our own districts, unless some suitable remedy is applied. Ever since I have had anything to do with this frontier, many years now, I have steadily opposed the idea of armed intervention, as I have always considered it as certain to prove detrimental in a high degree to the Khan's best interests, and more likely to weaken than strengthen his power by our settling the country, not he. These were the views entertained by General Jacob as expressed by him to the previous Khan, when the treaty was entered into in 1854.

35. I am, however, and always have been, of opinion that the Khan's position and the strength of his Government may be greatly improved by the judicious application of moral power, by cordially and truly supporting his rule, by letting it be seen by his nobles and subjects that we desired to have rule sustained; and by exerting our influence in his behalf whenever we found him to be deserving and in need of it.

36. The application of moral power though may not always be sufficient, and especially in respect to a poor country like Khelat. The course we would recommend and be prepared to encourage, the ruler may not be able to carry out for want of means, either in money or war equipment, to enforce the orders he would have to issue, and to carry out the plans necessary to secure their complete observance.

37. I would therefore respectfully recommend that should the Khan of Khelat be able to send his Wuzeer into Kutchee to confer with me as proposed, that I should be authorised to act on the above views. That should I find after careful inquiry that, as I believe to be the case, one of the Khan's chief difficulties is want of pecuniary means to restore order, I should be permitted to supply him with the necessary funds to an extent not exceeding one lakh of rupees, that it may be expended for the above purpose, in rewarding those who have done him good and faithful service during these disorders, and in recompensing in some degree those who have suffered by those.

38. I would also most strongly recommend that, as a very valuable assistance at the present time, a present of 400 Enfield rifles, with 200 rounds of ball ammunition for each, and the proper supply of caps, should be made to his Highness the Khan by the Government of India. This would not only be a great help now and for hereafter, but it would be an unmistakeable mark of the earnestness of the desire of the Government of India to see the Khan's power maintained, and of its determination to uphold it. It would also clearly show the discontented that their illusion, as to the countenance acts of rebellion were likely to receive, was totally unfounded.

39. On an interview taking place with the Wuzeer, I would hear fully from him the Khan's views and intentions, and if his Highness desired that I should assist in bringing about restoration of order I might then, with due propriety, receive intimation that an amnesty was proposed, and assent to a communication being made to the rebellious Sirdars, that if they chose to throw themselves on the mercy of the Khan the question of an equitable and just settlement of the respective position and rights of the ruler and ruled would be entered upon under the authority of the British Government, and that any arrangement so made should be held to be binding on all.

40. If the above procedure is deemed appropriate by Government, I think it very probable that any money payment may be avoided, or only a moderate one be found necessary. But on a satisfactory conclusion being arrived at, I would still urge that the present of arms should be granted as a sign of the confidence of Government and continued friendly feelings towards his Highness the Khan. I need hardly add, after all that has passed, that no measure derogatory to the position of his Highness the Khan will meet with any attention from me, while at the same time every endeavour will be made on my part to ensure the relations between the Khan and his nobles being placed on a sounder and more satisfactory footing than has hitherto existed.

41. I trust that my proceedings in this matter may meet with approval and my recommendations be accepted; should such be the case, I would beg that I may be favoured by telegram with instructions to act in accordance with the proposals herein submitted, so that there may be no delay in carrying them out. I shall of course remain here until the orders of Government are received.

P.S.—I do not consider it expedient at present to enter into the arrangements and make the payments to the Murree and Boogtee tribes lately provisionally sanctioned by the Government of India, and referred to in correspondence forwarded under Mr. Secretary Wedderburn's letter No. 5980, of the 9th instant. Order should certainly be restored before anything is done in the matter, and the year of trial should date from time of commencement of the new system.

(Signed) W. L. Merewether, Colonel,
Commissioner in Sind.

No. 29.

No. 222 P., dated Fort William, 24th January 1872.

From C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

I AM directed to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 264, dated 15th January, on the subject of the present rebellion in Khelat, and to communicate the following remarks and instructions of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council :—

2. The proposals of the Commissioner in Sind, which are concurred in by his Excellency the Governor of Bombay in Council, have, to a great extent, been anticipated in my letter No. 8 C.P., dated 11th January; and the condition of affairs in Khelat, as reported in the Commissioner's letter, No. 868, of 30th December last, does not appear to call for any considerable modification of the views of the Governor General in Council, as already communicated to you.

3. The inquiries which the Commissioner has made appear to establish two points, 1st, that the rebellion, although perhaps mainly brought about by the intrigues of the exiled Sirdars, was to a great degree occasioned or at least favoured by certain injudicious and illiberal proceedings of the Khan in investigating the nature and extent of the landed tenures of some of his influential subjects in Kutchee ; and, 2nd, that the rebellion has so gained head that there is not much hope of the Khan being able to suppress it by force of arms without assistance. Since the date of the Commissioner's letter the rebellion has extended to Kedj, where the Khan's representative has been unable to make his authority felt. The Khan on his part has not been able apparently to strike such a blow in any part of his dominions as to destroy the hopes which the marked successes of the rebels are calculated to inspire.

4. Under these circumstances, the Governor General in Council can entertain little hope that the rebels in the flush of success will be induced to throw themselves on the Khan's mercy and surrender unconditionally as the condition antecedent to the inquiry into, and redress of, their grievances. Whatever may be the merits or demerits of their complaints, his Excellency in Council doubts whether it is wise or prudent, unless the Khan is confident of his ability to assert his authority and suppress the rebellion, to force the quarrel to extreme issues. To insist on the recognition by successful rebels of extreme and absolute sovereign rights which the Khan is unable to enforce, and the attempted assertion of which appears to be one of the main causes of the outbreak, and to listen to no statements in regard to their complaints, unless the rebels, who have hitherto had no reason to anticipate the failure of their enterprise, abandon their attitude of hostility, is a policy of which, to say the least, the prudence is doubtful, and which may only prolong a trial of strength to which the Khan apparently does not feel himself equal.

5. It would have been a satisfaction to the Governor General in Council if he could have felt assured of the Khan's acquiescence in the proposals made in my letter of 11th January last, with a view to re-establish order in Khelat. But the Commissioner's telegram of the 21st instant intimates that the reply of the Khan to the Commissioner's previous letter was unsatisfactory. It is possible that the Commissioner's second letter may produce other results, but some days must still elapse before the Khan's reply is received. The terms on which the Governor General in Council will be prepared to aid the Khan to re-establish his authority are stated explicitly in my letter of 11th January. In the telegram despatched to you yesterday, of which a copy is enclosed, the Governor General in Council has desired that mediation or interference shall not be undertaken unless the Commissioner is assured of the Khan's consent, and that the Khan should be told to weigh well the serious consequences of a refusal on his part to accept cordially the proposals which have been made. If his Excellency the Governor of Bombay in Council had other suggestions to offer, I am to request the favour of their early submission.

6. With reference to the Khan's remark to Major Harrison that if he failed to obtain assistance from the British Government, he would in the end have to apply elsewhere, either to Afghanistan or Persia, I am to draw attention to my telegram of the 11th January, and to request that the Khan may be reminded that under Article 3 of the Treaty of 1854 he is bound to enter into no negotiation with other States without the consent of the British Government. Under the circumstances stated in the Commis-

sioner's telegram of the 21st, it is more necessary than ever that the attention of the Khan should be drawn to his (engagement) in this respect, and that he should be distinctly informed that any attempt to invite the interference of foreign powers in Khelat affairs will be considered and treated as an infraction of the treaty. It is the sincere desire of the Governor General in Council to see the Khan's authority firmly established, and to give him not only moral, but, when possible, material support. But his Excellency in Council cannot actively aid him unless assured that his Government is established in a just basis, that the rights of his subjects are properly cared for, and their reasonable grievances inquired into and redressed.

7. I am now to advert briefly to that portion of the telegram from his Excellency the Governor, dated 12th January, which is quoted in the margin. The Governor General in Council feels confident that throughout the correspondence relating to the intricate complications in Khelat politics, he has on all occasions given every possible support to the views and proposals of the Bombay Government. In accordance with the views of his Excellency the Governor of Bombay, the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan has been placed in political matters in subordination to the Political Superintendent of the Sind Frontier. In addition to the large sums already expended, an expenditure of rupees 32,040 has been provisionally authorised for the entertainment of Murree and Boogtee levies. In deference to the opinion of his Excellency the Governor, it has been decided that this payment shall be made in the name of the Khan, and that the Khan's subsidy shall not be reduced. The views of his Excellency the Governor in respect to Khelat affairs, as expressed in his minute of 10th February 1871, have also been concurred in, and the frontier officers have been required to shape their attitude to the subjects of the Khan accordingly. After the outbreak of the rebellion, when the Governor General in Council requested the Bombay Government to consider the expediency of making payments to the tribes, the matter was committed entirely into the hands of his Excellency the Governor of Bombay in Council, with the sole proviso that care should be taken to arrange the payments so that on the one hand the British Government might not be committed to taking any part in the struggle, and on the other hand that the money should not be used to assist any of the Khan's subjects in their rebellion. Again, in all the measures regarding the detention of the ex-Jam of Beyla at Hyderabad and his subsequent removal to Bombay, the views and proposals of his Excellency the Governor have been entirely approved and confirmed. The Governor General in Council is unable to recall any single instance in which the proposals of the Bombay Government have not been concurred in, with exception of the proposal made in his Excellency's telegram of the 9th November 1871 to make an immediate payment of money to the Khan. The Governor General in Council did not at the time feel himself justified in authorising a large and immediate expenditure in interference in a quarrel regarding the merits of which he had been very imperfectly informed. The expenditure, however, has been eventually authorised under certain conditions in my letter of 11th January.

"But as my views of the merits of the dispute and course to be adopted have not been concurred in, I am obliged to refer to the Viceroy, to whom your letter of December 30th is sent."

The Governor General in Council sees no advantage to be gained by raising, in the course of instructions conveyed to subordinate officers, questions as to how far the Government of India have concurred in the proposals of the Local Government. No good results can be expected to follow such a discussion, and it should not be continued. Setting aside all such questions, the object to be aimed at is to devise effective measures for putting a stop to the present lamentable anarchy in Khelat and establishing a satisfactory administration in that country. His Excellency in Council has already expressed the grave concern with which he views the present state of things, and he feels sure that his Excellency the Governor of Bombay in Council will heartily co-operate with him in endeavouring to devise an effective remedy. Should his Excellency the Governor in Council have any modifications to propose in the measures which have commended themselves to the Governor General in Council as likely to be most successful in restoring peace and prosperity to Khelat, I am to convey to you the assurance that they will receive the most careful and attentive consideration.

No. 30.

No. 5 of 1872. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. Secret.

To his Grace the DUKE OF ARGYLL, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE, Fort William, the 24th January 1872.

IN continuation of our despatch No. 185, dated 31st October last, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers* relative to the insurrectionary movement in Khelat.

2. We would beg to draw your Grace's attention to the letters to the Bombay Government of 11th January, and of this date, as containing our views on the subject.

We have, &c.

(Signed) MAYO.
JOHN STRACHEY.
J. F. STEPHEN.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.

No. 31.

No. 373, dated Bombay Castle, 20th January 1872.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying copy of correspondence* from the Commissioner in Sind relative to the state of affairs at Lus Beyla.

* Letter from the Foujdar of Lus Beyla, to Commissioner in Sind, dated 12th December 1871.
Letter from Commissioner in Sind, No. 836, dated 20th December 1871, in reply to above.

Enclosure 1 in No. 31.

Dated Kurrachee, 12th December 1871.

From Dewan Munguiram, Foujdar of Lus Beyla, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, C.B., K.C.S.I., Commissioner in Sind, on Circuit.

I HAVE the honour to submit for your information the following particulars received by me direct from Lus Beyla. The particulars are certainly of an unsatisfactory and discouraging nature, and as such are greatly to be regretted.

Your honour is aware that one of the objects of my visit to Kurrachee was to recover certain moneys from Mr. Noonan, a merchant here. I informed the Shah Gassee that I had failed to come to a settlement with Mr. Noonan, when the Shah Gassee instructed me that pending a settlement I should obtain advances of money from the Soukars here, and sell them the State share of the jowar, moong, and sursee crops, with which advances I was to purchase provisions for the Shah Gassee's troops.

I succeeded in raising money, and despatched the provisions in charge of the Khan's sepoys. A small portion only of the provisions reached Beyla, the greater portion having been interrupted by Ali Khan at Oothul, and by Shere Khan at Soon Meanee, the latter a relative of the former. Shere Khan informed the sepoys that Ali Khan was coming and would kill them, and advised them to return to Kurrachee with all despatch. They accordingly returned.

A couple of weeks since I heard here that Ali Khan Jamote contemplated an attack on the Shah Gassee of Beyla; the information received by me I communicated to Shah Gassee, and asked his permission to gather forces here, and to purchase arms and ammunition with the view to enable him all the more effectually to resist the attack. In the interim I anticipated a reply desiring me to do the needful in that respect, and accordingly I collected a number of men and purchased arms and ammunition.

A large quantity of provisions was forwarded by me to the Shah Gassee in the shape of wheat, &c.

The Shah Gassee sent me a reply in which he made no allusion whatever to the subject matter of my communication.

I was left in a state of anxiety in consequence.

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* Nos. 16 to 29.

I received further information subsequently that Ali Khan Jamote had collected his forces at Oothul, and Noordeen at Wud, and both marched on Lus Beyla. Ali Khan halted at Dundah, about six miles from Beyla, and Noordeen at Asea, about three miles distant. The Sirdars of the Roonjah tribe, Ibrahim Ali Mahomed, Sallay Ismahil, and Hajee Mahomed played upon the fears of the Shah Gassee's troops, giving them to understand that the enemy had overwhelming forces, and that to oppose him would be to court inevitable destruction. They also alarmed the Shah Gassee. Whereupon the Shah Gassee left everything at Beyla and betook himself, with his family and his troops, towards Jao *viâ* Lus. The following morning Ali Khan with his forces came into Beyla, Noordeen halting at a garden distant about one mile from Beyla.

I have furnished all the above particulars to the Khan whose answer to my letter I am awaiting; by his instructions I shall abide. In the meantime I shall be obliged by your favouring me with your advice as to how I am to act under existing circumstances.

Apologizing for thus troubling you.

Enclosure 2 in No. 31.

Memo. No. 836, dated Camp Humon, 20th December 1871.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, C.B., K.C.S.I., Commissioner in Sind.

In reply to his letter dated 12th instant, Dewan Munguiram, Foujdar of Lus Beyla, is informed that the Commissioner is very dissatisfied to hear of the flight of the Shah Gassee from Beyla. It appears to have been mainly brought about by the gross cowardice and misconduct of the troops serving with him. His Highness the Khan will issue his own orders in respect to these matters.

2. Dewan Munguiram had no right or authority to entertain men in British territory for service at Beyla, and his doing so was most improper. He is informed that should he act again in a similar manner, his immediate departure from Sind will be ordered.

No. 32.

No. 400, dated Bombay Castle, 22nd January 1872.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to Government, Bombay, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am directed to forward to you, for submission to the Government of India, copy of a letter and of its accompaniments from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 833, dated the 19th ultimo, relative to affairs at Khelat.

Enclosure 1 in No. 32.

No. 2277, dated Jacobabad, 16th December 1871.

From Colonel R. Phayre, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I., C.B., Commissioner in Sind, on circuit.

I have the honour to forward for your information the vernacular reports as per margin, which are copies of letters from Vakeel Mahomed Khan, commanding the Khan's troops at Bagh, to his son, Peer Jan, the Vakeel at this place.

Four reports, from which a renewal of hostilities by the Sirdars may be expected.

A few days ago the Sirdars sent a messenger to Jacobabad with a letter for me. I requested his Highness' Vakeel to inform this messenger that if the Sirdars wished to communicate with me it must be through either his Highness the Khan himself, or through his Vakeel, Mahomed Khan, now commanding in Kutchee, and that I could not open direct communication with rebels to their sovereign.

Enclosure 2 in No. 32.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from Meer Mahomed Khan to his Son.

THE state of the Brahooees is that on Monday they having collected all their cavalry and infantry marched from Mittree and entered the town of Hajee. Meer Buktyar Khan Baroozee also arrived at Hajee to see the Sirdars. I, too, was making arrangements to move towards Hajee to-day, or Wednesday, but was awaiting the arrival of the aforesaid Sirdar. I have sent my sowar, Attar Khan Baroozee, to bring Sirdar Meer Buktyar Khan, and it is hoped he will leave Hajee for this to-day, to-morrow, or Thursday. I will move from Bagh with my army to give battle to the Brahooees, who are making preparations for war. This news is sent for your information. By the favour of God all will be well. I will give you further particulars if the Baroozee speak of peace and reconciliation.

Enclosure 3 in No. 32.

Abstract Translation of a Letter to Mulla Peer Buksh, Mulla Mahomed Azeem Khan, Mulla Aman Allah, Mulla Atta-ulla, Mulla Faizullah, Meena Khan, and Mulla Khyr Mahomed.

I HOPE you have perused the intelligence I gave you of the expected arrival of Meer Sumundar Khan. On the night of the 25th of Ramzan, the aforesaid Meer arrived at my quarters in Bagh. To-day, at the time of breakfast, we met and commenced conversation. I informed him in clear terms that with the exception of Sirdar Moollah Mahomed Raisanee, all the Sirdars and chief men should accompany me to Khelat to the court of his Highness the Khan, and that the wishes of the Khan in regard to terms of peace or war should be carried out. Sumundar Khan agreed, and expressed his approval. He has left, and said that if the Sirdars also agreed he would bring them. If he did not, let us see what God does. If the Sirdars arrive I will take them to the presence of his Highness the Khan, and await his orders. If they do not arrive I will let you know of the arrangements that are then made in my next.

Enclosure 4 in No. 32.

Abstract Translation of a Letter to the Address of Mulla Peer Buksh, Mulla Mahomed Azeem Khan, Mullah Aman Allah, Mulla Mahir Khan, Mulla Attah-ullah Khan Mulla Faizullah, and Mulla Khyr Mahomed.

THE news about the Brahooees is that most of them do not desist from plundering caravans and committing ravages in the Sirkar's territories. Many persons came to me and gave me intelligence that it was the intention of the Sirdars to march from Mittree with their whole army (infantry and cavalry) and go to Mungar, near Nandee. Wadera Abdool Khyr Abrah, on hearing this, came to me and asked permission to march. I gave him leave yesterday (being Tuesday), and he has proceeded from Mungar towards the town of Janso. Yesterday, Kaj Mahomed Khan, Lehree, who came from Mittree, brought the same intelligence, viz., that the Sirdars were collecting their troops. To-day, on Wednesday, I permitted Kaj Mahomed to leave, and gave him clearly to understand that if Meer Sumundar Khan arrived and spoke of peace, well and good; if not, it was in the power of God to allow all that he wished to pass. Whatever the Sirdars may like to do I am not afraid. I am ready with the Sirdars' troops to meet the emergency. To-day one hundred faithful sepoys and one piece of artillery have been ordered to the fort of Mungar. This I have written for your satisfaction. If Meer Sumundar Khan should come, I will let you know in full what passes between us. If he does not, I will write you the necessary information. I hope you will keep me informed of the state of the affairs of the family, &c.

Enclosure 5 in No. 32.

Abstract Translation of a Letter to Mulla Peer Buksh, Mulla Mahomed Azeem Khan, Mulla Aman Allah, Mulla Mitto Khan, Mulla Attah-ullah, Mulla Faizullah, and Mulla Khyr Mahomed.

I WROTE to you in my last about sending 100 sepoys and one piece of artillery to the town of Mungar, and hope you have received the letter. Further intelligence is to the effect that I sent a message to the Sirdars, informing them that if they had resolved to fight,

I was ready with my troops to meet them. In the meanwhile a letter was received from Meer Sumundar Khan, stating that he will leave Mittree on Friday, the 24th Ramzan, and join me. He has not yet arrived. As soon as he does I will write and tell you, and will also let you know what passes between us.

Sirdar Meer Bukhtyar Khan has written to say that he will come to Bagh, and I have replied that he is at liberty to do so. By the wish of God, the said Sirdar will arrive to-morrow at Bagh, and I will give you further information in my next.

Kindly buy and send me two silk belts.

Enclosure 6 in No. 32.

No. 832, dated Camp, Shikarpoor, 19th December 1871.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I., C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to Colonel R. Phayre, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

In reply to your letter, No. 2277, dated 16th instant, I have the honour to inform you that the instructions you have issued through the Vakeel of his Highness the Khan of Khelat to the messenger of the rebel Sirdars, declining to hold direct communication with them, are approved.

No. 833.

True copies, with vernacular letters and translations, submitted to Government for information.

No. 33.

No. 459, dated Bombay Castle, 24th January 1872.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Referring to previous correspondence regarding Khelat affairs, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter from the Assistant Political Agent, Gwadur, No. 4, dated the 7th instant, received under endorsement from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 35, dated 16th idem, relative to the disturbances in Mekran, as also copy of the Khelat Agent's diary for the week ending 6th instant.

2. Copy of communications* and enclosures since received from the Commissioner in Sind regarding Khelat affairs, also accompany.

* No. 30, dated 13th instant,
„ 46, „ 17th „

Enclosure 1 in No. 33.

No. 4, dated Gwadur, 7th January 1872.

From Captain S. B. Miles, Acting Assistant Political Agent, Gwadur, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I., C.B., Commissioner in Sind, Kurrachee.

I have the honour to report, for your information, that the whole of the province of Kedj-Mekran, subject to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, is in a state of rebellion, and that hostilities have actually occurred between the inhabitants and the newly appointed Naib of Kedj, Darogah Atta Mahomed.

2. The country has been in a disaffected state for some time, ever since, in fact, the removal of Sirdar Faqueer Mahomed, and the inhabitants have now united under the leadership of Meer Bhai Khan Gitchkee, and Moolla Rehmut Zehree, to endeavour, if possible, to drive Atta Mahomed from the country, and restore the old *régime* under Faqueer Mahomed, or some other Sirdar. The proximate and assigned cause of this revolt is the obnoxious imposition of new taxes by Atta Mahomed, who has shown more zeal in collecting revenue for his Highness the Khan than the inhabitants altogether approve of.

3. About twelve days ago a collision took place between the parties, resulting in a loss of the Darogah's troops of two or three men, and on the part of the Beloochees of six killed and nine wounded. The fort or "Mirri," on being evacuated by Atta Mahomed, was plundered of all its property and occupied by Meer Bhai Khan. Atta Mahomed retired to Toorbut, which is less defensible, the walls having been partly destroyed by himself soon after his arrival at Kedj, and he is now surrounded by the rebellious tribes, number-

ing nearly two thousand men. No fighting has occurred since, but a desultory fire has been maintained by both sides.

4. An attempt was made a few days ago by Meer Esau Gitchkee, late Governor of Punchgoor, to effect a reconciliation, and he offered to secure Atta Mahomed a safe retreat to Khelat, if he would leave Kedj; this, however, the Darogah refused to do, and negotiations accordingly failed. I have received two letters from Atta Mahomed, announcing the progress of events, and stating his ability to put down the rebellion, but as he has only a few troops, and none of the Beloochees are on his side, it appears doubtful whether he will be able to do so. In his last letter Atta Mahomed requests to be supplied with ten thousand (10,000) service percussion caps.

5. I have also received letters from Meer Bhai Khan, Moolla Rehmut, Nubbee Buksh, and Meer Kirmnir, informing me of the state of affairs, and giving as the reason for their recourse to arms, the levying of double malyat or taxes which they cannot afford to pay. In acknowledging the receipt of these letters, I have requested Bhai Khan to respect the persons and property of British subjects resident at Kedj.

6. It appears to me that the removal from the Naibship at such a critical time of Sirdar Faqueer Mahomed Bezonjao, a man who had held it for nearly thirty years, and had acquired more power and influence in the country than any other man, was a serious mistake, and has enabled the disaffected part of the population to take advantage of the disturbed state of affairs in other parts of his Highness' territory, to raise a formidable insurrection, and endeavour to obtain by force the redress of grievances, real or supposed, under which they suffered.

7. Rumours have been brought by caravans of a raid having been made by the Afghans under Surfuraz Khan on Persian territory, and a large quantity of cattle and property carried off. Surteep Ibrahim Khan, in pursuing the robbers, fell into an ambuscade, in a pass between Bamm and Seistan, and lost a number of men. The report says that he has since been despatched by the Governor of Kerman with a force to retaliate upon the Afghans, and that his visit to Mekran has consequently been postponed. As Ibrahim Khan was to have been at Bumpoor in the month of Ramzan, and has not yet arrived, the rumour is probably not altogether without foundation.

No. 34, dated Jacobabad, 16th January 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copy forwarded to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, for information and for communication to the Political Agent, Khelat, with the view of his informing his Highness the Khan of the unfortunate results brought about by the misdirected zeal of Darogah Atta Mahomed. From Major Harrison's diary, ending 6th January 1872, it would appear as if his Highness had been led to believe that the measures of taxation proposed by Atta Mahomed could be carried out. Sirdar Faqueer Mahomed, declining to accept the government of Mekran on the terms proposed by the Khan, and the information now forwarded received direct from Mekran, should be all sufficient proof of the impolicy of the acts of the Darogah, and the sooner his Highness signifies his disapproval of them, and directs a reversal, with introduction of more liberal measures, the better. A change of governor for Mekran is most desirable, as, even should Atta Mahomed succeed in putting an end to present disturbances, his indiscreet commencement will always make him unpopular, and his work more difficult.

No. 35.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government for information.

Enclosure 2 in No. 33.

Diary by Political Agent, Khelat, from 25th to the 31st December 1871.

On Wednesday the 27th, I received a letter from his Highness the Khan forwarding a report from Nawab Mahomed Khan in continuation of correspondence noted in my diary for the week ending 3rd instant. As the Nawab still persisted in ignoring his instructions and taking upon himself the responsibility of treating with the rebels, his Highness asked the English Government, through me to disapprove of his proceedings and that of the rebel Chiefs. Copies and translations of his Highness' letter and accom-

paniments were forwarded by special messenger on Thursday the 28th instant. My reply to his Highness was to the effect, that if the rebel Chiefs went into English territory under the same circumstances as the ex-Jam of Beylah, my Government might, perhaps, support him in the way requested, but that if they proceeded to Jacobabad under his Vakeel's guarantee, his suggestion could scarcely be entertained. I further remarked that in my opinion the rebel Chiefs would not be received, and that their object was merely to maintain their present positions in Kutchee and Beylah until the spring, when they hoped to be joined by Azaad Khan and other people, and that it would, therefore, be to his advantage to send some capable person to Kutchee, who would have the courage and ability to carry out the instructions that had been given, as delay would tend to further complications.

On Friday I received the Commissioner in Sind's letter No. 846, to address of the Political Superintendent, covering a letter to his Highness, which quite supported what I had previously written as to the improbability of the Chiefs being received, and the advisability of relieving Nawab Mahomed Khan. I trust that the Shahgassee will be here in a few days en route to Kutchee.

Naib Peer Jhan's Sowar, who brought our post, reported having heard at Bushoree that Shukur Khan and the Naib of Bagh had made a night attack on the rebels at Mittree, killing 120, "amongst them Junda Shawanee;" also that Alladina Khoord has been captured. A letter to a buniah gives the following news on the subject; that when it was known no treaty had been made, Nawab Mahomed Khan was afraid of being murdered, and he went to Jellal Khan's Gote and sent a message to Shukur Khan to meet him with a regiment. The Brahooees sent off to collect at Mittree and have a grand looting in Kutchee. Shukur Khan also received intimation that there was no treaty, and being free to act on his Highness' orders Nawab Mahomed Khan being absent, he proceeded to Hajee-ka-Shere without the rebels knowing it, and from thence made a night attack. The cavalry, it is said, were in hot pursuit after Moolla Mahomed and the rebels.

The news from Beylah is that the people are divided amongst themselves, at first the Roonjahs and Minguls had a dispute, so Noordeen proceeded with a Koran and made anjam; later the Roonjahs and Jamotes, again Noordeen with the Koran was required; the general belief is that when the defeat of the rebels in Kutchee reaches Beylah, that the Minguls will desert Noordeen and return to their separate koochas, and that the Roonjahs being on bad terms with Ali Khan will ask Shahgassee Goolam Jan to return. Dost Mahomed Mingul confirms what I reported last week as to Noordeen's intentions in this direction had I not arrived, viz., that he was about to start for Kozdar and Bhagwanah, and had been promised money and supplies by Ali Khan Jamote to carry out his plans.

At Khelat there have been two snow-storms during the past week and a heavy fall of rain in this place.

No news from Mekran.

Shahgassee Goolam Jan is remaining at Mushka in hopes that his Highness will send reinforcements to enable him to retake Beylah.

Since closing this diary I have just received a letter from his Highness, forwarding a letter from Anriome Shah, Syud of Dadur, from which it appears that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, on hearing that he would not be allowed into English territory, directed the rebels to re-occupy Hajee-ka-Shere. Shukur Khan, commanding his Highness' force, had made arrangements to attack Mittree, hearing that there was no treaty. Both forces arrived about the same time at Hajee-ka-Shere, fighting continued all night and at daylight Shukur Khan divided his party into three divisions so as to command the flanks of the rebel force as well as his own front. After an hour of this fighting, the rebels were utterly routed and pursued to the walls of Mittree, which was then taken by his Highness' troops. The rebel loss was very heavy and his Highness' very small.

The Zingur Mingul Sirdar writes to me as follows:—The Minguls, Ismails, and Mahomed Hussanees collected a force of 500 at Chur Sooruk, in Seistan, and proceeded to plunder Boorjun and Gain. The Persian force went to intercept them; a fight ensued, in which seven or eight were killed on both sides; the Persians fled, leaving 80 camels, 10 horses, and 4 mules in possession of the Belooch. The latter have returned safely home with all their plunder. The force in Seistan is small, and Alum Khan's son resides at Boojud. Surfuraz Khan Sunjranee has returned from Jalk without fighting or making an anjam. The Zingur Minguls, who were compelled by dearth and famine to proceed to Gurin Seih, have returned to Nooshky and are living in Char Raizan.

No. 30, dated Camp Jacobabad, 13th January 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government in continuation of Commissioner's endorsement No. 1, of the 1st instant. The account of the fight in Kutchee differs from that before given, in so far as this would make the Khan's troops also assailants. The former account being direct from the Khan's Commander is, I believe, the correct one, and is confirmed by subsequent information that the rebels tried a night attack.

Enclosure 3 in No. 33.

No. 1, Kozdar, 6th January 1872.

Diary by the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 6th January 1872.

ON Tuesday, the 2nd instant, I was visited by Moolla Yoosoof Sirdar, Faqueer Mahomed's confidential agent, who informed me that the people in Mekran contemplated rebelling against his Highness' authority, and that the Sirdar had not reported these rumours to his Highness the Khan, for fear interested motives should be attributed to him. The chief object of this visit, in my opinion, was to ascertain if the rebels in Kutchee had been actually defeated. Moolla Yoosoof stated that his Highness' reception of Sirdar Meeah Kairah was kind; that he declined, however, to present Sirdar Faqueer Mahomed with the district of Toorbut, but had offered to free the district of Kedj from Darogah Atta Mahomed's control if the Sirdar would undertake to pay the same revenue. This Sirdar Faqueer Mahomed declined to do.

A man called Kuchee Dinaree arrived here on Tuesday, stating that he had been sent by Afzul Khan's wife with a post for us, and that it was taken from him by twelve or fourteen armed men close to Paishtkhana. Having received posts despatched from facobabad on the 23rd, 26th, and 30th ultimo, I am inclined to think that the packet was or his Highness the Khan.

Shahgassee Goolam Jan has proceeded to Khelat. Noordeen Mingul is camped in a large garden about three miles from Beylah with 400 men, and Ali Khan Jamote is in possession of the town.

A letter from Shukur Khan to his Highness, forwarded for my perusal, stated that on its being known that there was no treaty, Nawab Mahomed Khan had written to him to attack the rebels, but that after moving out with the force he got a second letter, directing him to remain quietly at Bagh until he, Mahomed Khan, rejoined. Having acted on the first order, he did not think it advisable to retrace his steps, so sent Sirdar Hubeeb Khan Shawanee on to Hajee-ke-Shere, to tell the people not to be alarmed, as he was coming to protect them and the Khan's ryots from the rebels. The above Sirdar returned, stating that the rebel force had left Mittree for Hajee-ke-Shere, with the intention of attacking him. The rest of the circumstances were as narrated by Syed Aurang Shah in last week's diary.

No direct news has been received from Mekran. A kafila from Punchgoor en route to Kutchee has just passed through this place, so I conclude that quiet prevailed up to the time of their leaving.

On Saturday evening during the night we had a little rain.

No. 37, dated Jacobabad, 16th January 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copy submitted to Government, in continuation of Commissioner's endorsement No. 35, of 16th instant.

2. Intelligence direct from Mekran shows that the ill-advised arrangements of Atta Mahomed to increase the revenues had caused very general discontent, and that the outbreak alluded to by the messenger of Sirdar Faqueer Mahomed had taken place. From the offer made by the Khan to Faqueer Mahomed it would appear as if his Highness had been led to believe that the revenue proposed by Darogah Atta Mahomed could be levied. The Khan had been informed that, in former years, Sirdar Faqueer Mahomed had appropriated much revenue, which belonged to the State. This was doubtless true, but he managed to keep order in the country to a certain extent, which was worth quite as much as he took. The refusal of the Sirdar indicates he considered the Darogah's impositions too high, and the sooner they receive the disapproval of the Khan the better for his Highness' interests and for the country.

Enclosure 4 in No. 33.

No. 89, dated Jacobabad, 15th January 1872.

From Colonel R. Phayre, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, C.B., K.C.S.I., Commissioner in Sind, Jacobabad.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, an original letter (with translation) received from Nawab Mahomed Khan, Commanding his Highness the Khan's forces in Kutchee.

2. Also copies in English and the vernacular of my reply of this date.

Enclosure 5 in No. 33.

Dated Bukkra 10th January 1872.

Translation of a Letter from Nawab Mahomed Khan, Agent to His Highness the Khan of Khelat, to the Address of Colonel Phayre, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

I HAVE informed you of my having marched against the Brahooees on the 7th instant. I marched from Bagh and arrived at Bukkra to-day. Before I got here the rebels had fled and had gone by the Naree Nulla into the hills. My intention is to go to Gooloo to-morrow, and from thence I will write you all about the Brahooees and where they are. I hear that those* they have left behind have been placed with the Baroozees. On my return from Gooloo after full inquiry I will ask the Baroozees for these fugitives. If they fight or give any other reply, I will let you know.

* NOTE.—The writer appears to allude to the women and children.—(Sd.) R. P.

To-day Lushkhur Khan, the Kujjuk Sirdar, arrived in my camp and paid his respects. He is with me now.

Enclosure 6 in No. 33.

Dated Jacobabad, 15th January 1872.

From Colonel R. Phayre, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Nawab Mahomed Khan, Agent of his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

I HAVE received your letter from Bukkra, dated 10th instant, informing me that next day you intended marching with the troops of his Highness the Khan under your command to Gooloo in the neutral territory of Seebee, a dependency of Cabul. You also report that Lushkur Khan, the Kujjuck Sirdar, who is a feudatory of the Ameer of Cabul, had paid his respects and was with you. Also you express the intention of calling upon the Baroozees to give up the families, &c. of the Brahooees who have taken refuge with them, and it appears from your letter that if they refuse your request, you will fight with them.

No one knows better than you do that the two Pathan tribes of Baroozees and Kujjucks are at eternal feud with each other, and that to draw them into their contest will only make matters worse for all parties.

It is, therefore, contrary to the interests of his Highness the Khan that you should carry out your intention of fighting with the Baroozees about the women and children of the Brahooees who have taken refuge in their territory, and on behalf of the British Government. I request that if you have marched your troops to Gooloo for the purpose indicated, you will be pleased to withdraw them on receipt of this letter, because it would be displeasing both to the British Government and the Ameer of Cabul were you to carry out your intentions.

Enclosure 7 in No. 33.

No. 45, dated Camp, Jacobabad, 17th January 1872.

From Colonel Sir. W. L. Merewether, C.B., K.C.S.I., Commissioner in Sind, to Colonel R. Phayre, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

IN reply to your letter No. 89, of 15th instant, I have the honour to inform you that your answer to Nawab Mahomed Khan is entirely approved. Gooloo-oe-Shuhr is well within the district of Seebee, which belongs to his Highness the Ameer of Cabul. The Nawab's entrance into that territory with armed men was most unjustifiable.

2. I have to request that copies of the Nawab's letter, of your reply, and of this letter may be forwarded to the Political Agent, Khelat, for the information of his Highness

the Khan, who should be again urged to send to Kutchee without delay a person better suited to conduct his Highness' affairs than Nawab Mahomed Khan has proved himself to be.

No. 46.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information.

No. 34.

No. 462, dated Bombay Castle, 24th January 1872.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

REFERRING to my letter No. 264, dated 15th instant, regarding the rebellion in the Khelat territory, I am directed to transmit herewith, for submission to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, copy of the further papers noted in the margin, from the Commissioner in Sind, and to state that the Right Honourable the Governor in Council entirely concurs in the policy recommended by Sir W. Merewether in his communication of the 10th instant.

No. 18, dated 9th January 1872 with enclosures.
No. 27, dated 16th January 1872 with enclosures.

2. The danger of allowing a divided authority in the Government of Khelat has long been recognized by his Excellency the Governor in Council, who considers the condition of the British frontier in this quarter worthy of exceptional attention. He would urgently recommend that Sir W. Merewether should be allowed a wide discretion in settling Khelat affairs in the manner and on the basis of the policy he has sketched out. He has, I am to point out, a larger experience of frontier affairs, and is necessarily better informed than a Punjab officer can be, while his views are concurred in by Colonel Sir H. Green as well as by Colonel Malcolm Green. His Excellency in Council would, therefore, deprecate the adoption of a different policy, which, in the opinion of this Government, will inevitably lead to anarchy and foreign intervention.

Enclosure 1 in No. 34.

No. 122, dated Kozdar, 28th December 1871.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to Colonel R. Phayre, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

I HAVE the honour to forward correspondence received late yesterday evening from his Highness the Khan of Khelat; as they are important, I have not delayed their despatch to make any remarks on the same. From their perusal it will be seen that Nawab Mahomed Khan is acting in opposition to his Highness' instructions; that the Brahooee force is not such as to prevent their being punished for their conduct, and that his Highness' troops were quite willing to face them, but were prevented from so doing by Nawab Mahomed Khan.

Enclosure 2 in No. 34.

Dated 11th Shawul 1288—24th December 1871.

From his Highness the Khan of Khelat, to Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent.

A REPORT from Nawab Mahomed Khan has just reached me. I forward it, as also letters from Shukur Khan, the Kazee, and Zemindars of Bagh for your information. You, my friend, know the conduct of the Brahooees regarding the plundering of Kutchee from the commencement to the end. Before this no Sirdars nor subjects of mine have behaved as they have done; these ill-fated people have broken all the laws of my country, and in every possible way have ruined my country and subjects. They never thought what the end would be, and have left me no choice to treat with or forgive them. In your presence I sent Nawab Mahomed Khan with a force to punish these people. He has acted in such a manner, that the English Government, who are my friends and to whom I look for support, will, I trust, disapprove of the arrangements of Nawab Mahomed Khan and the rebellious chiefs, and support their good name and show me respect by treating these rebellious chiefs in the same manner as they have done the Ex-Jam of Beylah, Sirdar

Meah Khah. Without the English Government will support me in this way there will be neither quiet in the country nor safety for my subjects. The English Government are the best judges of what action in the matter will contribute to their good name. Always consider me your friend and continue to write to me.

Enclosure 3 in No. 34.

From Nawab Mahomed Khan, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

On a former occasion I reported all matters connected with the province of Kutchee. The latest news is that your instructions to fight reached me. By one fight the whole tribe of Brahooees cannot be exterminated, neither can chiefs be apprehended, nor any other advantage accrue, from so doing the whole country and people would be ruined. The regiment and levy left Bagh three or four times to fight; by a thousand artifices and entreaties I prevented them. The Brahooees had assembled at Hajee-ke-Shere and sent me the following message :—That if I did not ratify the treaty with them in presence of the English Government they would fight." Your Highness, thinking it for your advantage in every respect, I have treated with them as the only means of restoring peace in the country and securing the safety of your subjects. Yesterday, Friday, Moheem Khan Raisanee was sent to me by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee to state that if I took them to Jacobabad they mistrusted treachery on my part *en route*, or that the English Government would be guilty of deceit and treachery, and that I was to give them a written agreement on oath. Your Highness, I yesterday wrote the agreement required and sent it to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed. To day, Saturday, I have heard that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Buktiar Khan Baroozai, and others have left Hajee-ke-Shere and arrived at the village of Kutbar, from which place they intended proceeding to Jacobabad. I intend starting to-morrow, 4th Shawul, 17th December, by Shooree for Jacobabad. When I arrive I will report anything that may occur. I trust your Highness will agree to all my arrangements. To write more would be disrespectful.

Enclosure 4 in No. 34.

From Shukur Khan, commanding Khelat Infantry, to his Highness the Khan.

Your Highness, the orders you sent to Nawab Mahomed Khan and myself have arrived. I am prepared to obey them. God keep you in safety. The departure of Nawab Mahomed, what arrangements are being made, and that Buktiar Khan Baroozai has arrived to mediate, will be learnt from the Nawab's letter. The Nawab leaves this on the 4th Shawul, 17th December, for Jacobabad. Moolla Mahomed Raisanee has also left for Jacobabad. I remain with the force in Bagh. Cherisher of the poor, may you always be kept in safety. My petition is that I said and did all I could to Mahomed Khan and informed him that I would fight, as it was your orders to do so. The Nawab answered me that on no account whatever would he allow me to fight, as he considered it to your advantage and that of the cultivators to make anjam. That if I fought the result would lie in God's hands and that the responsibility of success or disaster would rest on me, and that he would make a satisfactory treaty in presence of the English Government.

Being helpless, I have been obliged to remain quiet. You will learn everything from Nawab Mahomed Khan's letter.

Enclosure 5 in No. 34.

From Kazee of Bagh, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

On a former occasion I wrote to you from Sharree regarding affairs in Kutchee, and hope from it you are aware of all that has occurred. By direction of Nawab Mahomed Khan I returned to Beeghoree the 11th Ramzan, 30th November. The whole country from Nuree to Kassim-ka-Shere has been plundered by the Brahooees; they have left the inhabitants neither grain, cattle, food to eat, or wearing apparel. The people are naked, weeping, perplexed, and in such a miserable state; God forbid that any one should see such misery. These Brahooees, although they talk of anjam, are still plundering the country; it is impossible to describe the plundering that has occurred and the state of the country; no pen could write what has taken place. If I live to meet you, I will tell you all that has occurred; for the present I have given you a hint. I pray for you night and day, may God Almighty spare you to old age and bring ruin to your enemies. Always think kindly of me and write occasionally.

Enclosure 6 in No. 34.

From Kazee of Bagh, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

CHERISHER of the poor, may you be preserved in safety. I have given slight information from time to time of what is going on. Since Mahomed Khan has made anjam the people of the country are being daily plundered and have to leave the country. The poor classes have three times gone to Sind and returned. On the last occasion they returned, hearing of the anjam and have been again plundered; they have been so looted that I can scarcely think the Haree country will ever be cultivated again. The country now is in such a state as no one has ever seen.

This is Nawab Mahomed Khan's work; he is well acquainted with anjam arrangements. He has sent for Sumunder Lehree, and that person is expected at Bagh on the 8th December. Uttur Khan Kooruck has arrived from Buktear Khan Baroozai at Nawab Mahomed Khan's request, and the latter is about to send him, Uttur Khan, to fetch Buktear Khan so that the treaty may be pucka "permanent."

This treaty is incorrect; the ryots are flying from the country in consequence of it. The Brahooees are at Hajee-ka-Shere and Mittree; their strength is not augmented. Nawab Mahomed Khan is a clever man and your well-wisher. He well understands fighting and all wordy arrangements. From the above you will be able to judge for yourself. Not a leaf or grain has been left of my crops in Bagh, and on the Shoree Nulla. Moossa Kossid arrived from Khelat, but there was no letter from you to me. I am your well-wisher, why do you forget me? I shall never do anything against your interests, but shall remain your well-wisher so long as life lasts. I hope you will tear this up after perusal.

Written sarcastically.—(Sd.) W. L. M.

I am comforted with the presentiment that the wish of your heart will be accomplished I and my pupils pray for you night and day.

Enclosure 7 in No. 34.

From Ala Dittah, Faiz Mahomed, Lall Buksh, Ryee Khooda Buksh, Hajee Morad, Bais Julloo, Oosman, Rehim, and Moleena, Zemindars of Bagh, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

WHEN the disturbance commenced in Kutchee, all your officials and we poor cultivators were like fishes on dry land; we were so perplexed that we fled with our household property. Most of the people fled like the wind. We, the writers of this letter, and Arhab Jaffer Khan, "since dead," went to Imaum Buksh Rhind and asked him for God's sake to defend Bagh, as it was your Highness' Takht or palatial residence, and that the Belooch and Brahooees were your subjects, and to save us and the Hindoos and Mussulmen from the snake's mouth. In spite of all we could say he left us, and we poor people did what we could and prayed to God to save us from the plunderers.

Bagh is your residence, your officials deserted us, and left us to be plundered by these dogs and wolves, "Brahooees." The Brahooees have only two hands and so have we, and had we been assisted we would have fought. All your people fled for one month and four days; we did all we could to save the town. The Brahooees in your pay and employ at Bagh joined the rebels in looting the place.

Wudderah Ahmed Khan Bolehdee came in the middle of one night and helped us to get our families away, and gave us every assistance. He only had a few men, and the Brahooees were in numbers; in the fight one of his people was wounded. The Brahooees have looted Bagh in such a manner as we are unable to describe what has occurred.

During one month the Brahooees plundered from Bagh to Kunchah, *viz.*, Johi-Kahrah, Beregaree Gaelpore, Gunjlo-Johi, Gool Mahomed Arhab, Oosta, and other villages, carrying off cattle, household property, money, jewelry, and wearing apparel. Many people had buried their treasure, but the Brahooees drew their swords and threatened to kill them if they did not show where it was hidden. Having done this they set fire to many of the villages. Our sighs must have reached heaven; to describe all we have gone through would necessitate writing a book as large as the Shah Nammah; for this reason we have only briefly alluded to what has taken place. If we live we will tell you everything.

No. 18, dated Jacobabad, 9th January 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government for information.

2. These papers show the very grave misconduct of Nawab Mahomed Khan and all the officials of his Highness the Khan in Kutchee.

3. The proceedings of the rebel Sirdars have been most ruthless, and will cause much misery for years to come. They have also lately plundered two kafilas at Koondilana, in the Bolan, carrying off much valuable property. The remainder of the kafilas were escorted into Bagh by the Khan's troops. Latest intelligence is to the effect that the rebels having collected together have advanced to Mittree, and another fight is expected. If the Khan's troops are properly led and handled, and there is no treachery, they should defeat the rebels.

4. Reply from his Highness the Khan to my letter of the 21st December 1871 is now daily expected.

Enclosure 8 in No. 34.

No. 27, dated Camp Jacobabad, 10th January 1872.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.S.C.I., C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to his Excellency the Right Honourable Sir W. R. Seymour, V. FitzGerald, G.C.S.I., Governor and President in Council, Bombay.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt to-day of telegram from your Excellency's Private Secretary, desiring me to hold conference with Colonel Phayre and Captain Sandeman.

2. I should at once have carried into effect your Excellency's instructions as in duty bound, and as always has been my practice to do, but before acting on them I considered it right and necessary to bring to your Excellency's notice certain points which are set forth in my telegram in reply (copy of which is annexed), and which materially affect the question as well as, I think, render the prominent action of Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Gazee Khan, in the matter between his Highness the Khan of Khelat most inexpedient.

3. I would, however, in this letter desire to explain myself more fully and enter more into the reasons for the opinion I have given.

4. When I arrived here on the 21st ultimo I found Captain Sandeman already in the place, and I had been previously informed by Colonel Phayre that Captain Sandeman would be here on the 19th to meet me. I concluded this visit had reference to the orders of the Government of India on the plan of subsidizing the Murree and Boogtee tribes which I had just received.

5. On the 21st, as before reported, I had an interview with his Highness the Khan's Vakeel, at which Colonel Phayre was present, and I then declined to have anything to say to the terms the Vakeel had taken from the rebel Sirdars, or to hold any communication with the latter as long as they were in arms against their Sovereign. This was most necessary, as had any consideration been given to the outrageous terms dictated by the Sirdars (that they were dictations their tenor shows) the power of the Khan would have gone for ever, and anarchy and disorder been rife through the whole country. To show how little trust ought to be placed in the actions or words of these Sirdars, and how dangerous it would be to give them encouragement in their proceedings, I may mention here it was afterwards learned that at the very time Moolla Mahomed Raisanee was arranging to accompany the Vakeel to this place to have the terms ratified, as it was said before the British authorities,* he was writing to Sirdar Noordeen Mingul to continue disturbances in Jalawan.

* Part of these terms being:—"That if from this day, Friday, 10th of Ramzan, any of the Brahooees did any ill or any act of hostility in the territory of his Highness the Khan, he would be given in charge of Mahomed Khan, Vakeel, to be punished any way he liked. That whatever misdeeds Sirdars Noordeen and Azaad Khan have committed are forgiven, and the same would not be done in future. That his Highness the Khan was Sovereign and hey the subjects."

After the interview with the Vakeel on the 21st, Captain Sandeman waited upon me, and the subject of the proposed subsidizing the Murree and Boogtee tribes was first discussed. I informed him that I had recently received the orders of Government on the subject, but that in the present state of affairs it was quite impossible to think of carrying them into effect. He spoke of the necessity of some consideration being paid to his frontier, and that delay in arranging with the Murrees and Boogtees would embarrass him. I remarked that the earliest opportunity would be taken to enter upon the new arrangement, I being as anxious as any that the best available measures should be used to improve the existing state of affairs as regarded his frontier and that of Sind, but that at present something more was at stake than the mere settlement of the Dera

Ghazee Khan and Upper Sind frontier in connexion with those hill tribes; that the question of the future quiet and well-being of the whole border of Sind down to the sea, and of proper government in the country beyond was involved, and to that my attention must be first directed, and that until order was restored in Beloochistan, it was manifestly impossible to come to any sound arrangement bearing on that portion only occupied by the Murrees and Boogtees. Captain Sandeman then said that, under those circumstances, he supposed he had better return to his district. On my replying in the affirmative he produced a paper from which it appeared he had instructions to come here to be associated in the settlement of the disturbances in Khelat territory. I informed him I had received no such instructions from your Excellency; that I had your orders, which I intended to carry out, and being thoroughly well acquainted with all that had lately passed, as well as having an intimate knowledge of previous events, I saw clearly what ought to be done, and felt myself quite able to do it. I told him he might give me a copy of the paper he had shown me, and he said he would, but has never done so.* Had he I should have immediately submitted to your Excellency with my respectful remonstrance against his being associated in any way excepting such as I saw fit to require in the present proceedings relating to the disturbances going on in the territory of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and in which I hold it particularly inexpedient he should in any way interfere.

* The above is given from recollection, and though not perhaps in exactly the words used, or in all of them, is, I believe, in all essential points perfectly correct.

7. I hold it inexpedient for the following reasons, first, because Captain Sandeman's duties with this frontier are intended to be, and should only be, in respect to the hill tribes of Murrees and Boogtees, with whom, owing to their being immediately adjacent to his frontier, he is necessarily brought into contact, and that it is quite unnecessary, and going out of his way, for him to be concerned with the general policy to be observed between the British Government and that of Khelat; secondly, *in re* his connexion with the Murree and Boogtee tribes only is he subordinate to the Political Superintendent on the Frontier of Upper Sind, and Commissioner in Sind, and he should confine his attention solely to circumstances directly bearing on those connexions, and then under the instructions and orders of the officials in Sind, the object of such subordination being merely to prevent clashing, and different systems being observed on the two borders in respect to the management and treatment of those tribes; thirdly, his position at Dera Ghazee Khan, and very recent acquirement of any information as regards the political state of Khelat necessarily renders his knowledge on that head very imperfect and incomplete, mere hearsay in fact, therefore, no advantage could be gained by resorting to him, for his advice and assistance; fourthly, and this is the most important of all, Captain Sandeman has on more occasions than one shown a marked and public interest in favour of the principal rebel Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee. A messenger of his to that Sirdar was arrested by officials of his Highness the Khan, so that the proceedings and bearing of that officer became known to his Highness. Only very lately Captain Sandeman sent messengers to Seebee to obtain information he said. Buktyar Khan, of Seebee, reported this to the Political Superintendent, and added, "four Muzzaree "Sowars came to Seebee lately to inquire about Sirdar Moolla Mahomed." These Muzzarees went from Rajan in the Dera Gazee Khan district. I do not assert that they were sent by Captain Sandeman, but it was inferred by the people of the country that they were, and it was so stated to the Khan of Khelat. Colonel Phayre very properly objected to these communications with Seebee, and they were then dropped. But these proceedings have caused Captain Sandeman to appear in an obnoxious light to his Highness the Khan, and the fact of that officer being taken into deliberation regarding the present state of affairs between his Highness the Khan, and some of his nobles, including Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, cannot fail to be very distasteful to his Highness the Khan, and at the same time likely to give encouragement to the rebels at a time when it is most desirable such should not be shown in any way.

8. Under these circumstances I trust the orders of Government may be re-considered, and in place of Captain Sandeman's service being employed as proposed I should be inclined to recommend that he may be allowed to return to his district until such time as a better opportunity offers for arranging the subsidizing of the Murree and Boogtee tribes, as sanctioned by the Government of India. Thus will the risk of his presence here being misunderstood be removed.

9. I am well acquainted with Captain Sandman's views on Khelat politics. As far as they go, they are simply those of Colonel Phayre, which Government have disapproved, and being so they can add no additional strength in carrying out any measures I may find it necessary to adopt. I regret exceedingly having had to enter into these particulars regarding Captain Sandeman, and would far rather have avoided doing so,

as I entertain a high opinion of his intelligence, zeal, and energy, and shall always without hesitation be gladly willing to avail myself of his valuable services in a legitimate way, and in their proper place. But a sense of justice to myself in the delicate matter that is in hand, as well as of what is due to all concerned, and the desire to bring about at as early a date as possible a discontinuance of the unfortunate disorders now existing in the kingdom of Khelat, have compelled me to lay the above before Your Excellency.

10. What is going on now in Beloochistan is only the natural result of the necessary breaking up of the feudal system brought on by the near approach of civilization and fixed rule. It has been somewhat accelerated by the circumstance of the present Khan being very young, when he came to the throne, and his barons conceiving him to be a weak character, they believed they could easily get him into their hands and all power to themselves.

11. The struggle for power has continued ever since, and will continue until the Government of the country is powerful enough to repress every show of insubordination at once and with a strong hand. If the present Government is upset, and the country is divided amongst a number of chiefs with different and merely selfish interests, anarchy and misrule will prevail throughout the land, until the country falls to the first strong power that chooses to step in and enforce order.

12. The Khan has his faults, which are well known now to those who have had long acquaintance with him, and mine dates from his ascent to the throne (as well as with his predecessor, his chiefs and subjects for years before), and he doubtless has not acted always with the policy and foresight which would have, perhaps, prevented much that has occurred; but then it must be borne in mind that he has been sorely tried, and that it would have been almost more than is in human nature, especially in that of an Eastern despotic Sovereign to look with affection on turbulent nobles, who were perpetually plotting his destruction and overthrow of his rule.

13. The history of the principal rebel Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee I have already laid before Government. Sir Henry Green, who like myself was personally acquainted with this Sirdar, offered a little before he left this frontier, to intercede with the Khan on behalf of this Sirdar, then a fugitive, thinking that some allowances might be accorded to him, and that it would be good policy on the part of the Khan to accede to a reconciliation. That officer went to England before this could be carried out. But Colonel Phayre on my instruction took the matter up; unfortunately the manner of the Sirdar's approach to the Khan was misarranged, and instead of his nearing his Sovereign in respectful form, he went accompanied by some other discontented chiefs, and a large body of armed retainers, demanding as it were, instead of begging forgiveness and restoration to his former position. In spite of this, matters were smoothed through the good tact and prudence of the British Political Agent at Khelat, and the Khan most generously conceded to Moolla Mahomed all he had any right to expect. But he, acting foolishly on ill advice of others, spurned the Khan's offers, and started off, saying he would go to Colonel Phayre, the Political Superintendent on the frontier. The latter, however, had previously received instructions from me, and very properly refused to allow the Sirdar to come near him.

14. The above is briefly repeated to show that all that could be done justly for Moolla Mahomed Raisanee was carried out then in 1869. The grievances of most of the other Sirdars in rebellion were fully detailed by me in my letter No. 868, of the 30th ultimo. They are mainly petty, and such as most certainly should not be considered fair justification for rising in rebellion against their Sovereign. Neither would it have happened so had it not been for the opportunity of their dissatisfaction, and the absence of the greater part of the Khan's regular troops on relief happening to be synchronous, and appearing to Moolla Mahomed Raisanee to be a favourable time for his renewing his struggle against his master. I regret also I must add my conviction, as stated in my former letter, that he entertained hopes his proceedings would not be disapproved here. He had failed to obtain any countenance or assistance from his Highness the Ameer of Cabul.

15. As there seems to be some doubt and misunderstanding as regards my views, I would explain that my reading of the Khelat position, and its effects on British interests, is this:—It is of the first importance that there should be a strong Government in Khelat, both for the maintenance of proper order on our border and for the protection of trade coming in and going out of British territory. To ensure these, the ruling power at Khelat must have every support we can legitimately and advantageously give. As long as the ruler does his best to conform to the terms of the Treaty existing between him and the British Government, and the Khan has, I maintain, faithfully done this, it is clearly the best policy to so support him and avoid as much as possible any act that is likely to weaken his power.

16. I do not at the same time at all maintain that the ruler should receive any encouragement in procedure which may be unjust to his subjects. On the contrary there should be constant endeavour on the part of the Political Agent at his court, by good and seasonable advice, to deter the Khan from engaging in any such acts, and the strongest expression of the disapproval of the British Government would infallibly follow his adopting so unwise a course. At the same time the greatest care must be taken that in recognizing any complaints by subjects they are not based on frivolous grounds, or merely the offspring of petty discontent. If the Sirdars have just cause of complaint I should be the last person to oppose their appeal being heard and should be the first to urge that the Khan should be moved to grant redress, or forfeit the favour of the British Government. This latter he would not risk, as repeated instances of his desire to retain it have clearly proved. But then the call for redress must be first precluded by submission, and not conveyed in the form of insolent and unreasonable demands, from men with arms in their hands.

17. The course of action I have as yet followed, and propose to follow, is, I respectfully urge, the true and sound one. The conditions the rebel Sirdars tried to impose on the Khan, and thought to get approved of by the British authorities, were such as the Khan could not possibly assent to and retain any power in his country. The attempt of the Khan's Vakeel to bring the Sirdars to the British authorities here was most unjustifiable and disloyal to his master, and required to be resented at once.

18. The Khan's interests were evidently in wrong hands, and a change of management must be made before anything suitable could be done. I, therefore, urged on his Highness the Khan to at once send his able and faithful Wuzeer, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, to Kutchee, that his interests might be better served, and that the Wuzeer, having full powers, might confer with me as to the best means of bringing the present disturbances to a satisfactory and lasting conclusion. If asked then by the Khan to interfere, I might with perfect propriety cause the rebels to be informed in the name of the Khan, that if they chose to submit unconditionally, I was ready to enter fully into the merits of their asserted complaints, the causes of the hostile attitude they had assumed towards the Khan, and their differences with him. I should then be in a fair position to advise what should be done in justice to all parties, and to place everything on a proper and sound footing. The question of pecuniary or other assistance to the Khan was alluded to by me in previous communications in case it might come forward, and that I might be in possession of the desire of Government in this respect.

19. This I believe to be the really equitable and only true course to be followed. I earnestly hope, therefore, that these views may meet with approval, and that I may be allowed to carry them out, continuing to enjoy the confidence of your Excellency and the Government of India, with the feeling that I am not reckoned unworthy of the trust, or that my many years' experience of the affairs of this frontier and Khelat is not considered to have rendered me unfit to conduct the important duties pertaining to my position, and for the correct performance of which I still believe myself solely responsible.

No. 35.

No. 75, dated Camp, Jacobabad, 24th January 1872.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I., C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of my letter, No. 66, dated 22d instant, with accompaniments, to the Government of Bombay, relative to the state of affairs in Beloochistan.

Enclosure 1 in No. 35.

No. 66, dated Camp, Jacobabad, 22d January 1872.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I., C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to his Excellency the Right Honourable Sir W. R. Seymour V. Fitzgerald, G.C.S.I., Governor and President in Council, Bombay.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have received a reply from his Highness the Khan, dated 5th instant (copy annexed). It is not at all satisfactory. He is unable to send his Wuzeer to Kutchee, because the wounds lately received by the latter are still unhealed,

and states that he hopes the arrangements he is making will prove all sufficient, but says nothing about deputing any other person either to supersede the Nawab, who has acted so badly, or to confer with me.

2. I have therefore addressed the reply (copy of which is appended), and trust it may meet with your Excellency's approval. It has been my object to impress on his Highness the gravity of his position, and the impossibility of Her Majesty's Government any longer viewing unmoved the general disturbances existing so close to the British border, and that the only course now left for him is to frankly and entirely accept the friendly interposition offered, by means of which order may be restored, and good government re-established. I have carefully abstained from holding out any promises, as I had no authority for doing so; at the same time I considered it right to assure the Khan that by assenting to the course proposed, he would secure the high consideration and continued friendship of Her Majesty's Government.

3. Major Harrison informs me in a demi-official letter that there were only two other persons besides the Wuzeer who were thought of to be deputed to Kutchee—Abdool Luteef, the Naib of Quettah, and the young Shahgassee Goolam Jan. The first is a very good and true man, but could not be spared from his very important post; the second had recently failed in his government of Lus Beyla, and was not considered fit.

4. At this season of the year a reply from Khelat can, it seems, scarcely be expected under twenty days. It is just possible that, on receipt of my second letter, the Wuzeer's condition may be so much better that the Khan may be able to send him down. If not, it is to be hoped he will place his affairs unreservedly in my hands, but whichever of these happens, the delay that must take place is, I consider, fraught with great danger, and I would strongly urge that measures should at once be adopted from this to check the disturbances and to prevent more embarrassing complication taking place. I have, therefore, thought it necessary to submit the telegram, copy of which is also appended.

5. Throughout the whole of this business the Khan's representative in Cutchee, Nawab Mahomed Khan, who is also Vakeel at Jacobabad, has acted in a manner most injurious to his master's interests, showing the worst possible judgment with marked pusillanimity. On his return from this to Bagh, at the end of last month, he did little or nothing till lately, when in the most unjustifiable manner, accompanied by his Highness the Khan's troops, he entered the district of Seebee, neutral ground, belonging to the province of Candahar and territory of his Highness the Ameer of Cabul. He informed Colonel Phayre that he was about to do so, stating that the women and children of the rebels had taken refuge there. On my being informed of this, I at once requested Colonel Phayre to write and tell him he should abstain from entering the territory of his Highness the Ameer, and that he should leave the women and children alone. The Nawab also mentioned that he was engaged making another truce with the rebel Sirdars, under which they were to submit to his Highness the Khan, Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee sending his son to Khelat, and, pending reply from the Khan, the Nawab would remain at Dadur. Supposing this to be the case, I further requested Colonel Phayre to summon the Nawab in here to explain his proceedings, but that he was on no account to bring any of the Sirdars with him.

6. To-day information has been received that the Nawab positively did enter the district of Seebee, marched about within it for several days, and ventured to make a meagre attack on the rebels in the hills bounding that district. A truce was then arranged, and the Nawab moved to Dadur. It was also reported that he had endeavoured to draw the Murrees into these disturbances, notwithstanding they had been told from this they should carefully abstain from engaging on either side.

7. All this shows that the Khan's difficulties as well as the disorders prevailing are only being increased by the proceedings of the Nawab, and that it is very desirable measures should be taken to prevent an early settlement of differences being indefinitely postponed by the injudicious proceedings of this person.

8. If the proclamation recommended by me is issued the rebel Sirdars will be only too glad to give in. They are getting pressed for supplies, and their followers are running rather out of hand from having to provide for themselves. The action will be in the name of the Khan, but the Sirdars will know well that every inquiry will be made, and a just decision come to, fair to all parties, while the British authorities engaging in mediation is guarantee that whatever decision is arrived at will have to be strictly adhered to by all parties, as on any breach by either the favour and countenance of the British Government would be immediately and entirely withdrawn from the offending party.

9. It would have been better to have had the Khan's assent in the first instance, but the season is becoming so far advanced that the delay in getting a reply from Khelat cannot be afforded, and Brahooee dilatoriness is so chronic in the race that there may

possibly be another reference before the Khan finally assents. In justice to all then, and for the purpose of putting an end to the present unfortunate disturbances which are ruining the country, as well as producing bad effects on the people within our own territory, I consider it to be wise and sound that immediate interference to the extent recommended by me should at once take place.

10. There has not been much change in the state of affairs at Lus Beyla and in Mekran. In the former district Ali Khan Jamote has possession of Beyla, Soumeeanee, and the other towns of Lus, and states that he is holding them only for the ex-Jam. It now appears that Beyla was most unnecessarily abandoned by the Shahgassee Goolam Jan. He had sent 40 of his regular troops into Kurrachee to escort provisions out, but he had still a good number of horse and foot with him. The Jamotes, however, tampered with these and persuaded them that 8,000 to 10,000 men were coming down upon them. The troops on this informed the Shahgassee that they could not and would not fight against such overwhelming numbers, and that he must retire in time. He did so, and Beyla was occupied by Ali Khan Jamote with 150 men only. Noordeen Mingul joined him shortly after, but lives separately, and there does not seem much cordiality between them.

11. The latest accounts from Mekran state that negotiations were going on between the Darogah Atta Mahomed and Bhai Khan Gitchkee, which, it was thought, would end in the Darogah being allowed to leave the country, provided he went at once. Present disturbances would then cease there for a time, but it will be necessary for the Khan to establish a Governor again. This will probably have to be Faqueer Mahomed, as there is no one so well suited. It was an unfortunate move, the Khan letting Faqueer Mahomed leave Kedj, that he did not make it worth his while to remain. He will have now to make further concessions to Faqueer Mahomed than he would have had to do before, and lays open a temptation to the latter to ask for more when he feels inclined, a temptation which I am afraid he has not sufficient patriotism to avoid.

12. The disorders in Mekran have prevented a Commissioner and escort being sent from Kedj to Major St. John, but if Faqueer Mahomed returns there they will be despatched immediately. In the meanwhile, there is no fear of the disaffected chiefs interfering in any way with that officer; they would not risk to offend us, though, of course, it will be as well that Major St. John should proceed very cautiously.

13. I trust my proceedings may meet with the approval of your Excellency.

P.S.—Translation of a letter from his Highness the Khan regarding General Pollock's journey to Seistan is also given. General Pollock should have reached Kozdar *en route* to Khelat on the 16th instant, and intimation to that effect should arrive in a day or two.

Enclosure 2 in No. 35.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to the Commissioner in Sind, dated the 24th Shawal 1288 (5th January 1872).

I RECEIVED your letter, and made myself acquainted with the contents thereof. The Brahooees have left no stone unturned and no means untried to commit ravages on my country and subjects, and are in every way deserving of punishment for their misconduct and rebellious habits. My policy was the same as that understood by the British officials.

You informed me that Major Harrison, who is the Political Agent on behalf of Government, would be now near me, and be ready to favour me with good counsel on all occasions and times of emergency, and that I should act on his advice. In reply, I beg to state that I have hitherto made good use of his counsel, and will do so in future. I thank you and the British Government for telling me to avail myself of such aid.

You wrote to me to send my Wuzeer Shahgassee to Kutchee to make arrangements of the affairs there. I would have sent him without delay, and the Wuzeer himself would not have lost any time in leaving for Kutchee, had he not been still suffering from the wounds he received, and of which you are well aware. He is, no doubt, my true and faithful Wuzeer, and I have entrusted to him many affairs of importance to the State. By the grace of God, and favour and kindness of my friends and well-wishers, arrangements which will bring matters to a satisfactory conclusion are in course of being carried out Please rest assured, and, considering me as your friend, keep me informed of your health and welfare.

Enclosure 3 in No. 35.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from Shahgassee Moolla Mahomed to the Commissioner in Sind, dated the 24th Shawal 1288 (5th January 1872).

I MADE myself acquainted with the contents of the letter you wrote to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and was pleased to find that his Highness the Khan and I are treated with such favours and consideration by the British Government. The reply of his Highness will inform you of the facts. As long as there is a spark of life in me I will not swerve an inch from my faithfulness and honesty to both the Governments—his Highness and the British.

Enclosure 4 in No. 35.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to the Commissioner in Sind, dated the 24th Shawul 1288 (5th January 1872).

I RECEIVED your letter about affording assistance to Colonel Pollock, who is on his way to Seistan, and read its contents. I have written to Moolla Mahomed Khan, Vakeel, and Shukkur Khan, Commander of forces, to get ready Moolla Sahibdad, and a certain number of sowars and footmen for placing at the disposal of Colonel Pollock to act as his escort, and to afford him every aid, and to proceed to where he directs them. He will be shown every consideration, and you need not be apprehensive on that score.

Enclosure 5 in No. 35.

From Commissioner in Sind, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

I HAVE received your Highness' letter dated the 5th instant (24th Shawal), and have learned with extreme regret that your Highness is unable to despatch your Wuzeer the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed to Kutchee to attend to your interests there, and to confer with me. I the more regret this as the reason assigned is that the Wuzeer is still suffering from the wounds he received.

As no person has been deputed by your Highness in his place, which I asked, I must now by letter call your Highness' most serious attention to the state of affairs in your dominions.

The district of Kutchee has been overrun and devastated by certain of your Sirdars, who are in arms against your authority. These are still in hostile array and have lately plundered two kafilas of peaceable merchants passing through your country, while hundreds of the poor and well-disposed inhabitants of Kutchee have fled for protection into British territory.

In the province of Jalawan insurgents have taken possession of Lus Beyla, and your Highness' officials have failed to restore your authority.

In Mekran, also, rebellion has shown itself, and your Naib has been forced to leave his seat of government.

It becomes my duty to inform your Highness that such a state of affairs is matter of deep concern to the British Government, and that that Government can no longer view such events unmoved, occurring, as they do, so immediately close to British territory, and being opposed to the obligations of the treaty existing between the two Governments.

They not only unmistakeably convey that wide-spread discontent and consequent disorder prevail in your Highness' dominions, but they also force the conclusion that the existence of good government, which it has always been the earnest desire of the British Government, as well as your Highness' power to rule for the good of your people, are most dangerously threatened.

The causes and reasons for all this I do not wish in any way to prejudge, or, until full inquiry has taken place, to offer any decided opinion, but the effects so prominently brought to notice can only and certainly have led to the impression that there have been serious defects in administration to have produced such grave results—results which give extreme solicitude to the British Government, and which demand an immediate call on your Highness for the adoption of remedial measures and for improved system of government. Your Highness is well aware that during the many years I have had the honour of being in communication with your Highness, it has always been my sincere and undeviating endeavour to assist in every measure which would strengthen your Government and enable your Highness to rule for the benefit of your country and people. My best advice, and that of all officers of the British Government serving here, has also been freely given to that end.

Under existing arrangements, especially as regards those of the officials entrusted by your Highness with the management of affairs in Kutchee, I see no prospect of any improvement taking place, or of return to that state of order and general satisfaction which alone constitutes good government.

I have come to Jacobabad by the orders of Government to inquire into and attend to these matters, and as your Highness is unable to send your Wuzeer to me, it only remains for me to address your Highness and offer my services to promote the restoration of tranquillity in your kingdom, and to urge that you will accept my mediation in the points at issue between your Highness and your Sirdars, and to use my good offices in bringing about more reasonable and satisfactory relations between your Highness and them.

It is scarcely necessary for me to convey the assurance to your Highness that you may confidently trust in a sincere desire on my part to see a firm and lasting government established in your country, and that my best assistance will be heartily given to that object. I would therefore now press on your Highness that you should frankly accept of my offers of intermediation, and that you should at once convey to me full authority to act in your name, and on your behalf, in all necessary points and measures I may see fit to adopt, and that you will express your determination, and undertake to abide by any terms I may deem it requisite to conclude.

By acting thus you will assuredly secure the high consideration and continued friendship of the British Government, and your Highness and people will, I trust, derive lasting benefit in the return of the blessings of peace and renewed prosperity to your country.

I would beg that an early reply may be granted to this letter, and with expressions of true friendship and best wishes for your Highness' welfare, subscribe myself, &c.

Enclosure 6 in No. 35.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed.

It was with extreme regret that I learned from his Highness the Khan that you were still suffering from the wounds lately received by you. I sincerely trust that they may soon be healed, and that you may be relieved from further inconvenience on this account.

I have to-day addressed a letter to his Highness the Khan, the contents of which he will doubtless communicate to you.

You well know as well as I do that the position of his Highness and his Government is most critical, and that some better steps than have hitherto been taken must now be speedily adopted. I need not urge on so devoted and true a servant of the Khan as yourself the advisability of using your best influence to induce his Highness to accept the advice, which, in regard to his best interests and those of the country at large, I have been led to offer him, and to follow the course which, after mature consideration and under the orders of my Government, has been deemed the only one now left.

I trust soon to hear of your complete restoration to health, and should be glad to learn that improvement in this respect would yet allow of your being deputed by his Highness to join me.

With expressions of sincere friendship, I subscribe myself, &c.

No. 36.

No. 468, dated Bombay Castle, 25th January 1872.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 400, dated the 22nd instant, I am directed to forward herewith, for submission to the Government of India, copy of a memorandum from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 7, dated 4th idem, enclosing translations of a letter (and accompaniments) from Moolla Mahomed Khan, Vakeel, to his son Moolla Peer Buksh at Jacobabad, regarding the engagement between the troops of the Khan of Khelat and the rebel Brahooee Sirdars.

2. I am at the same time desired to enclose copy of a second memorandum from Sir W. L. Merewether, No. 1, dated 1st instant, submitting, with remarks, diary of the Political Agent, Khelat, from 18th to 24th ultimo.

Enclosure 1 in No. 36.

Abstract translation of a letter from Moolla Mahomed Khan, Vakeel, to his son Moolla Peer Buksh.

I HOPE you have perused the intelligence of the victory gained by his Highness the Khan's troops, and the defeat of the Brahooees in the letter of Shukkur Khan to my address which I sent you in original. I left Shoree, and arrived at Chhulgeree, where I learnt that his Highness the Khan's army had made an entry into Bagh. I also marched from Chhulgeree and arrived at Bagh this morning (Wednesday). I visited the Commander (Shukkur Khan), and he gave me a full account of what had passed. He said that the Sirdars on their return joined the Brahooees at Mittree, and attacked the Khan's troops. The fight lasted for some time, and the enemy was eventually compelled to beat a retreat. The Brahooees, he said, lost about 110 or 120 men in killed, and that in this number was included some men of note, viz., Sadalla Raisanee, Jamal Zehree, son of Mahomed Khan, Rustomzy, Gool Mahomed, and Yar Mahomed, Raisanee, sons of Meer Kuteb Khan, Saheb Khan, and Dad Mahomed, nephew to Futteh Khan, Raisanee. It is not known what other personages have killed.

I enclose for your information the letter I received from the commander of the forces. Everything is getting on well here.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from Shukkur Khan, Commander of the Waffadar Regiment, to Nawab Moolla Mahomed.

TO-DAY, on Wednesday the 14th of Shawal, we made a triumphal entry into Bagh. The Khan's troops lost four of the cavalry in killed and eight received severe wounds. The loss of the Brahooees has been very considerable, about 110 or 120 men in killed. Please leave at once and join without delay. The Brahooees are by the grace of God and good fortunes of his Highness the Khan scattered and still retreating. I had given you full particulars of their defeat and flight in my previous letter.

Meehan Khan, Raisanee, has been sent with 100 men to Dadur for the purpose of making the necessary arrangement for the safety of the people there. A large caravan of Afghans has arrived in Dadur. The Government dues will be recovered. I have sent spies to institute inquiries into the affairs of the Brahooees, and as to where they have located themselves.

No. 7, dated Camp, Jacobabad, 4th January 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE translations submitted to Government for information, in continuation of Commissioner's letter No. 868, of 30th December 1871.

Enclosure 2 in No. 36.

Diary by the Political Agent, Khelat, from 18th to 24th December 1871.

ARRIVED at Kozdar on Tuesday. The chief intelligence during the past week is Noordeen Mingul's success in Beylah. The Roonjahs had collected in force to aid Shahgassee Goolam Jan against Ali Dhan Jamote, but joined on his approaching Beylah. The Shahgassee's detachment was unfortunately weakened by the absence of a convoy party and the refusal of some of the men to fight. He was, therefore, obliged to evacuate the town and fall back to his nearest support *viâ* Jao and Mushka. When last heard of he had arrived at the latter place with about a hundred men, but it is not known whether he will come to Kozdar *viâ* Nal, or go to Khelat. The Roonjas, Jamotes, and Minguls were inclined to dispute as to who had the right to govern the province of Lus Beylah. Noordeen Mingul, it is said, resigned his pretensions in favour of Ali Khan Jamote, on condition that all his Highness' stores of grain, &c. should be made over to him to enable him to march on Kozdar and Baghwana. Our timely arrival will of course put an end to this arrangement, and if Nawab Mahomed Khan has met with success in carrying out his Highness' instructions, recovering Beylah will be a matter of no great difficulty.

Sirdar Faqueer Mahomed Bezonjao has written twice to my Moonshees to find out what object I had in coming here, how long I was going to stay, and where I was going

to. His messenger was informed that they were not at liberty to correspond with him, it being against my orders.

Sirdar Azaad Khan has, I believe, made some arrangement with Noordeen Mingul to create disturbance in this part of the country as soon as the cold weather is over. By our last post I received a letter from Naib Peer Jan, stating that I should know what was going on in Kutchee from his father's daily reports to his Highness the Khan. For some days prior to my departure from Khelat no news had been received from Kutchee, and in a letter just received from his Highness, dated 19th, he mentions that no information had been received regarding Nawab Mahomed Khan's movements. I, therefore, conclude that the rebellious Brahooees have intercepted the reports alluded to by Naib Peer Jan.

No news has been received from Mekran.

No. 1, dated Jacobabad, 1st January 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copy submitted to Government for information. The presence of Major Harrison in Kozdar just now will have the best effect. The relief for Major Harrison's escort is now *en route* to join him, and both parties can remain with him for a time if considered necessary, but I do not myself think it will be. No one in the country is either inclined or will venture to interfere with or do anything to trouble him. The receipt of intelligence of the success gained by the Khan's troops in Kutchee on the 24th ultimo will remove the despondency which had come over the people at Khelat on hearing Nawab Mahomed Khan's timid conduct in making terms with the rebels. His Highness the Khan should be able to make early arrangements for re-establishment of his Government in Beylah.

No. 37.

No. 693, dated Bombay Castle, the 5th February 1872.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay in the Political Department, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I AM directed to forward herewith, for submission to the Government of India, copy of diary from the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 13th idem, as also accompaniments thereto, received through the Commissioner in Sind under endorsement No. 78, dated 25th January.

Enclosure 1 in No. 37.

No. 2, dated Khozdar, the 13th January 1872.

Diary by Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat, for the week ending 13th January 1872.

ON Monday the 8th Jan Sing Goolam Mahomed informed me that the victory of his Highness' troops in Kutchee had already had a beneficial effect in the Jalawan country in deciding the movements of certain tribes who were merely watching events. The Mahomed Hoossainee Sirdar had gone to join his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and sent his son with 20 followers to the Jan Sing for any service that might be required of them.

News from Wudd states that Noordeen Mingul heard of Sirdar Meah Khan's removal after he left Kharan, but as he had previously written to him to escape and not mind his wife and family, he looked upon this merely a report to deter him from effecting the ex-Jam's restoration. On realizing that the efforts he had made had only benefited Ali Khan Jamote, and that the people of Lus Beyla had no intention of taking up arms on his behalf, he regretted what he had done, and is in great perplexity as to the future.

The Minguls of Wudd have sent to inform his Highness, through Sirdar Meah Mahomed, that they are quite willing to attack Noordeen Mingul and those of their tribe who have settled on the Poorali river in Beyla, if his Highness will confiscate their land in Wudd and present it to them.

A post arrived late on Wednesday from his Highness the Khan containing two letters

for the Commissioner in Sind, which have been forwarded through the Political Superintendent, Frontier, Upper Sind.

A letter from Sirdar Azaad Khan to his Highness' eldest son, with reply to the same, as also Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed's answer to the message to him, were forwarded for my perusal. Copies and translations are attached.

Darogah Atta Mahomed writes that the people in Mekran having heard of the occurrence in Kutchee are inclined to be rebellious, and have refused to pay the balance of revenue; but that his Highness may rest assured that he will do his best to quell any disturbance that may arise.

The weather during the week has been mild.

Enclosure 2 in No. 37.

Translations.

From Sirdar Azaad Khan, of Kharan, to Sahibzada Meah Mahmood Khan.

AFTER SALAAM,—By God's blessing everything is well with me, and I hope you are also well. Your father is Khan of Beloochistan, and he is responsible for all the good and evil that occurs in his country. Well, your father sent a force against me at Kharan, and took away my people and slaves, the former he released, but detained the latter. A governor of a country fights in every possible way, but does not make slaves of defeated people. Your father has acted in this way. I am looking forward to the future; "had I not done so," I was quite capable of creating a disturbance. I have received a hint from your father to this effect "that he would give me my slaves and country." On this hint I have sent Mahomed Kumbranee to you; if the slaves are to be released, hand them over to him, and give him one of your servants as escort to Dusht Goran.

Shahgassee Goolam Jan carried off ten of my slaves who are now at Mushka. If the slaves are to be returned, collect them wherever they may be, and send them back. I claim the forts of "Goorjuck and Kooda Abadan; if you give them, well, if not it is in God's hands. I have nothing more to write about.

You Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed are in the place of a brother to me. You are a great man. You have seen fighting, and have just been wounded, now it is necessary for you to restrain your hand and tongue.

Enclosure 3 in No. 37.

From Sahibzada Meah Mahmood Khan to Sirdar Azaad Khan.

You are in the place of an uncle to me. I have received the letter you have sent by Mahomed Kumbranee. I am aware of its contents. You write about some country and slaves. Amongst rulers of countries war is often necessary, and results in the way you complain of. In former years, when there was a rebellion in Afghanistan, all the Ameers, nobles, and chiefs remained true and faithful to him. You, Azaad Khan, having seen the disturbance that a few foolish Brahooees have made, "have got wind in your head." By God's blessing these badly-behaved Brahooees have been well punished: God willing, they will be further punished. Formerly you were the friend and ally of these rebel Brahooees, "now you have held aloof from them. Noordeen came to your 'house, you would not join him, and sent him away." At least such is my father's impression, and he considers that as you are an old man you may wish to break with these Brahooees, and may desire to take service with him and act in the same way as your father did.

What you request can only be settled by a personal interview. Had you written respectfully, and asked for what you wanted in a becoming manner, I would have petitioned my father on your behalf, and have sent for you now or at some future time, and have done all I could for you. By God's blessing we are all well. Be comforted and write me regarding your welfare.

Enclosure 4 in No. 37.

From Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed to Sirdar Azaad Khan.

AFTER SALAAM,—May you, my brother Azaad Khan, remain happy. In the Sahibzada's letter you wrote to me as follows—That I had seen a fight and been wounded

and that it was now necessary for me to restrain my hand and tongue. In reply, I beg to state that to use the sword is manly. "May God preserve my Khan to old age." My hope is that, so long as life lasts, I may do every thing I can for those who are well-disposed to his Highness; but as regards rebels and ill-disposed people, "neither hand nor tongue will be restrained." I will do everything I can for his Highness's good and welfare. I have done so hitherto, and shall continue to do so. I have written this separately as it would have been disrespectful to embody it in the Sahibzada's reply to you.

(True translation.)

(Signed) C. H. Harrison, Major,
Political Agent at Khelat.

No. 78, dated Camp, Jacobabad, the 25th January 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government for information, in continuation of Commissioner's endorsement No. 37, dated 16th instant.

No. 38.

No. 713, dated Bombay Castle, the 6th February 1872.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to Government of Bombay, Political Department to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of previous correspondence ending with my No. 693, dated 5th instant, regarding Khelat disturbances, I am directed to forward herewith for submission to the Government of India, copy of a further letter (and of its enclosures) on the subject, from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 84, dated 26th ultimo.

Enclosure 1 in No. 38.

No. 84, dated Jacobabad, 26th January 1872.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to his Excellency the Right Honourable Sir W. R. Seymour V. Fitzgerald, G.C.S.I., Governor and President in Council, Bombay.

On receipt of the telegram conveying the instructions of the Government of India that "Commissioner should press terms as strongly as possible on Khan, but should not "issue proclamation, nor enter on mediation with chiefs unless of Khan's full consent; "meanwhile he should let it be fully known that he is in communication with Khan "upon the subject," I weighed the subject well and, taking into consideration the great injury that is being caused by the disturbance now going on, the mischievous effects they may have in unsettling the people within our own border, and the inexpediency of allowing further great delay before hostilities were checked, if possible, I came to the conclusion that the best way to carry out the orders of Government would be to cause the vakeel of his Highness the Khan, now with the forces in Kutchee, to be addressed and informed that I am in communication with his Highness the Khan on the subject of intermediation, and authorizing him to communicate so much to the Sirdars, with intimation that if they at once submitted and sent their followers to their homes, stopping all plundering, the mediation of the British Government, concurred in by his Highness the Khan, would be used, a full inquiry instituted, and afterwards the influence of Government would be exerted to secure to the Sirdars any just rights they may be shown to have. But it must be clearly understood by both sides that this mediation depended on immediate and complete suspension of hostilities; that on the Sirdars submitting, the Khan's forces would be withdrawn to a separate part, and the Sirdars could remain unmolested in any place in Kutchee they chose to select.

2. I accordingly instructed Colonel Phayre to write to the Vakeel to the above effect, and append copy of translation of his letter. If the Sirdars are reasonable, and really only wish for what they have a fair right to expect and claim, they will gladly and at once avail themselves of this opportunity to obtain a hearing, but if they have other

views, only desire their own aggrandisement, and to follow their own selfish ends, regardless of the general good of the country, they will hesitate and raise difficulties. These should be firmly and distinctly disallowed.

3. It will be observed by your Excellency that while insisting on submission, and suspension of all hostilities, as a necessary preliminary to our engaging in mediation between his Highness the Khan and the Sirdars, I have been careful to avoid making any promises beyond that, on submission and dismissal of followers, there shall be full inquiry, a patient hearing given, and afterwards the influence of the British Government may be used in their behalf. This is even more than they justly deserve after what they have done, and considering that they are in actual rebellion against their sovereign with whom we have a treaty of alliance. But under the present circumstances and the great advantage it will be to all to have some change effected in the wretched state of affairs now existing in Kutchee without further delay, I decided that this much consideration might be allowed them and the arrangements with his Highness the Khan could then be carried out systematically and in proper form.

4. At the same time, as desired in the telegram, I addressed another letter to his Highness the Khan, urging him to promptly accept my offers of intervention, and pointing out the serious consequences that would follow his not availing himself of them. I also forwarded to him a copy of the letter sent by Colonel Phayre at my desire to the Vakeel Nawab Mahomed Khan, that his Highness might be aware of what had been done here and the measures I had adopted in reference to the correspondence going on with him.

5. The Khan has always shewn himself so ready and willing to abide by the advice and conform to the wishes of the British Government, that I trust he will not on this occasion hesitate as to the line he should take, and I should have been almost disposed to have acted as quite assured that he would not think of withholding his consent. But though it will be some time before an answer can be received from him, and delay is to be deprecated, the object desired will be partly gained in the suspension of hostilities, and suppression of petty outrages, which do far more harm than active operations of war.

6. I do not for a moment anticipate any violation of British territory, or that disturbances will occur within it; but continuance of such proceedings as are daily taking place in Kutchee cannot but have a very bad effect on the people inside our border by unsettling their minds and keeping up a feeling of uncertainty as to what is going to happen.

7. Major Harrison is perfectly safe at Khozdar. He commands easy access to the Moolla pass from there, and can always reach the plains in five or six marches. The rebels in Beyla, whose proceedings are watched from Kurrachee, are in no force at present, and to reach Khozdar would have to force their way through that portion of the Mingul tribe which has remained faithful to his Highness the Khan under the leadership of Meah Mahomed, and which will continue to be so, or Meah Mahomed, a person of influence, character, and popularity, will lose the leadership of the clan to which he has been nominated by the Khan. But even supposing the rebels from the south attempted to move towards Khelat, they would carefully avoid Major Harrison's camp, because it would be their very worst policy to get embroiled with us, and the last thing they would dream of. Major Harrison would of course not interfere with them in any way, which he fully understands.

8. I am glad to be able to report that General Pollock was met on the 15th at Gooroo, the last march according to the route I gave him before he would reach Khozdar. He had therefore done his marches exactly as was arranged, from which I conclude he had experienced no difficulties. The native officer commanding the party of the relieved escort, who met General Pollock, reported that all was well. I was told by Colonel Phayre that there was a report in the bazar of General Pollock's baggage having been fired upon; but it was mere bazar rumour, and though measures were taken that every inquiry should be made into the truth of the report, I did not consider it necessary to telegraph such doubtful circumstances to Government, and I would beg to suggest that Captain Sandeman should, while he is here and supposed to be acting under the orders of the Sind authorities, be directed to communicate with me, and take my orders, before he sends such hasty intelligence, which is only likely to mislead. If he confined himself merely to the matters which are entrusted to him, and belong to his office and position, such mistakes would not occur.

Enclosure 2 in No. 38.

No. 76, dated Jacobabad, the 24th January 1872.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, C.S.I., C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to Colonel R. Phayre, Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Government have expressed their approval of the nature of the last communication addressed by me to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, copy of which was furnished to you, and are desirous that just mediation should be undertaken in the questions at issue between his Highness the Khan and certain of his Sirdars, with the view of bringing the disturbances now going on in Beloochistan to a satisfactory and lasting conclusion.

2. I have the honour to request, therefore, that you will inform his Highness' Vakeel Nawab Mahomed Khan, by letter, that I am in communication with the Khan on the subject and that he, the Vakeel, is authorised to inform the Sirdars to that effect, and that if they at once submit abandoning all hostilities and dismissing their followers to their homes, the fullest inquiry will be made by me into all that has occurred. All just claims the Sirdars may have will receive a patient hearing and the influence of the British Government will be used with the Khan to secure any rights they may truly be entitled to, both now and for hereafter. That it must be fully understood both by the Sirdars and the Vakeel that this mediation will depend on condition of immediate and complete suspension of hostilities and the Sirdars entrusting their case to me, that all petty plundering or injury to peaceable people be carefully repressed, any persons offending being at once seized and given up for punishment; all operations by his Highness the Khan's troops to immediately cease on the Sirdars so submitting, and they withdrawn from the neighbourhood of the Sirdars. The Sirdars can reside unmolested in any place in Kutchee they may select until such time as the inquiry above stated may be commenced, when they will be received into the British camp, perfect safety guaranteed to them, and full freedom to come and go as they please.

Enclosure 3 in No. 38.

Dated Jacobabad, the 24th January 1872.

From Colonel R. Phayre, Political Superintendent, Frontier, Upper Sind, to Nawab Mahomed Khan, Vakeel to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—I have to inform you by the desire of Sir William Merewether, the Commissioner in Sind, that he is now in communication with his Highness the Khan of Khelat on the subject of the present disturbances in Beloochistan, and of his giving his offices to mediate between his Highness the Khan and the Sirdars now acting in opposition to his authority, such mediation being desired by the Government of India.

I am also requested to tell you that you are authorised to inform the Sirdars to the above effect and add that if they at once submit abandoning all hostilities and dismissing their followers to their homes, the fullest inquiry will be made by Sir W. Merewether into what has occurred, all just claims the Sirdars may have will receive a patient hearing, and the influence of the British Government be used with the Khan to secure any rights the Sirdars may truly be entitled to.

That it must be clearly understood both by the Sirdars and by you that this mediation will depend on immediate and complete suspension of hostilities and the Sirdars entrusting their case to Sir W. Merewether; that all petty plundering or injury to peaceable people be carefully repressed, any persons offending being at once seized and given up for punishment.

All operations by his Highness' troops to at once cease on the Sirdars so submitting, and the troops to be withdrawn to a separate place.

The Sirdars can reside unmolested in any place in Kutchee they may select, until such time as the inquiry above-mentioned may be commenced, when they will be received into the British camp, perfect safety being guaranteed to them and full freedom to come and go as they please.

You should attend to this without delay, informing me that you have done so and the result.

Enclosure 4 in No. 38.

Dated Jacobabad, the 25th January 1872.

From Colonel Sir W. R. Merewether, C.S.I., C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

After Compliments.—Since writing to your Highness on the 21st instant, I regret to say that intelligence from Kutchee shows that affairs are assuming a still worse aspect, that small bands of robbers are scattered over the district, engaging in petty plunder and injury to poor peaceable people.

2. A kossid conveying a letter from me to your Highness was stopped, beaten, and the letter taken from him.

3. All this, as well as the late plunders of the kafilas in the Bolan Pass, not only causes great discredit to your Highness' Government, and grievous injury to your subjects, but I must also point out plainly and distinctly is in direct contravention of the terms of the treaty entered into with your predecessor. In the 5th paragraph thereof it is stipulated that "Meer Nusseer Khan binds himself, his heirs and successors to prevent all plundering or other outrage by his subjects within or in the neighbourhood of British territory, to protect the passage of merchants to and fro, &c.

4. I must not disguise from your Highness that recent events have caused extreme concern to my Government, and that a continuance of them must produce the worst possible results.

5. I would again, therefore, urge your Highness' most earnestly and strongly to assent at once to the proposals made in my letter of the 21st, and give me full authority to act in these matters on your behalf, as that is the only means now left of bringing about a more favourable state of affairs. I must also impress upon your Highness that very serious consequences must follow if my offers are not availed of, and my proposals for the benefits of your Highness and country not cordially accepted.

6. Knowing, however, from past experience the readiness which your Highness has always shown to take the advice of the British Government when it has been tendered to you, and the desire you have always displayed to act with all sincerity in accordance with its wishes, I have every confidence that you will not hesitate a moment in following the course that the British Government has proposed that you should adopt.

7. In this confident expectation I have to-day caused your Vakeel to be addressed in the manner shown in the letter copy of which is herewith forwarded, and I feel sure that your Highness' action will be such as to prove you are in strict accord with the views I have taken, and that you are prepared to fully concur and co-operate in the measures I have considered it advisable to adopt to save increasing evils which the delay in referring to you at Khelat gives opportunity for being brought about.

With expressions of sincere friendship and best wishes for your Highness' welfare, I subscribe myself, &c.

No. 39.

No. 817, dated Bombay Castle, the 10th February 1872.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of previous correspondence regarding Khelat disturbances, I am directed to forward herewith, for submission to the Government of India, copy of the Khelat diary for the week ending 20th ultimo, and of its enclosures, received through the Commissioner in Sind under endorsement No. 98, dated 31st idem.

Enclosure 1 in No. 39.

Diary No. 3 for the week ending 20th January 1872.

The escort furnished by the 2nd regiment, Sind Horse, left this en route to Jacobabad on Sunday the 14th.

A post from his Highness the Khan was received on the 15th, forwarding letters from Nawab Mahomed Khan, Shukkur Khan, and Lusker Khan, the Gujjuck chief. The former reported that a force had gone into the hills usually occupied by the Lehrees, but that they had fled. Two Kafilas had been plundered by the rebels under the leadership of Yar Mahomed Khoord, eldest son of Sirdar Alladina, and his Highness' force was

about to march on Meeskab, where they were assembled. Shukkur Khan reports that the Khan of Seebee had refused to allow the rebels to enter his territory. The Gujjuck chief's letter was to the address of Shukkur Khan, stating that he had always considered his Highness the Khan his friend, and thought him wanting in friendship not to have asked him for assistance against the Brahooees; that the latter were collecting in force, and the sooner he attacked them the better. Further, that he would supply them with provisions and join them, if he wished, with an auxiliary force. This chief stated the Khan of Seebee's * people had joined the rebels, and were giving them every assistance, owing to the enmity which exists between Gujjucks and Baroozyes. Shukkur Khan's statement is considered most reliable.

* Meaning thereby Buktyar Khan Baroozye of Kurruck, near old Seebee. The Gujjuck Chief was merely desirous of playing off the Vakeel against his old enemy, the Baroozye Chief. The Vakeel had no business to enter the Seebee district.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

On the 15th a detachment of Regular Infantry, strength 50 and 10 sowars, arrived from Khelat to garrison this fort.

Major-General Pollock and Dr. Bellew, accompanied by Naib Peer Jan, arrived on the 16th from Jacobabad with a detachment of the 3rd regiment, Sind Horse. Their baggage animals being fatigued and unable to march, Major Harrison and I placed our private camels at their disposal as far as Khelat, no carriage being obtainable here at this season of the year.

Naib Peer Jan received a letter from his father at Kotra, stating that he had occupied Goolooke Shair,* and that the Murrees and Dhoombkees were co-operating with him against the rebels. From amongst the latter the Lehrees, with the exception of Sumunder, had returned to their allegiance, and several other Brahooees, who had joined the rebels against their will, were most anxious to make their salaam to him. The rebels, it is said, have neither food nor grain, and may be obliged to capitulate or disperse in the course of a few days.

* Is in Seebee, where the Vakeel has no right to go.

Major-General Pollock, Dr. Bellew, and Major Harrison, who accompanies them as far as Khelat, left this on the 18th with 30 sabres from the detachment of the 1st Sind Horse, his Highness the Khan's escort not having arrived.

Information from Beyla states that all the people of Lus have agreed to rejoin his Highness the Khan directly a force appears, except Ali Khan Jamote; also that the Minguls have left Noordeen and returned to their homes, but that he is waiting there, hoping to effect a junction with Jam Ali the ex-Jam's son. He has sent people to this neighbourhood to ascertain if he will get assistance, should he raise a rebellion. Ali Mahomed, Sirdar Meer Khan's vakeel, and Aboo Bukkur Roonjah have been directed by him to go to Kurrachee for the purpose of buying gunpowder, and to see if anything can be done regarding the ex-Jam's son, to whom they have sent a hoondee for Rs. 5,000.

Meer Kaira, son of Sirdar Faqueer Mahomed Bezonjao, wrote to Alum Khan, one of the chiefs of the Kumbranees, not to go to Beyla, or join in any disturbances against the Khelat Government.

Sahib Khan Choota, and Khalifah Munjah, Borah of Lus Beyla, have had a dispute. The former is preparing to attack the Borahs.

No news from Mekran has been received during the past week.

On the 20th there was a continuous fall of rain during the night, and of snow in the morning at this place. It is supposed that General Pollock and Major Harrison may be detained two or three days at Lack Koran, where they have met with a severe snow-storm.

The accompanying letter, with translation, from Darogah Atta Mahomed to his Highness the Khan regarding affairs in Mekran has just been received.

(Signed) R. Bowman, Assistant Surgeon,
Khozdar, the 20th January 1872. Khelat Agency.

Enclosure 2 in No. 39.

Translation of a Letter from Darogah Atta Mahomed, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

After Salutations.—On a former occasion I informed you of what was occurring here. On the 24th December, Sirdar Bhai Khan, Gitchkee, joined those refractory people. He also assembled a force. On hearing this, I collected your troops, guns, and mortars, and marched against Goshie Kila, in which place they had fortified themselves. A fight took place, in which the guns were chiefly used. How many people were killed

I do not know, but the rebels were somewhat dispirited. A second time he sent a force against Turbot, which I heard of, and followed up. They had nearly reached Turbot when I overtook them. A fight ensued, and they were defeated.

In your force one chakar and two other sepoys were wounded. Among the Gitchkees, Lalla Nowsherwan was wounded on the shoulder-blade by a bullet. Shakaroolla and Shazaree, Gitchkees, residents of Buhidee, were killed. Many people of no note were killed and wounded. After this defeat they re-assembled, and have come to attack Turbot. Another fight is about to take place. What occurs I will let you know. You are my sovereign.

(True translation.)
(Signed) R. Bowman, Assistant Surgeon,
Khozdar, the 21st January 1872. Khelat Agency.

No. 98, dated Camp Jacobabad, the 31st January 1872.
Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

True copy, with accompaniment, submitted to Government for information.

2. The District Superintendent of Police, Hyderabad, has been directed to warn Sirdar Meer Khan's son against being misled into any connexion with the rebels in Lus Beyla. Instructions have also been sent to the District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee, not to allow munitions of war to be taken from there to Beyla.

No. 40.

No. 856, dated Bombay Castle, the 13th February 1872.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of papers received from the Commissioner in Sind under endorsement No. 115, dated 3rd instant, regarding Khelat affairs.

Enclosure 1 in No. 40.

No. 224, dated Jacobabad, the 29th January 1872.

From Colonel R. Phayre, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, Commissioner in Sind.

Herewith I have the honour to submit statements by Major Harrison and Nawab Mahomed Khan regarding Syed Ali Mahomed, of Mustoong, as called for in your letter No. 834, dated the 19th ultimo.

In the press of business recently, Major Harrison's letter was overlooked, or I should have forwarded it on receipt.

Enclosure 2 in No. 40.

No. 1, dated Khozdar, the 8th January 1872.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat to Colonel R. Phayre, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of memorandum No. 834 (Political Department) by the Commissioner in Sind, dated 19th December 1871, with remarks on the same, contained in your memorandum No. 2348 of the 28th ultimo, and beg to submit the following report on the subject.

2. Syed Ali Mahomed, of Mustoong, was in former years highly esteemed and respected by his Highness the Khan. In 1863, however, he sided with the chiefs through whose instrumentality the present Khan was dethroned, and appointed Shere Dil's Wuzeer, or Prime Minister. His tenure of office only lasted a few months, as Shere Dil was murdered, and his Highness re-seated on the Khanali. Syed Ali Khan was then looked upon with disfavour from the active part he had taken against his Highness, and the position he occupied, but I never heard of his being badly treated.

3. His Highness the Khan not having visited any of his districts for some years, proceeded to Kutchee in 1870, and at different places examined the revenue accounts

from the date of his last visit; from thence he proceeded to Quetta, and, having audited the accounts of that place, went on to Mustoong.

4. At the latter place his Highness followed the same procedure, and on looking over his accounts found that Syed Ali Khan had embezzled large sums of money, and disbursed other amounts without the sanction of Shere Dil or himself. On hearing what was going on, I strongly advised his Highness, through Mahomed Khan, to look upon this and other similar transactions as bygones, and only to examine accounts from the date of his restoration. The reply I received was that the case had progressed so far that his Highness could not withdraw from the same. After a full inquiry it was ascertained that he had taken about Rupees 8,000, and was in possession of a document with Shere Dil's seal on it, making over the whole of Quetta to Afghanistan. His Highness called upon him to refund the money and produce the document alluded to; the latter order was at once complied with; but being in pecuniary difficulties, he asked Nawab Mahomed Khan to intercede for him, and it was ultimately arranged that he should give up a garden to liquidate this claim, and that the Nawab would take the first favourable opportunity of getting it restored to him.

5. Syed Ali Khan had left before Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed had defeated the rebels at Mustoong. Some weeks afterwards it was reported that he had gone to Cabul. His Highness' Wuzeer having full powers restored the garden to the Syed's son.

6. The above are the facts in connexion with the Syed. I have no doubt that he was interested in the proceedings of the rebels, but it seems incredible that the rebellion should be attributed to the story current in Kutchee, viz., that the disturbances arose from his Highness' bad treatment of the Syed.

7. I would respectfully invite attention to the accompaniment of my letter No. 85 of the 21st October 1871, and ask whether subsequent events have not proved that the rebellion originated with Sirdars Moolla Mahomed and Noordeen; the accompaniment was addressed to Saloo Khan, Raisanee. In it particular inquiry is made as to the views of Sirdar Jehangir and this Syed regarding a rebellion; opportunity and money were named as requisite to ensure success. Subsequent information shows that difference of opinion existed amongst the rebels as regards opportunity. Jehangir, Lehree, recommended that they should wait until the Brahooees went down to Kutchee and create a disturbance there; others advocated an immediate attack before his Highness' regiment could return from Beyla. The latter course was adopted, and the rebels were headed by Jehangir, Lehree, of Nurmook. The letter found in his pocket shows at whose instigation and in whose interest he fought. After his death Sumunder assumed the chieftainship of the Lehrees, and openly boasted that the rebellion had been got up by them, and refused to acknowledge Sirdar Dina Khoord and Mahomed Khan Rustamzai, both of whom looked upon themselves as Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's representatives. By plundering Kutchee the Brahooees doubtless thought they were carrying out the instructions in accompaniment above alluded to as regards opportunity and money.

8. Since the commencement of the disturbances I have asked his Highness on more than one occasion if he had done any thing to annoy or excite the people, or committed any injustice, such as taking away land, &c. He repeatedly assured me that he had given no cause whatever for the outbreak; that it was undoubtedly organized by Moolla Mahomed and Noordeen: and that they took advantage of all his infantry being away to create this disturbance. The Shahgassee also confirmed the above, stating that his Highness had acted justly, but had shown no generosity; as an example, his Highness, on examing Sirdar Jehangir's sunnud, found that, though only entitled to fourteen bunds, he had enclosed several more crown land. His Highness therefore ordered that revenue was to be paid on whatever was in excess of sunnud. Sirdar Jehangir said that he would keep what he had got or nothing. His Highness not having yielded this point accounts for Sirdar Jehangir's hostility to the Khelat Government.

9. In conclusion, I would respectfully allude to that part of my diary ending 26th November which refers to a conversation with Wullee Khan, as it not only shows how unreliable stories of this kind are, but supports his Highness's own statement, that he had done nothing that could account for this rebellion.

Enclosure 3 in No. 40.

Statement of Nawab Mahomed Khan, Vakeel of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, regarding the flight of Syed Ali Mahomed from Mustoong.

"Syed Ali Mahomed is the Moorshed or spiritual adviser of the Brahooees. He was at one time Minister to Shere Dil, some time Khan of Khelat. When the present Khan this year arrived at Mustoong, the Syed was directed to produce his accounts. Directly

that he was informed of this, he came to me and said that he would render a statement of his accounts, and at the same time he requested me to take the ornaments belonging to his family to his Highness the Khan. After this a large quantity of women's gold ornaments were made over to me by another Syed, called Azeem Shah. These ornaments I myself took to his Highness, who refused to take them, saying that he did not want these, nor did he desire to do any oppression. All he asked for was that the Syed should render true accounts of the money affairs entrusted to him. The Khan himself directed me to get this from Syed Ali. The accounts were to be made up with the aid of arbitrators, and the Syed was to give a bond, signed by the Kazee, for whatever sum was due to his Highness by the Syed. This was done, and Rs. 6,500 (more or less) was fixed as due by the Syed to his Highness, and the Syed gave a bond for the amount, signed by the Kazee. This was made over to the Khan, but by whom I cannot say, as whole affair took place in the Durbar. After this, by the Khan's desire, I comforted the Syed, saying to him that he ought to treat the whole affair as a joke; that the Khan had authorized him to say privately that, after the Khan's return to Khelat, the bond would be returned to him, Syud Ali, and the Khan had no desire to take one pice from him. His Highness shortly after this left for Khelat, and the day after his arrival there the present Brahooee disturbances broke out. Upon this Syed Ali fled to Candahar, but the reason for his doing so was partly because he had no hope that the Khan would do as stated and return the bond, and also partly because he feared that the Brahooees would implicate him in their dispute with the Khan. Directly I heard of Syed Ali's flight, I received the bond from his Highness, and sent it after him to Candahar, telling him that the Rs. 6,500 would never be taken from him, and not to fear. My letter reached him all right, and he replied that he would return home to Mustoong after his son's return from Cabul, where he had gone on business."

Question by Colonel Phayre. Explain what accounts of the Khan's were kept by this Syed, regarding which he required a statement?

Answer. " I cannot say for certain. For some time the Syed was the late Shere Dil's Wuzeer during the time he was Khan, and he kept the revenue and other accounts of the Mustoong district. He was also Naib for some time during the present Khan's rule. I believe the accounts he was called on to produce were those of the collections of revenue, &c., made during the time he held these offices."

Question. Do you know anything about Commandant Atta Mahomed, of the Khan's troops, having questioned the Syed about money he was reported to have accumulated during the time of the late Shere Dil, Khan of Khelat?

Answer. " I myself told the Syed that Atta Mahomed had made such a report to the Khan, and the Syed laughed, and said the whole story was false, and was an idle tale. The Commandant himself is at Kedj, and has been there for more than a year."

Given before me,

(Signed) R. PHAYRE, Colonel,
Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

Jacobabad, the 20th January 1872.

No. 115, dated Camp, Jacobabad, the 3rd February 1862.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government in continuation of Commissioner's letter, No. 868, of the 30th December 1871.

No. 41.

No. 857, dated Bombay Castle, the 13th February 1872.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I AM directed, with reference to previous correspondence, to forward to you, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying copy of papers received from the Commissioner in Sind, under endorsement No. 122, dated 5th instant, relative to Khelat affairs.

Enclosure 1 in No. 41.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from Nawab Moolla Mahomed, to Colonel R. Phayre, dated 19th Zoolkaid 1288.

I RECEIVED your perwannah dated the 13th instant about communicating certain matters to the Sirdars, &c. I have furnished you before this with the detailed information of the flight of the Brahooees into the hills, and of the conversation about truce between the Commandant and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and Alladina on the following day, and hope it has been received by you. I have sent the same information to his Highness the Khan, and have not received any reply. Now that I got your perwannah, I at once, on the 16th instant, despatched a copy with my letter to the Sirdars, and herewith enclose, in original, their reply, which came to hand on the 19th. I submitted your letter, in original, to his Highness the Khan, and also a copy of the Sirdar's reply. I am ready to obey any orders that you, or his Highness the Khan, who is my master, may be pleased to communicate to me. I received a copy of the former letter that you had sent me, in the belief that the original may have miscarried, and sent it, in original, to the Sirdars. Some of the Brahooees (i.e. Sirdars) are living in Seebee, and some in the hills.

Enclosure 2 in No. 41.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from Sirdars Jundo Khan, Sumunder, Alladina, and others to Moolla Mahomed Khan.

WE received your letter and copy of Colonel Phayre's to your address, and made ourselves acquainted with their contents. We have had before this some conversation on the subject, and we distinctly stated that we and his Highness the Khan would not come to binding terms without the intervention of the British official, Colonel Phayre. Our statements on this head were all not listened to by you; and now that the order from the aforesaid officer has been received, and a copy has been sent to us, we consent to abide by it, and express our approval of it. Now from the 18th of Zoolkaid, the date on which a copy of the letter of Colonel Phayre has reached us, we give information of the contents of the above copy to the men with us, and to Sarabuns and Jalabuns that we are here, and write and inform the other Sarabuns and Jalabuns to abstain from all wrongful acts. We will communicate the contents of the perwannah of the English Government to all the Sarabun and Jalabun people, for now the British Government is our sovereign as well as yours, whereas the British officer on our frontier is Colonel Phayre. If after this any unlawful act is committed by a Sarabun or Jalabun, information of it, after the necessary proof, may be given to us, that we may hand over the offending party to Colonel Phayre. According to the order of the British Government and Colonel Phayre we dismissed our followers, who will go and reside in any place they like.

You should move from here, and return to Bagh or Gundava, which is the capital of the Khan's dominions in Kutchee. Be at ease and keep us informed of what passes there.

No. 122, dated Camp Jacobabad, the 5th February 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE translation submitted to Government for information.

2. The tone and some of the expressions in the Sirdars' letter are worthy of notice, wherein they try to make it appear they consider themselves the subjects of the British Government. This will have to be most carefully met in any proceedings and arrangements that may take place, and it must be clearly established that the British authorities only engage as mediators between the Khan and his Sirdars, and that the latter can only be regarded as the subjects of his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

3. The Political Superintendent has been instructed to inform the Vakeel that, under this change in circumstances, he should at once withdraw with the Khan's troops to Gundava, and there await the arrival of his Highness the Khan from Khelat, expected shortly; also that, should there be any renewal of hostilities or disturbances by either side, the initiating party will be held to blame.

No. 42.

No. 1012, dated Bombay Castle, the 19th February 1872.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of the letter from this Office, No. 857, dated the 13th instant, I am directed to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of further papers received from the Commissioner in Sind with endorsement No. 124, dated the 6th idem, relating to the present state of affairs in Khelat.

Enclosure 1 in No. 42.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from Nawab Mahomed Khan to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, dated 28th January 1872.

I received your letter dated 17th January 1872, asking me to come with all the papers regarding the recent truce. From Bagh I went by several stages to Deh Narree, and arrived at Peer Kutto, and found that the Brahooees had before my arrival fled to the hills. On the second day the commander, one Ressaldar, and a few trustworthy persons of my side, and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and Alladina, on the part of the Sirdars, had some conversation, when they came to the following terms, viz., that if his Highness the Khan will pardon all the wrongs committed by the Brahooees; 2ndly, if they (the Brahooees) are not obliged to make good the losses of which they are the cause; and 3rdly, that if all the allowances and grants received by them (the Brahooees) are given back, all the Sirdars (with the exception of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed), as also the son of Moolla Mahomed, will proceed to appear in the presence of his Highness the Khan. That for the present we should go with our army to Dadur and report the whole matter to his Highness the Khan. In case the Khan consents, they should be sent for, when they will leave for Khelat; but if the answer is in the negative, they will not give up their plans of aggression. At the same time the Brahooees agreed to remain at the foot of the hills till such time as the reply reached Dadur, where we were to stop. I marched, and coming to Dadur, submitted a full report of the proceedings to his Highness the Khan, whose reply is not yet received by me. No paper was drawn up at the time that I should bring with me. If you desire me to come in, kindly let me know soon, that I may, after leaving the commander and the forces at Dadur, return to Jacobabad. Nothing was done in writing, but all was oral. Favour me with your orders that I may obey at once. I received your letter yesterday in the evening.

Enclosure 2 in No. 42.

No. 105, dated Camp Jacobabad, the 1st February 1872.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, to Colonel R. Phayre, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

In reference to the letter from Nawab Mahomed Khan, forwarded under your endorsement, without number, dated 29th January 1872, I have the honour to inform you that, under present circumstances, it will be better to let the Nawab remain where he is. No answer, therefore, is necessary.

No. 124, dated Camp, Jacobabad, the 6th February 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government for information.

No. 43.

No. 1122, dated Bombay Castle, the 24th February 1872.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

REFERRING to previous correspondence regarding the affairs of Khelat, I am directed to transmit herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of further papers on the same subject, received from the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, under endorsement of the Commissioner in Sind, No. 135, dated the 7th instant.

Enclosure 1 in No. 43.

No. 280, dated Camp, Thoole, the 4th February 1872.

From Colonel R. Phayre, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, Commissioner in Sind.

Two messengers from the Sirdars arrived in my camp this morning, bringing to me the enclosed letter, which I forward, in original, for your information, together with a copy of my reply.

2. One of the copies sent by the Sirdars is of the original letter received by me yesterday and submitted to you, the other is a copy of the letter written under your instructions to Nawab Mahomed Khan on the 24th ultimo.

Enclosure 2 in No. 43.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from the Sirdars to Colonel R. Phayre, dated 19th Zoolkaid 1288.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS,—We received a copy of your perwannah and order to Naib Moolla Mahomed Khan through the said Naib. According to your perwannah we expressed our consent and approval, and sent a letter giving vent to such expressions to the Naib. We append a copy of our letter to the Naib, as also of the one addressed by you to the Naib and forwarded to us. We hope these will be perused by the Sirkar. There is nothing particular that we can mention. Be at ease and favour us with a reply.

Enclosure 3 in No. 43.

Dated Camp, Thoole, the 4th February 1872.

From Colonel R. Phayre, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier to Sirdars Moolla Mahomed, Alladina Khoord, Sumunder Khan, Jinda Khan, Mahomed Syed Khan, and Shadee Khan, Bungoolzai.

I HAVE received your letter dated 31st January 1872, enclosing copies of letters as per margin for my information.

1. Copy of letter from the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Nawab Mahomed Khan, of 24th January 1872, containing the orders of the Commissioner in Sind.
2. Copy of letter from the Sirdars, to Meah Mahomed Khan, in reply to above letter.

2. In reply I forward to you copy of a letter which I addressed to Nawab Mahomed Khan yesterday, from which you will see that the Commissioner in Sind has invited his Highness the Khan to confer with him in Kutchee about these affairs, and that until his Highness the Khan arrives, the Commissioner has requested Nawab Mahomed Khan to remain with his Highness's troops at Gundava, and that you should remain quiet until his Highness's decision is made known.

No. 135, dated Camp, Jacobabad, the 7th February 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to the Government for information, in continuation of Commissioner's No. 122, dated 5th instant.

No. 44.

No. 1173, dated Bombay Castle, the 26th February 1872.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Referring to previous correspondence regarding the affairs of Khelat, I am directed to transmit herewith, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying copy of a "summary of news" from the 18th to the 25th ultimo received from the Political Aent, Khelat.

Enclosure in No. 44.

Summary of News from the 18th to the 25th January by the Political Agent, Khelat, dated Khelat, the 25th January 1872.

Thinking I might be of some service to General Pollock if I accompanied him as far as Khelat, I left Kozdar with 30 sabres on the 18th instant, leaving the remainder of my escort with Dr. Bowman, as forage would not be procurable except for a limited number of horses.

2. The climate was pleasant until we arrived at Lahran, three miles from Anjeera. From that place we started in a snow storm and experienced several showers of snow and sleet before reaching Lohrab. From the 21st to the 24th the sky was clear, but a cold cutting wind, with the thermometer in the early morning at 8° or 10°. On the 23rd we reached Khelat at 2 p.m., and later in the afternoon I introduced General Pollock and Dr. Bellew to his Highness, and on the following afternoon he returned their visits. General Pollock and Dr. Bellew left to-day, the 25th, at 11 a.m., escorted by 50 sowars. They appeared to be pleased at the hospitality and attention that had been shown to them.

3. On the morning of the 24th I visited his Highness to see that suitable arrangements had been made for General Pollock between this and Quetta. The conversation then verged on affairs in Kutchee; and on his Highness informing me that the chiefs had asked through Shukur Khan to be pardoned on any terms he (the Khan) might think fit, I strongly advised that Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed should be sent to Kutchee to assist in coming to some understanding with the rebel Sirdars. The Shahgassee, however, appeared to think it more desirable that his Highness should proceed and confer with the Commissioner in Sind on the subject. No decision was arrived at beyond its being agreed that a special kossid should be sent off informing the Commissioner in Sind that either his Highness or the Shahgassee was prepared to start on knowing with whom he wished to confer. Pending an answer to this question I have consented to remain at Khelat. Should his Highness proceed to Kutchee, he would probably expect me to accompany him, and, to save time, would proceed viâ Lehree and the Tahree Hills.

Before leaving Kozdar I received a letter from Sirdar Faqueer Mahomed, who reported all quiet in his districts, and that Sirdar Azaad Khan, of Kharan, had steadily refused to join in any intrigues. News from Nooshky leads me to doubt Azaad Khan's good intentions.

Two letters have just been received from Sirdar Abdool Khaman, Zuggur Mingul, one to his Highness' address, the other to me. In the former he writes: I have sent a man to collect all the people who will obey me. Dost Mahomed and his tribe will follow me, but Alum Khan and Poor Dil Khan are inclined to join Azaad Khan. The Bareechees stole some of my camels, but I recovered them.

This Sirdar, in writing to me, states the following is the latest news from Seistan: Alum Khan, Boorjundee, has arrived in Seistan, and made arrangements with Surfuraz Khan, Sunjravee of Chaga, and is now making other arrangements regarding Afghan boundary. He has also written to me to take service with Persia and acknowledge her rule. I and the Mahomed Hussainees have refused to have anything to say to them, consequently we have been plundered.

On arrival at Khelat I heard that a man had been blown away from a gun at Mustoong; so asked his Highness when visiting him who it was, and why it had been done. In reply, he stated that the man was Balack, Lehree, who cut down Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed in the Mustoong outbreak. Being wounded in the flight he had concealed himself in the neighbourhood, and on this being known he (the Khan) had ordered Balack's arrest as a bad and dangerous character, and directed his Naib to punish him in the way I had heard.

Between Sohrab and Khelat we met two small kafilas laden with wool, about 60 loads.

(Signed) C. H. Harrison, Major,
Political Agent at Khelat.

No. 45.

No. 1174, dated Bombay Castle, 26th February 1872.

From W. Wedderburn, Esq., Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

REFERRING to my letter No. 958, dated the 13th instant, I am directed by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, to transmit herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 170, of the 17th idem, giving cover to copies of letters from his Highness the Khan of Khelat, according to him (Colonel Merewether) full authority to act in his behalf in bringing to an end the present disturbances in Kutchee.

Enclosure 1 in No. 45.

No. 170, dated Camp, Jacobabad, 17th February 1872.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to His Excellency the Right Honourable Sir W. R. Seymour V. FitzGerald, G.C.S.I., Governor and President in Council, Bombay.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copies of abstract translation of letters from his Highness the Khan of Khelat in answer to my letters of the 21st and 25th ultimo. From these your Excellency will observe that his Highness in his accustomed desire to meet the wishes of Government has unreservedly accepted the proposals contained in my letters, that he entrusts me with full authority to act for him, and will willingly give his approval and assent to all the measures and arrangements adopted by me for the good of his country. He also expresses his concurrence in the letter I requested Colonel Phayre to write to the vakeel, Mahomed Khan, copy of which was forwarded to me by the Khan. His Highness has issued a proclamation suspending hostilities, translation of which is appended.

2. His Highness most impressively urges that he has up to this time countenanced no wrong to his subjects, or anything that endangered the safety of their persons and property, and that he has ever acted up to the terms of the treaty of his predecessors. I shall be better able to speak more fully on these subjects after I have heard fully all that can be said on both sides at the coming meeting with his Highness, and reserve any further remarks until then.

3. I wrote from this on the 1st instant to Major Harrison, requesting the Khan would himself come to Kutchee with his Vizier and Major Harrison. That letter, carried by a special messenger, was expected to reach Khelat about the 7th, and as the Khan was quite ready to start, I conclude he is now on his way, and that he may be expected to reach Gundava by the 23rd or 24th instant.

P.S.—I would draw attention to His Highness' remarks on the plunder of the kafilahs in the Bolan, the people with the kafilahs were warned against following that route, but persisted in taking it, giving documents to the Khan's officer at Quettah to the effect that they adopted it at their own risk. These documents, the Khan says, he has in his possession, and presuming they are of the above tenor, the Khan may be clearly absolved of all responsibility for the losses incurred by the merchants.

Enclosure 2 in No. 45.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat, to the Address of the Commissioner in Sind, dated 25th Zoolkaid 1288.

I BEG to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 25th January 1872, relative to the disturbances in Kutchee and in the neighbourhood of the English territory in contravention of the terms of the Treaty, and to giving you authority to act on my behalf, &c. In reply, I state that I have not up to this time countenanced anything that has wronged my subjects and endangered the safety of their persons and property, and have ever acted up to the terms of the treaty of my predecessors. I have ever tried my utmost to enhance the welfare and prosperity of my subjects, and have now hopes that by your kindness all will be made straight. I with great pleasure consider you master of all my affairs, and entrust you with full authority to act for me. I will with willingness give my approval and assent to all the measures and arrangements adopted by you for the good of my country. I highly approve of the letter addressed by Colonel Phayre to Naib Mooila Mahomed on the 24th January 1872.

If it please God, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed will leave for Kutchee in two or three days, and will, it is hoped, arrive at Bagh about the 23rd February 1872.

Enclosure 3 in No. 45.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat, to the Commissioner in Sind, dated 25th Zoolkaid 1288.

YOUR letter reached me, and I read its contents. I had before the receipt of your communication obtained full particulars of the affair from Major Harrison, and had therefore prepared myself and instructed my vizier, Moolla Wullee Mahomed, to get ready to meet you. We only waited for your reply, which we expected in a day or two, I had resolved to await arrival of your letter for two or three days, and then if my coming to visit you were difficult, to send my vizier Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, to meet you and to grant to you and my vizier full authority to act on my behalf in all matters connected with the good of my State, feeling sure at the same time that measures will be adopted which will result in my welfare and that of my subjects. In reference to the plunder of kafilahs mentioned by you, I have to state that I had given the necessary warning to the merchants, and told them to avoid the Bolan route for fear of the evil doings and robberies of the rebels around and in the vicinity of the Bolan Pass. I also informed them that they should take that route which they might consider the more safe and free from danger. They took no notice of this warning and took the route by the Bolan at their own wish, but before they did so, I caused documents of idemnification to be executed by them which are still in my possession. If perchance I am unable to come, I will give all these papers in charge of my vizier.

I have issued proclamations to officers in Kutchee and Kohistan, copies (four) of which are appended, one of these is for your information, the second is addressed to Naib Moolla Mahomed and Shukkur Khan, Commander of the Regiment "Waffadar," the third to Kumbur, Naib of Gundava, the fourth to Moolla Shahibdad, Nazim of Bagh, my object in sending these to you is to request you to send copies of the last three to their respective destinations, in order to avoid delay in their transmission from me direct, or their being intercepted by the rebels. Consider me as your true friend as before, &c.

Enclosure 4 in No. 45.

Abstract Translation of Copy of a Proclamation issued by his Highness the Khan of Khelat to all the Officers in his Dominions, sent for the information of the Commissioner in Sind.

IN consideration of the friendship existing between our Government and the British, the latter have agreed to engage in promoting a cessation of the disturbances caused by the Brahooees and to give peace to our subjects, you are therefore directed to see that there is no breach of the peace by any person belonging to your forces, and that all acts of hostility with the Brahooees are avoided. Make this public, and let every one of my subjects refrain from wrong doing. This is my pleasure. See that it is not departed from, and that every one feels himself bound by it.

NAIB MAHOMED KHAN.
SHUKKUR KHAN.
KUMBUR, Naib of Gundava.
SHAHIBDAD, Nazim of Bagh.
} A copy to each.

Enclosure 5 in No. 45.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from Moolla Wullee Mahomed, Vizier, to the Commissioner in Sind, dated 25th of Zoolkaid 1288.

I RECEIVED your purwana and perused it. The reading of its contents made me glad. You will know all the particulars from his Highness the Khan's letter. It will be with great joy that I obey the orders of my master to proceed to Kutchee to meet you. If it pleases God, it will soon happen. Consider me as the faithful servant of both the Governments, and be doing me kindness as heretofore.

No. 46.

No. 1370, dated Bombay Castle, 6th March 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to C. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I AM directed by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council to transmit herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a Diary by the Assistant Surgeon at Khelat, for the week ending the 3rd ultimo, received under endorsement of the Commissioner in Sind, No. 170 of the 17th idem.

Enclosure in No. 46.

Diary, No. 4, by Assistant Surgeon R. Bowman, M.D., for the week ending 3d February 1872.

The following information has been forwarded by Major Harrison from Khelat :—

On the 22nd January letters from Nawab Mahomed Khan and Shukkur Khan were forwarded for my perusal. The former reported his return to Dadur from Peer Kutta, and that his having proceeded into Afghan territory had been disapproved of by the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier. Shukkur Khan had gone with 100 of his men to a place called Tung; a skirmish ensued, but no casualties occurred; he then returned to his camp, and on the following day the chiefs came and made their salaam to him, and asked to be forgiven, and that if his Highness would pardon them they would proceed with him, Shukkur Khan, to Khelat, and, pending reference, agreed to remain where they were.

On the 28th other letters were received from the above persons. Nawab Mahomed Khan mentioned that ill-disposed Brahooees had taken up a position in Western Kutchee, and were plundering the inhabitants, and that it would be necessary to establish regular outposts as they did not care about the Belooch levies. The following Lehrees had made their salaam :—Shere Taj Khan and Sobrah Khan; other Brahooees would follow their example if his Highness sanctioned a treaty. Regarding the latter the chiefs make three stipulations :—

1st.—That whatever faults they have committed shall be forgiven.
2nd.—That their lives should be spared.
3rd.—That their hereditary lands, and what they had purchased should be restored to them.

Sirda Moolla Mahomed had proceeded into the Murree Hills with nine Sowars. The Juttuck and Lotanee chiefs, Chakur Khan and Kumal Khan, had constant disputes with Nawab Mahomed Khan, wanting to draw pay and subsistence for 500 men, whereas they only had 200. This dispute at last ended in Chakur Khan being placed in confinement, but released at the intercession of the Moosanee Sirdar, and presented with a loongee. The Nawab requested permission to dismiss the levies, as also that money should be sent to meet current expenses.

Shukkur Khan stated that the rebels had been assisted by the Khan of Seebee, and that he had charge of all the property they had plundered in Kutchee, and from the kafilas, and that if his Highness would give the necessary instructions he would attack Seebee.

His Highness has replied to Nawab Mahomed Khan, that he has taken the subject of treaty into consideration, and will intimate his intentions at a future date. To Shukkur Khan he writes :—Proceeding into Afghan country has been disapproved of by Colonel Phayre, C.B. The English* Government are on friendly terms with the Ameer and myself, and I am hopeful that they will solicit him, the Ameer, to either order this property to be restored, or to sanction my proceeding against Seebee.

Sirdar Faquir Mahomed displays great inquisitiveness regarding my movements. I have just received a letter from him, asking what General Pollock passed through the country for, and where I am going to, &c., &c.

Darogah Atta Mahomed writes that he had been fighting seven days with Bhai Khan, but that whenever he left the fort to meet them they retreated from one date-grove to another. Sirda Gajee Khan had been written to three times to reinforce Atta Mahomed, but had made no effort to do so. Meer Hussun and Meer Nawab Moolahzais Gitchkees were holding the fort of Khooda Budeen for his Highness, and could be relied upon. His Highness, when visiting me on Friday the 26th, stated that he had reliable information that Sirdar Bhai Khan had sent for Meer Esan Khan, his Highness' brother-in-law, to try and arrange matters for him with Darogah Atta Mahomed.

A post for General Pollock despatched from Jacobabad on the 16th was received here on the 29th, at 9 a.m., and forwarded at once.

General Pollock was at Mustoong on the 27th, and expected to be at Quettah on the 29th. Syud Noor Mahomed, the Afghan Commissioner, had arrived at Killah Kassim, near Kooch Lak, with 100 Infantry and 160 Sowars.

* This point may be noticed hereafter when the Khan arrives. It does not, however, appear to me that the interference of the British Government is in any way called for. If the Seebee Sirdar does not of himself give up any plunder he may have in possession, after affairs are arranged between his Highness the Khan and the Sirdars, the Khan might then address his Highness the Ameer on the subject, begging the latter to dispose of the matter. But he certainly should not propose to proceed against Seebee, a possession of Cabul.

(Sd.) W. L. M.

Zemindars from the village of Meedpoor have sent to Beebee Gunjan, stating that when they were putting aside her revenue or share of grain they were surrounded by Sarawan Brahooees, who claimed her share on the plea that Kutchee now belonged to them; that they at once asked for protection from Kumbur, the Naib, who came over with 20 Sowars, but being outnumbered retired, and that the Brahooees then carried off what they considered Government property.

The Jan Sing of Kozdar reports that he has received information from Wud, stating that the Minguls had collected 100 camels for Sirdar Noordeen. Ali Khan, Jamote, declines to allow him to remain any longer at Beyla. It is supposed he will return to Wud as soon as the baggage animals reach Beyla. Abdool Azeez reports to the same effect from Bhagwana.

The Belooch who were assembled here to garrison the fort have been allowed to return to their homes under instructions from his Highness the Khan.

The last Kossid from Jacobabad states that a party of Brahooees were looting between Kotra and Kharee.

No. 170, dated Camp Jacobabad, 17th February 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government for information.

No. 47.

No. 1551, dated Bombay Castle, 13th March 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am directed to forward herewith, for submission to the Government of India, copy of diary from the Assistant Surgeon, Khelat, for the week ending 10th ultimo, received under endorsement of the Commissioner in Sind, No 193, dated the 29th ultimo.

Enclosure in No. 47.

No. 5, dated Kozdar, 10th February 1872.

Diary by Assistant Surgeon R. Bowman, M.D., for the week ending 10th February 1872.

His Highness the Khan has informed Major Harrison that he had heard from Candahar that some of the merchants plundered in the Bolan Pass near Dadur had complained to the Sub-Governor of that place of the treatment they had experienced at the hands of the Brahooees, and that he at once ordered Sirdar Moollah Mahomed's brother-in-law, Aladad Badoozai, to be blown away from a gun. This order was rescinded at the intercession of Syud Ali Mahomed of Mustoong. Sirdar Abdool Rahman Zuggur Mingul has written to his Highness to say that Azaad Khan has been warned by the Ameer not to take part in any Brahooee disputes against his Highness the Khan, and that he, Abdool Rahman, has offered his services to Azaad Khan as a mutual friend to make up any misunderstanding that exists between him and the Khan; this information has been corroborated by letter received here from Nal.

Meer Mahomed, the Mingul Sirdar residing at present at Baghwan, reports that Noordeen Mingul has left Beylah with 100 camels, carrying supplies, ammunition, guns, &c. with the object of attacking Wud and Kozdar; also that he had marched as far as a mountain pass named Kumarooe, when he dismissed all his followers with the exception of thirty men, with whom he returned to Beylah. The Jam Singh reports that there are constant disputes between the Minguls and Jamotes.

A Raisanee named Nubbee Buksh was met in the Moolla Pass; he stated he was *en route* to Beylah with a message from Sirdar Moollah Mahomed for Noordeen.

Naib Peer Buksh, writting from Kotra to the Jam Singh, states that on the 27th January a man named Khan Mahomed Zehree gave him the following verbal information under instructions from Vakeel Mahomed Khan Meeah Khan Raisanee. Munnoo Khan Giranee, Jamal Khan, and Buzkhan, with a detachment from his Highness' force, had gone to disperse the Badoozai and Nicharee tribes, who were looting near Kundah under Sarhing Khan Badoozai and Bahawur Khan Nicharee: in the fight which ensued, three of the Khan's force were wounded, 10 or 12 of the lootoos killed, Sarhing Khan received two wounds, one from a bullet, the other a sword-cut; the Oomaenee tribe, who had given the plunderers assistance, were also punished; 1,000 sheep, 60 camels, and other property belonging to these people, were seized by the Khan's force. Meeah Khan and Munoo Khan are at present residing in Kundah.

No news from Mekran has been received during the week.

Two Candahar kafilas chiefly consisting of wool, have passed through this *en route* to Kurrachee *viâ* the Raj Road. A kafila of 150 camels from Kurrachee for Candahar passed through on the 5th instant; they report everything quiet on the road; on the 8th there were several showers of sleet and rain during the day.

No. 193, dated Camp Jacobabad, 29th February 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government, for information.

No. 48.

No. 1552, dated Bombay Castle, 13th March 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Referring to my letter No. 1370, dated the 6th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith, for submission to the Government of India, copy of a Diary (No. 6), by the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending the 17th ultimo, received under endorsement of the Commissioner in Sind, No. 183 of the 27th idem.

Enclosure in No. 48.

No. 6, dated Kozdar, 17th February 1872.

Diary by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 17th February 1872.

Aladad Badoozai, brother-in-law of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, left Candahar with five followers, passed through Kharan, and was sent by the chief of that place, Azaad Khan, to join Noordeen Mingul at Wud.

Sirdar Faqueer Mahomed has left Nal for Jao; object not known, but it is supposed that he does not wish to meet Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed.

Shortly after Nawab Mahomed Khan's departure with a force to Kutchee, his Highness the Khan wrote to Darogah Atta Mahomed to hand over charge of the Kedj district to Sirdar Bhai Khan or Sirdar Esau Khan Gitchkees. These instructions could not be carried out owing to disturbances created by the former chief. Through the intervention of the latter Sirdar hostilities have ceased, and Darogah Atta Mahomed has handed over charge of Kedj, and the Toorbut Fort to his Assistant, Ali Jan, returning himself to Khelat with the detachment *viâ* Kotewah.

I left Khelat with Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed on the 11th, arrived at Kozdar on the 16th, and after halting here to-day, the 17th, proceed down the Moolla Pass, and expect to be at Gundava on the 23rd or 24th.

(Sd.) C. H. Harrison, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

No. 183, dated Camp Jacobabad, 27th February 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government for information.

No. 49.

No. 1554, dated Bombay Castle, the 13th March 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay in the Political Department, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 1552, dated the 13th instant, I am directed to forward herewith, for submission to the Government of India, copy of the diary from the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 24th ultimo, and of its enclosure, received under endorsement of the Commissioner in Sind, No. 204 of the 2nd instant.

Enclosure 1 in No. 49.

No. 7, dated Gundava, the 24th February 1872.

Diary by Political Agent, Khelat, for week ending 24th February 1872.

Left on Sunday the 18th with my escort, Dr. Bowman, and Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, *en route* to Gundava, arriving at the latter place to-day, the 24th. In the Moolla Pass we met several Belooch returning to their homes from Nawab Mahomed Khan's camp, amongst them Sirdar Kaisah Khan Moosanee.

The Mugzee chief, Kaisah Khan, and the Rhind Sirdar's son, Sirdar Khan, met Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed between Peer Chuttur and Kotra with about 800 followers, and escorted us to our camp. Both chiefs visited me in the course of the afternoon.

Many of the poorer classes of Brahooees who live in the hills came from a distance to see the Shahgassee, as they scarcely credited he was still alive. All of them brought their little offerings, and the expression of good will among all classes showed the esteem and respect that is felt for Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed.

Nawab Mahomed Khan wrote to the Shahgassee and myself, stating that he had been ordered by the Political Superintendent to proceed to Gundava, but that he had written to point out that scarcity of forage and supplies rendered it advisable for him to remain at Bagh, and that he should stay there until an answer was received, unless the Shahgassee gave him orders to move. The Shahgassee has, I believe, sanctioned the force remaining where they are, pending the Political Superintendent's reply.

His Highness forwarded a letter from Darogah Atta Mahomed, reporting that the rebels had made their salaam, and that on their being asked whether they would prefer his assistant, Ali Jan, or Sirdar Faquir Mahomed as Naib of Mekran, they elected the former. Darogah Atta Mahomed had also made arrangements for Major St. John and his party. Copy and translation of letter are attached.

Sirdar Faquir Mahomed has written me a friendly letter, stating that he had proceeded to Jao, but that his son Meah Kaira was at Nal and would be always willing to do anything for me.

The very sudden change from cold to heat has told on the health of the escort, but Dr. Bowman reports that the majority of the sick will be fit for duty in a few days.

(Signed) C. H. Harrison, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

Enclosure 2 in No. 49.

Dated 17th Zoolkaid (corresponding with the 29th January 1872).

From Darogah Atta Mahomed to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

I have received your letter, your kindness to me is great, may God keep you in safety. On the 15th Zoolkaid, Wednesday, 27th January, Mea Bhai Khan and other Belooch of Kedj came and made their salaam, acknowledged their allegiance to you, and agreed to pay revenue. Oomer Kossid took a month on the road, being ill 15 days. I asked the chiefs and other people under whose orders they would be most

happy, Sirdar Faquir Mahomed or Ali Jan; they all with one consent elected the latter. I, therefore, appointed him Naib, and handed the fort of Toorbut over to him.

I have given Ali Jan and the chiefs strict orders to do everything they can for Major St. John, and that on his leaving Mekran he should be asked for a letter stating whether he had received every attention and assistance.

Agreeably to your order I left with the detachment, guns, &c. on the 17th Zoolkaid, 29th January. I have ordered the detachment at Punjoor to meet me at Muska. I have also written to Sirdar Gazee Khan at Punjoor and Shabban, Jan Singh, that they may rest satisfied and contented, and to be always ready and willing to perform your service.

The sowar that I took into your service at Punjoor still remains at that place. Please send a relief for the 20 sowars at Kedj.

Please write to your Naibs at Kolewah and Muska to provide supplies for my party.

In the late disturbances the detachment and all under my orders have behaved remarkably well.

No. 204, dated Camp, Jacobabad, the 2nd March 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government for information.

No. 50.

No. 669P., dated Fort William, the 18th March 1872.

From C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department.

I AM to communicate to you the following observations of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, with reference to your letter No. 1174, dated 26th February 1872, forwarding copy of a communication from the Commissioner in Sind, to the effect that the Khan of Khelat has accorded to Colonel Merewether full authority to act in his behalf in bringing to an end the present disturbances in his Highness' dominions.

2. I am to state that as the Khan has placed his case in the hands of the Commissioner in Sind, and the Sirdars have now ceased hostilities, pending a settlement of the dispute and as the Government of India has laid down clearly the course to be pursued in conducting negociations in the matter in its letters No. 8C.—P. and No, 222P, dated respectively the 11th and 24th January 1872, and in its subsequent telegrams, and has further given Colonel Merewether full discretionary power within the scope of those instructions, His Excellency in Council hopes soon to hear that the Commissioner has succeeded in effecting a settlement satisfactory to all parties, and giving a hope of permanent peace in the future.

No. 51.

No. 1678, dated Bombay Castle, the 19th March 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay in the Political Department, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN continuation of the letter from this Office No. 1551, dated the 13th instant, I am directed to enclose, for submission to the Government of India, copy of a letter, with enclosures, from the Political Agent, Khelat, No. 36, dated the 6th instant, regarding the movements of Sirdar Noordeen in Beloochistan, received under endorsement of the Commissioner in Sind, No. 236 of the 8th idem.

Enclosure 1 in No. 51.

No. 36, dated Jacobabad, the 6th March 1872.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent in Khelat, to Colonel R. Phayre, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind frontier.

IN continuation of my letter No. 34, I have the honour to forward letter just received from Khozdar, relating to Sirdar Noordeen's movements.

Enclosure 2 in No. 51.

TRANSLATION of a Letter from the Jan Singh, of Jalawan, to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed.

ON a former occasion I gave you news from this place; I hope it may have reached you in safety. Sirdar Noordeen will enter Wudd on the 18th Zoolhuj, 28th February. The Lassees have not accompanied him. The Bezonjaos on the Purali and in Beyla are with him. He has also sent a man to collect the Minguls. I write this for your information. By God's blessing and his Highness' good fortune, everything is all correct. Kindly write to me of your welfare.

P.S.—Ibrahim Roonja and 100 followers are with Noordeen. The latter has also sent a messenger to Sirdar Azaad Khan.

Enclosure 3 in No. 51.

TRANSLATION of a Letter from the Jalawan Jan Singh to Molee Dost Mahomed.

ON the 18th Zoolhuj, 28th February, Noordeen will enter Wudd. Ibrahim Roonja is the only Lassee with him. He has 100 followers. The Bezonjaos of Beylah are with Noordeen. He has Keywul Mistree with him, two guns, and one mortar. Noordeen will probably await the result of the Shahgassee's conference. He has sent to Sirdar Azaad Khan. We are all well here. Write to me of your welfare.

(True translations.)
(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major.
Political Agent, Khelat.

No. 236, dated Camp, Jacobabad, the 8th March 1872.
Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government for information.

No. 52.

No. 2221, dated Bombay Castle, the 15th April 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I AM directed to forward to you, for submission to the Government of India, the accompanying copy of a memorandum from the Commissioner of Sind, No. 351, dated the 6th instant, enclosing copy of a letter addressed by him to the Khan of Khelat, relative to the settlement of the claims of the Sirdars of Beloochistan.

Enclosure in No. 52.
Dated the 6th April 1872.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS,—Your Highness' Wuzeer, the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, arrived here on the 1st March, and has ever since then been most zealous and useful in carrying out your Highness' instructions to give me every assistance as he would to you.

The proceedings in reference to which he came here have now been brought to a close, and I have given him, for your Highness' information, a copy of the decision I arrived at.

He assured me in presence of the Sirdars that the terms granted in your Highness' name should be strictly adhered to.

I sincerely trust that the clemency that has been once more extended to these Sirdars will be fully and properly appreciated by them, and that the consideration they have been treated with will lead them to be in future good and faithful subjects of your Highness, so that peace and order may be undisturbed in your dominions.

The entire approval of the British Government has been accorded to what has been done, and, in communicating that approval, I have to represent to your Highness that, while it is anticipated that the conduct of the Sirdars of Beloochistan will be such as to prevent all cause for disquietude, it is also expected and trusted that every effort will

be used by your Highness to draw the affections and sympathies of your chiefs towards yourself, so that they may always look up to you, and endeavour earnestly and heartily to promote the stability of your Government and the prosperity of the country generally. No Government can be strong unless justice guides it, and there is thorough union of all parts thereof. It cannot stand by itself. On this occasion mediation by me has been permitted in the hope that it may be beneficial. But at the same time I am constructed to inform your Highness that, while in future every aid will be afforded you when it is needed in the shape of advice from the Political Agent with you, from the Political Superintendent on the Frontier here, and from the Commissioner in Sind, you must depend upon your own powers and your own good management for the proper ruling of your country. That any armed intervention on the part of the British Government between you and your chiefs can never be permitted. Such as explained by General Jacob to your brother would only tend to weaken, not strengthen, your position, and must not be looked for.

I have in conclusion to express to your Highness the gratification experienced by Her Majesty's Government at the frank and sincere manner in which you entrusted to me power to act in your behalf, and agreed to abide by whatever conclusions I might see fit to come to, and I have had much pleasure in intimating to your Highness' Wuzeer the manner in which Her Majesty's Government desires to show its appreciation of what has passed. This will be communicated to you by him and by Major Harrison, and I trust it may prove satisfactory to your Highness.

With expressions of sincere friendship and earnest desire for your welfare and the prosperity of your country, I subscribe myself, &c.

No. 351, dated Camp, Jacobabad, the 6th April 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

True copy submitted to Government for information, in reference to the Commissioner's letter No. 340, dated 5th April 1872.

No. 53.

No. 2343, dated Bombay Castle, 20th April 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

With reference to recent correspondence regarding Khelat affairs, I am directed to forward to you, for submission to the Government of India, the accompanying copy of a letter from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 340, dated the 5th instant, giving cover to copy of papers connected with the settlement of the claims of the Sirdars of Beloochistan, lately in rebellion.

2. I am to state that the enclosure to my No. 2221, dated 15th idem, should have been delayed for the present correspondence.

Enclosure 1 in No. 53.

No. 340, dated Camp, Jacobabad, 5th April 1872.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to His Excellency the Right Hon. Sir W. R. S. V. FitzGerald, G.C.S.I., Governor and President in Council, Bombay.

I have the honour to report that the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, Wuzeer to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, arrived here on the 1st March, accompanied by Major Harrison, Political Agent at that Court. I received a visit of ceremony from the Shahgassee on the same day and returned it on the following morning.

2. The Sirdars of Sarawan named below, having been summoned to attend on the 4th idem, arrived that afternoon :—

Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee.
„ Shadee Khan, Bungulzye.
„ Jundo Khan, Shawanee.
„ Syud Khan, Mahomedshahee.
„ Dost Mahomed, Lehree.
„ Alladina Khoord, with his two sons—
1. Dost Mahomed,
2. Yar Mahomed.

I received them in a ceremonial durbar on the morning of the 6th, at which were also present—

Colonel Phayre, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.
His Highness' Wuzeer, the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed.
Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat.
Mr. F. R. S. Wyllie, Assistant Commissioner.

3. On the 7th the above officers being again present, the Sirdars attended in Durbar, when I addressed them as follows :—

"The British Government has noticed with much concern the disturbances which have been going on in Beloochistan, and so seriously affecting the prosperity of that country and the well-being of all in it.

"The British Government is in alliance with the sovereign of Beloochistan, and, regarding him, his Sirdars, and subjects as friendly neighbours, has always been desirous to assist in promoting any measures that may be for the benefit of that country, its ruler, chiefs, and people.

"Differences have unfortunately occurred beween his Highness the Khan and certain of his nobles. It appears to the British Government that its good offices may advantageously be employed in bringing about adjustment of these differences by friendly mediation.

"I am instructed accordingly to so use them, and his Highness the Khan has with proper frankness and good-will fully authorised me to engage in this mediation on his behalf and you also, Sirdars of Sarawan, have accepted the same.

"I shall now call upon you each separately and individually to lay before me any points in which you may consider yourselves to have been sufferers, and any rights which you may consider yourselves justly entitled to hold.

"In doing so, however, I must tell you that in anything you submit to me, you must recollect that the British Government can only listen to such claims as are based on true justice and the undoubted customs of your country, and I would urge you all in making your statements to recollect that unfounded claims cannot be attended to; that as Sirdars you are bound to bear in remembrance that you have a public duty to perform, viz., to apply your best powers in maintaining good government in your country for the security of all, and that you should not allow any personal fancies to make you forgetful of your public duties.

"I feel sure that your good sense and regard for your country's welfare will confirm this view to you, and I will now proceed to call on the first Sirdar, Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, to submit what he wishes to have considered."

4. I then called on each Sirdar separately to state what he wished to be taken into consideration, commencing with Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee. These statements are given hereafter, as well as the remarks obtained from his Highness' Wuzeer on the same. Before proceeding further, however, I should explain the exact position of each of these six Sirdars, who were the leaders, or engaged in the late revolution which commenced at Moostung in October last and ended in Kutchee in January.

5. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed is the head of the Raisanee tribe of Brahooees. He holds lands at Khanack, near Moostung and Mittree, in Kutchee.

The Raisanee is one of the principal tribes of Sarawan, but not always the head one, as has hitherto been erroneously supposed. The Shawanee is the oldest and was always the leading one, carrying the standard of Sarawan in battle until the time of Mahomed Khan, father of Mehrab Khan, when the standard was taken from them owing to the then chief, Abdool Kadur, having fallen under the displeasure of the Khan, and given to Hybut, Raisanee, great-grandfather of Moolla Mahomed. In Mehrab Khan's reign, Meeroolla Khan, son of Hybut, Raisanee, rebelled, and the standard was taken away and re-given to the Shawanees. In Meer Nusseer Khan's time it was again taken from the Shawanees and placed in the hands of Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, who forfeited it by rebellion, and it was restored to the Shawanees who hold it now. The standards of Sarawan and Jalawan are always kept by the Khan, excepting when his vassals are called out for active service. They are then formally delivered to and carried in front of the head of the tribe to whom they are entrusted for the time being. The Raisanees were originally Patans before they settled with the Brahooes under a man named "Rais," whence their name, not because they were "the head," as supposed by "Masson."

6. Shadee Khan, Bungulzye, is present head of that tribe, his father, Wudera Adam Khan, having died last year. The Bungulzyes are the third in importance of the Sarawan tribes and hold lands near Moostung and at Mull in Kutchee. Adam Khan was always well esteemed by the Khans. He, however, sided with Shere Dil Khan in

1863. Being afterwards forgiven by the present Khan he was treated well by him, but was unfortunately led away by Moolla Mahomed and Alladina Khoord. Part of the Bungulzyes remained faithful to the Khan, and are with him at Khelat under Shahdad Khan, cousin of Adam Khan.

7. Jundo Khan, Shawanee, is only a minor chief of that clan, which, as above mentioned, is really the leading as well as the most powerful and numerous in Sarawan, It is not really a Brahooee tribe, but supposed to be of Persian origin. It has, however, for long been incorporated among the Brahooees. The true head of the clan is Abdool Kadur, but he is an imbecile, and for some time past endeavours have been made to get the Khan to recognise one of the other Sirdars as chief, but he would not do so. Moombarik Khan, Shawanee, who was killed in the fight at Moostung in October last, aspired to the leadership. The Shawanee hold lands near Moostung and at Hajee-ka-Shere in Kutchee.

8. Syud Khan, Mahomedshahee. The Mahomedshahees rank about fourth, and have lands near Moostung and near Bagh in Kutchee.

9. *Dost Mahomed Lehree.*—The Lehrees hold lands in the hills between Moostung and Dadur, principally at Narmack and near Bagh in Kutchee. Jehangeer Khan, father of Dost Mahomed, was a man well spoken of, until led away by others. He had been pardoned by the Khan for a previous act of rebellion and released from imprisonment to be reinstated in his former possessions. But in spite of this clemency he joined in the outbreak at Moostung in October and was killed in the fight. On his person was found a letter believed to be from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, written from Canhahar, calling upon him to create disturbances on behalf of the Sirdars in exile, Moolla Mahomed and Noordeen Mingul. This letter had no seal attached, but as Moolla Mahomed did shortly after join the insurgents and Noordeen Mingul went to Jalawan to cause rebellion, it may be fairly assumed that there was truth in Moolla Mahomed's connexion with the latter, especially as the Khan of Khelat received at the same time information from Candahar that the Brahooee Sirdars, Moolla Mahomed and Noordeen, were in communication with Jehangeer Khan, Lehree, and Syud Ali Mahomed of Moostung.

10. *Alladina Khoord.*—The Khoords hold lands on the Dusht-i-bedowlut at the top of the Bolan Pass and at Moras in the hills, a little to the left of that pass, also some near Bagh in Kutchee. The possessions of the Dusht and Moras yield very little to the Khoords, and they have always been known as restless and questionable in their behaviour. Having little to lose, they were ready to join in any disturbance that took place, and this has particularly been the case with Alladina, who is a subtle character, most unscrupulous in his sayings and doings. He has been repeatedly pardoned by the Khan, and has been left in possession of his estates; but this leniency has had no effect whatever on him. Much of the evil that has occurred in the country during the past nine years may with justice be laid at the door of this reckless schemer.* The Khoords, as their name shows, are not of Brahooee origin, but, as far as I can learn, have been associated with them for a great many years. A portion of the clan under Aftar Khan and Mullik, cousins of Alladina, remained faithful to the Khan, but Aftar Khan died lately; some of his followers are here with the Shahgassee.

* One of his sons, Yar Mahomed, led the attack on the kafilahs.

11. As the lands in the hilly country produce nothing in the winter, it has always been the custom since Kutchee was taken from the Culhoras of Sind and given to the Brahooees by Nadir Shah, in compensation for the death of Abdoolla Khan, Khan of Khelat, to give Sirdars grants of land in Kutchee as well. All these they held under feudal service.

12. It will be observed that the disaffected Sirdars of Sarawan, numbering only six, all belong to either Moostung or its immediate neighbourhood, where also resided Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, the most influential of the party, and it will be seen from the papers which follow that they have, since the outbreak of 1867 (also commenced at Moostung), blindly followed his leading. It will lead to a clearer understanding of the position if his career is briefly followed before reviewing the statements made by the Sirdars.

13. In the younger Nusseer Khan's reign Moolla Mahomed was treated with great distinction and regard by that sovereign, and it is not improbable, as has been supposed, that Nusseer Khan's strong leaning to this powerful chief led the Darogah, Gool Mahomed, to perpetrate the atrocious deed of causing Nusseer Khan to be poisoned from the dread that his, the Darogah's, influence would be sacrificed for that of the Sirdar. Moolla Mahomed was present with the Sirdars, who with the Jam of Beyla

presented themselves at Khelat in September 1857 on the present Khan's accession under the pretence of doing homage, but who, as Sir Bartle Frere wrote, "thought the "occasion propitious for pressing claims on the Khan, some of which appear to have "been reasonable and well-founded, while others were quite the reverse." They assembled their followers then with a view to enforce the Khan's attention to their claims, but the Darogah met them successfully and remained master of the situation, as well as in possession of the Fort of Khelat and the person of the Khan, then a youth of between 17 and 18, just freed from the harem. Matters went tolerably smoothly for a time, though that ill-feeling existed between the Khan and his nobles is shown by Sir Henry Green's report in 1863, when he wrote :—"Much of the ill-feeling towards the Khan is "doubtless caused by his capricious and unstable character, but his chiefs by the "unreasonableness of their demands and insolence of their conduct towards him render "any permanent settlement of their differences most difficult. His power over them is "slight, and although their lands are held by feudal tenure any attempt made by his "Highness to enforce even the extradition of a culprit leads to their banding together and "defying his authority." Unfortunately, the year before that the Khan had passed a grave personal affront* on Sirdar Taj Mahomed, Zehree, the principal Chief of Jalawan, in the matter of a marriage. Moolla Mahomed at that time made common cause with Taj Mahomed, and the revolution of 1863 followed, when the Khan was wounded at Gundava by his half-brother, Shere Dil, and had to flee for his life. The Chiefs set up Shere Dil and maintained him as long as he had money or power to bestow favours. The whole treasure of the Khanate that was in the "Miri" at Khelat, amounting, it is said, to some nine lakhs of rupees, was either plundered or squandered. In May 1864, Shere Dil was murdered, and Meer Khodadad Khan recalled and reinstated on the throne, mainly through the assistance of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee. After the restoration Moolla Mahomed and Taj Mahomed were all powerful at first and acted much as they liked. This was viewed with great disfavor by many of the other Sirdars, who remonstrated with the Khan on the subject. Moolla Mahomed and Taj Mahomed dreaded the loss of their power, and the latter still evinced his personal discontent. In March 1865, when the Khan was at Bagh in Kutchee, these two Sirdars plotted together to assassinate him and put his infant son on the throne, that there might be less check on them. The conspiracy was discovered in time and failed by the prompt action of the faithful Wuzeer, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed. Moolla Mahomed went off to his own place, Mittree, about 27 miles north of Bagh, but Taj Mahomed remained and was not interfered with. He then endeavoured to carry out the Khan's assassination by himself. This was detected also, and then only was Taj Mahomed made a prisoner, continuing in confinement until his death, in August 1867. One of the demands made by the rebel Sirdars in 1869 was blood-money for Taj Mahomed, meaning to convey thereby that he had been killed by the Khan. Sir Henry Green stated, "as no inquiries I have made can prove the truth of the report, "I place little faith in it." The Wuzeer, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, declares most decidedly that Taj Mahomed died a natural death; that he himself saw the body laid out, and can speak positively to no signs whatever of a forcible death; and that there are plenty of others who could do the same. If force had been intended by anyone, two years would not have been allowed to pass before it was used. This question of blood-money has been lately revived by the Sirdars, but is utterly unsound and most offensive. Sir Henry Green, in writing of Taj Mahomed's character said :—"One thing is, how-"ever, beyond a doubt, that a more desperate intriguer or a greater traitor did not exist "in any Native Court in Asia, and so long as he remained at large, his Highness the "Khan's position could never have been safe."† On hearing of Taj Mahomed's arrest Moolla Mahomed fled to Candahar. From March 1865 to October 1867, that is from the time "Taj Mahomed was secured and Moolla "Mahomed had fled, the most perfect tranquillity reigned throughout Beloochistan." This tranquillity was only disturbed by Moolla Mahomed returning from Candahar in 1867, and joining in an outbreak, which commenced at that time amongst the unsettled characters of Moostung, when Hubbeeb Khan, a Raisanee chief, was killed. The Khan had a great liking for this Hubbeeb Khan,‡ and hearing he was being misled sent and warned him not to forget his faith. But Hubbeeb Khan could not resist the temptation, and joined the others, who brought about the émeute for no real grievances, but mainly at the bidding of Moolla Mahomed, at Candahar. The Shahgassee was sent against the rebels, defeated them on several

* This had nothing to do with administration; was purely a personal matter.
(Signed) W. L. M.

† Taj Mahomed's estates were placed in charge of his mother, who has held them ever since, and resides close to Khelat on most friendly terms with his Highness the Khan.
(Signed) W. L. M.

‡ Hubbeeb Khan was a cousin of Moolla Mahomed, and his sister is the wife of the latter.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

occasions, till they at last dispersed, and Moolla Mahomed fled to the Murrees. It was then Sir H. Green offered to mediate on behalf of Moolla Mahomed, and to obtain the Khan's pardon for him. Unfortunately departure for Europe prevented his doing this, and the matter had to lie over, Moolla Mahomed remaining quiet in Seebee. In the autumn of 1868 the Jam of Beyla rebelled and called on Moolla Mahomed to join him, but the latter kept aloof on this occasion and stayed where he was. In March 1869 Sir H. Green's promise was taken up under my orders by Colonel Phayre, and mediation with the Khan entered on. But Moolla Mahomed, instead of going direct to Khelat, as instructions were issued by me that he should do, either in company with Captain Harrison (then appointed Political Agent), or immediately following him, chose to go off to Beyla, and approached Khelat, not as a suer for pardon, but with the Jam of Beyla, Noordeen Mingul, and Azaad Khan of Kharan, at the head of a large body of armed followers, and preferring demands which it was utterly impossible the Khan could accede to. Notwithstanding this the Khan accepted the intercession of Captain Harrison, which was used in accordance with Sir H. Green's promise, and agreed to restore to Moolla Mahomed all his old rights and privileges, with the prospect of others, if he behaved well and faithfully.* It did not suit the views of the Jam and Azaad Khan that Moolla Mahomed should be reconciled to the Khan, so they dissuaded him against accepting the offers made him, and he unhappily possessed an idea that he would receive support from the Political Superintendent on the frontier of Sind, spurned the Khan's clemency, fled to Seebee again and afterwards to Candahar, where he remained until he thought he saw a favourable opportunity of renewing disturbances in October last. It will be observed from the above abbreviated account that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed arrayed himself in hostile attitude to, and attempted to coerce, the Khan into compliance with his demands, firstly in 1857, secondly in 1863, thirdly in 1865, fourthly in 1867, fifthly in 1869, and sixthly in 1871, while the Khan has been ever ready and willing to forgive past offences and restore him to his old position.

* At the same time the Khan forgave and restored their old lands to Wuderah Adam Khan Bungulzye and Alladina Khoord.

14. The only disaffected Sirdar of consequence lately in Jalawan has been Noordeen Mingul. It is universally allowed that he has no complaint to urge against the Khan, but he has steadily thrown in his lot with Sirdar Meer Khan, formerly Jam of Beyla, with whom he is connected by marriage. In the same way as with his relative, he has been repeatedly pardoned by the Khan for various rebellions in which he has engaged in company with Sirdar Meer Khan, but this kindness has been thrown away upon him. He was informed of the intended mediation here, that it had been allowed for all the chiefs of Beloochistan who desired to accept it on condition of their disbanding their followers and submitting, and that they had agreed to it. He has not only failed to present himself as the others have done, but he has continued in hostile attitude to the Khan, and has committed various outrages on the Khelat and Beyla road since he heard of the arrangement that had been made. He has therefore forfeited all claims to consideration at the present time, as appended correspondence will show (Appendix A.).

15. Sirdar Meer Khan of Beyla has always held a somewhat different position to the other Sirdars. As Jam of Beyla he was almost independent, though he was bound to give feudal service to the reigning Khan of Khelat. He is now about 42 years old. A sister of his was one of Mehrab Khan's wives, and he is himself married to a half-sister of the present Khan of Khelat, and daughter of Mehrab Khan. He is of a most restless and intriguing nature. In Meer Nusseer Khan's time he took up arms to screen Noordeen Mingul, who had murdered Khan Mahomed Mingul. During the present Khan's reign Sirdar Meer Khan has altogether appeared in seven rebellions against his sovereign, and been twice imprisoned. His object was to supplant the Khan. He was each time pardoned by his Highness the Khan mainly through the intercession of the Beebee Gunja, a stepmother of the present Khan, and mother of Meer Khan's first wife. He is also married to a sister of Noordeen Mingul. The first wife has been long separated from Meer Khan, and has resided with her mother and the Khan at Khelat. The other accompanied Meer Khan to Hyderabad, and is there still. On the last outbreak Meer Khan, having been defeated by the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, fled into Sind. He was granted an asylum provided he abstained from engaging in any way in the affairs of his old country, or of Khelat generally, and was at first located in Kurrachee. Being so near Beyla the temptation was too strong for him to resist; he was then changed to Hyderabad, but here also he continued communicating with his old country contrary to the stipulations, until at last a letter from him was intercepted, in which he wrote of the disturbances then going on in Beloochistan as of use to restore him to his old position. This open and clear breach of the stipulations under which he was allowed to reside at

Hyderabad showed he could not be permitted to remain longer in so near neighbourhood to the Khan of Khelat's dominions, and he was removed to the Deccan.

16. Ali Khan is a very petty chief, cousin by a junior branch of Meer Khan. He has little or no influence except amongst his own personal followers, which do not muster 200. He has no sympathy with the proceedings of Moolla Mahomed or Noordeen Mingul. Indeed he carefully kept the latter apart from him, and would not allow him, Noordeen, to enter Beyla, as that Sirdar wished to do when he came from Candahar in November last. Ali Khan's action is purely in behalf of his relative Meer Khan, whose return he naturally wishes for. He is assisted in this, as I frequently before reported, by certain bunniahs, merchants of Beyla, to whom Meer Khan is largely indebted, and who know the only chance they have of ever seeing any of their money again. These merchants supply Meer Khan now with funds, and they also enabled Ali Khan Jamote to bribe the officers of the Khan's troops, so that they refused to fight, and he obtained possession of Beyla unopposed. The other tribes of Beyla, Roonjas and others, do not side with Ali Khan, and have lately asked the Khan to send a ruler to them. They were very tired of the losses brought on them by the continued disturbances brought on by Sirdar Meer Khan, and they would gladly see Ali Khan brought to order. Major Harrison last May marched through the whole of this country from Soumeeanee to Khelat without any guard, only three peons, and found the people most civil and contented, excepting Ali Khan and his immediate followers, who kept away from him.

17. The disturbances in Mekran merely related to the manner in which taxation was being levied, were purely local, and had no connexion whatever with the proceedings of Moolla Mahomed and his party, neither have the chiefs of Mekran any sympathy with the latter.

18. I will now return to the statements alluded to in paragraph 4.* They were all nearly of the same character, that they asked for their hereditary lands in the hill country (styled by them Khorassan) and Kutchee, as possessed in the time of Meer Nusseer Khan the younger, to be restored to them; also annual allowances given for feudal service, besides land; daily allowance of food when in attendance on the sovereign; marks (dresses) of honour when dismissed from attendance; and grants given by the present Khan of Khelat in his days of adversity, that is, when he was being restored in 1864, and now refused in his days of prosperity.

* Appendix B. p. 185.

To each a reply† is given by his Highness the Khan's Wuzeer, Wullee Mahomed Shahgassee, pointing out that the four first were always given by the present Khan till the Sirdars acted rebelliously, and as regards the fifth, that they were obtained by deception, and discontinued because the Sirdars failed to render the services they had covenanted to perform. I would also add myself that in conversation at the time with the Wuzeer he informed me that the annual and daily allowances claimed were very far in excess of what was ever given, as he could prove from the State accounts. It was not thought necessary to send to Khelat for these, as, in the event of the Sirdars' rights being given to them, it could be stated that they would be in accordance with what they received in the time of Nusseer Khan the younger. In regard to the extra lands claimed by Sirdars Moolla Mahomed, Shadee Khan, Syud Khan, Sumunder Khan for Dost Mahomed, and Alladina Khoord, the Wuzeer informed me that these were bestowed in the first instance by Shere Dil Khan when he was put up by these Sirdars; that the present Khan on his restoration confirmed them, but as far as Moolla Mahomed was concerned, that Sirdar voluntarily resigned them at Khelat in 1864 in his, the Wuzeer's presence. This the Sirdar could not gainsay. The other four claimants never assumed possession of the lands they mentioned in Deh Bubber, and had they done so they had now clearly forfeited them by engaging in rebellion.

† Appendix B. p. 185.

19. On the 8th, 9th, and 11th, Sirdars Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, Shadee Khan, Bungulzye, and Alladina Khoord were questioned on the statements orally made by them. The questions and answers given are appended, with marginal notes by me. It was not thought necessary to question the other Sirdars, but that all might be in a position to have everything they wished to adduce recorded, I decided that they should be allowed to submit a joint statement, as also separate ones, all of which would be remarked on by the Wuzeer Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed. Each paper, as received from the Sirdars, was given over to the Wuzeer for his remarks thereon, and all afterwards carefully translated, as well as the final letter from the Wuzeer to Major Harrison, Political Agent, to which I would call particular attention as giving his opinion of the Sirdars and their conduct, and what he understands to be the wishes and desire of his master, his Highness the Khan, in his conduct towards those under his rule.

Appendix C. p. 190.

Appendix D. p. 197.

20. It is unnecessary for me to review the whole of these statements. They, with the Shahgassee's answer, speak for themselves. I have, however, added a few marginal notes explanatory of certain points in the general statements by the chiefs, and in that of the chief Sirdar, Moolla Mahomed, as well as in the replies by the Wuzeer. These papers most conclusively show how unfounded and ill-suited are the complaints adduced against his Highness the Khan of Khelat. Many of them are most frivolous, while others are most unreasonable, as the wrongs the Sirdars imagine themselves to have sustained have been almost entirely brought about by their own deliberate acts in opposition to the sovereign of the country to whom they were bound by rule and custom to pay allegiance. Their views of obedience and proper government are vague to a degree. They seem to imagine that the sovereign of the country is only to rule as they choose to determine, and only to exert authority as they choose to deem proper. That conspiracy on their part against the person and authority of the ruler is not only justifiable, but in a measure a duty they owe to themselves; that no matter how few in number they may be who fancy themselves aggrieved (in this case only (8) eight at the utmost), they have a right to dictate to the sovereign how he is to act towards themselves without any regard to the interests or well-being of the general body, and that whenever it suits their purpose they may become, as they term it, "Yazee" ("discontentedly independent or rebellious") without being held responsible in any way for the acts they may commit, or the injury they may cause to others. According to them such a thing as supremacy of the king could not exist, but, on the contrary, it is the ruler only who did wrong, and they the only judges of such. No government could last under such a state of affairs, and their endeavour to demonstrate that such was ever warranted by custom is simply absurd. The real truth is that, instead of tyrannizing, the Khan has been too lenient. Acts which in any other country would have been treated with stern severity have been overlooked, and the perpetrators readmitted to favour. His Highness the Khan so often pardoned rebellion that it was becoming a custom, and resorted to whenever opportunity seemed to offer, and unless such proceedings as these of the Sirdars are most distinctly and decidedly discountenanced by us, the power they have learned to look to for consideration, the most disastrous dissolution of government in Beloochistan must follow.

21. There would appear to be some foundation for one act on the part of his Highness the Khan or his followers which savoured of not sufficient regard for the interests of the people, that, during his tour last summer, in some places an undue quantity of forage (Lucerne) was appropriated and full compensation not given. At least the Wuzeer's replies on this point are not complete, and in conversation he allowed this might have been the case. But I would point out that this was the first time for eight years or so that the Khan had been able to visit that neighbourhood, and it is after all not such an unusual circumstance when native rulers traverse their country. I do not mean to say it is right, but surely it is not sufficient to warrant rebellion as means of obtaining redress.

22. One good result will follow from having all these papers placed on record. It will plainly show how very inexpedient and unsafe it is to attach too ready faith to the interested statements of people circumstanced as these Sirdars were, and how easily wrong conclusions may be formed from the statements of only one side being before and accepted by anyone not fully acquainted with the general facts, and who has not had opportunities of gaining personal knowledge of all concerned. I allude to the unfortunate and most partial views entertained by Colonel Phayre in regard to the position the Sirdars held, and should hold, to their sovereign the Khan of Khelat.

23. Having most carefully perused all the documents and weighed well what was adduced on both sides, I could only come to the following decision, which was on the 28th read to the Sirdars in durbar, the Wuzeer of his Highness the Khan being present, also Lieutenant-Colonel Mainwaring, Officiating Political Superintendent on the Upper Sind frontier, Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, and my assistant, Mr. F. R. S. Wyllie

"SIRDARS,—I have heard from you, orally given, the statements you wish to submit in regard to claims you considered you were entitled to as chiefs of Beloochistan.

"I have also received long written statements from you, all setting forth what you conceive to be grievances you have suffered at the hands of his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

"I have made most careful inquiry into all these statements, and have had the advantage of information which the Wuzeer of Khelat, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, could, from his position, place at my disposal, information which has been the more important and valuable from his universally acknowledged honesty and truthfulness.

"After carefully weighing all I have no hesitation in pronouncing that you Sirdars are in the wrong.

"You have assumed to yourselves the right of deciding what was just and what was unjust in matters purely personal. This is utterly incompatible with good order and proper government.

"You would limit the power of your sovereign till he became a mere cypher. Such was never done in the great Nusseer Khan's time, nor ever afterwards.

"You have brought forward an array of petty circumstances which you style grievous acts against yourselves, but which in reality are most of them based on no fair grounds, while some of them are simply complaints against the ruler of the country on account of measures which he, as sovereign, found it necessary to introduce. If such were allowable no country could be at peace, no government last for a day.

"In regard to one question on which Sirdar Moolla Mahomed lays great stress, the marriage of his Highness the Khan with a relative of Sirdar Taj Mahomed in 1862, that was more a personal than an administrative matter, and it would have been best that influential Sirdars, having the good of their country at heart, should have endeavoured to bring about an adjustment of any difference that chanced to follow, and should not have used the circumstance as a means of fostering and promoting ill-will and discontent.

"From the records of the past nine years it would appear that persons having a grievance, fancied or real, have rushed into rebellion against the governing power without any consideration of duty towards the ruler of the country, or of the well-being of their fellow-countrymen. The ruler has repeatedly extended forgiveness, but it has availed nothing.

"I find that the hereditary estates and grants you asked for in your oral statements have never been resumed from you, excepting when you were in rebellion, and that as regards you, Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, all was given back by his Highness the Khan to you at Khelat in 1869, but not taken advantage of. The same happened with Adam Khan, Bungulzye, and Alladina Khoord.

"Allowances, daily allowances, and marks of honour have always been given you in accordance with established custom, whenever you have been performing the duties for which those grants were originally provided.

"The lands alluded to as given by his Highness the Khan, Meer Khodadad Khan, and now withdrawn, were, as you well know, Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, presented to you in the first instance by Shere Dil Khan for assistance in setting him up and deposing Meer Khodadad Khan. The latter continued the grant on his restoration, but you very properly then, and with correct feeling, abandoned the claim. But even had this not been the case, your subsequently acting in open rebellion caused them to be justly forfeited.

"These same remarks apply to the other Sirdars who claim lands in Bubber, near Bagh, obtained in the same manner. These claims cannot be recognized.

"The request of compensation for the death of Hubbeeb Khan is utterly unreasonable. He rose in rebellion notwithstanding that his Highness the Khan sent friendly warning to him, and he met his death as the consequence of his own acts. During the late rebellion initiated by you, great injury has been done to the country and much misery been inflicted on poor unoffending people.

"The pillage of the kafilahs in the Bolan Pass was an outrage for which there could be no excuse. To obtain your own ends you deliberately plundered peaceful merchants who were travelling through your country and who trusted in your protection.

"By orders of my Government I have agreed to mediate on this occasion and do so in the hope that such events as have occurred may never be repeated. That the Sirdars of Beloochistan will bear in mind that the prosperity of the country depends on unanimity, not division, and in their affording cordial aid in the maintenance of good government, and in supporting the sovereign who has been called to rule the country. That the desired end can never be obtained if each Sirdar thinks only of himself and not of the good of all.

"His Highness the Khan will gladly avail himself of their counsel and support them when they are given for the general benefit. But the course hitherto followed by the Sirdars I am now addressing has kept them apart from him and prevented his availing himself of these.

"The only object the British Government has in view is that there should be a firm and stable Government in Beloochistan, peace and prosperity throughout that country. These should come from the ruler and ruled of that country, not from any one else, and for that reason the British Government desires it to be clearly understood that it does

not wish to interfere between the Khan of Khelat and his Sirdars, but merely to give its good offices to promote the welfare of all, and bring about the preservation of order throughout the country. It looks to his Highness the Khan as the head and representative of the country, and trusts that by good rule he will command the respect and affection of his nobles and subjects.

"On the present occasion his Highness the Khan has delegated to me full powers to act in his name, and I accordingly do so now, when stating that, though I conceive the Sirdars have erred greatly in what they have done, I consider also that they have been much misled, and in the hopes of future adherence to only a loyal and true path the door of clemency should be held open to them. I would say for his Highness the Khan that their lands be restored to them and all allowances be accorded as was the case in the time of Meer Nusseer Khan the younger, and that they may be allowed to reside peaceably on their estates on condition that they pay due and proper allegiance to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, their lawful sovereign.

"That the property plundered from the kafilahs be given up to the owners.

"That all property seized during the late rebellion by the Sirdars and their followers from the ryots of Beloochistan, whether in Khorassan or Kutchee, be restored.

"As regards Crown property, the Khan will generously forego such and make no demand on that account.

"And I hereby, in the name of his Highness Meer Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat, call on you, Wuzeer Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, to see that these terms are carried into effect.

24. Notwithstanding I could not consider otherwise than that the Sirdars were in the wrong, I felt so convinced that they had acted recently from misdirected views, and to a certain extent from the impression that they possessed the sympathy, and might receive the support of one high in authority on this frontier; that some allowance should once more be made for them, and one more opportunity given them of returning to the allegiance they owed to their sovereign. I, therefore, in virtue of the power entrusted to me by that sovereign to act in his behalf, decided in his name that they should be restored to their old hereditary possessions and position. Trusting that this clemency, having the approval of the British Government, may be properly understood by them, and that they will, in future, show themselves worthy of its having been extended to them, by following a totally different course to that they have so ill advisedly hitherto given themselves to. The Wuzeer before all assembled engaged on behalf of his master that the terms now granted should be scrupulously adhered to.

25. The second and third stipulations I considered only equitable and unquestionably necessary. Were they not enforced a premium on rebellion would have been established, and the faithful many would have been in a worse position than the rebellious few. The Sirdars and their followers would have largely benefited by the plunder they got possession of when engaged in lawless proceedings, and it would have been to the advantage of the unruly in future to side with any chief who chose to raise the standard of revolt, while traders who were passing through the country relying on the good-will of the inhabitants thereof, and the poor people of the country, who were leading peaceful lives, would have been the chief sufferers.

26. His Highness the Khan had experienced heavy losses from Crown property being carried off by the rebels, and of revenue by the suspension of all agriculture in Kutchee during the time disturbances were going on. He, however, through his Wuzeer generously consented to forego all claims in this respect, that he might not appear to be too hard on those he was willing to forgive, and that they might not be closely pushed when they returned to their position as good and loyal subjects.

27. At first the Sirdars raised objections to Nos. 2 and 3, but I informed them that no deviation could be allowed, and dismissed them for the day. On the following morning they waited on me again, and, after a short conversation, accepted the terms unreservedly, and said they would do their utmost to carry out those parts which they had at first begged to be relieved from.

28. I trust these proceedings will meet with the approval of your Excellency in Council. On receipt of that approbation, which I have asked for by telegram, the Wuzeer Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed will at once return to Khelat, accompanied by the Sirdars, that they may tender their allegiance and pay their respects to his Highness the Khan. Major Harrison, the Political Agent, will follow to continue his duties with his Highness the Khan.

29. Before leaving this part I would venture to bring to your Excellency's notice that his Highness the Khan's Government has suffered greatly in a pecuniary point of view

from the late disturbances. His revenue from the province of Kutchee has either been carried off (being almost entirely in kind), or what had not been collected he considers it would be a most hard measure to endeavour to recover now in the present impoverished state of the inhabitants. He has liberally foregone any claim on the lately rebellious Sirdars and their followers for Crown property they possessed themselves of, that no apparent harshness on his part might interfere with the settlement of the differences which have so unhappily existed. He has also shown himself most thoroughly earnest in his desire to act immediately and exactly up to the wishes of the British. He at once frankly entrusted full power to me to act as I found best in his behalf, and for the good of all, in the disastrous circumstances, which were not only injuring his country and people, but were likely to produce ill effects to British interests. I would, therefore, earnestly ask and most strongly recommend, that to mark the approval of the British Government of his liberal action towards his offending subjects, and of the true determination he has displayed to act only as appeared suitable to that Government, that a sum of one lakh of rupees may be presented to him to assist in meeting present pressing demands upon his resources, and to enable him to start fair once more.

30. Of the poverty of his Highness the Khan I am assured from the knowledge I have of his circumstances, though a different statement has been set about by interested parties. When he was driven from his Government in 1863, everything he possessed, cash, jewels, &c., was plundered by his half-brother, and the rebels who set up the latter. Since his restoration he has been continually harassed by the rebellious conduct of factious nobles, has been put to great expense in meeting their efforts to subvert his authority, and been compelled to engage in large expenditure to sustain his power by keeping up regular paid troops in place of that support which should have been given by those very nobles according to the rules under which they held their lands. It is a great mistake also to suppose that those lands were confiscated to the State on the defection of the individual nobles. They were mostly left with portions of the tribes who remained faithful. The Sirdars flying the country lost by non-possession, but the Khan gained nothing by them. In the late rebellion one of the great difficulties the Khan experienced was his inability from poverty to call out Sirdars with their tribes who remained faithful to him, these being the greater portion of his subjects, while the rebel Sirdars only mustered eight all told. The cost of calling out these retainers is very great, as each has to be provisioned according to his rank and position.

31. Some time back I wrote to Major Harrison, the Political Agent, and asked him to favour me with his opinion, formed from his residence with the Khan, as to the extent of his wealth. His reply was lost in a post, which was reported to have been plundered by some robbers between Gundava and this in January last. He has since given me, a nearly as he can recollect, what he wrote at the time demi-officially. It was to the following effect, dated 15th January:—"I received your letter late yesterday, informing "me of General Pollock's movements, and asking what his Highness' means were, as a "report had been circulated that he was very wealthy. On the outbreak occurring in "Moostung, his Highness urged me to ask the English Government for assistance in "money and arms. I at once told him that I had heard he had accumulated three lakhs "of rupees, and received the following reply:—That he had jewels which he had "collected for some years past, but that his actual cash balance roughly calculated was "not more than a lakh. That the districts from which his principal revenues were "derived, *viz.*, Moostung and Kutchee, had been plundered so completely by the "Brahooees, that no revenue would be derived for a year at least, and that, unless aided, "he did not see how he could live and keep things going; on Nawab Mahomed Khan "being sent to Kutchee with about 700 troops these were not only paid up to date, but "each man received a gratuity of one month's pay. The Belooch levies also received "their usual allowances of grain and money besides handsome khilluts. With a liberal "expenditure like this how long would a lakh of rupees last." Further, Major Harrison wrote:—"Perhaps it is as well, under all circumstances, that you are to mediate between "the rebel chiefs and his Highness, for serious disturbances would have arisen on future "occasions, such as the death of the Shahgassee or his Highness. I do not, however, "believe that there will be permanent quiet in the country unless the Sirdars are fully convinced that the Khan has the support of the English, and my opinion is that this might be brought about by modifying the present Treaty to the former one, in which the Khan would have had personal assistance or aid under certain circumstances. I do not think personal* force would ever be required, but if the Brahooees realised that such might occur it would have a deterrent effect in future "rebellious organisations and conspiracies. In the present crisis it may not be out of

Note. Major Harrison knows now this could not be allowed.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

* Meaning armed intervention.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

" place to tell you what I think of these chiefs. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed is a proud " ambitious man, but with means too limited to support his pretensions. Consequently " he has always been dissatisfied and tried to wrest land and other concessions from his " Highness. Sirdar Noordeen was very wealthy; had no complaints whatever against " his Highness, but from his restless intriguing nature joined in every disturbance. " Sirdar Alladina Khoord's lands are a mere waste, and he finds plundering more " profitable than what he could realise in a legitimate manner."

The above, though not the exact words is, Major Harrison believes, the substance of the letter which was lost and never reached me.

32. The Crown lands are very limited both in extent and value. The best in the country have been given out in feudal tenure to the chiefs. The Khan's annual income therefore, is very small. The help I recommend would be invaluable just now, and I trust that it may be granted.

33. I would now proceed to offer a few remarks on the future. There cannot, in my opinion, be the least doubt what course should be followed with regard to Khelat or Beloochistan, as it should be correctly termed. His Highness the Khan is *de facto and de jure* Ruler of that country. We have Treaty engagements with him, under which he is bound to keep his subjects from injuring British territory or people, to protect trade &c., &c., but the Treaty is with him as ruler only, and under none of the engagements are we called upon to interfere directly in the manner in which he carries on his Government. It is, however, an object to us that there should be a strong and well-regulated Government in his country, and it has been the custom hitherto to give him freely through the Political Agent at his Court the best advice on occasions of difficulty. I must say I know of no occasion when such advice has been rejected, and I can confidently state that the Khan has invariably done his best to act as would be approved by the British Government. But he has had great difficulties to contend against in the ambitious practices of certain of his nobles. They are not many. They can easily be numbered and named, but they have been sufficient by their restless intrigues to keep the country in a perpetual state of turmoil, destructive of all advance in prosperity. It is the state of our own country under the Plantagenets over again. Its real condition is most correctly shown in your Excellency's minute of the 10th February last, and the course laid down therein is the only sound one to follow, if we wish any order to remain in Beloochistan.

The chiefs must be made to understand that the Khan is regarded as their sovereign, and to him alone must they look for benefits to be conferred, grievances to be redressed; to feel that their interests and his are identical, and that anything that reduces his power or influence reflects injuriously on them; and to rest assured that acts of rebellion, such as they have hitherto engaged in on such improper and frivolous grounds, cannot and will not receive any countenance whatever from the British Government. They have hitherto been labouring under delusions, but now they should be informed that any repetition of such acts as they have committed will at once, and for ever, forfeit for them the favour of the British Government, as it will assuredly the approbation of all good men.

34. These chiefs are captious and hasty. Being very poor they hoped to be able to gain more by pressing on disturbances. But they are not altogether unreasoning, and some of them having had to endure hardships from exile begin to think rebellion a losing game after all. If, therefore, they are at the same time fully assured that it will ruin their prospects with us, I believe we have some guarantee for the future, and I think this cannot be too clearly or strongly impressed upon them.

35. At the same time the Political Agent will do his best to induce the Khan to follow such a course as will draw his chiefs towards him as much as possible and make them find their best interests are with him. This should be done with great discretion and with the least possible parade. It is unquestionable that there is a steady social change going on in Beloochistan, in Afghanistan the same. The only plan is to assist its progress and be careful in no way to check it. Allow it to grow as peaceably as it will, and in a few years the chiefs will be more satisfied to live quietly on their lands, and as their ambitious ideas pass away some of them might be employed in offices of the State under the orders of the sovereign. At present this would be difficult and probably dangerous. If one or two were selected, and trusted apparently with more power than had been the custom, they would presume on it, and the others be discontented. It was on this very account that in the old customs of the country none of the influential chiefs were ever allowed to hold the post of Wuzeer.

36. The attitude assumed by Sirdar Noordeen Mingul has placed him beyond the pale of mediation. The Sirdars here wrote to him that as he had not ceased to cause

disorders they had no longer anything to do with him. I also informed him he had lost my mediation, and his Highness the Khan was at liberty to act against him as he pleased. Correspondence on the subject is appended.*

* Letter relating to Sirdar Noordeen. Appendix A.

37. With regard to the ex-Jam of Beyla, Sirdar Meer Khan, I certainly consider that nothing should be done at present about him. The Sarawan Sirdars made no request in his behalf, and had they, I should have informed them that his many rebellions against the Khan had ended in his being obliged to fly the country. But beyond that his disregard of all rule and orders had been carried by him into the country where a safe asylum had been generously allowed him, and that now he was answering for his disobedience to the British Government. I should not, under any circumstances, have recommended his being permitted to return to his old country, feeling certain that there will be no peace there if he once more enters it, and considering that he has sacrificed all claim to return.

38. His Highness the Khan, on the arrival of his Wuzeer at Khelat, will make arrangements for the proper government of the province of Lus Beyla, the Roonjas and other influential people there having already asked for a Naib to be sent from Khelat. The agitation which has been kept up in behalf of the ex-Jam, Meer Khan, will soon cease when it is found that he is really not to return. This agitation, especially in the local English press, has been kept up by the bunyahs, Hindoo merchants, before mentioned. Directly they see it is useless they will abandon it, and Ali Khan Jamote will fall back into the subordinate and insignificant position he has always occupied until his actions were found useful to others.

39. There is one point that I should beg most strenuously to urge, and that is the absolute necessity of the strictest and most clear instructions being issued that the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan, or any of the officers under him, should in no way interfere or communicate with subjects of his Highness the Khan of Khelat (excepting the Murrees and Boogtees as has been provided for), or in any way engage in the general politics of, or arrangements existing between the British and Khelat State. What has occurred during the past two or three years clearly shows what grievous mischief may be caused by refractory Sirdars in Beloochistan believing and actually finding that they could apply and be listened to by officers serving under a different local government from that with which their ruler was in communication, and thus as it were putting two portions of an Imperial Government one against the other. The Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan, Captain Sandeman, was desired by me, as far back as January 1870, to hold no communication with Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee. The correspondence since then will show how deliberately he disregarded my request, and how systematically he has taken upon himself to oppose the policy I had, under the orders of your Excellency, ordered to be upheld. The Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan has lately been subordinate to the Political Superintendent on the frontier of Upper Sind in respect to any arrangements that might be made with the Murree and Boogtee tribes, subjects of the Khan of Khelat. Such being the case, I would respectfully suggest that all matters relating to those tribes on which the Deputy Commissioner may desire to report, or any points relating to Khelat affairs in any way, should be submitted by him in the first instance to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind frontier, who would forward them to the Commissioner in Sind, copies being forwarded of course to his own Government of the Punjab. This will make his position more clear, and will at the same time allow of his bringing anything to the notice of the Political Superintendent he may think it necessary or advisable he should show. But he should be bound to abstain from any direct action in any matters not belonging to the specific duties laid down which have reference only to the two tribes of Belooch residing opposite a portion of his border.

40. I regret exceedingly to have to state that the expenditure on account of this arrangement for mediation has been far larger than was either intended or desired by me. This has been caused by two circumstances, first by Colonel Phayre, then Political Superintendent, having without previous reference to me sanctioned more people being brought into Jacobabad by the Sirdars than I should have allowed, but as he had given the orders I did not wish to mar matters by countermanding them; and, secondly, from the great delay which took place on the part of the Sirdars in submitting their statements, for which Colonel Phayre must also be held to be, to some extent, answerable. Before the Sirdars arrived, I strictly enjoined him to be most careful how he let it appear that his sympathies and views were solely with the Sirdars, knowing that on exhibition of such they would be induced to take an exaggerated view of their position and indulge in unnecessary representations. He assured me that he would keep quite

aloof from them, only seeing they were properly cared for. I regret to say he failed to act up to this assurance. He closely associated himself with them daily, and the result was as I expected. Finding it utterly impossible to expect obedience to my instructions from him, and feeling certain that no practical or satisfactory results could be expected as long as he was present, I was at last compelled to request your Excellency would cause his removal at once, as, if he remained, I could not be answerable for the results. Your Excellency was pleased to do so, and the effect was most salutary. But I regret I have to add that on the day of his departure he displayed an instance of further disregard of my wishes and of the customary rules on such occasions by making public presents to each of the Sirdars and some of their followers, notwithstanding the object for which they had come here had not been disposed of. The impolicy and disrespect of such a proceeding I need not descant upon, nor need I here further remark upon the impropriety of his whole proceedings here for some time past, as they have already been fully placed before your Excellency.

41. The expenditure, however, will, I trust, not have been thrown away nor prove wanting in good results. Before the departure of the Sirdars I shall point out to them that they have been well and handsomely treated here now, as they were called in, and if they show themselves in future good subjects of their sovereign and desirous of promoting his welfare and that of their country, such consideration will be readily accorded to them. But if they misbehave hereafter such favour will be withheld for ever.

42. The only subject that remains to be noticed is that of carrying into effect the arrangements agreed upon at the conference at Mittunkote and sanctioned last October, in reference to the Murree and Boogtee tribes. Considering all that has passed, and how very recently the Khelat troubles have been arranged, I do not think it advisable to enter immediately on those arrangements. They should be carefully and deliberately carried out after mature consultation between the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, and the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan. The delay will not affect that frontier at all, as all arrangements for it were in existence before. The new ones related chiefly, if not entirely, to circumstances connected with this side. And I think it desirable a little pause should be allowed before anything is proposed. The time for taking this up I can safely leave to Lieutenant-Colonel Mainwaring, Officiating Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, with whom I shall leave full instructions, and who will communicate when necessary with the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazee Khan.

43. I can fully trust in Lieutenant-Colonel Mainwaring, as his local experience of 14 years gives him advantages which no new comer could possess; and I am happy to be able to report that in all questions that have occurred since he assumed charge, and in the manner he has acted towards the Sirdars, he has given me great assistance and shown sound discretion and good judgment with a thorough desire to implicitly follow the instructions of Government. Being in constant and cordial communication with him here I have been able to explain to him thoroughly those instructions, and to show him exactly what is required. I feel, therefore, a just confidence in him.

Enclosure 2 in No. 53.

APPENDIX A.

ABSTRACT TRANSLATION of a Letter from Noordeen Mingul to the Commissioner in Sind, dated 14th March 1872.

YOUR letter received, and I was pleased to read its contents. I had been summoned to appear in Jacobabad within 10 or 12 days, for the purpose of arrangements being made for the Brahooees. In reply I beg to state that when Sirdar Moolla Mahomed is in Jacobabad, he is sole master of everything; whatever arrangement the said Sirdar does is acceptable to the whole class of Brahooees. I got your purwanna on the 2nd* Mohurum. Whatever property of the subject people and others may have been pillaged and plundered before that date must be considered as a thing of the past; on and after that date (2nd) I will refrain from any wrong doing or breach of the public peace.

* Corresponds with 13th March 1872.

Enclosure 3 in No. 53.

REPLY of the Commissioner in Sind to Noordeen Mingul, dated 18th March 1872.

I HAVE received your letter.

Before my last letter reached you you had heard that I had consented to mediate for the chiefs of Beloochistan, and that the Sarawan Sirdars had taken advantage of what I had caused to be written in January last to his Highness the Khan's Vakeel, Mahomed Khan, and disbanding their followers had remained quiet.

You disregarded what was offered, continued in arms against his Highness the Khan, and committed acts of violence. By this conduct you have separated yourself from the Sirdars of Sarawan; your must answer yourself for the contrary course you have followed; any further act of violence committed by you will be immediately punished by the officers of his Highness the Khan.

Enclosure 4 in No. 53.

No. 654, dated Jacobabad, 18th March 1872.

From Colonel R. Phayre, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, Commissioner in Sind.

I HAVE the honour to forward for your perusal copy of a letter brought to me by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, which he received from Noordeen Mingul yesterday.

Sirdar Moolla Mahomed states that as Sirdar Noordeen has not disbanded his men he will write to him to that effect, explaining that since the British Government has taken up this matter he must abide by whatever decision may be come to. The Sirdar also proposes to inform Noordeen that if, after this, he makes any disturbance, he (Sirdar Moolla Mahomed) is separate from him, because such conduct would be contrary to your orders regarding the matters under mediation.

The whole of the Sirdars would like to have an interview with you about this letter and Noordeen's case generally before writing to him.

Enclosure 5 in No. 53.

ABSTRACT TRANSLATION of a Letter from Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, Syud Khan, and Bahadoor Khan, to Sirdars Moolla Mahomed Khan, Meer Syud Khan, Sirdar Meer Alladina Summundur Khan, Hajee Moola Mahomed Khan, Sirdar Meer Shadee Khan, Meer Jundo Khan, and Futteh Khan, dated 3rd Mohurrum 1289.

YOU must be aware that we received the Commissioner's letter on the 2nd Mohurrum 1289. It was therein stated that I shall come to Jacobabad for arrangements. We got your letters also on the same date. I have written to the Commissioner in Sind and informed him that you are sole master in respect to the arrangements about the Br - hooees. We write to you also that whatever terms you agree to in regard to the Jam and the tribes of the Brahooees before Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed are acceptable to us all Brahooees. All the property of the subjects and the people that has been plundered before the receipt of your letter and of the Commissioner must be considered a thing of the past. After that date we will not touch the property of the subject people. and will not commit wrong and oppression. It cannot be hidden from you that we will with our whole army go and take repose in Zaidic and Khozdar, and will wait particulars about the arrangements that may be effected; whatever arrangements are made should be communicated to us soon.

Information has been received from Meer Azaad Khan to the effect that he will arrive in Bhagwana in a day or two. The forces of the Minguls numbering 4,000 men and the army of Azaad Khan and Lus Beyla will assemble in one place. Arrange and send money for meeting the expenses of the army that it may be taken from "Jai Misheen" Ghulam Mahomed. We await reply. Do not you have any anxiety about this quarter and keep us informed of what passes.

"Assistant to the Naib" (Deputy).

Enclosure 6 in No. 53.

No. 270, dated Camp Jacobabad, 18th March 1872.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to Colonel R. Phayre, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

IN reply to your letter No. 654 of to-day's date, I have the honour to request you will inform Sirdar Moolla Mahomed that I am aware Noordeen Mingul received from the

very first the intelligence of the mediatory position accepted by me under the orders of Government, but that he, Noordeen, deliberately continued in arms against his Highness the Khan, and committed acts of violence after he had heard of what was to be done, and what had been accepted by the Sirdars of Sarawan. Noorden Mingul has therefore by his own acts separated himself from the Sirdars of Sarawan; it should be so considered by the latter Sirdars, and I shall be glad to hear that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed has at once without further delay written to Noordeen Mingul to that effect.

2. The time when the next interview will be accorded to the Sirdars will be communicated hereafter.

Enclosure 7 in No. 53.

No. 657, dated Jacobabad, 19th March 1872.

From Colonel R. Phayre, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind.

In reply to your letter No. 270, dated yesterday (received this day), I have the honour herewith to forward a letter from the Sirdars to Noordeen Mingul, as required in your letter under reply, which, if approved of by you, will be despatched without delay.

Enclosure 8 in No. 53.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from Sirdars Moola Mahomed, Raisanee, Shadee Khan, Jundoo Khan, Alladinna, Syud Khan, Dost Mahomed Khan, Mahomed Shye, and Summunder Khan, to Noordeen.

As the Commissioner in Sind states that you had received reliable and *pukka* information that arrangements were being made, and you did not refrain from the commission of wrongful deeds and acts of violence, but continued taking a contrary course, you have therefore separated yourself from us and from all the Sarawan Sirdars. In future there will be no sympathy and consultation between us both. This is written for your information.

Enclosure 9 in No. 53.

No. 274, dated Camp Jacobabad, 19th March 1872.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to Colonel R. Phayre, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

In reply to your letter No. 657 of to-day's date, with accompaniment, herewith returned, I have the honour to request that you will inform the Sirdars that their letter to Noordeen Mingul is approved and should be forwarded without delay.

Enclosure 10 in No. 53.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from Noordeen to the Commissioner in Sind, dated the 14th of Mohurum 1289.

I sent two sowars to you, and they came back with a third from you and Moolla Mahomed on the 13th instant. They brought neither letter nor purwanna, and this caused me anxiety. I beg to state that, if inquiry will be made, claims of rightful parties will be established. This will give us some satisfaction. The Sarawan and Jalawan Sirdars cannot dispute your decision in the matter under investigation.

Enclosure 11 in No. 53.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from the Commissioner in Sind to the Address of Noordeen, dated the 29th March 1872.

I received your letter. In reply you are informed that the settlement will be made as intimated in my letter dated 7th instant. You have failed to act up to the orders contained therein, and have not refrained from doing injury to the property of the people. It is not necessary now to keep up any correspondence with you.

Enclosure 12 in No. 53.

APPENDIX B.

STATEMENT of Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, given before Sir William Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, on the 7th March 1872.

My claim is that I receive back all grants and allowances vouchsafed to my forefathers and myself by the great Nusseer Khan, Meer Mehrab Khan, and Khodadad Khan. The details are as follows:—

I.—Land, with use of water, in Kutchee and Khorasan,* according to sunnuds which I possess.
II.—Allowances.
III.—Daily allowances.
IV.—Marks of honour.
V.—Rights given by sunnuds by Khodadad Khan in his days of adversity, and now refused in his days of prosperity.

Description of No. II.

Rupees (1,000) one thousand a year.

Description of No. III.

When I went to pay my respects to his Highness the Khan I received a daily allowance of one rupee in cash, four seers of rice, 10 kassas* of wheat, one seer of ghee, 10 kassas of "jow" (barley). This was only for myself; my clansmen received a separate allowance.

* A kassa contains about 13 seers.

Description of No. IV.

His Highness the Khan counselled with me and asked my advice in cases of proclaiming war and management of the affairs of Government, and granted me a khillut (dress of honour).

I also obtained one-seventh of the receipts of his Highness the Khan on account of the kafilahs passing through Dadur in consideration of the Sarawan Sirdarship; as also (10) ten khurwars† of wheat per annum.

† A khurwar contains about 20 maunds.

All the above are for myself, and my ooloos (clansmen) did not share with me.

REPLIES of Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed to the Statement made by Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, before the Commissioner in Sind, dated 5th Mohurrum 1289.

Moolla Mahomed Raisanee claims to receive back all grants and allowances enjoyed by him from the great Nusseer Khan to Khodadad Khan, and gives details as follows:—

I.—Land with use of water according to sunnuds.
II.—Allowances, Rupees 1,000 per annum.
III.—Daily allowances, four seers of wheat, one seer of ghee, four seers of rice, four kassas of jow (barley), and four kassas of wheat.
IV.—Marks of honour.
V.—One-seventh of the receipts.
VI.—Eighteen khurwars of wheat per annum.

I have to state in reply to the above claims that his Highness Khodadad Khan continued to the Sirdar all the grants of land and allowances made to him and to his forefathers from the days of Nusseer Khan the Great to those of Nusseer Khan the Junior, and were proved from the records of the latter Khan, till such time as the battle which took place between the Khan and Shere Dil Khan. Lands given by sunnuds that were obtained by deception were discontinued because the Sirdar failed to render the services he had covenanted to perform.

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* Meaning Khelat.

II.

STATEMENT of Wudera Shadee Khan, given before Sir William Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, on the 7th March 1872.

My claim is:—

I.—Land according to sunnuds.

II.—Yearly allowance, Rupees 500.

III.—Daily allowance eight annas, two seers of rice, half a seer of ghee, four kassas of wheat, four kassas of "jow" (barley).

IV.—Khillut (dress of honour) for my Sirdarship.

V.—Four khurwars of wheat in Kutchee and four in Khorassan per annum.

VI.—Two mares were allowed to stand in his Highness' the Khan's stables in the days of the junior Nusseer Khan.

VII.—Twelve "bitts" of water in Dadur.

VIII.—One-fourth of the land in Deh Bubber according to the purwana of his Highness the Khan.

IX.—Eight angushts* of water in Deh Nowshera, Talooka Dadur, obtained by purchase.

All the above are for myself, and my ooloos (clansmen) are not included.

REPLY of Shahgassee to the Statement made by Wudera Shadee Khan before Sir William Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, on the 7th March 1872.

His claims are:—

I.—Land according to sunnuds.

II.—Yearly allowance, Rupees 500.

III.—Daily allowance eight annas, two seers of rice, half a seer of ghee, four kassas of wheat, four kassas of jow (barley).

IV.—Four khurwars of wheat in Kutchee and four khurwars in Khorassan.

V.—Two mares, &c.

I have to state in reply to the above claims that his Higness Khodadad Khan continued to the Sirdar all the grants and allowances made to him and to his forefathers from the days of Nusseer Khan the Great to those of Nusseer Khan the Junior, and proved from the records of the latter Khan, till such time as the battle which took place between the Khan and Shere Dil Khan.

Lands granted by sunnuds (which were obtained by deception) were withheld because the Sirdar failed to render the services he had covenanted to perform.

As regards the matter of mares, this depends on the wish of the ruler, and is not any right which should be (necessarily) respected.

III.

STATEMENT of Jundo Khan, Shawanee, given before Sir William Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, on the 7th March 1872.

I make the following statement for myself and for Shirbat Khan, son of Moombarick Khan,* who was killed in battle, as his guardian.

* A chief of the Shawanees.

Two years ago I came to Bagh and was treated with disrespect by Sahoojan, Naib of Bagh. One of my mares was taken by force from me by his Highness the Khan in Moostung. Before this difference his Highness the Khan confiscated all the lands belonging to Moombarick Khan, and it was for this reason that he joined the rebels. I joined them after Moombarick Khan's death, and now ask redress.

This is only for myself, and my "ooloos" are excluded.

REPLY of the Shahgassee to the Statement made by Jundo Khan before the Commissioner in Sind.

He complains of the murder of Moombarick and Shirbat Khan, of being treated with disrespect by Sahoojan, and of one of his mares and lands having been taken by force.

In reply I beg to state that Moombarick Khan and Shirbat Khan were killed in battle on account of their unfaithfulness at Bagh; he, Jundo Khan, interfered in the affairs of

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* "Angusht" means the length of a finger.

State, and on being prevented by the Naib attempted to attack him with his sword, which was snatched out of his hands. This was the cause of his being treated with disrespect. What he states about his mare is untrue. What he affirms about his land may be considered partly true, because those who prove rebels are deprived of portions of their lands by the officers of the State.

STATEMENT of the Syud Khan Mahomed Shahee, given before Sir William Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, on the 7th of March 1872.

When his Highness the Khan was kind to me I was loyal. About three years ago his Highness the Khan came to Moostung and deprived me of my "list* pust," for which I complained to the Shahgassee, who made no arrangements. I felt aggrieved. Besides, in Mosstung there is a Karez† called Khassan. On this stood my Shahbuna‡ and a garden; these were confiscated. Rupees 1,000 were forcibly levied from Lall Khan Mahomed Shahee. Lands that belonged to Alladinna Mahomed Shahee, according to sunnuds granted by Nusseer Khan, were also converted into Government property. He was besides made to pay Rupees 400. His Highness the Khan refuses to give in my possession one-fourth of the land in Deh Bubber that he granted to me by his sunnud. He also refuses to give 12 "bitts" of water in Deh Dadur that he allowed me by his sunnud.

* Lucerne.

† Water-course.

‡ A perpetual water-course.

Further, my allowance is Rupees 500 per annum, and eight annas, two seers of rice, half seer of ghee, four kassas of wheat, four kassas of jow per diem, and khilluts, as also four khurwars of wheat in Kutchee and four in Khorassan per annum.

My ooloos are excluded from the above.

REPLY of the Shahgassee to the Statement made by Syud Khan Mahomed Shahee before the Commissioner in Sind, dated 5th Mohurrum 1289.

He (Syud Khan) complains of being deprived of his "list* pust" by his Highness the Khan when he came to Mustoong about three years ago, and of his failing to obtain redress from me, and of a "karez," garden and land belonging to Alladinna. He further states that Rupees 1,000 were forcibly levied from Lall Khan, and Rupees 400 from Alladinna Mahomed Shahee. He also urges his right to the restoration of one-fourth of the land in Deh Bubber, 12 "bitts" of water in Dadur, and of his daily allowance.

* Lucerne.

In reply I beg to state that the "list pust" at Mustoong is all liable to payment of "Zari† Kullung." The person from whom Syud Khan has purchased this had to pay "Zari Kullung," and it was in consequence of this liability that his Highness the Khan took the lucerne. As regards the karez, water and garden which were confiscated, Syud Khan came to me, and on my taking him to his Highness the Khan he was asked to bring the Sunnud under which he held the grant. He failed and, therefore, lost his claim. Lall Khan, from whom Rupees 1,000 were taken, was Naib in the days of Shere Dil Khan, and he was called upon to render accounts of the monies received by him on account of leases and fines from thieves. It was found during inquiry that he had embezzled sums of money, and this was the reason of his having to pay Rupees 1,000. On the land said to have been granted to Alladinna Mahomed Shahee by his Highness Nusseer Khan, "Zari Kullung" of 400 rupees had been fixed, and the 400 rupees stated to have been exacted were recovered on account of Zari Kullung."

† Zari Kullung is a kind of cess.

He did not receive anything less than what was found on the records of Nusseer Khan in respect of daily allowance and "bitts" of water and land in Deh Bubber. The new Sunnuds that are in his possession were obtained by deception, and the grants thereby given were not allowed because he failed to perform the services he had agreed to render.

STATEMENT of Sumundar Khan, Lehree, on behalf of Dost Mahomed,* son of Jehangeer Lehree, given before Sir William Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, on the 7th March 1872.

* Dost Mahomed *i* is a minor, and Sumundar Khan his uncle.

My claim is:—

I.—That I had 20 bunnahs† in Deh Bullal town of Shahdad, free from all expenses.

† Bunds.

II.—Half of the Government share in the produce of the town of Shahdad.

III.—Jholees‡ on account of Naibship.

‡ An apronful of grain.

IV.—The town of Shahdad was free from the necessity of supplying labourers.

V.—Land and water in Khelat belonging to my uncle, Ismael Khan, granted by Nusseer Khan, and now taken from me.

VI.—One-fourth of the land in Deh Bubber.

VII.—12 "bitts" of water in Deh Dadur.

VIII.—Rupees 500 per annum.

IX.—Khilluts (dress of honour).

The details of my daily allowance when in attendance upon his Highness the Khan are given below:—

8 annas.
2 seers of rice.
½ seer of ghee.
4 kassas of wheat.
4 kassas of jow (barley).

My Ooloos are not included in the above.

REPLY of the Shahgassee to the Statement made by Sumundar Khan, Lehree, on behalf of Dost Mahomed *wd.* Jehangeer, before the Commissioner in Sind, dated 5th Mohurrum 1289.

He claims the following:—

Allowance Rupees 500 per annum.
Daily allowance 8 annas.
2 seers of ghee.
½ seer of ghee.
4 kassas of wheat.
4 kassas of jow.
Mark of honour "Khillut."
Half of Government share in ten bunnahs in Deh Bullal Johlee.
Land belonging to Ismael Khan in Khelat.

In reply I have to state that all the grants and allowances given to Mahomed Khan, his father and his uncle from the Great Nusseer Khan to Nusseer Khan the junior were, as found on the records of the latter Khan, continued to the grantees for so long a time as they proved faithful and loyal. The new Sunnuds that are in their possession were obtained by deception, and the grants thereby given were not allowed because they failed to perform the services they had agreed to render.

As regards lands belonging to Ismael Khan, I have to state that if they are his property no one would prevent him from entering on them and enjoying them.

STATEMENT of Alladina Khoord given before Sir William Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, on the 7th of March 1872.

My claim is:—

I.—One-fourth of the land in Deh Bubber granted to me by Sunnud of his Highness the Khan.

II.—Twelve bitts of water in Deh Dadur.

III.—Yearly allowance of Rupees 500.

IV.—When I presented myself before his Highness the Khan, I used to receive a daily allowance of—

8 annas.
½ seer of ghee.
2 seers of rice.
4 kassas of wheat.
4 kassas of jow (barley).

V.—Four khurwars of wheat in Kutchee and 4 khurwars in Khorassan per annum.

VI.—Duties levied on merchandize passing through the Bolan according to Sunnud.

VII.—Ten angushts of water in Deh Nowshera obtained by purchase.

My Ooloos are excluded from the above.

REPLY of the Shahgassee to the Statement made by Alladina Khoord before the Commissioner in Sind, dated 5th Mohurrum 1289.

He claims land, water allowance, and daily allowance according to Sunnuds, as per following detail:—

8 annas per diem.
½ seer of ghee.
2 seers of rice.
4 kassas of wheat.
4 kassas of jow.
4 khurwars of wheat in Kutchee and four khurwars of wheat in Khorassan per annum.
12 "bitts" of water.
A portion of the duties levied on merchandise passing through the Bolan Water in Nowshera.
¼ of land in Deh Bubber according to Sunnud.

In reply I have to state that he was continued in the possessions proved from the records of Nusseer Khan the junior, and which were found to have been granted from the time of Great Nusseer Khan to that of Nusseer Khan the junior. His possessions were not disturbed until he became rebellious. The new Sunnuds that are in his possession were obtained by deception, and the grants thereby given were not allowed because he failed to perform the services he had agreed to render.

STATEMENT of Futteh Khan Mingul given before Sir William Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, on the 7th March 1872.

About four years ago his Highness the Khan made the town of Khunuck, near Mustoong, Government property, and beat and ill-treated my relations. He has also deprived me of five angushts of water in Deh Dadur that I purchased from the Shawanees. In Khelat the lands and water in Deh Mulgizzar I had right over have been confiscated, as also the land I possessed in Foolajee in copartnership with Noordeen Mingul, and half of the lands in Deh Kunree.

I beg restoration of the above.

NOTE.—This person is not reckoned a Sirdar. He is properly a Mingul of Jalawan, but has for many years joined himself to the Raisanees and resided with them.

(Signed) W. L. M.

REPLY of the Shahgassee to the Statement made by Futteh Khan before the Commissioner in Sind, on the 7th March 1872.

He states as follows:—

That since four years Khunuck has been confiscated, as also five "angushts" of water in Deh Dadur lands and water in Deh Mulgizzar in Khelat, and half of the lands in Deh Kunree.

In reply I have to state that he was allowed to enjoy all grants and allowances according to the extent of grant from Nusseer Khan the Great to Nusseer Khan the

junior for so long a time as he remained faithful and loyal. What he has stated to be his right is more than he is entitled to according to grants, and more than this amount to which he enjoyed at the time of the breaking out of the rebellion.

STATEMENT of Nubbee Buksh, of the Kocha tribe, given before Sir William Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, on the 7th of March 1872.

I joined the rebels because a fine of Rs. 400 was levied by his Highness the Khan from Huzzar Khan and Hyat Khan, Kochas.

NOTE.—This person is not a Sirdar either, but a petty head of a small tribe living at Kirta, in the Bolan pass, and who were used by his Highness the Khan to act as police on that road.

(Signed) W. L. M.

REPLY of the Shahgassee to the Statement made by Nubbee Buksh, Kocha, before the Commissioner in Sind.

He claims restitution of the 400 rupees fine imposed on him. In reply I have to state that he was the cultivator of his Highness the Khan, and was made to pay the penalty for his wrong doings, and breach of trust * as regards crops. He was also with Naib Wullee Mahomed in the battle at Dadur, and there proved himself unfaithful by plundering the property of the subjects and joining the Brahooees (rebels).

* Wrong returns.

Enclosure 13 in No. 53.

APPENDIX C.

DEPOSITION of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee.

Question.—In your statement of yesterday you mention that all you ask for is to get back all grants and allowances vouchsafed to your forefathers by the Great Nusseer Khan Mehrab Khan. Why do you go back before the reign previous to the present one. You were well satisfied then?

Answer.—In the time of Nusseer Khan the younger I was in possession of my rights, but I was young then. I, however, am quite willing to fix the time from the commencement of Nusseer Khan the younger's reign; if I am given what I enjoyed then under existing Sunnuds I am satisfied.

Question.—Can you give a statement of the lands you held at the time above mentioned under Sunnuds?

(List put in, marked A. and B.)

Question.—Of the lands in above list what are in your possession now?

Answer.—None for the last seven years. I have been deprived of all. On one occasion in 1868 I received portion of the produce of one crop in Khorassan through the good offices of the British Officer. I received nothing from Kutchee.

Question.—Why were you deprived of these lands, or how did you come to lose them?

Answer.—I advised the Khan to follow the principles of his ancestors, and that the country would then be impartially and well governed; that the Shahgassee should not be made Wuzeer or disputes would arise.* The Khan replied that he alone would govern the country; for this reason the Shahgassee is no friend of mine.

* The Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed was appointed Wuzeer by his Highness the Khan of Khelat in 1858 at Jacobabad in presence of Sir B. Frere, General Jacob, myself, and Sir Henry Green. The appointment was afterwards solemnly confirmed at Gundava in presence of all the chiefs.

(Signed) W. L. M.

Question.—How long was the Khan on good terms with you?

Answer.—For two years after he assumed sovereignty.

Question.—At what place did you give the above counsel to the Khan, and on what grounds were your lands confiscated?

Answer.—In Khelat and then at Bagh when the Khan resolved upon seizing Taj Mahomed, and had imprisoned my brother at Khunuck. I ran away to Mittree and thence to Candahar; while away my lands, cattle, and other property were confiscated.

Taj Mahomed was not seized until after Moolla Mahomed went from Bagh to Mittree in 1865.

(Signed) W. L. M.

Question.—What was the cause of the last insurrection?

Answer.—The Khan wanted forcibly to marry the sister of Taj Mahomed, but Taj Mahomed Zehree, Sher Dil, and myself and other Sirdars tried to prevent him doing so, on the ground that Taj Mahomed's daughter had married the Khan.

The Khan married Taj Mahomed's sister, widow of the late Khan, against the wish of the Sirdar, but it was in accordance with the customs of the country for the succeeding Khan to marry the widows. The sister was on bad terms with the Sirdars, hence his objection. Arrangements were also in progress for the Khan's marriage with the Sirdar's daughter. The other espousal broke this off for the time and so further offended the Sirdar. Afterwards the sister died and the Khan then married the Sirdar's daughter, who is still with him, the Khan.
(Signed) W. L. M.

Question.—Had you any intention to hurt the Khan, or to remove him from the throne?

Answer.—None; it was by force and by mediation on my part that the Khan was reinstated. He continued on good terms with me for two years. He changed towards me as shown above.

Question.—Were there any other reasons besides those mentioned above by you for flying to Candahar?

Answer.—None.

Moolla Mahomed, Taj Mahomed, and others conspired against the Khan in 1863, and again in 1865; on latter occasion the intention of the two first was to kill and place a (then unborn) son of the Khan by Taj Mahomed's daughter on the throne, when they would have all the power in their own hands.
(Signed) W. L. M.

Question.—Are you aware of Taj Mahomed having intended to do anything against the Khan?

Answer.—No, because I and Taj Mahomed were of one and the same mind, and he had no such intention.

Question.—Was there no other reason why you left your home, country, and lands?

Moolla Mahomed fled from Mittree directly he heard of Taj Mahomed's apprehension.
(Signed) W. L. M.

Answer.—None. I went to Mittree before Taj Mahomed was seized. Troops were sent against me, on which I fled to Candahar.

Question.—When you returned from Candahar, and the English officers were allowed to intercede with the Khan about you, how was it you did not accept the terms offered?

* These Moolla Mahomed had voluntarily resigned at Khelat in 1865.
(Signed) W. L. M.

The blood-money for Taj Mahomed was a most improper and offensive demand.
(Signed) W. L. M.

Hubbeeb Khan was killed in fight when he rose in rebellion in 1867.
(Signed) W. L. M.

Answer.—The Khan agreed to give me all my old rights but not the new ones on his restoration,* the blood-money of Taj Mahomed or the property taken from me at Mittree when I fled to Candahar, also blood-money for Hubbeeb Khan, Raisanee, who was my brother-in-law, and killed in 1867 by the Khan's troops.

Question.—Were there any other reasons why you did not accept the Khan's terms?

The Khan forgave Adam Khan, Bungoolzye, and Alladina Khoord at the same time, 1869, but would have nothing to say to Jam of Beyla or Azaad Khan.
(Signed) W. L. M.

Answer.—I also represented the claims of the other Sirdars, but the Khan rejected them.

Question.—You had a right perhaps to urge the blood-money claim for Hubbeeb Khan; what right had you to do the same for Taj Mahomed?

Subsequent inquiry showed Hubbeeb Khan met his death as above stated, so blood-money for him either was not due.
(Signed) W. L. M.

Moolla Mahomed's object in this claim was to show that the Khan had caused Taj Mahomed's death. Sir Henry Green after careful inquiry gave his decided opinion there was no truth in such a supposition.
(Signed) W. L. M.

Moolla Mahomed did not avail himself of this but fled to Kooruk, foreign territory, belonging to his Highness the Ameer of Cabul.
(Signed) W. L. M.

This is not true. The Jam seized the grain on Kumal Khan's estates which had been decided did not belong to him, and so commenced hostilities.
(Signed) W. L. M.

Answer.—I claimed for Taj Mahomed's blood-money because we are all one, Sarawan and Jalawan. I accepted nothing from the Khan, saying I must refer to the other Sirdars before anything was done. The Sirdars did not agree to the terms, and I went away from Khelat to Kooruk, in Seebee, and proceeded to the Murree Hills; afterwards the Jam's business took place, and I went to Candahar. Captain Harrison said if neither broke truce for three months he would do his best to get matters adjusted. Before that time the Jam's business commenced. The Khan commenced the business with the Jam by sending troops against the latter.

Question.—Why did you commence the late disturbances?

Answer.—I received at Candahar intimation that other Sirdars had been treated by the Khan with tyranny, viz., Moobarik Khan, Shawanee, Syud Khan, Mahomed Shaye, Jehangeer Khan, Lehree, Vynd Khan, Bungulzye; that the Khan had also gone to Abdool Kadir's house at Moostung and desired to force on a settlement of an old business in which one Moobarik Khan Hassil Khanozye had misbehaved with the wife of Abdool Kadir Khan, and that this was a dishonour to the Shawanees, of whom Abdool Kadir was chief. Moobarik Khan Hassil Khanozye was with the Khan. Moobarik Khan Shawanee, cousin of Abdool Kadir Khan, wrote to me of this and said no Khan had ever acted in this way before, and asked me to come and join in a revolution.

The Khan's object was to try and settle this family quarrel amicably.
(Signed) W. L. M.

Mooajib Allowances.

Question.—Did you ever receive the Mooajib you mention in Mahomed Nusseer Khan's time or afterwards?

Answer.—Nusseer Khan was in the habit of giving it every year, sometime Rupees 1,000, sometimes 800, not always the same. I was young then, so don't know particularly. The Khan treated me with the greatest honour. The present Khan used to pay it to me sometimes yearly until I fled to Candahar.

The Khelat Government records can prove the correctness or otherwise of this. (Signed) W. L. M.

Rozina daily allowances when in attendance on the Khan.

I received rozina from Nusseer Khan and from the present Khan regularly whenever I attended them until I fled to Candahar. No Khan formerly ever had regular troops, but depended on the chiefs and their followers. Nusseer Khan first commenced, but only with 100 men with my advice. Now there has been a great increase in numbers, and these troops eat up all the produce which otherwise would go amongst us.

The records will show this. (Signed) W. L. M.

These have become necessary to the Khan in consequence of the defection and opposition of the chiefs. They numbered 400 in Nusseer Khan's time, and were paid from Crown revenues.

Marks of Honour.

Nusseer Khan was in the habit of giving marks of honour to me, as to others, when I waited on him, and was dismissed, or at Eeds if present, and so also did Khodadad up to the time of my going to Candahar. The Khan also was in the habit of consulting me as Sirdar of Sarawan in all matters, first me and then the Sirdars of Jalawan, and sometimes he put questions to other Sirdars. This was in regard to matters of the arrangement of the country with regard to peace or war, appointments or removals of Naibs, and appointment of the Wuzeer even. Nusseer Khan followed this practice; when I was young he used to consult my Vakeel, Mahomed Khan Shawanee.

The Wuzeer states these were always given while the Sirdar was loyal. (Signed) W. L. M.

As long as support was duly given the Khan consulted the Sirdars of Sarawan and Jalawan in reference to matters of national importance, according to custom, but this was closed by Sirdar's defection. Consultation on appointment of Naibs was never the custom. The Khan also selected his own Wuzeer, and his appointment was confirmed in formal Durbar. (Signed) W. L. M.

Question.—When Nusseer Khan was on the throne was your father alive?

Answer.—Yes, Azad Khan, my father, arranged with Mr. Ross* Bell that the country should be given to Nusseer Khan. Khodadad Khan did not at first act rightly from Gungaram being Wuzeer, but afterwards when Wullee Mahomed was made Wuzeer at my recommendation† things went well for a time; he then ceased to act according to custom, and the first disturbances commenced.

Afterwards, on his restoration for a time, he followed the correct course, but then abandoned it, and I went to Candahar.

* Should be Major Outram. (Sd.) W. L. M.

† This differs from former reply. (Sd.) W. L. M.

On Khodadad Khan's restoration Moolla Mahomed and Taj Mahomed arrogated all powers to themselves, causing much discontent. (Sd.) W. L. M.

Question.—Is it the custom in Beloochistan for the Wuzeer to be selected, or is it an hereditary post?

The appointment of Wuzeer was hereditary for a great many years in a Dehwar family, who also bore the title of Akhoond or tutor. It nowhere appears that Sirdars were first consulted. (Sd.) W. L. M.

Answer.—Always selected and not hereditary, the Khan first consulting the Sirdars then selecting.

Question.—Was the Wuzeer's discharge governed by the same rule?

Answer.—Yes, with the combined voice of the Sirdars.

Question.—Was Mahomed Hoosein's father selected, or did he inherit?

Answer.—Mahomed Hoosein's father, Abdool Rahman, was selected Wuzeer with the advice of the Sirdars when Mahomed was the Khan. His father Aghali was Wuzeer before Abdool Rahman was murdered in Mehrab Khan's time by Dad Mahomed Ghilzi, who was made Wuzeer with consent of the Sirdars. Dad Mahomed was murdered by Mahomed Hoosein, and the latter became Wuzeer by the advice of my father, Azad Khan, and Rashid Khan, the Jhalawan Sirdar.

Abdool Rahman was a Budozye, a small family residing at Khelat; he was not really Wuzeer but Naib, so also was his father Aghali, and his son Mahomed Hoosein. The latter, however, became real Wuzeer in Nusseer Khan the younger's time, but was removed at General Jacob's recommendation for gross treachery to the Khan. The Sirdars were not re-consulted on any of these occasions. (Sd.) W. L. M.

Question.—Had not the Wuzeer the right of appointing Naibs?

Answer.—Yes, but only with consent of the Sirdars‡ except Bagh, which, being really the Naib of the Wuzeer, he appointed a deputy of his own.

‡ Inquiry shows this was never the case. Had it been it would have left the Khan no power at all. (Sd.) W. L. M.

Question.—Supposing the advice of the Sirdars and the opinion of the Ruler did not agree, what followed?

Answer.—It would not be right. Result would not be good. If the Khan said right it would be well.

Question.—Would the Khan's wish prevail, or would he give in to the Sirdar?

Answer.—A division must follow, but if the Khan thought one way and both Sirdars the other, and the former persisted, it would be on his own head, they, the Sirdars, would not help him.

This is tantamount to saying the Sirdars ruled and not the Khan, and seems very much to have been what Moolla Mahomed and Taj Mahomed acted on.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

Question.—In what points did the Khan Khodadad Khan not consult you before you quarrelled with him?

Answer.—In matters relating to the good of the country, and he committed acts of tyranny over the Sirdars and people. One was that he took transit duty on grain which was never done before. That he took money revenue from people and afterwards demanded from the same in kind as well. Tyranny was performed because the advice of the Sirdars was not followed.

In these assertions the Wuzeer does not agree.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

If this was warrant for rebellion, I am afraid many other countries would see it.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

Question.—Was the course you mention in regard to taking advice from the Sirdars and following it adopted in the elder Nusseer Khan's time.

Answer.—Always he acted properly and did what was right. Was it ever heard that he killed any one or took away one's property? He gave much. In matters of importance he consulted the Sirdars.

Nusseer Khan the elder kept all in perfect order by his ability and will. He had one safety valve, viz., that he sent 500 men under a Sirdar to Candahar to do service there, and in this way got rid of restless characters for a time.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

Question.—Was it customary to consult the Sirdars in any other appointment besides that of Wuzeer?

Answer.—Yes, it was, and formerly all Naibs were Brahooees, but in Mehrab Khan's time and Nusseer Khan's time there were some slaves, but most were Brahooees.

Question.—Who were Naibs of Quetta in Nusseer Khan's time?

Answer.—Minee Mingul, Rahimdad slave: Noor Mahomed, Raisanee; Alladina Khoord. Nusseer Khan died during Alladina's incumbency. Alladina remained for two years under Khodadad Khan.

Mahomed Khan, Rustumzye, resigned because the people complained of the exactions he was compelled to enforce.

Abdool Azeez, slave.

Abdool Luteef, slave.

Question.—Who were Naibs of Bagh in Nusseer Khan's and Khodadad Khan's time?

Answer.—Mahomed Amees, Bungulzye,
Prusram, Bunniah,
K. Taj Mahomed Shahgassee's brother,
Khodadad Khan. Dad Mahomed, Bungoolzye,
Laho Jan.

Naibs of Dadur.

Khalikdad, slave.
Futteh Khan Mingul.
Khair Mahomed Mingul.
Mahomed Khan, Shawanee.

Nusseer Oolla Dehwar remained till the restoration, when the latter was sent away for being a friend of Shere Dil Khan.

By Khodadad Khan. Wullee Mahomed Menejo killed by village rebels.

Moostung Naibs—Nusseer Khan's time.

Jubbur Patan.
Mahomed Khan Shawanee.
Abdool Azeez, slave.
Khodadad Khan. Abdool Rahman Dehwar, who has been Naib for the past three years.

Khozdar Naib in Nusseer Khan's time.

Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, his representative.
Gholam Mahomed (brother-in-law).

Gundava Naibs.

Nusseer Khan.
Darogah Gool Mahomed, slave.
Khodadad Khan. Attah Mahomed.
Kumber slave.

Ittaba, slave of Kurrum Khan, Allahzye. All these rulers were appointed before I went to Candahar, and were appointed with the consent and approval of Sirdars.

Question.—Who was the Wuzeer in the time of the Great Nusseer?

These were Naibs not Wuzeers. The Wuzeers were then Akhoonds and remained so till Mehrab Khan's time.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

Answer.—Agh Ali Budozye. His son succeeded him because he was a good man, but not as a necessary consequence, making the appointment hereditary.

Question.—You mention in your statement that you got one seventh of the receipts on account of kafilas passing Dadur, how was this?

Answer.—From Nusseer Khan the Great's time I, as Sirdar of the Sarawans, received one rupee per camel or load or four asses. This custom continued during the reign of Mohbeit Khan and Mehrab Khan, Nusseer Khan the less reduced it to annas eight. This continued until treaty by General Jacob, when Nusseer Khan told me I could no longer receive it, but he would give me Rupees 400 or 600. I then found that the Khan received Rupees 50,000 from the British and asked for my share. The Khan Nusseer promised it, but I never received it, because he died after two years. I was to be allowed to levy one seventh of the amount taken by the Khan at Dadur. This was confirmed to me by Khodadad, and I continued to levy it up to the time of my fleeing to Candahar.

Mehrab Khan gave me the ten khurwars of grain per annum as blood-money for the death of my grandfather, which were continued to me by Mehrab Khan, Nusseer Khan, and Khodadad Khan until the rebellion took place.

Question.—What are the real points then briefly you ask for from the Khan?

Answer.—The Khan consented to give me back my old estates but not my new ones in consequence of the assistance rendered in restoring him to the throne. He refused me the claim for blood-money on account of the death of Taj Mahomed or for Hubbeeb Khan, my cousin, who were killed with seven others; restitution of the property taken from the Budozyes at Gurwaf; restitution to the Lehrees of Nurnuck; restitution of the property taken after my flight to Candahar; restitution of the property of Hubbeeb Khan, and compensation for losses. Ditto for injury to Khunuck, and further plunder and injury at Mittree, injuries that I have suffered from being in rebellion.

Explained above. (Sd.) W. L. M.

(Sd.) W. L. M.

This and the following refer to losses said to be sustained by the Sirdar in consequence of his turning rebel.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

Question.—Who commenced the fight on the night of the 24th December last?

Answer.—The Khan's troops were coming against our troops, and our troops attacked them. The Khan's troops came from Bagh to Hajee, and our troops from Mittree to Hajee. They reached Hajee first. The Commander seized the Naib of Hajee, a Shawanee. Information was then conveyed to Mittree, and it was said that the enemy were coming on to attack Mittree. Our troops then marched on Hajee and attacked the others.

Question.—Why did you allow your troops to injure poor traders by plundering the kafilah in the Bolan?

Answer.—It occurred because Mahomed Khan Vakeel behaved badly. The fight ensued at Hajee. We lost men and property and lost name (women ill-used). It was done in retaliation. I heard of the intention afterwards, being at Khunuck, and sent to stop the foray, and was too late.

The Wuzeer distinctly declares no women were injured, and that the Syuds of Mittree are ready to depose to this.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

A.

Description of land and use of water to which Moolla Mahomed Khan, Raisanee, considers he is entitled in Kutchee.

Deh Dadur.

Land and water in Wustee Abraham Baranwallah granted as blood-money by Mere Mehrab Khan on account of the murder of Mehur Olla Khan, maternal uncle of Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee.

In Wustee Baranwallah.

10 "bitts" of water—
4 by purchase.
6 by Sunnud.

In the town of Mittree.

$\frac{1}{4}$ share.

Deh Narree.

Ten ounds known as Tyar Gazeewallah, according to Sunnud, Mulek Gamwallah, whole grant according to Sunnud, Deh Mohram, whole Deh obtained as blood-money from Meer Mehrab Khan on account of the murder of Mehur Oolla Khan.

One-seventh of the dues levied on merchandise passing through Dadur.

In Mull.

Khushkabah, known as Harinwallah, granted according to Sunnud.

In Mush Kabah.

Khushkabah, known as Baranwallah, granted according to Sunnud.

B.

DESCRIPTION of Land and Water, &c., to which Moollah Mahomed thinks he is entitled in Khorassan.

Deh Shawl.

1. Watercourse.
2. Use of water for two nights.

In Karez, called Mulazye Doshabannah, obtained by purchase.

Doubtful, another Karez.

In Karez called Samgullee; $2\frac{1}{2}$ shabanah obtained by purchase.

In Karez called Nahsarwallah; $\frac{1}{2}$ shabanah obtained by purchase.

One Karez called Byaizyewallah; grant according to Sunnud.

3. Land dependent on rain.

Two Karez and Khushkabah called Gud'aiewallah; grant according to Sunnud.

One Karez and Khushkabah called Sahibzadehwallah; grant according to Sunnud.

One Karez and Khushkabah called Sahibzadehwallah; grant according to Sunnud.

In Karez called Sangulleewallah; one shabanah granted by his Highness Khodadad Khan.

Deh Khunuck.

In Karez called Syudwallah; seven shabanah and five watches obtained by purchase.

In Karez called Dareaziwallah; half shabanah obtained by purchase.

In Karez called Sarbarakwallah; one shabanah grant according to Sunnud.

In Karez called Meramwallah; five watches grant according to Sunnud.

Khush Kabab, known as Khushwalla, one half of it; grant according to Sunnud.

One Karez, known as Sirdar Abdool Nanawallah; grant according to Sunnud.

One Khushkabah, known as Anamwallah, one-half of it; according to Sunnud.

One Karez called as Shahanwallah, grant according to Sunnud.

Deh Moongachur.

One Karez known as Shah Hooseinwallah.

Two Karez known as Rahimtullawallah.

One Karez known as Dildurwallah.

One Karez known as Bahadur Khanwallah.

One Khushkabah known as Shawaneewallah in "Rail" within the limits of Moongachur.

One Khushkabah known as Reakwallah.

In Karez, known as Mundo Hajeewallah, one shabanah.

In Karez, known as Shawaneewallah, one-fifth share.

In Karez, known as Dudramwallah, two shabanah.

In Karez, known as Ziarutwallah, two shabanah.

Two Karez known as Mucchahi and Gohickwallah.

All the above in Deh Moongachur were in possession of his forefather before the time of Ahmedzaie.

Deh Moostung.

One garden.

Deposition of Shadee Khan.

Question.—The claims you have mentioned, were they allowed to you by the present Khan on his first coming to the throne, and were you then in the enjoyment of them?

Answer.—Yes, in the time of Meer Nusseer Khan the younger, and also in Khodadad Khan's time; they have been taken from me since 1867, when Hubbeeb Khan was murdered. The reason was the Khan told my cousin Shadad Khan to kill the headman, Adam Khan. On this Adam Khan, Hubbeeb Khan, Alladina Khoord consented together, and as Moolla Mahomed, their Sirdar, was an exile at Candahar, agreed there was nothing for but to fight or appeal to the British, and wrote to Moolla Mahomed accordingly. The disturbances of 1867 then commenced. From that time up to the present, not having received what my father considered his rights, and what I consider mine, I have remained dissatisfied. My father, Adam Khan, Bungulzye, died about four months ago. The meaning of the two mares is that the Bungulzye Sirdar has a right to send two mares into the Khan's stables to be fed free. In the same way my right to eight khurwars of grain is derived from my being a Bungulzye Sirdar. They are not ridden, but the Sirdar can change them for others when he likes.

Adam Khan's lands were restored in 1869; he accepted them first, but then went to Seebee.
(Signed) W. L. M.

This is dependent on the will and pleasure of the Khan. No right.
(Signed) W. L. M.

Bubbur is divided between Shahdee Khan, Bungulzye, Jehangeer, Lehree, Alladina Khoord, and Syud, Khan, Mahomedzye. These grants were given on the Khan's restoration in 1864.

Forfeited by rebellion. First given to these four by Shere Dil.
(Signed) W. L. M.

Deposition of Alladina Khoord.

Question.—For what service do you say you were granted one-fourth of the land in Deh Bubbur?

Answer.—First Shere Dil, the usurper of the throne, when temporarily on the throne, gave it to us four Sirdars.

Mallik Dinna Mahomed Shye,
Adam Khan Bungulzye,
Alladina Khoord,
Jehangeer Lehree.

The Khan verbally gave the share to me at Khunuck on his restoration. It was confirmed by him by Sunnud a year afterwards at Khelat for my services in reference to the restoration.

The Sunnud for the 12 "bitts" of water at Dadur was given by the Khan at Khunuck when the other was verbally given.

Question.—When did you receive the Mooajib of Rupees 500. In Nusseer Khan's time?

Answer.—No, I got then Rupees 200 and some grain occasionally. I was then Naib of Shawlkote and remained so until the present Khan returned from the Murree Hills till 1859, when Mahomed Khan, Rustomzye, was appointed. The reason of my losing the Naibship was an accusation of my having appropriated Rupees 4,000. I denied it. Green Sahib paid the money to the Khan, saying it would be better not to press Alladina for it. The mooajib was given me first by Khodadad Khan the day he was attacked and wounded at Gundava. I did not receive it in Shere Dil's time, because I did not pay my respects to him but went with the Shahgassee. I received it regularly after the present Khan's restoration until I became yaghee (bad friends) at the time that Hubbeeb Khan was killed at Khunuck.

Sir H. Green interceded for Alladina and got the Khan to forego this claim. He paid nothing.
(Signed) W. L. M.

I also regularly received daily allowances when I was not in opposition; and the eight khurwars received at Kutchee and Khorassan of grain such being customary to give to Sirdars.

I was reckoned amongst the Sirdars always during the Great Nusseer Khan's time to the present Khan's.

Question.—For what reason, and how was it you received duties on kafilas passing through the Bolan?

Answer.—I received one rupee per camel for protecting kafilas from Quetta to the water at Siri Bolan; half a rupee was given to the Satukezyes for protection from Siri Bolan to Ahigoom; half a rupee to the Mundranees from Ahigroom to Bibinanee;

Rupees 1-2 to the Khijjuck of Kisti from Bibinanee to Dadur; one rupee to the Raisanee Sirdar at Dadur. The Khan also took Rupees 2 here per camel if it had not been taken at Quettah; half rupee also to the Shawanee Sirdar, altogether Rupees 6-10. This was assigned by the great Nusseer Khan. Mahomed Khan also gave it.

It was stopped in the time of Mehrab Khan after two years, and the arrangement was not re-introduced afterwards, excepting that the Raisanees and Shawanees had their amounts allowed to them, and continued until disturbances occurred between them and the Khan.

Question.—If Mehrab Khan stopped this allowance, why do you claim it from the present Khan?

Answer.—Because we are poor. Nusseer Khan used to give us plenty, but this Khan nothing, so I ask for return to the above. It was stopped in Mehrab Khan's time. I don't exactly know why, as I was young then, but it may have been because the road was not properly protected.

Question.—Why do you adduce this stoppage of the Bolan allowance as a claim against present Khan?

Answer.—I did not mean to do so. I merely meant to show that it was a right I used to hold. It was the present Khan's father who took it away.

Question.—Was the road was Shawlkote to Siri Bolan ever in your charge?

Answer.—No; I was Naib of Shawlkote, and after the kafilas had started had nothing further to do with them.

Question.—How did the ten angushts of water at Nowshera come into your possession?

Answer.—I bought them from Gholam Nubbee and Sultan Mahomed Shawanee in two instalments, first in 1861, and second in 1863.

These were taken from me by the Khan after the disturbances following the death of Hubbeeb Khan in 1867. The Khan gave orders for one fuzzul in 1869, and I then received two khurwars of grain; since then nothing.

Question.—When the English troops were in Kutchee and Quetta, what post had you with regard to Bolan?

Answer.—I received various sums at different times, Rupees 300, sometimes Rupees 400, for protecting sahibs going through the pass, to whom I gave 40 or 50 men, horse and foot, who accompanied them to Shawlkote, I going myself, and on reaching the top of the pass I let others go and went on to Shawlkote with the sahibs, taking only five sowars.

I was also ordered to make a well at the top of the Bolan at the edge of the Dusht, where there was no water. I did this, and derived great benefit from the well afterwards. The well has now fallen in. I consider that was a good piece of duty.

Enclosure 14 in No. 53.

APPENDIX D.

ABSTRACT TRANSLATION of a letter from Sirdars Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee; Wudera Shadee Khan, Bungulzye; Jundo Khan, Shahwanee; Syed Khan, Alladina Khoord, and Sumlundar Khan, Lehree, to the Address of the Commissioner in Sind, dated the 9th March 1872.

WE beg to lay before you and the British Government all the particulars connected with our case.

1st.—If any of our Rulers oppressed us and our "raj" (clansmen) and refused to follow our advice and counsel, we went and complained to Ahmed Shah, who made full inquiry from either party. If the Ruler was proved to have acted wrongly and treated us with a high hand, he was at once deposed, and another Ruler was ordered to be placed in his stead. We Sirdars with one accord selected Meer Ahmed as our Khan of Khelat, but he having acted against our will, was in his turn and on our complaint dethroned by Ahmed Shahee* and Meer Abdoolla Khan, Ahmedzye, appointed to take his place. He, by the will of God, died, and we having consulted each other's wishes made Mohbut Khan our Ruler. He proved to be an oppressive and self-willed "Hakim" † and had, therefore, to vacate his post, which was filled up by the Great Nusseer Khan. We accepted his authority, and it was by our advice and counsel that he was placed over us. He spent many years amongst us, all of which were marked by good rule

This was only done on one occasion mentioned below, and then the Khan Mohbut Khan was deposed by the Ruler of Candahar, to whom the Khans of Khelat then paid allegiance.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

* Meaning Ruler of Candahar.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

† Ruler.

Not so. He was appointed at and from Candahar by Ahmed Shah.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

and good treatment. On his career in this world being at an end he was succeeded by Meer Mahmood Khan, his son, who gave us and the Raj no cause for complaint, except in one instance, when he caused a Sirdar of the Bezonjao tribe and several other Bezonjaos to be killed. On hearing of this deed, we (Sirdars Jalawan and Sarawan) went to him in a body, and after paying him the usual homage gave him good advice. All the Bezonjaos became disobedient, and we told Meer Mahomed Khan that as long as the Bezonjaos remained disaffected, and were not satisfied by payment of blood-money, disorder would reign. Our counsel was listened to, and a grant of four towns in Kutchee was made to the Bezonjaos as blood-money. This grant is still enjoyed by the descendants of the original grantees. By the will of the Almighty, Meer Mahomed Khan bade adieu to this world, and we appointed Mehrab Khan as our Khan. He behaved well with us and our Raj (clansmen) for some years, but afterwards began to be oppressive and exacting. He caused Sirdar Mehuroolla, Raisanee, and some other Sirdars to be butchered, and, Sirdars Hussud Khan and Mahomed Khan, Shawanee, and another therefore proceeded to Candahar and laid their grievances before Ahmed Shahee. Sirdar Meer Abdool Kurreem, Raisanee, younger brother of Sirdar Hussud Khan, and younger uncle of Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee together with all the Sarawan Sirdars went and overran the whole of Kutchee. Mehrab Khan at this time sent his mother, Beebee Sahitee, to Candahar to mediate between him and the Sirdars, agreeing to pay Rupees 100,000 and two or three towns in Kutchee as blood-money which was due. Meer Mehrab Khan fell in the battle which took place between his Highness the Khan and the British Government, and Meer Abdool Kurreem, uncle of Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, also lost his life. The English Government then gave the Khanate to Shahnawaz Khan, whose administration and behaviour towards us were not marked by justice and kindness. He did not also follow our counsel. Meer Nusseer Khan the less, who was in Kharan, arrived in Moostung* with his army, and we, having strengthened his forces, marched with him to Khelat. Mr. Ross Bell summoned Sirdar Azaad Khan and other Sirdars into his presence and asked them to acknowledge Meer Shahnawaz Khan as their sovereign. We all replied that Nusseer Khan the less was our Ruler, and we would not pay our allegiance to Shahnawaz Khan. The aforesaid gentleman complied with our wishes, and we informed him that the prevailing custom in our country was, that if any Ruler treated our "Raj" with cruelty and oppression, and set our counsel at nought, we at once threw off his yoke.† We then, with Mr. Bell's consent, sent a Sowar to Nusseer Khan, and before he arrived among us the English officer breathed his last at Sealkote, and was succeeded by Major Outram, who accompanied us to Khelat, where, with the assent of all of us, Sirdar Nusseer Khan was proclaimed as our Khan.‡ As long as Nusseer Khan was alive and presided over us as Ruler, he gave us no reason to be dissatisfied with him. He also by the decrees of Heaven passed away. Now that Meer Khodadad Khan has been our Ruler, whatever good he has conferred on us Sirdars and on our Raj is not hidden from the British Government, and needs no detail from us.

This is very differently decided by the Wuzeer.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

* Meer Nusseer Khan was brought forward in autumn of 1840 by the Darogah Gool Mahomed, Beebee Gunja, and certain of the Sarawan Sirdars, but the Jalawan Sirdars were mainly with Shahnawaz. Nusseer Khan's forces being defeated at Dadur in November 1840, he again became a fugitive until he was brought to Khelat in July 1841 by Colonel Stacey.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

† This is here announced as a sort of vindication for their recent proceedings.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

‡ This is very incorrect as the British records show. Major Outram, on behalf of the British Government, arranged for Meer Nusseer Khan being placed on the throne of his father as an act of justice, and Colonel Stacey proceeded to where Nusseer Khan was in refuge and brought him to Khelat.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

2*ndly*.—When Sirdar Mehur Oollah was murdered and we went to Ahmed Shahee, the ruler of Candahar told Mehrab Khan that if he had not been so unjust and cruel towards the Sirdars, he would not have been reduced to that plight, and that therefore we should be allowed to enjoy all the property obtained by us by plunder in Kutchee.§ His Highness the Khan used to receive one lakh of rupees from Ahmed Shah and distribute half of it among us Sirdars.

We have placed all our circumstances before you. Dated 9th March 1872.

P.S.—Forty or fifty persons, brothers and nephews of each Sirdar, used to be taken for service by the Khan, and no other exaction made.

§ This is mentioned to try and give a precedent for the writers retaining what they had recently plundered while in rebellion, but is manifestly untrue.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

ABSTRACT TRANSLATION of a Letter from Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed to Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, dated 5th Mohurrum 1289.

I make the following remarks on the petition of the Sarawan Sirdars, dated 9th March 1872, presented to the Commissioner in Sind.

They state that they seated Meer Ahmed on the throne of Khelat and complained to Ahmed Shahee whenever they were oppressed by their rulers, whom they got deposed. All that is advanced by them is contrary to the real facts, and is for the promotion of their own ends. I give below the full particulars:—

The five Khans who preceded Meer Ahmed have been omitted to be mentioned by the Sirdars. The number of Ahmedzye rulers is 22, who have all sat on the throne of Khelat. Mahomed Ghaznavi was ruler of Afghanistan when the Ahmedzyes brought Kohistan under their sway: The kings of Delhi and Candahar were then of the Ghoree tribe, and the Ahmedzyes acknowledged the authority of the King of Delhi. As the King of Candahar was dependent on that of Delhi for aid, the Ahmedzyes commenced to have connexion with the former. When the Ghilzies fought with the Ghorees for the sovereignty of Candahar, Meer Kurreem Shah, Ahmedzye, brother of Meer Abdullah, fell in battle, and the Ghilzies became the rulers of Candahar. From the first the Ghilzies were on bad terms with the Ahmedzyes, and on many occasions quarrels and struggles between the two had taken place. The Ahmedzyes never made themselves dependents of the Ghilzies. Then Nadir Shah became the sovereign of Candahar, Herat, and Persia, and on his death was succeeded by Ahmed Shah. When, in the days of Sooltan Mahomed Ghaznavi, Ahmedzyes obtained possession of Kohistan, the ancestors of these Sirdars did not live in Kohistan. They came afterwards one by one, and perhaps this is their 10th generation. They took service and classed themselves as khizmutgars* of Ahmedzye family. In proportion to their service they were allowed to enter the Brahooee clan. The above will show that it is impossible that the Ahmedzyes could have obtained sovereignty through these Sirdars. As a Persian poet has said:—

* Servants.

"When he himself has lost his way and gone astray how can he be a guide to others."

They declared that they were instrumental in putting Meer Ahmed on the throne of Khelat, and that when he commenced to be oppressive he was, on a complaint being made by them to the Ahmedzye, deposed, and Meer Abdullah Khan placed in this stead. This is wholly false. The facts are that the rulers continued their rule till Meer Ahmed ascended the throne by his birthright. In his time the Ghilzies were the rulers of Candahar. The reasons of ill-feeling between the Ghilzies and Meers Ahmed and Abdullah were the following:—

1*st*. The death of Meer Kurrum Shah.

2*nd*. The Ahmedzyes had from generations past subjected themselves to the authority of the King of Delhi. There was always fighting between the two (Ghilzies and Ahmedzyes). Meer Abdullah became the ruler in this wise, viz., when Meer Ahmed was the ruler, Meer Abdullah was residing in Shawlkote. The two brothers did not agree, and there were continual fights between them. At length a reconciliation was brought about, and both came to Khelat. After some days Meer Ahmed was laid up with sickness, and Meer Abdullah, taking advantage of this opportunity, imprisoned his brother and proclaimed himself ruler. He did not, however, kill his brother on account of their near relationship, and when Meer Ahmed recovered from his illness the brothers came to terms, and it was resolved that Meer Ahmed should receive the receipts from Beyla and Mushkah, heretofore enjoyed by Boorfat Sirdars, and that Meer Abdullah should be the ruler at Khelat. The former lived on the revenue allowed to him, and at last, in obedience to the will of God, entrusted his soul into the hands of the Almighty. His tomb still stands at Beyla. Meer Abdullah conducted the affairs of the State very well, and took care of the subjects. At this time Nadir Shah Erani,* having resolved to conquer Herat and Candahar, wrote to Meer Abdullah Khan for his aid, who replied in the affirmative, and commenced to collect an army. Nadir Shah, having won the fort of Herat, was proceeding to make an attack on Candahar when Meer Abdullah left Khelat to join him, and encamped at a place called Moostung. While here he received a petition with a deputation of some respectable Beloochees from Kutchee, asking to be relieved from the injuries sustained by them at the hands of Mean Noor Mahomed Kalhora, ruler of Sind. According to this request Meer Abdullah Khan started for Kutchee, at the same time informing Nadir Shah by writing of what had compelled him to return to his territory, and that he would join him at Candahar as soon as the urgent business that had called him was completed. He at once proceeded to Kutchee and encamped at a place called Khanpoor. Mean Noor Mahomed, on receiving information of his arrival, appointed Shah Bahara to oppose him. An engagement took place between the two forces at Jandrihar. It lasted long, and both parties lost a great number of men. Meer Abdullah also fell as a martyr. At this juncture, and when the affairs of Khelat were in this state, Nadir Shah obtained a victory and ascended the

* The Persian.

throne of Candahar and Cabul. He brought Candahar, Herat, and Cabul under his sway, and made Sind his dependency. He also placed Kutchee in the hands of Meer Eltyaz Khan, Meer Mohbut Khan, and Meer Nusseer Khan, sons of Meer Abdullah Khan, as compensation for their father's death, sending at the same time Mean Noor Mahomed to Meer Mohbut Khan to be killed or disposed of in any way he liked. Mean Noor Mahomed was not severely dealt with, but set at liberty, and Meer Mohbut Khan was raised to the rulership of Kutchee and Kohistan.

Meer Mohbut Khan commenced to carry on the duties of the State, while Meer Eltyaz Khan and Meer Nusseer Khan were taken by Nadir Shah with him to Candahar and shown great kindness. The king always kept as hostages one Sirdar with 500 men at his court, to ensure the peace and comfort of the inhabitants of Kutchee and Kohistan. Every year these were transferred and new ones sent instead. This rule continued till his death, and prosperity and peace were daily on the increase. Meer Nusseer Khan also received new favours at the King's hands every day. By the will of the Almighty Nadir Shah was killed, and Ahmed Shah sat on the throne of Candahar. No rupture took place between Meer Mohbut Khan and his people owing to this change of government in Candahar, but as Meer Mohbut Khan was fond of ease and pleasure, the roads by which the subjects of the king and other people passed became dangerous and devoid of safety. As the king had great love and affection for Nusseer Khan, and as the roads and passages became infested with thieves and robbers, Ahmed Shah sent for Meer Mohbut Khan with his ooloos (clansmen) to Candahar, and there it was settled that Meer Nusseer Khan should be the ruler of Kutchee and Kohistan, and that Meer Mohbut Khan should remain in Candahar.

3. Meer Nusseer Khan proved to be a good ruler and gave satisfaction to all great and small. He made good arrangements for the government of the country. He used to send every year one Sirdar with 500 men as hostages to Candahar, as was the custom during the reign of Nadir Shah, although these Sarawan Sirdars have stated that Meer Nusseer Khan spent his days well with them, still they, owing to their bad character, were guilty of wrong-doing, detail of which is given below.

Meer Mohbut Khan died in Candahar; his son also, Meer Hajee Khan, expired there, and his grandson, Meer Behram Khan, was with the King at Candahar. As by the command of God all the sons that were born to Nusseer Khan died, he asked the King to let him have Meer Behram Khan, whom he brought to Khelat, and there gave to him his daughter in marriage. After the expiration of some days a disturbance was set afoot by Sarawans of the Shawanee tribe. They made Meer Behram Khan their tool and girded their loins to assist him. They caused an engagement to take place between Meer Nusseer Khan and Meer Behram Khan at a place called Iskalka. The end of the fight was disastrous to the rebels. They had several of their number killed, and received the punishment which they deserved for their base deeds. Meer Behram was imprisoned, and peace was restored to the country. Meer Nusseer Khan soon bade adieu to this world and hasted to heaven. It may be considered how far the appointment of a ruler in Khelat was dependent on the will of the Sirdars when they themselves have all along received due punishment for their deeds.

4. Meer Nusseer Khan was succeeded by Meer Mahomed Khan, who conducted the affairs of the Khanate with justice and humanity, and thus secured the happiness of his subjects. Whatever the Sarawans state in regard to the murder of Fakeer Mahomed Bezonjao and other Bezonjaos, and the Khan giving four towns in Kutchee upon their advice as blood-money, is untrue, and one in which self-interest is sought. The facts are these. In the days of the rulership of Meer Mahomed Khan, Meer Fakeer Mahomed Bezonjao pillaged a kafila of the King of Candahar, who sent Nowrung Khan Duranee with 200 Sowars to Khelat to obtain restitution of the plundered property. According to these orders of the King, Meer Mahomed Khan, accompanied by Nowrung, Khan, Duranee, went to Kozdar, and there, summoning Fakeer Mahomed, recovered the stolen property and handed it over to the kafila people and Afghans who, however, stated that property stolen from them was more than what was given back. While Fakeer Mahomed declared that all that belonged to them had been restored. While Fakeer Mahomed and Nowrung Khan, Duranee, were engaged in disputing this point, the former out-stepped the rules of courtesy and lost his life, as well as some of his men; his son, Kheyra, who was with him, was taken into custody. He was, however, soon released and appointed to his father's post by Meer Mahomed Khan. Kheyra showed great faithfulness and self-sacrifice in the discharge of the functions of his new office, and after the lapse of some days preferred a request that as the Bezonjaos had fallen on the kafila of the King through poverty and hunger, and as he was a loyal subject of the Ahmedzye family a piece of land should be granted to his family in Kutchee to aid in their

maintenance and support. At this entreaty his Highness the Khan took compassion and gave Meer Kheyra the lands "Bukshis," which are still in the possession of his descendants. This grant was not made at the recommendation of the Sarawans and Bezonjaos, nor was it given as blood-money for the death of Fakeer Mahomed. Meer Mahomed Khan was held in great esteem by, and received high honours from, the King, and ever received from him the same aid and favours as were shown to Meer Nusseer Khan. During the rule of Meer Mahomed Khan, who when he ascended the throne was young in years, the Brahooees, as was their wont and behaviour, did not give up rebellion, and rendered every assistance to Meer Behram Khan to create disturbances. The Sudozyes were then the rulers at Candahar, and Mudad Khan with his forces was sent by the King to help the Khan. The combined forces meted out due punishment to the insurgents and slaughtered many. Meer Behram Khan saved his life by flight to Dera, where ended the latter days of his life. The Raj and subjects are like children to the Ruler, and whereas the former turned rebellious and misbehaved themselves, the latter chastised them for the purpose of ensuring peace in the country. There is an apt verse by a Persian poet:—"Obedience and due respect to superiors or a crown. If a son is obstinate, for an obstinate dog the remedy is in a clod" (meaning chastisement). How then could the rulers have obtained sovereignty through these Sirdars? Meer Mahomed Khan, by the wish of the Almighty, placed his seal in his hands and disappeared from this world.

5. Meer Mehrab Khan was the next ruler at the time of the death of Meer Mahomed Khan at Gundava. Munsur Khan, Duranee, was present on behalf of the King, and none of these Sarawans were seen that day. With due promises from the King, Meer Mehrab Khan took his seat on the throne. After this the kingdom of Candahar got into disorder and the rulership of Candahar, Cabul, and Herat came into the hands of the Barukzye Sirdars. Between these Sirdars and the Khan friendship existed, and the bonds of amity were the same as before. The Khan was not, however, a dependent of them as he was of the King. Every one was the owner and ruler of his own dominions. One did not take aid from another. The Sirdar and 500 men that were taken by the Kings of Candahar as hostages for the safety of the country of Kohistan were not now sent and remained in their respective places. As the Sarawans found that they had nothing to fear from the side of Candahar, they commenced their old practice of causing disturbances to the peace of the country. Mehur Oolla Khan Raisanee made rebellion his profession. Disturbances having been commenced, and their intentions appearing to be base, the Khan Sahib was under the necessity of putting the ringleader and his two men to the sword. The others of the Raj and family remained loyal. Some men however, with certain disaffected and rebellious Sirdars, hastened to Candahar, and the authorities of that place, in consequence of their liberal spirit, despatched an ambassador to his Highness the Khan, as a matter of friendship and good will, with the message that the Sirdars of Kohistan, who were his "Ooloos," had come to them and fallen before them, and that, in consideration of the friendship that existed between the two Governments, it was desirable that the fugitive Sirdars should be sent for with such honour as was suitable to the dignity of the ruler of Candahar. The Khan, on hearing this message, and looking to the terms of amity between himself and the ruler of Candahar and to his own fame, sent Beebee Sahib and Moolla Dost Mahomed Wuzeer to summon them. They arrived and paid their respects to his Highness the Khan. As Mehur Oolla Khan, Raisanee, had no son or brother as heir, his near relations of the Brahimzai Raisanee tribe were his heirs, and they petitioned the Khan for the right of Sirdarship. As the Khan had seen no fidelity in Mehur Oolla, he refused to confer the Sirdarship on the Brahimzaies. Some of the lands belonging to the Sirdarship of Raisanee were handed over to Sirdar Azad Khan, father of Sirda Moolla Mahomed. Not wishing, however, to keep back from the Brahimzaies the food obtainable from Sirdarship, and seeing the loyalty of Meer Azad Khan, he gave a portion of the lands to them. In consequence of the depredations committed by Allyar Lehree, Sirdar of the Lehrees on certain crops, that chief was dismissed, and Sirdar Mahomed Khan Lehree appointed in his place. Mehrab Khan arrested people according to their misdeeds and thus restored peace and tranquillity to the country. By the order of God Meer Mehrab Khan was removed as a martyr to his eternal abode in Heaven. The Sarawans affirm that the several Ahmedzyes have owed their sovereignty to them but, as I have shown above, that the rulership has from the time of the Sultan Mahomed Ghaznavi descended to lawful heirs (and this is the 22nd ruler) and these Sarawans settled in the country afterwards (this being their tenth generation) and took service under the Ahmedzyes, it is proved that the rulers have not been appointed at the will of these Sirdars. The Ahmedzyes showed firmness in their obedience to the authority of the King of Candahar, received from him favours and aids and gave them in return. What the Sirdars say about a lakh of rupees

having been given as blood-money for the death of Mehur Oolla and two men is wholly untrue and mendacious. Meer Abdul Karim Raisanee and some other Sirdars that were present in battle also fell with his Highness the Khan at the time of the latter's death.

6. After the death of Meer Mehrab Khan the English Government placed the country of Moostung, Khelat, and Khozdar in the hands of Meer Shahnawaz Ahmedzye, but this continued for only about a few months. During this short period not a single act of oppression was committed by the said ruler towards the Raj and "Ooloos," who had proved staunch to Meer Shahnawaz from the days of Meer Mehrab. Many a time disturbances broke out at the instigation of rebels, who were discomfited and defeated everywhere, and had to flee. The truth or otherwise of what they allege in respect to their getting Meer Nusseer Khan the rulership by requesting the British Government, and declaring that they would not acknowledge the authority of Meer Shahnawaz Khan, is not hidden from the English Sircar, and needs no explanation from me. The British officials know the full particulars from first to last. The country of Kutchee and Kohistan was by his birth the rightful property of Meer Nusseer Khan, and the British Government, respecting the old customs and the institutions, appointed him to the rulership. His administration of the affairs of the Khanate was marked by justice and liberality. He never allowed any oppressive act to be committed and gave satisfaction. This testimony is borne by the Sirdars in their petition. These Sarawans were also guilty of carrying on a disturbance once in the time of this Khan. Its particulars are these:—Bijar Dhoombkee carried away by theft the property of the subject people in Kutchee and Sind, and by the wishes of the British Government Meer Nusseer Khan came with his forces to Chuttun and Phoolajee to arrest the offender, Bijar, who fled and concealed himself in the hills. The Sarawans without permission committed outrages on the town of Chuttun, and plundered the property of the people. In consequence of the disloyalty of the Sarawans, and in consideration of friendship, General Jacob arrived in the town of Hajee to punish the offenders, and to apprehend Mahomed Khan, Shawanee. The said Sirdar fled to Candahar and sought protection from the rulers there, who told him plainly that they would not interfere, the Khan being on terms of peace with the British Government. He was, therefore, compelled to return and ask refuge and pardon from the Khan in the name of God. Free pardon was given him. The Commissioner in Sind knows full well of the particulars of the other Sirdars, and that none had power to do or say anything at his will during the rulership of his Highness the late Khan. All are aware that, although every one was afraid of him and in awe, none of the subject people and Raj were oppressed or dealt with severely, and they were all treated and taken care of as a father takes care of his children. He was just to the end of his life.

Mehrab Khan lost his life through the treachery of Akhoond Mahomed Sadick, Naib Moollah Mahomed Hoossein and others.
Placing his son on the throne was a simple act of justice which had unfortunately been too long delayed.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

7. His successor to the Khanate is the present Khodadad Khan. The particulars of his administration are as follows:—He continued all grants and allowances found to have been made from the time of the Great Nusseer Khan and that of Nusseer Khan the less. He conferred additional honours on each day by day. After the death of Nusseer Khan the less the Sirdars again created disturbances at Khelat in the days of the present Khan, when his Highness, with all the Sirdars, was sent for to Jacobabad by the British Government. He arrived and arrangements were entered into, which were soon broken by the Sirdars. This led to the rebellion headed by Shere Dil Khan and to the wounds received by His Highness Khodadad Khan. The disturbances have continued up to this day, and the Sirdars have not yet known their duty. They fled to Candahar and Khorassan, and have kept the country in alarm. I beg full inquiry be made into their misdeeds, and justice be done by the British Government.

I turn now to the assertion made by the Sarawans of the Khan receiving Rupees 1,00,000 from Ahmedzye, and paying them one-half of that sum. This is an untruth, and the truth is this, that Ahmedzye once paid Rupees 2,00,000 (two lakhs) to his Highness the Khan for rendering him military service with his forces in times of emergency. The whole of this sum was spent by his Highness the Khan in his own expenses and in the equipment of troops, and nothing was ever given to any of his relations, or the Sarawans, or any other.

The Sarawans state that the Sirdars of Candahar informed his Highness Mehrab Khan that if he had not proceeded in the manner he had done the result would not have been such as had been, and further that no notice should be taken by him of the acts of plunder committed by the Sirdars. I must say that this statement also is not true and is fabricated. The British Government, the Commissioner in Sind, and others are fully cognizant of the fact that Mehrab Khan was not a dependent of the authorities in Candahar after the extinction of the Ahmedzye government. Friendship only existed,

and now can any property plundered in the territory of one prince be allowed to remain in the possession of the plunderer by another prince? On the contrary, Mehrab Khan, in order to show his indignation for such acts, deprived the rightful heirs of Mehur Oollah of their Sirdarship and gave it to Azad Khan, father of Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee. He also took away the friendship from Alyar Khan, Lehree, and granted it to Mahomed Khan, Lehree. The facts in regard to the statement of the insurgents, that their 40 or 50 relations obtained service under the Khan, are, that their cousins by the mother side are still servants of his Highness the Khan. If any of the insurgents became disloyal he was dismissed and his relation appointed in his place. For instance, Sirdar Meer Mahomed Mingul was appointed in place of Noordeen Mingul; Shahdad Khan Bungoolzye after Khan Khoord. Nawab Khan Dinarzye, Shirbut Khan Syudzye, and other notables of each tribe, who have proved loyal, are yet in the service. The ruler only has power to appoint servants, and those who appear faithful are appointed. This is the rule of public service among us.

His Highness the Khan considers the British Government in the light of kings of past ages, and I may say more than that. The Sarawans are in every respect in the wrong. It is hoped that the best arrangements will be made by the English Sircar; there is no difference between the two Governments. The Commissioner in Sind is fully acquainted with all the affairs, and knows that the evil results of the disturbances caused by the Sarawans have shown themselves on the people, and affected their safety and the peace of the country.

(Signed) SHAHGASSEE WULLEE MAHOMED.

5th Mohurrum.

PETITION of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, Chief of Sarawan, to the Commissioner in Sind, dated 15th March 1872.

You are aware of my rights and those of my clansmen, as they were mentioned to you personally by me. The Sirdars and Ooloos* have experienced troubles and harassments during the reign of the present Khan only. The following will give the details. About ten years ago the Khan married the daughter of a Jalawan Sirdar, Taj Mahomed Khan. All the Sirdars of Kohistan were present at the time at Gundava; all the Sirdars, young and old, hoped that this marriage would result in the good management of the country for the future.

* Clansmen.

Afterwards the Khan, contrary to the doctrines of the Mahomedan religion, and without the consent of the Sirdars, had this marriage dissolved and married Sirdar Taj Mahomed Khan's sister. This gave rise to our troubles, inasmuch as about two or three years after Shere Dil Khan created a disturbance and ejected the present Khan from his throne. His Highness Khodadad Khan sat again on the throne of Khelat after one year's interval, and having been advised by me took back to his bed Sirdar Taj Mahomed Khan's daughter, from whom he had been separated for a time. This, however, happened after the death of the same Sirdar's sister. I hoped that this would establish peace in the country and among the clansmen, but the Khan's enmity towards me and Sirdar Taj Mahomed Khan by this time became so great as to make him take the following steps:—(1) viz., to cause the latter to be imprisoned and to try to apprehend me. Sirdar Taj Mahomed Khan died while in the custody of the Khan's regiment, and the general belief was that he was foully murdered, for he went to his bed the previous night quite healthy, and was found dead the next morning; and, secondly, that the man who always attended on him was that night sent to Meer Hybut Khan, who was imprisoned in a separate place. The Khan took possession of the whole of this Sirdar's state, leaving some portion of land in the hands of the deceased's mother. The Khan called the Sirdar's mother to Khelat at first, but did not take care of her afterwards. She was again called by him to Khelat (where she still is) on the occasion of the fight at Khunuck. About one or two years ago the Khan appointed his son (who since died) to be Sirdar of Jalawan. This was contrary to the old usage.

There was nothing contrary to custom in the Khan marrying his brother's widow, the sister of Taj Mahomed, nether was the Sirdars' consent necessary. The marriage with the daughter had not taken place, therefore had not to be dissolved. The betrothal had, and breaking this off was an affront, but purely a personal one. The Khan did marry the daughter afterwards in 1864 after the death of the sister.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

Taj Mahomed was imprisoned for twice conspiring to take the Khan's life. No steps were taken to apprehend Moolla Mahomed. He fled.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

This suspicion was shown at the time by Sir H. Green to be incorrect, and is now distinctly denied by the Shahgassee.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

The whole was given to the deceased's mother, who has them still, and is well esteemed by the Khan.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

Reasons for this given by the Wuzeer.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

I was at Mittree when Sirdar Taj Mahomed Khan was apprehended and could not, therefore, help leaving for Candahar, having heard that a force was also sent by the Khan for my arrest. On this occasion the Khan confiscated all my states situated in Shawl, Moostung, Khunuck, and Mungachur, and apprehended my brother, Hybut Khan, who managed the estate. Great was the oppression and force that commenced to be practised on Hubbeeb Khan and Mahomed Khan, who were at this time in Khunuck, and also on the people and clansmen in the country. Intelligence of this state of affairs was sent by Hubbeeb Khan to Wudera Adam Khan, Bungulzye, Sirdar Alladina Khood, Mahomed Khan, Lehree, and Sirdar Jehangeer Khan, Lehree, in order that they may all jointly desert the country and proceed to the British authorities for obtaining redress of their grievances. It was arranged that I should come from Candahar and join them in their proposal. To carry out this intention the above-named assembled at Khunuck, but the Khan's force arrived that day and made an attack on them, killed Hubbeeb Khan and seven others. I then joined the Sirdars at Nunuck, and about one month thereafter the Shahgassee with his force met us at Tahkaree in the Bolan, attacked us, but was defeated.* At this time we ran short of our supply of ammunition, and, therefore, retired to the Murree Hills, but the Shahgassee's force on their way came to a place called Toonum Khoond Budozer, and carried away by plunder 200 camels, 4,000 sheep, 80 bullocks and cows, and all ornaments. On his arrival at Kirmab the Shahgassee called before him on urgent request Meer Khan, Lehree, and Jahnee Khan Khoord, on the understanding of concluding terms of peace with them and myself, but afterwards when they went to him he made them all prisoners. The Shahgassee then sent Jehangeer Khan, Lehree, and Janee Khan Khoord, together with five men in custody to Khelat, detained Meer Mahomed Khan, Lehree, with him for awhile, sending him afterwards to me at Mundai for terms of peace; this I refused on the ground that the Shahgassee had previously acted fraudulently in apprehending the above-named persons. Meer Mahomed Khan then returned to the Shahgassee, and was again put in prison by him, where he died about three months after. I then petitioned Colonel Green in 1868, when he sent for us in Jacobabad, but, without effecting any arrangement, ordered me to reside in Seebee. Colonel Green was afterwards succeeded by Colonel Phayre. In 1869 we all, including Jam Sirdar Noordeen, Sirdar Azaad Khan, and other Sirdars proceeded to Khelat, presented ourselves before Major Harrison in Baghwana, and related to him the whole circumstances of our case. At this interview I mentioned to Major Harrison the details of my property that had been confiscated on Taj Mahomed Khan's arrest to be as follows:—Mares, 100; camels and she camels, 600; and cows, 100. I also claimed the rents and profits of my estate, which were collected by the Khan for three years, as also blood-money for Sirdars Taj Mahomed Khan and Meer Hubbeeb Khan's deaths. Major Harrison desired us to dismiss our forces, to which we replied that we had not come for war, but to get arrangements made for the restoration of our rights, and we would naturally risk our lives by dispensing with the force we had; we then marched to Kupota, and afterwards, under instructions from Major Harrison, went to Khelat; the following day we obtained an interview with the Shahgassee in the Sahib's tent. We refused having any conversation with the Shahgassee, but Major Harrison wished us to speak to him before seeing the Khan. We all then went to the Khan and related to him all that had passed, beginning it from the time of Sirdar Taj Mahomed Khan's death. We also craved that he should treat us as was done by his father, Meer Mehrab Khan. His Highness the Khan declined giving us the produce of our estates for the past three years, as also our new landed property, but consented to give us back all our ancestral estates, as well as our property. In our old estates a great deal of land is lying waste, and we depended for our maintenance mostly on new lands. I then proposed to the Khan to restore the confiscated estates of all the Sarawan Sirdars, the Jam's, and Sirdar Noordeen's lands in Baghwana, Azaad Khan's land in Punjgoor and Muskah, and Mahomed Hussainee's land in Bhach. These the Khan refused, and I then

The Sirdar having fled.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

This is distinctly denied by the Wuzeer.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

In rebellion.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

* This is incorrect. It is well known to every one on the border the Shahgassee was successful in every engagement that took place.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

Vide Wuzeer's account.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

Vide Wuzeer's account.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

Colonel Phayre was instructed to act on Colonel Green's promise of mediation on behalf of Moolla Mahomed, and the latter was told to accompany or follow Captain Harrison, Political Agent, to Khelat, where intercession would be made with the Khan. But Moolla Mahomed disobeyed these instructions, went off to Beyla, and then advanced on Khelat, with the Jam and others, at the head of a large force. This was not the proper guise of a suppliant for restoration to favour.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

These rights appear to be what these Sirdars chose to constitute as such.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

The members of the tribes who remained faithful were in no way disturbed in their possessions.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

The mediation by Captain Harrison was only authorised in behalf of Moolla Mahomed, but was extended to Alladina Khoord and Adam Khan, Bungulzye. Jehangeer Lehree had been already pardoned and reinstated.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

returned to Kupota to meet the rest of the Sirdars ; of course no terms were made with the Khan. Major Harrison then came to Kupota and advised us to return to our homes, promising that he would use his efforts soon to arrange matters and desiring us to wait for three months. All the Sirdars returned to their homes accordingly. I was, however, desirous of seeing the Political Superintendent, but being refused an interview I went to Seebee. At the time of the late Jam's case I was in the Murree Hills, and after that at Candahar. It is now about seven years since my ancestral lands had been attached by the Khan. I have four sons and a large family, and for this reason our maintenance is in a precarious state. Likewise my "Ooloos" and "Raj" are also very hard up. Some of the people of my "Ooloos" and Raj have gone to Candahar to earn their livelihood, others to Seebee, and a few to Sind and Bombay. I have already furnished you with details of my property, estate, and other hereditary possessions in Kutchee and Khorasan, and these have been confined to what was enjoyed by our ancestors and are widely and generally known to be so enjoyed. I have no sunnud of these estates, &c., as they have been held by my ancestors from Ahmedzye's time.

Moolla Mahomed in rejecting the Khan's offer said he would go off to Colonel Phayre. That officer, however, had been ordered by me not to receive him after his disobedience in going to Beyla.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

In consequence of the Sirdar's own rebellious proceedings.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

A large portion remained quiet and were undisturbed.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

These do so regularly as merchants.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

I have submitted this petition in my own behalf and in that of my whole "Ooloos" and "Raj." I leave to you to pass any decision you like, and the redress is in your hands. This 15th day of March 1872.

REPLY of the Shahgassee to Petition from Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, to the Commissioner in Sind.

IN reply to statement No. 1, I beg to state that the petitioner has not represented the truth, but has kept the promotion of his own ends in view. The facts are briefly told. When Meer Mahomed Nusseer Khan (on whom be mercy, &c.) bade adieu to this world, and Meer Khodadad Khan ascended the throne of Khelat, the wife of the former, and sister of Sirdar Taj Mahomed, became a widow. The Mahomedan religion and the custom prevailing in countries following the Islam faith permit a marriage with a deceased brother's wife (or sister-in-law) if parties agree. In those times Beebee Gunja of her own accord, and without the permission of his Highness previously obtained, entered into arrangements for his Highness being married to the daughter of Sirdar Taj Mahomed, and when she mentioned the subject to his Highness he gave a flat refusal, and said plainly that as it was impossible the widow of his predecessor would take herself any other husband, and as she was willing that he should marry her, the consent to the new match could not be given. The "nikah" (marriage) with the sister of Sirdar Taj Mahomed then took place according to the rites and ceremonies of the Mussulman religion, and when she died his Highness showed no inclination or wish to marry the daughter of the said Sirdar. Soon after disturbances and rebellion were created and set on foot by Shere Dil through the connivance of the Sarawans, who have always shown a turbulent disposition and been refractory. These were quelled, and after the death of Shere Dil, his Highness again sat on the throne of Khelat, and contracted a marriage with the daughter of Sirdar Taj Mahomed in accordance with the principles of Islam.

From the beginning of the sovereignty of his Highness to the present moment, no act of oppression or harassment has been permitted or sanctioned towards Moolla Mahomed, his brothers, and the Raj ; every one remained in the enjoyment of his possessions and hereditary estates as from years past. Owing to their rebellious habits, and a strong conviction that opposition to lawful authority did them good and was advantageous to them, they, in concert with each other, and in conjunction with Shere Khan, commander of the forces, who was their accomplice from the days of Shere Dil Khan, they resolved to put an end to the life of the present Khan, as they acted towards his predecessor (Shere Dil), and to raise his son to the throne. As they had obtained a large booty by the murder of Shere Dil Khan, they through avarice wanted to do the same towards their present sovereign to get possession of his property. They afterwards, with their well-matured designs of causing injury to his Highness, came with Shere Khan in the presence of the Khan, but I fortunately obtaining timely information, put his Highness on his guard, and as by the grace of the Almighty the Khan's forces were near at hand, the opponents failed to take advantage of our position and to put their base intentions into execution. They tried the same once or twice again, but met with discomfiture. Shere Khan was also

This was at Bagh in 1865.
(Signed) W. L. M.

refused assistance by the troops, who gave full information to the Khan, and reported that Shere Khan was in league with Moolla Mahomed and Taj Mahomed. His Highness was, therefore, obliged to order the expatriation of Shere Khan, and allowed Moolla Mahomed to depart without receiving the slightest injury. Taj Mahomed remained behind with the object, perhaps, of accomplishing his end, and secretly sent persons to Jam Meer Khan and Noordeen with the message that if they joined him he would, on the pretext of visiting, enter his daughter's apartments and assassinate the Khan. Meer Khan and Noordeen were both at that time in prison and the person who visited them was seen by the guard. Although the latter was bribed (Rupees 60) to keep silence, report was made to Shukkur Khan* then, and the whole matter was laid before the Khan the following morning. When Meer Khan and Noordeen came to know that their secret was out, they also, in order to free themselves from blame, reported to the Khan that Taj Mahomed wanted to bring them into trouble. I then at daybreak, at the order of his Highness the Khan, told Sirdar Taj Mahomed to let me know whether he wished to fight or to become a prisoner. Finding himself unable to wage war, he chose the other alternative and begged quarter. He was imprisoned, and remained in confinement for about one and a half or two years. He fell sick frequently, and doctored himself; on the last occasion he was ill for 12 days, and at last expired at Khelat. Moolla Mahomed states in his petition that, after the death of Taj Mahomed, his Highness gave a portion of his estates to his mother and kept the remainder to himself. In reply, I beg to explain that all the property of the Sirdar was handed over to his mother, inasmuch as the Khuleefa Mirza, who acted as manager during the lifetime of Taj Mahomed, was allowed to have possession of the estate. His Highness the Khan did not touch his hereditary lands. When Mirza fell by the hands of the Zurukzyes and Mayee Hur Beebee, Taj Mahomed's mother was greatly harassed, his Highness sent for the latter to Khelat and took measures to ensure her happiness. The lady being fond of her daughter, the wife of his Highness, stops of her own free will at Khelat, and at times goes to her native place. She is now with the Khan.

* A Commandant in his Highness's army. (Signed) W. L. M.

The petitioner affirms that his Highness the Khan gave the Jalawan Sirdarship to his son, Sir. Khan Sahib is the master and ruler of his dominions, and the Prince cares very little for the Sirdarship. The particulars are that Taj Mahomed had neither a son, brother, or other near relative worthy of the honour, and, therefore, his Highness intended to place the turban of Sirdarship on the head of Kaisar Khan Raisanee, whose ancestors held the title. It afterwards descended to the Iltarzyes, who, when they rebelled, were deprived of it by the great Nusseer Khan, and it was granted to the forefathers of Taj Mahomed, who were loyal and well-wishers of the government. Three generations must have passed. As the last holder of the title, Taj Mahomed, left no heir, and the Sirkar wished to confer the same on Meer Kaisur Khan. His mother, Mayee Hur Beebee, interfered and entreated that, as with the title she would lose all the hereditary lands and other rights which the Sirdarship conferred, the turban of the title be granted to her son-in-law, the Khan's son, and the affairs of the "Ooloos" and hereditary estates be allowed to remain in her hands. These were complied with, and the lady presented khillut† to the young Khan, kept the estate in her hands, and managed the affairs of the "Ooloos" herself. By the decrees of Heaven the Prince died, and the lady still manages everything. She appointed Meer Abdool Kureem as her Khuleefa,‡ who was with the "Ooloos" present in battle to do service to his Highness under Moolla Mahomed Khan Vukeel. He is with me here at Jacobabad, and has always proved himself ready to render service.

† Dress of honour.

‡ Manager.

In reply to complaint No. 2, I have to state that Taj Mahomed, through his base deeds and following the advice of Moolla Mahomed and his other companions, was imprisoned. His Highness knew full well what character Moolla Mahomed bore, for he figured in the rebellion set on foot by Shere Dil Khan at his, Taj Mahomed's, and his other companions' instigation, and which ended in his Highness' receiving wounds and being deprived of all his property, which was seized by these insurgents and converted to their own use. Moolla Mahomed then caused Meer Shere Dil Khan to be murdered and created fresh disturbances, especially the one above referred to in which he had Taj Mahomed, Shere Khan, and others as helpers. He still strains every nerve to raise rebellions and disturb the peace of the country. When Taj Mahomed was put in confinement, Moolla Mahomed fled from Mittree to Candahar; when he arrived at Moostung, his brother Meer Hybut was secured, and released as a matter of favour. The Sarawans had met with no ill treatment and had not been oppressed. All was at Moolla Mahomed's instigation, and a fresh rebellion having taken place, he was called

from Candahar to take part in it. By the favour of the Almighty the insurgents, Moolla Mahomed, Mahomed Khan Wudera, and Jehangeer were defeated in all the battles and contests that took place. They had to flee, Moolla Mahomed and his companions to the hill Mundaie, and Mahomed Khan Jehangeer, and son of Alladina Khoord, to where their families had taken their abode, full particulars of which are laid before you in my replies to petitions from Dost Mahomed and Jehangeer Lehree. That when I was pursuing them, and two stages had only remained, they sent their females to intercede for them, when I informed them that in honour of the name of God I would grant protection to their families, and would not seize their property, provided they submitted and consented to be taken as prisoners to his Highness the Khan, and that if those terms were not agreed to I was ready to fight with them. I stopped two days at that stage, and, finding that they did not, make their appearance, proceed with my army to their place of retreat. I was one night at Kirmab and the next day near their abodes. The insurgents then seeing that they were quite unable to come to a combat with me, surrendered themselves as prisoners of war and besought protection. I then refrained from touching their families and their property. I beg reference to the details given by me in my replies to petitions from the Lehrees. These men, whose ancestors had been appointed noblemen, have made lying and prevarication their habit, and feel no shame at telling a tale misrepresenting matters. They show no improvement although they are in the presence and in the territory of such world-winning monarchs where nothing but the truth should be spoken. I have placed before you all the particulars about Sarawan in my replies. Now I come to the statement of the petitioner about his complaining to Colonel Green. When Colonel Green called both parties to Jacobabad I gave my unqualified consent to all the terms proposed by that officer through justice and welfare of either party, while the petitioner through doublemindedness disagreed and returned to Seebee. The petitioner next represents that he, in company with Meer Khan, and Noordeen, Azaad Khan, and others came to Bhagwana, and thence left for Kupota by order of Colonel Phayre and Major Harrison. When Moolla Mahomed with 5,000 men presented himself before his Highness, his Highness, at the wish of Major Harrison, sanctioned the restoration to him of all the estates he and his companions were in possession of from the time of the Great Nusseer Khan to that of Nusseer Khan the less, but Moolla Mahomed refused such offers and returned with his accomplices to Kupota. At this time also, his Highness, at the request of Major Harrison, abstained from opposing them, although the forces were very near and ready to fight at a distance of two miles. The British officer (Major Harrison) then permitted a truce for three months which was broken by Meer Khan, and Noordeen sending letters respecting fights and the assemblage of an army to Chakurjutak. These letters were, however, intercepted and sent to Major Harrison who had his camp then at Shawl or Moostung. Copies of these are still to be found on the records of his Highness. After this breach of the terms of the truce, I fought a battle with Meer Khan and Noordeen at Wudh and hills of Beyla, and, defeating them, put them to flight. This victory placed Beyla and Wudh in the possession of his Highness, and I need not enter into full details because you know all from beginning to end.

Were submitted to Government at the time, 1869.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

The petitioner next brings forward his complaint about horses, camels, and other property having been seized. Now, sir, you hold the scales of justice, and I would leave it to you to pass any judgment after any inquiry into this matter which you may deem necessary. All the arrangements are entrusted to you, and you have full authority to act. I would, therefore, beg you to be good enough to cause restitution to us of all the cattle, grain, and other property of the poor subjects that have been seized by these insurgents. The petitioner petitions about his hereditary and inam lands; all these lands that had been granted to his forefathers by the Ahmedzyes, and of which details are given in my first letter, have not been withheld from him. This is the 22nd Khan of the dynasty of the Ahmedzyes, while the present generation of these Sirdars must be the 10th or thereabouts. Their forefathers received grants from the Ahmedzye for their loyalty, and not that they had any lawful right. The province of Kutchee then came into possession of the Khans, Meer Mohbut, and Nusseer Khan the Great as blood-money for the murder of Meer Abdoollah Khan. These men, who have not a spark of truth in them, have misrepresented facts and made such statements as tend to promote their ends only.

ABSTRACT TRANSLATION of a Petition from Wudera Shadee Khan, Bungulzye, to the Address of the Commissioner in Sind, dated 16th March 1872.

You are well aware that we are the residents of Shawl, Moostung, Aspaljee, Kutchee, Bagh, and Mull. About five years ago Wudera Adam Khan, Bungulzye, went to Khelat to his Highness the Khan to make four representations.

1st.—That his Highness the Khan had imposed a fine of Rupees 14,000 on the Muzeranee Murrees, who were then the followers of the Wudera.

2nd.—That we had not received the yearly allowanee of Rupees 500.

3rd.—That the servants of his Highness the Khan had taken by force "ust pust" (lucerne grass) belonging to the Wudera.

4th.—That all the camels of the Bungulzye, who lived on the receipts of their hire, were being used by his Highness the Khan without a pie being received as hire.

These requests were duly made to his Highness the Khan, and they were not taken notice of. Wudera returned home, and all the Sirdars, after consultation, resolved to lay their case before the British Government. For this purpose the Sirdars started for Khunuck to get Hubbeeb Khan removed. They were, however, attacked by his Highness the Khan's troops, and Hubbeeb Khan was killed. This happened five years ago. We, Sirdars, viz., Sirdars Alladina Khoord, Jehangeer Khan, and others came to Narmack, and sent for Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, who was then at Candahar. Removing from thence we arrived at Nakas, and took up our abode on the borders of the hills towards Kutchee. The Shahgassee reached the Bolan *viâ* Narmack, and as we heard he was coming with his army to fight, we also prepared ourselves to meet him. He arrived from Beebee Nanee Kadir Buksh, Budozye, and Aral Khan and Bijarzye were carrying provisions for the Khan's troops from Dadur, and these we forcibly took and appropriated to our own use.

Naib Moolla Mahomed, who was Naib at Dadur, compelled them to pay a fine of Rupees 1,000. Last year when his Highness the Khan encamped at Moostung he permitted his animals (horses and camels) to feed on the lucerne crops raised on two "Karez Moorghee," belonging to Purdal Khan and Shere Mahomed, and two-half shubanahs of land purchased of a Hindoo. His Highness the Khan levied a camel-load of lucerne on each Shabanah a week, and in case of default Rupees 5 in cash. If any one failed to give the lucerne, or was unable to pay the money, he was used ill and beaten, and thus compelled to make payment. We had already paid to the servants of his Highness the Khan a tax of Rupees 140 a year on the above "Karez" for three years, and when his Highness arrived at Moostung last year he recovered the same tax again (or Rupees 420), thus making a double levy. We had a share in the water of Aspaljee, and we went to Shahdad Bungulzye to receive payment of our share, who complained to his Highness the Khan, and caused a sum of Rupees 500 to be exacted from us as fine through the Naib Abdool Rahman at Moostung. Our camels went to graze in our field, and the Naib inflicted on us a fine of Rupees 20. For those camels that we sent to Kurrachee, Kutchee, and Khelat on hire, we were required to pay Rupees $1\frac{1}{4}$ each in addition to the ordinary tax. During this battle the Khan's force took by force two mares, 12 camels, eight loads of tobacco, and one khurwar of wheat in Moostung. Last year 12 camels, of which two were loaded, one maund of munjeet* and Rupees 250 were imposed as fine, on the ground that I had enjoyed a daily allowance in the days of Shere Dil Khan. A few days before the battle Naib Shahajun recovered in Naree Rupees 100 on camels exclusive of the ordinary cess. We have not experienced such oppressive exactions, nor paid such exorbitant rates before. After the battle the forces of his Highness the Khan carried away as prize Rupees 4,000 in gold, leathern bags of the value of Rupees 500, 10 maunds of wool, four loads of almonds, and other personal property belonging to Syud Khan, Syudzye, in Moostung. Naib Abdool Rahman, of Moostung, deprived us of a mare and a horse of the value of Rupees 200. In Baigh Naib Shahajan despoiled us of nine camels and a quantity of wheat. The Khan's forces seized one mare, one horse of Shah Ali, Budozye, and the property of 20 houses, as also the property of Budo, Budozye, and the contents of five houses in Moostung. Last year, when his Highness the Khan was going from Khorassan to Kutchee, camels were forcibly taken by his Highness the Khan's servants for baggage without payment of hire or compensation for those killed. On their dismissal, strange to say, we had to give Rupees 50 as a fine. Lands belonging to Ahmed Khan and Moombarik Khan, Gumbranee, in Deh Moostung, were resumed by Naib Rahman Khan, and a fine of Rupees 500 levied, although the ordinary assessment had been paid regularly and without intermission

* Madder.

about three years ago. Naib Abdool Rahman Khan levied a fine of Rupees 200 on water which was allowed for two watches in Karez belonging to Hajee, and in the same year a mare was taken from Sahib Khan, Gumbranee, without any payment. Yar Mahomed had a free grant of ten bunds of land in Deh Bukshee; these were resumed by his Highness two years ago, although the grant had been enjoyed from a long time. Yar Mahomed's niece, the wife of Moombarik Khan, Shawanee, was in the enjoyment of five "angushts*" of water, which were stopped by his Highness six years ago. The lady is with me, and Moombarik Khan with his Highness the Khan. About five years ago his Highness confiscated the village of Hubbeeb Khan, the town of Mittree, and Chundres, village in Norree, as also five bunds in the town of Mittree, which were obtained by me and Shukkur Khan as a free grant. The hereditary land of Aval Khan in Janoos, village in Deh Lehree, and 14 bunds were also resumed by his Highness, although Sunnuds for its free grant were produced and shown to him. About four years ago his Highness the Khan confiscated "Inam" 46 bunds in Deh Janoo belonging to Kadur Buksh, Budozye, and "Inam" land on Khanwah, belonging to Hizrat Khan, Shoraizye. Last year, when his Highness arrived in Moostung, he was given a baggage camel by Kadur Buksh, Budozye, which was returned, and a fine of Rupees 300 levied. Himat Khan, Budozye, was grazing his camel in Lehree, and was made to pay to the "Jai Nisheen†" of Lehree a fine of Rupees 120. In Moostung, Naib Abdool Rahman sent for camels to carry the baggage of his Highness the Khan, but as the camels were not near at hand a fine of Rupees 30 was imposed. Himat Khan had a Karez in Deh Moostung, which is well known in Pringabad as a hereditary grant, and although the assessment had been regularly paid, a fine of Rupees 100 was levied last year by Abdool Rahman Naib on the ground that he was living in Mull and cultivating the land of the Duranis. In the battle fought at Hajee, the following property of the Budozyes was plundered by the army of his Highness:—176 good camels, house furniture, 7 flocks of goats, horses, mares, and 24 khurwars of wheat. Kadur Chan, Denarzye, a servant of the Khan, who always remained in his service, purchased some waste land from Gholam Mahomed Shawanee in Deh Dadur, which he brought under cultivation and enjoyed. He possesses documents in regard to it. Three years ago Naib Wullee Mahomed commenced to appropriate the produce. He (Kadur Khan) had also purchased waste land from Futteh Ali Khan, and the produce of this land last year was carried away by the same Naib. The right to five "shabanahs" of water purchased in Deh Dadur, for which documents are forthcoming, were unlawfully resumed by his Highness last year. I had five shabanahs in Karez known by the name of "Haft Dohi," in Khanak Doori, in Khorassan. These had been in my possession from former times and were confiscated last year.

* The length of a finger.

† Assistant to Deputy.

In this battle 250 camels and 100 khurwars of wheat, 60 bullocks with their loads, 40 donkeys and other personal property were pillaged by his Highness the Khan's forces. I crave justice from the British Government; when such oppressive acts commenced to be perpetrated, and our Raj and ourselves were harassed, we had no alternative left but to wage war and turn rebels.

Whatever the particulars were have been detailed above, and we leave everything in the hands of the English Sircar.

TRANSLATION of a Reply from the Shahgassee to the Petition from Wudera Shadee Khan, Bungulzye, dated the 13th Mohurrum 1289.

Reply to complaint No. 1 about the petitioner's father going to his Highness the Khan with the following four requests, *viz*:—

1*st*.—That the Muzeranee Murrees who reside in the Nakas Hills were made to pay Rupees 14,000 as fine. You are a just and impartial officer as also of sound judgment, and I would beg you to be good enough to weigh well whether this statement could be true. If it be proved that it is not correct then it will be for consideration how far the other representations can be believed or relied on. The facts connected with this complaint are that there were blood-feuds between those Muzeranee Murrees and the Afghans, which were settled by Moolla Mahomed Raisanee and Atta Mahomed Darogah. I am not aware how the settlement was made, nor what compensation was awarded. The assertion about the Rupees 14,000 is altogether incorrect, not a single "gaz" (pie) has been recovered by his Highness. These Muzeranees are not here, but if the petitioners are unable to produce them, I request I may obtain permission to do so, that the truth or falsehood of their representations may be fully established.

In regard to the second complaint, about the non-receipt of their allowances, I have to state that all the allowances enjoyed by them and their forefathers were continued to them while they remained loyal, but were discontinued when they became rebels. They affirm that they obtained an annual allowance of Rupees 500 during the sovereignty of his Highness Nusseer Khan the less, and were in receipt of the same for 15 or 16 years. The records of that Khan still exist, and if from them it can be established that they have drawn this amount of Rupees 500 for a single year, what they have advanced must then be taken to be true, but if the contrary is shown, their statements must be received with great caution. Whatever has been found on record in the Khan's Duftur has invariably been allowed to them.

In regard to the third complaint I have to state that nothing in excess of the "Zari Kulung" cess, and the established rates paid by the zemindars of Dehs, has been levied by the Khan.

In reference to the fourth complaint, I have to assert that what is stated has never occurred. Hire for camels used for baggage has always been, and is still, given as explained by me before; even if a person has been found guilty of an offence, he has not for that reason been deprived of his hire.

I come now to the statement of Kadur Buksh Budozye having been fined. The real circumstances are as follows: Disturbance and rebellion existed in the country and Kadur Buksh engaged with Naib Wullee Mahomed to carry all baggage and to be responsible for all damage that might be done while it remained in his charge. The Naib handed over some goods to him, and he, on the advice of these rebels, delivered over the same to them at the Bolan; hence he was made to make good the loss as he was bound to do by his engagement. The Naib must know the exact sum which was taken from him. I cannot say whether it was Rupees 1,000, as set forth by the petitioner.

As regards "Karez," I state that the levy of this cess is no more than that which was levied in olden times, and that is recovered through the chiefs and Wuderas of the Deh.

I have given full details of the battles which were fought, and the engagements that took place, in my replies to petitioners from other Sirdars. You know that it is needless for me to go over the same ground and give the same particulars over and over again if the same matters are brought forward by petitioners. For what is plain requires no detail. You are fully aware of what the truth is.

Reference is made by the petitioner to the fine recovered from him on complaint of Shahdad Bungulzye by the Naib Abdul Rahman. My explanation is that when Shahdad Syudzye, who is not connected with the Bungulzyes in their rebellious practices, made his complaint, he probably had his rights restored to him.

It is stated that fines were levied on the grazing of camels. In reply I beg to explain that these animals had trespassed into the fields of other persons, and the landowners required compensation for the damage to their crops, as is the rule everywhere.

I have already afforded explanation in respect to the alleged levy of Rupee 1-4 on each camel in my reply to petitions from the Lehrees, Khoords, and Mahomed Shahees. Briefly, no such fee has been authorised, but it is possible that some payment may have been made to jemadars for obtaining release of camels. The allegations in this respect are unfounded.

The petitioners complain of the plunder of their camels, horses, and other property. My answer is, that when they fled after the fight they took all their property and their families on their camels, and left only what they could not carry off, such as mills, woollen carpets, and things of small value, and these were seized by the Khan's troops.

The petitioners are wrong in affirming that the daily allowances granted by Shere Dil Khan were withheld by the present Khan, and that a fine was recovered in addition. No one has been harassed or laid under any exaction without fault.

I turn now to the assertion of the seizure of specie, guns, muskets, almonds, and wool belonging to Syud Khan Syudzye. I beg to state that Syud Khan was an accomplice of the rebels in the fight; how can he then have kept money in his house. I am not aware that the Syud possessed any such property, but this much I can say, that it was never seen by the Khan's troops, nor seized by them as booty. At the time of plunder some tobacco, wool, and almonds were discovered in his house, and these were seized by the troops. All about the money is false and nothing but exaggeration, as is the custom with these men, who convert "a fowl into an elephant." It is true that the horses and mares came into the possession of his Highness the Khan's servants.

Or, as they say, a toad into a cow.

Mention is made about the seizure of 19 camels at Bagh. Some animals came into the hands of the Naib after the battle, and were given to the merchants, whose property they were proved to be. I cannot state with certainty what the number was.

The next thing referred to is the plunder of articles and camels at the fight which took place at Hajee. The personal property of a Brahooee is generally a "guidan" (a large bag), which contains miscellaneous articles, woollen "nawads" (carpets), &c., and if such fell into the hands of the forces full information will be obtained from Nawab Mahomed Khan Vakeel and Shukkur Khan.

What is stated about the non-receipt of hire of camels, the death of the same, and levy of a fine, is all false.

The cess on lucerne cultivation has not been increased, and nothing in excess of the established tax has been levied.

The petitioners are incorrect in declaring that mares were forcibly taken by Naib Abdul Rahman without payment. A complaint was never made to his Highness the Khan on this head, but if it had been full inquiry would have been made. As the petitioners have never made a complaint they are not right in what they have affirmed.

No estate or "Inam" land has been unjustly confiscated. Whatever they had received from the time of his Highness Nusseer Khan the Great to that of his Highness Nusseer Khan the Less was continued to the petitioners until they turned rebellious and left the path of faithfulness.

The facts connected with the water allowed to the wife of Moombarik Khan are that the mother-in-law of the latter came to Dadur and complained to his Highness the Khan; that as her son-in-law had granted to her daughter the receipts on account of water tax hitherto enjoyed by him, the cultivators on demand refused to pay the usual sum. His Highness summoned the parties concerned, and during investigation it was elicited that Moombarik Khan had not made such a transfer in favour of his wife, who had, without the permission of her husband, gone to reside with her relations. His Highness the Khan, however, after taking further evidence, ordered water to be given her.

As regards the "Inam" lands of Hubbeeb and Janoo Abro in the town of Lehree, and of Shadee Khan and other Bungulzyes, those of the latter were converted into Government property because they refused all allegiance to the Khan, while the lands of the former were never touched, except in so far as it was proved that encroachments had been made on the lands of others.

The petitioners are incorrect in stating that the land and water fees belonging to Kadur Khan, Dinarzye, were confiscated by Naib Wullee Mahomed.

The facts relative to the complaint of fine imposed on Futteh Ali on account of cultivating lands belonging to the Dinarree Pathans are that Futteh Ali had by fraud contrived to include some lands of his Highness the Khan with those of the Afghans, and when this was exposed and proved he had doubtless to pay penalty.

The old rules and usages have not been set aside in respect to "Karez" and "Shabanah," and no cess has been levied but what was sanctioned by ancient rules.

The lands of Ali Khan, which were stated to have been seized by the Raisanees, were after taking evidence allowed to remain in his possession.

The complaints regarding the plunder of camels, horses, and bullocks are also wrong; some property may have been plundered, but most of the statements are false.

13th Mohurrum 1289.

Petition of Jundoo Khan and Ten others to the Commissioner in Sind, dated 14th March 1872.

You are well aware that we are residents of Khorassan, Shawlkote, Moostung, Sorab, Kutchee, and the town of Hajee. By profession we are merchants, and deal in horses and mares for breeding purposes; we also keep camels for letting them on hire and carry on agricultural pursuit. We beg to state as follows in regard to the oppression which we have met with at the hands of the Khan:—That in our country, within the limits of Shawlkote and in Deh Sorah, 14 "Karez" and "Chukul" belong to us by inheritance, and they have always been in our hands. We also possess there seven "Karez" which we purchased from Kasee Zemindar, who, however, is answerable himself for the assessment payable on them. Last year Meer Khodadad Khan came to Shawlkote and forcibly caused all the lucerne grown on our "Karezes" to be given as fodder to his horses and camels without paying us a single pie for it. By this we suffered a great loss. He afterwards required us to show him our sunnuds, which we delivered to him accordingly. He refused to return these

documents unless we paid him a fee of Rupees 22 and two domestic sheep for each "Karez." We had no alternative but to comply with his demand. The Khan declined to recognize the deed for one of the above "Karez," which we purchased and forcibly levied from Nusseeroo (one of the petitioners) Rupees 600 as the value thereof, giving him a new Sunnud and cancelling the previous sale. He likewise cancelled the Sunnud of Sattak Shawanee for his share in the same "Karez," and having recovered from him an additional sum of Rupees 300 gave him also a fresh Sunnud. One day some altercation about family affairs took place between Syud Khan and Abdool Wahak Shawanee, and the Khan who was at the time in Shawl sent for them both and fined each Rupees 60, unjustly and for no fault. Last year three donkeys, the property of some merchants, were stolen in Dadur; the Khan fined Azeem Khan Rupees 60 without any valid reason. The donkeys were eventually found with the Murrees, and brought before the Khan, and on this we demanded refund of our money, but were refused, while the Khan fined the Muzeranee Murrees, the real offenders, in whose possession the donkeys were found, a further sum of Rupees 50. On our return to Shawl the Naib of that place recovered from us an additional sum of Rupees 12 each for the same theft, without paying any attention to our explanation of the previous payment. Meer Karm Khan, nephew of his Highness the Khan, took away by force a horse belonging to Sirdar Jundoo Khan (a petitioner), and did not pay its value. When the Khan visited Moostung and Pirangabad he caused all the lucerne grown on our hereditary and purchased lands, which was ready to be reaped, to be unjustly and forcibly removed and given to his horses and cattle: no payment was made on this account. On his visit to Khadwaree, he levied by force and without any just cause a sum of Rupees 400 from th Shawanee inhabitants of the place. The Khan has deprived us since four years of hundred bunds and cochas* situated in the same Deh, which we inherited from our ancestors, and their produce is enjoyed by him. peated requests were made to the Khan by the late Moombarik Khan, who was k at the fight which took place at Moostung for the restoration of these, but they not acceded to. We enjoyed the right of levying a fee of annas eight on each camel- of merchandise that arrived at the Bolan, and this was collected through Sirdar A Kadur's own people. This fee was subsequently converted into a lump sun Rupees 800 a year to be defrayed by the Khan and reduced again to Rupees 400 a but last year it was brought down to the sum of Rupees 200 only, and notwithstan repeated applications by Moombarik Khan, Shawanee, no attention to our grievanc been paid by the Khan. Besides this the grandfather of Jundoo Khan (one of the tioners) had the privilege by Sunnud granted by the Great Khan (Nusseer K of recovering a fee of four annas for each camel-load, which was disallowed by Mehrab Khan and has not since been re-granted. We still hold the Sunnuds. I customary before that when conveyance was required by the Khan for his use or of his forces, to obtain camels from the Mugzee tribe in Kutchee. We were never in Khorassan to supply camels as we and our "Raj" let camels on hire to merc and thus sustained life. Now, however, the present Khan forcibly takes away our c without paying us any hire, and recovers a fine of Rupees 3½ from any person ref to give his camels. This year on the occasion of the Khan's returning to Khelat Moostung a sepoy of the Khan's force killed with the stock of a gun Fazyl Shawanee, who was with his camels for refusing to allow them to be taken away. blow at first fractured two of his ribs and eventually caused his death. On each hired from us by traders for carrying bales of wool a tax of Rupee 1-4 is lev addition to that recovered from the merchants themselves. During our journe Khorassan to Kutchee we carry with us a supply of grain for consumption, a required to pay a duty of Rupee 1 per camel—a thing which was never known time of the previous Khans, and a grievance which we never before had to complai

Moombarik Khan, Shawanee, Hasul Khanzye, having rendered himself li punishment for having illicit intercourse with the wife of Sirdar Abdul Kadur escaped to Sind, and all his estates were taken possession of by Moombarik K but they were seized by the present Khan when he ascended the throne, and he allowance to Moombarik Khan on his making appearance before him. Several were made to the Khan to surrender the offending party, as such a course was ju both by religion and the right of "Ooloos," but they were replied to in the nega On the contrary, the Khan received a bribe of Rupees 2,000 from the miscreant and went himself to the house of Abdul Kadur, and extorted forgiveness from him. Last year, about ten days before the engagement at Moostung, the Khan personally received a sum of Rupees 200 as an invitation fee from Sirdar Abdul Kadur Khan's wife, which act on his part brought shame on all the Shawanees Montaburs (respectables), and is such

* Preserves.

as was never committed by any of the Khan's predecessors. Such being the state of affairs, apart from the degradation and tyranny, disturbances commenced, and we became insurgents and took to fight. All our property and estates in Khorassan or in Kutchee have been plundered by the Khan's forces, and we are unable to describe them. We look to you for redress.

(Sd.) 1. JUNDOO KHAN, SHAWANEE.
„ 2. SHARBUT KHAN *wullud* MOOMBARIK KHAN.
„ 3. RUSHEED KHAN *wullud* AZEEM KHAN.
„ 4. ATTA MAHOMED, KUSHAREE.
„ 5. SHAHMEER KHAN.
„ 6. CHAKUR KHAN.
„ 7. SHORAB KHAN.
„ 8. KUNGUN KHAN.
„ 9. DAD MAHOMED, SHORABZYE.
„ 10. ZURRE KHAN, OOMRANEE.
„ 11. RAHEEM KHAN *wullud* MOOMBARIK KHAN, SHORABZYE.

ABSTRACT TRANSLATION of the Reply of the Shahgassee to a Petition from Jundoo Khan, and other Shawanees, to the Commissioner in Sind.

The petitioners who have signed this petition for the Raj of the Shawanees are neither the chief men nor Sirdars of the Shawanees, as they represent themselves to be, and their statements are contrary to the truth. The chief Sirdar of this tribe is Abdul Kadur, who has proved himself to be loyal and faithful to the Khan. He is the true representative of "Ooloos" and "Raj," and is with his clan living with the Khan, who shows him great kindness and favour. What have these rebels to do with the interests of the Raj? This I have already mentioned to you at my personal interview. As regards the petitioners and their personal servants I can state that none of their estates or other property has been confiscated by his Highness the Khan, nor had they to suffer any loss.

In respect to their complaint about a horse I beg to explain that Meer Karm Khan, Ittarzye, nephew to his Highness the Khan, received this animal as a present from the Shawanees in consequence of the relationship and friendship he bore towards them. If they have received any other horse in return, Meer Karm Khan must know.

13th Mohurrum 1289.

ABSTRACT TRANSLATION of a Petition from Syud Khan Mahomed Shahee to the Address of the Commissioner in Sind, dated 12th March 1872.

I BEG to lay down before you the injuries I have received at the hands of his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

I have large possessions (land, water, "karez," and garden) in Dehs Moostung, Shawl, and Khanah, Mittree, and Mungachur. I have property in Kutchee also; some of these possessions have descended to me and been enjoyed in my family for seven generations past. Others have either been obtained by free grants from his Highness the Khan or by purchase. We Mahomedshahees have been from three or four generations dealers in horses, as well as breeders of these animals; we purchase horses in Herat and take them to Bombay, Bangalore, Madras, Nagpoor, and other countries for sale: our sole profession is to deal in horses as merchants. We cultivated only in our hereditary lands. We sometimes breed camels and hire them out for taking wool to Kurrachee and bringing dates from Punjgoor. The business of a merchant is thus carried on by us.

My first complaint is that some of my hereditary property has been unlawfully confiscated.

2. That as our land is purchased property, a tax is contrary to custom levied on "ust pust," (lucerne). Nothing remains for us, and we get no profit.

3. That we breed horses, and when they are ready for us they are taken by his Highness the Khan at less than half their price.

4. That a new rule has been enforced, requiring a cess of three rupees and eight annas to be paid every year for all baggage camels given on hire or kept at home. If a camel is sick no exemption is allowed.

5. That if his Highness the Khan hires one of our camels, he pays half or even less than the usual rate of hire.

6. That if any delay or default is made in the payment of the cess, the officers of his Highness ill-treat and beat us. This state of things was unknown until three years ago, and was the cause of disaffection among the people and among all of my "Ooloos" (clansmen.)

In regard No. 1.—The lands belonging to me that are confiscated are: (1) Shahwah Khassam; (2) A garden in Deh Moostung. The word Shahwah means the right of water for irrigational purposes for one day and night. I had come into the possession of this Shahwah by a free grant made by the Great Nusseer Khan and have been unlawfully deprived of it by his Highness Khodadad Khan. One month before this disturbance took place a "Cocha" (preserve), situate between Mungachur and Gordeal, known by the name of Khandai Dusht, and which was my hereditary property for seven generations past, was converted into Government property. I had besides a fourth share in Deh Bubbur, which I got by free grant. This too has been taken from me since four or five years. I had also a right to 12 "bitts" of water, which have been similarly confiscated. Mungachur is my hereditary property, and a portion of it belongs to the Raisanees; a tax was never before imposed by Government on this land, but now his Highness the Khan has forcibly appropriated lucerne and crops for the use of his camels.

Lall Khan Mahomed Shahee is a merchant and a resident of Moostung. This year, when his Highness the Khan arrived in Moostung, one of his servants came to Lall Khan, and told him that as he was very wealthy he should pay Rupees 1,000 to his Highness the Khan. Lall Khan was compelled to hand over Rupees 374, and it was soon after that these disturbances happened.

Alladinna Mahomed Shahee, resident of Moostung, is a merchant. He has a Shahanah in "Karez Notewallah," obtained by purchase, and has a Sunnud of Nusseer Khan. Rupees 400 were exacted from him by his Highness the Khan, and the reason assigned for this exaction was that he had enjoyed all the produce for several years without making any payment. The Sunnud was cancelled and the "Karez" resumed some 12 months ago.

Buddul Khan Mahomed Shahee was without lawful reason obliged to pay Rupees 73 [illegible] horse. Two camel-loads of wool have also been taken from a Hindoo.

In regard to complaint No. 2.—From the first the "Zari Kulung" cess fixed on the cultivation of lucerne in a Shahanah was Rupee 1-4-0 per annum as "Zari," and $1\frac{1}{2}$ maunds of barley as "Kulung" A proportionate decrease maunds of wheat, and [illegible]rding to the water received. Since three years his Highness was made in the tax acco[illegible]levy lucerne in addition to the "Zari" cess of Rupee 1-4-0. the Khan has commenced to [illegible]ted for six months. The crop of each "Shahwah" is In each year the lucerne is cultiva reaped once a month. His Highness takes a camel-load of lucerne every month on each Shahanah. If any default is made herein the officers and collectors of his Highness recover by force Rupees 5 instead. If any delay is found to have been made in the payment, force is used and hurt caused. The former Khans kept cattle (horses and camels, &c.) in proportion to their use and necessity, while the present keeps herds of them for breeding purposes, and to be fattened on the hard-earned lucerne of the cultivators. Whatever lucerne remains fails to suffice for our animals; we have to suffer great loss by such exactions. The Kulung cess is rightly levied. The following is a list of the lands on which lucerne cess is recovered in excess of what was done before:—

10	Shahanahs of Behramshahee in Moostung, obtained by purchase.
$\frac{1}{2}$	Shahanah Khassam, obtained by purchase.
$3\frac{1}{2}$	Shahanahs in De Moostung, obtained by purchase.
$1\frac{1}{2}$	Shahanahs Karez Nowh.
1	Shahanahs of Ghulam Bozir.
2	Shahanahs Karez Satur.
$3\frac{1}{2}$	Shahanahs Karez Kulie and "Kushkabah."
3	Bunds (Bunnahs) in Gulaman.
3	Shahanahs Karez Khund.
3	Shahanahs Karez Latrina.
6	Shahanahs Karez Puggee.
20	Bunds Kushkabah, within limits of Niryab.
1	Karez "Khan," Deh Peringabad.
$7\frac{1}{2}$	Shahanahs Karez Kossalabad.
1	Shahanah Karez Burin.
10	Shahanahs, Ulvi.

7 Shahanahs Karez Surkh Kaji Mittree.
12 Shahanahs Karez in Kush Rood.
1 Karez Eedu.
12 Pieces of land in Karez.

Mahomed Hussun in Shawlkote.

1 Karez Jamanwallah.
2 Shahanahs Surki, in Deh Shawl.
8 Shahanahs in Karez Shannizye.
4 Shahanahs in Karez Tubri, and 20 bitts.
12 Shahanahs in Karez Kulandar.
4½ Shahanahs in Sorn.
2 Shahanahs in Khos Khanah.
12 Bunds in the limits of Foree.
12 Bunds in the limits of Shannizye.
20. Gardens in Moostung.
5. Gardens in Mittree.
4. Gardens in Peringabad.

When such acts of violence as shown above were committed and such a pressure was put on me, I was obliged to class myself among the disaffected. In the battle that was fought, 130 horses in Deh Mungachur and Moostung were seized, and the property carried away and taken by the servants of his Highness the Khan. I cannot enter into details of all the property thus sacked. 300 khurwars of grain, 120 sheep, and 10 flocks were forcibly taken possession of in Bagh; 20 mares were lost in the battle. The village was wholly ruined. Houses were thrown down, and the timber even was not left. If such violence had not been used, all this loss would not have been sustained by us.

REPLY of the Shahgassee to Petition made by Syud Khan Mahomed Shahee, dated 9th Mohurrum 1289.

Reply to complaint No. 1.—His Highness has never acted unlawfully towards them, nor has he confiscated a piece even of their hereditary land. Whatever the petitioner has stated shows that he has had only the promotion of his ends in view.

Reply to No. 2.—He is not right in stating that his Highness the Khan recovers a large quantity of lucerne as tax on lands, the possession of which he, the petitioner, obtained by purchase. The facts are that these lands have been tax-paying for many years, and when they were transferred to Syud Khan, the right of assessment, which existed before the assignment, was continued, and Syud Khan was asked to pay only what was due and not a farthing more.

Reply to No. 3.—His Highness the Khan very seldom purchased horses from these men. If by chance any purchase was made the seller must have received the price fixed by an arbitrator. For instance his Highness the Khan bought horses from the son of Mars Sing, and paid more than the amount settled by a third party.

Reply to No. 4.—The real circumstances about the levy of a fee of Rupees 3-4-0 on each camel given on hire complained of by the petitioner are as follows:—If any person takes to the profession of letting out camels on hire, he is obliged to place some of his camels at the disposal of his Highness for the carriage of his Highness' baggage on payment of the usual rate of hire, and the rest he can dispose of as he likes to private merchants. It is probable that some money may have been given to the Jemadar for the release of camels, but no such order as mentioned has ever been issued by his Highness the Khan; all that is urged is untrue.

Reply to No. 5.—According to former custom all camels that are made use of by his Highness the Khan are paid for at the usual rate.

Reply to No. 6.—The recovery of the cess of Zari Kulung* bearing "Karez" is made through the Zemindar of the Deh, and through him is credited to Government. How then could the servants of the Khan beat and illtreat the cultivators. The servants of his Highness have, in never a single instance, caused annoyance and vexation to the cultivators; such being the case none of the Raj and Ooloos† are discontented. except these persons who have become disaffected through their misdeeds, Syud Khan states that his Shahanah of water in Moostung and one-fourth share in Kurriah Babbairwallah have been converted into Government property. The truth is

* Name of cess.

† Clansmen.

that he was possessed of none in Dadur, and therefore he was dispossessed of that which did not belong to him. This has already been explained in reply to his statement to you.

His Highness the Khan did not resume as stated 12 bitts of water in Dadur. They did not belong to the petitioner. I mentioned this when replying to his former statement to you.

Lands in Mungachur are cultivated by cultivators of the tribe, Lanku, subjects of his Highness the Khan. A tax has been fixed on their lands from years past. If this man purchased these lands, he made himself responsible for that for which the Lankus were responsible. The servants of his Highness the Khan may have levied some grass according to custom.

In regard to Lall Khan Mahomedshahee, and Alladinna Mahomedshahee, I have already laid before you the facts in reply to his statement and by reference to them.

Some of the rebels had horses in partnership with Dadul Khan. One of these horses so shared was sold, and his Highness the Khan took some of the purchase money on account of the co-sharer who was in rebellion; a mare and a foal also remained, which were jointly shared; the mare is with Badal Khan, and the foal was taken by his Highness the Khan. Whatever the petitioner states about two loads of wool is contrary to real facts.

The cess of Zari Kulung levied on "Karez" of Moostung, Saire, and Shawlkote, &c., remains the same as before, no increase having been made in it.

The petitioner affirms that his Highness the Khan has a large number of camels, horses, and other animals, and that the quantity of "list pust," dried lucerne, expended on their feed is very large, and if any delay or failure is brought home to any person he is maltreated by the servants of his Highness. In explanation I beg to state that the former Ahmedzyes also kept a large number of animals. Sometimes the number of animals is greater and sometimes less. Lucerne on "Karez" is levied according to former custom through the Zemindar of the Deh, who recovers from the cultivators, and the servants of his Highness the Khan do not interfere. This is the duty of the Zemindar or headman of the Deh, who recovers according to long-established usage. The petitioner adds that the "Kulung" cess is properly recovered, but that the "Karez" mentioned by him have unjustly to pay list pust* in addition. The latter statement is completely wrong. When Kulung is rightly levied, ust pust† is also recovered as settled in olden time. His Highness the Khan has not taken from a single Zemindar anything in excess of ancient custom.

* Lucerne.
† Do.

The petitioner declares that when he turned rebel all his property, cattle, and other movables were plundered. My reply to this is, that when the petitioner and others became disloyal, they carried away all the property they could, leaving only unoccupied houses and huts, containing heavy things of trifling value, such as charpoys, timber, &c. As they renounced allegiance to his Highness the Khan, and classed themselves with the rebels, the property they left, which they could not carry off, was taken possession of by the forces of his Highness the Khan.

The petitioner complains of grain and flocks of sheep having been carried away by the forces of his Highness, and of 20 mares having been lost in the flight. This is met by the following. These rebels who know nothing but breach of promises and agreements and injury to the public entered into an agreement with the Vakeel of the Khan, Nawab Mahomed Khan, in "Kurriah Shere Khan," and at the same time directed their followers at night to continue acts of violence and disturb the peace of the country. In two or three days they caused much annoyance to the people of Kutchee. Then by order of the Vakeel some of the sheep and camels that had been carried away by the rebels were taken back by the army of his Highness the Khan; the exact number is known to the Nawab Moolla Mahomed Khan and Shukkur Khan.

The petitioner's next complaint is about 20 mares. These were not forcibly taken away by any one from his house. The facts are that as the Sarawans were defeated in the battle fought at Kunbi they took to flight, and 18 or 20 of their mares came into the hands of his Highness the Khan's troops.

Lastly, in regard to the statement of 12 bitts of water in Dadur, I beg to state that these Mahomedshahees have not had any grant of land or water in Dadur from ages past up to the present time, excepting those of water that they obtained by deception lately, and of which particulars have been given by me in my reply to their statement made before you.

TRANSLATION of a Petition from Sirdar Dost Mahomed, Lehree, to the Address of the Commissioner in Sind, dated 13th March 1872.

You are aware that the tribe Lehree live in Narmack, which is at a distance of 40 miles from Moostung. It is customary with us to go to Kutchee to graze our cattle on "Nar" (stubble) in the cold season. This "Nar" was given to all Brahooees for the above purpose in Mohbut Khan's time. Five years ago we went to Kutchee to graze our cattle in the cold season, when my father, Sirdar Jehangeer Khan, was in the service of the Khan of Khelat. At that time Abdool Rahman was the Naib at Bagh. He said that he would charge us grazing fees and would not allow us free grazing, as was the practice before. My grandfather Meer Mahomed Khan then told him that we had been using the "Nar" since the possession of Kutchee, and had never paid any fees. On this my grandfather wrote all the particulars to my father, Jehangeer Khan, who informed him in reply that he had applied to the Khan, but to no purpose, and we were obliged to pay him for grazing our cattle. After the expiration of ten days ten persons of Abdool Rahman came and killed twenty sheep and carried them away. The Lehrees who grazed the cattle told them that they had to pay double tax, *viz.*, sheep as well as grazing fees. The Sowars of the Naib plundered the two houses of the Lehrees that stood near Nusseerabad, on which occasion the owners gave a good beating to the Sowars with their clubs and killed one of their horses. When we went to Narmack my father, Jehangeer Khan, was there. He said that he was at Khelat for six months and was not paid regularly his daily allowances by the Khan. Having assembled together we all went to Wudera Adam Khan, Bungulzye, with the object of going in company with him to represent our circumstances to his Highness the Khan. At that time there was some dispute between Alladinna and Aftar Khan, who had come to Wudera Adam Khan. Afterwards Wudera Adam Khan, Hubbeeb Khan, Raisanee, Dost Mahomed Wullud, Sirdar Alladina Khoord, and Ariff Khan, my uncle, went to make petition to the Khan who did not comply with Ariff Khan's request. Ariff Khan then came home and proposed to remove to Sind and apply to the English Government. For the purpose of enabling Hubbeeb Khan to remove to Sind all the Sirdars went to Khunuck, when the Khan's men made an attack on them and killed Hubbeeb Khan. Afterwards the Sirdars came to us at Narmack and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, after five days came from Candahar. After consultation we sent to the officers of the English Government with our messenger an application which was intercepted by the Khan's men at the town of Soombee, and the messenger returned to us. We had done nothing beyond emigrating to the Hill Nakoo. At that time the Shahgassee came to Narmack with his troops and set fire to our town. Several thousands of khurwars of grain, which we had deposited in the ground, were taken by them and also all the things in our houses. After this a fight took place between us, which resulted in the death of three or four men on both sides. Having left that place we came to Kaftari, where anothe fight took place, when on our side two Lehrees were killed and eight were wounded, and many of the Khan's troops were killed: all the Sirdars then went to the Murree Hills. My father and grandfather, who were at the village of Nakas, came. The next day, Shahgassee with his army went and plundered a village of the Rahilas and another of Jan Mahomed Lehree, who dealt in merchandize. Jan Mahomed Lehree was also killed. Wool, ghee, and other merchandize were plundered, together with ten flocks of sheep and a drove of camels. In another village 50 houses of the Budozyes were sacked. At that time Mahomed Khan Naib was at Bagh, where he forcibly seized 700 sheep belonging to the Lehrees. In this manner the Khan's troops carried away all that belonged to the Lehrees, which they could lay their hands on. The forces of the Shahgassee came then to Narain, and he abjured Meer Mahomed Khan, by the Koran to hasten into his presence, that he might arrange for all the Sirdars. Meer Mahomed Khan, my father, Jehangeer Khan, and Jami Khan wullud, Alladina Khan Khoord went and saluted him. They were immediately imprisoned and carried to Bagh. The Shahgassee came to Dadur, where he imprisoned Jehangeer Khan, Jami Khan, and others, and sent them to Khelat. The Shahgassee then sent my grandfather Meer Mahomed Khan to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, who as well as others said that he would believe in none but the English Government. My grandfather, Mahomed Khan, then went back to the Shahgassee and acquainted him with this, on which he was again imprisoned. When they arrived at Bagh, my grandfather, Mahomed Khan, died. It is not known how or what he died of; his corpse was sent to Sunnie, and the Shahgassee ordered that the funeral ceremony should last for only three days. My uncle Muzar Khan was afterwards called to Bagh and told by the Shahgassee that he was going to Khelat to apply to the Khan to get him released, and that he (my uncle) should send for Sum-

munder Khan, who was at Seebee, and let him remain in Narmack. My uncle Summunder Khan, who was with Moolla Mahomed at Khunuck, came to Narmack. When the Shahgassee reached Khelat he called my father Jehangeer Khan and informed him that his release by the Khan was contingent on his handing over to him the gun, sword, and camel that were given to Summunder Khan by Shere Dil Khan. These conditions were soon fulfilled by sending one of the Shahgassee's men and a Lehree to Summunder Khan at Narmack and getting the above-mentioned things. Notwithstanding this, my father, Jehangeer Khan, was not set at liberty. My uncle, Summunder Khan, sent Shere Dil on behalf of Mahomed Khan Lehree to the Shahgassee, with a message that his father, Meer Mahomed Khan, was dead, and that if his brother, Sirdar Jehangeer Khan who had been now one year in prison, was not released, we would all remove to the hills and fight. On this the Shahgassee evinced great liberality, and obtained the consent of the Khan to the release of Jehangeer Khan and to make over to us all our lands. Having enjoyed the possession of our lands and remained in the Khan's service for two years, we were again deprived of all our lands in Kutchee, when the Khan came to Gundava last year. On this my father, Jehangeer Khan, went to the Khan and asked him the reason of our being deprived of lands. But the Khan gave no reason, and said that he would not restore our lands. Jehangeer Khan then returned home. Gholam Mahomed Lehree had purchased some tracts of land at Shoran in the early days of the reign of Meer Nusseer Khan the Less. Last year the Khan ordered a sum of Rupees 1,345 to be exacted from Gholam Mahomed. His lands were also confiscated. On this, my uncle, Moorad Khan Lehree, went to petition the Shahgassee in the matter, but the Khan refused his petition. Meer Syud Khan Iltazye had obtained the town of Machee, on the borders of Shorejee, as a grant, and this he mortgaged with Hayar Khan for Rupees 2,300 and Rupees 1,000 cash received. When the Khan came to Gundava he ordered Hayat Khan to bring his Sunnuds and clear his account with Meer Karam Khan wullud Meer Syud Khan. He did so and went to Gundava, where the Khan ordered him to proceed to Khotrah, there to adjust accounts with Meer Karam Khan and Beebee Fatiha Khatoon. Accordingly Hayat Khan went to Khotrah and kept his bag containing his Sunnuds in Dawai Hindoo's shop. Soon after Ittbar Khan, servant of the Beebee, came to the shop, and during the absence of Hayat Khan, who was busy eating his dinner, took by force the Sunnuds from the bag and gave them to the Beebee. The son of the shopkeeper thereupon intimated to Hayat Khan what had happened, who proceeded to Ittbar Khan's house, but found the door closed. This compelled Hayat Khan to call in the aid of a Lehree Commander of the Artillery at Gundava to accompany him to Ittbar Khan and to ask for the Sunnuds. A demand was made but in vain. Hayat Khan then came to my father, Jehangeer Khan, and acquainted him with all that occurred at Sunnie. When the Khan arrived at Bagh, my father, Jehangeer Khan, in company with Hayat Khan, went and complained to him, but received no favourable answer. Hayat Khan is in a sad plight, deprived of Sunnuds, deprived of lands which were in his possession, and without any profession and unable to obtain justice. After this last year, when the Khan came to Dadur, Balach Khan Lehree, whose land had been purchased by Moombarik Khan Shawanee from Hassool Khan, and which had been confiscated by the Khan, applied to the Khan for its restoration but in vain. Balach Khan had a good mare, which the Khan demanded from him, and which he did not part with, and the result of this refusal was that Balach Khan was arrested and imprisoned for three months, but was released before the fight took place at Moostung on paying Rupees 500 in cash, and five camels. Balach Khan was wounded in that fight and proceeded to Peringabad, and when he was better the Khan ordered him to be blown away from a gun, and took a foal belonginig to him and plundered the property of five or six houses belonging to the Lehree at that place.

The particulars of Bahadoor Khan, Lehree, are as follows :—In the reign of Shere Dil Khan there was a fight between the Pundranees and the Lehrees, in which two men of the Lehrees were killed. In the time of Meer Khodadad Khan (the present Khan), a man of the Lehree tribe was murdered, a man of the Pundranees was a servant to the Khan, and Bahar Khan, Lehree, being then also in the service of the Khan, requested that as the Pundranees had killed three of the Lehrees, inquiries should be made into the matter, and justice done to the parties concerned, but without avail. The Pundarees after that took leave of the Khan and went to Tombo. His Highness was then at Bagh, near a place called Mahlianee; a dispute occurred between one of the Pundranees and Bahar Khan, where the former abused and insulted the latter, and asked why a complaint had been made to the Khan, and said that if they had any manliness they should fight it out. This incensed Bahar Khan, who aimed a blow with his sword at the Pundranee,

and the latter, leaving his camel, a sword, and two pistols, threw himself into the water. Thereupon Bahar Khan took these things and made them over to the Naib of Tombo, telling him at the same time how he had come in possession of them. The Pundrance went and complained to the Khan, while Bahar Khan proceeded to Sind. My father, Jehangeer Khan, told the Khan that Bahar Khan, who had been abused by the Pundrance without cause, was not in fault, and that on a former occasion three Lehrees had met with death at the hands of the Pundranees. That Bahar Khan was in Sind, and when he returned he would be brought to the Khan; on this the Khan pardoned him. Afterwards, my father, Jehangeer Khan, called Bahar Khan from Sind, and told him of his having been forgiven by the Khan. Bahar Khan then removed to Narmack, and the Khan sent six men to my father, Jehangeer Khan, at Shawl, and told him that he might set his mind at rest and send Bahar Khan to his presence. In conformity with these orders Bahar Khan was sent to the Khan, who was at Khunuck. The Mustee Khan, Chobdar, after having abused him, took away by force his sword. Bahar Khan remonstrated with him and told him that as he had been forgiven he ought not to be treated in that manner. Bahar Khan was then informed by one of his intimate friends that he was to be killed by the Khan, whereupon snatching Mustee Khan's sword he wounded him and three others, the consequence of which was that he was blown from mouth of a gun by order of the Khan.

One or two years ago when the Khan was at Khelat, Kharam Khan, Lehrce, finding Khan Mahomed Khan, Lehree, having illicit intercourse with his wife, gave both a fatal blow with his sword according to the dictates of the Mahomedan religion. The murderer was immediately arrested. Sirdar Jehangeer Khan besought the Khan to pardon Kharam Khan on the ground that he had done the deed to save himself from shame, but the Khan refused, but afterwards released him on payment of a fine of Rupees 500. At that time the Naib Shahajan, who was at Bagh, took from Chundram, Lehree, a camel and Rupees 120 because he suspected him having stolen a merchant's camel. After eight or ten days the missing camel was found in some other quarter, and on this Chundram asked the Naib for his money and his camel on the ground of the merchant's camel having been found with another person, but in vain.

Last year, when the Khan was at Shawl, he ordered all the lands belonging to the Lehrees to be confiscated, and with them the "Inam" land, which was purchased by Kootab Khan, Lehree, from Syud Mahomed Ameen, the yearly produce of which was Rupees 1,000. On this Kaiser Khan *wullud* Kootab Khan requested the Khan to give him back the land, saying that the same had been purchased from Syud Mahomed Ameen, but the Khan told them to go and recover the purchase money from Syud Mahomed Ameen, inhabitant of Karanee. Afterwards Kaiser Khan brought Suyd Mahomed Ameen to the Khan, who did not give a favourable reply to either of them. When Nawab Khan, Lehree, inhabitant of Shawlkote, who is not present here, comes, I shall make a written application in his case. After this the Khan arrived in Moostung in August 1871, but prior to that Abdool Rahman, Dehwar, the Naib of Moostung, had taken Rupees 300 from Kadur Buksh *wullud* Chundram, in consequence of there being a quarrel between them. When the Khan arrived at Moostung he confiscated the "Karez" of Safur Khan, Lehree, which had been given to him as a reward by Meer Nusseer Khan the Less, the Sunnud for which is in possession of Shahbaz Khan *wullud* Safar Khan. A "Karez" in Peringabad, belonging to Kaisur Khan, Lehree, which was given to him as a free grant by Meer Nusseer Khan the Less, had presented to Ali Lehree, a Shahanah as a reward for his services, the Sunnud for which is in his hands. This was also confiscated by the Khan, and a fine of Rupees 60 levied in addition.

Khumber *wullud* Rehmut had some land and water on a "Karez" called Kuncher. Rehmut Khan had obtained possession of this land by purchase from Jooma Dehwar, but the land originally was a free grant. The Naib of Moostung, Abdool Rahman, after confiscation of the property, recovered a fine of Rupees 300. A fight took place afterwards, in which Abd Ali Khan was killed.

Abd Ali, Lehree, is an uncle of Kasser Khan. He received 15 years ago by mortgage land and five "angusht" (the length of a finger) of a water belonging to Gholam Nubbee, Shawanee, for which he had to pay Rupees 1,600 to him. When the Khan arrived at Moostung he called on him to produce his Sunnuds, telling him at the same time that he would inquire into his case. This order was obeyed, and by command of the Khan Gholam Nubbee *wullud* Sooltan Mahomed destroyed all the Sunnuds belonging to Abd Ali, and cast them into water. Sooltan Mahomed, according to the instruction received from the Khan, also exacted a fine of Rupees 300.

Sooltan Mahomed has large possessions. Last year he went and took service under the Khan. His father, Gholam Nubbee, had mortgaged a great deal of his land in

Khorassan and Kutchee, and his son, Gholam Nubbee, tries to obtain redemption through the influence of the Khan. He (Sooltan Mahomed) holds no high rank among the "Ooloos" and has no followers.

Toork Ali, Lehree, states that he was a servant to Shere Dil Khan, who was the Ruler at that time. Last year Abdool Rhaman, the Naib of Moostung, asked Toork Ali the reason of his taking service under Shere Dil Khan, and ordered him to pay Rupees 60 in return for enjoying the daily allowances which had been given to him.

The Lehree inhabitants of Moostung who act as carriers of wool and other articles of merchandise to Kurrachee and other places, represent that last year, when the Khan was at Moostung, they were informed that they would have to pay Rupee 1-4 for each camel going on hire to Kutchee and other places. This fee is quite new. It had no existence for seven generations past, and it is in addition to the road fee usually levied. This fee is fixed on camels belonging to Lehrees only. In this way oppression and annoyance have prevailed throughout the whole of Kutchee. When the Khan arrived at Khelat the whole of the people resolved to endeavour to put a stop to these oppressive practices. My father, Jehangeer Khan, was at Narmack, and learnt that the whole town of Moostung had been taken possession of, and that the "Jainisheen" (Assistant to Deputy) had run away to the house of Syud Rustom Shah. My uncle, Summunder Khan, was sent to Moostung. Information was received that the troops of the Khan were approaching. The Brahooees at once left, and making an attack on the Khan's troops at Khui Grooh put them to flight. The next day the Shahgassee came with his troops to Khud, which is at a distance of six miles from Moostung. Here my father, Jehangeer Khan, also arrived. The Khan's troops then went to "Karez Amanoolah," which place the Brahooees also reached. The two coming together an engagement took place at mid-day and lasted for four hours. My uncle, Summunder Khan, got close to the Shahgassee in company with 10 or 11 persons. Aftar Khan Khoord and Shurbut Khan, Syudzye, and others were present there. The Shahgassee received wounds at the hands of my father, and when my father was asked by Summunder Khan why he had not put an end to the Shahgassee's life, he said that the Shahgassee had asked for his life, and therefore he had not killed him. My uncle, Summunder Khan, told the Shahgassee that he considered him in the light of a father and offered him his horse to ride on, to which he received a reply that he (the Shahgassee) was not such as would ride his horse, and the Shahgassee told him to take back his troops. I accordingly did so. Afterwards there were with Shahgassee Shurbut Khan, Syudzye, Nawab Khan, Aftar Khan Khoord, and others, and 10 or 12 footmen. My father, Jehangeer Khan, was on horseback, with four or five men, with whom he was talking. As they approached the gun, they found that the Khan's troops had to all appearance stopped fighting and kept their arms on the ground. In obedience to the instructions of some one the gun was fired, which caused my father's horse to fall down on the ground. On this the footmen charged and my father was killed. Thereupon Abdool Rahman, the Naib, plundered all that was possessed by the Lehrees, and their houses were levelled to the ground and the timber taken away. Having stated all the circumstances to you I crave justice.

ABSTRACT TRANSLATION of the Reply of the Shahgassee to the Petition from Dost Mahomed, Lehree.

Reply to first complaint.—In regard to their taking cattle to graze on "Nur"* in the summer in Kutchee, and in the winter in Khorassan, the particulars are these. The said "Nur" is the property of the ryots. When the season of cultivation is over, and the cultivators obtain release, then, if rain falls, no one either of the ryots or the Brahooees is allowed to touch the "Nur" for fear he may cause damage, but if there is no fall of rain, permission to graze on the "Nur" is granted for 20 days. During the time that such permission is granted, the "Jainisheen"† levies a cess either in sheep or cash according to old established rules, and after the expiration of 20 days grazing on the "Nur" is stopped.

* Stubble.

† Assistant to Deputy.

The facts connected with the alleged plunder and slaughter of sheep, belonging to the Lehrees, by the sowars of Abdool Rahman at Bagh are these. The Lehrees had caused injury and damage to the crops of the cultivators, who came and lodged a complaint with the Naibs. Sowars were despatched to the Lehrees to stop these annoyances to the Khan's subjects, and to prevent wrong-doers from inflicting further wrongs on the poor cultivators. The sowars went and made known their mission; no attention was paid to their orders, and they were on the contrary attacked. In this attack two men

and one horse of the Sowars were wounded, and the aggressors fled. The insurgents lost no property, and the Sowars returned. Jehangeer then came into the presence of his Highness the Khan and implored pardon for the offenders; his Highness ordered that the parties be produced before him, that full inquiry might be instituted. I was present on that occasion, and Jehangeer stated that the evil-doers had fled and would be brought into his presence on their return. This is the truth, while the petitioner has concealed the real facts.

Reply to complaint No. 2.—All that the petitioner states in regard to his father, Jehangeer Khan, receiving no daily allowance and batta when he was at the court of his Highness for six months is wholly false. During the whole time that Jehangeer Khan was at Khelat he was given all the allowances, both daily and other, that were usual, entry for which is still on the records of his Highness the Khan. He was also granted woollens and "posteen" on account of cold. He then took leave at his pleasure and went home. The petitioner further asserts that when Jehangeer Khan came home a consultation took place, and that all the Sarawans going to Wudera Adam Khan, it was there resolved that they should present themselves before his Highness the Khan and represent the state of affairs. This is also contrary to the real facts. The truth is that when Jehangeer reached his place of residence, the Sarawans, such as Mahomed Khan, Lehree, Alladina Khoord, and others (the Shawanees and Mahomedshahees are excepted), proceeded to the house of Wudera Adam Khan and determined to be rebellious and to create disturbances. On this their resolution coming to the ears of his Highness, Meer Nawab Khan, Dinarzye was sent to give them good advice, and to bring them to his Highness. Nawab Khan went and counselled the Wudera, Mahomed Khan, Hubbeeb Khan, Jehangeer Khan, and Alladina and their confederates. He then brought with him the said Wudera, Ariff, son of Mahomed Khan, the son of Alladina Khoord, and Hubbeeb Khan, and presented them to his Highness. The said Nawab is here with me, and knows full well of their seditious conversation. When they paid homage to his Highness they were told that information had been received of their rebellious resolves, which, if true, would go against them; that as their offences and acts of disloyalty in the days of Shere Dil Khan had been pardoned, they should go home and live in peace on their hereditary estates. Wudera then, taking an oath seven times on the Koran, declared his determination to abstain from acts of unfaithfulness, and his companions did the same. Hubbeeb Khan was given to understand that as he was a good man he should keep aloof from Mahomed Khan, and prove himself faithful in order to better his condition. Hubbeeb Khan promised improvement, and all were permitted to go home. As soon as they returned they commenced their old practices of rebellion and violence, as was their wont, and, making up their minds to plunder Moostung, collected an army at Espanjir, and were preparing to go to Moostung, when the Naibs and officers of his Highness the Khan's gave them battle, which resulted in the death of Hubbeeb Khan and his companions. This was the commencement of the disturbances, otherwise it had not originally been the intention of his Highness the Khan to thus ruin their family. After this Mahomed Khan, Wudera, and Alladina with their companions, assembling their followers at Narmack, declared their intention of making war. They had before the engagement, in which Hubbeeb Khan was killed, summoned from Candahar Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, and they had thus, as stated in the petition, invited him during the days that peace reigned in the country, with no other object but of laying waste the country of Kutchee. Moolla Mahomed joined them five days after the above-mentioned fight. I would leave you to consider whether these rebels would have sent for Moolla Mahomed from Candahar had they not fostered base and evil designs in their bosoms long before the battle was fought. Most of their statements are false and contradictory. What may I write about them when everything is clear before you? As it happened, I was appointed by his Highness to take an army to oppose them. I obeyed the orders and fought the insurgents at the Narmack Hill, and defeated them. They fled, and, taking their families and relations, concealed them in the midst of the Hill Nakao, while they themselves took possession of Durro Cahandalum by the Bolan. I encamped at Narmack with my forces. There was grain at these places, perhaps a number of "khurwars," not in granaries, but according to the custom prevailing in Beloochistan, buried in the ground, which process of storing is called "Khuram." From some of these "Khurams" grain was taken by my troops and appropriated for food. Grass was also taken for cattle. I went in pursuit of the insurgents *viâ* the Bolan, and, reaching Durro Cahandalum, met the rebels in battle and was victorious. Moolla Mahomed, Adam Khan, Jehangeer, Alladina, and some Sarawans saved themselves by flight. Moolla Mahomed Khan

Khan and other Sarawans, by the aid of their swift horses, went and hid themselves in Koh Mundaie, while Mahomed Khan and Jehangeer were compelled to flee to their families in Koh Nahas. I did not give up pursuing the latter. At one stage some property of Jan Mahomed, Lehree, and of some of the Budozyes came into the hands of my troops. There were still two stages intervening when Mahomed Khan sent the females of his family to intercede for him. They came and implored pardon in the name of the all-glorious Almighty, at the same time stating that Mahomed and Jehangeer avowed loyalty and gave salutations. At this entreaty I replied that I would take Mahomed Khan and Jehangeer Khan as prisoners of war, but would allow their families and relations to go anywhere they liked without molesting them or seizing their property, adding also that I was ready to fight if they wished. The ladies returned, and I waited for two days. Seeing that they did not make their appearance I mounted my horse, and accompanied by my forces went to punish them in the place they had posted themselves. As soon as I arrived Mahomed Khan and Jehangeer, surrendering themselves, asked protection. I made them prisoners, and abstained from touching either their families or their property. After this I proceeded to Bagh, and started, *vid* Dadur, in pursuit of Moolla Mahomed and all his companions, Mahomed Khan and Jehangeer being all this time with me as prisoners. When I entered Mittree Mahomed Khan fell ill, for which reason I set him at liberty and permitted him to go where he liked. After some time Mahomed Khan visited me, and admitted his having been the cause of sedition and disturbance, and declared his intention of making up for past offences by causing Moolla Mahomed and the Sarawans to surrender. I gave him leave, and permitted him to go mounted on horseback. He failed to bring Moolla Mahomed and the Raisanees, and returned. As it was brought to my notice that he was engaged in giving money to my troops and sowing the seeds of sedition, I informed him that as he was employed in creating disturbances, and wherever he went he caused men to rebel, he should be imprisoned. He was again made a prisoner, and I then left in pursuit of Moolla Mahomed for the Mundaie Hills. I marched with my forces night after night, and arrived at Mundaie at sunrise, and there I found that Moolla Mahomed, having obtained intelligence of my movements from the Barozyes, had fled. At that time I sent from Dadur Jehangeer and Janee, the son of Alladina, to his Highness the Khan, while I brought Mahomed Khan with me to Bagh, and he there fell sick while he was in prison, and died a natural death by the will of God. When he was seriously ill and at the point of death, he made a will to the following effect:—1*st*, that his corpse should be carried to the town of Sunnee; 2*nd*, that his sons were to be taken care of; and 3*rd*, that his sons were to be told not to be disloyal. Accordingly, in conformity to his last words, his corpse was sent by me with all due honours, according to the Islam faith, to Sunnee; secondly, having requested his Highness, I caused Jehangeer Khan to be enlarged, and his Highness the Khan of his own kindness and pleasure, granted to him all the hereditary lands possessed by his father; and, thirdly, I informed Jehangeer of his father's wishes, *viz.*, that he should follow the path of loyalty and faithfulness. He was dismissed with due honours. The sword and riding camel (originally Government property) that were with Summunder Khan from the days of Shere Dil were, on the return of Jehangeer to his abode, taken by him from Summunder and forwarded to the Khan. The flocks that had been carried away by order of Moolla Mahomed Khan, Vukeel, were returned to their owners at the request of Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee. In addition to these some camels and things of small value may have been taken away by my troops, but all that the petitioners affirm is exaggeration. They allege that last year their inam lands in Kutchee were confiscated by his Highness without any just cause or valid reason. In reply I beg to state that when during the past year his Highness encamped at Gundava, the officers of the "Sirkar" reported that Jehangeer had, in addition to the 20 bunds and half produce of Shahdadwah that he possessed, taken possession of the remaining half share to * belonged to Government. On this Jehangeer Khan was summoned, and given to understand that he should hold possession of his 20 bunds and half produce according to Sunnuds, and Naib Sahibdad and other ministerial servants, respectable zemindars of those parts, were sent with him to give him land in Shahdad, in accordance with the terms of the grants. When the whole party reached the place Jehangeer refused to take land in accordance with his Sunnuds. There was no cultivation in those lands, and the matter rested for a while.

* *Sic.* in orig.

The petitioners have referred to the lands of Gholam Mahomed, Lehree, that had been purchased in Sorab. Their statements are incorrect, and the facts are that these lands were the property of Maie Tajee and the Rinds had purchased a portion of them. Gholam Mahomed obtained possession of them by violence and enjoyed the receipts for several years. Maie Tajee came and complained to his Highness of her hereditary

lands having been violently seized, on which his Highness summoned both parties, in order that the case might be decided according to law and the rights restored to their owners. Gholam Mahomed, when he heard of this, went and concealed himself and forwarded Moorad Khan, son of Mahomed Khan, Lehree, to Wudera Imam Buksh, Rind, to mediate for him and screen him, on which Wudera sent Raza Mahomed and Dutto Rinds to his Highness the Khan, with a message that as he was the head of the Rinds he would get the rights of Maie Tajee restored to her, but that compensation for the intermediate profits could not be granted her. His Highness entrusted this business to Wudera Imam Buksh, and ordered that the rightful owners should receive their rights. After this Raza Mahomed and Dutto Rinds, and Moorah Khan, Lehree, were sent by the Wudera and they paid into the Government Treasury Rupees 1,000, although the produce enjoyed by Gholam Mahomed had been a great deal more.

Mention is made of the dealings with Hayat Khan, Lehree. The facts are that "Inam" lands of Meers Khuram Khan and Gowar Khan. Iltarzye, had been given into his charge, and he appointed a Naib. On examination of accounts it was found that he had misappropriated several sums of money. This breach of trust was brought home to him, but he was hard-pressed and denied the claims made against him, and left the question still open. He is wrong in accusing Ittbar Khan of making away with his Sunnuds. Reference is made by the petitioners to the confiscation of the lands of Balack, Lehree, and the circumstances connected with it are the following: The said Balack stole some camels at Khelat belonging to merchants from Candahar, and the offence of theft was, after some time, proved against him. He was on that account imprisoned by the Naib of Dadur, and the stolen property recovered from him, as also a fine. That which is stated about the mares is false. He was present in the battle at Moostung and, receiving wounds when on the side of the rebels, fled and concealed himself in a cultivator's house. He was, however, discovered, and having been arrested by the Naib of Moostung was, by order, put to death in consequence of his rebellious proceedings.

In regard to Bahar Khan, Lehree, I have to state that, in former days, the Lehrees and the Pundranees had feuds, and much blood was shed. The latter then removed to British territory and settled there. The servants of his Highness the Khan issued strict orders to the Lehrees to refrain from further bloodshed, because the murderers of their race were in Sind. Bahar Khan however, in defiance of such instructions, attacked some Pundranees at Kurriah Somba, and wanted to put his evil intentions of murdering his enemies into execution, when he was assailed by the servants of his Highness and took to flight. The Pundranees then came and complained to his Highness, who issued a mandate to Jehangeer Khan to search for Bahar Khan and send him into his presence to answer the charges preferred by the Pundranees. Bahar Khan was not at first caught, having fled into Sind, but when his Highness the Khan was in Khorassan he repeated his orders to Jehangeer Khan, who forwarded Bahar Khan in the custody of Chobdars. On the way the accused, finding the guard careless, seized the opportunity and, drawing from its sheath the sword of Masti Khan Chobdar, who was asleep, inflicted such wounds on his person as to make him almost lifeless. He wounded three more men (two of these are here) and was himself slaughtered by the Hakim * in consequence.

* Ruler.

In regard to the statement about Karam Khan, my reply is that they are not right in saying that Karam Khan killed Khan Mahomed for adultery with his wife. It is a well-established rule in Beloochistan that the person who kills another for having illicit intercourse with the females of his family goes unpunished. This man must have shed innocent blood and thereby has made himself liable to penalty.

In regard to Chundram, Lehree, I have to explain that three or four times the camels and camel-loads of Afghan merchants were stolen in Naree. As the persons mentioned by the petitioner were found to be the offenders, the stolen property was recovered from them (Chundram and grains) and handed over to Colonel Green for delivery to the merchants. Receipts of the merchants are in the possession of Mahomed Khan, Vakeel.

I come now to their complaint of the seizure of the lands of Kutib Khan, Lehree. The truth is that the brother of the late Syud was a debtor to his Highness and to others (such as Alyar, &c.) When the Syud died, the said Lehree took possession of his lands from his brothers on the ground of debts due to him. The creditors having preferred a complaint to his Highness, all the parties were called and, according to the provisions of Mahomedan law, the lands were taken possession of by the Sirkar and ordered to be handed over to the creditor, who would pay in all the debts.

The petitioners are right in declaring that Naib Abdool Rahman levied a fine from Kadir Buksh, Lehree, son of Chundram, for being guilty of criminal force, &c. This

is sanctioned by long usage, that he who unlawfully causes a breach of the public peace should pay a fine in proportion to his offence.

I turn now to the complaint that the "Karez" of Shahbaz Khan has been made Government property. If this "Karez" has been confiscated, the order for its confiscation must have been passed in consequence of some offence having been committed. It would not have been detached without just grounds.

As regards the attachment of "Karez Kaissab Khan," granted by a Sunnud from Beebee Gunga, I will make inquiries from the servants of the Beebee. I am sure that there must be a valid reason for such an action.

In respect to the Shahanas of Ali, Lehree, and in Karez at Moostung, I have to state that the Karez and Shahanah pay "Zari Kullung," and when Ali was in the service of Meer Mahomed Nusseer Khan, he received the cess in lieu of service allowances. Now that he is no longer in service he is obliged to pay the "Zari Kullung" cess.

I now reply to the complaint of "Karez Kumber Lehree." The Karez in these lands have the cess Zari Kullung fixed on them. Whoever purchases land and Karez there has to be answerable for the Government tax, which is recovered from him. It may be that Kumber relinquished his possessions in consequence of his inability to pay the tax. No one has forcibly taken lands away from him. The sums of money referred to must have been levied on account of "Zari Kullung."

In respect to Abdullah, Lehree, it is stated that the Lehrees had purchased black-water* from Sultan Mahomed, Shawanee, and his Highness the Khan forcibly deprived them of it. Sultan Mahomed is a little man, and is not the sort of person to have a large number of followers. It may be that the Lehrees seized the property of Sultan Mahomed, who, having complained to his Highness the Khan, had his rights restored to him. No force has been used, and no one has illegally kept possession of his land and water.

* In the original "Panee Karro."

The statement that Turk Ali had to pay a fine for being in the service of Shere Dil requires confirmation. Many of the Brahooees held appointments, under Shere Dil, and not a single one was harassed for that reason.

Only those who gave up the path of faithfulness afterwards were punished and fined.

The facts connected with the levy of Rupee 1-4 on each camel are that persons who let camels on hire have to place some of their camels at the disposal of his Highness for the carriage of his baggage, for which they receive payment, and they can carry merchandize for merchants to Kutchee and other countries. It may be that those camel-men may have paid some thing to jemadars to free their camels, but the order for the levy of Rupee 1-4 on each camel has not been issued.

All these disturbances that have been created are due to the disloyalty of the petitioners. When they affirm that they have rebelled and took Moostung, they state an untruth. The circumstances connected with this are well known. If the rebels proved victorious, why did Moostung go out of their hands? And why did they flee from their native places?

ABSTRACT TRANSLATION of a Petition from Sirdar Alladina Khoord to the Commissioner in Sind, dated the 12th March 1872.

You are well aware that when the British forces arrived in the Bolan Pass I was living at Mero on my lands on the Surro* Bolan. My age at that time was 20 years. I have now seven sons. Major Outram employed me at first for protecting the officers and their baggage from Dadur to Shawlkote by way of the Bolan. Those who were with me in this service received from Government Rupees 12 each. I used to receive sometimes Rupees 360, at other times Rupees 400, in proportion to the services rendered by me. Once when I brought Rahimtoolla Barkurdar Kakur and Durria Khan Murree to make their *saláam* to the British officials, I obtained a reward of Rupees 1,000 in consideration of my services. I got money from Government for digging and sinking wells and making arrangements for supplying water in Bayaree, in Surro Bolan, for the convenience of the troops and travellers. I executed this work properly. As long as the British officials and the forces remained I served them well. Major Outram at the time of his departure granted me a "than" of brocade, one loongee, and Rupees 500 in cash. I also received a certificate, which is lost. Afterwards there was no proper arrangement for the safety of persons travelling by the Bolan. When his Highness Meer Nusseer Khan, the Khan of Khelat, came to Jacobabad to pay a visit to General Jacob, plans were devised for making the Bolan free from danger, and it was arranged

* Head.

that the Naibs of Dadur and Shawlkote should see to the safe passage of the kafilas from the Bolan, and this was carried out. Rahmdad Khanazad was then the Naib of Shawlkote. Jam Sahtakzye Khoord was kept at the Bolan with 200 men to arrange for the coming and going of the kafilas in safety; since then a large caravan arrived at Beebee Naree, and was attacked by 700 Murrees, who took away the whole property in plunder. Jam Khoord and his 12 men lost their lives. It was not until Sirdar Taj Mahomed, Zehree, was imprisoned that the Brahooees failed to do all the necessary service at the Bolan. This work was then entrusted to Shere Dil Khan and Mobut Khan Muzeranee Murrees. Before that the Muzeranees used to graze their cattle in our lands and the lands of the Bungoolzyes without permission. The rule was that they gave one goat for each flock that grazed. When the army of his Highness the Khan attacked the town of Khunuck and Hubbeeb Khan Rustumzye was killed, we Sirdars were present. His Highness the Khan directed the Muzeranees to graze their cattle wherever they liked and not to pay anything to us Sirdars, and that in whatever place they resided they should be independent of the Sirdars. This led to a breach between us and the Muzeranees.

2. When the British Army proceeded to Sind, Moolla Rahmdad was Naib of Shawl. After him Noor Mahomed was appointed, and he remained in office for two years. I succeeded the latter in the Naibship, and performed the duties for five years. One day I received a letter by a sowar of Rahmdad, the late Naib, which I found on perusal bore the seal of his Highness the Khan, and contained an order appointing Rahmdad as Naib, and dispensing with my services. His Highness the Khan was at that time at Gundava. I made my way with all speed to Dadur, and Moolla Rahmdad entered on his new office the following day. When I reached Dadur I sent an application to his Highness the Khan, asking to be favoured with grounds for my dismissal from the Naibship. I received a reply, in which his Highness the Khan informed me that I had not been dismissed, but had been deceived by some one, and should at once proceed to resume charge of my appointment. In obedience to this order I went to Shawl with 700 men and sent a message to Rahmdad, asking him to leave Shawl, to which he gave no heed. A fight ensued, which lasted for ten days, and ended in the flight at night of Rahmdad to Umber Kambranee. Ten days afterwards Syud Kumbranee and his men went in a body as intercessors to his Highness the Khan, who pardoned Moolla Rahmdad. Dewan Gungaram was then the Wuzeer of his Highness the Khan. I carried on the work of Naib for six or seven months afterwards, and then received an order to accompany his Highness the Khan against the Murrees. I obeyed the call, and collecting my men and Raj to the number of 500, joined his Highness the Khan and went with him to the Murree Hills. I left my son, Yar Mahomed, to do duty at Shawl. When we came out of the hills I returned to the Naibship of Shawl. A few days after his Highness the Khan appointed Meer Mahomed, Rustomzye, as Naib and dismissed me. Moolla Abdool Azeez, who was then Naib of Moostung, and was a relation of Moolla Rahmdad, examined my accounts, and reported to his Highness the Khan that I had embezzled about Rupees 4,000. I explained that the money had been spent during the struggle between me and Moolla Rahmdad; I was unable to repay it. Colonel Sir H. Green was then in Moostung, and after calling me and investigating the whole matter promised to make arrangements in consultation with his Highness the Khan. That officer at the same time gave me a rifle, and with his advice I departed for Dadur. I very soon was in receipt of a letter with the seal of his Highness the Khan, a copy of which is given below.

"*To Meer Alladina Khoord.*—You were indebted to me in the sum of Rupees 4,000 in consequence of defalcations in the accounts of Shawl, but as the said sum has been received from Major Green on your behalf you need not entertain any anxiety about it."

3. I have been from the first a faithful servant of his Highness the Khan and have not failed in my duty. About five years ago his Highness the Khan unlawfully took possession of the land of my nephew, Aftar Khan, in Merv, and I sent my son, Yar Mahomed, and my brother, Kadur Dinno, to his Highness at Khelat to solicit restoration. On this an order was issued by the Khan, directing us to go to the Naib of Moostung, Abdool Azeez, and get the case decided according to law by the Kazee who is there. We did so and exhibited our Sunnuds and other documents to the Kazee and the Naib. After trial a decree was passed, rejecting Aftar Khan's claim. He (Aftar Khan) refused to abide by this decision, and removing from my habitation proceeded to the Bungoolzyes, servants of his Highness the Khan, and lived with them. He is still enjoying the produce of the disputed land by force. I reported his departure to the Naib, Abdool Aneez, who paid no attention. This gave rise to an ill-feeling among the men of my clan. I then sent my son, Dost Mahomed, to his Highness the Khan for redress of my grievances, but obtained no relief. His Highness the Khan ordered Aftar Khan to fight with me, and caused a fort to be built for Aftar Khan and Nawab Bungoolzye; when I

found that the Ruler thus assisted and aided my enemy I was compelled to separate myself from my relation. I applied for justice but did not obtain it. When the other disaffected Sirdars heard of this they came to me, and advised me to remove to British territory, and lay my complaints before the English Government. Hajee Mahomed Khan, Raisanee, then came to me and declared that he would also endeavour to free himself from such injustice. We, Sirdars, marched to Khunuck, and on the following morning his Highness' force arrived to oppose us. A fight took place. We lost Hubbeeb Khan, nephew of Hajee Mahomed Khan, and five others. His Highness the Khan's army then left for Moostung, and we started for Narmack. We sent a Sowar to Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, who had arrived from Candahar. He met us at Narmack. We, Sirdars, then all came together to the Bolan, where the Shahgassee also arrived through the pass. Below the Kartah, on the hills above Cahandalu, a battle took place. The Khan's army had many of their number killed. We left the field the following day owing to our stock of powder and shot having been exhausted. There were about 20 houses of the Khoords near the spot where the fight took place, and these were all plundered by his Highness the Khan's forces. The property thus taken possession of consisted of cattle, sheep, goat, &c., and ornaments. We, Sirdars, then all proceeded to the hills (Cahun) and our followers stayed in Seebee. Here a purwanna was received from Colonel Sir (then Major) Henry Green, Political Superintendent on the Frontier, to the address of Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, to the effect that we should at once leave for Jacobabad, where the necessary arrangements would be made, as the Shahgassee had also been sent for. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, obeying the order marched to Jacobabad and reached that place, where the Shahgassee had also arrived. We did not come to terms, and the matter came abruptly to a close. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, returned to his place in Seebee, and the Shahgassee also went away. The hot days of summer were over and the winter set in. His Highness the Khan then confiscated the possessions of the Jam Saheb and Noordeen in Baghwana and Khozdar, and this gave rise to a battle between the forces of the Jam and Noordeen on the one side and of his Highness the Khan on the other, at a place called Baghwana. I was sent by Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, from Seebee with a message to the Jam to refrain from war and to look to the British Government for a reconciliation. I delivered the message to the Jam Saheb and Noordeen, who replied that their lands had been forcibly taken possession of, but if they were restored they would cease from warfare. His Highness the Khan did not listen, and war was, therefore, continued. It lasted for two days, and then his Highness the Khan sent his mother, Beebee Gunja, to intercede for him with the Jam and Noordeen. The Beebee came and stated that the Khan had declared that the Jalawan and Sarawan possessions would be allowed to remain in the hands of their rightful owners, and that she was surety for the performance of this engagement. The Jam Saheb and Noordeen consented to the cessation of war, which then came to an end, and all returned to their houses. Every one kept guard over his possessions. A letter was afterwards received by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, from the Jam and Noordeen, stating that his Highness the Khan had broken his word and placed his own men over all parts of the country. When our men were dismissed, and the matter was brought to the notice of Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, he sent me to the Political Superintendent at Jacobabad, and asked me to request that officer to allow him (Moolla Mahomed) to come in his presence to lay his circumstances before him. I came and made the necessary request, which was complied with. We, Sirdars, afterwards all went to the Jam Sahib and Noordeen to pay them a visit. At nightfall a murderer killed one of my sons, and wounded me and two other sons. We seized him and inquired of him who he was. He replied that he was the executioner,* and as he promised so he had done. We proceeded into the presence of Major Harrison, and made him acquainted with all that had passed.

* In the original head cutter.

4. His Highness the Khan inflicted and recovered a fine of Rupees 70 from Zardad Khoord. Aftar Khan carried away two camels of Hajee Khan in Bagh.

Wullee Mahomed Naib exacted the sum of Rupeees 180 and 14 khurwars of wheat as penalty from Nubbee Buksh. Naib Wullee Mahomed caused to be carried away the produce of three crops of indigo, cotton, and jowaree.

Aftar Khan took away 60 khurwars of wheat belonging to me.

Aftar Khan seized wheat, as also the produce of the crops in Merv Dusht, and the produce of a crop belonging to Nubbee Buksh. He also took away the realizations of one "Karez."

Naib Wullee Mahomed recovered by force Rupees 40 from Hajee; Naib Wullee Mahomed extorted Rupees 20 from Hajee Borat.

REPLY of the Shahgassee to Petition from Alladina Khoord, dated 9th Mohurrum 1289.

The petitioners consider that whatever situations they may get from his Highness become their hereditary property, and they set themselves up as hereditary officers. As the petitioner was on several occasions appointed by English Officers to do service in "Surra Bolan," he nows expects the same appointment, and has so stated in his petition. The arrangements in regard to kafilas have been by order of his Highness the Khan placed in the hands of the Naibs of Shawl and Dadur. His Highness can appoint any one to this duty, and is not bound to entrust the work to the petitioner.

The petitioner states that Shere Dil and Mohbut Khan, Muzeranees, grazed their flocks in the Cochar* and paid him grazing fees, *viz.*, one head of sheep for each flock.

* Preserves.

These Muzeranees are separate from the disloyal Murrees that are subjects of his Highness the Khan. They may have given a sheep for each flock that grazed, but his Highness never issued any orders to this effect as the petitioner alleges, As he became rebellious, his Highness directed the Muzeranees to keep aloof from him. He writes about his Naibship such appointments are in the gift of his Highness the Khan. He has sufficient authority to nominate any transfer any one at pleasure. When Alladina was formerly Naib of Shawl, his Highness was in Gundava, and Moolla Gholam Ali, Khanazad, who was in Shawl, came and gave information that Rahmdad Khanazad had brought a letter of appointment to the Naibship of Shawl, and that Alladina had given over charge to him. On this his Highness said that he (Rahmdad) had not been appointed and should be relieved. Alladina with 50 or 60 men returned to Shawl, and Rahmdad was confined in the fort of Shawl for two days. Alladina communicated his letter of appointment to the people, and with their assistance removed Rahmdad and got charge of the Naibship again. You know full well the courage and boldness of the people of Shawl. After some time the Khan transferred Alladina, and when the accounts of the Naib were examined, defalcation to the extent of about Rupees 4,000 were found in his accounts. The Sirkar thereupon, according to the rule which requires the accounts of a Naib to be examined on his transfer, and any sums found deficient to be recovered from him, directed the above amount to be paid by Alladina, who brought forward the excuse that he had spent the money in the fight he had with Rahmdad. Alladina then went and applied to Colonel Green, at whose wish the Khan forewent the money, which was not again demanded.

In respect to Alladina's statement, that he remained loyal to his Highness the Khan and was guilty of no fault, I beg to state that as long as he did not swerve from faithfulness he was considered faithful by his Highness, notwithstanding that he was one of the rebels in Shere Dil Khan's days.

He mentions his case in connexion with Aftar Khan. He sent his son to his Highness the Khan, who ordered both parties to appear before the Naib at Moostung, Moolla Abdool Azeez, that the matter might be decided according to law. Both parties appeared before the Naib, and as Aftar Khan had evidence which established his right, Alladina lost his claim. The brothers of Aftar Khan are present here, and inquiry may be made from them, if necessary, or I may be directed to do so. Alladina states an untruth when he declares that it was this circumstance which compelled him to go with Mahomed Khan, Rustomzye to the British Government to complain. The facts are that Mahomed Khan had gone on a pilgrimage to Mecca, and on his return was accompanied by Fakeer Mahomed, Bezonjas, when Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, entreated the permission of his Highness the Khan to go and put Mahomed Khan to the sword. His Highness, however, did not accord permission, and refused to pass such an order. Meantime Sirdar Taj Mahomed, Zehree, obtaining information told Moolla Mahomed that Mahomed Khan was returning in company with Sirdar Fakeer Mahomed, Bezonjas, and if he (Moolla Mahomed) made an attempt on Mahomed Khan's life he would find opposition from Fakeer Mahomed. This made him change his intention for a time, but afterwards, removing his followers in company with Darogah Moola Atta Mahomed, he overran Mahomed Khan's village, broke into his fort, made him prisoner, and brought him before the Khan. Mahomed Khan made an urgent request to his Highness the Khan for justice and release, having been guilty of no offence, and being so treated by his enemies. His Highness complied with his appeal and set him at liberty.

When Taj Mahomed, Zehree, was arrested, and Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, fled, all these Sirdars, Mahomed Khan, Rustomzye. Alladina Khoord, the Shawanees Mahomedshahees and Lehrees and Bungulzyes, were with his Highness the Khan,

when the latter asked permission of his Highness to go to Khorassan. Naib Abdool Luteef was with them. Their second request was to be allowed to storm the fort of Moolla Mahomed, and to bring his brother as prisoner for being disloyal. This was granted, and they did as they wished. His Highness the Khan afterwards released the brother of Moolla Mahomed. Hubbeeb Khan and Mahomed Khan then begged that as Moolla Mahomed had proved himself disloyal his Sirdarship should be taken from him and given to Futteh Khan, Raisanee, who had a right to it on account of his being a Brahimzye. His Highness did not consent and stated that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed might yet repent and implore pardon of his misdeeds. This refusal made them turn rebels, and after summoning Moolla Mahomed, they collected an army at Espang and arrived at Khunuck. His Highness the Khan's troops which were in Moostung, on receiving information, came to the same place and gave battle to the insurgents, which ended in the death of Hubbeeb Khan and the flight of the others to Narmack. They are wrong in affirming that they sent for Moolla Mahomed after this fight. He arrived five days after the battle; how then could he come all that distance from Candahar in five days? That which is the truth I have related. All of them collected afterwards at Narmack, and I was directed by his Highness the Khan to go and punish them. I met them in battle at Narmack and Cahandulan, and defeating them put them to flight. Mahomed Khan, Lehree, who stopped in his village was pursued, but he sent females with a Koran to intercede for him. I informed them that if he came and paid his respects I would carry him and his sons as prisoners to his Highness, but if he would not come, then I would fight with him in his place of concealment to-morrow. I then left and attacked their village. Mahomed Khan Chungez and the son of Alladina came out and submitted. I made them prisoners and started for Bagh, and from thence went to Mittree. Here I obtained news from Barozye that the families of these rebels had arrived at his place and that he wanted orders as to their disposal. I sent word that they were not to be molested, and it was optional with them to go anywhere they liked, but that the males should remain apart from them. When I reached Dadur, I heard that Moolla Mahomed and the others were with the Murree Guzzun at Mundaie. I left for Mundaie, and on my arrival there they fled. When I returned to Bagh I received an order from his Highness the Khan to go to Jacobabad to Colonel Green. I did so, and the other parties also appeared. Some words were exchanged, and Colonel Green directed that I should not follow up the rebels till arrangements were made by him with his Highness the Khan. I obeyed and returned to Khelat, whereupon another disturbance was created by these insurgents in company with the Jam. The particulars are as follows:—The Jam collected an army and went with Noordeen to fight with Fakeer Mahomed, Bezonjao, but by the direction of his Highness was presented from engaging in any fight by Shahgassee Moolla Gholam Mahomed and Moolla Mahomed Raisanee. A second time news reached his Highness that the Jam and Noordeen had arrived at Sarhay with their forces. I was directed to meet them, a battle was fought, in which the Jam and Noordeen were taken prisoners. They were for one year kept prisoners, when the sister of his Highness the Khan and wife of the Jam interceded for them, and they were set at liberty and sent with due honours to Beyla. A second time they brought an army to fight at Bhagwana and Khozdar. His Highness the Khan was informed of this and came out of Khelat to oppose them. At Bhagwana Khozdar both parties met and negotiations lasted for two or three days. Alladina was present when I engaged in conversation with the rebels. Beebee Gunja was with the Jam, and had accompanied him in this campaign. One day the Beebee visited the Khan with her daughter and was asked the reason of the rebellious conduct of the Jam: she replied that the lands of Kumal Khan, Ittarzye, were the cause, and the Jam, being the son of Kumal Khan's sister wanted his share. His Highness rejoined that he (the Khan) had nothing to do with the property of the Ittarzye, his heirs being the Ittarzye, and that the heirs of Kumal Khan were Meer Karm Khan and Gowar Khan, Ittarzye, who are his sister's sons; Kamal Khan is the son of the maternal uncle of the latter. I then had an interview with the Jam and told him in conversation that they (the Jam and others) were not in the habit of giving their daughters any share in the inheritance. If he agreed to this well and good, if not, a fight would take place. A battle was fought in which two or three divisions of the Jam's army submitted to the forces of his Highness the Khan. Beebee Sahib again interfered, and it was arranged that the Jam should leave one of his servants to take care of the share in Kumal Khan's estate. The Jam again with 50 or 60 men came to Khelat for the settlement of the question of this estate. His Highness on this third occasion, on the urgent request of the Beebee, kept silence, and the Jam returned to Beyla. It was then that Major Harrison came to Khelat for the settlement of affairs, and the Jam

again came to Kupota with his army. An interchange of communication took place, and what followed then is fully known to you and Major Harrison. At that time the whole of the Khan's troops were marched out to fight, but through the mediation of the British officers the Jam was again permitted to go scot-free. That which is asserted about the murder of men I know nothing about. If the rebels have been wronged they must attribute it to their base deeds.

Now I come to the allegation about the sums of money said to have been taken as fines from Zardad, Hajee Barat, and Nubbee Buksh. These men have not yet washed their hands of theft and misappropriation of property, and it is probable that this levy was owing to some fault or offence committed by them. The statement that Aftar Khan carried away grain from Alladina and Hajee, and appropriated it to his own use, is explained thus :—When the complainants took it into their heads to become rebels, the land was granted by his Highness the Khan to Aftar Khan, and Cocha Mery was also given in his charge. He has, therefore merely enjoyed the allowance of his Sirdarship.

ABSTRACT TRANSLATION of a Letter from Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, Wuzeer to his Highness the Khan, dated the 14th Mohurrum 1289, to Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat.

Whatever petitions and statements that were received by me from the Commissioner in Sind through you were replied to by me, and the answers were sent for the Commissioner's information. My letters will have shown how disturbances were created and rebellions raised, and who took the initiative. I hope that the Commissioner in Sind will, taking into consideration all the facts laid before him, and weighing well the several points raised, pass such a decision as will have the effect of establishing his Highness the Khan's Government on a sound basis, and giving the subject people a lasting peace and tranquillity. I now enter into a little detail of the injury done by the insurgents to the country and to the people.

Alladina Khoord stands foremost among the Sarawan Sirdars, and Noordeen among the Jalawans. Although his Highness the Khan showered favours on them, and will continue to treat them with kindness, still they did not, and will not, prove loyal and show allegiance, as a subject should do towards his ruler. They are turbulent and refractory and will not show improvements, as a well-known poet has said—

"The colour of a negro cannot be changed from black into white if he is washed as many times as it is wished."

They tempt other people and entice them to their ways. The wish of his Highness the Khan is that he be on peaceful terms with nobles, montaburs,* Ooloos, Raj, and others, and thus secure happiness to all by his rule. There is unity between his Highness and the English Sirkar, and his Highness hopes that the Commissioner in Sind will make such arrangements as will prevent any possibility of further disturbances being caused, and the peace of the country being endangered. Besides, I beg to give details of the damage caused to and loss sustained by his Highness the Khan, his subjects, and the town of Bagh and other villages. By his Highness at the time of Shere Dil Khan at Khelat, 4,00,000 of rupees cash; property of the value of Rupees 4,00,000, property plundered by Noordeen at Baghwana and Khozdar, value Rupees 1,00,000; property seized by Azaad Khan at Sohrab and Punjgoor, value over Rupees 1,00,000, besides murders caused by him; property seized at Dadur and Moostung several times; cash, Rupees 2,00,000; and grain and property and 200 mares and horses; plundered from granaries of the crops at Kutchee; Government share during the current year, value Rupees 4,00,000; property (cattle, grain, &c.) of the subjects plundered at Bagh and other places in Naree, value over Rupees 4,00,000 after the truce.

* Respectable.

Besides these, the kafilas were sacked and the poor Afghan merchants deprived of their property.

After the overthrow of Shere Dil Khan, the Sarawan Sirdars and Noordeen took an oath of allegiance to his Highness the Khan, and received Rupees 7,500 and pistols, but they soon broke that oath and created fresh disturbances.

No. 54.

No. 2510, dated Bombay Castle, 27th April 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay; to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of the papers forwarded with my letter of the 20th instant, No. 2343, I am directed to enclose, for submission to the Government of India, copy of a further letter from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 367, dated the 11th idem, connected with the settlement of the claims of the Sirdars of Beloochistan.

Enclosure in No. 54.

No. 367, dated Kurrachee, 11th April 1872.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind; to his Excellency Right Honourable Sir W. R. Seymour V. FitzGerald, G.C.S.I., Governor and President in Council, Bombay.

In continuation of my Report, No. 340, dated 5th instant, I have the honour now to state that on receipt of telegram dated the 6th, I immediately caused arrangements to be made for the departure of his Highness' Wuzeer and the Sirdars from Jacobabad.

2. At a public Durbar held on Friday, the 5th, the Wuzeer and all the Sirdars were dismissed, and to those who were so entitled the customary presents were given. The six Sarawan Sirdars were included among the recipients. Though they had been pronounced by me to have been decidedly in the wrong, pardon for their acts had been extended to them in the name of his Highness the Khan, and as is usual on such occasions, suitable khilluts were bestowed on them also as a mark of their being re-admitted to favour, and I trust such recognition of their restored position may have the desired effect of bringing them more closely for the future in their allegiance to their Sovereign.

3. I took the opportunity of impressing most strongly upon them the folly and want of patriotism displayed in their former proceedings, and that the favour and countenance of the British Government would assuredly be withheld from any who hereafter may show themselves so unmindful of their duty to their Khan, and of the welfare of their country as to regard only their own personal views and on fancied grievances to enter on disturbances which checked prosperity and caused grievous injury to the poorer and peaceably disposed portion of the community.

4. I again repeated to them that the sole desire of Government was to see a strong and well organized Government established in Beloochistan, and that such could never exist unless the nobles of the land cordially gave their assistance in maintaining order and sustaining those principles of administration which were suitable to the country and to the interests of all. That Government looked to his Highness the Khan that he should duly observe such principles and rule with justice and fair consideration, and as long as he continued to do so, he would assuredly command the friendship and countenance of the British Government. This was to be clearly understood by the Sirdars, and that there was no wish whatever on the part of Government to interfere between his Highness the Khan and his Sirdars in matters which only affected themselves, and which should be decided according to the customs and rules in force in the country. At the same time the Sirdars must also bear in mind that any renewal of factions and unreasonable conduct on their part against their ruler would at once and for ever forfeit for them the favour which Government would otherwise be most willing to show to them on all fitting opportunities.

5. The Sirdars were most earnest in their protestations that they would follow a new course for the future, and looking to his Highness the Khan for just recognition of what they were rightfully entitled to, they would do their best to prevent any recurrence of those differences which had existed and would give such aid as they were capable of in the maintenance of the ruling power.

6. I do not wish to appear over sanguine in anticipating certain good results from these procedings. No one acquainted with the capricious nature of the Brahooees and the social changes which are now taking place in their country would be so rash as to pin his faith on any thing of the sort. But I think it may be fairly reckoned that matters now bear a more favourable aspect than they have done for some time past, and as long as those Sirdars who have up to the present time engaged in rebellion, whenever it suited their purpose, can have it kept in their minds that such conduct is and will be

regarded with entire disapproval, that it will meet with the marked displeasure of the British Government, and that it is their best interest to act peacefully and loyally, we may expect that the effect of what has recently passed will prove good, and lead to satisfactory and permanent results.

Self interest is the only as well as the best bond for their future good behaviour. The greatest care therefore will have to be taken that there should be no renewal to them of the ill suited expectations they had been led to form of their former unreasonable and disloyal demands receiving attention or support. A careful adherence to the orders of the Government of India issued in October last will ensure this.

7. I had afterwards a long conversation with the Wuzeer Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, and he assured me it was his master's most earnest desire to act only in strict conformity with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, and appealed to me to confirm him from my own knowledge of all that has passed in the statement that from the time when his Highness had ascended the throne he had never once failed to act strictly up to that desire. I can most fully do so and confidently assert that whatever faults his Highness may have, want of loyal friendship to the British Government is certainly not one of them.

8. He also desired to explain that the Khan had done his best to keep his Sirdars bound to him, but that there were a certain few amongst them, who had for some time past endeavoured to strip him of all power and leave him utterly helpless to govern for the good of the country. Of these the chief are three, the Ex-Jam of Beyla, Sirdar Meer Khan, his (the Khan's) relative Azaad Khan, quasi independent ruler of Kharan, but formerly holding lands in Beloochistan which he forfeited through rebellion and unprovoked attacks on other parts of the Khan's dominions, and Moolla Mahomed Raisanee. These had always taken advantage of any petty discontent that might arise, and done their utmost to turn it into rebellion.

9. The first had rebelled many times again the Khan, though the Khan had not only never interfered with his proper possessions, but had pardoned him as often as he had misbehaved. On the last occasion of rebellion Sirdar Meer Khan fled into British territory where he had been generously afforded safe asylum, but there even he had continued his evil habits of intrigue to promote disturbances in his old country. His Highness was most grateful to Government for having removed Sirdar Meer Khan to a greater distance from Beloochistan, and trusts he may be kept where he now is, as his return to his old country or its neighbourhood would most certainly be followed by a renewal of disturbances and fresh disorders in the land.

10. Azaad Khan would be harmless if sedition did not occur in Beloochistan, but whenever it does he immediately offers to join and encourage the malcontents as much as he can, his object being to obtain the throne for himself. He sometimes pays allegiance to Persia, sometimes to Afghanistan, at present the latter, and a little time back he appealed to his Highness the Ameer to assist him by calling on his Highness the Khan to restore to him, Azaad Khan, the lands he formerly held in Beloochistan. The Khan replied suitably to the Ameer, and nothing more has been heard of it. But as Azaad Khan so lately acknowledged his Highness the Ameer's power, I lately suggested by telegram that the latter might be moved to order Azaad Khan to abstain from interfering with Khelat affairs and Khelat subjects.

11. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee is certainly the best of the three, but though not aspiring to the Khanate, he is ambitious of power, and being somewhat weak, is easily led away by designing people who make use of his high position to promote their objects. At the instigation of Meer Khan and Azaad Khan he foolishly rejected the liberal terms given him by the Khan in 1869, and recently he has acted a good deal on the instigation of Allad Dina, the chief of the Khoords, a restless, reckless, person, and one or two others, The Wuzeer, however, hoped that after what had been said here to Moolla Mahomed and the others, as well as the consideration that had been extended to him, that he would separate himself from bad advisers, and that they also would cease to work upon him.

12. The Wuzeer said that immediately after his return to Khelat, if not on his way up the Moolla Pass, he would proceed against Noordeen, the Mingul chief, who had not taken advantage of the amnesty granted but continued in open hostility to the Khan, and he will probably either surrender or fly the country. If the former, it will remain with his Highness the Khan how to dispose of him, whether to punish or pardon him. I should be disposed myself to certainly follow the former course, but the Khan has ever shown a tendency to leniency more than severity, and will probably forgive. I informed the Shahgassee that I would say nothing in behalf of Noordeen, on the contrary that I considered him deserving of severe punishment.

13. The Sirdars who came into Jacobabad will accompany the Wuzeer to Khelat, and there pay their respects to his Highness the Khan. The Wuzeer again pressed on me the great difficulty his master was in on account of want of funds, and that he would now especially greatly need money when the Sirdars and others were all assembled at Khelat. I then privately informed him of the orders of Government in this respect and of the handsome present Government had been pleased to make to the Khan. The Wuzeer expressed himself extremely grateful, and said the amount would be of the greatest possible assistance to the Khan. I accordingly arranged that the one lakh granted in addition should be sent up with the usual annual subsidy so that it may seem to the uninformed outside people that merely the subsidy was being despatched. His Highness the Khan will be, and his Wuzeers was, quite aware that the extra lakh was for only this occasion alone, and was not to be repeated.

14. I trust the above will meet with your Excellency's approval.

P.S.—The Wuzeer was not to leave Jacobabad till Monday, the 8th. Major Harrison would accompany him to Gundava, and then follow him up the Moolla Pass to Khelat.

No. 55.

No. 616, dated Lahore, the 10th May 1872.

From E. W. Trotter, Esq., Assistant Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I AM desired to forward, for the information of the Supreme Government, copies of news reports and letters received from Captain Sandeman.

Enclosure 1 in No. 55.

NEWS REPORT.

EXTRACT from a Private Letter from Syeds Meer Ourung Shah, Chirag Shah, and Bahar Shah, of the village of Dadur at the foot of the Bolan Pass, to the Address of Syed Sooltan Shah, inhabitant of Jampore, in the Dehra Ghazee Khan District. (The two parties belong to the same family, and are nearly related.)

The news is as follows:

THE Sarawan Sirdars, by order of the British Government, went to meet the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed in presence of the Commissioner at Jacobabad. They had much conversation over matters, and the two sides made *injam* (peace).

The English gentlemen desired that Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, who is now the chief representative of the Jalawans, should with some headmen of tribe attend at Jacobabad, in order that before the English gentlemen a good settlement might be come to between the Jalawans and Sarawans on the one side, and the Khan on the other.

According to these directions, the principal chiefs of Sarawan joined Sirdar Moolla Mahomed in writing to Noordeen Mingul to come to Jacobabad. The English gentlemen sent a perwannah also, and the Shahgassee wrote himself to Sirdar Noordeen.

These papers were all taken by four sowars of the Shahgassee to Sirdar Noordeen, but he refused to come to Jacobabad, saying that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed could act for him. This reply of Noordeen's the sowars took back to Jacobabad.

When the gentlemen heard this, they then said that they would only come to a settlement with the Sarawan Sirdars, and that the Jalawans must act for themselves, and that the former must separate from the latter. The Sarawan chiefs then wrote a promise, to the effect that they separated themselves from the Jalawans, and they set their seals to it. It was then arranged by the English gentlemen that the plunder of the kafilas and of Kutchee should be made good by the Brahooees, and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed became responsible. All the jagirs that the Sirdars of Sarawan possessed, when Nusseer Khan was on the Khelat throne, were to be returned to them. The case was thus settled, and the Sirdars left. The Sirdars went to Seebee, and four days afterwards Captain Harrison and the Shahgassee went to Gundava. Since then, to-day (17th April), with the exception of Sirdar Alladina Koord, all the Sirdars of Sarawan have gone to Gundava to Captain Harrison and the Shahgassee with the intention of going to the Khan of Khelat.

The news about the Jalawans is as follows:

Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, with the heads of the tribe and an army of about 2,500 men, arrived at Kozdar. In the fort was Khanazad Abdool Azeez and the troops. Firing with the guns from a distance was daily going on. The Khan's troops were in the Fort, and the Jalawan forces were outside. Now the Shahgassee and the chiefs of Sarawan with Captian Harrison have started for Khelat. We will see what is in the future. The kafila route through the Bolan Pass is not now closed. The chief of the Muzeranee Murrees, Shere Dil, has been placed in charge of the Pass by the Khan, and furnishes guards for the kafilas. The Doomar (Kakar) Pathans are quiet, and do not plunder. The families of the Sarawans will shortly leave Seebee for Khorassan by route of the Bolan.

The *kossids* who pass through the Bolan from Moonshee Unwar (Government Moonshee) report that Pollock Sahib had arrived in Seistan, and that the King of Persia had on Pollock Sahib's representation agreed to give up the country to Ameer Shere Ali.

Syed Noor Mahomed Shah, the Ameer's Wuzeer, who had gone with Pollock Sahib, had written to Candahar about a proper person being sent to rule over the country.

(True translation).
(Signed) R. SANDEMAN, Captain,
Deputy Commissioner.

MEMORANDUM by Captain R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner.

THIS news is fairly reliable, and shows that the chief of Muzeranee Murrees, Shere Dil, has again accepted service under the Khan of Khelat, while the apparent fact of Alladina Koord not having gone with the other Sirdars of Sarawan to meet Captain Harrison at Gundava, admits of the inference that the settlement come to at Jacobabad by Sir William Merewether has not included all, or settled the grievances of the Koords, Kakurs, and Murrees with regard to the Bolan Pass arrangements.

This affects very seriously the arrangement for the Punjab with the Murree clan, who occupy such a very important position on its immediate Frontier.

The Koords and Doomur Pathans are the rightful owners of the lands about the Bolan Pass, and to bring the Muzeranee Murrees there, is contrary to all my ideas of right and justice, for the Murree clan itself has nothing whatever to do with the Bolan Pass.

This is evidently the idea of Sirdar Alladina Koord himself, which accounts for his not going with the other Sirdars to Khelat.

As reported in a former letter, the Muzeranee Murrees are a section of the Murree clan. They formerly belonged to the Khetran tribe, but becoming discontented, joined about 100 years ago the Murree clan, and are bound by all the customs of the tribe.

I have no doubt this arrangement for the Bolan Pass is a very good one, as far as it goes, for the Khan of Khelat, as the Murrees will probably escort the kafilas far less than the Koords; but I doubt very much if the arrangement will, in the long run, work, but fear it will result, as it has hitherto done, in failure and disaster, for the clans of Murrees and Kakurs as a body will sympathise with the ousted Koords, and will be sure to aid them on the very first opportunity that offers of their righting themselves.

Such an arrangement is contrary to tribal custom, and will, in all probability, again arouse the jealousy of the entire Murree clan and prevent their settling.

They will never agree to arrangements being made with the chief of a section of a tribe without the Tomundar and other chiefs having been in any way consulted.

This I know they have not been (*sic*) from the Murree chiefs themselves who are now here, for they never heard of the arrangements until I told them of it.

They left the Hills fifteen days ago, and are waiting the surrender of the clan of the leader of the party who murdered a Gurchani in December last.

They have one and all expressed great dissatisfaction with it.

Enclosure 2 in No. 55.

TRANSLATION of a News Letter from Surab Khan, Tomundar of the Dhoombkees in Kutchee, to Eman Buksh Khan, Sirdar of the Muzaries.

THE Brahooees and the Wuzeer have settled their case before the Commissioner and departed.

They had arrived at Gundava when they were informed that Sirdar Noordeen,

Mingulzai, with the Jalawanees, and Sirdar Azaad Khan, of Kharan, had carried off the crops of Kozdar and Bhagwana lands—the city forts had not been attacked.

When the Jalawanee army heard of the Wazir's arrival at Gundava, Noordeen fled to his own home. Azaad Khan also went home. Previously to this, the Wuzeer and Brahooee Ameers had left Gundava, but whether *en route* for Khelat or in pursuit, I cannot say.

Enclosure 3 in No. 55.

TRANSLATION of a News Letter from Meer Sher Mahomed Khan, Muzarie, to Sirdar Eman Buksh Khan, Muzarie.

SAHIB KHAN has arrived at Rohjan. I heard from him all about Khelat and the Brahooees. He inquired from his friends and found that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Khan, Raisanee, the Brahooees, Shawanees, and the Wuzeer of the Khan had settled their case before the Commissioner on the following conditions, *i.e.*, that the villages given to the Brahooees in the time of Nusseer Khan remain with them; that grants of land made in the time of Shere Dil Khan and Khodadad Khan be resumed. The Brahooees and Shawanees agreed to these terms before the Commissioner.

Moolla Mahomed said he would be responsible for the Pathan kafila robbed by the Brahooees. That he would see that that the Brahooees gave up their plunder. The Commissioner thereupon gave the Wuzeer the following presents:

An Arab horse, worth Rupees 1,000.
A saddle (silver-mounted.)
Ten chogas.
Six loongees.

Besides this he gave him several costly things for the Khan.

He also presented Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, with a khillut or robe of honour, consisting of—

Eight chogas.
Six loongees.

The Commissioner then left for Kurrachee. Captain Harrison, the Wuzeer, Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, and other chiefs went to Gundava. At the time of starting, the Wuzeer was informed that Noordeen Mingulazi with an army had sacked Khozdar and Bhagwana, but had not penetrated inside the fort; that he had also devastated the surrounding country.

The Wuzeer at once wished to pursue Noordeen, declaring that some time or another, he would certainly take him. Moolla Mahomed declared himself ready to go with him.

Nothing more is yet known.

(True translations.)

(Signed) R. SANDEMAN, Captain,
Deputy Commissioner.

No. 56.

No. 2977, dated Bombay Castle, the 20th May 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay in the Political Department, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

REFERRING to recent correspondence regarding the Khelat State, and to the papers submitted last year in the case of the ex-Jam of Lus Beyla, I am directed to transmit herewith, for the information of the Right Honourable the Viceroy and Governor General of India in Council, copy of a Memorandum dated 9th instant, on the present state of affairs in relation to the Khelat State, drawn up by Sir William Merewether (who is now in Bombay), for submission to his Excellency the Governor.

2. With reference to the case of the ex-Jam of Beyla, I am to state that, since the arrival of his Excellency the Governor in Bombay he has had an interview with the ex-Jam, and has been in communication with Sir William Merewether on the subject of the affairs of Khelat. At the interview the Jam took the opportunity of protesting very earnestly against his present detention in our territory, and still more against his being confined at Nuggur, which he asserted to be very injurious to his health. He desired to return Sind. It was pointed out to him that he had fled for his life into

British territory, and, after he had found an asylum there, had been discovered to be carrying on intrigues of a nature hotsile to the Khan of Khelat, with whom this Government was on very friendly terms; that a necessary consequence was his removal to a distance from the frontier, and his being placed under closer surveillance; that this Government was not prepared to assign him a different place of residence, and that he must be prepared to return at once to Nuggur. A day or two after, when required to proceed accordingly, he became exceedingly indignant, declared he would only move by force, and that we might put him to death. The medical officer in charge of him was consequently required to report, and as he stated that he was suffering from diarrhœa, fever, and a bad sore, and, therefore, unable to bear a journey by road, it was directed that, for the present, he should proceed to Poona, and that his future place of residence should be determined hereafter.

Note.—The ex-Jam was sent to Ahmednuggur in December last.

3. It will be noted from the Memorandum submitted that Sir William Merewether thinks it desirable that the belief in the probability of the return of this chief to Khelat Territory should be decidedly discouraged, and that he should be distinctly informed that his return will not be permitted, except at the request of the Khan.

4. The Government of India will also observe that Sir William Merewether recommends that a gift should be made to his Highness the Khan of Khelat of 2,000 old percussion muskets, now in store at Hydrabad, in Scinde. I am to state that upon both these points this Government is desirous of learning the wishes of the Government of India.

Enclosure in No. 56.

MEMORANDUM by Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, on the present state of Affairs in relation to the Khelat State, dated Bombay, the 9th May 1872.

No one acquainted with the history of Beloochistan and the people of that country would be rash enough to expect, or even suppose, that the arrangements recently made at Jacobabad will be lasting, or be held binding by the Sirdars, previously in rebellion, one instant longer than it suit them to abide by the terms granted, or that there does not appear what would seem to them a fair opportunity for further attempts to grasp power and force concessions from the Khan of Khelat.

All that can be safely asserted as having been conclusively done is, that a most unfortunate misapprehension of the position of the Sirdars towards the Khan, and of the course we should take in reference to the Sirdars, has been checked, and I hope completely removed, and the great evils arrested, which the ill-advised support accorded by the Political Superintendent on the frontier to the Sirdars was creating, and which could only bring about the utter subversion of all rule in the country.

The power of any of the Khans of Khelat over the turbulent chiefs of that country has always been of a very uncertain nature, much like that of the Plantagenet Kings over the Barons of England. But unquestionably that of the present Khan has been more sorely tried than any, owing to the fixed determination of the Sirdars, from the very first commencement of his reign, to do their utmost to deprive him of everything but the mere forms of sovereignity, to make him a mere puppet, while the power remained with them. Some even aspired to rule themselves, such as the late Jam of Beyla, Sirdar Meer Khan, and Azaad Khan, the Ruler of Kharan, who was once a feudatory of Khelat, holding lands therein, which he forfeited in consequence of rebellion, but of late independent, and acknowledging only the sovereignty of the Amir of Cabul. He is related to the Khan of Khelat by marriage—the late Khan having married his daughter, and, according to Brahooee custom, the present Khan has taken his brother's widow to wife.

The chief refractory Sindars have been—

Sirdar Meer Khan, formerly Jam of Beyla, now at Ahmednuggur;
Sirdar Azaad Khan, Ruler of Kharan;
Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, the most influential chief in Sarawan, or northern part of Beloochistan;
Sirdar Taj Mahomed Zehree, chief of Jalawan, died in prison in 1867; and
Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, a relation of Meer Khan, and a restless spirit.

Of these, none scarcely can be said to have any real grievances, unless having their ambition and unpatriotic efforts thwarted, and being continually pardoned for repeated acts of rebellion, may be called such.

Meer Khan of Beyla has rebelled seven times, and been as often pardoned. On two of these occasions he and Noordeen were confined in prison, but afterwards released by the Khan and allowed to resume their hereditary estates.

Meer Khan had never been molested by the Khan, but he aspired to be Khan himself, and never failed to use any opportunity that seemed to offer. His efforts, however, were generally futile, owing to his own personal cowardice, which is extreme and notorious in the country, so that it is wonderful he ever gained a following.

Azaad Khan has joined in every disturbance that has taken place during the past 15 years in hopes of gaining the khanate for himself.

Moolla Mahomed and Taj Mahomed, I think, only wanted increased powers and possessions for themselves and adherents, but did not aspire to the sovereignty.

If there is to be peace and order in the country next to the frontier of Sind, there must be a fixed Government and responsible ruler there. This would be impossible if the Sirdars are encouraged, as they lately were, in their resistance to their legitimate sovereign, and in their selfish endeavours to better only themselves. I maintain, therefore, that it is our true and the only reasonable policy to do all we can to strengthen the possession of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and to show marked disapproval of the attempts of the Sirdars to subvert his authority. This being thoroughly understood by the latter, they would find it their best interests to rally to the Khan, and endeavour to secure his favour in hopes of having ours also.

The lakh of rupees lately presented to the Khan will be of very great use to him, and help him to recover himself after his late heavy expenses. But much of its value to him was lost by reason of its being desired that the gift should not be made public. The more widely it was known amongst his own and adjacent people, the more it would have helped to show them his position, and to convey assurance to the Sirdars and others that the Government of India, recognising him as the *de jure* and *de facto* ruler of the country, was ready to give him such support as was suitable, and wished that his authority and a firm fixed government should be maintained in the country, while any movement intended to disturb those would certainly be in no way countenanced.

Small help judiciously given to the Khan on proper occasions will be of most material benefit to him as ruler, and, while not costing us much, should enable him to gradually assume the strong position in his country, I hold it is our best policy he should have, so that we may stave off, as long as possible, the necessity for direct interference with affairs beyond our present line of frontier. The Khan is very poor owing to the best lands in his country being in the possession of the chiefs, who ought to be steady supporters of his authority and government, but on whom he can no longer rely in consequence of the changes which are taking place in the habits and ideas of these chiefs, so well described in his Excellency the Governor's Minute of 10th February 1871.

Though the chiefs, in virtue of their tenure of the lands they have, should give support to the ruler, his power has hitherto been so small that he cannot enforce their doing so, or venture to deprive them of the lands for non-performance of their duty. He has, therefore, to fall back on mercenaries to maintain his power, and these have to be paid out of original small revenues, no new returns coming in at present. Very much the same process is going on in Afghanistan, and the Government of India has there found it necessary to assist his Highness the Amir indirectly, or that potentate's attempt to establish systematic and firm government would fail.

The matter for consideration is, what can best be done at least expense to improve the Khan's position, and to make the results which should follow the late arrangements at Jacobabad and the gift of a lakh of rupees as complete as possible. The Khan must for the future rely on his mercenary troops more than on his capricious Barons, if not entirely on the former, and a present of some of the arms now lying useless in our arsenals would be of immense importance to him. It would not only strengthen him very much, but it would show the chief's legitimate authority was required and would be supported. The Khan would be able to promptly suppress any attempts at rebellion, and, quiet being enforced, the country would improve, and Crown revenues, as well as general prosperity, would be largely increased.

I would, therefore, recommend that two thousand stand of percussion muskets of the old pattern be presented to the Khan at once, and that sanction may be accorded for their issue from the arsenal at Hydrabad.

I can confidently assure Government on two points regarding which objection to this course might be raised,—

1st. That there is not the slightest danger in giving these weapons that they will be ever used against us;

2nd. That the idea that the Khan desires to crush the chiefs merely for crushing' sake, that he would use these arms for that purpose, and that we should be helping to prop up an undeserving ruler against the wishes of the mass of the ruled, is a grievous mistake and a totally wrong view of the case.

As regards the first, these mercenaries would never act against us, or, if they did, their discipline and array would never be so complete as to give any trouble to a much smaller body of our troops, though they would be very powerful against the rabble following of any chief who attempted to show his teeth.

As to the second, the Khan is not a bit worse ruler than other Native sovereigns; indeed, he is far better than a great many. He is somewhat hasty and capricious, as all Native princes, over whose actions there is little check, ever will be; but, instead of persistent vindictiveness, as he has been acccused of he has erred rather in the other way by being too lenient and pardoning over and over again those who richly deserved the most severe punishment for their disloyal and ungrateful conduct.

The mass of the chiefs and people of Beloochistan are well satisfied with the present Khan, and all would soon be equally so if it was clearly understood that we, to whom they all look, were determined that there should be no light or unnecessary change of rule. There is a fixed feeling in Beloochistan that their ruler must be an Ahmudzai,* neither Azaad Khan nor Sirdar Meer Khan of Beyla are of that family, only related by marriage, and both Brahooees and Belooch would have none of them; indeed, Meer Khan, being a Sindee by parentage, would be particularly distasteful to the Brahooee and Belooch, as they look down on all Sindees, styling them mere cultivators.

* The Brahooee family, from which the Khans have been given for many generations.

If the present Khan were ousted, there is no grown-up member of his family to succeed him, and anarchy and confusion must prevail. His eldest son, a very young boy, would probably be set up as a puppet for the ambitious Sirdars to use, and there would be a continued struggle for power among them.

I would recommend that the policy laid down in his Excellency the Governor of Bombay's minute of 10th February 1871, and which has been approved of by the Government of India, should be strictly followed. The Political Agent at Khelat, while freely assisting the Khan with good advice and moral support, should abstain, in every possible way, from direct interference in the affairs of the State

Sirdar Meer Khan, the ex-Jam of Beyla, now a fugitive in British territory, should be kept away from his old possessions, so that he may not be tempted to engage in intrigues connected with Khelat affairs, and he will never abstain if he is anywhere within reach. He should also be distinctly told, once for all, that any petitions regarding return to his old country and position, can neither be listened to nor received; that he was granted a safe asylum in British territory, protecting him from the just resentment of his sovereign, solely under conditions that he should abstain from any communication with his old country, and his deliberate breach of those stipulations has been a grave offence against the Government (that so generously gave him shelter) for which he must be made to answer, by being more strictly looked after than he was at first, or otherwise would have been. I would recommend that, on my return to Sind now, I may be authorised to make a communication to the above effect to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and further that, excepting at the special request of his Highness the Khan, Sirdar Meer Khan will never be allowed to return to the country, where his presence formerly only produced rebellion and disorder, and by flight from which he had abandoned the position he used to hold. The Khan should be authorised to make such use of this communication as he considers best in the way of promulgating it throughout the country. Such would settle the Province of Lus Beyla, which is now kept much disturbed by false reports set about by the ex-Jam and his adherents of the probability of his immediate return, and, until the people are fully assured there that he will not return, they will believe it possible and only half accept new arrangements. The merchants, too, who have hitherto been supplying him with funds in hopes of getting back by his return some of the money they formerly advanced to him, will continue their help, unless they see all chance of return is gone.

With the clear intimation that Meer Khan is not to go back (the Khan will assuredly not ask for him to be allowed to do so) Noordeen Mingul will at once give up his opposition to the Khan and either fly the country or surrender, and Azaad Khan will have to abandon his designs of troubling the khanate.

The above being approved and allowed to be carried out, there will be a fair chance of the errors of the frontier management of the past three years being remedied, and the Khan of Khelat given opportunity of establishing peace and order in his country.

No. 57.

No. 6 S., dated Simla, the 26th May 1872.

From L. H. Griffin, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I AM desired by the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor to forward for information copies of two telegraph messages just received from Captain Sandeman, containing intelligence from Khelat, and of an attack by the Muzeranee Chief on a kafila in the Bolan Pass.

Enclosure in No. 57.

Telegram dated the 24th May 1872.

From Captain Sandeman, Dera Ghazee Khan, to Secretary to Punjab Government, Simla.

NEWS from Murree to Tamindar Ghazee, Khan. Shere Dil, Chief Muzerani Murrees Bolan, at the head of 700 men, attacked kafila in Bolan Pass, killed 30 Afghans, and plundered property estimated to value twenty thousand rupees.

News from Seebee *viâ* Murree to Tamindar. Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed directed Sirdar Moolla Mahomed to go with Captain Harrison to Khelat to Khan, while he himself took Khelat army against Sirdar Noordeen and Ali Khan Jamote. Moolla Mahomed refuses to visit Khelat unless Shahgassee went with them.

No. 58.

No. 3065, dated Bombay Castle, the 27th May 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN continuation of my letter No. 2626, dated the 4th instant, I am directed to forward, for submission to the Government of India, copy of the Diary of the Political Agent at Khelat for the week ending the 20th April 1872, received under the endorsement of the Commissioner in Sind, No. 451, dated the 14th May 1872.

Enclosure in No. 58.

Dated Gundava, the 20th April 1872.

Diary No. 9 by the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 20th April 1872.

INFORMATION regarding Sirdar Noordeen's movements have been received by Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed from the Janeeshee of Khozdar, *viz.*, that the above chief had made a second attempt to take the fort of Khozdar, and fired 42 shells during three days and nights, of which number 25 had fallen into the fort without causing injury to any one. Ordinary shot had been freely fired with the same result. On the 2nd *Suffer* (11th April) Noordeen made over one of his guns to Sirdar Azaad Khan, and on the 15th retired towards Wudd, but was pursued by the Langa's levy, who made six prisoners and captured baggage animals.

Azaad Khan has been joined by Gohur Khan Zuruckzai. News regarding the former is derived from Darogah Atta Mahomed's letter to his Highness the Khan, forwarded for my perusal. Azaad Khan was then at Shahdadzai, and, having a long standing blood feud against these Mahomed Hussanees, demanded 4 camels, 11 bullocks, 100 sheep, besides compensation for the murder above named. He also plundered 11 loads of grain, and one of dates, that were being sent by a Gredur Bunniah to Gerisha. Darogah Atta Mahomed writes that Azaad Khan is waiting to see what Noordeen will do, and that, if he (Atta Mahomed) can attack Azaad Khan without endangering Sohrab and Khelat, he will do so.

Atta Mahomed writes regarding affairs in Mekran: Sirdar Ghazee Khan and Ibrahim Khan, son of Kadur Baksh, Nowsheerwanee, and first cousin once removed to Sirdar Azaad Khan, have made anjam or treaty together, Ghazee Khan having given Ibrahim

Khan the fort of Khudabadan, on condition that he would assist him in taking the fort of Thool from the Shahbegs, or Moolazais. Atta Mahomed further writes that though these disturbances are of a minor nature, yet that, if the Nowsheerwans are not checked, matters will become very serious.

Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, Sunjranee, of Chakansur, has written a friendly note to his Highness the Khan, stating that he had only just heard of the disturbances in his country, and was disappointed that he had not been asked to assist him in some way or another.

A letter was also sent, addresssed to the English Sahib, which was sent to me. It gives the following information regarding Generals Goldsmid and Pollock, *viz.*: General Goldsmid arrived in Seistan a few days before General Pollock, who came by the Gurm Seil route with Syed Noor Mahomed Khan, the latter arrived at Killa Futteh. I went with Sirdars Ahmed Khan, Murdan Khan, and other people of rank, to pay a visit of ceremony. I did good service for them. When they reached Jam, the Governor of the place said he would consider over what the Sahibs had said, and give them an answer at some future day. The Sahibs being annoyed went with Syed Noor Mahomed to the town of Okat. I sent my son Khan Jehan to join them there; from thence they proceeded to Lash, and, having remained there two days, marched towards Herat *en route* to Meshed. My son went with them, the first march from Okat. I received a post for the Sahibs, which came *viâ* Killa Ghrish, and sent it on by two sowars.

Lieutenant Maitland joined me with the cavalry part of my escort on the 18th instant.

(Signed) C. H. Harrison, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

No. 451, dated Kurrachee, the 14th May 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government for information.

No. 59.

No. 1214 P., dated Simla, the 30th May 1872.

From C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C. S. I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department.

The important papers forwarded with your letters marginally noted having been fully considered by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, I am now instructed to request that the cordial thanks of the Government of India may be conveyed to Sir W. Merewether for the patience and good judgment displayed by him in the conduct of the difficult negotiations which preceded his settlement of the claims of the lately insurgent Sirdars of Khelat. The conditions imposed by him on the Sirdars, as a necessary preliminary to reconciliation between them and their chief, are considered entirely just and reasonable, and the terms of his closing address to the Sirdars, as stated in paragraph 23 of his report, are regarded by his Excellency in Council as exceedingly well chosen.

No. 2343, dated 20th April.
„ 2510, „ 27th „

2. To complete the good effect which that address is calculated to produce, the Sirdars should be given distinctly to understand that his Excellency in Council wishes to see the Khan's authority firmly established throughout the length and breadth of his dominions; that the British Government will encourage him by their advice and countenance in all lawful endeavours towards this end; that they will favour with no countenance or support whatever, but, on the contrary, will regard with strong displeasure any of his subjects, whether Sirdars or ryots, who rebel against or endeavour to subvert his legitimate authority; and that the Sirdars will best consult their own interests and the interests of their ryots, and will most surely secure the favour of the British Government by assisting heartily in the establishment of peace and good order, in protecting traders and putting down robbery and violence.

3. At the same time the Khan should be informed that he will not be countenanced in any high-handed interference with the rights of his nobles and subjects; that if by any such proceedings they are driven into rebellion, he must not look to the British

Government to save him from the results of his own misgovernment, although he may rely on receiving such assistance as the British Government may find it possible to give him with the view of maintaining his lawful authority; and that the best security for the stability of his throne is for him to treat his nobles and subjects in a kind and conciliatory way, respect their ancient privileges, honours and rights, and gain a hold on their affections.

4. As to the advisability of the Commissioner's procedure in abstaining from further endeavours to bring Noordeen Mingul within the compass of the reconciliation effected between the other Sirdars and the Khan, his Excellency in Council is disposed to believe that it would be better even yet to hold out to him a direct offer of an amicable settlement, unless, indeed, Sir William Merewether feels sure of the Khan's ability to coerce him. Until the disorders consequent on the Sirdar's continuance in arms are put a stop to, the suppression of the insurrection cannot be considered as complete. Intelligence of the steps taken with this end, and of the measure of success by which they are attended, will, therefore, be anxiously awaited by the Government of India.

5. In conclusion, I am to request that Colonel Phayre may be desired to explain his act in making presents to the late insurgent Sirdars on the day of his departure.

6. With respect to Captain Sandeman's position, the orders issued in my letter of 18th March appear sufficient to prevent misunderstandings in future.

No. 60.

No. 3157, dated Bombay Castle, the 30th May 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay in the Political Department; to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of the letter from this Office, No. 2907, dated the 17th instant, I have the honour, by direction of his Excellency the Governor in Council, to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying copy * of a news report received from the Commissioner in Sind.

* No. 482, dated 23rd May 1872.

Enclosure in No. 60.

No. 482, dated Kurrachee, the 23rd May 1872.

NEWS REPORT from the 8th to the 15th and the 22nd May 1872.

Syud Thoweynee, the Wuzeer of his Highness Syud Toorkee, Sultan of Muscat, took possession of Gwadur without opposition. The Wuzeer was accompanied by 300 Arab soldiers, and the change of rule was favourably received by the inhabitants. The Wuzeer proposes remaining at Gwadur until the next Gulf steamer passes about the 29th instant.

2. Fever and small-pox have disappeared from the town.

3. On the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed reaching Kozdar, Noordeen Mingul endeavoured to open negotiation. The Shahgassee caused him to be informed that if he surrendered, giving up all the property plundered from kafilas, the guns, &c., obtained by him at Beyla, his life should be guaranteed, but not the chieftainship of the tribe. These terms were offered by the Shahgassee to save the necessity of marching a force into Wudd against Noordeen, which would injure and distress the poorer classes, who had been compelled by circumstances more than inclination to share in the late disturbances. Noordeen has accepted the terms and surrendered to the Shahgassee on the 10th instant, at Kozdar, stating he was prepared to undergo any punishment his Highness the Khan chose to inflict upon him.

4. The Sarawan Sirdars are with the Shahgassee on their way to pay their respects to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

(Signed) W. L. MEREWETHER, Col.,
Commissioner in Sind.

No. 61.

No. 1250 P., dated Simla, the 4th June 1872.

From C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 1214 P., dated the 30th of May 1872, I am instructed to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Governor in Council, and communication to Sir William Merewether, a copy of the letters noted on the margin, from the Punjab Government, submitting reports and letters from Captain Sandeman on Khelat affairs.

No. 616, dated 10th May 1872.
„ 6 S., dated 26th May 1872, (with copy of enclosures).

2. With especial reference to the first of these letters, I am to state that Captain Sandeman will be instructed to submit any future remarks which he may have to make about the Murree tribe direct to the Commissioner in Sind, through the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind, Frontier, (to whom quâ the tribe in question he is subordinate,) sending copies of his communications to the Punjab Government for information.

3. I am also to take this opportunity, in reply to your letter No. 2977, dated the 30th May 1872, of conveying approval of the recommendation contained in Colonel Sir William Merewether's memorandum of the 9th idem, to the effect that the Jam of Lus Beyla should be told distinctly that his return to Khelat will not be permitted, except at the request of the Khan.

4. As regards the Commissioner's further suggestion, that the Khan should be presented with two thousand stands of percussion muskets of the old pattern, I am to inform you that this matter will be referred to the Government of India in the Military Department, for consideration. A further communication will be addressed to you on the subject, as soon as the views of that Department thereon have been ascertained.

No. 62.

No. 3350, dated Bombay Castle, the 6th June 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay in the Political Department, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of this office letter No. 3065, dated 27th ultimo, I am directed to forward herewith, for submission to the Government of India, copy of a diary No. 11, by the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 4th ultimo, received under endorsement of the Commissioner in Sind, No. 495, dated 29th idem.

Enclosure in No. 62.

No. 11 of 1872.

Diary by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 4th May 1872, dated Kozdar, the 4th May 1872.

Arrived at Kozdar on the 4th instant, and were received about a mile from our camp by Sirdar Meah Mahomed Mingul, Naib Abdul Azeez, Janesheen Goolam Mahomed, and a following of 200 people.

Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed forwarded several letters from Mekran for my perusal.

Sirdar Meah Bhai Khan has written in a friendly spirit to his Highness the Khan, and reports everything quiet in the neighbourhood of Kedj.

Dad Karreem, Karreem Beg Dandos residing in the district of Kedj, and Meer Morad Bolehdee, bring to his Highness's notice that, owing to their loyalty to him, they have incurred the ill-will of those who were in rebellion.

Mahomed Hoossein, Sooliman, and Moolah Rahmat, of "Kolanch Dusht," write—"We warned Darogah Attah Mahomed that the policy he followed would end disastrously, but he paid no attention to the advice given." The above also report that Naib Ali Jan acted unjustly towards them, but had behaved better since receiving his Highness' instructions.

Shah Oomer, Gitchkee, states that, though the majority of the people in Mekran had been disaffected, he had remained true and loyal, but was obliged to disguise his real sentiments to save himself. Shah Oomer also writes that Nubbee Buksh, Sooliman, and Meer Koonur, of Kolanch, joined in the rebellion, owing to Darogah Attah Mahomed's bad treatment; but that if his Highness would write them a complimentary letter, and tell them to have confidence in him, "Shah Oomer," matters could be satisfactorily arranged.

Meer Esan Gitchkee and Yar Mahomed Soongar bring to his Highness' notice the assistance they afforded to Darogah Attah Mahomed on his leaving Mekran.

Naib Ali Jan writes to his Highness that with only six sowars he is not in a position to collect revenue from people indisposed to pay the same.

Sakur Sajdee, of Mushka, has written to his Highness for assistance against Sirdar Azaad Khan, who is plundering his country.

During the past week Sirdar Noordeen has twice communicated with Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, once by letter, and on the last occasion "a verbal message."

The letter was written on the 23rd April addressed to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, and the Sarawan chiefs, as follows: (After salaams)—I received your verbal message through Jungee Khan, Raisanee, viz., that you were about to start for Kozdar with Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed. He also delivered your other messages. I have dismissed my force and gone to Wud, and Azaad Khan has returned to Kharan now that you have left. I authorize you to treat for me, the Jam, and others concerned, and hope that you will inform me what has been agreed upon.

Jungee Khan tells me that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed has made arrangements for himself, but I do not credit this; for it seems extraordinary that he should make terms for himself and forget me. I am greatly concerned about this, for I distinctly authorised Sirdar Moolla Mahomed to act on my behalf. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed ought to have acted as if Wud and Beylah belonged to him. Don't be careless on this point: "now is the time." I have also heard that Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed is coming up the Moolah with a force. Let me know what his intentions are.

The message received on Saturday was to find out what measures were likely to be taken against Sirdar Noordeen and his adherents. On both occasions Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed asked my advice.

I therefore told them that I had no authority to interfere between his Highness the Khan and his chiefs; that the Commissioner in Sind had been deputed by my Government to bring about a friendly settlement, but that as Sirdar Noordeen had declined his good offices, ignored his Highness' proclamation, as also the authority he had given to Sirdar Moolla to act on his behalf, it rested with his Highness the Khan to deal with Sirdar Mahomed Noordeen in such manner as he might deem advisable.

Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed authorised Sirdar Meah Mahomed to tell the Minguls that if they gave up property plundered from the kafilas, his Highness' guns and mortar, and surrendered Noordeen, they would be forgiven for having taken part in the late disturbances. No reply having as yet been received, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed marches on Ferozeabad, a Mingul village a few miles from this, and has arranged with Shukur Khan, the commandant, that the standing crops are not to be injured and property respected.

The Shahgassee proposes writing to Noordeen, informing him that if he surrenders and gives up the property plundered from kafilas, his Highness' guns, &c., he will guarantee his life, but not the chieftainship of the tribe. These terms are offered by the Shahgassee not out of consideration for Noordeen, but that having to march a force into Wud would ruin and distress the poorer classes, who have been compelled by circumstances to take a share in the late disturbance.

Noor Ali, the son of Sirdar Shere Ali Khan, has written to Sirdar Noordeen regarding the kafila he plundered on the 1st Mohurrum. This letter was entrusted to two Afghans, who passed through Kozdar a few days ago *en route* to Wud. They informed the Janesheen that Noordeen had been called upon to restore the property, and that if he did not do so he would be punished. Noor Ali also wrote to his Highness the Khan as follows:—

"You are aware that your subjects are annoying kafilas whilst passing through your country, and that they plundered 700 camels laden with wool whilst passing through the Bolan Pass, and that 20 of the merchants were killed and others wounded. I have also heard that Sirdar Noordeen intended to plunder another kafila *en route* to Khelat,

and that they took shelter in the fort of Kozdar, which was then attacked by the above chief. Taking these circumstances into consideration, it was necessary to write to you. These people are evidently beyond your control, and consequently you may not be able to protect the kafilas. The closing of the kafila route causes you loss, reflects unfavourably on you as ruler of the country, and injures the subjects of his Highness the Ameer; the whole world knows of the friendship existing between his Highness the Ameer and yourself, it is apparent as the light of the sun. I am, therefore, hopeful that you will make some arrangements regarding kafilas, so that merchants may traverse your country without danger to life and property. This will be to our mutual advantage. If you are quite incapable of making these arrangements, write and tell me, and I will report the same to his Highness the Ameer, and he will make suitable arrangements for the protection of his subjects."

Copies of letters on this subject are attached.

His Highness has written to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed regarding the raid on the Muzuranee Murrees by the Sumalanees, and Shere Dil's attack on the kafila, stating that the former action was at the instigation of the Sarawan chiefs, hoping to get charge of all kafilas passing through the Bolan, and that the latter, in a reckless frame of mind, attacked the kafila; that he, the Khan, had written to his Naibs at Mustoong and Quetta to recover Shere Dil's property by force, if necessary, and had also written to Shere Dil to keep quiet, explaining that measures had been taken to recover what had been plundered from him. Letters from Attah Mahomed, Naib of Kedj, and the Sumalanees support his Highness' view of this question. The former writes * on the 9th Sufur: I heard that the Minguls and other Brahooees of Mustoong and Kunuk had assembled for the purpose of attacking Shere Dil, Murree. Considering that, as the said Murrees had charge of the Bolan, an attack on them would be injurious to kafilas passing through, I at once started with some sepoys. I met the Brahooees on the Dusht with property plundered from the Murrees. I sent some people to look after a kafila that was coming up. On the Brahooees making a demonstration against me, I sent some Shawanees of rank amongst them, and when they ascertained who I was they abstained from all violent measures. The leading Brahooees were brought to me by the Shawanees. I told them that I should take them and their plunder to Quetta, as they had created a disturbance in the country, and that your Highness would so punish them as to be a warning to others not to act in the same way. Rawut Khan and Kurreem Khan then told me that what they had done had been at the instigation of other people, but declined to give up the names of their advisers."

* Persian letter attached. (Sd.) C. H. H.

The rest of the letter alludes to Shere Dil's attack on the kafila reported in last week's diary.

Naib Abdool Rahman, of Mustoong, writes † to his Highness on this subject—"Your Highness,—On being aware of the disturbance created by Kurreem Khan, Rawut Khan, and Dad Shah, "Sumalanees," I sent Jemadar Afzal Khan to forbid them attacking Shere Dil, and to inform them that they had no right to create any disturbance, so long as Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed was engaged in treaty arrangements at Jacobabad. These evil-disposed people had plundered Shere Dil before the Jemadar arrived. He at once upbraided them for their conduct. In reply they stated that what they had done had been by the advice of all the Sarawanees. The Jemadar took possession of 1,385 goats and sheep and 34 donkeys and handed them over to me. I enclose a paper showing the parties concerned. Kootub Khan, Satukzai, a servant of yours, killed one man, recovered 1,500 sheep and 25 donkeys, and handed them over to the Murrees."

† Copy of letters attached. (Sd.) C. H. H.

Deposition ‡ *by the plundering Sumalanees.*

‡ Attached.—(Sd.) C. H. H.

We, the undersigned, of our free will, in the presence of Sooltan Mahomed Shawanee, Syed Roostum Shah, Sheik Mahomed Jaro, "Sahibzada," state that this raid was organized and carried out by the whole of the Sarawanees, and that we would not heed what his Highness' Naibs advised.

The 19th Sufur 1289. (Signed) KURREEM KHAN, RAWUT KHAN, DAD SHAH, and NOOR MAHOMED, } "Sumalanees."

Second paper by Kurreem Khan, Rawut Khan, Kheir Buksh, Dad Shah, and Jaro Mahomed, Sumalanee Minguls, giving the names of those who participated in the plunder, viz. :—

Yusuf Khan Budoozai Khan.
Mahomed " Mahomed Shai."
Morad Buksh " Aba Bukee."
Zureef Khan Peer Khanee.
Zuruk, Johanee } " Sahukzai Koords."
Moobaruk Shawanee " Sooreezai."
Guddo " Dinarzai."
Subz Ali " Keahzai."
Hotewan " Mahomed Hussunee."
Ala Buksh " Sassoolee."
Hajee Khan " Rodenee."
Bursham " Jaddee."
Shere Ali " Lehree."
Beg Mahomed " Gooroog Naree."
Hybut and Rehein Khan, sons of Butteh Bahadoor " Shoranzai."

We further state that this raid was effected before Jemadar Afzul Khan arrived. On his ordering us to give up the plunder, most of the Brahooees refused; some of it, however, was returned in presence of Subedar Mahomed Yar, " Moonshee Mahomed Sudeek," " Dad Kurreem " Arhab, Beig Mahomed Khwajee Khail Mustee Khan, Shaik Futteh Khan, Johanee Koodoo Nijao, and others.

" Kurreem Khan, Rawut Khan, and Dad Shah also write * to his Highness the Khan:

* Copy attached.—(Sd.) C. H. H.

" (After salaams)—Your Highness will know ere this that the raid we have committed was with the full approval of all the Sarawan people, and that we have furnished a list showing amongst whom it was distributed.

" Kootub Khan, Sutukzao, killed one of our party and recovered 1,200 sheep. We are quite willing to suffer any punishment you may order. The rest of the Sarawans are as guilty as we are."

Sirdar Abdool Kardar, the imbecile chief of the Shawanees, died a few days ago, and has been succeeded by his eldest son.

Sirdar Meah Kaira, son of the Bezonjao chief, Faqueer Mahomed, Sirdar Pahar Khan, Sassoolee, Hyat Khan, son of Sakur Sajdeo, and other minor chiefs, have visited me.

Darogah Attah Mahomed, though reinforced by a detachment from Khelat, never attempted to prevent Sirdar Azaad Khan raiding, and allowed him to pass by Geedur, eight miles from Sohrab, where his camp was pitched. His Highness some time ago ordered Attah Mahomed to support the garrison at Kozdar, but he avoided marching on various pretences, though he received most urgent letters from Naib Abdool Azeez and Janesheen Gootano Mahomed.

Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed has written very strongly to the Darogah about not proceeding to Kozdar, reported his conduct to his Highness the Khan, and suggested that, as the Darogah appeared disinclined to move, some one else ought to be sent to relieve him.

Sirdar Noordeen, when at Kozdar, sent Goolam Mahomed, Shahzai, to Ali Khan, Jamote, stating that he had surrounded the fort, expected to take it in a day or two, and wanted rice, flour, ghee, &c., for his people. Ali Khan, hearing that Noordeen had failed in his attempt on Kozdar, ordered Goolam Mahomed to be turned out of Beylah, telling him at the same time that he had nothing to do with Noordeen or the Minguls.

It is currently reported that the Roonjas and Jamotes have quarrelled amongst themselves and that a serious fight is likely to ensue.

No. 495, dated Kurrachee, the 28th May 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information. A subsequent telegram reports that Noordeen Mingul had accepted the terms offered by the Shahgassee.

The Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, has been instructed to obtain further report on the subject of the raid made by the Sumalanee Minguls, and what orders his Highnees the Khan finally issued in the matter. It is expected that on the Shahgassee rejoining his Highness the Khan at Khelat, these and other questions will be disposed of.

No. 63.

No. 3351, dated Bombay Castle, the 6th June 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of the letter from this Office, No. 3350, of this date, I am directed to transmit herewith, for submission to the Government of India, copy of a Diary No. 12 by the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 11th ultimo, received under endorsement of the Commissioner in Sind, No. 494, dated 28th idem.

Enclosure in No. 63.

Dated Khozdar, the 11th May 1872.

Diary No. 12 of 1872 by the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 11th May 1872.

His Highness, writing to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, states "that the Sarawans "who participated in the plunder of the Muzuranee Murrees, are trying to evade "restoring the same."

In last week's diary it was stated that Sirdar Noordeen, Mingul, had been offered terms by Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed being unsupported by his tribe. He surrendered himself to the Shahgassee on the 10th instant, stating that his object in creating this last disturbance was on the ex-Jam's account, having failed in his object. His Highness was at liberty to imprison him, take his life, or act in any way he might deem advisable. Sirdar Noordeen has also undertaken to restore the kafila property and his Highness' guns, &c.

The Kafila Bashi of the kafila plundered by Noordeen has visited me several times, stating that he considered the English Government responsible to him for his property, or value of the same. I explained that no such responsibility existed, but that I would exert my influence with his Highness and Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed to recover the same.

A large kafila was just arrived from Kurrachee.

Darogah Atta Mahomed has arrived with his detachment at Bhagwana, but will probably return to Khelat, now that no further disturbances are apprehended in this part of the country.

Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed intends sending letters to the principal chiefs in Beyla, calling upon them to come to Khelat, after which arrangements will be made for the government of that district.

Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed proceeded to Ferozabad as intended, and hopes to march on Bhagwana on the 13th instant. I also propose proceeding towards Khelat about the same date.

(Signed) C. H. Harrison, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

No. 494, dated Kurrachee, the 28th May 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government for information.

No. 64.

No. 44 of 1872.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. Secret.

To his Grace the Duke of Argyll, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE, Simla, the 24th June 1872.

IN continuation of our letter No. 5, Secret, dated the 24th of January 1872, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers* relating to Khelat affairs, and the settlement effected by the Commissioner in Sind.

2. We beg to draw your Grace's attention to our letter of 30th May to the Bombay Government, which contains the orders we have passed upon Sir William Merewether's reports.

We have, &c.
(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
JOHN STRACHEY.
R. TEMPLE.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.

No. 65.

No. 3506, dated Bombay Castle, 12th June 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN continuation of the letter from this office, No. 3351, dated the 6th instant, I am directed to enclose, for submission to the Right Hon. the Governor-General in Council, copy of the diary* of the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 18th ultimo, received under endorsement of the Commissioner in Sind, No. 534, dated 5th instant.

* No. 13.

Enclosure in No. 65.

Diary No. 13, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 18th May 1872.

ANOTHER Pathan kafila has been plundered at the Musjid between Much and Siri Bolan. The merchants twice repulsed the marauders, though they were over one thousand strong; eventually they were overpowered, and their property taken from them. It is currently reported that these plunderers were from different Murree tribes; it has also been stated that Alladdina Koord and his people were within a few yards of where the attack occurred, and they appropriated some of the plunder. "This requires confirmation."

His Highness in writing to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed informed him that Abdool Rahman had taken Balkh, and that his Highness the Ameer had ordered twenty-five guns and the troops at Candahar to form part of the force ordered to proceed to Balkh.

Abdool Luteef, the Naib of Quettah, writes to his Highness that the property plundered from Shere Dil Murree has been distributed amongst the people in Mustung, Kunuk, Ispilmeji, and Murao, and that force will be required to recover the same.

Before leaving Kutchee Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed ordered the Naibs to send all kafilas by the Moolah Pass. At Gundegao, two marches from Khelat, we met five hundred camels laden with piece-goods; and the merchants reported that this only composed half of their kafila, and that the rest of the camels were only a march or two behind.

Had the Naib of Dadur followed the Shahgassee's instructions, the catastrophe in the Bolan would have been avoided.

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* Nos. 31 to 63.

No. 534, dated Kurrachee, 5th June 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information. Further particulars as to this last attack on the kafila in the Bolan have been called for from the Political Agent Khelat.

No. 66.

No. 34 S., dated Simla, 18th June 1872.

From Officiating Secretary to the Government of Punjab to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with Governor General.

I AM directed to forward correspondence submitted by Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan, relating to the treatment of the Murree tribe, together with a copy of a telegram despatched this day to the Commissioner of the Derajat Division.

2. In the opinion of his Honour, whilst it is absolutely necessary that Captain Sandeman should act in subordination to Sir W. Merewether in his treatment of the Murree tribe, yet, taking into consideration how much exposed the frontier is to their depredations, it is equally desirable that the grievances alleged by them against the Khan of Khelat should be investigated by the Commissioner in Sind without delay and satisfactorily adjusted, otherwise it is to be feared that, without any cessation of the outrages in the Bolan Pass, the disturbances on the Dehra Ghazee Khan frontier will be renewed, and the conciliatory measures which have put a stop to them for some years past will become nugatory.

Enclosure 1 in No. 66.

News Report.

Telegram, dated 4th June 1872.

From Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan, to Secretary to Government, Punjab.

"A KAFILA consisting of 39 camels want escort from me through Murree Hills. Kafila Bashi declares Bolan route quite unsafe. I can ensure safety of kafila to Candahar. Shall I apply to Commissioner in Sind for permission to escort kafila ?"

Enclosure 2 in No. 66.

Telegram, dated 8th June 1872.

From Secretary, Government, Punjab, to Captain Sandeman.

"You should refer question of escort of kafila to Commissioner in Sind."

Enclosure 3 in No. 66.

Telegram, dated 9th June 1872.

From Captain Sandeman to Sir William Merewether.

"KAFILA of 49 camels arrived here *en route* for Candahar. Kafila Bashi feared Bolan route. He asked me for safe conduct through Murree Hills. I can ensure safety of kafila by giving it. Is this all right?"

Enclosure 4 in No. 66.

Telegram, dated 10th June 1872.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether to Captain Sandeman.

AFTER the way the Murrees have behaved lately in plundering kafilas in the Bolan I neither can nor will have anything to say to them until the plundered property is given up. I consider it therefore very unadvisable that the Murrees should be treated with as if nothing had happened, or that kafilas should be allowed to enter their country from ours. The Moolla is quite safe and open to the kafilas, and so would the Bolan be but for the misconduct of these Murrees.

Enclosure 5 in No. 66.

Telegram, dated 10th June 1872.

From Captain Sandeman to Commissioner in Sind.

I HAVE sent instructions to send kafila to Jacobabad. I will attend willingly to any instructions you send. My demi-official of 4th explains the necessity of moving troops to Hurrund, if I break off relations with Murrees. By unity of action I believe it is quite possible to coerce Murrees into surrendering plundered kafila property.

Enclosure 6 in No. 66.

Telegram, dated 10th June 1872.

From Captain Sandeman to Officer Commanding, Rajunpoor.

SEND for the Tehsildar and direct him to send an express to the Muzari chief, Imam Buksh Khan, not to allow the Usterana kafila to go *viâ* the Murree Hills, but send it to Jacobabad to go *viâ* the Moolla Pass. The matter is urgent.

Enclosure 7 in No. 66.

Translation of a Letter from Tomundar Ghuzzun Khan, chief of the Murree clan, to Captain R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan, dated Kahun, 19th May 1872.

I HAVE understood the state of affairs from my brothers Mehroolla and from Shahan Khan. I am greatly pleased. I sent Hajee, the brother of Shahan, to Seebee about affairs there, as you directed. I send papers from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and Buktear Khan, Barakzai. I received your order that I was to come direct to you, when sent for, and that I would get the order direct and not through any of the Ghazi chiefs. I will attend to this and to any orders I receive, and am very much pleased with the order that you will send for me direct. When you do direct my attendance, please send a very reliable sowar for me, for my enemies are many.

Shere Dil, Muzzerani, collected his people, and in the Bolan Pass attacked and looted a kafila; 40 Pathans and three Murrees were killed. The Murrees looted 120 camels, 500 donkeys, 40 horses, and a very large amount of property.

Kukkul, Bijarani Murree (a chief of this section of the tribe), who was wounded, is dead.

No letter came with this from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, The letter itself went astray and has only turned up to-day, but I send it to show how willingly these men will work with us if they find it is in their interests to do so, and they have confidence and faith in the way they will be treated. When Ghuzzun Khan first undertook my service he told me plainly that he could not be responsible for the Muzzerani or Bijarani Murrees with regard to their looting in Khelat, as they had grievances which required redress at the hands of the Khan of Khelat. That he (Ghuzzun Khan) had been turned out of his lands in Kutchee, and until he was righted he would not engage to serve the Khan and protect Kutchee from the tribe. I remember well saying to him,—"But the Khan "is your Sirdar, you ought to serve him." He never hesitated in his reply, but said quickly—"Sahib, if the Khan would right me and my tribe I would take service with "the Khan at Rupees 10 a month for each sowar, and do it as well as I do for you at "Rupees 20 for each sowar," or words to that effect, *i.e.*, he meant that what he would do for me for Rupees 20 he would do for the Khan for Rupees 10. I felt convinced of his truth and that he had no disloyal feelings towards the Khan, and I have seen no reason to change my opinion. The above is what actually passed, and when I wrote Sir Henry Green that my arrangements with the Murrees were only in connexion with the Punjab border, and that Ghuzzun Khan could not engage on account of the service I gave him to protect the Khelat roads from marauders, he said—"I was quite "at liberty to make any arrangements that I liked, and then he would look after the "Khan's affairs, and for me not to bother myself about them," or words to that effect.

The state of affairs between the Muzzerani chief Sher Dil and Kenchi Khan and the Tomundar of the tribe, Ghuzzun Khan, I do not quite know.

The Muzzeranis against the desire of the tribe took service with the Khan for the protection of the Bolan Pass, and used to escort the kafilas from Shawl Kote to Dadur. From other sources of information I learn that the reason why the Muzzeranis looted the kafila named in Ghuzzun's letter was because a body of Minguls (Brahooees) had

first attacked Sher Dil and killed two of his men. He lost a son it is said and appealed to the Khan for aid, but got no redress.

In retaliation he attacked and looted the kafila as described by Ghuzzun Khan.

In my telegrams to Sir William Merewether above recorded, I say that I believe the Murrees can be coerced into the surrender of the plunder, which by all accounts is great. I say coerced because I do not believe any other measures would enable the chiefs. even if they were willing to aid in the recovery of the plunder, to get hold of it now that it has been divided by the marauders. Fear of the consequences of retaining it alone would compel its surrender.

The Murree tribe is a very unruly one, but there are elements of great good in it, which, if utilized, might produce a lasting benefit to all connected with it. I feel fully persuaded, and I do not talk without considerable experience of the tribe and its ways, that no peaceful solution of the Khelat question will ever be arrived at, nor will quiet and progress on the Punjab border be ensured till our arrangements embrace the settlement of the whole clan in their own country. To do this I know to be perfectly feasible, but we must begin by having right on our side. I believe this at present we have not, and that it was a political mistake the leaving of the grievances of this clan to be taken up at any time as suited our convenience. They knew and understood all that was passing around them, and I know as a certainty that Colonel Phayre, if not Sir Henry Green, also promised that some day their grievances would be redressed, and I myself understood that the intention was that they should ultimately get back the service they formerly enjoyed for the protection of Kutchee and the Bolan Pass prior to the reduction of the Khan's allowance from a lakh to half a lakh. I fully understood that all that was required to enable us to settle with the Murrees was the additional allowance lately granted by the Government of India. The present complications with this powerful tribe are the result of not doing so, and they seem to me of a very grave nature.

Since I left Jacobabad I was told by the Murree chief's confidential agent that Ghuzzun Khan was greatly mortified at not being summoned with the other Khelat Sirdars to the meeting at Jacobabad, as he counts himself one of the chiefs of the Khanate of Khelat. I have heard it openly talked of that when Sir Henry Green, at the head of the Brahooee army, marched against the Murrees to punish them on account of their conduct during 1856–57, that the other Khelat Sirdars, who were with the force, told the Murree Sirdar to give in his submission as he was a Sirdar, and they had come all to demand it. They said that they would put it all right with the Shahgassee and the Khan. The Murree tribe then submitted, and the Khelat army returned home; but no arrangements for the future were come to, and no inquiry as to the causes which led to Murree raids was made; the consequences are that we have these raids to the present day, and the tribe is day by day getting more unruly and unmanageable.

The very fact of the Muzaranis and Khan Murrees respectively taking service with the Khan of Khelat and the Punjab Government for (on the one hand) the protection of the Bolan trade, and (on the other) that of the Punjab borders, by fair inference proves that the entire clan, if properly managed, are capable of doing good service to both the Khan of Khelat and the British Government, which would by degrees change from being a band of unruly robbers and plunderers to a fairly conducted people.

I believe inquiry would show that the Murree Tomundar, like the other Sirdars, is entitled to a position in the Khanate of Khelat, and that his being ousted from this, as he considers such loss of honour, is his principal grievance.

P.S.—The Murrees, if admitted to form part of the Khanate of Khelat, could, as I am prepared to show, be held easily in hand, when raids could not be committed, as at present, with impunity, that is to say, if the Khanate itself was only fairly governed. I have not sent a copy of this to Sir W. Merewether as it did not seem necessary to do so.

Enclosure 8 in No. 66.

Telegram, dated 13th June 1872.

From Commissioner in Sind, Kurrachee, to Captain Sandeman, Dera Ghazee Khan.

I certainly consider it most desirable that Murree chief should be made to understand that late conduct of tribe in regard to kafilas in Bolan cannot be put up with, and pressure should be brought to bear on them to give up plundered property. I certainly will not enter into any arrangements with Murree chiefs until the property is given up, and you are authorised so to inform the head. Under these circumstances it would, I think, be better that you should put off your interview with chief if your work can wait, giving above also as reason.

Enclosure 9 in No. 66.

Telegram, dated 13th June 1872.

From Captain Sandeman, Dera Ghazee Khan, to Commissioner in Sind, Kurrachee.

I will at once attend to your instructions. If you determine that tribe must restore property, I suggest that very decisive coercive measures should be taken from Punjab, Sind, and Khelat. The Murree country is quite open and accessible from Hurrund. I know every road leading to it, and believe strict military blockade would result in the surrender of plunder. Shall I submit my views for approval? I will cordially co-operate in any measures you decide upon taking, but these ought not to be delayed if you are to recover the property, which under any circumstances must be matter of difficulty. Murree chiefs are now assembled at Kahun in council, probably to consider how to dispose of plunder.

Enclosure 10 in No. 66.

Telegram, dated 12th June 1872.

From Captain Sandeman, Dera Ghazee Khan, to Sir William Merewether, Kurrachee.

I had fixed to go to Hurrund in a few days to have a friendly interview with Murree Tomundar about my own border affairs. Your telegram about kafila seems to render this undesirable now. What course shall I pursue?

Enclosure 11 in No. 66.

Telegram.

From Lieutenant-Governor, Simla, to Commissioner, Derajat.

Captain Sandeman demi-officially states that to enforce Sir W. Merewether's measures against the Murrees, it is necessary to bring the posts up to their full strength and blockade the tribe. As the peace of the Dera Ghazee Khan frontier is brought in question, you must keep yourself informed of all Captain Sandeman's doings and control them, and if necessary, go to Dera Ghazee for the purpose.

Repeated to Captain Sandeman.

No. 67.

No. 40 S., dated Simla, 21st June 1872.

From Officiating Secretary to the Government of Punjab to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor-General.

In continuation of my letter No. 34 S., dated 18th current, with its accompanying report of the orders of the Commissioner in Sind, in regard to the Murree tribe, I am desired to forward, for information, copy of a further telegram received from Captain Sandeman.

Enclosure in No. 67.

Telegram.

From Captain Sandeman, Dera Ghazee Khan, to Secretary to Government, Punjab, Simla.

Bruce was at Murree, and until he was withdrawn I could not safely communicate Commissioner in Sind's orders to Murree chiefs. Lieutenant-Governor's telegram received. Will place Khelat correspondence before Commissioner, Derajat, being guided by his advice before writing to Murrees or taking any measures likely to involve peace of frontier. I yesterday again wrote Commissioner in Sind, placing state of affairs on frontier before him, and now I propose carrying out his orders. Copy by post.

No. 68.

No. 43 S., dated Simla, 25th June 1872.

From Officiating Secretary to the Government of Punjab to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor General.

I am desired to forward copy of a letter addressed by Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan, to the Commissioner in Sind, dated 18th June 1872, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy. I am to observe that the Lieutenant-Governor considers this letter proper and reasonable, In the views therein expressed by Captain Sandeman his Honour fully concurs, and would urge their early enforcement.

Enclosure in No. 68.

Dated 18th June 1872.

From Deputy Commissioner, Derah Ghazee Khan, to Commissioner in Sind.

On receipt of your telegram regarding sending the Usterana kafila *viâ* the Moolla Pass, I at once sent orders to Rajhan, directing that your instructions should be complied with, and to-day I have received notice from Rajhan that it has been sent on to Jacobabad in charge of trustworthy men.

I propose carrying out your instructions with regard to the Murrees in the following way:—

I have sent for the Murree Vakeel, who is a relation of Ghuzzun's, and I will inform him that there are no hopes of their ever being reconciled to the Khan, or of their being taken into favour, unless they surrender the kafila property looted by the tribe in the Bolan Pass. I will also tell him that you have directed that the friendly intercourse that has hitherto existed between myself and the tribe cannot be allowed to continue unless they do as you have directed, and that therefore I must decline to receive Ghuzzun for the present to settle the Gurchani case. If you desire me to communicate anything further to the chiefs, on receiving your instructions I will do as you desire.

I think it is only right now to place before you, for favourable consideration, the position that I have held with regard to the Murrees, and the very serious trouble it may give to us here should I break with them entirely. As recommended in one of my telegrams, as far as I am concerned, it would be a very great blessing if you determined to coerce the tribe into the surrender of the looted property, to do so by blockading it from Sind, the Punjab, and Khelat. If we do not adopt decided measures, I fear the revival of the old blood feuds between the tribe and our subjects, and which have only after great trouble been healed. I set about healing the feud between the Murrees, Drishuks, Muzaris, and Gurchanis under the following circumstances:—

Towards the close of the year 1866 the Murrees and Boogtees led by the noted robber chieftain, Gholam Hussain, made a raid on a large scale on Hurrund. We were prepared for them, and the raiders were beaten off with the loss of 250 killed and their leader, Gholam Hussain; on our side we lost some seven or eight men killed, amongst the latter one of our chiefs, and had 60 men wounded, besides several hamlets were burnt, the damage done amounting to some thousands of rupees.

With the consent of the Commissioner of the Derajat I addressed Sir Henry Green on the subject, asking him if he could not, under the terms of the treaty with Khelat, afford our subjects compensation for their losses. To this application Sir H. Green replied in the following words:—

"I have to acknowledge receipt of yours of the 10th instant (10th December 1866) "regarding a Murree raid and other frontier matters. With regard to the raid, the "Murrees being Belooch are certainly subjects of the Khan of Khelat, and are held by "him under about the same control as the Afreedees of the hills surrounding the Peshawur "Valley are by the Ruler of Cabul, and any complaint of their conduct to the Khan "would be of as much use as the Commissioner of Peshawur bringing to the notice of the "Ameer the conduct of the said Afreedees. The Murrees now and then try a raid on "my frontier, and I trust to the alertness and activity of my frontier posts for their defeat "and nothing to the influence of the Khan; if they succeed in carrying off my cattle, my "Native officers suffer, but I would certainly not complain to the Khan on account of "the want of activity of my own people. I allow no cattle to proceed beyond the line of "my posts, &c. &c." Sir Henry concludes his letter by saying that the Khan himself from Murree "depredations" at present suffers "very much more than we do."

Since the letter quoted above was written 5½ years have passed. Finding I could not get aid from Khelat through the Political Superintendent, I set about doing what I could for myself. I got in the Murree chiefs, formed an alliance with them and gave them service, and since then not one of our people inside our border line has been touched by them. The Gurchani, who was killed in January last, met his fate inside Khelat territory, for the Khelat line runs just outside our border from the hill called Gaindair in front of the Muzari country to Hurrund. I have visited Kahun escorted by the Murrees themselves, sent kafilas through their country, and I have increased our salt trade many thousands of rupees yearly. When I first came here we used to get Rupees 300 yearly for the contract, or Rupees 900 for three years. Nearly three years ago I sold it for Rupees 21,500, and very soon again I will be in a position to resell it; and unless our trade is put a stop to, I expect to get from Rupees 30,000 to 35,000 for the contract. How accessible the Murree Hills had become and how friendly the chiefs are

is surely proved from the fact that even Sher Dil, the Muzerani chief, who has caused all the present trouble, came on my summons, and was ready and willing to give his people to act as an escort for General Pollock's mission *en route* to Candahar until he reached the Kakurs. I again, however, repeat that all these considerations will not prevent my most hearty co-operation in requiring the Murrees, by coercive measures if necessary, to surrender the stolen property. All that I would entreat of you is to put the question fairly to them, as to surrender or no surrender, and that if the reply was the latter, that we should be in a position to put the question to the issue; for in a trial of strength we must in the long run succeed, when our little quarrel, for such only it would be, would make us stronger with them than ever. What I do dread is drifting into a petty war of reprisals, which results by doing more harm to our subjects than to the hill people, and creates in the minds of the latter that bitterness of feeling which a blood feud alone can engender against our name and rule.

A feeling which did exist, but which by patience and perseverence in my dealings with these very hill chiefs I have succeeded (which I trust results have proved) in removing to a very great extent.

I have written you at length, as such is the desire of the Government, and with the earnest hope of convincing you that, although I believe in my own way of dealing with these hill tribes, I am perfectly prepared to do all I can to aid in the success of any schemes you may consider it necessary to adopt for the recovery of the stolen property. Sir H. Green's letter quoted above shows that I was led to believe that Khelat requirements would not interfere with those of the Punjab. This the Murrees knew, otherwise they would not have taken service, and this I over and over again explained to Sir Henry Green. I understood both him and Colonel Phayre to agree that some day the entire question would be fairly considered, and that if the Murree chiefs had real grievances against the Khelat State they would be redressed. I trust that, after perusing this letter, that in whatever way you may consider it necessary to deal with the Murree chiefs on account of their relations with me, and the circumstances under which they were brought about, my plan for the recovery of the stolen property may meet with due consideration.

No. 69.

No. 834–46 S.

From Lepel Griffin, Esq., Officiating Secretary to Government, Punjab and its Dependencies, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.

Foreign.

SIR, Dated 26th June 1872.

I AM desired to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of Captain Sandeman's report and annexures on Khelat and border affairs, and to state that copy of the sketch map to which he refers will be forwarded hereafter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LEPEL GRIFFIN.

Officiating Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Enclosure 1 in No. 69.

No. 229, dated Dera Ghazí Khan, 10th April 1872.

From Captain R. G. Sandeman, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazí Khan, to the Officiating Secretary to Government, Punjab.

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of the report that I was directed to submit to the Commissioner in Sind on the subject of present state of Khelat affairs, and the effect they have had or may have hereafter on the British border.

2. Since writing my report I have received, for my information, copy of a diary kept by Colonel Phayre, Political Superintendent on the Frontier, from the 28th of February last to the 20th of March, the date on which he left for England. The Political Superintendent has given me permission to make any use of it that I choose, and, as I consider it of value, I have made it an annexure to this letter.

3. The Political Superintendent, at the same time that he sent me his diary, also sent for my information copies of petitions in the vernacular, presented by the Khelat Sirdars of Sarawan to the Commissioner in Sind. These so fully illustrate many of the statements contained in my report to the Commissioner in Sind that I also forward them translated into English, with vernacular copies of the originals attached.

4. To illustrate my portion of the Khelat subject, I have had prepared as carefully as circumstances would permit the sketch map enclosed, showing the position of the Sind and Lower Derajat borders. I have had carefully traced on it the routes from Sakki Sarwar, the Chachar Pass, and Rojhan to Kandahar, by which a large trade at one time with British India and the countries beyond was successfully carried on not long prior to British rule.

5. By referring to the sketch map, if you include the Hurrund Dajal Illaqua as well as the Murree and Boogtee hills as a part of the Khelat State, as shown in green on the map, it will readily be understood why it is that Khelat matters generally are of such vital importance to the prosperity and progress of this portion of the Punjab.

6. The State of Khelat itself, before we interfered in her affairs, extended in the north to Shaulkot, or, as called by us, Quetta; to the sea on the coast of Mekran; from the frontier of Persia beyond Kharan and Punjgur on the west; to Sind and the Punjab on the east.

7. When our officers in 1838 first became acquainted with this State, the Government of the country was a confederacy of Khan and nobles, and the Murrees, Boogtees, and Gurchanís were subjects of the Khanate; and it was not until our troops attacked the Khan and took his country that Ranjít Singh, taking advantage of the turn affairs had taken, seized Hurrund Dajal and annexed that portion of the Khan's territory to the Punjab.

8. Our treatment of the Khanate then and since, I respectfully submit, has led to the present disorganized state of the country, as I will now endeavour to show, and to much loss of life.

'9. Shortly after Ranjít Singh's death, no one having been found able to fill the place of that astute ruler, the whole of this part of the country fell into a state of anarchy. The Khelat Sirdars, at the desire of the Khelat Government it is said, raided into the country in retaliation for the conduct of the Sikh Government and in the endeavour to recover the stolen province, and all became anarchy and confusion; but it was not until about four years prior to annexation that the once flourishing trade that found its way through the Murree country from above the Bolan Pass, by the routes shown in the map, entirely ceased. The Murrees at that time, partly the results of the Cabul war, got quite unruly, and it was not until then that they threw off all the restraints of good government and took to plundering and to predatory life, making thieving their pursuits and robbery a means of livelihood.

10. In the days of Mehrab Khan the feudal army of the Khanate when called into the field was composed of the two great families of Sarawan and Jalawan, with the hereditary chiefs at their head; a regular organisation hardly to be believed in the present day, but the memory of which is still dearly cherished by the chiefs, existed; and it thus happened that the State of Khelat held a position in the country that enabled her to hold her own against all comers with the exception of the British.

11. The Murree, Boogtee, and Gurchani clans, in the days of which I write, were included in the Sarawans, and they not only rendered feudal service to the State, but paid tribute to the Khan of Khelat.

12. Were the Khanate of Khelat properly settled under her Khan, and the nobles of the country happy and contented, and in the possession of their rights, the Murree clan would be perfectly helpless to do evil. In short, with the Sarawan tribe once again properly organised under their hereditary chief, the Murree clan, as a natural result, would take the place in the country which it occupied until, by our attack upon Khelat itself, we afforded the opportunity to Ranjít Singh to annex Hurrund Dajal and separate this province of Khelat from the Khanate.

13. But, to make matters worse, at the annexation of the Punjab we did not fix our border according to the possessions of our new subjects. We made an arbitrary border line, leaving the principal and most valuable lands of the Gurchani clan outside our territory, and nominally included in that of Khelat. It thus happens that a portion of the Gurchani clan are subjects of the British Government and a portion of the Khelat State. Only one result has accrued from this unhappy arrangement, viz., very great confusion and anarchy, as well as injustice to all concerned.

14. But this has been conspicuously the result to the doubly unfortunate Gurchani clan, which was divided into two portions. As long as the British portion remained

within our arbitrary boundary, we told them that they should enjoy British protection, but that if they went into Khelat they must share the fortunes of Khelat subjects.

15. In the hot months it is an absolute necessity that the flocks and herds of the Gurchani clan graze on their Khelat lands, and, as the doing so causes them to lose British protection, and none is afforded by the Khelat Government, they at once fall a prey to the depredations of their fellow subjects, the Murree robbers.

16. The result of this is that we keep up and cherish by our own bad arrangements a state of things that is as much a misfortune, if not more so, to the British Government than it is to that of Khelat. We have the power, if we would only exercise the will, with a very little trouble, to afford protection to the entire Gurchani clan. Since I have held charge of this district, in consequence of the arrangements above described, over 800 lives have been sacrificed and much property lost, thereby causing much sorrow and great privation to many a poor family.

17. But, although this is greatly to be deplored, it is not the worst feature in the case. On account of the Gurchani and Murree clans having at one time been under a fairly conducted government, their respective countries are well defined and perfectly known, and in consequence no boundary dispute has ever existed. But on account of the way the two tribes have been situated towards each other and their respective Governments, and because of the geographical position of their countries, which join on to each other for many miles in front of Hurrund, plundering each other's cattle, and taking each other's lives, has been a matter of daily occurrence; and the doing so was at one time, indeed has been so until very lately, treated as a matter of course.

18. To the Gurchani clan especially, split up, as described, into two portions, the result has been most disastrous. The best culturable portion of their country, parts of which consist of valuable lands irrigated by perennial streams, is lying waste and empty, which has rendered the clan as a body poor and often nearly desperate, forcing them, as the annals of my office fully show, to become robbers by trade in British territory. Until I was able to make some arrangements with the Murree clan for their better protection their position was nearly hopeless; and it was only the attachment to their country and lands, so conspicuous in Belooch character, that made them hold life rather than abandon them entirely as not worth having.

19. Although it forms an important portion of my subject, I will not enter more fully than I have done in my report to the Commissioner in Sind on the family ties that exist between the Mazari and Drishuk clans and the subjects of Khelat; suffice it to say that the two Drishuk chiefs are married to Murree ladies. The Mazari chief's family and his tribe are intermarried with the Murrees, Boogtees, and Koords. The latter clan inhabit the Bolan Pass and the Dusht and Murrow plain about Shaul, and are also in turn intermarried with the Dúmers, a section of the Kahar Pathans. Alladina, the Sirdar of the Koords, whose petition to the Commissioner in Sind is attached, is cousin to Ghuzzi Khan, the headman of Shahwali.* Their grandfathers were the same. Surely, then, when we have the clans on this border so intimately connected by old family ties, to treat them, as we have done since their connexion with us, as two distinct peoples, must result, as has hitherto been the case, in confusion and disaster.

See map.

* In the Punjab, a village near Kurrum.

20. It is far from my desire to lower or in any way interfere with the position of his Highness the Khan of Khelat. In fact my object is to see his Government as strong as a healthy treaty with our Government can make it, and that, instead of the undignified and helpless position it has lately held, its strength may be felt up to the Punjab border in the same way as British power and influence is felt up to the Khelat border; but this can never be hoped for or expected until the Government of the Khanate of Khelat, with the aid of British officers, undertakes to protect her entire territory and Punjab subjects as well as her own from violence and robbery.

21. This can only be done, in my opinion, by our future arrangements admitting of the Punjab and Sind officers acting together in concert in the common interests of the British Government and that of the Khelat State. Late events ought surely to have convinced our Government of this, and that the sooner we recognise the necessity for this the better it will be for all concerned, whether they are connected with the Punjab, Sind, or Khelat.

22. To keep up any distinction is suicidal to our interests, and as unjust to our subjects as to those of Khelat, preventing as it does all progress. I feel convinced that further persistence in the old system will assuredly again result in more bloodshed, more especially on the Hurrund frontier, where the Gurchani, Mazari, and Drishuk tribes have nothing to fall back on, should the present arrangements with the Murree and Boogtee tribes be at any time broken off.

Enclosure 2 in No. 69.

Dated Camp, Jacobabad, 6th March 1872.

From Captain R. G. Sandeman, on Special Duty, Jacobabad, to the Commissioner in Sind.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following remarks and observations on the present position of affairs in the Khelat State:—

2. On the 18th December 1871 I arrived at Jacobabad, and held a long consultation with the Political Superintendent, Colonel Phayre, on the then position of affairs on the two borders; we were of opinion that on account of the insurrection they were critical.

3. I had only recently traversed the Murree and Boogtee Hills. Both clans were very excited, and the chiefs informed me that it was with the greatest difficulty they prevented their people joining the Brahooee Sirdars in the plundering of Kutchee.

4. The Murree chiefs, Meeroola and Shere Muhammad, with whom I had a personal interview, were most anxious as to what might happen. They told me that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed had arrived from Kandahar, and had placed himself at the head of the Sarawans. They also said, which I knew before, that there was a private understanding between him and their Sirdar, Ghuzzun.

5. At Boogtee, Duyra, the young chief of the Boogtees, seemed to think that it was very hard indeed that his tribe could not join in the disturbances. I told him plainly that what the Murrees might do was quite a different matter from their attempting a similar course. I assured him that on my knowing that one Boogtee had joined the insurrection, if he was not at once apprehended and made over to me, that, as far as I was concerned, the result would certainly be the loss of British friendship and protection hitherto enjoyed.

6. Colonel Phayre told me that similar excitement existed in the minds of the Beloochis on the Sind border, and altogether we naturally felt anxious as to the turn events might take. I have for years exerted myself in the interests of peace with the Murree tribe. My anxiety was, therefore, considerable as to the consequences that might result from a prolongation of the disturbances.

7. This we hoped might be avoided, for it was known that a truce for the time being had been made between the insurgent Sirdars and the Khan's agent in Kutchee, Nawab Muhammad Khan. The position of affairs at that time in Khelat itself was briefly as follows:—

8. The rebel Sirdars had attacked the Khan's troops at Mustung; a victory was claimed by both sides. The result actually was that the Shahgassee and Prime Minister, who commanded the troops, lost a good number of men and was himself severely wounded. On the side of the rebels, Jehangeer their leader was killed, and with him several men of respectability.

9. The rebels, after summoning the exiled Sirdars, Moolla Mahomed and Noordeen, from Kandahar, overran the province of Kutchee, captured Bagh, Gundava, Dadur, and Shaul. These places were all plundered, and several of the Khan's officials were put to death.

10. The Khan's army, after these events, had, after considerable delay, been put in motion, and marched *viâ* the Moolla Pass to Gundava. The agent of the Khan, on getting there, found the rebel forces in position at Mittree and Haji-ka-Shere.

11. But, instead of attacking the insurgents, after consideration, he found that even "one victory," as I heard him afterwards myself express it to Colonel Phayre, "was doubtful, while defeat would be utter ruin." He said he had not the means to conquer a whole people. In plain terms I heard him tell Colonel Phayre that the whole Brahooee nation was in arms against the Khan.

12. In addition to the state of affairs in Kutchee, on my way to Jacobabad I heard that Sirdar Noordeen Mingul and Ali Khan Jamote had taken Lus Beyla, the Khan's troops having fled without firing a shot.

13. Just before I arrived at Jacobabad the terms of peace offered to the Sirdars by the Khan's agent were accepted conditionally on their being ratified before Colonel Phayre, the Political Superintendent. The Sirdars and the agent of the Khan were on their way to Jacobabad for the purpose.

14. By order of Sir William Merewether the Sirdars were refused permission to enter Jacobabad, and were directed to remain at a village on the border.

15. The agent of the Khan, Nawab Muhammad Khan, alone was allowed to come to Jacobabad. On his arrival, the Commissioner inquired of him if he had made terms by permission of the Khan with the insurgents; he said he had made the treaty without having first obtained the Khan's consent.

16. After consulting with the Political Superintendent, Colonel Phayre, who sent for me to tell me that the Commissioner considered that until the Khan's consent was obtained he could not interfere, I asked and obtained an interview with Sir William Merewether.

17. I told the Commissioner in Sind my view of affairs, expressing an opinion that I hoped peace could be maintained. I further said that I thought that the telegram of the Viceroy, No. 42 A. C. P., dated 22nd November 1871, to the Governor of Bombay —a copy of which I had, and which I showed him—permitted mediation.

18. The Commissioner thought differently; he said he had the interests of all to consider; that they had been specially entrusted to him; that the proposed peace was derogatory to the Khan; therefore without his consent he could not permit its ratification.

19. Thus the hopes of peace being for the time ended, the Sirdars returned to their people, and the agent went to take command of the Khan's forces and prepare for war.

20. What actually happened after this is doubtful. The Khan's commander declares that he was attacked by the insurgents; the latter declare they were attacked before the Sirdars rejoined them. Be that as it may, it is certain that a fight did take place, and that 30 to 40 Brahooees were killed.

21. In retaliation for this, two kafilas passing through the Bolan Pass were attacked by the Sirdars, and property plundered to the value of nearly a lakh of rupees. Twelve of the kafila people were killed and 19 wounded, amongst them a woman, who afterwards died of her wounds at Jacobabad.

22. Shortly after this an insurrection was reported to have broken out in Mekran. Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, was said to threaten Major Harrison's camp at Kozdar. The Jamotes talked of destroying the Indo-European telegraph line. An attack on the Sirdars by the Khan's troops had failed, and the latter had fallen back to Dadur. The Murree clan were known to have openly joined in the fight. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed was reported to have met the Murree chiefs at a conference at Moondaie, at which they decided to carry on the war on a large scale, directly it got a little warmer, into Kutchi and Khorasan.

23. Their intentions were said to be to first attack the Khan's troops with a view to expelling them from Kutchi; afterwards the Sirdars were to be met at Kozdar by Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, at the head of the Jalawans, when they intended to possess themselves of the whole country, eventually taking Khelat itself.

24. That this was a certain result had the war been continued there cannot be a doubt.

25. There was clear and satisfactory intelligence that the Sirdars, according to their old traditional policy, had become firm confederates. Their councils were guided by Sirdars Moolla Mahomed and Noordeen, who were in perfect accord as to their future designs and movements. They had been together too long in exile not to know that the time for action, if they were ever to take it, had come.

26. To those who are aware of the nature of my connexion with the Murree clan it will at once be admitted that my information as to what their intentions really were was beyond a question. I was informed that the Khan's agent, Nawab Mahomed Khan, had been intriguing with the Bijarani Murrees, and it was said that, after he had paid to them in the hope of securing their services a considerable sum of money, they had given him a flat refusal to join him.

27. The murder in front of Hurrund by Murrees, though doubtless done in revenge on account of an old blood feud, was still perpetrated, I believe, on account of the tribe's intention to join Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, and with the object of getting rid of my alliance.

28. I consider that a review of the state of matters at the time of which I write will show that the entire Khelat State, including the hill tribes, was in active insurrection against the Khan. The Murrees joining showed that the insurrectionary spirit was spreading to the Belooch; some chiefs were still passively loyal to the Khan; but they could not, had the war continued, have hoped to remain so.

29. The question then arises as to what led to such a deplorable state of affairs. In my opinion it was because the Government have tried to introduce a policy the effects of which would be to alter the constitution of the Khelat State, and this too without our having adopted the means necessary to secure its success.

30. We found the Khelat Khanate, a confederacy of the Khan and his nobles, bound together by hereditary rights and customs, to which the traditions of generations had given the force of law. Khan, nobles, and people reverenced them and were bound by them.

31. In the year 1837, on account of circumstances which arose out of the occupation of Cabul, we attacked Khelat, stormed and took it. The Khan himself, Mehrab Khan, and several of his chiefs were killed.

32. The British Government then placed a scion of the family—a prince by name Shah Nawaz—on the throne of the Khanate; but from various causes their doing so did not turn out well. Our Political Agent at his court was murdered and the Brahooee tribes rose in rebellion.

33. The chiefs of Khelat declared for their late Khan's son, Nusseer Khan. After a little time he was recognised by the British Government and formally placed on the throne by General (then Major) Outram on the 26th September 1841. From that day to this we have taken much interest in Khelat affairs, and in fact they have been under the direction, to a great extent, of the British Government.

34. I now come to that part of my subject which, for obvious reasons, I feel much delicacy in touching upon; still, under present circumstances, it seems necessary to plainly state my views for any consideration those in authority may consider them worthy; I allude to recording my opinion as to the actual causes which I consider have thrown Khelat, at different times and periods, into insurrection, and rendered it so difficult of management.

35. I believe every political officer who has been associated with the chiefs and people of Beloochistan has found them most tractable and easy of management, and at the same time a warlike and fine people.

36. I have conversed with several chiefs not in any way personally connected with Khelat, though of course interested in her welfare and acquainted with her history, who distinctly affirm that our interference between the Khan and his Sirdars has led to these constant insurrections.

37. On going fully into what they meant by our interference, I found that they alluded to the treaty which was concluded between the Khan and the British Government, and which has been actually, as far as I can discover, from the first day it was signed until now, in practice, of little real value.

38. I will not take up any space by demonstrating this. I, however, do not think that there is any evidence on record to show that the treaty made with the Khan by General Outram was practically of any real benefit; nor can I find from any facts that I can discover that the new one made by General Jacob has been worked a bit more successfully, or that there are any results to support a contrary view.

39. I think the reason for this is that we have, for the sake of our own objects, which I will not enter upon, treated the Khan as a despotic prince, while all the time he was by ancient usage a constitutional one, having with his position inherited certain responsibilities towards his Sirdars, which, if he desired to retain his own position at the head of the State, he was bound by custom and expediency to observe.

40. I consider that the present state of affairs in Khelat proves the soundness of this view. I will now record what this position is.

41. In pursuance of our policy at the time the last treaty was entered upon, we bestowed upon the Khan for stipulated services a subsidy of Rs. 50,000 a year, but we did not stipulate as to the way this money was to be employed; the money was apparently used for the maintenance of a small standing army.

42. Prior to this, as far as I have been able to discover, neither Mehrab Khan nor his son, Nusseer Khan, had any troops at all worthy of the name. They had a few armed retainers, but that was all.

43. The stability of the throne was dependent on the "Ooloos" of the country, with their Sirdars and chiefs at their head. Our own experience tells us they did not fail their Khan in time of need. Such a state of matters established a connexion between the Khan and his Sirdars which our subsidy destroyed. Nothing else was introduced to supply its place.

44. I find that the Khan's aim evidently was to, by degrees, get rid of his principal Sirdars and possess himself of their estates, and, with the aid of his mercenary troops, to establish in his own person an absolute despotism of the very worst kind.

45. The Jalawan Sirdar, Taj Mahomed, died in prison; it is commonly reported he was poisoned. The chief Sirdars of the State, Moolla Mahomed and others, were driven into exile. There are also other chiefs I could name who have been imprisoned and got rid of.

46. I consider it unnecessary to say more as to the nature of our late policy. Suffice it to say that it supported the Khan in his ambitious views to be recognised as a despotic ruler. All our intercourse was directed to be carried on with him through his officials, and we were enjoined to have nothing directly to do with the complaints and grievances of his chiefs and people.

47. In January last this policy was entirely altered by order of the Government of India. Our Government consented to mediate, with the Khan's cordial consent, between him and his insurgent chiefs, on the basis of a fair consideration of their reasonable grievances, which would be inquired into and redressed.

48. This proposal was accepted by both sides, and I trust the grievances of all the Sirdars without distinction will be inquired into and redressed.

49. First on the list I consider are those of the ex-Jam of Beyla. I have heard much talk of his case even at Derah Gházi Khan, and I think the statements of the chiefs regarding him, as to anything they may have to urge in his favour, ought to be fully recorded and submitted for the consideration of Government.

50. I consider the country of Lus Beyla will not settle or the Khan hold it without the aid of regular troops. I think a fair settlement with the Jam, if possible, would be, under present circumstances, a wise and politic measure.

51. The provisions of the treaty with the Khan, as well as the promise of fair mediation given to the Sirdars, ought to embrace the grievances of all the Khelat chiefs.

52. I believe for the future we shall not only consult our own interests but those of the whole of Beloochistan if we insist on the treaty being one not only in name, but in reality; we ought to see that its provisions are acted up to, and their benefit felt throughout the country.

53. I think we may fairly inquire if we have not ourselves, by our neglect of the obligations the treaty bound us to, failed in our duty to the chiefs and people of Beloochistan. We have to confess that, although the Khan by treaty with us is bound to follow our advice, anarchy and confusion under our acknowledged responsibilities have reigned for some time past triumphant in Beloochistan.

54. But, although a careful observance of the treaty and the careful fulfilment of the obligations imposed on us by the promise of fair mediation, made in January to the Khan and his Sirdars, on which basis peace was agreed to, may eventually do much for the Sind border and the Khelat State, no lasting peace or progress on the Punjab border can accrue so long as our arrangements with the now only really troublesome tribe on the frontier, viz., the Murrees, are not comprehensive, and do not embrace the settlement of the entire clan. They are acknowledged to be a regular scourge in the country, and are the dread of their neighbours.

55. Their country (proper) extends from the immediate neighbourhood of the Bolan Pass on the west, to the Khetran, Boogtee and Goorchani country (Punjab), a distance of 150 miles, on the east. To the south they extend to a hill called Surtoff, and as far as Afghan territory on the north.

56. During the last few years the Khan of Khelat's officials, without the consent of the rest of the tribe, have employed the Muzerani section of the clan in protecting kafilahs passing to and fro through the Bolan Pass. This has been bitterly resented by the Khoords and Kakurs, for good and sufficient reasons unnecessary to enter upon here, who in consequence not only fight with the Murrees, but when a chance offers attack and plunder kafilas.

57. But the Murree clan also, with good reason, are most indignant at the arrangement; for the employment of this section of the clan alone by the Khan weakens the entire little commonwealth, and they have in consequence, in order to get the Muzeranis to return to their allegiance, several times attacked them. One of the Muzerani chief's (Sheredil) sons was slain, also another man of note. Altogether the arrangement has proved most mischievous, as it has infused a bitter feeling against the Khan into Khoords, Murrees, and Kakars.

58. Recent events have clearly shown the intimate relations from a political point of view which exist between the people of Khelat and the people of the Punjab.

59. The Murree clan by the geographical position of their country connect Khelat itself and the Bolan Pass with the Punjab by direct, easy, and open routes, which have only been closed since annexation. Their country joins the Punjab in front of Hurrund, which (Punjab) was formerly itself a part of the Khelat State.

60. The Khoords of the Bolan Pass and the Murree clan are intimately connected with, and both clans are related to, our own Muzarí clan, which occupies such an important position on the Punjab border.

61. I am of opinion, and I have held it for long, that nothing can be so detrimental to the administration of this portion of the British border than insisting on a distinction being kept up between these people in our mode of dealing with them. They are really one race, inhabiting one and the same tract of country, and, were it not for our system, would have free and easy intercourse with each other. This would positively have the effect for all useful purposes of joining Kandahar to the Punjab border.

62. By the late resolution of the Government of India, No. 4248 P., dated 19th October

1871, the Deputy Commissioner of Derah Ghazi Khan, as far as the Murrees are concerned, is under the Political Superintendent, Jacobabad.

63. The same resolution sanctions tentatively Rs. 32,000 being paid in the name of the Khan of Khelat by the Political Superintendent to the chiefs of this tribe for the objesct named therein.

64. From my personal acquaintance with this tribe, and from knowing the desires of the chiefs, I feel that the sanction of this money gives a grand opportunity which I earnestly entreat may not be lost, of settling the entire clan and securing their chiefs in our interests. The benefit to the Punjab alone would be enormous; for, as already stated, it would establish the means of easy intercourse between it and Kandahar.

65. I feel confident that if we take into our pay one or two sections of the tribe only, as I believe has been proposed, with a view to the protection of the Bolan route to Jacobabad, hatred and envy will be the feeling engendered in the hearts of the principal chiefs.

66. The members of this clan are very poor. They live by the fruits of predatory expeditions—in fact, their chief livelihood is gained by stealing from their neighbours. The good or evil that might be done by giving regular service with or without due care is so clear as to require no demonstration.

67. We cannot wean them from their predatory habits in a day, but we can do it by degrees; for they have a fine country, capable, if cultivated, of supporting the tribe in comfort and happiness. In making the attempt let us make a right beginning, and not by half-and-half arrangements irritate the principal chiefs, and thus court failure at the outset.

68. The late conduct of the clan during the insurrection has, for the time being, caused their relations with me to cease. This has afforded a favourable opportunity for the entire Murree question to be settled, not with a view to the benefit to be afforded to one particular part of the country with which a certain section of the clan may be connected, but with the object of settling the entire tribe and weaning them from their present predatory life.

69. I am of opinion that this should be done by the Political Superintendent on the frontier, in the name of and for the Khan of Khelat, who, as provided in the treaty, is responsible for the safety not of the Bolan route merely, but also for that of the Punjab and Sind borders.

70. I intended to have brought this matter fully before the Commissioner in Sind at the conference, at which I was directed to attend by order from the Foreign Secretary conveyed by telegram. I submitted the telegram at Jacobabad to Sir William Merewether in a demi-official note. I got a reply, telling me that he had referred the matter to the Bombay Government.

71. A second telegram came from the Government of India, which I also submitted to the Commissioner in Sind. I received, in reply, an official letter, dated 18th January, calling on me for a report on the state of Khelat generally; but no conference took place.

72. This report I had taken in hand, when I got a demi-official letter from Colonel Phayre, saying that, in answer to certain matters I had reported to Colonel Phayre prior to the 18th, and which appeared to us both to be connected with the duty for which I came to Jacobabad, Sir William Merewether considered I had exceeded my duty, and desired me for the future to confine myself to matters connected with the Murrees and Boogtees.

73. I therefore, to prevent further mistakes, and as I knew of no immediate hurry for the report, and further as Colonel Phayre's order of the 24th January nullified to a great extent my power of inquiry, so essentially necessary to enable me to report fully, as I desired to do, thought it better, all things considered, especially as no conference had been held, not to report until I was fully assured of my position and the duty I was then on at Jacobabad.

74. In the necessity for referring this question to the Government of India, the Political Superintendent, Colonel Phayre, fully concurred, and I did so through him. The correspondence on the subject has, I believe, been submitted to the Bombay Government by the Commissioner in Sind.

75. Last Sunday evening I received a telegram from the Foreign Secretary, directing me to submit a report as to my view of Khelat affairs at the present time. I therefore submit this in compliance with that order, also in reply to the Commissioner in Sind's letter of the 18th January 1872.

76. The telegram said the report was to be submitted in three days. This is the third day. I have not got time therefore to take a copy (the original is so altered by erasures that I doubt if I could copy from it again). I trust, therefore, that the Commissioner in Sind will favour me with a copy of this report for record.

I instructed Colonel Mainwaring to send a strong guard, full company of rifles, with it, to strengthen Major Harrison's escort. I do not, however, anticipate for a moment that the Khan would dare venture on any open act of hostility against the British camp. There was a report that such a thing was contemplated, but that the Khan's mother had used her influence to stop it. This, however, wants confirmation. The movement of the party up to Khelat, and its presence there with Major Harrison, will add to the influence of his position, and have a good effect in encouraging the best affected. The general feeling of all, excepting the few bad men about the Khan, is unquestionably in our favour, and Major Harrison may be sure of getting early intimation of anything that may be intended, and should extreme measures be madly thought of, there will at once appear a strong party in his favour. He has with him a complete troop of Sind Horse, 80 good sabres, and 50 of Jacob's Rifles, so he is well able to protect himself from any petty attack such as might perchance occur at Khelat.

27. At the same time, in the hope of recalling his Highness the Khan to a sense of what is due from him to the British Government under treaty engagements and long friendship, I have addressed to him and forwarded to Khelat a strong letter of remonstrance which I hope may have effect, and save this ruler from the utter ruin he seems rushing into. Copy of my letter is appended, and I trust will meet with your Excellency's approval.

28. Should Major Harrison have been obliged to leave Khelat before the letter reaches, he will cause it to be delivered to his Highness, and should the latter reject the warning it contains, Major Harrison should then, I consider, be withdrawn into British territory, leaving the Khan to his own devices.

29. Major Harrison has shown great prudence and firmness, as he always has done, and I feel confident his conduct at a most critical time will meet with your Excellency's approval. He has no other course left him but to afford the Wuzeer the protection asked for; and I have told him, that in the event of his leaving Khelat, the Wuzeer should be allowed to accompany his camp.

Enclosure 2 in No. 75.

No. 1343, dated Jacobabad, the 27th May 1872.

From Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, Officiating Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind, Kurrachee.

I HAVE the honour to submit for your information the accompanying correspondence as per margin in the vernacular, with translations in English, received from Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, relative to the attack by the Murrees on certain Pathan kafilas *en route* through the Bolan.

1. From Abdool Wahud, Naib of Dadur, to his Highness the Khan.
2. From a private correspondent in Kutchee to his Highness the Khan.
3. Letter from Sher Dil, Muzaranee, to the Naib of Dadur.

Enclosure 3 in No. 75.

No. 73, dated Sohrab, the 17th May 1872.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat, to Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, Officiating Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind, Jacobabad.

IT is with regret that I have to inform you of the plundering of another kafila in the Bolan Pass. From the Naib of Dadur's report, attached, it would appear that prior to the receipt of his Highness' instructions not to allow kafilas to proceed by thi route, he has entered into correspondence with Sher Dil regarding the safe transit of the kafila, and received a favourable reply from the latter. The men, however, deputed by Sher Dil for this duty having declined the responsibility, the Naib made the best arrangements he could, and gave them an escort of 70 horse and footmen, who conveyed them to Mir Nusseer Khan's musjid in safety, "between Mach and Siri-Bolan." There they were attacked by a large body of Murrees, "about one thousand," and after having twice repulsed them, were overwhelmed by numbers. The property was carried off by the Murrees, except (30) thirty loads, which the merchants retained.

2. Regarding the postscript to the Naib's letter, I would respectfully point out that Captain Sandeman's persisted endeavours to interfere in this country have given rise to this rumour and others of a similar nature, and led both his Highness the Khan and

Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed to openly express their conviction of Captain Sandeman's hostility to the Khelat Government. Feeling convinced that disorder and ill feeling would prevail so long as this interference continued, I respectfully solicited the protection of Government against interference with duties entrusted to me, *vide* letter No. 42 of 1870, paragraphs 3 and 18. I can only now reiterate that should it continue I cannot be held responsible for what may occur.

Enclosure 4 in No. 75.

Translation of a Letter from Abdool Wahud, Naib of Dadur, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

AFTER SALUTATIONS.—A donkey kafila arrival from Shikarpore. The owners informed me that their intention was to proceed with the Brahooees to Khorasan. I told them that if they did, they must absolve me from all responsibility, and give me a written certificate that they undertook all losses that might occur. They refused, and did not accompany the Brahooee Toman. Shortly after this a Pathan kafila of camels arrived, and asked me for an escort to go through the Bolan. I wrote to Sher Dil, and he sent me a reply written by a bunniah, which I enclose. My Janesheen, Selah Mahomed Jutoee, with 37 sowars and 30 footmen, were told off as an escort under two Badrak Murrees, connexions of Ali Shere and Jungoo—total 71. They arrived in safety at Mach. On the following day, when they reached Meer Mahomed Nusseer Khan's tomb, they were attacked by a Murree force, who had concealed themselves in the hills. A fight ensued. The merchants, aided by their escort, twice repulsed the Murrees. The third onset was with sword in hand, and as the Murrees were in overpowering numbers, they defeated the merchants. Saleh Mahomed Jutoee and his nephew were killed, as also Deen Mahomed Shawanee, Burkhooda Khoord, and 20 merchants. Hyat Khan Janesheen and Pailwun, Lehree, were wounded. The Murrees carried off nearly all the property; 30 loads, more or less, were left on the ground, and subsequently taken possession of by the surviving merchants. Four of the escort were afterwards found dead in a cave. One of the escort only returned to me and gave the information now reported. I delayed two days before submitting this report, in hopes that the rest of the escort would confirm what had been reported. No one having returned, I am helpless, and cannot delay further in reporting what has been stated to me. I will write again as soon as I can get further information. Sher Dil sent six of his men with letter above alluded to. The substance of the letter was that he was the well-wisher of all kafilas, and regretted having attacked one; that in future they would go in safety, but should keep either in advance or rear of the Brahooee tribes going up the pass, as he intended to revenge himself on them. I then directed two of Sher Dil's men to remain at Dadur, and four to go with this kafila, but they refused. I, therefore, sent the 70 people above alluded to, so that the kafili should not be delayed. Your letter ordering me not to allow kafilas to pass through the Bolan reached me five days after the above kafila had left. Had it reached me in time, I would not have allowed to go by this route.

P.S.—A man of mine has just returned from Seebee. He tells me that whilst there three letters had arrived from the Punjab Sahib, "Captain Sandeman," and that he had seen the same—1, for the Barukzai Chief; 2, for Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's son; 3, for the Kujak Chief. This man also informed me that the people of Seebee had told him that Captain Sandeman had also written to Shér Dil. Your Highness, I am perfectly convinced that Captain Sandeman has caused all these disturbances in the Bolan, in hopes that he may ultimately get charge of this country.

Enclosure 5 in No. 75.

Translation of a Letter from a Private Correspondent in Kutchee to his Highness the Khan.

Extract letters have arrived at Seebee from Captain Sandeman of Dera Ghazee Khan to the following people:

1. Bukhtawar Khan, Barukzai.
2. Azad Khan, son of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed.
3. To the Kujak chief.

The contents of these letters have not transpired as yet. If I can ascertain I will let you know.

Enclosure 6 in No. 75.

Translation of Letter from Sher Dil, Muzaranee to the Naib of Dadur and Janesheen Hyat Khan, dated the 30th April 1872.

AFTER SALUTATIONS,—I have received the letter you sent by *kossid*, and am aware of its contents. I was formerly in Government employ. The Brahooees attacked me with a force, killed 10 or 12 of my people. I consider that it was done because I was in his Highness' service; being helpless I went to Badra. The Murrees have always received the *badruki*, and the Brahooees had no claim to these transit dues. If Government take me into service, I want the transit management. Neither you nor the Brahooees have any claim to the transit dues. When a kafila is ready, I will go with them, and receive my money from you at Dadur. I will not guarantee kafilas from attacks by Brahooees, but will be responsible for Murrees and other marauders.

(True translations.)

C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent at Khelat.

Enclosure 7 in No. 75.

No. 1475, dated Jacobabad, the 12th June 1872.

From Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, Officiating Political Superintendent, Frontier, Upper Sind, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. & C.B., Commissioner in Sind.

In accordance with instructions conveyed in your Memorandum No. 493 of 1872, I addressed the Political Agent, Khelat, on the subject of kafilas plundered in the Bolan, and requested him to call the serious attention of his Highness the Khan to the matter.

2. I have now the honour to forward, for your information, the correspondence that has passed between the Political Agent and myself.

3. The determination arrived at and expressed to Major Harrison by his Highness is so opposed to the terms of the treaty entered into by him with the British Government, and is so calculated to defeat the very object of such treaty, that I am at a loss to understand what measures can be taken to establish the Bolan route on a firm and safe footing for the passage of merchandise.

4. Apart from the fact that many of the Pattan merchants are entirely ruined by the plundering to which they are subjected in the territories of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, the great loss of life that has lately occurred in the Bolan is worthy of the most serious consideration, though his Highness would appear to make very light of it.

5. I would, under the circumstances, respectively suggest that a communication, from yourself direct to his Highness might have a beneficial effect, since he seems to make so light of the representations of Major Harrison and myself.

Awaiting further instructions.

Enclosure 8 in No. 75.

No. 1246, dated Jacobabad, the 20th May 1872.

From Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, Officiating Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind to Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat.

UNDER instructions received from the Commissioner in Sind, I have the honour to request you will invite the attention of his Highness the Khan of Khelat to the very serious political complications that will assuredly arise, unless his Highness takes immediate and severe measures for the safe passage of kafilas through the Bolan Pass. From the Cabul diary which you will receive with this, you will observe that the subject or kafilas plundered in the Bolan is attracting the notice of the Ameer, who very reasonably looks to the British Government to use its influence with his Highness the Khan for the prevention of such lawless proceedings in his dominions.

The terms of the treaty originally concluded with his Highness by the late General Jacob, on behalf of the British Government, very clearly lay down the undertaking on both sides; and as the British Government has hitherto never failed, now delayed to

carry out its share of the arrangement, it is but reasonable to expect that his Highness should make some effort for the protection of commerce through his territories.

With due deference to his Highness, I would beg to point out that there are but two ways of protecting kafilas in the Bolan,—they are, subsidy or force. The former would doubtless in the end be the least expensive, but if the Bolan Murrees cannot be subsidised, they should and must be coerced.

It will I am sure be evident to you that if Pattan merchants from and to Candahar are encouraged by promises of safety to themselves and merchandise to travel through the territories of his Highness the Khan, they must, if plundered, be reimbursed.

The question then arises, if the plunderers cannot be made to give up their spoil, who is to reimburse the plundered? I venture to think the question is easily answered, but I am very sure the Commissioner in Sind would be most loth to exact the letter of the treaty concluded with his Highness.

Under these circumstances I leave the matter with every confidence in your hands, feeling assured that you will represent the case with delicacy, but at the same time you will give his Highness to understand that immediate and firm action is imperative.

Enclosure 9 in No. 75.

No. 81, dated Khelat, the 31st May 1872.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat, to Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, Officiating Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

In acknowledging receipt of your letter No. 1246 of the 20th instant, I have the honour to report that, since my arrival at Khelat, I have incessantly urged his Highness to secure the safety of kafilas passing through his country, as also either to exert himself in recovering the merchants' property, or to compensate them for the same.

On receipt of letter under reply, I wrote to his Highness, thinking it might influence him more than verbal communication. Copy of the same is attached, and has, I hope, expressed the views you entertain as to his Highness' responsibility.

Yesterday his Highness the Khan visited, and seemed much astonished that his Highness the Ameer should expect compensation for the property lost by merchants, as he must be well aware that, in the late disturbances, the whole country had been devastated and plundered, and that he, the Khan, was the chief sufferer. His Highness distinctly informed me he would not compensate the merchants but would try and recover their property or its value from those who had plundered it, "provided they were not Murrees" as he did not consider himself in any way responsible for the acts of this tribe on this or any other occasion, and was not prepared to coerce them under present circumstances.

I have not only dissented on this point with his Highness, but pointed out that he had no right to take transit dues and money for safe passage, if he was not prepared to guarantee the same. His Highness is also under a mistaken impression that his responsibilities cease when a tribe is rebellious.

Enclosure 10 in No. 75.

Dated Khelat, the 31st May 1872

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

After salutations—You, my friend, are aware that since my arrival I have urged you in the strongest manner to make suitable arrangements for the protection of kafilas passing through your country and to take measures, either to recover the property plundered, or to compensate the merchants for the losses sustained.

Within the last six months four kafilas have been plundered. Full inquiry as to the first was made by the Commissioner in Sind, and the Sarawan chiefs undertook the responsibility of recovering what had been plundered by them, or giving compensation for the same. With the assistance you are affording these chiefs, I earnestly trust that this case may be brought to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion.

The second kafila was plundered by Sirdar Noordeen, and has this chief's life was only guaranteed by your Shahgassee on condition that he would restore your guns and the merchants' property, I don't anticipate any difficulty in recovering the same, if Sirdar Noordeen is reminded on what terms he is under surveillance.

The members of the third kafila by their bravery saved the greater part of their property; Shere Dil, Muzaranee, appropriated from ten to thirty loads; and it now rests with your Highness to exert yourself in recovering the same, or exacting full compensation from the Murrees who plundered the kafila.

The circumstances under which the last kafila was plundered have caused me the greatest concern, as the merchants insist that they hold written guarantees from your Naib at Dadur stating all losses in the Bolan would be made good to them. Feeling convinced that these repeated raids on the subjects and property of his Highness the Ameer would be brought to your notice by my Government, I urged you to make full inquiry into each person's loss, to give such claimant pecuniary assistance as an advance, and to assure them that you would do your utmost to recover the balance for them; it was, therefore, with the greatest regret I heard from you that you would not acknowledge your responsibility by any such act, and that you would not give the barest maintenance to these starving merchants.

To show that some action of the sort was necessary, I have now the honour to inform you that his Highness the Ameer has appealed to the British Government in the following terms: "To call upon you to adopt suitable measures for the security of the Khelat "route, and then either to restore the plundered property of traders, or to pay compen- "sation for it through the British authorities: otherwise, considering the prosperity or "misforture of the Cabul and British Governments identical, the British Government "should permit me to make arrangements in this matter myself suitably with the Khan "of Khelat."

This information has been submitted to me through Colonel Mainwaring, Political Superintendent, and that officer clearly points out that the responsibility of safe transit through Khelat territory rests on you as king of the country as guaranteed by you in your treaty with the British Government. Colonel Mainwaring also points out that as the English Government have without fail performed their obligations to you, they look upon you to carry out yours, viz., to ensure safe transit to merchants. Colonel Mainwaring also points out that one of two policies must be adopted to ensure this, coercing or subsidising, and that the present state of affairs will, unless immediately rectified, lead to serious political complications.

The supposition that you are in no way responsible for depredations committed by the Murree tribe is not provided for in your treaty.

Having been $3\frac{1}{2}$ years the accredited Political Agent at your Court, you can judge whether my councils have been to your advantage and that of your country; it is therefore with the greatest pain that I have had to write so strongly to you on the present occasion, knowing as I do how the late disturbances have harassed you, and what losses you have sustained. The safe transit of merchants through your country, however, is of the greatest consideration to the British and Cabul Governments; it is, therefore, imperative on me to write as I have done, and I feel sure that you will accept what has been said in a friendly manner, knowing the interest I feel in all that concerns you and your country.

Enclosure 11 in No. 75.

No. 1581, dated Jacobabad, the 25th June 1872.

From Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, Officiating Political Superintendent Frontier Upper Sind, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind, Kurrachee.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith true copies of letters received from the Political Agent, Khelat, yesterday. I will take this opportunity of informing you that I have received your reply to my telegram of yesterday, and that in accordance with your instructions, a strong company of rifles, under the command of Captain Humfrey, will march on Khelat in charge of treasure so soon as carriage can be provided.

Enclosure 12 in No. 75.

No. 84, dated Khelat, the 12th June 1872.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat, to Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, Officiating Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your memorandum No. 1376 of 31st May, with accompaniments, and regret that reports on the subject noted in my diary No. 11 have been so contradictory as to render it impossible to decide why, and through whom this raid originated; no definite decision can be arrived at until his Highness has fully inquired into this case, and as it may take time I beg to submit the following information.

2. The Muzaranee Murrees have lived in the Boheer Hills since Abdoolla Khan's reign, and being considered quiet peaceable people, during the past three or four years they have had charge of kafilas going through the pass, and conducted the duties devolving on them in a satisfactory manner. At the end of the cold season this year they settled with their flocks, families, and property on the Dusht near Sirial, Sher Dil, their chief, receiving pay from his Highness for the safe transit of kafilas. On or about (date not known) the Sumalanees, a Mingul tribe, and other Brahooees collected about 600 men and made a sudden raid on the Muzaranees, compelled the latter to retreat into the hills, and robbed them of every thing, Sher Dil's son and other Muzaranees being killed whilst defending their property.

3. On the 18th April, Sher Dil, with about 200 of his tribe, attacked a kafila at Abgoom, but was defeated, losing 30 men, and carrying off about 15 loads of merchandise. Directly this was reported to me I at once advised Shahgassee Wulli Mahomed to write to his Highness and recommend that Sher Dil's property should be at once restored, and a letter sent to him stating that justice would be done if he returned the kafila property and caused no further obstruction in the Bolan.

4. The information submitted in diary No. 11* infers that the attack on Sher Dil was at the instigation of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed. A later statement, which will be alluded to hereafter, would, if true, throw the onus of this raid either on his Highness or his Naibs at Mustoong and Quetta.

* Already submitted to Government. W. L. M.

5. Before reaching Khelat I heard that about 1,000 Murrees of different clans had plundered a kafila at Siri-Bolan, killed 60 merchants, and carried off nearly all their property. A Patten merchant, by name Abdool Youssaf, who lost eight loads of tea, appeared to think that this attack on them was to avenge the losses sustained by the Murrees at Abgoom.

6. One of the first people I met on arrival at Khelat was a Pesheen Syud who for the past 25 years has resided at Quetta and supplied remounts to the Committee at Bangalore. This man, who was in a very excited state, consequent on his having been robbed of 7,500 rupees, insisted that Sher Dil, Murree, was not to blame for the disturbances in the Bolan, as the attack on him and the Muzaranees had been at his Highness' instigation, in consequence of Sher Dil's having accepted money and presents from Captain Sandeman. This horse dealer, also by name Sher Dil, further stated that the Naibs of Quetta and Mustoong had received one-fifth of the spoil taken from the Murrees.

7. On the earliest occasion I informed his Highness of the above statements; he positively denied the horse dealer's assertion regarding himself, stating that in any case where an English officer was concerned, he should first consult me, and, with reference to Sher Dil, stated that he had been at Khelat a few days before the raid regarding kafila arrangements, which had been concluded in a friendly spirit; further, that during Sher Dil's stay at Khelat, the Nooshky Minguls had carried off 2,000 of his sheep, and he, the Khan, at once wrote to his Naib to try and recover the same.

8. Since Sher Dil's raid on the kafila, his Highness has twice written to him to take possession of four or five thousand sheep that had been recovered, but he declined unless his Highness agreed to the following terms:

1st. That his incapacity to return the kafila property should be admitted.
2nd. That his Highness would undertake to chastise the Sumalanees and people who raided him.

9. Regarding the second allegation by Sher Dil, horse dealer, his Highness promised to thoroughly investigate the matter, and punish whoever was to blame; at the same

time he informed me that as far as he could learn, this raid was the independent act of the Minguls and other Brahooees who had been raiding in Kutchee. I remarked to his Highness that if the Naibs had acted as some people supposed, it would be scarcely credited that they had done so without authority.

2ndly. That 600 men could not assemble close to Mustoong, without his Naib knowing what was going on. To this his Highness replied: Being on friendly terms with Sher Dil, I have done nothing directly or indirectly to injure him. My Naib was cognizant of these Brahooees collecting, but as it was supposed they were going against the Budrak Murrees, he did not interfere with them. The Naib of Dadur's statement, as reported in diary No. 16, was received a few days after the above conversation had taken place.

10. His Highness having for some time past allowed me to understand that an investigation would take place regarding the raid on Sher Dil, I asked him yesterday to commence the inquiry without further delay; also to inform me what arrangements he contemplates making for the protection of kafilas passing through the Bolan. His Highness at once agreed to send for Basheer and Kuchee, relatives of Sher Dil, as also to write to the latter that the Sumalanees and others concerned in the raid against him had been imprisoned, and were about to be tried for the offence. His Highness is of opinion that until this dispute is settled, it would be of no use to make arrangements with the Muzaranees, and therefore proposes as a temporary measure that detachments of infantry at Dadur and Quetta should give escorts to kafilas proceeding through the Bolan.

11. The various conflicting statements now reported will, I trust, show how difficult it is to form an opinion regarding this raid, and that before doing so, it may be advisable to await and see what is elucidated by his Highness' investigation.

Enclosure 13 in No. 75.

No. 86, dated Khelat, the 12th June 1872.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat, to Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, Officiating Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge Memorandum by Commissioner in Sind, forwarded under your endorsement No. 1,414, and to state that his Highness called upon Sher Dil to return what had been plundered, and received an answer that it was beyond his power to do so.

Naib Abdool Azeez left for Mustoong on the 7th instant to assist the Sarawan chief in collecting the property they are responsible for, and received instructions to make particular inquiries regarding the kafila plundered at Siri-Bolan. As many of the merchants had stated that the Murrees were aided by Sirdar Alla Dina Koord and his tribe, at present his Highness does not appear to know what portion of the property was appropriated by the Murrees, how much was saved, and what part Sirdar Alla Dina Koord took in this raid. Up to the present no steps have been taken to coerce the Murrees into restoring what they have plundered. Moreover, his Highness has expressed his inability to do so under present circumstances. Letters were again despatched yesterday to Sher Dil from his Highness the Khan, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed and myself, stating that if he would exert himself in recovering this property, those who had injured him would be punished and made to give up what they had plundered.

On the 5th instant I received a letter from Sirdar Alla Dina Koord, stating that he had forwarded 30 to 40 loads of goods and wounded merchants to Quetta. As the merchants state that this is false, I have asked his Highness to ascertain from the Naib of that place if there is any truth in the Sirdar's statement.

On Tuesday the 11th instant, his Highness agreed to make arrangements for kafilas passing through Bolan, as reported in my letter No. 84.

Enclosure 14 in No. 75.

No. 87, dated Khelat, the 12th June 1872.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat, to Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, Officiating Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

In acknowledging the correspondence forwarded under your endorsement No. 1403, I have the honour to refer to my letter No. 84, from which it will be seen that Captain Sandeman was misinformed regarding the place where the Muzaranees were attacked, also that the statement of his Highness the Khan having refused redress to Sher Dil is equally incorrect.

Enclosure 15 in No. 75.

No. 89, dated Khelat, the 15th June 1872.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat to Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, Officiating Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

I have the honour to report, for the information of Government, that Shahgassee Wulli Mahomed came to my tent at 5.30 a.m. yesterday morning, stating that it was his Highness the Khan's intention to make him a prisoner for the part he had taken at the Jacobabad Conference, and begged me to save him from this insult, as also to get a written guarantee from his Highness that he would not injure him in any way.

2. Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed at the same time stated that no reliance could be placed on his Highness' word, and though what was contemplated was publicly known, his Highness would positively deny he had any such intention. The Shahgassee further stated that the attack in his opinion on Sher Dil, the plundering of kafilas, the panic at Mustoong, and his intended arrest, were with the object of evading what had been guaranteed in his Highness's name at Jacobabad. I was also informed that no advice I gave would be of any good, as his Highness was guided solely by what his mother, sister, two moonshees, Darogah Atta Mahomed, and Shukkur Khan advised, and that under these circumstances it might be as well for me to withdraw from his Highness' court, as it was impossible to state what might occur.

3. I was asked by the Shahgassee to escort him to English territory if his Highness would not guarantee him honourable treatment, and, pending reference, the Shahgassee declined to leave my camp.

4. According to the custom of the country, I sent my moonshee to inquire after his Highness' health, as he was suffering from fever, and directed him to give the following message, viz., that I was much concerned at his Wuzeer having to seek safety in my camp, and begged him not to listen to evil advisers until we could talk over the matter, and that if his health would not permit of his paying the usual weekly visit in the afternoon, I would do myself the honour of calling upon him. His Highness took a solemn oath that he had never contemplated the Shahgassee's arrest, and begged to be excused visiting me as he was still suffering from fever.

5. At 4.30 p.m., I called upon his Highness and pointed out to him how disastrous a misunderstanding with his Wuzeer would be at the present crisis, and that I felt sure it would bring about a general rebellion, far worse than the one quelled. I reminded him of the old Wuzeer's services, and that he was too brave a man to act as he had done, unless he had received the information regarding his intended arrest from some person that he thought reliable. I tendered my services as a friend to bring about a reconciliation, but his Highness disregarded everything that was said, and declined to consider the subject, unless the Shahgassee gave up his informant's name and proved the charge he had made.

6. Feeling what serious consequences may result, I wrote to his Highness the Khan this morning, and annex copy of my letter.

7. For two or three days prior to this there was a rumour that his Highness intended to arrest the Shahgassee, and Sirdars Moolla Mahomed and Noordeen. I mentioned what I had heard, but his Highness laughed at the idea of such a thing being done after his agreement at Jacobabad. On Friday morning, it was currently reported in the town that an attempt was to have been made to assassinate the Shahgassee, but was postponed as some of the sepoys warned to parade at 12 p.m. were not present. Information from an authentic source was given to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, and he came over at once to my tent.

8. I regret to be obliged to record my opinion that the above statement is more worthy of belief than his Highness' denial. At the interview yesterday, his Highness said a few words regarding the conference at Jacobabad, which evidently showed that he was displeased with the Shahgassee in connexion with what occurred there. I referred to this part of our conversation in annexed letter, and pointed out that my Government would feel angry if any injury were inflicted on Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed for the assistance he gave to the Commissioner in Sind on that occasion. His Highness on reading my letter, denied having said anything of the kind.

9. In my letter No. 84, I reserved giving an opinion regarding the raid on Sher Dil, Muzaranee Murree. After what has occurred, I am inclined to think that it was at his Highness' instigation, and that he has no intention of performing what was guaranteed in his name by the Commissioner in Sind, and Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, also that the lives of these Sirdars and the Shahgassee are in imminent danger. Until quite lately I thought I had sufficient influence with his Highness to see that no injury befell them.

10. The Sirdars are naturally alarmed, and consider themselves entitled to the protection of Government, so long as they are honestly carrying out their engagements. The Shahgassee also claims protection, as he has committed no other fault than having done his best to reconcile the Khan to his chiefs; he also states that as he was put into the appointment of Wuzeer by the English Government, he hopes they will interfere on his behalf.

11. From various sources, I learn that the Shahgassee's statement regarding the ruling clique at Khelat is reliable, with the exception of Atta Mahomed's name, his Highness has also taken a relative of Gungaram's, "Pir Bhow," into his pay and favour, though he promised not to employ him. I also hear that Mungaram* and other members of this family are en route to Khelat. His Highness has so often been told how much the English Government disapprove of his employing any member of this family, that his doing so speaks for itself.

* Lately Khan's Moonshee at Beyla, and the chief cause from his vexatious exactions of the Khan's rule being disliked there.
W. L. M.

12. In conclusion, I would advocate a very strong remonstrance being sent by Government, insisting upon fair and honourable treatment for the Shahgassee and chiefs, and that his Highness will assuredly lose their support, should any outrage be committed.

Enclosure 16 in No. 75.

Translation of a Letter from Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

AFTER SALUTATIONS.—It was necessary for me to visit you last night regarding Shahgassee Wulli Mahomed, in hopes that I might be able to adjust the differences that had arisen between you, as a speedy understanding was advisable. When all members of a Government are of one opinion, matters are carried on in a satisfactory manner. Peace and quiet is especially necessary for your country, as rebellions have been of constant occurrence. My hope is that what has happened has happened, and that you and your Wuzeer will in future conduct the affairs of government in a friendly spirit, and that as sovereign you will give him your fullest support. Such conduct would be worthy of you. I have told your Wuzeer what was said in your durbar, and he replied that he would return to you under what terms your Highness deemed advisable. If you will kindly allow him an interview I should esteem it a favour. My Government is well aware of your Wuzeer's high abilities. I understood from your conversation yesterday that your cause of annoyance with the Shahgassee is the part he took at the Jacobabad Conference; if on this account he is disgraced, or otherwise injured, you may be assured that my Government will be angry and annoyed with you. I intend reporting all that has gone on to my Government, and you will probably receive a letter, or hear through me what their opinion, &c. is. If you will send a person of influence to conduct the Shahgassee to your durbar, I shall esteem it a favour.

(True translation.)

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON,
Major, Political Agent at Khelat.

Enclosure 17 in No. 75.

No. 90, dated Khelat, the 17th June 1872.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat, to Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, Officiating Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

In continuation of my letter No. 89, I have the honour to inform you that his Highness the Khan agreed to give a written guarantee to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, and the latter, though doubtful of his Highness' good faith, had determined to return to duty.

2. An influential person has, however, sent secretly to let the Shahgassee know that there is no safety for his life or liberty, in spite of all written agreements, and advised him on no account to leave my camp.

3. I am naturally unwilling to give an antagonistic view to my actions, but as his Highness is deliberately breaking faith with the English Government regarding the treaty made at Jacobabad, I hope Government will support me in giving protection to the Shahgassee and those chiefs who accompanied me to Khelat.

4. His Highness the Khan is entirely in the hands of three or four low unprincipled people, and most decided measures will have to be taken, as he is perfectly indifferent to anything I may suggest.

Enclosure 18 in No. 75.

No. 623, dated Kurrachee, the 29th June 1872.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. & C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, Officiating Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 12th and 25th instant, with their accompaniments. The intelligence conveyed in the latter is of a most serious nature, and of so extraordinary a character, that it would lead to doubts in regard to the sanity of the Khan of Khelat. Hitherto he has always accepted and attended to the advice of the Political Agent, and when it has only depended on himself, acted upon it; while, if others were concerned, he has done what was in his power to get measures carried out.

He has also invariably trusted in and leaned upon the Wuzeer, the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, always looking to him for help, so that this sudden change is the more unaccountable caprice of which the Khan has always been considered to have a large share, would not be sufficient cause for so complete an abandonment of previous habits and custom. Irritation of the difficulties he has lately experienced from the plunder of kafilas passing through his country may have had something to do with it, but is not sufficient. I am convinced, therefore, there is something more behind, of which we know nothing at present, and of which it is most desirable we should obtain accurate information. I request, therefore, you will be good enough to spare no trouble or expense in finding out what are the real motives and reasons for the Khan's present strange action.

2. In the meantime it is most necessary that the Khan should have plainly set before him that his present line of conduct is in direct opposition to the treaty existing between him and the British Government; it is most ungrateful considering all that has been done for him, and will infallibly lead to his disgrace and destruction unless he stops in time. I have, therefore, addressed a letter to his Highness, which is forwarded herewith for your perusal and transmission to Major Harrison at Khelat, who should also read it and then deliver it to, or cause it to be delivered (as he finds best) to his Highness the Khan.

3. If the Khan should still persist in ignoring the treaty engagements and their obligations, Major Harrison should at once leave Khelat and proceed with his escort to Bhagwana or Kozdar, whichever he considers most suitable, and there await further instructions. It is not improbable that his withdrawal from the capital will bring his Highness the Khan to his senses, and it will then have to be considered by Government how the Khan's conduct should be viewed, and what steps should be taken to prevent a recurrence of such dangerous and unseemly procedure. My telegram conveyed instructions to this effect, and is left to Major Harrison's judgment, in which I have complete confidence.

4. The report of intended attack on Major Harrison's camp needs confirmation, and I can scarcely conceive the Khan could for a moment contemplate such a measure, whatever other people may have proposed. But should Major Harrison, on finding it necessary to withdraw, see any inclination to display violence, or offers molestation to him in every way, he should tell his Highness from me, that he, the Khan, is strictly responsible, and will be held rigidly so, that no annoyance or injury in the slightest degree should happen to Her Majesty's Political Agent, or his party, as long as he is within the Khan's dominions; and that should the Khan unfortunately elect to reject the advice now offered to him, that it is required of him to see that Major Harrison leaves his country with all freedom, honour, and consideration. The Wuzeer having sought protection in the British camp will of course accompany Major Harrison when he leaves the country, and be accorded honourable treatment in British territory becoming his position and worth.

5. You will also have learnt that I quite approve of the proposal to take advantage of the need of treasure with Major Harrison's escort, to increase the strength of the latter by an additional body of riflemen. These should remain with that officer until further orders.

6. I would impress upon you the necessity of obtaining early and trustworthy intelligence of all that is passing in Beloochistan, in case communication may be for a time cut off by Major Harrison's posts being intercepted. At the same time the most direct and rapid line should be adopted and maintained for postal despatch between Jacobabad and Major Harrison's camp.

Enclosure 19 in No. 75.

Translation of a Letter from Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I., C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, dated the 29th June 1872.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—It is with extreme regret I have learned that Colonel Mainwaring, Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind, and from Major Harrison, the Political Agent at your Court, that on two occasions lately peaceful merchants passing through your Highness' country have been plundered of their goods, and that your Highness has failed to cause restitution of their property to be made to them, or to punish the evil-doers, Muzaranee Murrees. Further, it is stated that these deeds of violence were brought about by most unjustifiable acts of certain of your Highness' subjects residing near Mustoong, who attacked the Murrees when they were quietly living near the head of the Bolan Pass; and that these acts were perpetrated, if not under the authority of, certainly with the cognizance of your Highness' officers, placed at Mustoong to preserve order, and that the Murrees waylaid the kafilas in reprisal for the injury that had been done them. Major Harrison most properly brought to your Highness' notice that the first thing to be done was that a thorough investigation of the charge brought against the Mustoong people should take place, and that should the outrage be proved those engaged in it should be severely punished, and restitution of, or compensation for, what they had lost should be assigned to the Murrees, after which the question of their proceedings could be taken up.

Your Highness at first concurred in this, and promised to do all that was necessary; but in spite of your Highness' protestations, I now learn that nothing has been done, and that this outrage remains so far unnoticed and unanswered for. Such being the case, the inference is inevitable, either that your Highness is utterly indifferent as to what passes in your country, or that the act, if not actually authorised by you, meets with your approval. As regards the merchants I must point out to your Highness that leaving their wrongs unredressed not only reflects most seriously on the honour and credit of your Highness, and the manner in which you administer the government of of your country, but it is directly opposed to the terms of the treaty existing between your Highness and the British Government. Those terms cannot be evaded by either side, and I must now distinctly and emphatically call upon your Highness to adopt immediate measures for a full and faithful compliance with them, or it will be my duty to report to my Government that your Highness is determined to wholly disregard these, and to be faithless in the most solemn obligations a sovereign can enter into.

It will also be necessary then for me to ask for instructions from my Government to recall the British officer who has hitherto been residing at your court, and so withdraw

from you that countenance and assistance which has hitherto, since your Highness' accession to the throne, been so cordially and unreservedly given to you.

There are, however, other circumstances of the gravest nature reported to which I must now allude, and which have occasioned me the deepest concern.

I am now informed that your Highness, listening to evil-doers who only seek your ruin, has ceased to treat the Political Agent at your Court with that confidence he is entitled to, and to attend to the counsel and advice which it is his duty to offer, and which has always been fittingly proffered to the advantage of yourself, and to the good of your country. Also that you have been led to turn from you one of the most faithful and true servants a sovereign ever had, your Wuzeer, the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed. Your Highness is well aware, having had more than sufficient proofs, that my sole object has been ever to promote your welfare, and to assist in every possible way in getting carried into effect what is the just desire of the British Government—the establishment of a firm and just government in your dominions. Recently, at your request, and by desire of my Government, I engaged in the endeavour to mediate between, and reconcile your Highness and certain of your chiefs then in opposition to your authority. In that task the Wuzeer afforded me the most valuable assistance, and evinced an unswerving regard for your Highness' best interests, and for the good of your government, and all that he did or said met with my unqualified approval. Arrangements were then made which received the full approval of the Government of India, whose appreciation of the frank manner in which your Highness then acted was markedly shown as communicated to you.

As your Highness delegated to me full power to act in your behalf, and in your name it would be a breach of faith did your Highness go back from any one particular that was then acceded to and accepted by me. Your Highness has been yet shown that such had a place in your conduct, and I cannot but hope that what has occurred has arisen from some hasty misunderstanding on your part; and that on receipt of this letter, if you have not already done so on reconsideration of the advice tendered by Major Harrison, you will remedy what has occurred, restoring the Wuzeer to that place and share in your confidence which he so thoroughly deserves, and on which the prosperity of your country so largely depends.

The Wuzeer has sought protection with Major Harrison in the British camp, and there it will continue to be afforded to him as long as necessary; but I trust to your Highness' sense of what is right and of justice that the necessity shall be of the shortest.

In conclusion I would solemnly urge your Highness to pause before it is too late, and to listen to the advice of your oldest and best friend, and hold back from the reckless and unreasonable course you are now entering upon, a course so widely different to what you have hitherto followed, and which can only result in your ruin and destruction. Dismiss from your side and councils the ill-disposed people who have led you to adopt such disastrous views, and to act in so ungrateful and unbecoming a manner. Rest only upon those who, by long and truthful service have proved their attachment to you, and their fidelity to your Government. Look to the British officer who is accredited to you and who has often shown such sound judgment and thought in your behalf; and cordially accept from him the advice he will be ever ready to give. By following this course you will continue to enjoy the friendship and support of the British Government, and, with God's blessing, peace and prosperity will be restored to your country.

But should your Highness be led to neglect this advice and to persist in the course you have so unhappily chosen, as reported, I must intimate to you in distinct terms that such will involve the forfeiture of the friendship of the British Government, and the immediate withdrawal of the British officer at your court, leaving you to the fate you provoke.

This letter will be handed to you by Major Harrison, who is in possession of its contents, and has instructions to act upon the above at once, should such a step be unfortunately forced upon him by your Highness. But I trust your Highness will accept warning in time, and avoid the abyss now yawning before you, so that I may continue to subscribe myself as your sincere friend.

(True translation.)

W. L. Merewether, Colonel,
Commissioner in Sind.

No. 76.

No. 91, dated Khelat, the 21st June 1872.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat, to Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, Officiating Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

I HAVE the honour to report for your information that the Naib of Dadur states he tried to induce the merchants plundered at Siri-Bolan to proceed by the Mullah Pass, and on the camelmen refusing to go by that route, he drew up an agreement, copy and translation of which are attached.

Enclosure in No. 76.

Translation of an Agreement.

NAIB ABDOOL WAHID, of Dadur, states that the following is the agreement he made with the merchants who were plundered at Siri-Bolan:

At this time I have given Abdool Rahman, kafila-bashee, (70) seventy sowars and footmen for their protection in the Bolan on the following understanding: That if the Murrees attack the kafila, and loss occurs from the escort not fighting, such losses are to be made good; if, on the other hand, they fight, and the kafila is plundered, no account will be taken of the losses incurred, the lives of the escort being a set-off for the same. This agreement has been given to the merchants.

(True translation.)
(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent at Khelat.

No. 631, dated Kurrachee, the 4th July 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information, in continuation of Commissioner's letter, No. 625, dated 29th June 1872.

2. From the letter forwarded by the Naib of Dadur, it would appear that the people of the kafila persisted in following the Bolan route, contrary to the desire of the Naib. This being the case, the chief blame rests on themselves, though it does not absolve his Highness the Khan of Khelat from the blame of the risk of such disorders and disasters in his own country. A copy of the vernacular letter is also attached.

No. 641, dated Kurrachee, the 5th July 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies of papers noted in the margin are forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esquire, C. S. I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Commissioner's compliments, in continuation of Commissioner's Memorandum, No. 629, dated 4th July 1872.

No. 91, dated 21st June 1872.
Translation of letter from Abdool Wahud of Dadur.
Commissioners endorsement, No. 631, dated 4th July 1872.

No. 77.

No. 92, dated Khelat, the 21st June 1872.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat, to Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, Officiating Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

In forwarding the accompanying copy and translation of a letter purporting to be written by the Sumalanees who plundered Sher Dil, I am still of opinion that the raid on the latter was at his Highness' instigation, and that the Sumalanees have been made to sign the accompanying document and relieve his Highness' Government of the onus attached to such a proceeding.

Enclosure in No. 77.

Translation of a Letter from Karim Khan, Rawat Khan, and Dad Shah, Sumalanee Minguls, to his Highness the Khan.

AFTER SALUTATIONS,—We have been guilty of the following disrespect: That without any order we committed a raid on Sher Dil, Murree, and now throw ourselves on your Highness' mercy. The Murrees have constantly plundered our property and killed members of our tribe. According to Belooch custom we retaliated upon them. These Murrees being enemies of Brahooees, we never imagined your Highness would have been angry with us. Your order has been received to return the Murree's property. We agree to this, and will give it back when they come to fetch it.

Naib Abdool Rahman is very hard on us, and insists that we must make good what was plundered from the last kafila, as it was through our instrumentality that the Murrees made the attack. Your Highness, we are unable to do what he orders, not even if we were to sell our wives and children. We have only retaliated on the Murrees, as they have frequently plundered us and killed many of our tribe. Any loss of lives the Murrees have sustained is the khoon or blood we were entitled to, and if they felt aggrieved, they ought to have retaliated on us, not on the kafilas. Their having done so is no fault of ours. Kindly write to Abdool Rahman not to exact compensation for the kafilas property from us. Should you insist upon it, we agree. Consider us your faithful servants.

(True translation.)

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent at Khelat.

No. 632, dated Kurrachee, the 4th July 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government, in continuation of Commissioner's letter, No. 625, dated 29th June 1872.

2. Even supposing the statement of the Sumalanee Minguls to be true, and that Major Harrison's supposition is not correct, what occurred shows clearly that these subjects of the Khan have most unjustifiably disturbed the peace of the country, making the trade routes unsafe, and were quite beyond his control. The necessity, therefore, must be most strongly urged upon him of making better arrangements for good government in his country.

No. 642, dated Kurrachee, the 5th July 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esquire, C. S. I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, in continuation of Commissioner's Memorandum, No. 629, dated 4th July 1872.

No. 78.

No. 93, dated Khelat, the 21st June 1872.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat, to Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. Mainwaring, Officiating Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

I HAVE the honour to forward letters, with translation, from Syed Aurung Shah and the Naib of Dadur, and would respectfully suggest that Captain Sandeman might be asked to interfere as little as possible, as his doing so irritates his Highness.

Enclosure 1 in No. 78.

Translation of a Letter from Abdool Wahud, Naib of Dadur, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

AFTER SALUTATIONS,—I have just heard that two sowars arrived at Seebee with a khillut and letters from Captain Sandeman for Bukhtawar Khan. One of the letters was for Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's son. The substance of the letter was as follows: "Detain "my sowars eight days, and inquire why the kafila was plundered, and what arrange- "ments are being made. At the end of eight days send the sowars back with reliable "information." It is Captain Sandeman's intention to take a tour through the Murree, Seebee, and Dadur Hills. I will report what occurs. Captain Sandeman also requested to be informed how your Highness and the chiefs are getting on, and what arrangements have been made for the Bolan.

Enclosure 2 in No. 78.

Translation of a Letter from Syed Aurung Shah, of Dadur, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

AFTER SALUTATIONS,—A few days back a sowar came from Captain Sandeman of Dera Ghazee Khan to Bukhtawar Khan of Seebee. This I reported at the time. A second sowar brought a letter from the above sahib on 1st *Rabi-ul-Sani*, 7th June, for Bukhtawar Khan, and remained at Sibi three days. The following communication has been received from the letter and what the sowar said, viz., Bukhtawar Khan was asked to give him information regarding your Highness, the Jalawan and Sarawan chiefs, also about the Bolan, the Muzarani Murrees, the Dumars, as also what was the state of affairs in Kutchee and Korasan, what your Highness and the Sirdars had done, and were about to do, and what arrangements had been made for the Bolan. I don't know what Bukhtawar Khan has replied. The sowar who brought the letter gave the following information: That Captain Sandeman intended to make small *stations** through the Boogtee, Murree, and Khetran country to Dadur; also that the sahib has a great many other intentions, and had told Bukhtawar Khan to report to the Punjab Government what was going on in your frontier. It is also stated that Captain Sandeman proposes coming to Kutchee about *Shawal*, September.

* The word in vernacular letter is Commissioner.

Captain Sandeman is now at Koh-Murree. He formerly had a house there, but is building another. I have told you what I have heard. God knows whether it is correct or not. Any further news will be reported to you. I am your well-wisher.

(True translations.)

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent at Khelat.

No. 643, dated Kurrachee the 5th July 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

No. 93, dated 21st June 1872.
Translation of letter from Abdool Wahid, Naib of Dadur.
Translation of letter from Syed Aurung Shah.

The papers as per margin are forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esquire, C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, in continuation of Commissioner's Memorandum No. 629, dated 4th July 1872.

No. 79.

No. 94, dated Khelat, the 21st June 1872.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat, to Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, Officiating Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

In continuation of my letters Nos. 89 and 90, I have the honour to report that his Highness visited me on Monday, and agreed that Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed should stay near my camp until I could receive an answer to letters above quoted, and, in the meantime, carry on the duties devolving on him as Wazeer.

Enclosure 1 in No. 79.

No. 95, dated Khelat, the 21st June 1872.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat, to Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, Officiating Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

I have the honour to forward copy of a letter from Shere Dil, Murree, to his Highness the Khan, and the latter's reply to the same. Letter in original to my address is also attached. Shere Dil's letters to a great extent confirm the statement and opinion given in correspondence marginally noted.

Letter No. 14, paragraph 6.
„ No. 89, 1st part, paragraph 9.

Enclosure 2 in No. 79.

Translation of a Letter from Shere Dil, Muzaranee, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

After salutations,—I was formerly in your service, and though the whole of the Sarawans were in rebellion against you, I remained faithful to you night and day, and protected kafilas going through the Bolan. As soon as your treaty with the Sarawans was near completion, your naibs assembled the Sumulanis, attacked me, plundered our property, killed my son, two cousins, and three other men, and carried off 30,000 sheep, 400 flocks of goats, and property contained in 60 houses. One fifth of the spoil your naibs took. Ask Kechi if what I state is true. I do not accept your terms and will not come. If you require my services kill the following men as my *khoon* or blood compensation: Rawat, Mairan, Karam Khan, Hotman, Sabz Ali Taimir; and hand over my property to Wudera Shadhi Khan. On his sending it to me I will visit you and again do your service. If you do not do this, well and good: I am a Belooch and will act like them.

Enclosure 3 in No. 79.

Translation of a Letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat, to Shere Dil, Murree, dated the 14th Rubi-ool-Sani 1289.

After salutations,—Your letter regarding terms required has reached me, and I am aware of its contents. I now tell you that an inquiry regarding the Sumalani raid on you is about to take place before me. I wrote to you before to come to me. Your presence is urgently required. Do not delay. On receipt of this letter come at once. No harm will befall you. On arrival I will make satisfactory arrangements regarding this business.

Enclosure 4 in No. 79.

Translation of a Letter from Shere Dil, Muzaranee, to the English Sahib.

After salutations,—By direction of Captain Sandeman I proceeded with Bijur to Khanghar. The English were very kind to me. I was happy, agreed to take service with them, and returned to my place. His Highness the Khan and the Brahooes became my enemies on account of my having become a servant of the English Government, and the Sumalani Minguls assembled a force which attacked and plundered me. My son, two cousins, and three other men were killed, 30,000 sheep, 400 flocks of goats,

and 60 houses were plundered. I now write that, if you are prepared to be kind, I am entitled to the lives of the following men: 1, Rawat, 2, Mairan, 3, Karam Khan, 4, Hotman, 5, Sabz Ali Taimar, as also the property that was plundered from us. If this is done I shall consider myself a servant of the British Government, and refrain from causing any injury in the Bolan, and will guarantee not to cause any one the loss of a pie, or personal injury. If you cannot do this, do not be angry. The Belooch are thieves, and I shall go on thieving.

(True translations.)

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent at Khelat.

No. 644, dated Kurrachee, the 5th July, 1872.

Memorandum from Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. & C.B., Commissioner in Sind.

No. 94 of 21st June 1872.
No. 95 of 21st June 1872.
Translation of letter from Shere Dil to his Highness the Khan.
Translation of a letter from his Highness the Khan to Shere Dil.
Translation of a letter from Shere Dil to the English Sahib,

The Commissioner in Sind has the honour to forward copies of the papers noted in the margin for the information of C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, in continuation of Commissioner's Memorandum, No. 629, dated 4th instant.

No. 80.

Dated Khelat, the 22nd June 1872.

Diary No. 19, for the week ending 22nd June 1872.

NAIB ABDOOL WAHUD writes that he has induced the Kossahs, who left Dadur some [illegible] ago, to return and cultivate his Highness' lands at Mishkab.

[illegible] Murrees have committed a raid on the Lehrees at Shah Mardon, 24 miles from [illegible] The [illegible] carried off two flocks of sheep and goats, and six head of cattle.

Khelat, and [illegible] merchants who were plundered by the Sarawans have returned from [illegible] The Pathan [illegible] that there is not the slightest prospect of their getting their property Mustoong, stating [illegible] glish Government will not compel his Highness the Khan to [illegible] back, and that if the Eng[illegible] to give a written paper stating that his Highness the compensate them for the same [illegible] the Khan of Khelat and exact restitution. The Ameer is at full liberty to coerce [illegible]ds, a few donkeys, and paid 20 to 30 Rupees in Sarawans have only collected 115 came[illegible] cash. [illegible] of what has not been recovered to Syed

Sirdar Noordeen has agreed to pay the value [illegible] Ahmed, and sent sowars to fetch the money. [illegible] the Khan and myself regarding

Shere Dil, Muzaranee has written to his Highness [illegible] on which he would again take the Sumalani raid on his camp, and stated the terms [illegible]ly to the Political Superin- service with the Khan. Particulars were reported offici[illegible] tendent, Frontier Upper Sind. [illegible]he chiefs seeing how his

The political aspect of affairs at Khelat is very critical. T[illegible]e no confidence that Highness is disposed towards Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, ha[illegible] respected. matters in which they are personally interested will be carried out an[illegible]e chief command

The troops are also in a very unsettled state, in consequence of th[illegible]termined to having been given to a Brahooee, Shukur Khan. His Highness appears [illegible]fficult to abide by the council of evil advisers; what his intentions actually are it is [illegible] ascertain, as startling reports are circulated daily.

Darogah Atta Mahomed visited me this morning, Friday, and was evidently sent by his Highness to persuade me that Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed had allowed himself to be unnecessarily alarmed by a bazar rumour. The Darogah also seemed anxious to ascertain what reports I had heard, but I did not satisfy his curiosity, and talked on ordinary subjects.

(True translation.)

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent at Khelat.

No. 645, dated Kurrachee, the 5th July 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esquire, C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, in continuation of Commissioner's Memorandum No. 629, dated 4th July 1872.

No. 81.

No. 1496 P., dated Simla, 6th July 1872.

From Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with Governor General, to Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

IN continuation of Foreign Department letter No. 1426 P., dated the 27th ultimo, I am directed to forward, for the information of the Government of Bombay, the accompanying extract, paragraph 5, from a letter from the Government of Punjab. No. 53 S., dated the 29th idem, regarding the settlement of the claims of the Murree and Boogtee tribes.

No. 82.

No. 67 S., dated Simla, 6th July 1872.

From Officiating Secretary to the Government of Punjab to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with Governor General.

I AM desired to forward, for information, a copy of news reports received from Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dhera Ghazee Khan.

Enclosure 1 in No. 82.

NEWS REPORT.

Information received from Shehan Khan, Vakeel of Ghuzzun Khan, Murree Tomundar.

" ABOUT two or three months ago the Brahooees (Minguls) took an army (lushkur) against Muzzerani Murrees, who were grazing their cattle at a place called Murron and killed the son of Shere Dil Muzzerani, Mokuddum, and eleven of the clan, and carried off about 6,000 sheep and goats and 250 donkeys, and looted three (3) hamlets. The cause of the outrage was apparently that the Minguls were jealous of the Muzzeranis having charge of the Bolan kafila route, which they considered their right. Kenchi, head Mokuddum of the Muzzeranis, went to seek redress from his Highness the Khan of Khelat, but the Khan refused to grant him redress, saying that he must look after himself."

See my report on Khelat affairs.
(Sd.) R. G. S.

On receiving this reply Shere Dil and his people, being left without hope, left Kirtuk and joined the other Murrees at Kott Mundahi. As they were on their way they met a kafila going to Candahar and attacked it, but the kafila was well guarded, and after a severe fight, in which the Afghans lost four men killed, and the Muzzerani Murrees six killed, the latter only succeeded in carrying off six camel-loads of goods. After this Shere Dil went with 700 Murrees and attacked another kafila from Sind proceeding through the Bolan, and killed 30 of the kafilabashis, and carried off the whole of the property, consisting of about 500 laden camels, 600 laden donkeys, 50 horses, and three mules. Murrees lost three men killed and 25 wounded. As they were returning with their spoil an army (lushkar) of the Brahooees came to meet them at Shuken. As the Murrees were outnumbered by the Brahooees, they at first thought of leaving the property, but the Brahooees said they did not want to fight, but demanded a share of the property, which the Murrees divided with them, the Brahooees receiving something less than half, and the Murrees keeping the remainder. It was afterwards reported that Ameer Shere Ali Khan either wrote or sent a Vakeel to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, demanding that full restoration should be made to Shere Dil for the loss he had sustained at the hands of Brahooees, as he was at the time looked to as

Mundi, headquarters of the Bijarani Murrees, five long marches from Hurrunt Sihi, is one day's march from Mundi.
(Sd.) R. G. S.

responsible for the safety of Bolan kafilas, and had committed no fault, and also that all the property of the plundered Candahar kafilas should be restored by the Khan of Khelat. On this the Khan sent for Kenchi Muzerani and gave him a khillut, and sent him with 200 sowars to the Minguls to get back the property; he has not heard with what result. With regard to the property plundered by the Brahooees from the first kafila it is rumoured that one third of the value is to be made up by the Commissioner in Sind, one third by his Highness the Khan, and one third by the Brahooee Sirdars. With regard to the one third for which the Brahooee Sirdars are responsible, it is said that Moolla Mahomed has imposed a fine of Rupees 2 on each house in his toman to make it up and has sent to get the money collected. Moolla Mahomed and Noordeen are still at Khelat. There is a report current in the hills that Ameer Shere Ali has sent 5,000 men and four guns to Candahar, some say to enforce the restitution of the property plundered from the kafilas, others to collect the Ameer's revenues in his territories of Seebee and Kajrick. A force of about 1,300 Murrees and Boogtees have gone against the Luni Pathans to avenge the death of Kukkul, the Bijarani Mokuddum.

Enclosure 2 in No. 82.

Report of Ghuzzun Khan, Murree, Tomandar, to Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan.

I HAVE received your perwannah by the Bungul Lishari (Gurchani), in which you state the Sirkar and the Sind authorities are angry with Shere Dil Muzzerani Murree, on account of plundering the kafila in the Bolan. The circumstances attending that affair are as follows:—The Khan Sahib Wullee, Khelat has no hold over, or rule in, his country. Some time since, when the Sahibs of Sind and the Punjab met at Jacobabad, we all were greatly pleased in the expectation that the affairs of the country would be satisfactorily settled, but no result of the kind took place, for which we are sorrowful. Although Shere Dil is in truth a Murree, still from the time of his grandfathers, his wanderings and livelihood and that of his followers have been connected with the Brahooees, and the responsibilities of kafilas traversing the Bolan Pass had been entrusted to them. The Minguls (Brahooees) without any just reason or provocation attacked the Muzzeranis and killed Shere Dil's son with 12 of his men, and plundered all their property. On this Shere Dil joined the other Murrees, where he collected a force (lushkur) and attacked the kafila, but a great part of the property was carried off by the Brahooees, Shere Dil getting the credit of having taken all. It will be evident to you that there being no ruler (Wullee) in the country, I am powerless in an affair of this kind. If there was only a responsible ruler in the country matters would be brought right in a short time (*ek lahza men*). I do not deserve, therefore, the censure you have written to me, as the "Wulli Mulk" is not able to rule, and the Hakims at Khelat make us "intazam," and I am only a Belooch living in a corner of the hills.

This is in reply to my letter, telling him how grieved and vexed I was at the conduct of Shere Dil.

No news has been received here as to what steps are being taken to recover the stolen kafila property further than these reports contain.

(Signed) R. SANDEMAN.

1st July 1872.

No. 83.

No. 4363, dated Bombay Castle, 8th July 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

REFERRING to Mr. LePoer Wynne's letter dated 16th May last, No. 1188 P, I am directed to forward herewith, for submission to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, copy of a communication and of its enclosures from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 625, dated 29th ultimo,* affording the information required regarding the attack by a party of Minguls on Sher Dil, Muzaranee Murree, &c., and reporting the imminence of a crisis at Khelat owing to the conduct of his Highness the Khan.

* Received to-day 8th.

No. 84.

No. 4065, dated Bombay Castle, 8th July 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of the letter from this Office, No. 3506, dated 12th ultimo, I am directed to transmit herewith, for submission to the Government of India, copy of the diary (No. 14) of the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 25th May last, received under endorsement of the Commissioner in Sindh, No. 616, dated 29th ultimo.

2. Copy of the diary (No. 15) for the week ending 1st ultimo, is also enclosed.

Enclosure 1 in No. 84.

Dated Khelat, the 25th May 1872.

Diary No. 14 for the week ending 25th May 1872.

Arrived at Khelat on the 20th. After the usual visits of ceremony, I went with the Sarawan Sirdars on the 22nd to call on his Highness, and explained to him "that the "English Government felt greatly concerned at the disorder that prevailed of late "through the misunderstanding existing between him and these Sirdars;" and that as they had expressed their sorrow for the past, and a desire to give him their full support in future, I was in hopes he would overlook all past faults, and grant them the same privileges they had enjoyed in his late brother's reign.

Shadi Khan, Bungulzai, in consequence of his father's death, is to be officially acknowledged as the Bungulzai Sirdar. Most of the chiefs are to start on Tuesday next with Naib Abdool Azeez to collect property plundered from the first kafila. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and Semmedi, Lehree, remain at Khelat with me.

Sirdar Noordeen were present at his Highness' durbar on the 22nd, and he subsequently informed Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed that his people had collected two-thirds of the property plundered, and the remaining one-third had been so cut up and distributed as to be of no use. On the day this statement was made, I received a letter from the merchants at Kozdar, stating that up to the date of writing they had not received a single article. This letter I forwarded to the Shahgassee, and he informed the Sirdar that his statement was false, and he would be only allowed eight days more to complete his agreement regarding the kafila property.

Members of the kafila lately plundered between Muclo and Siri-Bolan have constantly visited me during the week; from them I learn that sixty of their number were killed, and most of their escort fled on the first alarm. They assure me that the Naib or Dadur gave them a written paper, stating he would guarantee any loss occurring in the pass. One of their number states most positively that Alla Dina Koord joined in the attack and appropriated six loads of tea belonging to him. A horse-dealer, by name Sher Dil, was plundered of Rupees 7,500 he was bringing up to fulfil a contract he had with the remount committee at Bangalore. He is so incensed at his loss that he has brought most serious accusation against his Highness, "being scarcely in a frame of mind to be responsible for what he said." I refrain from recording the same until convinced of their accuracy. I tried to induce his Highness to give the merchants some pecuniary assistance, to inquire fully into their losses, and assure them that he would do all in his power to redress their wrongs. My advice has not been followed as yet, so most of the merchants have proceeded to Cabul to lay their complaints before his Highness the Ameer.

I have also told his Highness that if the merchants hold the certificate above alluded to, he is responsible for their losses. Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed takes the same view of the case as I do, and is doing his utmost to induce the Khan to immediate action in this matter.

(Signed) C. H. Harrison, Major,
Political Agent at Khelat.

No. 616, dated Kurrachee, the 29th June 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information.

Enclosure 2 in No. 84.

Dated Khelat, the 1st June 1872.

Diary No. 15 for the week ending 1st June 1872.

ON Sunday afternoon his Highness held a durbar at which the Sarawan chiefs and the merchants who are interested in their proceedings were present, and it was agreed that they should proceed on the following day to their respective tribes, collect property, and send it to Mustoong, at which place Naib Abdool Azeez would be present to give them assistance if requisite. Hajee Mahomed Khan Rustoomzai, a connexion of Sirdir Moolla Mahomed, was appointed by the latter to exercise a general supervision over the other chiefs, and report progress. In the course of a week or ten days they have undertaken to state whether they are able to collect the property, or whether force will be required.

Sirdar Noordeen has as yet only returned a very trifling portion of the property he plundered.

The members of the last kafila plundered have visited me daily, and insisted that as their Ameer was a friend and ally of the English Government, I was bound to make his Highness the Khan compensate them for their losses. Having explained that I could take no direct action in the matter, but would use my influence with his Highness the Khan to redress their grievances, they expressed themselves dissatisfied, and have for the most part proceeded to Cabul to lay their complaints before his Highness the Ameer. His Highness the Khan has positively declined giving compensation, but has undertaken to try and recover the property, or get compensation from the people who plundered it, except from the Murrees, whom he disowns and professes to be unable to coerce.

Sirdar Azaad Khan, of Kharan, wrote me a long letter; the purport of it was that as a general treaty had been agreed upon, he hoped his Highness would restore him to the Naibship of Punchgoor.

This morning it was reported to me that great discontent prevailed in his Highness' small force from his having appointed a Brahooee to command one of his cavalry regiments, and having dismissed an Hindoostanee Native officer. On the Hindoostanees and Pathans objecting to serve under the above Brahooee, 47 were summarily discharged. Many people have asked his Highness to reconsider this decision as one calculated to bring about serious complications; he declines all advice on this matter, saying that he is the best judge of his own interests.

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent at Khelat.

No. 617, dated Kurrachee, the 29th June 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information.

No. 85.

No. 4126, dated Bombay Castle, the 10th July 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN continuation of my letter No. 4065, dated 8th instant, I am directed to enclose, for submission to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council, copy of the diary (No. 16) of the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 8th ultimo, received under endorsement of the Commissioner in Sind, No. 626, dated the 2nd instant.

Enclosure in No. 85.

Dated Khelat, the 8th June 1872.

Diary No. 16 for the week ending 8th June 1872.

ABDOOL WAHUD, Naib of Dadur, writes that Sher Dil, Murree, is in the hills, and that he and all the Murrees state that the raid on Hin by the Sumalanees was at the instigation of the Naibs of Mustoong and Quetta, who received one-fifth of the plunder, and that, in consequence of this treatment, he had plundered the kafilas, and hoped his Highness would punish his naibs for their conduct towards him.

Naib Abdool Wahud enclosed a memorandum showing that in the last kafila plundered there were 63 camels and 205 donkeys laden with merchandise, for which they paid Rupees 110-13-9 for *badurkee*, or safe transit.

No news has yet been received from the Sarawan chiefs engaged in collecting the property of the first kafila.

Sirdar Noordeen, up to the present time, has only recovered a very trifling amount of what he plundered.

Afghan merchants of this place have received letters stating that one hundred Toorkomen had arrived at Candahar and were *en route* to Cabul to visit his Highness the Ameer, with what object was not known.

A kafila arrived from Kurrachee *en route* to Candahar. Amongst the merchants was a European boy, who went by the name of Deen Mahomed. I sent for him, and, on inquiry, found that his name was John Rogers, son of John Rogers, formerly a private in Her Majesty's 82nd, who exchanged into the 37th when the former regiment left Aden for England. Deen Mahomed *alias* John Rogers, junior, is about sixteen years of age, strong and intelligent. Having quarrelled with his father he went to Lahore, and worked with a boiler-maker; from thence he proceeded to Kurrachee, and was employed on the railway; owing to reductions he was thrown out of employment, and then decided upon turning Mahomedan and proceeding to Candahar. I tried to dissuade him from going on, and pointed out that with his education there ought to be no difficulty in getting employment in English territory. He said he was travelling for amusement, and was so kindly treated by the merchants that he had no wish to leave them; consequently I did not consider myself authorised to interfere with his movements.

Sirdar Abdool Rahmen, of Nooshkee, has written a friendly letter, but gives no news of importance.

Sirdar Sorab Khan, Dhoombkee, has also written to me describing a Murree raid on the village of Jam, and that he had followed them up to Murree, recovered all the cattle plundered, "about 400 head," as also the horses, arms, and accoutrements of 29 Murrees. Three Dhoombkees were wounded and seven Murrees killed.

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent at Khelat.

No. 626, dated Kurrachee, the 2nd July 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information.

No. 86.

No. 4127, dated Bombay Castle, the 10th July 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN continuation of the letter from this Office, No. 4065, dated the 8th instant, I am directed to forward herewith, for the purpose of being laid before his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council, copy of further correspondence regarding the present position of affairs in Khelat.

Enclosure 1 in No. 86.

Dated Khelat, the 16th June 1872.

Diary No. 17 for the week ending Sunday, the 16th June 1872.

Syed Ahmed, who was plundered at Kozdar, has arrived at Khelat with about 80 camels and a quantity of piece goods. Some portion of the latter had been cut into such small pieces as to be of little or no use. A committee of merchants are valuing these remnants, and Noordeen has agreed to give any money compensation that may be requisite to settle accounts with the Syed.

The Sarawan Sirdars were doing their best to carry out what they had undertaken, when some person reported that instructions had been received by the Naib of Mustoong to attack the Brahooees. Upon this Mahomed Khan, Rustomzai, and Tundee, Shawanee, fled and have not since been heard of. Shadee Khan, Bungoolzai, Alla Dina's son, Yar Mahomed, and Syed Khan Mahomed, Shaee, remained. On Monday Sirdar Moolla Mahomed received a letter on the subject; and as it appeared to me that an invidious attempt was being made to thwart the arrangements made at Jacobabad, I at once wrote to his Highness on the subject. A copy of the letter is annexed.

Yesterday morning, Friday, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed came to my tent at half-past five, and stated that his Highness the Khan had decided upon making him a prisoner, and that the only cause he could assign for this treatment was the share he had taken in the Conference at Jacobabad, and his efforts to carry out the agreement then entered into. The Shahgassee also informed me that he is of opinion that the raid on Sher Dil, the plundering of the kafilas, and the reports which led to the late panic at Mustoong, were all instigated by his Highness, whose object is to evade the promises made in his name to the Sarawan chiefs. He (the Shahgassee) considered that he was entitled to a certain amount of protection, not from death, but from dishonourable treatment, and refused to leave my tent.

I immediately communicated with the Khan, and though his Highness' intentions with regard to the Shahgassee are universally spoken of, yet he professed perfect ignorance, stating that he had never harboured injurious designs towards his Wuzeer, and I regret to say he would not see the necessity of an immediate reconciliation.

This morning, Sunday, I called upon his Highness, and was accompanied by Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed. After a long interview his Highness agreed to give the latter a written guarantee that his life and person would be respected if he returned to his duties. He is inclined to do so, but I fear the reconciliation will be only temporary.

Late last night Shukkur Khan, commandant of one his Highness' regiments, and leader of the party opposed to the Shahgassee, sent to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and advised him to leave the neighbourhood of my camp, and not to trust to the English Government or the Shahgassee, promising to make arrangements for him if he would come over to his side.

It would appear that Mahomed Khan, Rustomzai, had fled into the hills and collected a force, but on being assured there was no danger he returned, and is now assisting in collecting kafila property.

(Signed) C. H. Harrison, Major,
Political Agent at Khelat.

Enclosure 2 in No. 86.

Translation of a Letter from Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

By a post just received I am called upon to report when, where, and why Shere Dil was plundered by the Sumulanees. I informed you verbally what the merchants stated, as also that it was the current report that your Naibs at Mustoong and Quetta had an understanding with the Sumalanees and received one fifth of the spoil. As a friend I invite your fullest confidence on this subject, it being desirable to know who were the instigators of this outrage.

The duty of a friend is to give advice, and I therefore venture to suggest that the Naib at Mustoong is ruining your reputation and interests. A case just reported to me is calculated to create another disturbance in this country. The Sarawan chiefs went

to collect the property of the kafilas before time had elapsed. To enable them to do so your Naib allowed it to be understood that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed was a prisoner at Khelat, and that an attack was about to be made on the Brahooees in Mustoong. This information has resulted in the chief's seeking safety in the hills, and will retard or prevent the carrying out of their engagements.

My Government have but one object in trying to restore peace and order in your country; but if the late efforts of the Commissioner in Sind are to be tacitly thwarted by your subordinates, and no advice attended to, I cannot see how you can expect a continuance of the friendship and support that has always been shown to you. I shall be obliged by your replying to this letter at your earliest convenience.

Enclosure 3 in No. 86.

Translation of a Letter from Syed Khan, Mahomed Shaee, Kadur Buksh, and Mahomed Azim, to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed.

We are at Mustoong, and have sent people in every direction to collect the kafila property. On the 1st *Rubee-ool-Akir* (corresponding to the 8th June 1872) people came to us and said that ammunition had been served out by the Naib to his garrison, and that the object was to attack us; also that you and Sirdar Noordeen had been imprisoned. Fearing for our lives we collected together. On the following morning Naib Abdool Rahman said this report was false. We then sent Feroze Khan to the Naib, and he had a conversation with him, and the Naib again stated that the report was untrue. Before day-break on the 9th Soolan Mahomed, Shawanee, arrived with a levy, and told every one he met *en route* that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and Noordeen had been imprisoned, and that any Brahooees who wished to save themselves had better make terms with the Naib. Hearing this most of the Brahooees fled into the hills. Confiding in the English Government and his Highness the Khan, we have remained. Write a comforting letter and inform us of the true state of affairs.

Enclosure 4 in No. 86.

Translation of a Letter from Naib Abdool Rahnan, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

After salutations,—On the 1st *Rubee-ool-Akir* (corresponding to the 8th June) Afzul, Lehree, who was amongst his people, reported to me that all the Brahooees had collected together about midnight. On asking why they had done so they informed him that an order had come to the Naib from Khelat to attack them. Moorad Khan, in your Highness' service, confirmed this report, and stated that the Brahooees were leaving for the hills. I told Afzul, Lehree, and Moorad Khan, to stop them, and to let it be known that I had no evil intention towards them. Faiz Mahomed returned and informed me that Hajee Mahomed Khan and Junda, Shawanee, had fled, and that the Mahomed Shaees were in a great state of alarm. I sent to look for Mahomed Khan, Rustoomzai, but he could not be found. I then sent to Syed Khan, Mahomed Shaee, and told him that I had done him no harm, and no intention of doing any. Hearing this all the Mahomed Shaees came to see me, and I reassured them. Asking for the name of the person who had circulated this report, they replied the Brahooees had stated I had received an order to attack them. I replied that this was false, and asked them to hand over their informant. They agreed to do so, but have not done so as yet. I sent for Shadee Khan, Bungoolzai, and Alla Dina's son, Yar Mahomed; they confirmed what Syed Khan had said, viz. that the news had been circulated by Brahooees. I reassured them, and sent other people amongst the Brahooees to restore confidence. The people here start reports which I am unable to account for. The Brahooees have agreed to give up their informant, and I will punish him in such a way as you may seem fit. I have also informed them that the treaty with the English Government will be respected, and that I have no authority to act against it, and that they might remain where they were without fear. I have visited all the people, and told them they have nothing to be alarmed at.

No. 87.

No. 1589 P., dated Simla, 22nd July 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with Governor General, to Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

WITH reference to paragraph 4 of the letter from this office to your address, No. 1250 P. dated the 4th of June last, I am now directed to convey to you the views of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council in regard to Sir William Merewether's recommendation that the Khan of Khelat should be granted a present of two thousand stand of percussion muskets of the old pattern.

2. His Excellency in Council is of opinion that in the existing condition of Khelat affairs it would be unadvisable to grant the Khan a gift of arms. In the event, however, of a satisfactory state of affairs being hereafter established in Khelat, his Excellency in Council will be prepared to reconsider the proposal should his Excellency the Governor in Council deem it desirable to re-submit it for that purpose.

No. 88.

No. 4346, dated Bombay Castle, 22nd July 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor General.

I AM directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a memorandum from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 690, dated 15th instant, submitting copy of a letter from the Political Agent, Khelat, No. 96, dated 29th ultimo, reporting the particulars connected with the attack on the kafila near Siri Bolan by certain of the Murree tribes.

Enclosure 1 in No. 88.

No. 96, dated Khelat, 29th June 1872.

From Political Agent, Khelat, to Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

IN acknowledging receipt of memorandum by the Commissioner in Sind, forwarded under your endorsement No. 1439, of the 8th instant, I have the honour to report that the raid on the kafila near Siri Bolan about 6th May was committed by different branches of the Murree tribes. No information has yet been received in support of the merchant's accusations against Sirdar Alla Dina Koord and his tribe.

2. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed has from the first stated that, as Sirdar Alla Dina had accepted the terms offered him by the Commissioner in Sind, it was scarcely possible to believe he would ruin his prospects by taking any part in this raid. Yar Mahommed, the Sirdar's son, has been at Khelat for the last two or three days, and assured me that so far from having behaved as stated by the merchants, the Koords acted against the Murrees, killing three of the latter, and gave what assistance they could in forwarding wounded merchants and property to Quetta.

3. Yar Mahomed states that this raid was committed by the following Murrees :—

Muzzeranees.

1. Shere Dil.
2. Busheer.
3. Yaru.
4. Nawab, brother of Kutab Khan.
5. Nubbee Buksh.

Tinganis residing at Gwet.

1. Kanik, son of Masa.
2. Buktiar.

Langanis of Badra.

1. Duro.
2. Jungul.
3. Hingul.

The Bijaranis also took part in this raid, but no person of any rank or influence was present.

4. Shere Dil, Muzzeranee, has been written to on three or four occasions, stating that if he would return the kafila property justice would be done him. The Dinarzye Sirdar, who has been the medium of communication, writes to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed that he had sent Ketshi Murree with his Highness' letter, and one from myself, and that the only condition on which Shere Dil would come was, "that he should not be held responsible for the kafila property," as it had been carried off by the Hill Murrees; if restitution was insisted upon, the Samalanis were responsible. Copy and translation of letter annexed.

5. I regret to state that the Muzzeranees and Murrees so far from wishing this business amicably settled have commenced raiding. "Last week" I mentioned their attack on the Lehris, and in this week's diary an uncalled for raid on Busheer Murree is reported.

6. In conclusion, I would respectfully bring to your notice that I last year pointed out to his Highness the advisability of directing his officials not only to date their letters, but to give the dates on which any event of importance occurred. Disregard of these important points by his Highness' officials has caused the omission brought to my notice. As far as can be ascertained, the last two raids in the Bolan by the Murrees occurred on the 18th April and 6th May.

Enclosure 2 in No. 88.

From Sirdar Nawab Khan Dinarzye, to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed.

I RECEIVED letters from his Highness the Sahib and yourself for Shere Dil through Naib Abdool Rehman, and forwarded the same by Kutchee. Shere Dil has no wish to present himself before his Highness, fearing that he may be held responsible for the kafila property.

I now want your instructions if no attempt will be made against Shere Dil for the kafila property. I will do my best to induce him to visit his Highness.

Shere Dil states he has taken none of the plunder, but that it was carried off by the Hill Murrees, and that his Highness ought to exact compensation from the Minguls. If this is done, he will make his salaam.

Abdool Rehman, the Naib, always sends letters to Shere Dil for me to deliver, is it your wish that I should do so? Whatever you direct I will do with pleasure.

No. 690, dated Kurrachee, 15th June 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information, in continuation of Commissioner's endorsement No. 534, dated 5th June 1872.

No. 89.

No. 4347, dated Bombay Castle, 22nd July 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor General.

I AM directed to transmit herewith, for submission to the Government of India, copy of the diary No. 20, of the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 29th ultimo, received through the Commissioner in Sind under indorsement No. 693. dated the 16th instant.

Enclosure in No. 89.

Diary No. 20 of 1872, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 29th June 1872.

SHERE DIL, Muzzeranee, was some time ago informed that 15,000 of his sheep had been collected, and would be made over to him if he would send for them. On his

refusing, they were placed in charge of his relative Busheer, hoping that he (Sher Dil) would be induced to attend the inquiry his Highness had undertaken. On the 19th June Shere Dil attacked Busheer close to Mustung, wounded him, and not only carried off the 15,000 sheep above named, " but all Busheer's flocks."

Naib Abdul Aziz writes—" Great alarm exists at Mastung owing to Murree depre- " dations. The roads by Khand, Mustung, and Lak Shawe are so far closed that no " solitary traveller can pass. For safety, people are obliged to go in small parties from 10 to 12. At the latter place, Lak Shawe, some Brahooees were murdered.

Abdul Latif, the Naib of Quetta, reported to his Highness that the Lehris were inclined to create disturbances on the slightest provocation. Some of the latter tribe had quarrelled with Jafar Khan Jattack, an artillery sepoy, and on the Naib apprehending two Lehris the latter tribe went off and attacked the Jattacks wounding Jafar Khan and two or three of his relatives. On hearing this, I pointed out to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed that disturbances of this kind would retard the efforts that were being made to restore peace and quiet in his district, and asked him to insist upon better behaviour on the part of this tribe.

The above Naib also reports a dispute between Ali Jan and Mahomed Said Khan Bamuzais, residents of Hunnah, and that on the former complaining to him he sent Hybat Khan, Sumalani, a servant of his Highness, to try and settle their differences. Said Khan, however, was very abusive, and shots were fired on both sides without doing any injury.

Several of the Sarawans have written to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed pointing out that the Naibs are not content with the amount of lucerne taken in Nassir Khan's reign, but are most oppressive in their exactions. Another cause of dissatisfaction is, that when the Sarawan Chiefs had to leave their country his Highness benefited by the standing crops, and now that they have been forgiven they think they ought to benefit by the crops. The Naibs, however, deny their right to the same, saying the grain has been raised from his Highness' seed.

As the Sarawans were carrying out their engagements with the kafila merchants in a very dilatory and unsatisfactory manner, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed sent for the Kafila Bashi, and has been busy with him and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed for the last two or three days. The present arrangements are that all property in possession of the Brahooees seven-ninths of the whole is to be given up, and that Naib Abdul Aziz has full power to coerce those who will not do so. He can also call upon the Naibs of Quetta and Dada to give any assistance that may be required. On the Sarawans stating that all recoverable property has been restored, a committee is to assemble and assess what is due on missing donkeys, camels, and other property; two-ninths of the property was given to the Murrees, this the Brahooees say cannot be recovered.

Sirdar Alla Dina Khoord acknowledges to having received two-ninths of the plunder, but up to the present has evaded restoring any portion of it. I spoke very strongly to this chief's son, Yar Mahomed, at Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's request, and pointed out that it would have been more creditable if his father had set a good example by at once restoring the plunder in his possession, instead of procrastinating and "trying to evade" returning the same.

Excitement at Khelat has subsided. Many people have expressed their opinion very plainly regarding the mischievous intrigues of his Highness' two Moonshees and Abdul Ajan, a Pathan merchant. Yesterday Darogah Attah Mahomed said that no one's character was safe so long as his Highness listened to the insidious counsels of the Moonshees, and that their conduct on the present occasion had been such that they ought not only to be removed but most severely punished.

(Signed) C. H. Harrison,
Major, Political Agent, Khelat.

No. 693, dated Kurrachee, 16th July 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government for information, in continuation of Commissioner's indorsement No. 635, dated 4th instant.

No. 90.

No. 4624, dated Bombay Castle, 5th August 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor-General.

In continuation of my No. 4347, dated the 22nd ultimo, I am directed to forward herewith, for submission to the Government of India, copy of a diary of the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 6th idem, received through the Commissioner in Sind under his endorsement, No. 719, dated 24th July.

Enclosure in No. 90.

Diary, No. 21, of 1872, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 6th July 1872

Ali Jan, Naib of Kedj, writes to his Highness the Khan that Sirdar Fakir Mahomed had written to people of rank and influence to withhold their revenue, "as paying it "would reflect injuriously on his administration of affairs in Mekran, and by not paying "the same," he, Fakir Mahomed, would be reinstated. Ali Jan points out the difficult position he is placed in, and requests his Highness to send 100 infantry, one gun, one mortar, and six artillerymen, stating that complying with this suggestion would be acceptable to the majority of the people in Mekran, as they had promised him, Ali Jan, their support on arrival of the said detachment, and were quite willing that a new Sirdar should be elected, if Meah Bhai Khan assumed an hostile attitude towards his Highness' Government. The Mullas who were driven out of Turbut by Sirdar Fakir Mahomed have returned and offered Rs. (5,000) five thousand per annum for permission to occupy the fort. Ali Jan recommends his Highness' acceptance of this proposal, as Sirdar Meah Bhai Khan had offered to give them possession of the same for an annual consideration of Rs. (2,500) two thousand five hundred. This offer the Mullas refused, preferring that their possession of the said fort should be guaranteed by his Highness.

Mir Kunur, Mulla Suliman, Mulla Rehmat, Mulla Mubarak, Nubbee Buksh Koda, and other Belooch have informed Ali Jan that the revenue will not be paid unless people see that he is in a position to insist upon their doing so, and have recommended him to apply for the detachment above named.

The people who have given this advice to Ali Jan state that they are ashamed of having joined in the disturbance against Darogah Atta Mahomed, and that they have great cause for thankfulness when comparing their position with those Belooch under Persian rule. Ali Jan further reports "that Captain Miles had sent for him to Gwadur, "as it was supposed a kafila had been plundered between Punchgoor and Kedj, but that "he had been unable to ascertain whether anything of the kind had occurred. Vernacular "letter attached, no date."

By the post that brought Ali Jan's report complimentary letters were received by his Highness from the following people, stating that they were willing and ready to pay their revenue to Naib Ali Jan, and to perform any other service that may be required of them:—Sirdar Bhai Khan, Meah Murad, Meah Esaw, Meah Mahomed Hussein, Gitchkis, Meah Kunur, Saugar, Mulla Rehmat, Zehri, Mulla Rehmat, Bolehda, Nubbee Buksh and Abdulla, Kodahs, Mulla Suliman, Deshte, Meah Yar Mahomed, Meah Dad Karim, Mulla Karim Beg, and Futteh Mahomed.

Haji Mahomed Khan, Rustamzai, writes to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed that the Brahooes are quiet and well disposed, but as the Zemindars urged on by Moonshee Faiz Mahomed Shaikh were most anxious to create a disturbance, he had spoken to Naib Abdool Rahman, and held himself responsible for the conduct of the Brahooees. *Note.*—The Moonshee above-named is a connexion of the Moonshees who have caused so much trouble at Khelat.

Haji Mahomed Khan also mentioned that the merchants had received a letter from Safdar Ali's nephew, stating that his Highness the Ameer was in correspondence with the Commissioner of Peshawur regarding their losses, &c.

Naib Abdool Rahman writes on the 19th Rab-us-sani, 26th June 1872, that Shere Dil, Murree, had carried off four flocks of sheep about half a mile from the fort, and had taken the shepherds with him as far as Kirta in the Bolan. The Naib requests his Highness' instructions whether he shall attack Shere Dil who has taken up a position at Kajuri in the Bolan.

The Naib reports that the Brahooees refuse to feed 30 camels, as they used to do in the late Khan's reign, and that he has not coerced them. Consequently the supply of

grass only suffices for present consumption, and renders it impossible for him to stock any for the cold season.

The above Naib further reports that the Brahooees are sending their families and property into the hills, with what object he has been unable to ascertain. He, the Naib, had heard that Haji Mahomed Khan, Rustamzai, and Janda Shawani had received letters from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed telling them "the Brahooees" were not to create any disturbance or give offence to your Highness' officials, but to do their best to collect kafila property, &c., &c.

Abdul Latif, Naib of Quetta, writes that the Brahooees in his district are sending away their property and families into the hills, but he has been unable to ascertain whether they intend to create a disturbance or are afraid of being attacked. Syud Ali Mahomed had returned to Kirani.

Sirdar Azaad Khan having heard of the present state of affairs of Khelat has written to Shahgasee Wullee Mahomed as follows:—I have heard that you and his Highness distrust each other. This is the way of the Ahmedzais; they would murder their most devoted servant for 5 Rs. I and all my people served the Ahmedzais well, you must recollect how Ibrahim Khan, Nowsherwani, and twelve of my relatives, besides Rakshanis died in their service. The Ahmedzais seized my country, killed some of my people and made slaves of others. I myself served the present Khan to the best of my ability, but from first to last derived no benefit; on the contrary, he killed my nephew and deprived me of my lands. I held in my own right "or what had been given to me" by Meah Mehrab Khan, Nusseer Khan, and the Gitchkis. No one can trust or believe an Ahmedzai. If you can make any arrangement for me through the English Government or Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, I will get his Highness the Ameer's permission to visit Khelat. I have right on my side and Sunnuds to show; Musa Khan of Sohrab interferes with my people; please prevent this. Shahgasee Wullee Mahomed sent this letter to his Highness the Khan for perusal, and in replying to the same has been most careful not to encourage Azaad Khan or give offence to his Highness.

Sirdar Mahomed Syud Khan, Bamuzai, has written to me stating that the plundering of the last two kafilas was brought about by the Samalani Mingul's attack on Shere Dil. The Murrees had gone to Sang and the big hills, and asked permission to settle in the Durrani country, but no answer had been given, as he, "Sirdar Mahomed Syud Khan," would like to know the wishes of my Government in this matter.

The above Sirdar says that he has received no pension since the Mohurrum.

Sirdar Moolla Mahomed also received a letter from Sirdar Mahomed Syud Khan, in which he states that, although Shere Dil, Murree, had conducted transit duties in the Bolan Pass in a satisfactory manner, the attack on him by the Samalanis was at his Highness' instigation. Sirdar Mahomed Syud Khan also states that he has incurred his Highness' displeasure from having assisted Sirdar Moolla Mahomed in sending his family from Mittree to Seebee, and that the Naib of Quetta hopes by acts of oppression to drive him out of Hannah.

Sirdar Ali Jan and Sirdar Mahomed Khan, "Buranis," have been on bad terms with each other for some time past, and it appears to me that Naib Abdool Latif's report given in last week's diary, No. 20, is more reliable than what has been written to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed.

Sirdar Mahomed Syud Khan also writes that if he was entrusted with the management of the Bolan, he would make satisfactory arrangements for the protection of kafilas.

On Tuesday last when visiting his Highness the Khan he alluded to the Seistan Mission, and expressed an opinion that the Persians were being pushed on by Russia, and that within two years serious fighting might occur to arrest their further progress, consequently Beloochistan would be of the greatest importance to the English Government. With reference to the latter part of this speech, I replied that if his Highness relied more on the cordial support of his chiefs and people than on a few regular troops, Beloochistan would certainly be a place of importance.

No. 719, dated Kurrachee, 24th July 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government for information, in continuation of Commissioner's endorsement No. 693, of 16th July 1872.

No. 91.

No. 4667, dated Bombay Castle, 7th August 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor General.

In continuation of my letter No. 4624, dated the 5th instant, I am directed to forward herewith, for submission to the Government of India, copy of the diary of the Political Agent at Khelat for the week ending 30th ultimo, received under the Commissioner in Sind's endorsement No. 744, dated 30th idem.

Enclosure in No. 91.

Diary, No. 22, by Political Agent, Khelat, for week ending 13th July 1872.

In last week's diary, No. 21, Haji Khan Rustumzai reported that the Zemindars of Mustung at the instigation of Faizu were endeavouring to create a disturbance with the Brahooees. A few days after this Faizudad, Karim Shahdi Khan, Jamsher, Dil Murad Ali, and other Zemindars wrote to his Highness that the Brahooees were robbing and ill-treating them, and that they would not remain unless protection was afforded. Faizu himself is the largest Zemindar, his Highness' Kardar, and connected, as before stated, with the Kalat Moonshees. Faizu also writes to his Highness that Naib Abdool Aziz is siding with the Brahooees and does not exert himself about recovering kafila property.

Naib Abdool Aziz and the merchants write: The Sarawans will not restore what they have plundered, and force will be required to recover the same. On hearing this Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, by the advice of Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed sent Sumandar Lehri to the different tribes to ascertain who was withholding property. He is to return in six days and state against whom forcible measures are required.

On the 10th July the merchants at Mustung received a letter from Candahar telling them to come at once to the latter place; that their claims would be represented to the Governor General at Calcutta by his Highness the Ameer, and compensation obtained for them, and that there was no further necessity for their remaining in Beloochistan. Naib Abdool Aziz begged them to delay until he could communicate with his Highness and ascertain his wishes. Naib Abdool Aziz also writes that the merchants state they will not receive wool or the goods taken, but cash payment. The latter are well aware that seventy loads can be recovered, but as the price of wool has fallen they don't care about receiving the same.

Sirdar Nur Ali Khan, son of Shere Ali Khan, Governor of Candahar, wrote to his Highness, stating that in the kafila plundered Musha merchant had Rupees 5,945 worth of goods that had been purchased for his father.

This property was looted in your country; if you are in want of money you can keep it. "As we are friends," if not required, you can refund the same to Musha.

His Highness the Khan wrote the following reply: You are well aware that in this world fighting and plundering occur by chance. There has been rebellion in my country; I at once gave directions to my Naib to close the Bolan to merchants. He did so. Some of those who went gave written agreements that they took the responsibility of proceeding by this route on themselves, whilst others in a self-willed manner disregarded the advice given them, consequently they have only to blame themselves for the losses sustained. The said merchants then complained to the English Government, and the records on this subject are in Major Harrison's possession. The English Government decided that the Brahooe chiefs were responsible for this kafila, and the said Sirdars agreed to restore what they had plundered. On arrival at Khelat I directed one of my officials to assist them in recovering the same. My property is yours and yours is mine. I will do the best I can to recover what you have lost.

Sirdar Abdul Rehman, Zugur Mingul, of Nushky, writes to his Highness: The receipt of your letter has given me great pleasure. All the Seistanis are banding together and intend plundering Chaga, Nushky, and Kharan. About 60 camel sowars came secretly to Nushky and carried off 30 to 40 camels belonging to Alum Khan, Rakshani, and 25 belonging to the Minguls. We followed these Seistanis as far as Chago, but could not come up with them.

Small pox is very prevalent, as also a bad type of fever.

No. 744, dated Kurrachee, 30th July 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government for information, in continuation of Commissioner's endorsement No. 719, dated 24th July 1872.

No. 92.

No. 1558, dated Simla, 7th August 1872.

From Officiating Secretary to the Government of Punjab, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor General.

I AM desired to forward, for information, copy of letter addressed to the Officiating Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, by Captain R. G. Sandeman, dated 27th July, reporting a raid by a party of Loharani Murrees on the frontier village of Chota Bala.

Enclosure 1 in No. 92.

Dated 27th July 1872.

From Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan, to Officiating Political Superintendent, Jacobabad.

I HAVE the honour to report that a few days ago a party of eight Loharani Murrees from Nassan made a raid on the village of Chota Bala. They succeeded in getting clear off with 60 head of cattle. Two herdsmen, who were in charge of the cattle, were made prisoners, and taken by the marauders to the second range of hills, and there released.

2. I reported this affair to the Commissioner in Sind by telegram, intimating to him that I believe the act was committed without the knowledge or consent of the Murree chiefs, who are still deliberating at Kahan as to what reply they will give me regarding the return of the plundered kafila property.

3. The marauders were followed by a party of Lugharis who are now in a Mussooree (Boogtee) village in the Shum plain. The stolen cattle are with the Zoherani Murrees close by. I am now sending off a party to demand from the Zoherani chief the return of the stolen cattle. The result will be communicated to you hereafter.

4. The village of Chota Bala, from whence the cattle were plundered, is on our extreme border, and beyond the line of our frontier posts. Why I think the act was not done with the knowledge of the Murree chiefs is, because the object was apparently plunder only, as they did not injure the herdsmen in charge of the cattle. This is the view taken of the offence by the chief of the Lugharis, Jumal Khan. I enclose in the vernacular copy of the report made by the chief recording the occurrence.

Enclosure 2 in No. 92.

Demi-official, dated Camp Murree, 27th July 1872.

From Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan, to Colonel Mainwaring.

THE enclosed I think it right to send you at once. The village on which the raid was made, is quite near to the Murrees, and it is of course exposed to any depredation of theirs, being 13 miles beyond our present line of posts. A post in the Shum plain, which I have so long pleaded for, would entirely protect this border, and now I hope that this much will be clear, that it is necessary to afford our subjects (situated like the Chota Bala people), protection.

Surely it is hardly fair to take revenue from a village like Chota, if we do not protect it; yet we do so. I think the Zoheranis will give back the cattle, but in their present state of mind it is hard to tell. I will do my best.

In regard to your last letter, I forgot to notice one point when replying. You say it would not do for me to go as a suppliant to Kahan about the restoration of the property. Of course I know that, but had I gone I would have taken at least 600 sowars with me.

Kahan is really quite accessible from this, the country open and easy, and there are only 300 Murrees in the little fort.

I would have appeared before it half as a friend and half intending to demand the stolen property. Of course there would have been a little risk, but not so much as appears on the surface, for most of our Belooch chiefs who would have been with me are related to the Murrees, and they could hardly have resisted my friendly request, put in a way that made it rather difficult for them to refuse. However, under the circumstances, I think with you that it was well that I did not go.

Since last I wrote, I have had no reply from the Murrees. I expect it every day, though the delay shows that the chiefs are seriously considering their position. This letter, like the last, goes *viâ* Boogtee Dera.

True copy to Secretary Government, Punjab, for information.

No. 93.

No. 4841, dated Bombay Castle, the 16th August 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of the papers forwarded with the letter from this Office, No. 4127, dated the 10th ultimo, I am directed to transmit herewith for submission to the Government of India copy of a letter from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 785, dated the 7th instant, submitting further correspondence connected with the affairs of the Khelat State.

Enclosure 1 in No. 93.

No. 785, dated Kurrachee, the 7th August 1872.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I., and C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to his Excellency the Governor and President in Council of Bombay.

In reference to my telegram of this day's date, I have the honour to submit copies of the documents marginally noted.

Letter No. 100, from Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat.
Letter No. 101, forwarding translation of khureeta from his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

2. In the first Major Harrison expresses his opinion that his Highness the Khan has not been actuated in his late proceedings by promptings from any foreign source, and that he is confirmed in this by the assurance of the Wuzeer, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed. This may be depended on, and the view is so far satisfactory.

3. The causes then may be looked for in local circumstances only, and would appear to be attributable to the Khan's dissatisfaction with, and dislike to the Sirdars, who have given him so much trouble during his reign, to the encouragement in these of a few interested individuals who have unfortunately gained the confidence of the Khan, and who fear the loss of the influence they have obtained over him, should matters become more settled, and the Khan be induced to depend only on his legitimate and faithful advisers, and further to the difficulties he finds himself beset with in consequence of recent events.

4. Major Harrison seems, from additional information he has received, to be convinced that his Highness the Khan was fully cognizant of the intended attack on Sher Dil, Murree; and from what was said at first, as well as what has since transpired, it may be possible that he was led into countenancing such, on the suggestion that as the perpetrators started from the neighhourhood of the estates of the Sirdars, the odium of the act might easily be fixed on those Sirdars. Be this, however, as it may, there is no gainsaying the one fact that a gross outrage was committed within the Khan's territory on a body of people who were at the time residing inoffensively and unsuspectingly in that territory, and that this outrage led to others on the trade highway, involving heavy loss to merchants passing through the country, for which the Khan must be responsible, and, especially as regards the merchants, is clearly so under the treaty existing between him and the British Government.

5. But as regards the attack on Sher Dil, Murree, supposing the Khan to have known nothing of it, it only goes to prove that his subjects are quite beyond his control, or that

he does not care to try and bring them back within it. This is a most unsound state of affairs, and unless a change takes place there can be no other result than the speedy dissolution of the Khelat Government.

6. Hitherto the Khan has never failed to listen readily to advice proffered by the Political Agent, and has most willingly acted upon it; but he seems now so perplexed by the troubles that beset him that he has quite lost his head, and deliberately rejects the only safe course that lies open for him.

7. His complaint in conversation with Major Harrison as to the manner in which the Murrees had been separately recognised and treated with as if they were not his subjects, and that therefore he ought not to be held responsible for their actions, is not altogether unreasonable. I have always opposed that system as most objectionable both because it tended to lower the Khan's authority in this country, and because it was encouraging a portion of the Khelat kingdom in their acts against the sovereign of the country, and making them quasi-independent. In this instance, however, the plea adduced by him will not hold, for the injury done by the Murrees to the merchants was brought about by the unjustifiable aggressive action of the Khan's own subjects on that tribe.

8. Of the men on whom the Khan has so unfortunately taken to lean, the two moonshees are ordinary people of the country, sharp, clever, unscrupulous creatures, who being ever at the Khan's elbow, fill his mind with all sorts of suspicions, and with wild ideas as to the best means of getting free from his present embarrassments. One of these last I am told is, they have assured him the British Government will never proceed to the length of withdrawing the Political Agent, and that he need not feel anxiety on that score. This accounts for the quiet and almost unconcerned way in which he received my letter.

9. Shukur Khan is a Brahooee by birth, and has always shown great loyalty to the Khan. During the disturbances last cold season he commanded the Khan's troops serving in Kutchi, and showed much gallantry when his camp was attacked at night by the rebel Sirdars. He is a sensible man in his way, though not possessed of any marked ability. It is thought expedient by the intriguing party to secure his services, and the bait has been held out to him that he shall be made commander-in-chief of all the Khan's regular troops. But this will be of little use to him or them, unless he has more personal influence than at present he has the credit of, for the Khan's troops are mostly Hindustanees, and the majority of them would most strongly object to being commanded-in-chief by a Brahooee of small military experience.

10. In speaking to Major Harrison, his Highness the Khan remarked about Darogah Gul Mahommed and Gangu Bania in connexion with the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, as if the latter caused their removal. This is most unjust to the Shahgassee. The removal of those people took place shortly after the Khan's accession, before the Shahgassee became Wuzeer, or took any very prominent part in public affairs, and was desired by the British officials at the time, in consequence of the great injury the Darogah and the Bania did the Khan's cause by their bad advice and evil proceedings.

11. The reply of his Highness the Khan is, I regret to observe, most unsatisfactory; he endeavours to throw the blame of the attack on Sher Dil, Murree, and others, and evidently hints at the Sirdars being the promoters of it. But the information received from Major Harrison, especially in regard to the statement that a share of the plunder had been received by the Naib of Mustoong, which is generally spoken of, as well as the exertions the Sirdars have been making to recover the property plundered by their followers, all lead to the conclusion that the Sirdars were not mixed up in this matter, while it is pretty certain the Khan's officials were. The amount restored to Bashir, brother of Sher Ali, was only a portion of what was taken from the latter, and I have not yet heard of any of the perpetrators of the outrage having been punished by his Highness the Khan.

12. I have always done my utmost to support his Highness in his legitimate position as ruler of the country, and would be only too glad to place faith in the intentions he expresses, that they "are such as to benefit my country and government in every way. God willing, as far as I am able, I will not fail in the slightest degree;" but I am reluctantly compelled to say that judging from the present state of affairs I am unable to do so. His Highness declines to make arrangements for compensation on account of the kafila property plundered by the Murrees from the kafilas, and rejects the advice tendered him to remove from his side those persons who it has been pointed out to him by the Political Agent are misleading him, and inducing him to act in a manner which cannot meet with the approval of the British Government. He also denies that he had any intention of committing any injustice towards the Wuzeer, or of removing him from his position.

13. This last I am quite unable to credit. The Shahgassee is a man of staunch loyalty, of undoubted courage, proved on more than one occasion of great danger and difficulty, and I feel perfectly certain he would never have left his master to claim protection from the British representative had he not most positive reasons for knowing that his liberty, if not his life, was in danger and that he could do no good either to his sovereign or his country by remaining longer at his post.

14. Having carefully weighed all the circumstances, and having in view the indifferent and insincere attitude now assumed by his Highness the Khan, I feel convinced that to bring him to a proper sense of his position and responsibilities, it is absolutely necessary to convey to him in an unmistakeable manner that his present proceedings can only be regarded as directly opposed to the friendly relations previously existing between the two Governments, and at the same time to let him see that the intimation of the intended withdrawal of the Political Agent from his Court, if he did not conform more correctly to his treaty engagements, was not a mere idle threat. I have therefore addressed the instructions in the appended telegram to the Political Superintendent on the Frontier of Upper Sind for communication to the Political Agent at Khelat, and trust what I have done may meet with your Excellency's approval.

15. Judging from the Khan's character hitherto, it is not probable he will press matters to extremes, but will yield at the last moment. He well knows that he would be perfectly helpless without the support of the British Government, deprived also as he will be of the services of the only man in the country who has honestly and truly stood by him and given weight to his government, the Wuzeer Wullee Mahomed. Flight would be the only resource left to him, and he cannot but be aware that in the present unsettled state of the country, with the various factions existing around him, that would be most difficult if not impossible. The regular troops being entirely dependent on him for their pay and livelihood would try and prevent his leaving.

16. It remains then to be considered what should be done in the event of the Khan acceding to the stipulations which it has become necessary to impose. I would here beg to observe that setting forth any such stipulations beyond simple adherence to the treaty, was quite opposed to the policy I have all along advocated with reference to our relations with Khelat, but it was rendered imperative by the interference forced on by unfortunate circumstances last cold season, when prominent action had to be taken between his Highness the Khan and his chiefs on subjects which in their original state (that is before the plunder of the kafilas in the Bolan) related mainly to themselves, and needed no direct intervention on our part. However, that is all past, and I only allude to it here now to show that when recommending interference, which I have for so long strenuously endeavoured to avoid, it is from no change of view as to the policy that ought to have been maintained, but that the relative positions have been so much altered that something more than was before sufficient must now be entered upon.

17. The course, then, that I would recommend, should his Highness the Khan yield, is that he should give by letter, and immediate action clear assurance that he will cause the restitution of the property plundered from the kafilas in the Bolan in December last, and when such is not recoverable, that he will cause compensation to be made in money. The Sirdars are quite ready to exert themselves in this respect and, sincerely supported by his Highness the Khan, there is not the least doubt the measure may be perfectly carried out; that he will earnestly set to work to do justice to the Muzaranee section of the Murrees upon whom the outrage was perpetrated by the Sumalanee Minguls, the Murrees also restoring the property they captured from the kafilas in April last or its equivalent; that he will restore to his former position and to confidence the Wuzeer Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, who was appointed to that post originally with the concurrence of the British authorities, and that he will personally answer for his safety and honourable treatment; that he will remove from his counsels the evil disposed people who have been misleading him, and whose ill advice had led him into his present difficulties; and finally that he will at once make good arrangements for the safe transit of merchants and their goods through his country.

18. There is nothing in these that should bear heavily on his Highness the Khan, if he is sincere in his intentions and will heartily act up to what is asked of him. The most difficult part of all, the recovery from the Murrees of the property carried off by them, can be greatly, if not completely, facilitated by arrangements which Captain Sandeman from Dera Ghazi Khan is engaged in, and in which I have every confidence he will be successful. Then with justice done by his Highness the Khan, on the aggressors, or the Muzaranees, I trust to be able to make such arrangements with the whole Murree tribe, in conjunction with the Khan's officers, as should lead to their better behaviour in future,

and to the strengthening of his Highness the Khan's position by having them more under control.

19. Before concluding this report I should mention in reference to the Khan's family that he has three sons—

1. Miah Mahomed Khan, 9 years of age, of good family by the mother's side, intelligent and pleasing.
2. Shah Nawaz, about 4 years old, mother not well connected, bright and intelligent.
3. Miah Azim Khan, by the sister of the Panjgur chief, 13 months old, promising child.

The Khan has taken a great dislike to his eldest son* because he heard at one time that it was proposed by the Brahooees to put him on the throne on his, the Khan's removal. The families to which the mothers of the first two belong are not mentioned, but will be obtained and communicated hereafter.

* A not uncommon thing among Eastern monarchs.

20. Captain Humfrey, with company of rifles and treasure, had reached Khelat, so Major Harrison was well strengthened and provided.

Enclosure 2 in No. 93.

No. 100, dated Khelat, the 18th July 1872.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat, to the Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge correspondence forwarded under your endorsement No. 1675 of the 3rd July, and to report as follows:—

During the past three years I have as a rule found his Highness the Khan amenable to reason and willing to abide by my advice; consequently his recent behaviour is unaccountable, and makes me doubtful of his sanity.

Having heard him talk of Persian progress supported by Russian influence, it struck me that he might have been in secret communication with these countries, and I imparted this suspicion to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, who assured me that to the best of his belief no such communication had occurred.

This suspicion having been set at rest "to a certain extent," his Highness' behaviour can only be attributed to local causes.

In the early part of the year, when his Highness authorised the Commissioner in Sind to act on his behalf, he was under the impression that the Sarawan chiefs would be too much ashamed of their conduct to visit Jacobabad, and that he would therefore get the credit of complying with the wishes of the English Government without any settlement taking place. When, however, the Commissioner's arrangements were completed, and it was understood that the chiefs on certain conditions were to return to their country and hold the same rights and privileges as they had done in the late Nusseer Khan's reign, "his Highness in my opinion set about trying to nullify what had been done."

First thing heard was that the Brahooees had attacked Sher Dil, Muzaranee, and the latter had revenged himself on the kafilas. "Knowing the character of the people in this country," I at once surmised that the raid on Sher Dil had been at the instigation of his Highness or some of his officials. On reaching Khelat, I was confirmed in this belief, and was told only a day or two ago by Sirdar Nawab Khan, Dinarzai, that such was the case, the Naibs of Mustoong and Quettah being great favourites of his Highness. My urging an inquiry was distasteful, particularly as I pointed out that he was responsible for the acts of his subordinates. His Highness' present feelings to the Sarawan chiefs may be understood from the conversation narrated in last paragraph of diary No. 21, and I fear his Highness' hatred to these chiefs is such that he would do anything sooner than see them again established on their own lands.

His Highness' chief advisers are Saleh Mahomed and Gul Mahomed, Moonshies, as also Shukur Khan, commanding one of his Highness' regiments; "the two former "have accumulated large fortunes by peculation and acts of oppression," and doubtless feared that if quiet was restored their own conduct might be too strictly scrutinized. The last-named, though a good soldier, has been spoilt by familiar treatment, and has cast in his lot with the above moonshees. I have vainly endeavoured to point out to his Highness that the Shahgassee and myself have his real interest at heart, and that low intriguing people will assuredly be his ruin. How futile advice is will be seen from the conversation that followed on presenting his Highness with the Commissioner's khureeta,

translation of letter No. 1214, by the Secretary, Government of India, and paragraphs 2 and 5 of Commissioner's letter No. 623 to your address.

The khureeta was given to his Highness when visiting me on Friday afternoon, and as he did not seem to realize how serious the business was, I advised him to read it quietly when he got home, and that I should return his visit the next evening. Accordingly on Saturday I had a private interview, and first of all pointed out that the Ameer of Affghanistan had made very strong representations to the British Government regarding the losses sustained by his subjects in Beloochistan, and that my Government looked to him to carry out his treaty with them; I further stated that, as the Murrees were his subjects he was responsible for their acts, and that the best thing to be done would be to meet the difficulty in a manly spirit, pay what he could afford, and in the cold weather exact restitution from the Murrees: if compensation was not afforded in some way or another I should be obliged to withdraw from his Court.

To this he replied that during the past four years Colonel Phayre and Captain Sandeman had so interfered with the Murree tribe that he could not consider them his subjects, or be responsible for their acts, and therefore declined to give the slightest compensation. I again urged him to consider what the consequences would be, but he insisted upon adhering to what he had said.

I then told his Highness that Government had called upon me to report regarding the raid on Sher Dil, and had most unwillingly come to the conclusion that it was either at his instigation or that of his Naibs. His Highness denied this, and stated that the Sumalanees alone were to blame.

In conclusion I urged his Highness to follow the Commissioner's advice and dismiss his evil counsellors, mentioning Saleh Mahomed, Gul Mahomed, and Shukur Khan. His Highness in reply stated that I had been biassed against his moonshees by Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, a man of intolerant disposition, through whose instrumentality he h lost the services of his former Wuzeer Gangu, Darogah Gool Mahomed, and Sher Kh the commandant of his forces; that if the English Government wanted his countr would surrender it to them, but could not dismiss these servants as they had served faithfully and well. I had to remind his Highness that I last year urged him in strongest manner possible not to be guided by the advice of Nawab Mahomed Khan his moonshees, but to listen to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed. Having given me s decided answers regarding the Murree question, as also his determination not to dismis evil counsellors, I was obliged to let his Highness understand that there was every probability of my leaving Khelat at an early date. Hearing this he begged and urged me to remain, and to induce the Shahgassee to return to his duty, as the moment we left there would be a general outbreak. "His Highness, however, still adhered to what he "had said regarding treaty arrangements and dismissing evil advisers."

Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed states that his Highness will not be guided by my advice, or that of the English Government, there is no probability of his having any influence as Wuzeer, and that he therefore gratefully accepts the protection offered by the British Government.

Enclosure 3 in No. 93.

No. 101, dated Khelat, the 18th July 1872.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat, to the Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

I have the honour to forward reply by his Highness the Khan to the Commissioner in Sind's khurreeta. Translation of the same is enclosed.

His Highness' letter is intended to disprove any complicity in the raid against Sher Dil; his freedom from responsibility as regards the Murree tribe; perfect innocence of the charge brought against him by Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed; finally that he is not guided by evil counsellors.

3. As regards Sher Dil's business, in addition to information in letters marginally noted, I have since heard from Sirdar Nawab Khan, Dinarzai, that the raid originated with his Highness, and was carried out by the Naib of Mustoong, who received one fifth of the spoil. A Pathan merchant living near the latter place has been in the habit of purchasing wool from Sher Dil, and advanced Rs. 3,000 for this year's fleece. This man confirms previous statements, but has asked me to withhold his name.

84, 89, 90, 95.

4. Referring to his Highness' responsibility about the Murree tribe, he is more explicit in the conversation detailed in my letter No. 100 than in his reply to the Com-

missioner in Sind. There can, however, be no doubt of his refusing to be held responsible for the acts of this tribe.

5. His Highness having denied all knowledge of the Shir Dil business is not likely to confess having had any sinister designs against Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed.

6. His Highness denies being guided by evil advisers, and gives a high character to the people "who are misleading him by their insidious counsel." These three men, Saleh Mahomed, Gul Mahomed, and Shukur Khan are universally detested, particularly the first named. Knowing this I last year urged his Highness not to listen to his advice. His Highness' capacity of discriminating between good and evil counsellors can be estimated from the statement he made regarding Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed in connexion with Gangu, Darogah Gul Mahomed, and Sher Khan, formerly commandant of troops.

Enclosure 4 in No. 93.

Translation of a Letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat, to the Commissioner in Sind, dated the 9th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1289.

Your letter has reached me. From reading it I am aware of its contents. Through your friendship you write at considerable length regarding the plundering of merchants by the Murrees, and that this was brought about by certain people attacking an inoffensive Muzaranee, Sher Dil, who resides in the Bolan Hill. My kind friend, my reply to this is that the Muzaranees were undoubtedly inoffensive people, and were moreover in my service to look after transit in the Bolan. Ill-disposed people above mentioned, after the treaty arrangement made in your presence, either according to their usual habits, or at the instigation of other people, on arrival at Mustoong collected people from every tribe of Brahooees. My Naib at Mustoong hearing they had collected with evil intent, sent a man at once to stop them. They would not be stopped and gave him a decided answer. My Naib sent sowars against them with instructions to prevent their proceeding and should they not do so, to attack them. Before the latter could arrive, these ill-disposed people had attacked Sher Dil, and were returning with the plunder. Sowars met them on the road and ordered them to return the plunder; they refused to do so and began to fight, upon which one of their number was killed and some of the property recovered. The Naib then reported all that had occurred to me, and by my orders the ringleaders were imprisoned and property handed over to Bashir, Sher Dil's cousin. I was anxious to give the people in fault speedy punishment, but delayed fearing lest the Brahooees should, "to suit their own purposes," give rise to reports that would reflect on me. I therefore delayed punishment until Major Harrison and my Wuzeer, who were at Khozdar, could reach Khelat. When the latter arrived it was heard that Sher Dil and other Murrees had plundered a kafila. I and the Sahib talked together about recovering the property detained by the Brahooees in custody, and sent for Sher Dil, after which every endeavour was to be made to punish guilty people, recover Sher Dil's property and that of the merchants, or compensate them for the same. You, my friend, know how lawless the Murrees are and their thieving propensities. By the blessing of God, and His prophet, to add to my reputation and character, my intentions are such as to benefit my country and Government in every way; God willing, as far as I am able, I will not fail in the slightest degree.

I have never acted in opposition to my treaty with the British Government, and as long as I live will abide by the same, and daily consider the necessity of acting up to it. I look upon the Political Agent here as my elder brother, and have the greatest confidence in his good sense and ability, as his best endeavours are cheerfully and willingly afforded for the welfare and benefit of this country. I feel that his being with me is by the kindness of God and the British Government, I therefore do not act without his advice; consequently the hint you give about recalling him does not please me.

Major Harrison advised me to remove Shukur Khan, two moonshees, and to give compensation to merchants plundered by Murrees from my private resources. Major Shukur Khan is an officer and has served me faithfully and well, and the moonshees perform their duties truthfully and honestly,; these people have not been guilty of a single bad action or erred in the performance of their respective duties. To remove them without any fault appears unnecessary to me.

To give compensation for property plundered by Murrees is a bad precedent, very hard and difficult and beyond my power. I carefully avoid all evil advisers and would not keep anyone in my service through whose instrumentality disturbances might occur. If any such person was in my service, I should at once discharge him. What you write regarding the Wuzeer's faithfulness and truthfulness in the duties entrusted to him at

Jacobabad and also in this country is true. He has served me faithfully and well, and I retain in my heart the memory of each service performed. My friend, in this world considering you master of my country and arrangements, I sent my faithful Wuzeer as my representative with the Political Agent. "Alijah," referring to the arrangements made by you and the Wuzeer, I have not acted against them in the slightest degree. The rebels devastated the whole of my country causing me the loss of lacs of rupees: when you forgave them, I forgave them; I agreed to all your arrangements, and have had no intention of disregarding them. "Kindly consider." The Wuzeer has committed no fault but acted faithfully and truly towards me. Why, therefore, should I commit any injustice towards him or remove him from his position? Such action is foreign to a well-disposed sovereign, and that I had such intention is false and untrue: so long as I live, it cannot be proved against me. Major Harrison's place and mine are one, and it caused no ill-feeling in my mind that the Shahgassee went to him. It has, however, been prejudicial to me, its being known that I and the Shahgassee were on terms, and was unnecessary. Before receiving your letter I several times suggested to Major Harrison the advisability of the Shahgassee returning to his house, and that he would be shown every respect and consideration. My wish is that he should return to his wuzeership.

Chiefs in your presence agreed to return the kafila property. What they have restored will have been reported to you by the Political Agent.

This work cannot be carried on without force, but I have abstained from all violent measures lest these chiefs should look upon any such action as tyranny. I await to see them carry out their agreement.

Rest satisfied that I shall respect your arrangements in every way. You write that I am not acting as formerly, and that the course now taken is wrong and will lead to my destruction. My friend, from the day I was first obedient to the English Government until the present day, I have followed the same course and entrusted my life and property to God and the English Government. I consider this country belongs to the English Government, and that I am obedient to them; I am hopeful that the more I am supported by the English Government, the greater service I and my country will be to them. Please consider me obedient to you and think of me in a friendly spirit.

(True translation.)

(Signed) C. H. Harrison, Major,
Political Agent at Khelat.

Enclosure 5 in No. 93.

Telegram dated the 7th August 1872.

From Commissioner in Sind, Kurrachee, to Political Superintendent, Jacobabad.

Khelat papers received. Instruct Harrison to inform the Khan that Government hold him responsible, under the Treaty, for the safety of traffic, and will suspend payment of subsidy unless plundered property is recovered, and compensation given for losses, That, as a true friend of the Khan, I cordially aided him at Jacobabad to promote that recovery to enable him to adhere to terms of treaty as regarded first kafilas plundered by Sirdar's people, and regarding last plundered by Murrees. I was quite ready to do the same to cause restoration of the property taken by them. In my letter I gave Khan the best advice for the preservation of his honour, restoration of order in his kingdom, and for future prosperity of his country. In his reply he shows marked disinclination to follow that advice and expressed wishes of the British Government, and disregards the terms of the Treaty he is solemnly bound to observe. No other course therefore is left but to direct Major Harrison to withdraw from Khelat to a convenient position, there to await the further orders of Government.

Unless Khan, on above being communicated to him, immediately acts on advice in my letter of 29th June, changes his line of conduct by removing evil advisers and setting himself earnestly to comply with treaty engagements, Harrison should withdraw to Bhagwana or Khozdar and there await instructions, unless he considers it more expedient to continue his march to British territory, but first will probably be sufficient.

In the event of withdrawal, Harrison should, if he finds it necessary, again draw Khan's attention to what is said in fifth paragraph of my letter No. 623 to you. If Shahgassee desires it, he should be allowed to accompany Harrison.

No. 94.

No. 4984, dated Bombay Castle, the 22nd August 1872.

From C. Goone, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my No. 4667, dated the 9th instant, I am directed to transmit herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of diary from the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 20th July last, received under the Commissioner of Sind's endorsement No. 790, dated 13th instant.

2. Copy of further diary for the week ending 27th July is also enclosed.

Enclosure 1 in No. 94.

No. 23, dated Khelat, the 20th July 1872.

Diary by the Political Agent at Khelat for the week ending the 20th July 1872.

The bunnias of Lehree have written to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed complaining of Nawab Mahomed Khan's oppression in collecting octroi duties, stating that this is an innovation they will not submit to, and, if persisted in, they will be obliged to leave the country. Dues on the old system they express themselves willing to pay.

Sirdar Sohrab Khan and the zemindars complain of the Janisheen's conduct, stating that he wilfully tried to destroy the fort by opening the mouth of the Nullah Jiha, and that they only saved the place by digging another nullah to carry off the water. They represent, that owing to Murree raids, every protection should be given to keep this fort in a defensible state, and that if Miah Khan is allowed to act as he is doing, they shall be obliged to leave the country.

Sirdar Sohrab Khan complains that the Kardar withholds the money that has been guaranteed for his services. The bunnias and zemindars of Lehree have also written to his Highness asking him to send a company of infantry and a gun for the protection of the place, as Karam Khan's brother is about to attack the place with 1,000 men.

The Naib of Bagh reports that rain has fallen in sufficient quantity for the cultivation of the country, but that Moonshee Saleh Mahomed's son, who is Naib of Jok, Gul Mahomed, on his Highness' mother's account, refused to open the bund, consequently the whole of Nasirabad is uncultivated.

Sirdar Sohrab Khan has written to me regarding the members of his tribes now located at Toj. Copy and translation of the same is attached.

Captain Humfrey writes from Paisht Khana on the 14th, and reports that the men of his detachment have recovered from the exposure they underwent at the commencement of the march. He will probably arrive in the course of three or four days.

Sirdar Azaad Khan's daughter, widow of the late Nusseer Khan, now residing at Kharan, has written to his Highness to give her "subsistence money."

His Highness the Khan appears to be too much under the influence of evil advisers to part with them as recommended by me; consequently there is not the slightest prospect of either the Shahgassee or myself being able to do any good so long as our advice is counteracted by their pernicious counsels. Under these circumstances it may be advisable to make arrangements for retiring on Bhagwana, as soon as Captain Humfrey's detachment has had a short halt.

The Haroonees and Isanees living at Haji close to Sohrab had a dispute regarding a marriage. Pir Buksh, the Haroon Sirdar, was killed, as also Sher Mahomed, son of Daolut Khan, Isanee. "Three others were wounded."

Sirdar Ghazi Khan, Chief of Punchgoor, has married Sirdar Diliwar Khan's daughter, and is now at Dizzak.

Soolton Mahomed, Shalvanee, has complained that his life had been threatened by the Brahooees. His Highness has written to the latter that he disapproves of their proceedings, and requests that each chief will make arrangements with his tribe not to cause annoyance to zemindars or other people. Should they persist in doing so, his Naib has orders to punish them.

Shah Beg, Punchgooree, writes that Ibrahim Khan, Nosherwanee, nephew of Azaad Khan, had gone with Azaad Khan's daughter, Nusseer Khan's widow, to the fort of Khudabadun, and were repairing the place. They had been assisted by the Mulazais. His Highness has written to Ibrahim Khan, asking him what he means by taking

possession of the place without his permission, and that ere long he will be punished for his impertinence.

Sirdar Alla Dina Koord wrote to me complaining that the Naib of Quettah had stopped two out of three Shahbanas water supply, and asked me to represent this to his Highness. I informed him that when he showed the same anxiety about restoring merchant's property as he did about the water-supply, I should be glad to assist him; so long, however as he disregarded the agreement made at Jacobabad, I could take no interest in his private affairs.

Naib Abdool Luteef writes on the 8th instant, *Jamadee-ool-Awul*, that the Sumalanees were assembling in force to attack the Murrees, but that he had forbidden them to do so, and to wait and see if Nawab Khan, Dinarzai, could induce Shere Dil to visit Khelat.

Naib Abdool Aziz writes that Samandar, Lehree, had arrived at Moostoong and made arrangements with various tribes to pay Rs. 9,100 of which Rs. 2,100 was recoverable in Kutchee, and that he had, therefore, written to the Naib of Dadur regarding the last-named sum.

Samandar, Lehree, returned to Khelat on Friday, 19th, with letters to my address from the various chiefs, stating that they have every intention of acting up to what they engaged to do. The following is a memorandum showing what has been given, and what the Sarawans are about to make good:

Returned.—142 camels, 27 donkeys, 3 yabus, 121 "jowals," hairbags, 6 carpets, 300 rupees.

About to return.—267 camels, 360 donkeys, 14 carpets, 14 chogas, 210 jowals, 9,100 rupees.

The above does not represent what they plundered, and it is generally believed that Sirdar Alla Dina is withholding a considerable quantity of the merchants' property. The money above-mentioned is to be collected by making each horseman and footman who participated in the plunder, pay Rs. 26 and 13 respectively.

Samandar, Lehree, corroborates Naib Abdool Luteef's report, and had himself remonstrated with the Sumalanees, pointing out that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed would be very angry if Sher Dil's visit to Khelat was prevented through any act of theirs.

The Sumalanees wanted Samandar to take charge of a letter from them to my address, but he refused fearing that he might be accused of intriguing.

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent at Khelat.

No. 790, dated Kurrachee, the 13th August 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information.

Enclosure 2 in No. 94.

No. 24, dated Khelat, the 27th July 1872.

Diary by the Political Agent at Khelat for the week ending the 27th July 1872.

Naib Abdool Rahman again writes to his Highness regarding the conduct of the Brahooees, stating that they break into dwelling-houses, steal zemindars' grain, and make themselves generally obnoxious, though the conduct of the Sarawan Brahooees is not what could be wished. The Naib, in my opinion, is exaggerating what has occurred, hoping that a disturbance will take place, and prevent any inquiry regarding the raid on Sher Dil, Murree.

The Sarawan chiefs, as also Noordeen Mingul, are trying to evade compensating the merchants for the property plundered. I have spoken most seriously to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed on this subject, and pointed out to his Highness that as king of the country he is bound by his treaty to exert himself in recovering the said property. He professed himself willing to give the Sirdars any assistance in his power, and requested that I would talk over the matter with Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed. Both agreed that the only thing to be done was to send for all the chiefs

concerned and ascertain who was to blame, otherwise each Sirdar would exonerate himself and place the blame on some one not present.

Sirdar Noordeen has handed over a list of what money should be collected, and the names of persons responsible for the same. To pay his own share he asked Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed to raise a loan for him, mortgaging what land would be necessary until the sum advanced was liquidated. As no one would risk money on such security, his Highness has been solicited to send sowars to Wud to assist Noordeen in collecting the sum required.

Sumalanees, who are under restraint at Mustoong for having plundered Sher Dil, have written to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, the Shahgassee, and myself stating that the raid was at Naib Abdool Rahman's instigation, who received one-fifth of the plunder, and has subsequently taken away their shares and now wishes to put the sole responsibility of what has occurred on their shoulders. They also state that letters on the subject should be discredited as they were written by the Naib, and their seals affixed *nolens volens*.

Yesterday, Friday, the 26th, about 2 p.m., some one fired a shot into the rifle lines, the bullet passing through a tent in which several of the men were sitting; they at once turned out and searched the gardens in the neighbourhood. Havildar Mahomed Hussein arrested a man about half a mile from camp with a musket that had been recently discharged. Finding on inquiry that the man belonged to Faqueer Mahomed's regiment, I sent him in charge of my vakeel to his commanding officer, and desired that every care should be taken not to punish him without clear and distinct proof. I also suggested to the vakeel that this man might have been bribed by Shukur Khan. Thinking that if severely punished the Pathans of the regiment would be alienated from him (Faqueer Mahomed) and co-operate with him (Shakar Khan), Faqueer Mahomed and the Native officers of his regiment took the same view of the case, as the prisoner's brother was formerly a trusted sepoy in Shakar Khan's corps and recently transferred by him to the cavalry. The intention was to have beheaded him at once; but out to deference to my wishes, punishment was deferred, and the whole circumstances reported to his Highness.

His Highness visited me as usual on Friday evening, and I brought to his notice the incident above reported, as also that a similar case had occurred ten days previously. I reminded him of what had been written by the Commissioner in Sind regarding any insult offered to me or those under my protection, and pointed out that as evil-disposed people were determined to compromise him with the British Government, it would be for his advantage and welfare to punish them, and arrange that nothing of the sort occurred again. His Highness agreed to what I said, and promised to take every precaution. At the latter end of the durbar, Samandar, Lehree, was present, and his Highness pointed out to him that the Sarawan chiefs had up to the present done little or nothing towards fulfilling what they had undertaken, and that the non-fulfillment of their engagements would reflect as much on him as on them, consequently should they desire assistance it would be afforded.

Up to the present his Highness the Khan and the Sarawan chief mutually distrust each other; had it been otherwise the arrangements made at Jacobabad would have been completed long ere this. His Highness has not shown cordiality towards these chiefs, and they in their turn have not taken any trouble about restoring the merchants' property. Sirdar Alla Dina Khoord is the person most to blame.

News from Candahar is that the Russians have occupied Oorgunj.

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent at Khelat.

No. 799, dated Kurrachee, the 14th August 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government. This report does not speak so well of the proceedings of the Sarawan Sirdars; but if his Highness the Khan will cordially support them, and the required change in his own conduct is made apparent to all, this supineness will disappear. Alla Dina Khoord has possession of the greater portion of the plundered property, and being a most avaricious person, will not readily give it up until the Khan shows he is in earnest, and is carrying the other Sirdars with him.

2. The act of firing into the rifle camp is evidently an attempt to complicate matters, and should be severely punished by his Highness the Khan. These remarks have been forwarded to the Political Superintendent for communication to the Political Agent at Khelat.

No. 95.

No. 4989, dated Bombay Castle, the 22nd August 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of the letter from this Office, No. 4567, dated the 2nd instant, I have the honour, by direction of his Excellency the Governor in Council, to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying copy of a news report,* received from the Commissioner in Sind.

* No. 802, dated 15th August 1872.

Enclosure in No. 95.

No. 802, dated Kurrachee, the 15th August 1872.

News report ending 12th August 1872.

The state of affairs at Khelat is the same as before. The Sarawan Sirdars have made attempts to recover the property taken from the *kafilas* in January last, but have not been very successful as yet. It is said Sirdar Alla Dina Khoord has the chief part of the plunder, and is very loth to give it up.

2. The detachments of rifles with treasure had reached Khelat on the 23rd July, after a very trying march for the first half of the way, the heat having been most excessive.

3. Meer Nadir has left Charbar for Kussurkund, and Meer Hussein's brother, Mirab Khan, has taken charge of the Fort of Charbar. The latter has proved himself very uncivil, and talked of stopping supplies being furnished to the Telegraph Department, and used threatening language to the employés. He has been called upon for an immediate explanation.

4. The rains at Kedj have been abundant; the town is flooded, and the date crops have been considerably damaged.

(Signed) W. L. Merewether, Colonel,
Commissioner in Sind.

No. 96.

No. 5211, dated Bombay Castle, the 4th September 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay in the Political Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am directed to enclose for submission to the Government of India, copy of a memorandum from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 848, dated the 26th idem, submitting the diary of the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 3rd August 1872.

Enclosure 1 in No. 96.

No. 25, dated Khelat, the 3rd August 1872.

Diary of the Political Agent at Khelat for the week ending the 3rd August 1872.

Letters from Sirdar Azaad Khan of Kharan, arrived on the 29th for Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and myself. I pointed out to the latter chief that under present circumstances it was neither right nor discreet to keep up a correspondence with Azaad Khan, and that I should not send any reply. Copy and translation of the letter addressed to

me are annexed. Sirdar. Moolla Mahomed's note was almost verbatim the same as mine, except that Azaad Khan complains of Sirdar Faqueer Mahomed having taken the part of his cousin, Belooch Khan, and written to the Jalk Sirdar, Dilawar Khan, to give him every assistance in attacking Kharan. Azaad Khan also mentions that the Jalk people have carried off considerable property belonging to the Minguls and Rakshanees, and that if the latter will join him, he will recover what has been stolen from them.

On Thursday, 1st August, Sirdar Nawab Khan, Dinarzai, arrived with Sher Dil, Murree, and on their visiting me, I asked the latter to explain why he had plundered the kafilas and all that had occurred. Agreeably to my request he made the following statement: "I visited Mr. Bruce at Dera Ghazee Khan, having been sent for "through Guzzun Murree; the above officer gave me about Rupees (140) one hundred "and forty in cash and a loongee. From thence I proceeded to Jacobabad and met "Colonel Phayre and Captain Sandeman, who gave me presents and the following "arrangements, viz., that I should take service with the English Government and "receive maintenance for twenty sowars at the rate of Rs. 20 each man; also that I "should have the whole of the budrukee dues. I received a written guarantee to this "effect from Colonel Phayre. I told Nawab Mahomed Khan that the whole of the "budrukee had been guaranteed to me, but he advised me only to claim what I had "always received, one-third. On returning to my own country I heard through "Khoosh Mahomed Zarkail, who is in the habit of buying wool from me, that I was "about to be attacked by the Brahooees. I did not believe this, but sent and told "the Naib of Mustoong what had been told to me; he, however, took no notice of "my message. The Sumalanees and Brahooees were about ten days collecting, and "the rendezvous was at Mustoong. When, therefore, I was attacked, I felt convinced "that the raid on me was at his Highness' instigation, and I retaliated on the kafilas. "Had it been a voluntary act of the Brahooees, I should have revenged myself on "them, not on the merchants. Prior to this raid I had claimed his Highness' pro-"tection against the Juttucks, who had carried off six of my flocks, but got no redress "beyond being told that the Brahooees were no friends of his,* and that "I was at liberty to retaliate. The attack on me was out of revenge "for having taken service with the English Government. I lost 30,000 sheep, some "donkeys, 400 flocks of goats, property belonging to 60 houses, Rs. 3,000 in cash and "a hona† containing letters from Colonel Phayre, Captain Sandeman, "and Mr. Bruce. I am unable to return the kafila property, as the "majority of it was carried off by other Murrees. When the last kafila was "plundered the Brahooees were going to attack us, but were prevented by Alla Dina "Khoord. We carried off two-thirds of the property, the remaining one-third was "left on the ground, and was either taken possession of by the Brahooees or the "owners. About twenty days ago I received a loongee from Captain Sandeman, "when I met the above officer at Jacobabad. General Pollock was at the station."

* *Sic.* in orig.

† *Sic.* in orig.

In last week's diary it was mentioned that the Sarawan chiefs were to be sent for. "His Highness accordingly ordered them to come to Khelat with as little delay as possible." Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and Sumundar Lehree have constantly represented to me that their arrangements would be very much facilitated if his Highness would publicly appoint the sons of the late Shawanee and Lehree Sirdars as chiefs of their respective tribes, "as doing so" would be only conforming with the usages of the country. I have on several occasions spoken to his Highness on the subject, but he persistently refuses to make these appointments until the Sarawans have restored all property plundered from the kafila merchants.

It was also mentioned in last week's diary that his Highness had been asked to send some sowars to Wud to assist in recovering Syed Ahmed's property. Up to the present no one has been sent. I regret to say that his Highness appears quite indifferent whether property belonging to any of the four kafilas is recovered. The chiefs on the other hand, are equally indifferent, as his Highness either withholds what they are entitled to, or gives it with a grudging hand.

Certain zemindars of Mustung wrote to me on the 29th stating that they had been robbed and ill-used by the Brahooees, the letter having been written by the Naib's Moonshee, and the chief complainant being the Naib's kaidar. I did not put much faith in what was written, and sent Sirdar Moolla Mahomed copy of the letter, with a request that he would ascertain if there was any truth in the complaint.

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent at Khelat.

Enclosure 2 in No. 96.

Translation of a Letter from Sirdar Azaad Khan, of Kharan, to the Political Agent at Khelat, dated 15th "Jamadee-ool-Awul" 1289.

AFTER SALUTATIONS.—News at this place is as follows: I have just received a letter from his Highness the Ameer, in which he tells me to rest perfectly satisfied as regards my own affairs.

An Ambassador from the Russian Government arrived in the Toorkoman country, and asked the latter to allow a force to proceed through their territory to Herat, stating, that if not granted, they would be first attacked and destroyed. The Toorkomans conveyed the Russian Ambassador to Sirdar Yakoob Khan at Herat, who sent them on to Cabul, *viâ* Candahar. God knows what will happen. Ameer Alum Khan, Janesheen of Ghain, visited the Shah, and is now on his way back. Supplies are being collected for him at Neh. The Persians have instructed the Seistanees to plunder in Beloochistan. They have three times carried off droves of camels from Kharan, but my people followed them up on each occasion, recovering the camels and killing some of the plunderers. They have also raided Nooshky three times, and formed a small camp in the desert close to the place from which they daily plunder in the neighbourhood of Nooshky. The inhabitants collected together on one occasion, but were unable to do anything, consequently the Seistanees still maintain their position. Khodadad Khan appears perfectly regardless of his country and subjects, consequently the Seistanees can pitch their camp close to Nooshky, plunder the place, and close the road to Shorawuck. The Tokees, Narooees, Damnees, and Bahmarees, were formerly under my authority, but sometime ago settled on the Seistan border: the two latter have now offered to join me.

In Mekran there are three or four villages that I am entitled to, which his Highness the Khan took from me about six years ago. If you will kindly give me permission I will re-possess myself of the same. Kindly send me a reply to this letter that I may act according to your wishes.

P.S.—Five slaves of mine have found protection with his Highness. I don't rightly understand whether you are merely engaged in matters connected with Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, or have the interests of the whole of Beloochistan at heart. If the latter, it will probably be settled that one person cannot unjustly detain another's property, why, therefore, does his Highness detain my slaves. I would also point out that the people of Gidur are constantly stealing camels from Kharan, and Moosa Khan, Naib, has detained two slaves that I sent there on business. Kindly get them sent back to me, and direct Moosa Khan to restrain people from thieving in my country. If these slaves are not returned, you must not be annoyed with me if I retaliate.

(True translations.)

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent at Khelat.

No. 848, dated Kurrachee, the 26th August 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information, in continuation of Commissioner's endorsement No. 799, dated 14th August 1872.

No. 97.

No. 1893P., dated Simla, 5th September 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor General, to Political Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

WITH reference to the correspondence on Khelat affairs ending with your letter No. 4841, dated the 16th of August last, I am directed to inform you that his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council approves of the action taken by the Bombay Government and the Commissioner in Sind in connexion with the unsatisfactory attitude of the Khan of Khelat.

No. 98.

No. 5290, dated Bombay Castle, the 7th September 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of this Office No. 5211 of the 4th instant, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a further memoranduin, No. 856, dated 28th ultimo, from the Commissioner in Sind, giving cover to the diary of the Political Agent at Khelat for the week ending 10th idem.

Enclosure in No. 98.

No. 26, dated Khelat, the 10th August 1872.

Diary of the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending the 10th August 1872.

Sher Dil, Mazaranee, when visiting me on Thursday, the 8th instant, suggested the following compromise, viz.,—that a certain amount of his property should be returned for a certain amount belonging to the merchants; the whole of the Budrukee should be given to him, so as to make arrangements with the Murree tribe for safe transit of kafilas; finally, to leave him at liberty to exact khoon, or compensation for blood, from the Samalanee tribe.

On Friday I informed his Highness of what Sher Dil proposed. He, however, declined to give more than the usual amount of Budrukee, one-third, and would agree to no other arrangement than enforcing restitution from the Samalanees and giving compensation for blood. On my suggesting that inquiry should be comprehensive, and include the officials "by whose advice" the Samalanees had acted, his Highness refused, stating that if his Naibs had behaved as stated, he himself would be responsible, "being, however, sure that the accusation against them was false." Inquiry, as far as they were concerned, was unnecessary.

I also informed his Highness that Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed had volunteered to head a force against the Murrees, so as to coerce the latter into compensating the merchants. His Highness stated that, under present circumstances, nothing of the kind could take place.

The merchants who were plundered in the Bolan by the Sarawans write,—Samundar Lehree's arrangement of paying Rupees 9,000 had broken down; "Rupees 3,000 only "had been received;" they further state that Alla Dina and his tribe are withholding all the good-baggage camels and donkeys, and have only returned those in a starved and dying state.

His Highness the Ameer has written to his Highness the Khan, as also to Sirdars Moolla Mahomed and Noordeen, regarding Syed Ahmed, who was plundered by the latter chief near Khozdar; the sowars that his Highness promised to send to Wud on this merchant's account "have not yet started," though I have reminded his Highness on several occasions.

Sirdar Azim Khan and Sher Khan, Khybarees, as also Wullee Mahomed, Magzee, and Daoo Mahomed, Jamalee, have arrived at Khelat, having business to transact with his Highness.

Sirdar Gazee Khan has returned to Punchgoor from Dizzak.

No post has been received from Jacobabad since the 24th July, excepting a packed of Native letters and a newspaper for Captain Humfrey, forwarded by Nawab Mahomet Khan, on the 2nd instant.

(Signed) C. H. Harrison, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

No. 856, dated Kurrachee, the 28th August 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government for information, in continuation of Commissioner's endorsement No. 848, dated 26th instant. This diary was written evidently

before receipt of last instructions sent by telegram to the Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind, on the 7th instant, vide Commissioner's letter to Government, No. 785, dated 7th August 1872.

No. 99.

No. 1174–273S.

From C. M. Rivaz, Esq., Officiating Under-Secretary to Government, Punjab and its Dependencies, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.

Foreign.

SIR, Dated 11th September 1872.

I AM desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 1425 P., of the 27th June last, copy of which and of its enclosure were forwarded to Captain Sandeman for compliance with the instructions contained in paragraph 3.

2. It was suggested to Captain Sandeman that he should summon Ghuzzun or his brother, and take down their statements, so that no further doubt could remain as to the exact scope of the complaints of the Murree tribe. He was also requested to furnish a catalogue of the sections and sub-divisions of the tribe, together with a statement of the locality in which each was settled.

3. I have now the honour to forward, by desire of the Lieutenant-Governor, copy of Captain Sandeman's reply, No. 713, dated 14th August, with enclosures, containing the information he was called on to submit, and a report of the manner in which he has carried out the instructions given him in regard to the grievances and future management of the trible.

4. His Honour observes that, while Ghuzzun's statement throws no new light on the subject of the Bolan Pass arrangements and the share of the tribe in the late attack on the kafilas, these matters can best be dealt with by the Commissioner in Sind in communication with the Khelat officials.

5. I am, however, to remark that the statement now furnished is somewhat contradictory of Captain Sandeman's earlier information as to the unity of the Murree clan. It is now clear that the Mazarani section has to some extent broken off, and is more in subordination to the Bungulzais than to Ghuzzun. Still the Lieutenant-Governor is doubtful of the expediency of employing this section to guard the Bolan Pass owing to the jealousies which this arrangement has already excited.

6. His Honour sees no objection to the establishment of a post in the Shum plain on the part of the Khan's government, but he deprecates the employment of the Punjab Frontier Force in its garrison.

7. Three copies of the map sent by Captain Sandeman are enclosed.

I have, &c.

Officiating Under-Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Enclosure 1 in No. 99.

No. 713, dated Derah Ghazi Khan, 14th August 1872.

From Captain R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Derah Ghazi Khan, to the Officiating Secretary to Government, Punjab.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your No. 51 S, and its annexures, regarding the Murree tribe, and in reply beg to enclose copies of my reports* to the Commissioner in Sind and Political Superintendent on the subject, which show in detail the manner in which I have carried out the instructions of Government as contained therein.

* No. 707, dated 13th August 1872, to Commissioner in Sind.
No. 711, dated 14th August 1872, to Political Superintendent, Jacobabad.
No. 712, dated 14th August 1872, to Political Superintendent, Jacobabad.
Statement of Ghuzzun Khan, Murree Tomandar.

2. In compliance with the instructions contained in the 3rd paragraph of your letter under reply, I have the honour to enclose a tabular statement in which are given the sections and sub-divisions of the tribe as detailed by Ghuzzun Khan the Tomandar himself. I also enclose a sketch map showing where the different sections of the tribe are now located. It must, however, be remembered that the tribe is predatory,

wandering about from place to place in the vast country known as the Murree country. The fixed settlements (where there are small forts) of the tribe are, however, marked in the map.

3. The country occupied by Sher Dil and his people, as represented in the map, is the tract they fled to after they were so murderously attacked by the Minguls. The hereditary lands of Sher Dil and his people are situated not very far from Kahan itself. The Mazaranis are a sub-division of the Ghazni section of the tribe.

4. Many tracts of the Murree country are, when cultivated, most prolific. The tribe are fully alive to the benefits that would result to them as a people were their country only settled and cultivated; and this year the Loharani section have made a beginning by cultivating a portion of the Nassau plain. This fact the Loharani chief told me the other day with apparent satisfaction. In the valley of Kahan, when I visited it, there were many signs which showed that at one time large portions of it had been under cultivation. The water from the surface in many of the valleys I visited is said to be only 10 or 12 feet. The Wattakari valley is about the size of the Kohat valley, with a beautiful perennial stream flowing through it. Its soil is notoriously prolific, even amongst the semi-barbarians in whose country it is. The Murang valley, adjoining the western slopes of the Drajil mountain, is a portion of the Gurchani country. The perennial stream called the Kaha flows through it. Even to this day the wheat crop it used to yield is talked of as having been very fine. It also is now lying empty and uncultivated.

Tabular Statement showing the Sections and Sub-divisions of the Marri Tribe.

Name of Tomander.	Name of Section of the Tribe.	Names of Chief—Mokaddam.	Names of Sub-Divisions of the Tribe.	Names of Mokaddams of these Sub-Divisions.	Number of fighting Men.	Locality where each Section of the Tribe is settled.	Remarks.
Ghuzzun Khan	Ghazni -	Ghuzzun Khan	Mubarakzai -	Shahan - -	2,000	Kahan.	
		Mir Hazar Khan	Lengiani - -	Hyat Khan -		Nal.	
		Miah Khan -	Mahoudani -	Ghoram - -		Mahummad.	
		Khanak Khan -	Langheani -	Rammin - -		Nilak.	
			Mazarani - -	Jarro - -		Babar.	
			And others -	Sadack - -		Sartab.	
				Sher Dil - -		Mondai.	The Mazaranis live in these places.
				Kachi - -		Dumgan.	
				And others -		Kait.	
						Badra.	
						Powadi.	
						Nelli Vad.	
	Bijarani -	Wazir - -	Bijarani - -	Braham Khan -	2,000	Dabu.	
		Karim Khan -	Kallandarani -	Lal Khan - -		Chakar Gut.	
		Sharan - -	Raham Kani -	Sharbat Khan -		Sadri.	
		Dewa - -	Kalwani - -	Sawakli - -		Parotani.	
		Shadi Khan -	Somrani - -	Poulat - -		Chakar Jhang.	
			Kungrani -	Rahimdad -		Mondai.	
			Hassuzai - -	Shadi Khan -		Kholu.	
			And others -	Saad Khan -			
				And others -			
	Loharani	Sharbat - -	Kanarani - -	Shahs - -	1,500	Shum.	
		Nihal Khan -	Gowasarani -	Mehrab - -		Phihawar.	
		Jamsher - -	Sherani - -	Malu Khan -		Manjera.	
			Mahamdani -	Sona - -		Jaut Thalli.	
			And others -	Jark Ali - -		Nissau.	
				Khodadad -		Pat.	
				And others -		Lope.	
				Total strength	5,500		

R. SANDEMAN,
Officiating Deputy Commissioner.

DERA GHAZI KHAN,
Deputy Commissioner's Office,
The 14th August 1872.

Enclosure 2 in No. 99.

No. 707, dated 13th August 1872.

From Captain R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Derah Ghazi Khan, to the Commissioner in Sind, Kurrachee.

IN accordance with the orders contained in letter No. 1425P., dated 27th June 1872, from the Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to Government, Punjab, I have the honour to lay before you, firstly, what are the desires and hopes of the Murree tribe (I do not call them grievances, for I do not think

the chiefs desire them to be viewed as such); secondly, the specific measures I would propose for remedying the unfortunate position this tribe holds in regard to its relations with the British Government.

2. To enable me to submit these so as to be understood, it seems desirable first of all to make clear from a Murree point of view the system that has of late years been adopted for the protection of kafilas passing through the Bolan Pass. Regarding this the Foreign Secretary in paragraph 2 of the letter above named writes :—" The account " of the present aspect of the matter given by the Deputy Commissioner is by no " means clear; but his Excellency in Council gathers that it is somewhat as follows: " the protection of the Bolan Pass has been confided to one section of the Murree tribe, " the Mazaranis, instead of the whole tribe, who claim to share in the money given " for the protection of the Pass. The Mazaranis were attacked by a party of Minguls, " and in retaliation plundered traders in the pass, and the whole tribe is now held " responsible for the outrage, although only a section shares in the benefit of the " engagement which has been violated."

3. As you are aware, I have only recently met the Murree Tomandar, Ghuzzun Khan. I will therefore explain in his own words the Murree view of the case as it at present stands. I quote from his statement made before me :—

" The Mazaranis are really Murrees, and belong to the Ghazni section of the tribe. " Years ago, before my time, when Doda Khan and Mobarak Khan were the two Sirdars " of the Murree clan, the Mazaranis quarrelled with the rest of the tribe. They left the " Murree country and went to Mustung and the Bolan Pass. They placed themselves " under the protection of the Bungulzais and other Brahooees.

" About 12 years ago Karm Khan, the chief of the Bijaranis (Murrees), attacked the " Mazaranis and the Brahooees, who protected them, and killed 11 or 12 of the former, " besides carrying off some of their flocks. In retaliation for this the Mazaranis " attacked the Murree clan and killed a headman called Maddata Sangani, of the " Ghazni section of the clan. There were other Murrees also killed. The Murree clan " remained at feud with the Mazaranis. About five years ago it suited the purpose " of his Highness the Khan to take the Mazaranis under his protection. They became " his servants, and he placed them in charge of the Bolan Pass. They were entrusted " by his Highness with the duty of escorting kafilas through the Pass. This succeeded " fairly when the kafilas were large, and the escort which accompanied them was so " too, but small kafilas were plundered, and the road was not very safe. The Murrees " from Khot Mundai and the Duman Kakars plundered travellers, &c. It is not true " that after the Mazaranis Shel Dil and Kainchi took service with the Khan of Khelat, " that they paid me a share of their gains. They were entirely the Khan's servants, " and I heard that a portion of the escort fees went to him. The Mazaranis from that " time were looked upon by the rest of the tribe as entirely separate from it; and last " October, Kainchi Khan, Mazarani, Mukaddam, (headman of a section) came to " Kahan to me, and we settled together the blood feud. Last winter, when war broke " out in Khelat between the Khan and his Sirdars, the Mazaranis took part in it, and " Kainchi and Shere Dil joined Walli Muhammad, the Naib of Dadar, and fought on " the side of the Khan's troops. The Sirdars captured Dadar and took Sher Dil and " Wali Muhammad prisoners; Kainchi Khan escaped. The Sirdar of the Bungulzai " Brahooees, Shadi Khan, got the rebels to release Sher Dil, and he returned to his " people; but the Mazaranis were not strong enough to hold the Pass against the " Brahooees, who took possession of it and plundered kafilas in it. All this time the " Mazaranis were quite faithful to the Khan, and, when opportunity offered, did his " service as usual. This created anger in the hearts of the Brahooees, as they did not " consider that the Mazaranis had any right to kafila fees. On this account and out " of revenge the Minguls collected an army and attacked Sher Dil's camp, and killed " his son and 11 men, and carried off all he had in the world. His flocks and herds " and all he had were taken. After this Kainchi Khan and Shere Dil consulted " together as to what course they should pursue. It was arranged that Kainchi Khan " should go himself to the Khan and tell him of the conduct of the Brahooees. This " was done. Kainchi Khan returned to Sher Dil and told him that the Khan was in " anxiety himself about his own affairs, that he had not yet settled the Sirdars' case, " and at present he could not aid Sher Dil. After this Kainchi Khan, who is inter- " married with the Bungulzai Brahooees, left Sher Dil and joined their Sirdar, Shadi " Khan. Sher Dil, helpless and in great distress at the death of his son, left the " Bolan Pass altogether with his people, and encamped at Sangam and Khatt close to " the Murree country. He waited there for three months, and succeeded in collecting " an army of 500 men with which to take his revenge by attacking the Brahooees. The

" force he collected was composed as follows:—Namdani and Silachi Pathans, 20 men " (they are ryots of Kandahar), Saingani (section Ghazni), and Bijarani Murrees, resi- " dents of Khott Mundai, 140; Mazarani Murrees, 280. There were also 40 Kahan " Murrees who had gone to Khott to aid in cutting and collecting the harvest. The " lands of Khott Mundai are the joint property of the Murree clan. They are held in " common. Sher Dil, without my knowledge, asked these 40 Kahan men to join him. " The army started to attack the Minguls, and on arrival at the Bolan Pass they met " the kafila *en route* to Kandahar. Shere Dil, in grief and rage at the death of his " son, and because he was helpless, attacked the kafila. After the act was committed, " on the way back, when the Murrees were returning with their spoil, they found that " they were hotly pursued by a large party of Brahooees. As the pursuing party greatly " outnumbered the Murrees, they left their spoil and fled. A messenger from the " pursuers came after them and said that they were friends and not to fly. The place " where this happened is called Bibi Nani, and what I tell is well known. The " Murrees got the name of doing all the damage, but they were not to blame more than " the others." Further on in his statement with reference to the protection of the Bolan Pass, after declaring his desire to make any restitution that was possible for the loss of property, he adds: "The Bolan Pass is in Khelat territory, and belongs " to the Khan. I have nothing to say to it, nor did I ever have; nor did any of the " Khans of Khelat ever make the Murree Sirdar responsible for the Pass. The Khan, " through his other Sirdars, is the only person who can arrange to protect it; I am a " Sarawan, but the Murree country is far from the Pass." Again he says: "One thing " I beg to represent. The Murree chief has no power in the country if the Brahooee " Sirdars are allowed to send for the Murrees to join in their quarrels. This winter " the Brahooees sent to Mundai and Khott and called out the Murrees. Let this be " stopped, and with Government aid I can settle with the Murrees there, and prevent " them from plundering. The Bijarani Murrees had never any connexion with the " Mazaranis. The two are separate sections. The Mazaranis have for long obeyed " the orders of the Sirdar of the Bungulzais. I am quite content to be entirely sepa- " rate from them, and if they are employed by the Khan in the Bolan Pass, I can " have nothing to say against it. The old quarrel between the Bijaranis and Mazaranis " has been healed. Kainchi Khan, the Mazarani headman, came about this during " last October, and all was arranged. I am sure that the Bijaranis will not bear " enmity any longer to the Mazaranis. I can become responsible for this. I have " quite authority as chief of the tribe over the Bijaranis; and, with the aid of " Government, I can keep them in order and be responsible for their acts."

4. From the above extract from the statement of the Murree Tomandar, as well as from conversations which I held with him, I am able to assert that his wishes and those of his chiefs are—

1st.—That if it suits the purpose of his Highness the Khan to employ the Mazarani section of the Murree tribe in the protection of kafilas passing through the Bolan Pass, they cannot accept any responsibility in the matter.

2nd.—That the Bijarani section of the Murrees has no longer any feud with the Mazaranis or jealous feeling regarding their employment in the Pass.

3rd.—That the protection of the Pass should entirely rest with and be undertaken without reference to the Murree clan by the Khan of Khelat, in whose country it is.

4th. That if his Highness employs the Mazarani Murrees, they should be for the future considered as the Khan's servants, and not as a part of the Murree tribe.

5th.—That with the aid of Government they can prevent the Bijarani Murrees from plundering kafilas, and would under certain circumstances (to be named hereafter) undertake the responsibility of this.

6th.—That on account of circumstances arising out of the late war, and because they considered they had a right to share in the kafila fees, the Minguls attacked the Mazarani Murrees, who were at the time loyally performing the Khan's services.

7th.—That on account of similar circumstances the Khan was unable to right the Mazaranis, which led to their attacking the kafilas after a portion of them under Sher Dil had rejoined the Murree tribe.

8th.—That from circumstances over which they had no control a few of the Kahan Murrees did join in the plunder of the kafilas, therefore they are prepared to be held responsible in as far as is considered fair and right; but they desire it to be understood as an undoubted fact that the Mazaranis were employed

for the protection of kafilas entirely by the Khan and on his responsibility; and at the time they were attacked by the Minguls they were not at feud with the Murree tribe. They did not pay them a portion of the kafila fees and were acting independently of the Murree tribe under the protection of the Khan and Bungulzai Brahooees.

9th.—That they will do their best to meet the wishes of Government in whatever way it is considered to be advantageous.

5. I now come to the second portion of my subject, viz., what specific measures I would recommend being put in force in order to remedy the present unsatisfactory state of our relations with the Murree clan.

6. The most essential point of all, I consider, in dealing with a tribe like the Murrees, is to avoid even the appearance of a double-sided policy in our dealings with it. Unity of purpose, and uniformity of action on the part of the British officers when dealing with the tribe are essential to success. This am I sure will be admitted, and that the Government having once defined clearly its policy and laid down the principles on which it is based, it behoves all concerned to co-operate cordially and vigorously in carrying it out.

7. Having premised this much, I think I may safely assume that the policy you will recommend the Government to carry out with regard to this clan is a conciliatory one where possible, supplemented by material aid where you think it may be wise and beneficial to aford it. As I believe I am in some measure aware of what is required to enable this tribe like its neighbours to settle, I will endeavour briefly to record it.

8. I think the object from the foundation, and which in all our dealings with the tribe ought never to be lost sight of, should be to prevent the tribe plundering at all. I am fully convinced that this can gradually be brought about. I will begin by showing how I would permanently prevent their plundering in the Punjab.

9. The first measure I should at once put in force would be clearly to define the boundary line between the Punjab and Khelat. In as far as it was possible I would, in concert with the Punjab Government, arrange for the peace of the two borders and the protection of the lives and property of the subjects of Khelat and the British Government.

10. There is no independent tribe occupying any portion of territory between Khelat and the Punjab, but there is a very important tract of country lying between the two countries which is wholly unprotected by either Government. In this lies the great evil to Khelat and Punjab subjects, more especially to the latter, for this portion of country is actually the property of Punjab subjects, and its occupation by them is absolutely necessary to their prosperity.

11. Until means are adopted to enable them to occupy it in peace, no progress and no security for either life or property on this portion of the Khelat and Punjab borders can be hoped for or expected.

12. In illustration of what I mean I will for one moment direct your attention to my letter of the 10th April 1872, No. 227, to the address of the Secretary to Government, Punjab, a copy of which was sent you, and will briefly quote from it: "At the "annexation of the Punjab our Government did not fix our border line according to "the possessions of our new subjects. We made an arbitrary border line, leaving the "principal and by far the most valuable lands of the Gurchani clan outside our terri- "tory, and nominally included in that of Khelat. It thus happens that a portion of "the Gurchoni clan are subjects of the British Government and a portion of the "Khelat State." I continue my letter by showing, which is an undisputed fact, how terribly disastrous such an arrangement has proved to the unfortunate Gurchani clan.

13. I confidently assert that an inspection of that portion of the Punjab and Khelat border line will clearly prove, to any one taking the trouble to make it, that no permanent reform in the Murree clan can take place until we recognise with regard to their depredations that it is the first duty of a really beneficent government to protect its subjects in as far as is possible from violence or oppression. At present neither the Punjab nor Khelat Government does this as fully as it might, the result being that the subjects of the two Governments have hitherto been allowed to destroy each other at pleasure.

14. I have further shown in my letter of the 10th April, already alluded to, that the principal clans of this district whose country joins on to Khelat, are in a great measure dependent for safety and comfort on the forbearance of the Murree clan, and to the friendship that I succeeded in establishing between the two by means of our chiefs intermarrying with the Murrees.

15. This unsatisfactory state of things extends along the entire frontier occupied by the Murree clan. I am sure it will readily be admitted that any arrangement, never mind how well it may to all appearances work, must be unsatisfactory when its durability and permanency solely depends on the forbearance of a clan like the Murrees.

16. In order to illustrate this, and to show as clearly as I possibly can under present circumstances the relative positions of the clans along this border to the Murree and Boogtee tribes, I have had sketched from the Murree Hill, where my camp a very few days ago stood, the enclosed sketch map. As far as this border is concerned, although very roughly done, it is fairly reliable.

17. By glancing at it you will find that the entire border line of this district, as far as Kot Chacha, in the Khetran country, bounds the Khelat State, and that Murrees and Boogtees reside in close neighbourhood to the Punjab. Further, if you observe the position of the line of posts, it will be clear that there is a considerable tract of territory within the Punjab entirely unprotected. It was simply on this account that, the other day, the Loharani Murrees from the Nassau plain were able to make a successful raid on Choti Bala. The circumstances I reported at the time for your information.

18. A further inspection of the sketch map will show that the Punjab line of posts of the Lower Derajat are a considerable distance in rear of the Sind line of posts. For example, take the Sui post (Sind) and either the Sabzil-ki-kot, Drigri or Harrand (Punjab) posts. What I desire to establish by drawing your attention to this is that apparently the Sind posts were established with the view doubtless of protecting the Sind border from Khelat subjects; but also with the clear object of benefiting the latter when opportunity offered as much as possible, because they were subjects of a friendly State in alliance with our Government. On the other hand the Punjab posts would appear to have been established for defence only, and not as a protection to the subjects of Khelat as well as those of the Punjab.

19. The remedy, I would propose for the evils that exist and which I have done my best to demonstrate, is as simple as it would be effective, and could be put in force with hardly any additional expenditure of public money. I would propose that in the same way that the Sui post (Sind) was advanced to command the Boogtees (Sir Henry Green is my informant as to this) a post be erected in the Shum plain to enable us to command the Murrees, for had we one there such a result would undoubtedly be obtained.

20. I will not add to the length of this letter by giving my scheme in detail. Suffice it to say that the Shum post might be erected in the Khan's name, materially aided by the Punjab Government, or jointly in the name of both Governments. The Murrees and Boogtees in our pay I would place in it. They already number together about 100 horsemen. At first I would have a body of 200 Punjab cavalry also in the post, but ultimately as the country settled, I would withdraw these and garrison the post entirely by Guides or Militia belonging to the Gurchani, Mazari, and Drishak tribes, in addition to the Murrees and Boogtees, all under the command of a Native officer of rank and character.

21. On the Punjab border, with the exception of one or two of the larger posts, most of them are garrisoned in a somewhat similar way to the one proposed. The genius of the Belooch admits of this, and after a few years I feel confident such a post as the proposed one would not only remedy the evils I complain of in our present system, but do much to strengthen the Khan of Khelat's hold on that part of his territory. The desirability of such a post was concurred in by Colonel Sir Henry Green, and I believe the proposal has also the approval of Colonels Phayre and Mainwaring.

22. Regarding the other remedies that may be required for the settlement of the Murree clan, more especially in regard to the prevention of their depredations into Khelat territory, you are a much better judge than I can pretend to be. I would only suggest if it be possible that when arrangements are made with the clan for the Punjab at the same time those for Khelat should take place. I know well the chiefs are most desirous of being reconciled to the Khan's Government, and would gladly see their old position with regard to it re-established. In support of this I will again quote from Ghuzzun Khan's statement made before me. With reference to the recovery of the plundered kafila property from the Mundai Murrees he said: "I beg the Govern-
" ment not to ask what is impossible from me. I have not the power single handed
" to deal with Sher Dil and the Khott Mundai Murrees; the reason I can explain. The
" Khott Mundai Murrees were formerly kept in check, but the Murree Tomandar was
" then aided by the Khan's Government, and a Sirdar of the tribe lived at Mundai

" whose duty it was to make arrangements in the Khan's name for the protection of " the country. For instance, my cousin Gaman Khan I can name as one who aided " the Khan in this way. The Khan allowed the Murree chiefs Rs. 12,000 yearly for the " purpose of employing the minor chiefs according to their position in the tribe in " keeping order. In addition to this the Sirdars of the clan got from the Khan the " village of Tunia in Jagir; all the arrangements were made in the Khan's name and " performed properly, for he is the (Wali) ruler of the country. It was during the " reign of his Highness Nusseer Khan that the Rs. 12,000 were paid. It was not until " the reign of the present Khan that the allowance was reduced from Rs. 12,000 to " Rs. 6,000. This sum was paid very irregularly and at intervals. By degrees misrule " occurred, and the Murrees, as they were very poor, took still more to plunder. At " last the Khan stopped entirely the allowance, and no chief of the Murrees remained " as servant of his Highness at Mundai. I am too poor to keep a chief there at my " own personal cost to keep order."

23. In my dealings with this tribe hitherto, and in carrying out the remedies for its settlement which I now recommend, I trust it will be apparent that the primary object I have in view is by every means in my power to get such a hold over the tribe that ultimately its power to do evil will gradually, as in the case of the Boogtees and our own Gurchani and Mazari tribes, disappear.

24. That this object is obtainable by the means recommended I feel confident, and that if these were once adopted and put in force we would bestow on a fine and deserving people, in exchange for anarchy, distress and poverty, peace, plenty, and happiness. They are entirely dependent on our Government for their prosperity, and its acknowledged responsibilities would seem to necessitate some such remedies for the evils complained of and which undoubtedly exist as those proposed by me being put in force without further delay.

Enclosure 3 in No. 99.

No. 711, dated 14th August 1872.

From Captain R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Derah Ghazi Khan, to the Political Superintendent, Jacobabad.

IN accordance with the orders of the Government I submit for the information of the Commissioner in Sind a report* regarding the Murree tribe.

* No. 707, dated 13th August 1872.

Enclosure 4 in No. 99.

No. 712, dated 14th August 1872.

From Captain R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Derah Ghazi Khan, to the Political Superintendent, Jacobabad.

WITH reference to the correspondence which has taken place between us on the subject of the surrender, by the Murree clan, of property plundered from kafilas in the Bolan Pass, I have the honour to submit, for the favourable consideration of the Commissioner in Sind and for any order he may be pleased to pass on the same, the statement made by the Tomandar Ghuzzun Khan, regarding the plunder of the said kafilas; I will here briefly state what passed between myself and the Murree Chiefs prior to their visiting my camp for the purpose of discussing the surrender of the plundered property.

2. As directed by you in your demi-official letter of 10th July last, I communicated with the Murree Tomandar on the subject of the restoration of the property. At first, on account of the undoubted great difficulties which were in the way of his complying with the Commissioner's instructions in a way that was at all likely to prove satisfactory, he seemed inclined to meet the demand in sullen silence; and a few of the Loharani Murrees occupying the Nassau plain, seeing how matters stood, made a raid into British territory. The Loharani chief, Nihal Khan, however, arrayed himself quickly on the side of order. The cattle plundered in the raid from our territory were returned to a party of my men sent by me for the purpose of recovering them, and Ghuzzun Khan, the Murree Tomandar, came himself after some delay into my camp to discuss what plan he could adopt together in order to comply with the Commis-

sioner's wishes. These events I intimated to you by telegram, *viâ* Rajanpur, in which I stated my belief that the chiefs were anxious to do their best to comply with our wishes.

3. In reply to this you sent me, by telegram, further instructions from the Commissioner in Sind, which were to the effect that if the Tomandar could not restore the actual property plundered, he could show he was in earnest by restoring what he could recover. The Commissioner, in the telegram, also expressed his approval of my arranging for the Tomandar to pay a money compensation for any property he might be held responsible for. This compensation the Commissioner said could be paid by instalments.

4. After discussing the matter fully with the Tomandar I was enabled to send you the following telegram :—"Ghuzzun Khan pleads that because of division of property " he is unable to do more than surrender plunder in Kahan. He will send you 15 " camels at once, all there is. For the rest, as approved by Commissioner, he agrees " to give money compensation if held to be responsible." This agreement the Commissioner, through you, was pleased to approve by telegram, and I had the pleasure and satisfaction, at the same time that he conveyed his sanction, to receive his thanks for having brought it about.

5. Before breaking up my camp on the Murree hill, I gave the chief's agent a demi-official letter for you, as he was there, and then sent off to Kahan to fetch the 15 camels. I trust by this time they have been taken to you to Jacobabad.

6. The Tomandar's statements annexed to this letter is so plain as to the circumstances attending the plunder of the kafilas that I do not require to add to it. Moreover, the actual state of the Murree clan, as well as their connexion with this border, is so fully known to the Commissioner in Sind, that it seems unnecessary for me to say more regarding the offence which has been committed, and how I believe final terms with Sher Dil and his portion of the clan might be arranged. I will only add that Ghuzzun Khan seems to think that full reparation could be obtained from those actually concerned in the plunder of the property; and should any further information be required by the Commissioner regarding this, on your intimating his wishes to me, I can then supply it. I feel very confident in concluding this letter by saying that I feel sure that whatever portion of the property the Commissioner considers that Ghuzzun Khan ought to be held responsible for, the payment of the compensation can without difficulty be arranged in the manner approved by the Commissioner.

Enclosure 5 in No. 99.

Copy of statement of Ghuzzun Khan, Tomandar of the Murree tribe, to Captain Sandeman, regarding the plunder of kafilas in the Bolan Pass.

I HAVE come to your camp, as directed, to explain all I can regarding the plunder of kafilas by Mazarani Murrees and others in the Bolan Pass.

The Mazaranis are really Murrees, and belong to the Ghazni section of the tribe. Years ago, before my time, when Doda Khan and Mobarack Khan were the two Sirdars of the Murrees, the Mazaranis quarrelled with the rest of the clan. They left the Murree country and went to Mustung and the Bolan Pass. They placed themselves under the protection of the Bungulzai and other Brahooees.

About 12 years ago Karm Khan, the chief of the Bijarani Murrees, attacked the Mazaranis and the Brahooees who protected them and killed 11 or 12 of the former, besides carrying off some of their flocks. In retaliation for this, the Mazaranis collected and attacked the Murrees and killed a Mukaddam called Maddata Saingani, of the Ghazni section of the tribe. There were also killed Ghazi Saingani, Goru Kalwani, and others. The clan remained at feud with the Mazaranis. About five years ago, it suited the purpose of his Highness the Khan to take the Mazaranis under his protection. They became his servants, and he placed them in charge of the Bolan Pass. They were entrusted by his Highness with the duty of escorting kafilas through the Pass. This succeeded fairly when the kafilas were large, and a large escort accompanied them; but small kafilas were plundered and the road was not very safe. The Murrees from Khott Mundai and the Doman Kakars plundered travellers, &c. It is not true that after the Mazaranis Sher Dil and Kainchi took service with his Highness the Khan, that they paid me a share of their gains. They were entirely the Khan's servants, and I heard that a portion of the escort fees went to him. The Mazaranis from that time were looked upon by the rest of the clan as entirely separate

from it; and last October, Kainchi Khan, Mazarani Mukaddam, came to Kahan to me and we settled together the blood feud. Last winter when war broke out in Khelat between the Khan and his Sirdars, the Mazaranis took part in it, and Kainchi and Sher Dil joined Wali Muhammad, the Naib of Dadar, and fought on the side of the Khan's troops. The Sirdars captured Dadur and took Sher Dil and Wali Muhammed prisoners. The latter was put to death. Kainchi Khan escaped. The Sirdar of the Bungulzai Brahooees, Shadi Khan, got the rebels to release Sher Dil, and he returned to his people; but the Mazaranis were not strong enough to hold the pass against the Brahooee Sirdar, who took possession of it and plundered kafilas in it. All this time the Mazaranis were quite faithful to the Khan, and when opportunity offered did his service as usual. This created anger in the hearts of the Brahooees, as they did not consider that the Mazaranis had any right to the kafila fees. On this account and out of revenge the Minguls collected an army and attacked Sher Dil's camp and killed his son and 11 men, and carried off all he had in the world. His flocks and herds and all he had was taken. After this Kainchi Khan and Sher Dil consulted together as to what course they should pursue. It was arranged that Kainchi Khan should go himself to the Khan and tell him of the conduct of the Brahooees. This was done. Kainchi Khan returned to Sher Dil and told him that the Khan was in anxiety himself about his own affairs; that he had not yet settled the Brahooee Sirdars' case, and at present he could not aid Sher Dil. After this Kainchi Khan, who is intermarried with the Bungulzai Brahooees, left Sher Dil and joined their Sirdar, Shadi Khan. Sher Dil, helpless and in great distress at the death of his son, left the Bolan Pass altogether with his people and encamped at Sangan and Khatt, close to the Murree country. He waited there for three months, and succeeded in collecting an army of 500 men with which to take his revenge by attacking the Brahooees. The force he collected was composed as follows:—Namdani and Zilatchi Pathans, 20 (they are ryots of Kandahar), Sangai (Ghazni) and Bijarani Murrees, residents of Khott Mundai, 140, Mazarani Marris, 280. There were also 40 Kahan Murrees who had gone to Khott to aid in cutting and collecting the harvest. The lands of Khott Mundai are the joint property of the Kahan Murrees. They are held in common. Shere Dil, without my knowledge, asked these 40 Kahan Murrees to join him. The army started to attack the Minguls, and on arrival in the Bolan Pass they met the kafila *en route* to Kandahar. Sher Dil, in grief and anger at the death of his son and because he was helpless attacked the kafila. After the act was committed on the way back when the Marris were returning with their spoil, they found that they were being hotly pursued by a large party of Brahooees. As they were greatly outnumbered, the Murrees left their spoil and fled. A messenger from the pursuers came after them and said they were friends and not to fly. The place where this happened is called Bibi Nani, and what I tell is well known. The Murrees got the name of doing all the damage; but they were not to blame more than the others. I cannot be sure who the pursuers were, but they were Sarawans, and I know that there were both Koords and Bungulzais with them, and others. The kafila property was divided between the two sides. The Brahooees got the most, as they were the larger party of the two. I know what share each Murree of the party got. It valued Rs. 25 per man. The army numbered 480. The total Murree share came to Rs. 12,000. I received the Sirdar's share of the plunder. I received it from Sher Dil. He sent me 15 camels, also 12 or 13 thans of white cloth and some silk cloth. I am quite willing to make what restitution I can for plunder. I will return what I can and give any compensation I can. I beg of the Government not to ask what is impossible from me. I have not the power to deal with Sher Dil and the Khott Mundai Murrees. The reason I can explain. The Khott Mundai Murrees were formerly kept in check, but the Murree Tomandar was then aided by the Khan's Government to do so, and a Sirdar of the tribe lived at Mundai, whose duty it was to make arrangements in the Khan's name for the protection of the country; my cousin Gaman Khan I can name as one who aided the Khan in this way. The Khan allowed us Rs. 12,000 yearly for the purpose of employing the minor chiefs, according to their rank in keeping order. The Sirdar of the Murrees got from the Khan the village of Tunia as jagir; all the arrangements were made in the Khan's name, and were performed properly, for he is the ruler of the country. It was during the reign of his Highness Nusseer Khan that the Rs. 12,000 were paid for the maintenance of order, and to enable the Murree Chief to obey the Khan's wishes. It was not until the reign of the present Khan that the allowance was reduced from Rs. 12,000 to Rs. 6,000. This sum was paid very irregularly, and at intervals. By degrees misrule occurred and the Murrees, as they are very poor took still more to plunder. At last the Khan stopped entirely the allowance, and no chief of the Murrees remained as servants

of his Highness at Mundai. I am too poor to maintain a chief there to keep order at my own personal cost. The Mundai Murrees therefore have become very unruly, and I could not recover the plunder from them; but I will refund the plunder given to me and make the Kahan Murrees make restitution. If I can do more, I will do so. As to the property with Sher Dil, he will at once obey the order of Shadi Khan the Bungulzai Sirdar. I know this because he has always gone by his advice in all matters. It was Sher Dil's fault that the 40 Murrees from Kahan joined him. They were at Mundai to cut and collect the harvest, and he, without consulting me, got them to join him. He ought to be held responsible for this by the Khan through the Sarawan Sirdars, who have the power to make him give restitution, which I have not. The Bolan Pass is in Khelat territory and belongs to the Khan. I have nothing to say to it, nor did I ever have, nor did any of the Khans of Khelat ever make the Murree Sirdar responsible for it. The Khan, through his other Sirdars, is the only person who can arrange to protect. I am a Sarawan, but the Murree country is far from the Pass. With Government aid I can protect my country and prevent the Mundai and Bijarani Murrees from plundering if the old arrangements are again put in force. The Murree Tomandar is a servant of the Khan's. He had in Jagir the village of Tunia in Kutchi, and the Mundai chiefs served the Khan through him. A brother of the Tomandar or near relation was in charge at Mundai. One thing I beg to represent. The Murree Chief has no power in his country if the Brahooee Sirdars are allowed to send for the Murrees to join in their quarrels. This winter the Brahooees sent to Mundai and Khott and called out the Murrees. Let this be stopped, and, with Government aid I can settle with the Murrees there and prevent them from plundering. The Bijarani Murrees had never any connexion with the Mazaranis. The two are quite separate sections. The Mazaranis have for long obeyed the orders of the Sirdars of the Bungulzais. I am quite content to be entirely separate from them, and if they are employed by the Khan in the Bolan Pass, I can have nothing to say against it. The old quarrel between the Bijaranis and Mazaranis has been healed. Kainchi Khan, the Mazarani Mukkaddam, came about this during last October, and all was arranged. I am sure the Bijaranis will not bear enmity any longer to the Mazaranis. I can become responsible for this. I have quite authority as chief of the tribe over the Bijaranis, and with the aid of Government I can keep them in order and be responsible for their acts. I will arrange to the best of my power to do whatever the Government requires of me.

No. 100.

No. 5486, dated Bombay Castle, 17th September 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor General.

In continuation of this Office No. 4841, dated the 16th ultimo, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a further Memorandum No. 883, dated 9th instant, from the Commissioner in Sind, transmitting the diary of the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 17th August 1872.

Enclosure in No. 100.

Diary No. 27 of 1872 by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 17th August 1872.

A letter from Sirdar Abdul Rehman to his Highness the Khan reports that the Afghan authorities had intercepted a kafila at Shorawak and retained all property belonging to Jalawan people in retaliation for the kafila plundered by Sirdar Noordeen.

Letters from Sirdar Gaji Khan to the address of his Highness the Khan and myself, as also a note to me from the leading men of Punchgoor, shows that dissatisfaction has been caused in this province by a harsh letter from his Highness in connexion with Ibrahim Khan Nosherwani's occupation of Khudabadan attributing this move on his, Ibrahim Khan's part to support derived from Gaji Khan and not from any instruction

conveyed to him through Darogah Atta Mahomed. I lost no time in pointing out to his Highness that disturbances would arise at Punchgoor and Nushky if he was not more conciliatory towards his chiefs, and people begged him to allow affairs connected with the above places to remain in abeyance until he paid me his usual visit on Friday.

On Friday his Highness having heard what I had to say assured me that no complication would arise at Nushky as Imamdad had strict orders not to fight. To prevent any mistake written instructions would be sent without delay. His Highness also promised to write to Sirdar Gaja Khan in a friendly spirit.

Sirdar Abdul Rehman Zaggar Mingul of Nushky has for some time passed been on bad terms with the minor chiefs of his district, "particularly with" Alam Khan Rukshani and Pur Dil Mingul: both the latter were also represented to have been in correspondence with Sirdar Azaad Khan of Kharan consequent on Sirdar Abdul Rehman's representations and that of Dost Mahomed Rukshani. His Highness sent for Alam Khan and Pur Dil, and received a reply that they would come as soon as they had finished putting down their seed, His Highness at once sent off a party of horse under a Dewar "Imamdad" to arrest them. Having timely intimation of the Dewar's movements the minor chiefs previously named fled to Shorawak. The Dewar, being reinforced by Dost Mahomed's tribe and other people on bad terms with Alam Khan and Pur Dil, destroyed their fields, and a slight skirmish ensued, in which two or three were killed and wounded. Sirdar Abdul Rehman remained neutral and tried to convince the Dewar that harsh measures were not requisite, as the people to be arrested had fled. His Highness never informed me of what was going on until Imamdad had started; consequently when he sent this morning, Saturday, to tell me what had occurred and to ask my advice, I pointed out that his present act showed—

"He scarcely appreciated the efforts of the English Government to restore peace and quiet in his country," and that I could not therefore assist him with my advice.

Yesterday Friday I had all the Sarawan chiefs in my tent with Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed; a rough statement of accounts was given to them showing what had been realised, and that (60,000) sixty thousand Rupees would be required; before any settlement could be made with the merchants a capitation tax of one rupee on each person in Sarawan was suggested: this plan is under consideration.

With the view of adjusting claims against his Highness Sirdar Noordeen has been asked to agree to the latter chief's suggestion of mortgaging some of his land in Kutchi and authorising Nawab Mahomed Khan to raise Rupees (10,000) ten thousand on the lands mortgaged.

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

No. 883, dated Kurrachee, 9th September 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information. It has been learned by telegram from Jacobabad that Major Harrison had received the final instructions of the 7th August 1872,* which were forwarded to him, and was preparing to leave Khelat for Bagwana.

vide Commissioner's letter of same date, No. 785.

No. 101.

No. 2016P., dated Simla, 24th September 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department., with Governor General to Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

WITH reference to Captain Sandeman's letter to the Commissioner in Sind No. 707, dated 13th August, I am instructed to draw attention to paragraph 2 of my letter No. 1426P., dated 27th June, and to request that the report therein called for, with the views and recommendations of the Bombay Government, may be submitted as soon as possible.

No. 102.

No. 5620, dated Bombay Castle, the 27th September 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 4959 of the 20th August 1872, and previous correspondence, connected with the affairs of the Khelat State, I am directed to enclose, for submission to the Government of India, copy of further papers on the subject, received under endorsement from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 893, dated the 16th instant.

Enclosure 1 in No. 102.

No. 119, dated Khelat, the 29th August 1872.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to the Officiating Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 2004, dated 8th August, embodying a telegraphic message from the Commissioner in Sind, confirming previous instructions to withdraw from Khelat, should his Highness the Khan not agree to certain stipulations. This message was translated and forwarded with the letter that accompanied my diary, No. 28.

Having vainly endeavoured for weeks past to induce his Highness to accept the responsibility devolving on him by treaty with the British Government, as also to dismiss evil councillors, I felt further discussion was useless, and that the only thing to be done was to at once intimate my intention of withdrawing from his Highness' court.

His Highness' reply to my letter and the telegraphic message, was received on Tuesday morning, the 27th. From perusal of the same, it will be apparent that his Highness, whilst professing to value the support of the British Government, the Commissioner in Sind's kindness and advice, and the advantage derived from my presence, "still maintains the position he started with," viz., freedom from all responsibility as regards the Murree tribe, and a denial that evil councillors are admitted in his Durbar.

After intimating my intention to withdraw from his Highness' court, he at once adopted the suggestions that had been made "regarding Sirdar Noordeen and the Samalanees," though he had previously opposed the same, as reported in the first two paragraphs of diary No. 28.

On Tuesday evening, his Highness visited me, and stated that his conduct must have been misrepresented to induce the English Government to withdraw their support. He, therefore, hoped I would re-consider my decision about leaving Khelat. In consequence of this statement, I reminded his Highness that my withdrawal was not attributable to what may have been said or written; but that the Commissioner in Sind considered ignoring the claims of merchants plundered in his territory "breach of treaty," and was also of opinion that the government of his country suffered from the confidence he placed in three or four disreputable people. His Highness still adhered to what he had previously said and written regarding the Murree tribe; "and with reference to evil councillors," he said, "I, Shukur Khan and Moonshees "Saleh Mahomed and Gool Mahomed form one head, and if any attempt be made to "put these men out of office, my position as Khan would not be worth a day's "purchase." I at once pointed out to his Highness that this was tantamount to acknowledging "he was merely Khan in name, and that Messrs. Shukur Khan, Saleh "Mahomed, and Gool Mahomed, were actual rulers of his country;" to this I received the usual reply, viz.,—that they were good men, and to remove them without any fault would be unjust.

At this interview his Highness alluded to the treaty made at Jacobabad, and appealed to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed to prove that he had done all in his power to carry it out. The Wuzeer having solicited his Highness' forbearance in case what he said might be considered disrespectful, &c., "told the Khan plainly" that he had shown on every occasion that the arrangements were distasteful to him; had it been otherwise," he would have cordially co-operated, and everything would have been settled

long ere this. The faithful old Wuzeer begged his Highness not to recklessly throw away the support of the English Government, and pointed out how it was valued and appreciated by the Ameer's Government.

His Highness having ample time to consider his position, it would be weak to accept any compromise that might be made at the last moment, as little reliance could be placed on any such agreement; consequently I have ordered camels and intend leaving Khelat at an early date.

In conclusion, I would briefly allude to the character of the men who have got so much influence with his Highness the Khan.

Shukur Khan belongs to the caste Shaik, "converted Hindoos," resides at Mustoong, and was formerly in one of the Belooch battalions, but discharged for misconduct; since then he has been in his Highness' service, but had little or no influence in political matters until quite lately. The active part he has taken in late intrigues "is from ill-feeling" brought about by Shahgassee Golam Jan having reported his embezzling the men's pay and rations at Beylah. Saleh Mahomed and Gool Mahomed are also Shaiks, and natives of Bagh; they were formerly Moonshees under Wuzeer Mahomed Hussein, when, however, the latter's villainy was exposed by General Jacob. Nusseer Khan discovered that the above Moonshees were equally guilty, so had them severely beaten, fined, and imprisoned, and kept in confinement until his death. On the accession of Khodadad Khan to the Khanate, these Moonshees were released and taken on by Gangoo. On his removal from office, they were nominally under Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, but have gradually instituted themselves as the confidential advisers of his Highness in all matters, and have free access at all times to his private apartment.

No. 2319, dated Jacobabad, the 9th September 1872.

Endorsed by the Officiating Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

Submitted to the Commissioner in Sind.

Enclosure 2 in No. 102.

No. 892, dated Kurrachee, the 16th September 1872.

From Colonel W. L. Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, to the Officiating Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

In reference to your endorsement No. 2319, dated 9th instant, forwarding original report from Major Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat, I have the honour to inform you that that officer's proceedings, as detailed in his letter, are entirely approved, and I request you will be good enough to inform him accordingly.

2. As it appears to me from the reply given by his Highness the Khan of Khelat that he does not fully appreciate the gravity of the course that it has become necessary to follow, and that the withdrawal of Major Harrison from his court is really the breaking off of friendly relations between the British Government and that of Khelat, in consequence of the deliberate disregard by his Highness of his treaty engagements, and that the withdrawal to Baghwana or Kozdar only, may not be regarded by his Highness in the manner it was intended it should be, viz., that it involved the complete suspension of those friendly relations, I have, therefore, by telegram requested that you will forward, by express messenger, instructions to Major Harrison to come down the Moolla Pass and return to British territory with the least delay, intimating to his Highness the Khan of Khelat that such orders have been received in consequence of the position he continues to maintain.

3. The Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed may, if he desires it, accompany Major Harrison.

Enclosure 3 in No. 102.

Translation of a letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat, to the Political Agent, Khelat, dated the 22nd Jamadee-sanee, 1289.

AFTER SALUTATION,—I have received your letter, and am aware of its contents, viz. regarding the friendship that has existed between us, and receipt of a telegraphic message, confirming previous instructions, which necessitated your leaving Khelat. My friend, "this is true." Our friendship has existed for four years. I have always looked upon you as my elder brother, and am in no way to blame for the present misunderstanding. Your remaining in this country by God's blessing is of the greatest benefit, and you leaving it is far from wise. I regret one hundred times what you have written regarding your intended departure.

Your Government hold me responsible for returning the kafila property, or giving compensation for the same; but the Commissioner in Sind had, from kindly motives, assisted me, and was prepared to give further assistance, so that I might fulfil my treaty. My friend, I am fully prepared to carry out this treaty, and am acting by your good advice. By God's blessing, as long as I live, I will respect my treaty. The assistance given by the Commissioner in Sind was the act of a friend and of the greatest service to me. I appreciate the arrangements that have been brought about by God and the Commissioner in Sind, and will abide by the same, "as also what the Commissioner in "Sind wrote regarding future assistance."

On a former occasion, when replying to a letter of the Commissioner in Sind, I wrote regarding property plundered by the Murrees. My friend, you are aware that the Murrees are not under my control, and daily commit depredations; to give compensation would not be confined to the present raid, but to all occasions. This is quite out of the question, and how could it be expected from me. I did not refuse compensation, but I considered it unnecessary. The arrangements that were made for me by friends I approve of. The telegraphic message sent by the Commissioner in Sind to Colonel Mainwaring has been duly received through you. In it it is stated that merchants are to travel in safety through my country, and that if their property or compensation for the same is not given, Government will withdraw their annual subsidy of Rs. 50,000. You, my friend, know that it is my heart's wish that merchants should have safe transit through my country. The treaty by your assistance, with the Mazaranees and Samalanees was for the above object, viz. that on the latter compensating the former, half was to be given to the merchants. I am hopeful that the arrangements made with you by the Sarawans will be carried out in the course of a few days.

Rs. 50,000 have been granted by the English Government for years past. I am the slave of God, and hope by His blessing and friendly assistance that this annual grant will be doubled. It is true that the Commissioner in Sind gave me the greatest assistance in connexion with the Sarawan raid, so as to enable me to keep my treaty. He showed such kindness and friendship to me, that it was apparent to the whole world. I am hopeful that he will always treat me in the same way. I will abide by your Government's advice, and in so doing I shall preserve my reputation and respect. I have no other object in view, and will strive, heart and soul, to keep my treaty, and shall not fail. This treaty was executed some years ago, and is binding, and there are no evil-minded persons in my Durbar to recommend my disregarding the same; if there was such a man rest satisfied that I should remove him. My friend, you talk of going to Baghwana. Khelat and Baghwana are yours, but it would be better not to leave in displeasure.

My friend, I am obedient to your Government in every respect; how, therefore, could I allow you to be treated with disrespect, or sanction anything disrespectful by my ryots or sepoys? I swear to God that if any disrespect is shown the person guilty will not be screened, not even if he was my son, Mahomed Khan. My enemies are in Khelat, and out of devilry commit disturbances. You know this well, and knowing this, ought to show some consideration to me. If you are still bent upon going to Baghwana, every arrangement shall be made for you. If the Shahgassee goes, I would remind you that I have on several occasions spoken to you as to my willingness to reassure him, and it would be becoming on your part to induce him to return to his duties, as he will be treated as formerly with consideration and respect.

(True translation.)

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

No. 893, dated Kurrachee, the 16th September 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information, in reference to previous correspondence.

2. Notwithstanding pretended assurances to the contrary, his Highness the Khan seems determined to adhere to the unwise and unreasonable course he has lately adopted. Nothing remains, therefore, but to withdraw the Political Agent from Khelat until his Highness the Khan is prepared to give unquestionable assurance that he will abide by the terms of the treaty made with him.

No. 103.

No. 5653, dated Bombay Castle, the 28th September 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay in the Political Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of the letter from this Office, No. 5289, dated the 7th instant, I have the honour, by direction of his Excellency the Governor in Council, to forward for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying copy of a news report received from the Commissioner in Sind.

No. 905, dated 20th September 1854.

Enclosure in No. 103.

News Report ending the 16th September 1872.

No. 905, dated Kurrachee, the 20th September 1872.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay in the Political Department.

At Khelat matters were quiet. His Highness the Khan carried on the usual courtesies towards the Political Agent, but he still held back from acting up to the terms of the treaty between him and the British Government under which he was bound to cause restitution or compensation to be made to the merchants who had been plundered while passing through his country; as the early settlement of this question did not seem to sufficiently engage his Highness' attention, or to be likely to take place as matters stood, the Political Agent had instructions to withdraw from Khelat, and was about to do so. He had not left up to the 5th instant, but expected to be ready to move in a day or two.

2. The Chief of Toomp proceeded to Kedj lately to arrange with Naib Ali Jan for the annual payment of taxes, and Meer Hussein Khan has returned from Kussur-kund to Sirbag.

3. Fever of a mild form is prevalent in the town of Gwadur; the country is again perfectly quiet; the agriculturists are expecting an abundant harvest; wool and cotton are imported from Bahu and Dashtyari; the price of the former, however, has risen very high.

No. 104.

No. 5652, dated Bombay Castle, the 28th September 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay in the Political Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 5486, dated the 17th instant, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of endorsements from the Commissioner in Sind, as per margin, giving cover to the diary of the Political Agent, Khelat, for the weeks ending the 25th August and 3rd September 1872.

Nos. 901 and 906, dated respectively 18th and 21st September 1872.

Enclosure 1 in No. 104.

No. 28, dated Khelat, the 25th August 1872.

Diary by Political Agent, Khelat, for the Week ending 25th August 1872.

In diary No. 27, it was mentioned that Sirdar Noordeen wished to mortgage some of his land with the view of settling accounts with Syed Ahmed, merchant, "who was plundered at Kozdar." On Friday, 23rd, I again urged his Highness to give every assistance in the settlement of this business. I regret to say that his Highness would not take a sensible view of the case, said it was muskri—"nonsense," and that whenever Noordeen visited him, he considered the idea of paying Syed Ahmed a joke. On the other hand Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed state that Sirdar Noordeen is most anxious that Syed Ahmed's claims should be adjusted.

On Wednesday the 21st his Highness sent the Sumalanees and Muzaranee Murrees to my tent, requesting that the Shahgassee and myself would hear what both parties had to say, and devise some plan to settle their dispute. On Friday morning both parties agreed to the following terms, viz.: that the Sumalanees should give full compensation, "according to the scale sanctioned by the Great Nusseer Khan," for the six Murrees who were killed whilst defending their property. "Sher Dil's estimated loss was accepted," two rupees per sheep being given, and full value of donkeys and other property; money being a scarce commodity, payment was to be given in live stock, such as camels, donkeys, sheep, &c. the latter at the price agreed upon, and the two former on the Great Nusseer Khan's scale. After realising the full value, the Muzaranee Murrees agreed to give up one half for the benefit of merchants who had been plundered through their instrumentality. On Friday afternoon when his Highness visited me as usual Sumalanees and Murrees were present, and Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed clearly explained the above arrangement. His Highness gave a doubtful assent to this scheme, but on Sunday morning sent a message through my vakeel that the plan suggested was cutcha, "unsatisfactory," and could not be carried out. His Highness had attempted to settle this dispute, "but failing in doing so" had sent the parties concerned to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed and myself. As far as I can ascertain his Highness' intention is to have as many Sumalanees as he can. The Sumalanees, therefore, told my vakeel that they were being hardly treated, as they had been promised protection, if they did not implicate Naib Abdool Rehman.

The Sarawan chiefs have agreed to raise 20,000 rupees for the kafilas plundered by them, payable in two monthly instalments.

The Barochees of Shorawuk have written to his Highness stating they will not give up Poor Dil and Alum Khan, and trust that if their land and property is to be confiscated, the families of these chiefs may be allowed to proceed to Shorawuk. On the other hand, if his Highness is anxious to treat with them, five Barochees will at once proceed to Khelat and do their best to effect a reconciliation.

The Ruckshanees of Nushky, "Edul Khan, Shurif Khan, and other," write to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, that when his Highness had sent for Poor Dil and Alum Khan, they replied that they were then busy with their crops. "Every one was "satisfied when you Wuzeer Sahib wrote that they might remain until they had "finished putting down their seed." About midnight Alum Khan heard that there was a force coming to make him prisoner, he then fled to Shorawuk; at daylight a force composed of Jumaldinees, Mandanees, Harunees, Purazais, Sassulees, and others came to attack us, "so we sent Mulah Din Mahomed to intercede for us," with Naib Lushks and Imam Dad, and state that if not attacked we would make our salaam. Imam Dad then insisted upon our supplying him with provisions, occupied our houses, looted everything in them, and demanded that the members of eight families should give themselves up as prisoners. Notwithstanding our having agreed to this, he attacked us and being helpless we had to fight: "people were wounded on both sides," but words cannot explain what losses we have sustained by the plundering of our crops and property. On the 15th August we all leave for Khelat, to complain of the treatment we have received.

In connexion with the above, his Highness wrote to Imam Dad: I have heard from the macebearer all about your movements and those evil-disposed people you were sent against. These Rukshanees are my cultivators. I have written to Sirdar Abdool Rehman to send his brother with Alum Khan's brother and other people of influence to me; these men will be treated as they deserve; in future, don't interfere with them. I am of opinion that Alum Khan will come and make his salaam.

The substance of his Highness' letter to Sirdar Abdool Rehman was as above stated, with this addition, that his Highness' threatened to send a force to Nushky, if Alum Khan did not make his salaam.

Naib Ali Jan of Kedj writes to his Highness: When I went to visit Captain Miles at Gwadur, I left Yar Mahomed Sungur in charge of the fort at Kedj. During my absence Sirdar Bhai Khan tried threats and promises to induce Yar Mahomed to give up the fort, but he refused.

Ali Jan also writes: "Sirdar Faquir Mahomed is in constant communication with "the Mekran chiefs, inciting them to rebellion, and though I have done all I "can to conciliate, Sirdar Faquir Mahomed's letters have unsettled the people and "caused dissatisfaction; kindly, therefore, send me some sepoys and guns. Shah "Umer Gitchki, Meer Kumur, and Yar Mahomed Sunjas, may be relied upon. If "Bhai Khan's Sirdarship is taken from him, the rest of the chiefs will behave well; "to do this assistance would be required. The poorer classes are dissatisfied with the "above Sirdar."

Sirdar Faquir Mahomed has written to Sirdar Bhai Khan that the treaty between your Highness and the Sarawan chiefs has broken down, and hostilities would commence in a day or two. In a postscript to this letter, Sirdar Faquir Mahomed states that it was your Highness' intention to arrest and imprison Sirdars Noordeen and Moolla Mahomed, and that on Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed remonstrating with you, "you determined to make him prisoner;" but on hearing what your intentions were, they sought safety in Major Harrison's camp, "and that matters are now in a very "unsatisfactory state as far as you are concerned." I am, therefore, much perplexed on your account, so send me speedy intelligence.

Musah Khan, Naib of Sohrab, writes that Azaad Khan is shoeing his horses, and intends plundering Sohrab. The Naib requests that a detachment of infantry may be speedily sent for the protection of the place.

Telegraphic instructions from the Commissioner in Sind embodied in Political Superintendent's letter, No. 2004 of the 8th August, were duly received on Saturday the 24th. "Translation of the same," with forwarding letter, were sent to his Highness the Khan. Copy of the letter is annexed.

Mahomed Russak, a Belooch of the Mahomed Hussuni caste, writes to his High[illegible]ss that "though now in Seistan, owning to the enmity of the Minguls, he will [illegible]turn, if "he (the Khan) will take him into his service."

On Friday, the 23rd, his Highness received a letter from Naib Abdool Luteef of Quettah, in which he mentioned a rumour of the Russians having taken Balk. I told his Highness that I did not think this information reliable.

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent at Khelat.

Enclosure 2 in No. 104.

Translation of a letter from Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, dated Khelat, the 25th August 1872.

AFTER SALUTATION,—Taking into consideration the friendship that has existed between Your Highness and myself for nearly four years past, it is painful for me to inform you that previous instructions have been confirmed by a telegraphic message, and that I have now no other alternative except to arrange to leave this at an early date.

In the telegram it will be seen that Government hold you responsible either for the losses of the merchants or compensation for the same, and that the friendly efforts that have been made "and would have been made" in no way relieve you of this responsibility.

The stipulations by which the support of my Government would be continued were plainly set before you on a former occasion, and declined in your reply to the Commissioner in Sind.

Out of friendship I have waited most patiently, hoping that you would eventually carry out what had been advised by your well-tried friend, Sir William Merewether, but as you have shown no such inclination and evidently don't appreciate the efforts that have been made on your behalf, I must, as before stated, make arrangements to leave Khelat at an early date.

No. 901, dated Kurrachee, the 18th September 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information.

Enclosure 3 in No. 104.

No. 30, dated Khelat, the 3rd September 1872.

Diary by the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 3rd September 1872.

HIS HIGHNESS the Khan, after receiving my letter intimating my withdrawal from his court, professed himself willing to adopt the suggestions that had been made regarding the recovery of property plundered by Sirdar Noordeen and the Muzaranee Murrees. With reference to the former, Sirdar Noordeen gave a duly signed document to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, mortgaging certain land, proceeds of which would liquidate all claims against him in the course of six months. The Shahgassee on his part gave Syed Ahmed a letter, stating what terms had been agreed upon, and that the money, "a little over Rupees 17,000 would be forthcoming" in the time agreed upon. With reference to the Muzaranee question, his Highness took a bond duly executed by the Sumalanees, in which they agreed to compensate the Murrees in the manner described in last week's diary No. 29. I regret, however, to say that his Highness left re-employing the Muzaranees an open question, and was evidently inclined to entrust transit duties in the Bolan to the Sumalanees who raided the Muzaranees.

On the 27th ultimo Sirdar Nawab Khan, Dinarzai, Kachi, and Sher Dil, Muzaranee came to take leave of me. Having presented them with suitable khilluts, I told the two latter that whatever provocation they might receive, I looked to them not to retaliate on inoffensive merchants; at first Sher Dil said that if the transit dues were given to the Sumalanees he would do all in his power to obstruct them, eventually they agreed to respect my wishes regarding kafilas.

[redacted]ib Abdool Luteef in the early part of the week wrote that a kafila laden with wool had past down the Bolan in direct disobedience of his instructions; later in the week the above Naib reported the arrival of a Candahar kafila at Quettah, and solicited instructions whether an escort should be given by Hybut, Sumalanee, as the traders refused to go by any other route than the Bolan.

Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed having shown me the above letter, I pointed out that entrusting this kafila to the Sumalanees could end in their being attacked by the Muzaranees, and that it would be far better to insist upon the merchants proceeding *viâ* the Mulla, and in the event of their still refusing his Highness would be exonerated from all blame if he refused transit and badraki dues. His Highness' instructions to Naib Abdool Luteef were to point out to the merchants that the Bolan was unsafe, and that there were other routes very nearly as expeditious, *viz.*, *viâ* Lehdo or the Takare. Should, however, they insist upon going by the Bolan, he, the Naib, might employ Hybut Sumalanee

From the circumstances just narrated, it appears to me that his Highness has no intention of coercing or punishing the Sumalanees, and that he is foolishly imperilling the safety of merchants by placing them in charge of the very tribe who plundered and ruined the Muzaranee Murrees.

Naib Abdool Luteef writes to his Highness that he has no money, and that the detachment are dissatisfied not having been paid for four months. His Highness replied that the revenue of the district ought to cover the expenditure, but as arrangements in this world were unreliable, he (the Naib) was not to be anxious, for a hoondee would be sent to meet present requirements. The Naib mentioned that the Dumars had attacked the Lehrees and carried off some oxen. The latter had followed in pursuit, but could not overtake the former.

News regarding Afghanistan, as reported in Quettah, is as follows:

1st. Sirdar Yacoob Khan had treated Ahmed Khan, Meer Akhor, with disrespect, and fined him Rupees 15,000, in consequence of which treatment Ahmed Khan had proceeded to Cabul to complain to his Highness the Ameer.

Ahmed Khan, it is reported, states that Sirdar Yakoob Khan has again quarrelled with the Ameer, and has entered into arrangements with the Persian Government.

Sirdar Sohrab Khan, Dhoombkee, writes to his Highness—I have served you well, and can barely support myself on the income derived from my land, and certain privileges

that have always been held by family, *viz.*, a share of Government and Zemindar's grain $\frac{1}{3}$rd octroi duties, a share in transit dues, $\frac{1}{4}$th of money realised by fines, the inam lands of Togachee and Moradwah free from any restriction as to supplying grass, finally grazing fees. Your Highness' subordinates, by order of Nawab Mahomed Khan, prevent my realizing what I am justly entitled to. Kindly instruct Mahomed Khan that I am to have the same as my forefathers, and that he is to offer no further obstruction. My brother Malik Meeran, has, according to sunnud, Zemindar's rights over the villages of Kutbar, Nehal, and Khood Kasht. Although these sunnuds were shown to your Highness when in Kutchi, Mahomed Khan pretends to believe that I have not got them. I hope your Highness will afford redress to my brother and myself. We are both your servants.

(Signed) C. H. Harrison Major,
Political Agent at Khelat.

No. 906, dated Kurrachee, the 21st September 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information.

No. 105.

No. 5734, dated Bombay Castle, 2nd October 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with Governor-General.

IN continuation of my letter of the 28th ultimo, No. 5652, I am directed to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying copy of a memorandum from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 913, dated 26th idem, giving cover to the diary of the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending the 8th September 1872.

Enclosure in No. 105.

Diary No. 31, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 8th September 1872.

IN last week's diary, No. 30, paragraph 2, it was reported that his Highness had adopted Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed's suggestion with reference to the Samalanis and Mazaranis. At the time I had doubts as to his Highness' sincerity in this business not only from the fact that he was prepared to hand over charge of the Bolan to Hybat Khan Samalanee, but from his Highness having told me it was more than probable the Samalanees, who plundered Shere Dil, would escape from custody; with reference to the latter remark, I told his Highness such a thing could not occur if he was inclined to take ordinary precautions. Three days after this conversation the Samalanees were allowed to escape on their road back to Mustung with the exception of one decrepid old man.

In the early part of the week it was reported to me that Sirdar Azaad Khan had proceeded on a plundering expedition to Jalk. Letters from the above chief addressed to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and myself state that he is still at Kharan, but has made preparations to join the Afghan force in Seistan. Owing to present state of affairs at Khelat I have declined to answer letters written by Azaad Khan or any else, and strongly advised Moolla Mahomed not to have anything to say to the Kharan chief, as the latter is, I believe, only preparing to take advantage of any disturbances that may occur in this country.

A bania at Chagah wrote to one of his trade at Nushky stating that 1,500 Seistanis had started on a plundering expedition; the latter at once communicated with his agents at Khelat to send as much powder and lead as they could, for the above articles would command a high price.

On Saturday my Vakeel communicated certain suggestions made by his Highness in connexion with plundered merchants and evil counsellors. I sent my reply in

writing forwarding copy of the same with letter to Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

Having engaged camels for myself and escort I intend to march on Saturday, the 14th, *en route* to Baghwana.

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

No. 913, dated Kurrachee, 26th September 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information. Major Harrison's decision about Azaad Khan and his advice to Moolla Mahomed are most correct. It is to be regretted that the Seistanees do not abstain from plundering while the subject of the sovereignty of Seistan is under discussion.

No. 106.

Diary No. 32, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 15th September 1872.

DURING the past week I have been visited on several occasions by Darogah Atta Mahomed. On Wednesday afternoon he informed me that his Higness acknowledged his responsibility in connexion with merchants plundered in Khelat territory, and was willing to give them pecuniary assistance until their accounts could be adjusted. With reference to those merchants plundered by the Sarawans, examination of accounts showed that property and money, aggregating Rs. 19,647-12-0 had been realized, and the Darogah appeared to think that his Highness would advance sufficient money to make up the receipts to Rs. 50,000, *i.e.*, Rs. 29,527 annas 4. The Darogah was also of opinion that his Highness would advance Rs. 5,000 to Syed Ahmed on the mortgage papers granted by Sirdar Noordin.

His Highness was most anxious that I should hold the inquiry and award what advances I thought necessary: as this might have caused serious complications I declined all interference, stating that as ruler of the country in which the losses had occurred, his Highness was the proper person to undertake the duty.

On Thursday Darogah Atta Mahomed again visited me, reporting that his Highness the Khan had paid the merchants the sum above mentioned. Shortly afterwards the merchants visited me and appeared highly satisfied at the arrangement. His Highness adhering to his intention not to dismiss evil counsellors, I saw no necessity to cancel previous arrangements about leaving Khelat. On Friday his Highness visited me as usual, and showed no signs of yielding, as far as dismissing the Moonshees and Shukur Khan. On Saturday all our tents were struck and every arrangement made to march at 6 a.m. On the following morning at 5 p.m. I went to wish his Highness good-bye. All the people were dismissed with the exception of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Darogah Atta Mahomed, Faquir Mahomed, son of Naib Abdul Aziz, Abdul Ajan Patan and Vakil Dost Mahomed. His Highness the Khan having stated that his country and all that he had were at the disposal of my Government, and that he had no other desire except to conform to their wishes, Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Darogah Atta Mahomed, and Abdul Ajan asked him to support what he had said by at once dismissing the Moonshees and Shukur Khan. After about two hours his Highness agreed to dismiss these men, but hoped on further representation that my Government would allow him to reinstate them.

Next point was to induce me to defer our march and to persuade Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed to return to his duties. At first I steadily refused to alter my plans, stating that whatever evils and disasters might arise from my withdrawal, the Khan alone was to blame. At the end of an hour seeing that his Highness was thoroughly frightened and subdued, I so far yielded to the solicitations of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Darogah Atta Mahomed, and Abdul Ajan as to delay my departure for 24 hours. At 10 a.m. on the following morning his Highness came to inform me in person that the Moonshees and Shukur Khan had been dismissed from his service, and asked me to delay my departure until he could make arrangements to accompany me to Kutchee.

I agreed to wait 15 days provided the men above named were turned out of Khelat within 48 hours. Shukur Khan left for Mustung the same day, but I have not heard anything more regarding the Moonshees except that other men have been appointed in their place.

Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed has left my protection and returned to his duty and family.

Circumstances above narrated show that his Highness has at last yielded to good advice and adopted the course suggested by me on arrival at Khelat.

(Sd.) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

No. 2463, dated Jacobabad, 23rd September 1872.

Endorsed by Officiating Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

Submitted to the Commissioner in Sind.

Enclosure 1 in No. 106.

No. 127, dated Khelat, 16th September 1872.

From Political Agent, Khelat, to Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

IN acknowledging your letter No. 2251, of the 31st ultimo, and accompaniments, as also letter No. 4959, of the 20th August, by Secretary to Government, addressed to Commissioner in Sind, I have the honour to report that, prior to receipt of the same, his Highness the Khan had accepted the responsibility devolving on him "by Treaty" by giving the merchants plundered in his territory pecuniary assistance, with an assurance that he would do all in his power to recover the rest of their property. Late on Saturday night his Highness also consented to remove the Moonshees and Shukur Khan for a time only, as he hoped the Commissioner in Sind would sanction their being reinstated.

The correspondence above noted, as also 17th paragraph of Commissioner's letter No. 785, have been translated into Persian and forwarded to his Highness with a request that, after careful perusal of the same, he will give a written guarantee regarding the several subjects brought to his notice.

No. 2465, dated Jacobabad, 23rd September 1872.

Endorsed by Officiating Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

TRUE copy submitted to the Commissioner in Sind, in reference to his No. 852, dated 27th ultimo.

Enclosure 2 in No. 106.

No. 935, dated 2nd October 1872.

From Commissioner in Sind to Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

IN acknowledging the receipt of your endorsements Nos. 2463 and 2465 covering Major Harrison's diary up to the 15th September, and his letter No. 127 of the 16th idem, I have the honour to inform you that that officer's proceedings are entirely approved, and to request that you will convey to him my warmest thanks for the excellent judgment, firmness and cool determination he has shown throughout a period of no small difficulty and danger.

2. It is very satisfactory to learn that his Highness the Khan has at last been brought by Major Harrison's resolute and just bearing to adopt a more reasonable course, and it is to hoped that now his Highness' eyes are fairly opened to the dangerous position he was so ill-advisedly rushing into, that he will for the future more carefully adhere to that procedure with true regard for the interests of himself and country induced and always will induce the British officer at his Court to set before him.

3. His Highness the Khan has to a very great extent, if not entirely, conceded what was required of him, but at the same time I am still of opinion that without some distinct guarantee from him, the present arrangements will be liable to be broken through directly pressure of circumstances is removed. Indeed the remark made by the Khan that while he agreed to dismiss the Moonshees and Shukur Khan, he "hoped on further representation that Government would allow him to reinstate them," showed that he was not thoroughly earnest in his removal of them from his councils. I have the honour to request therefore that you will instruct Major Harrison to inform the Khan that any attempt to restore these men to their former position would be looked upon as a grave breach of faith and involve the immediate retirement of the Political Agent from the Court of his Highness, and further that before his present actions can be accepted with the cordiality and thorough faith which it is desirable they should be, the guarantee before mentioned should be frankly given by him, and if it is not that it will be necessary that Major Harrison should still act on his previous instructions, viz., to leave Khelat and retire within British territory.

4. Should his Highness act with the full candour that I trust he will, and show that he is sincerely earnest in the return to his old manner of procedure towards the British Government, it would I consider, be very desirable that he should accompany Major Harrison to Kutchee, and that officer should be instructed to inform his Highness that his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, Lord Northbrook, will be at Jacobabad on the 1st November, where if it was possible for his Highness the Khan to reach that place by that date, his Excellency the Viceroy would be pleased to receive him, and arrangements would be made accordingly. The communication however of this latter part must be left to the judgment of Major Harrison as depending on the state of affairs at the time these instructions reach him.

No. 937, dated Kurrachee, 2nd October 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, for information.

No. 107.

No. 5791, dated Bombay Castle, the 7th October 1872.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

ADVERTING to this Office No. 5620, dated 27th ultimo, regarding Khelat affairs, I am directed to transmit herewith, for submission to the Government of India, copy of a further correspondence on the subject, received from the Commissioner in Sind under his memorandum No. 923, dated 28th idem.

Enclosure 1 in No. 107.

No. 124, dated Khelat, the 9th September 1872.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat, to the Political Superintendent of Upper Sind Frontier.

HIS HIGHNESS the Khan having made certain suggestions to me through Vakeel Dost Muhammad, I thought it advisable to reply to the same in writing. From copy of my letter annexed you will perceive his Highness has professed himself willing to compensate the merchants, but declines to dismiss evil counsellors.

Taking into consideration his Highness' obstructiveness and insincerity during the past few months, as also circumstances connected with the Samalanees, reported in this week's diary, I felt no confidence could be placed in his Highness' offer to com-

pensate the merchants, and that the proposition was only made to induce me to defer my departure. In replying to his Highness' first and fifth suggestions, I have consulted the interests of merchants and given his Highness an opportunity "to regain "the esteem and confidence of our Government." Referring to first suggestion my Vakeel was instructed to point out to his Highness that sufficient time would elapse before our leaving Khelat to enable me to judge whether he was really anxious to compensate merchants and regain the good opinion of my Government.

His Highness' persistent refusal to dismiss evil counsellors convinces me that the thing to be done is to withdraw from his Court, and to give him an option of joining me at Baghwana in a month's time, provided matters are adjusted as required by our Government.

Enclosure 2 in No. 107.

Translation of a Letter from Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent at Khelat, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, dated Khelat, the 8th August 1872.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS,—Moli Dost Muhammad, "Vakeel," yesterday evening indicated to me what arrangements you were prepared to make in connexion with plundered merchants and dismissing evil counsellors:

1st.—That I should investigate the merchants' claims, after which your Highness would give money-compensation.

2nd.—You would dismiss the Moonshees in the course of a few days.

3rd.—To dismiss Shukur Khan would cause your Highness serious inconvenience, but that a written guarantee would be given, stating that in future he would be restricted to his legitimate duties, and have no voice in political matters.

4th.—That the Samalanee question could be easily settled.

5th.—Your Highness wished me to delay my departure for fifteen days, by which time everything would be settled, and you would accompany me to Kutchee.

Before replying to the above I will briefly allude to events that preceded present complications. In the autumn of last year a rebellion broke out in Mustung, which was quelled by your Wuzeer. Owing to his being wounded the rebels found their way down to Kutchee, and, being joined by other discontented people, created further disturbances, and insurrection became so contagious that Beylah and Mekran also rebelled. Nawab Muhammad Khan, who was sent by you to quell the disturbance in Kutchee, failed so completely that the British Government offered to intervene, and your Highness delegated your powers to the Commissioner in Sind and Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed; arrangements were then made calculated to restore peace and order in your country. On arriving at Khelat I did my utmost to induce your Highness to give the Commissioner in Sind arrangements your cordial support; but it was soon apparent that you had no such intention, and slighted any advice given. My Government, on being made aware of your feelings, wrote to you, through the Commissioner in Sind, pointing out your responsibilities to them and what was advisable.

Your reply to this was so unsatisfactory that a telegraphic message was forwarded, "translation of which was sent to your Highness." Your Highness' reply to this was merely a repetition of your former letter, in which you refused any reponsibility regarding the Murrees, and declined to dismiss evil counsellors. In the interval that elapsed between the writing of your letters I urged your Highness, as a friend, to do what was right, stating propositions made at the last moment would not be favourably received.

Yesterday morning, when you realised that I was actually going to leave Khelat, and disapproved of what had occurred, "by not accepting your annual gift of a horse," you sent my Vakeel with propositions previously noted.

Before remarking on these propositions, I will merely add that your arrangements regarding the Samalanees render me sceptical as to your sincerity in this matter, and that actions, not words, will be required to regain the esteem and confidence of my Government.

With reference to your first proposition, you have an opportunity of showing that you are really anxious to regain the good opinion of my Government. Merchants plundered by the Sarawans and Murrees are still at Khelat; and as you profess yourself willing to advance money, this business could be either settled at once, or

part-payment given, which would give the merchants a reasonable assurance that their claims were in a fair way towards adjustment. Sums so advanced would, of course, be ultimately recoverable from the Sarawans, Muzaranees, &c.

Your second proposition is that the Moonshees should be dismissed in the course of a few days. My opinion is that no object can be gained by keeping these men in your service for a single hour.

Referring to your third suggestion, Shukur Khan has undoubtedly done your Highness good service. Latterly, however, he has taken a very mischievous part in your Highness' administration, and has been guilty of gross disrespect to my Government, talking of my attacking my camp, encouraging his men to talk about turning Ghazees, and sending them to shout and yell close to our quarters at all hours of the night. If you value the friendship of the English Government you will not keep a man in your service who has been guilty of such disrespect.

In your 4th paragraph you say that the Samalanee question can be easily adjusted. I confess I do not understand your policy towards this tribe. Those who raided Shere Dil have been allowed to escape, and Hybat Khan, Samalanee, has been entrusted with transit of kafilas through the Bolan. This scarcely looks as if your Highness intended to coerce them into restoring the property of the Muzaranee Murrees.

Regarding your 5th paragraph, my arrangements to march have been made, and cannot be deferred without great inconvenience and expense. As Your Highness leads me to suppose that a speedy settlement of affairs is practicable, I will remain one month at Baghwana, by which time it will be apparent whether Your Highness is earnestly endeavouring to do what is right. If matters are adjusted as advised by my Government, you can join my camp and proceed with me to Kutchee. At the latter place you may possibly meet the Commissioner in Sind, and can then ask him to overlook your foolish conduct.

(True translation.)
(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent at Khelat.

No. 923, dated Kurrachee, the 28th September 1872.

Endorsed by the Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government. The quiet, determined, and firm attitude assumed by Major Harrison is most suitable to the existing state of affairs, and will, the Commissioner trusts, be fully approved of by his Excellency in Council.

No. 108.

No. 6054, dated Bombay Castle, 22nd October 1872.

From Secretary to Government, Bombay, to Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor General.

WITH reference to the papers ending with your letter No. 2016P., dated the 24th ultimo, I am directed to forward herewith, for submission to the Government of India, copy of a letter, with enclosures, from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 950 of the 5th instant, reporting on the question of the coercion of the Murree tribe on the frontier of the Dehra Ghazee Khan District.

Enclosure in No. 108.

No. 950, dated Kurrachee, 5th October 1872.

From Commissioner in Sind, to Governor and President in Council, Bombay.

IN accordance with the instructions conveyed in letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, No. 1426P., dated Simla, the 27th June last, I have the honour to submit in original Captain Sandeman's Report, dated 13th August, and received by me from the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, on the 2nd September, and to offer the following remarks.

2. The whole question of the position of the Murree and Boogtee tribes, in connexion with the Punjab and Sind borders and with the Khelat State, has been much mystified by the supposition that those tribes suffered undeservedly from unadjusted claims from grievances unredressed, and that they were a very ill-used body. In his present report, however, Captain Sandeman has correctly and judiciously abandoned this line, and draws attention "to the desires and hopes of the Murree tribe" (about whom he chiefly writes), adding,—"I do not call them grievances, for I do not think the chiefs desire them to be viewed as such." This gives the matter its proper and true bearing, simplifying the question greatly, so that it is fortunately unnecessary to go over old ground, or to refer at any length to what has passed.

3. Before remarking on what Captain Sandeman now adduces, I would in the first instance endeavour to put in as clear a light as possible the real aspect of affairs as they existed at the time alluded to in Mr. Secretary Aitchison's letter No. 1425 P. of the 27th June last. For a few years past the Khan of Khelat had entrusted the guardianship of the Bolan Pass transit to a section of the Muzzarani branch of the Murree tribe, they having established themselves as residents on the line of that pass, and being accordingly well placed to carry out that duty. This section had for some years before been quite separated from the other portions of the Murree tribe, and would have nothing to do with them. It was stated in former correspondence that the main portion of the Murrees felt hurt, because the section of the tribe was employed on the Bolan, and the whole did not share. This I always considered an entire mistake, and Captain Sandeman's present report goes to prove it so.

4. During the disturbances last cold season a portion of the main clan of the Murrees associated themselves with the followers of the rebellious Sirdars, and joined in that plunder of the kafilas which occurred in January. In April the Sumalani Minguls, Brahooees, for reasons which are not yet quite satisfactorily cleared up, attacked the Muzzarani Murrees at their camp near Bibi Nani in the Bolan Pass. In reprisal Sher Dil Muzzarani attacked not the Sumalanis, but an inoffensive kafila passing along the road. The Muzzaranis then retired from their old position near Bibi Nani to Khot Mundai, where the Bijarani Murrees reside, and getting assistance from them, as also from a certain number of the Kahan Murrees, who are immediately under the Sirdar Ghuzzun returned to the Bolan and plundered another kafila. From the above it will be seen that the Murrees generally had portions of the plunder taken from kafilas in January and April, and the Muzzaranis the whole from the first outrage in April.

5. I should have been very glad to have carried into effect the Mittunkote arrangements before I left the frontier last April, but after what had occurred in January I did not consider it right to do so. Afterwards, with reference to all that had passed I instructed Captain Sandeman to intimate to the Murree chiefs that I could not look on them with favour, or extend the consideration to them that would otherwise be accorded, unless the property plundered from kafilas, and which was in possession of the tribe, was immediately given up or its equivalent. I am not aware that it was ever said by me that the whole tribe was responsible for the Muzzarani section. I certainly did not intend to do so, for I have always held them to be entirely separate, and pointed out that it was very undesirable the Punjab officers should have anything to say to that section, as neither they nor the Murree Sirdar at Kahan had anything to do with it. Sher Dil Muzzarani was informed from me direct that he must surrender the property he and his people had plundered, and on his doing so the Khan of Khelat would be moved to redress the injury he and they had sustained at the hand of the Sumalani Minguls. According to my view of the case only those who possessed the plunder should be held responsible, the Kahan Murrees for their portion and no more, and unless they did deliver it up I consider it would be necessary to mark our sense of the misconduct by blockading that portion of the tribe, and suspending any payments made to them. It was of course a measure of precaution to prepare the Punjab frontier line for anything that might occur; but it did not seem to me likely the Murrees would proceed to the extremity of breaking with us. Our connexion is too valuable to them, and I therefore did not anticipate any breach of the peace on the Punjab Frontier in consequence of the measures, the proposed adoption of which I had considered necessary. The small raid by certain Loharani Murrees that did take place had nothing whatever to do with the question under review. It was merely part of an old blood feud.

6. I will now turn to Captain Sandeman's report. The statement of the Murree Chief Ghuzzun is very fair, and in the main correct. If the tribe is only considered to hold the position he describes and the course proposed by Captain Sandeman be

followed strictly, no difficulty will occur. It was never intended to make the whole tribe responsible for the safety of the Bolan Pass. But if any members of it join the Mùzzarani section, or whoever may commit outrages on that trade route, the chiefs of those so engaging will certainly be held answerable for the conduct of their followers. I should be glad to see the whole Murree tribe united under one head, and to think that Sirdar Ghuzzun had power over the Bezoranis and others. It will be my object to promote this in forthcoming arrangements. But I am afraid from the previous career of Ghuzzun and the history of these people it is not likely to be the case. We must then deal with as few heads as we can.

7. In former years when our troops were in Afghanistan, the Murree tribe, almost entirely footmen then, were confined as to plundering to their immediate neighbours, principally against the Boogtees, Khetrans, Pathans in the hills, and the district of Seebee in the western plains, with an occasional distant raid to the Bolan on one side or the Punjab on the other, but neither of these last were then frequent, owing to the great distances that had to be traversed. The Murrees themselves always date their taking to horsemanship from the capture of the British Artillery horses at the unfortunate affair of Nuffosk in August 1840. But even then they made but little use of these, because there were other tribes more powerful and more dashing in their forays than they were. The Dhoombkees and Jakranis were *the* celebrated border raiders in those days, having their places of gathering at Lehri, Phulaji, and Chatun, in Kutchee. They under the famous leaders, Bijar Khan, Dhoombkee, and Turk Ali, Jani, and Rahmut, Jakransis, used to plunder the whole of Kutchee as they pleased and often penetrated far into Sind. It was the sack of Kambar, near Lurkuna, in 1844 that roused Sir C. Napier's anger, called forth the famous hill campaign of 1844–45, and subsequent surrender of the Dhoombkees and Jakranis and their transport to Sind. These two warlike tribes being removed, the Boogtees then saw their way open to plunder in Sind and Kutchee, and continued to do so until the severe defeat and heavy loss they experienced on the 1st October 1847 broke the strength of the tribe and caused them to be more careful in future how they left their hills. At that time we were on very good terms with the Murrees; indeed, it was partly through information given by the chief of the Murrees, Deen Mahomed, that the punishment reached the Boogtees. From this time the Murrees may be said to have increased in power, and to have taken their position as prominent plunderers. There was no reason exactly why they should except the natural love of these wild people for a life of adventure, and that, being now strongest of all, they had it pretty much their own way. The younger, Nusseer Khan, at General Jacob's suggestion, endeavoured to bring them to a more orderly state of life, and established Government officials, both at Kahan and at Bubrack Dera, in the Boogtee Hills, but with little effect; the officials carried no authority with them. Had Nusseer Khan lived he would have conducted an expedition into the Murree Hills to punish that tribe for their misdeeds, but his death and subsequent disorders prevented the plan being carried out until the end of 1858, when the present Khan, at the earnest pressure of General Jacob, took the whole force of Sarawan and Jalawan into the Murree Hills, and brought them to subjection, taking with him to Khelat hostages for the future good behaviour of the tribe. After a short residence there the hostages, fancying themselves aggrieved by the behaviour of some of the officials towards them, fled from Khelat, got back to their hills, and the old state of affairs was revived. The endeavour was then made to keep them and the Boogtees quiet by the Khan paying them, but unfortunately just at that time the extra grant of a second half lakh of rupees that had been made to the Khan by our Government was withdrawn, in consequence of a raid made by the Murrees into the Punjab, and the Khan had to withhold his payment to the hill tribes. They have ventured, or it has been supposed so, to claim this subsidy as one of the rights withheld from them, but as it was paid to them to behave well they naturally and justly forfeited it on their misbehaving and plundering in British territory and other places.

8. Of late years, since communications have been opened with the Murrees from the Punjab side, and men from that clan as well as from the Boogtees have been taken into the pay of the British Government, those two tribes may be said to have behaved well and faithfully as regards their engagements on that side. But then this arrangement, while acting excellently for the Punjab, caused difficulties in the opposite direction, from the fact that we were paying and treating well portions of tribes, who were all the time misbehaving by deliberately plundering travellers on the roads and harrying the country of their Sovereign, and our ally the Khan of Khelat. The arrangement was doubtless a very good one for them. They got regular pay on one

side, and plunder at their pleasure on the other, on what they called their "shikar grounds," the plains of Kutchee, without being brought to task for it, the Khan being unable to do so. It was the unevenness of this arrangement, as well as the injury it really did the Murrees in encouraging them on one hand, though it was well known they were behaving most outrageously elsewhere, that led to the conference at Mittunkote, and the endeavour to introduce one uniform policy with the view of putting a stop to all plundering.

9. I should myself have preferred the bolder policy of telling these people we would not allow plundering in any form or anywhere, and if they attempted it they would lose our favour, and be attacked and destroyed whenever they engaged in any outrage, we at the same time giving such assistance to the Khan of Khelat as would enable him to act in a similar way in his country to protect the roads through and towns in Kutchee. This would have established peace for ever, but it would have, I believe, involved the necessity of extra military force (all armed militia within our boundary should be put a stop to) on the Punjab border. As the next best plan I advocated the entertainment of chiefs and bodies of Boogtees and Murree horsemen, who should be paid in the name of the Khan, and the Sirdars in return for such employment of their people made really to keep their tribes in order.

10. Captain Sandeman, in commencing on the second portion of his subject, enunciates in his 6th paragraph truths that are incontestible. There should most certainly be only one policy in dealing with these wild people, and one head to direct and be implicitly followed. It has been the absence of proper joint and unanimous action that has caused all the difficulties it is now intended to remedy.

11. Captain Sandeman's proposals appear to be two:—

1st. To clearly define the boundary line between the Punjab and Khelat; and 2nd to establish a post in the Shum Plain.

12. As regards the first, he does not seem to be exactly aware that the boundary line was laid down accurately after full inquiry, not at the time of the annexation of the Punjab, but in 1856 by then Captain, now Colonel, Graham, who was Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan and myself. The question of the lands to the westward of the Gehandari mountains was taken into consideration, and as it was found those lands had been long abandoned by the Gurchanies and others, who used at one time to graze their flocks there, and to advance the boundary into the plain beyond would give a line difficult to hold, it was decided that the plan generally adopted in most countries should be followed, and that was that the watershed of the highest ranges should be proclaimed the boundary line, and all British subjects should confine themselves to the localities to the eastward of that. General Jacob, who was then Political Superintendent on the frontier of Upper Sind, entirely concurred in this view; the Punjab Government, I believe, did so likewise, and it was finally approved by the Government of India. A straight line was drawn from the Sind and Khelat boundary, Tower and Sevee, 16 miles west of Kasmore, to the highest point of the Gehandari Mountain, and from that, as well as along the Murree Mountain, the watershed was fixed to mark the territorial limits.

The Muzzaris even put in a claim to the western slope of the Gehandari Hill.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

13. I would strongly recommend that this boundary arrangement should remain undisturbed. Gurchanies and all others who imagine they have any claims to lands beyond the frontier line, which they had abandoned because they could not hold them, should be told, as I think they ought to have been in the first instance, that they must elect either to be Kulab or British subjects, and confine themselves entirely to the land of their adoption. Some assistance from Government in the shape of improved means of irrigation to lands they may have in British territory would quite satisfy them, and make them forget all about the old places. There can be no question, but that these mixed possessions on a border side are a fruitful element of discord and disturbance, and they should always be done away with whenever this is possible. The country west of the Gehandari Mountains belonging to Khelat would be disposed of as the Khan thinks best, probably to the Murrees and Boogtees, who would then become the responsible holders up to the British boundary, and no British subjects being allowed to pass or have any claims beyond, there should be the less cause for perpetuation of old animosities.

14. There is, I know, a very strong desire on the part of the Belooch within our border to get back into the hills. The grazing and chance cultivation on the Shum and other plains there has a great charm for them, but it ought to be steadily discountenanced, and every encouragement given to those who are our subjects to settle

finally on the grounds they have within the border. Officers who have visited the hill tracts also think it would be well that something should be done to utilize such good land. I would most strongly deprecate any attempt on our part to interfere with these parts, leave them to be ultimately occupied, and used by the hill people themselves, when they choose to be at peace with one another. They would like very much that we should do the police work of the hills, and keep order while they cultivated in peace. But it is not, I hold, expedient that we should enter the hills for such a purpose only.

15. As regards a post in the Shum plain, there would be no difficulty whatever in establishing it as far as the Khan of Khelat is concerned. He would, I am sure, raise no objection. But the question is, is it advisable to advance a post not only within the hills, but with a high mountain between that post and its supports. In this respect the Shum post would differ considerably from the Siri post on the Sind Frontier. This latter is scarcely within the hills. It is on a hill torrent just within the lower range, and was established there, as Sir H. Green correctly observed, to command the Boogtees, that is, it is so far advanced that if any parties of Boogtees ever dared attempt to make a raid into Sind they must be cut off from return by means of this post. There is in advance of it a good-sized plain, "the Mubt plain," on which cavalry could act with advantage. In the rear of Siri there is nothing but open level country, and its communication with its supports at the outposts of Kasmore, Toj, and Sunree is unimpeded. The post of Hurrund more assimilates to that of Siri, and in the Shum plain would be akin to placing one from the Sind side in the valley of Dehra with the high hill, called the Zin, intervening between it and the other posts. I have never seen the pass which is stated to connect Hurrund with the site of the intended Shum post, but it should be made very easy, and quickly available at all times if such post is placed there. If the Punjab Government thinks it desirable to have this post I shall be very happy to assist in every way in getting it established.

16. The only thing I object to is the entertainment of any idea of advancing our present line of posts into the hilly country. I consider this would be a grave strategical error; we should be leaving an open country, where our cavalry can act with vigour and rapidity, and where they can with ease intercept any enemy who may dare to think of crossing that open space to attempt plundering in Sind, to coop that cavalry up in closed valleys where the robbers are quite at home, and where our horsemen would find themselves comparatively useless. Besides the Shum post then, if that is decided on, I would most certainly say no other should be taken inside the hills.

17. The map alluded to by Captain Sandeman was not forwarded with his letter, but the different frontier maps will show the places I have mentioned, and how the country lies.

18. Captain Sandeman's proposals only refer to the management of the hill tribes as respects the Punjab Frontier. But nothing done there will have any permanent good effect unless a similar system is followed on the Khelat side, and the Murrees and Boogtees are induced equally to abstain from harassing that country and the trade routes. This I hope to be able to effect by carrying out the arrangement proposed at Mittunkote, and afterwards sanctioned by the Government of India. These have been delayed hitherto first, because the sanction only reached me in December last, when serious disturbances were going on in Khelat territory, and it was not possible to do anything final until those disturbances were brought to a conclusion, and then when they were the action taken by a portion of the Murree tribe made it impossible to treat them with favour until they had made restitution of the property they had received as share of plunder from the kafilas. Captain Sandeman informed me by telegram that the Murree chiefs, apart from the Muzzaranis, had agreed to give up all of the property that could be collected, and equivalent in money for the remainder. This being done removes all impediment to the execution of the Mittunkote scheme, and during the ensuing cold season I purpose proceeding myself to Jacobabad, and there, in consultation with the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, the Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan, who will be requested to attend, and the Khelat authorities, to make the best arrangement with the sum of money that has been granted by Government to check these hill tribes from following longer their lawless and predatory habits, whether in the Punjab or in Khelat territory.

19. I have delayed submitting this report, because the state of affairs at Khelat was so very critical, and it was so uncertain whether our relations with that Government were to continue on the same friendly footing as before, that it was impossible to

state definitely what course could be pursued. His Highness the Khan having at last acted reasonably all complications appear now to be in a fair way to be adjusted, and there is nothing now to prevent any requisite arrangement being carried out in connexion with the Khelat authorities.

20. In conclusion I would beg to bring to your Excellency's notice the very great desirability that early sanction should be accorded to the expenditure asked for in the enlargement and extension of the "Maksudawah" from Kasmore through the Desser; this is a most important political work, as giving means for the employment and settlement of large numbers of the wild people, whom it is our best interest to reclaim from their lawless habits. I believe some technicality stops the scheme from being pushed forward. I would beg that this may be removed. It is not necessary that this canal should be constructed on the most scientific principles. It is only required as an inundation canal, to convey water during the rise of the Indus, and all that is needed is the sanction for the sum asked for to merely enlarge and extend what is now little more than a ditch, and to place masonry heads where required to prevent water being wasted. Unless early sanction is accorded another season will be lost, and I shall be deprived in the coming arrangements of the valuable assistance the certainty of this canal being ready next inundation would give me, and the power I should possess of holding out inducements of peaceful life to such of the robbers who would like to enter upon it.

No. 109.

Memorandum of a conversation held at a private interview between his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General and his Highness the Khan of Khelat, at Sukkur, on Tuesday, the 5th November 1872.

Present:

His Excellency the Viceroy.
His Highness the Khan of Khelat.
The Commissioner in Sind.
The Foreign Secretary.
The Private Secretary.
The Political Superintendent, Sind Frontier.
The Political Agent, Khelat, Interpreter.
Captain Henderson, *Attaché*, Foreign Department.

His Excellency the Viceroy commenced the conversation by observing that it afforded him much pleasure to have had the opportunity of meeting the Khan at so favourable a time after a settlement had been arrived at of the various disputes that had been distracting the Khelat State. The disturbed condition of the frontier had been to his Excellency a cause of anxiety, now fortunately removed.

His Excellency then informed the Khan that the proceedings of Major Harrison, the Political Agent, during the recent disturbances had been fully approved by the Government of India. Also that the Government reposed the most complete confidence in Sir W. Merewether, the Commissioner in Sind, to whose measures and policy they had given unqualified support.

Alluding next to the relations of the Khan with the British Government, and especially to recent events which had nearly led to the withdrawal of the British representative from Khelat under orders from the Commissioner in Sind, his Excellency remarked to the Khan that, though on that occasion the Commissioner had seen reason to modify his orders on observing the willingness of the Khan to adopt a more favourable policy, it was nevertheless incumbent on his Excellency to warn him that it was far from probable that the same consideration would be shown on a future occasion.

The British Government, his Excellency continued, had no other object in view than to secure entire freedom and security of trade through the Khan's dominions, and the attainment of this object would be equally advantageous to his Highness. While resolving scrupulously to observe the terms of the Treaty with Khelat, it was also incumbent on the British Government to insist that its provisions should be equally fulfilled by his Highness. The cessation of disturbances in Khelat would go far to facilitate this result, and his Excellency expressed a hope that the Khan, by a considerate and conciliatory course of conduct towards his chiefs, might be enabled in future to avoid all chance of a recurrence of similar disorders.

On this the Khan observed that the maintenance of order in his dominions was no easy matter. For the past three years there had been discussions between himself and

his chiefs, and actual hostilities which terminated in the advantage now of the one and now of the other party. To maintain order it was often necessary to resort to stern and harsh measures, without which it would be impossible to uphold his own authority.

To the above his Excellency replied, that there was no wish on the part of the British Government to interfere with his independent exercise of authority so long as peace was preserved on the frontier and Treaty engagements fulfilled. His Excellency recommended the Khan in all his difficulties to consult the British representative at his Court, who would be always ready either to assist him with his own advice, or in matters of great moment to obtain the opinion of his superior, the Commissioner in Sind, or of the British Goverment itself.

Being asked whether it was his wish to make any representations to his Excellency with regard to the subject of the conversation, the Khan commenced general protestations of loyalty towards the British Government, and professions of his anxiety to render that Government any service that it might be in his power to perform. He then asked for sanction to the reinstatement of his favourites,* owing to whose intrigues much of the recent complication was to be attributed, and whose dismissal had only very recently been secured. To this request his Excellency replied that to reverse the dismissal of these men at present would only have the effect of weakening the Khan's authority, and would afford encouragement to other evil-doers. Under these circumstances, therefore, it was quite impossible for the British Government to countenance their restoration, though at some future time, if events proved favourable it might be found possible to re-open the question. Notwithstanding the above refusal the Khan continued to press the matter of his favourites' restoration urging the insignificance of these men and the loss of dignity he would suffer if their dismissal was insisted on. His Excellency replied that it was impossible for him to reply to the Khan in any other sense than he had already done, and that the decision given would not be altered.

* Shukur Khan, late commanding his Highness' Troops.
Moonshee Saleh Mahomed.
Moonshee Gool Mahomed.

The interview then terminated with mutual interchange of civilities.

On the occasion of paying the return visit to the Khan on the following day, his Highness expressed his gratitude to his Excellency for the advice given him at the private interview. His Excellency thereupon observed that the substance of the conversation held at the private interview would be recorded, in order that both parties might have an opportunity of referring to it at some future time.

No. 110.

No. 6436, dated Bombay Castle, 6th November 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor General.

ADVERTING to previous correspondence regarding the affairs of Khelat, I am directed to transmit to you herewith, for submission to the Government of India, copy of a letter from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 969, dated 20th ultimo, giving cover to documents announcing a settlement of the difficulties in the administration of the affairs of that State.

Enclosure 1 in No. 110.

No. 969, dated Indus, 20th October 1872.

From Commissioner in Sind, to Governor and President in Council, Bombay.

IT is with great pleasure I have the honour to forward to your Excellency the accompanying documents, announcing, I trust, the commencement of the permanent settlement of the serious difficulties which have so unfortunately of late beset the administration of affairs under the Government of his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

2. The very successful issue that has now been gained, may most justly be attributed in the main, to the ability, cool judgment, and patient bearing of the Political Agent, Major Harrison, throughout a most difficult and dangerous crisis. His unchangeable firmness and calm courage could not fail to command respect and carried conviction at last. I trust his proceedings may receive your Excellency's high commendation.

In all that he has done, he has been most efficiently supported by the Wuzeer, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, whose patriotism and fidelity, often before commented on, has never been more prominently conspicuous than on this occasion. It is a matter of great gratification to find that the services of this able and devoted minister are still to be preserved to the Khelat Government, with, it is to be hoped, increased advantage.

Enclosure 2 in No. 110.

No. 132, dated Khelat, 1st October 1872.

From Political Agent, Khelat, to Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

In acknowledging your letters Nos. 2437 and 2394, with accompaniments, I have the honour to submit the following explanation for not withdrawing into British territory as directed.

2. Facts reported by me in my letter No. 127 of the 16th ultimo, diary No. 32, satisfied me that his Highness would soon realize how he had been misled, and that his regret for the past might be tested by full compliance with suggestion conveyed in the 17th paragraph of Commissioner's letter, No. 785.

3. Since the departure of Shukur Khan, Saleh Mahomed, and Gool Mahomed, people have spoken very plainly to his Highness, and shown him how seriously these men had compromised him by their words and actions.

4. On receipt of letters under reply I sent translations of the same to his Highness, stating that I only accepted the responsibility of not returning to British territory on one condition, viz., that he would give me a written guarantee that he would faithfully and truly carry out what was required of him by treaty, as also other matters that had been brought to his notice by the Government of Bombay and Commissioner in Sind. On Sunday morning I was favoured with the guarantee required, and send the same in original, as also his Highness' forwarding letter to my address. In conclusion, I would briefly state that my having been able to induce his Highness to adhere to his treaty and dismiss evil counsellors has given universal satisfaction. Merchants and traders were seriously alarmed at my intended withdrawal, as his Highness' sepoys had announced their intention of plundering the fort and deserting to their own country. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, are of opinion that his Highness will now honestly try to do what he has guaranteed; under these circumstances I hope my not withdrawing into British territory may be approved.

Enclosure 3 in No. 110.

Translation of Letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to Political Agent, Khelat.

Your friendly letter has reached me: perusal of the same has afforded me much pleasure. Translations of two letters have also been received, one from the Commissioner in Sind, the other from Colonel Mainwaring. You wrote that out of former friendship to me, you have not carried out the instructions you have received consequent on my having promised you a written guarantee, and that if I valued the friendship of the British Government, and regarded their advice, I should willingly give the guarantee required. I reply in a friendly spirit that in every respect I approve of the advice given to me by your Government and yourself, and agree to the same.

I now of my own free-will send you the guarantee required duly sealed. By the blessing of God everything is right, rest satisfied, and keep me informed of your welfare.

Enclosure 4 in No. 110.

Translation of an Agreement executed by his Highness the Khan of Khelat on the 25th Rajib 1829—29th September 1872.

I, Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat, give the following written guarantee:—

1st.—As regards property plundered from Pathan merchants at the latter end of December in the Bolan Pass and Dadar by the Sarawans, I am responsible for the

same according to treaty with the British Government; and to give confidence to the merchants, I, on the 19th September 1872, advanced them Rupees 30,000 from my treasury. I further undertake, on arrival in Kutchee, to do my utmost to recover the merchants' property or the equivalent, and hold myself responsible that their claims shall be equitably adjusted with as little delay as possible.

Case Muzzeranis versus Samalanis was inquired into by me in durbar, and the latter gave me a written agreement, but have broken the same. I, Khodadad Khan, faithfully and honestly undertake the responsibility resting on me by treaty as regards kafilas plundered by the Murrees in April and May last. Having heard that the British Government have recovered some of the property at Dehra Ghazee Khan any assistance or kindness that can be shown to me in settling this business will be gratefully acknowledged; after deducting what property may have been recovered I will exert myself to recover the remainder, or its equivalent. I will also do justice as regards the Muzzeranis and Samalanis, punishing the latter, awarding to the former what is just and right, and recovering from them what may be due to merchants. I hold myself responsible that their claims will be adjusted within a short period. I, Khodadad Khan, also advance Rupees 5,000 to Syed Ahmed, who was plundered by Sirdar Noordeen.

2nd:—Saleh Mahomed, Gool Mahomed, and Shukur Khan, "Sheikhs," owing to their intrigues and conspiracies have been discharged from my service out of deference to the wishes expressed by his Excellency the Governor in Council of Bombay and Sir W. L. Merewether, C.B., &c., Commissioner in Sind; and I now give this written agreement that they shall not be re-employed, either directly or indirectly, without the sanction and approval of the British Government. I further hold myself responsible that these men shall not openly or secretly take part in any intrigue, &c., &c.

3rd. Owing to intrigues and conspiracies by the aforesaid three men misunderstanding arose between Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed and myself. Through the intervention of the British Government we have been reconciled, after duly considering what was written on the subject by his Excellency the Governor of Bombay and the Commissioner in Sind. I approved of the advice given, presented the Shahgassee with a khillut, and reinstated him to his former position. I now give the following guarantee, viz., that so long as I live he shall be treated with the respect due to him as Wuzeer, shall occupy that position and have control over all affairs fiscal, political, and military, as he will I feel sure act in such a manner as to benefit my country. I further guarantee that during my lifetime neither I nor any one under my orders will cause any injury to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, or treat him with disrespect; should anything of the kind occur the British Government may hold me responsible.

I will exert myself to make such arrangements in the Bolan as will ensure the safe transit of merchant's property, &c. &c.

The disgrace of breaking a treaty rests on me if I fail in anything above written.

This guarantee has been given voluntarily and without pressure to Major Harrison.

Enclosure 5 in No. 110.

No. 970, dated Commissioner's Office, Indus, 20th October 1872.

From Commissioner in Sind, to Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

In acknowledging the receipt of the documents forwarded under your endorsement No. 2665 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to request that you will inform Major Harrison that he acted most judiciously in deferring strict compliance with my instructions to retire into British territory when he found that his Highness the Khan had really arrived at a just perception of the inappropriateness and danger of the course he was following under the evil advice of the bad counsellors he had so unhappily listened to of late. Major Harrison's proceedings as now reported are entirely approved, and I beg that you will convey to that officer my best thanks for the able and patient manner in which he has carried a most delicate and difficult crisis to so satisfactory a conclusion.

2. I have also the honour to forward herewith a letter addressed to his Highness the Khan to be forwarded to Major Harrison for delivery to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

Enclosure 6 in No. 110.

Translation of a Letter addressed by the Commissioner in Sind to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

IT is with extreme pleasure I have received from Major Harrison, the Political Agent, at your Highness' Court, intimation that your Highness has fully and sincerely decided on cordially acting up to the treaty engagements between yourself and Her Majesty's Government, and on removing finally from your side those evil counsellors who have of late been leading your Highness astray, and inducing you to act in a manner which could only meet with the marked disapproval of Her Majesty's Government. I sincerely trust that the change in your Highness' procedure, which has recently and so happily taken place, may be taken as a fair augury of the restoration of peace and happiness in your country on a sound and secure basis, and that it may be the commencement of increasing prosperity to your Highness, and to all the subjects of your dominions as well as of honour and renown to yourself.

His Excellency the Right Hon. Lord Northbrook, Viceroy and Governor General of India, is about to visit Jacobabad and will be there on the 1st November. He desires it may be so managed that he may have a meeting with you at that place. I trust, therefore, it may be convenient to your Highness to be at Jacobabad on the above-mentioned date; and I beg to invite you in his name to be present there.

No. 111.

No. 43C., dated on board the Steamer "Outram," Indus, 7th November 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with Governor General, to Commissioner in Sind.

I AM directed by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General to forward, for your information, copy of a memorandum of a conversation between his Excellency the Viceroy and his Highness the Khan of Khelat at a private interview which took place at Sukkur on the 5th instant.

A copy should be furnished to Major Harrison, Political Agent in Khelat, who should be instructed to make a careful translation of it for the information of his Highness the Khan.

No. 112.

No. 53 P., dated Kurrachee, 10th November 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with Governor General, to Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

WITH reference to the letter from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 969, dated 20th ultimo, to the address of his Excellency the Governor, announcing the termination of the recent complications in Khelat, I am directed to inform you that his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General fully approves of the settlement effected by Sir W. Merewether, to whom I am to request that the congratulations of his Excellency on the satisfactory solution of the recent difficulties may be communicated.

2. I am also to request that the commendations and thanks of the Government of India may be conveyed to Major Harrison for the judgment and determination displayed by him throughout the protracted negotiations that have taken place and amid times of considerable difficulty and danger.

3. A copy of this letter has been forwarded direct to the Commissioner in Sind.

No. 113.

No. 62 C.P., dated Camp Bombay, 21st November 1872.

Resolution—By the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Read again—

The correspondence ending with Foreign Department Resolution, No. 4603, dated 21st October 1871, relative to the future management of the Murree and Boogtee tribes.

Read also the following correspondence relating to the same subject :—

From Punjab Government, No. 34 S., dated 18th June 1872.
" " " 43 S., " 25th "
To " " 1425 P., dated 27th "
To Bombay Government, No. 1426 P., dated 27th "
From Punjab Government, No. 273 S., dated 11th September 1872.
From Bombay Government, No. 6054, dated 22nd October 1872.

OBSERVATIONS.—By the resolution quoted in the preamble sanction was conveyed to the expenditure of Rs. 32,040 for the entertainment of certain horsemen of the Murree and Boogtee tribes, with a view to the better maintenance of order on the portion of the Sind and Punjab Frontier which adjoins the Khelat State. This amount was sanctioned experimentally for one year only, and on the understanding that the question of the grant, connected as it is with the administration of the Sind and Punjab Frontiers, should be taken up shortly and discussed in all its bearings. Owing to the recent disturbances in Khelat, however, the arrangement sanctioned by Government could not be carried out.

2. In June last the Punjab Government forwarded copies of a correspondence that had passed between Captain Sandeman and the Commissioner in Sind, in the course of which the former officer alluded to certain grievances of the Murree tribe, which called for redress at the hands of the Khan of Khelat. Captain Sandeman was desired by the Government of India to state categorically what these grievances were, and what specific measure we would propose for remedying each and all of them. From his reply it appears that the Murrees have in reality no grievances, but desire only to be relieved from responsibility as regards the conduct of caravans through the Bolan Pass. His Excellency in Council is of opinion that Captain Sandeman has correctly appreciated the real position of the tribe, and the Commissioner in Sind has expressed his conviction that no difficulties are likely to arise if this position of the Murrees be admitted to that described by their chief himself.

3. While, however, denying the existence of any actual grievances, Captain Sandeman submitted two proposals for remedying what he considered to be the unfortunate position which the Murree tribe hold in regard to the British Government. These were—

1st.—That the boundary between the Punjab and Khelat should be clearly defined.
2nd.—That a post in advance of the present line of posts should be established on the Shum plain, beyond the British border.

4. With regard to the first of these proposals, it appears that the measure which Captain Sandeman advocates is not a definition but a rectification of the frontier, and that its object is to bring within British territory the whole of the Goorchanee, some of whom are now in Khelat and some in British territory. According to Sir W. Merewether, the tract occupied by the Goorchanees was advisedly excluded from the British possessions when the boundary was laid down in 1856, and he recommends that the arrangement then made should remain undisturbed, but that all those who have any claims to lands beyond the British frontier should be made to elect once for all to be subjects either of the Khan or of the British Government. With regard to these proposals, his Excellency in Council is of opinion that tribes situated within British territory, should in future be prohibited from occupying lands beyond the frontier, but that the *status quo* as regards tribes partly within and partly without the British boundary need not be disturbed.

5. As regards the proposed establishment of a post on the Shum plain, his Excellency is entirely opposed to any measure of the kind, and considers it needless to discuss the question after the adverse opinion expressed by the Secretary of State in his despatch No. 32, dated 24th March 1870, copies of which were forwarded to the Bombay and Punjab Governments.

nclusion his Excellency is of opinion that, as the disturbances in Khelat w to be satisfactorily settled, the time has arrived for carrying out the nts alluded to in the first paragraph of this resolution. But if there is to be chance of the measures being successful, it will be impossible to limit the nt to one year; the restriction upon the sanction to one year should therefore ed. His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General accordingly sanctions rly expenditure of Rupees 32,040, subject to revision of the scheme when tances and experience show such to be necessary.

r W. Merewether brings to notice the desirability of according sanction to an nditure applied for by him in the enlargement of the "Maksudawah" canal from more. It is understood that the project in question has been submitted to ernment in the Public Works Department, and a communication will accordingly addressed to that department, conveying the opinion of his Excellency that the ly execution of the project is highly desirable in a political point of view. It is the sh of his Excellency that authority may be given at a very early date to the ommissioner in Sind to make arrangements for the commencement of the work.

No. 114.

No. 83 of 1872.

Government of India, Foreign Department. Secret.

To His Grace the Duke of Argyll, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke, Fort William, the 20th December 1872.

In continuation of our despatch No. 44, dated the 24th of June 1872, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers* regarding Khelat affairs.

2. Your Grace has already been informed of the serious insurrection that broke out in Khelat early in the month of October 1871, and of the measures taken by the Commissioner in Sind, under our instructions, to bring about an amicable adjustment of the disputes between the Khan and his nobles which had culminated in this attempt to throw off the Khan's authority. The particulars of the settlement effected by Sir William Merewether, with our orders thereon, were reported in our despatch No. 44, dated the 24th of June last.

3. After their conference with Sir William Merewether at Jacobabad, the Sirdars proceeded to their homes for the purpose of fulfilling the engagements into which they had entered to restore the plundered property and return to their allegiance on the understanding that their estates would be restored to them. In consequence, however, of the circulation of a mischievous report, to the effect that the Naib of Mustoong had received instructions from his Highness the Khan to attack them, they became alarmed, dispersed without collecting the plundered property, and subsequently advanced the rumour of the intended attack on them as an excuse for not adhering to the promise they had given to make restitution to the merchants.

4. In the meantime difficulties had arisen on the Murree side. In the month of April last, Kuram Khan, Sumalanee, and Haibat Satakzai, chiefs of the Minguls, near Mustoong suddenly attacked and inflicted severe loss of life and property on a body of Muzzeranee Murrees owning allegiance to Sher Dil. Under the impression that this attack had been instigated by his Highness the Khan, Sher Dil retaliated by attacking and plundering a caravan on its way through the Bolan.

5. Affairs in Khelat again threatened to revert to a state of anarchy, and we found it necessary to remind the Khan that, under the treaty of 1854, we held him responsible for the safety of traffic, and to warn him that the payment of his subsidy of Rupees 50,000 would be suspended unless the property was recovered and compensation given for losses. Under the influence of evil advisers at his Court, however, the Khan at first refused to acknowledge his responsibility under the treaty for the doings of his subjects, and declined to compensate the merchants. His Highness, moreover, dismissed his faithful Minister, the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, and paid no attention to the friendly advice of our Agent, Major Harrison. Indeed his conduct became so unsatisfactory that we directed Major Harrison to return to British territory, unless there should be an immediate change in the policy and proceedings of the Khan. This threatened withdrawal of British support had the desired effect, and the Khan ultimately dismissed his evil advisers,

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* Nos. 65 to 113.

reinstated Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, and entered into a written agreeme[illegible] he promised to abide by his treaty engagement with the British Government a[illegible] compensation to the merchants.

6. During his recent tour the Viceroy met the Khan of Khelat and so[illegible] principal Sirdars at Sukkur on the Indus. A memorandum of what passed at [illegible] view accompanies this despatch. We are not without hope that the meeting bet[illegible] Excellency and the Khan will be productive of good, and contribute towa[illegible] permanence of the arrangements which have been brought about by the good ju[illegible] and firmness of Sir William Merewether and Major Harrison.

7. Your Grace will observe that we have now sanctioned the arrangements fo[illegible] entertainment of some Murree and Boogtee levies on the Sind and Dera Ghazee I[illegible] frontier which were approved of last year, but were held in abeyance in consequenc[illegible] the recent disturbances in Khelat.

We have, &c.
(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.

No. 115

No. 2432P., dated Fort William, 28th December 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

In the course of the voluminous correspondence regarding the recent disturbances in Khelat, the inconvenience and injury to the public interests which arose from the different views of policy entertained by the Commissioner in Sind and the Political Agent in Khelat on the one hand, and by Colonel Phayre, Political Superintendent of the Sind Frontier, on the other, were the subject of frequent representations by the Government of Bombay to the Government of India. I am to refer you more especially to the telegram of his Excellency the Governor of 18th March 1872, and the Viceroy's reply of the same date. So serious were the embarrassments arising from this state of things that the Governor-General in Council authorised the Government of Bombay to remove Colonel Phayre from Jacobabad on leave, and by recall, if he should refuse leave. Colonel Phayre accordingly proceeded on leave on 20th March 1872, and it is understood by his Excellency the Governor-General in Council that he has now returned to India.

2. The views of Sir William Merewether as to the policy to be pursued in the conduct of the political relations with Khelat have met with the full approval of the Government of Bombay and also of the Government of India in the letters noted in the margin. Moreover his Excellency the Viceroy, at the interview which he had with the Khan at Sukkur, informed his Highness that Sir William Merewether possessed the entire confidence of his Excellency, and that his proceedings were approved and confirmed by the Government of India.

No. 1214P., dated 30th May 1872.
No. 1893P., dated 5th September 1872.
No. 53C.P., dated 10th November 1872.

3. Under these circumstances, and bearing in mind the very serious embarrassments already caused by the conflict of policy between Colonel Phayre and the Commissioner in Sind, and the fact that the Khan of Khelat and his Sirdars, who were recently in rebellion, are fully aware of the differences of opinion and action which led to those evil results, and which are believed to have contributed considerably to the difficulties in the way of a satisfactory settlement of the disputes between the Khan and his Sirdars, his Excellency in Council is of opinion that it is not advisable in the interests of the public service that Colonel Phayre should resume the Office of Political Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier.

4. His Excellency the Governor-General in Council accordingly requests that Colonel Phayre may be provided with employment in some other suitable post under the Bombay Government, or, if such be not available, that his Excellency the Governor of Bombay in Council will place that officer's services at the disposal of the Military Department.

5. I am to add that his Excellency the Governor-General in Council has come to the

above determination with no wish to make any unfavourable reflections upon Colonel Phayre, and without reference to a correspondence which has taken place with regard to certain alleged frauds at Jacobabad, but solely from the considerations already stated, and a conviction that is impossible satisfactorily to conduct political relations with Khelat through an officer whose views of policy and action are much at variance with those of his immediate superiors and of the Government of India.

No. 116.

No 2 of 1873.

Government of India, Foreign Department, Secret.

To his Grace the Duke of Argyll, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke, Fort William, the 3rd January 1873.

With reference to the correspondence on Khelat affairs ending with our despatch No. 83 dated the 20th of December 1872, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the letter* noted on the margin, directing, for the reasons therein stated, the removal of Colonel R. Phayre from the post of Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

To Bombay Government, No. 2432P., dated 28th December 1872.

We have, &c.,

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
" R. TEMPLE.
" B. H. ELLIS.
" H. W. NORMAN.
" A. HOBHOUSE.
" E. C. BAYLEY.

No. 117.

Secret Despatch to India. (Extract.)

Dated 21st March (No. 1) 1873.

1. I have had before me the papers received as enclosures to the letters of your Government of the dates and numbers noted on the margin, regarding recent occurrences in Khelat.

Political:—(185), 31st October 1871.
Secret letter from India (5), 24th January 1872.
" (44), 24th June 1872.
" (83), 20th December 1872.
" (2), 3rd January 1873.

2. I have perused these papers with the attention due to their importance, and am constrained to observe that the impression left on my mind is, that Khelat affairs cannot as yet be regarded as permanently placed on a sure foundation.

3. Until you shall have had time maturely to consider the matter in the light of subsequent events, I do not think it advisable to do more than to invite your serious attention to it, and to request that I may be informed of the result of your deliberations on the affairs of Khelat, and the Sind frontier generally.

* * * * * * *

(Signed) Argyll.

No. 118.

No. 6395, dated Bombay Castle, 5th November 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of this Office No. 5906, dated 12th ultimo, I am directed to forward herewith, for submission to the Government of India, copy of the diary of the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 23rd September last, received through the Commissioner in Sind under his endorsement No. 965, dated 19th October 1872.

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* No. 115.

Enclosure in No. 118.

Diary by Political Agent, Khelat, for week ending 23rd September 1872.

With his Highness the Khan's consent Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed wrote as follows to Sirdar Azaad Khan :—

You have written to me regarding making arrangements for you. I have represented the matter to his Highness, and now inform you that the subject cannot be discussed without your being present.

His Highness the Khan and Major Harrison will shortly leave for Kutchee, and it would be a good thing for you to meet them at Sohrab; if time will not permit, you had better defer the visit until their return to Khorasan. Rest satisfied and write to me of your welfare.

With his Highness' approval I wrote to Sirdar Azaad Khan that owing to recent complications I had not thought it advisable to answer his letter; if, however, he was anxious to make Anjani or Treaty, a favourable opportunity would occur of visiting his Highness at Sohrab when *en route* to Kutchee, or on his return to Khelat.

Sirdar Moolla Mahomed also wrote to Sirdar Azaad Khan stating that recent misunderstandings had been settled, and his Highness the Khan, Major Harrison, and Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed were on good terms, and that if he, Azaad Khan, had anything to settle, or request to make, he had better meet his Highness at Sohrab. Other circumstances he would learn from Major Harrison and Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed's letters.

Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed informs me that the following arrangements will in all probability be adopted by his Highness in connexion with the provinces of Mekran and Lus Beyla. With reference to the former, Sirdar Faquir Mahomed, Bezonjao, to return to Kedj, and Naib Ali Jan transferred to Punchgoor; and as regards the latter province, Ali Khan, Jamote, is to be told, through Sirdar Noordeen, that he has the option of withdrawing quietly to make way for his Highness' representative, or a force will be sent to compel him to do so. As the presence of regular troops may cause dissatisfaction, it is under contemplation to place this Province in charge of the Bezonjaos.

His Highness the Khan, at the request of Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, has reinstated Darogah Atta Mahomed as Naib of Khelat and Gundava.

Naib Abdul Rahman writes that the Samalanis have sought safety in Shorawak and amongst the Kakars, and that it will be difficult to recapture them. He had, however, sent Kutab Khan, Satakzai, to the Kakars to induce them to break their treaty with the Samalanis.

Sirdar Sarfaraz Khan, Sanjrani, of Chaga, writes to his Highness the Khan :—

You are the master of my life and property. The Seistanis night and day devastate the whole country. My districts are dependent on rain for cultivation. By your prosperity I remain here. The Seistanis plunder Shorawak, Nushky, and Kharan, and I get the credit of having done it—1st, food is not procurable in my country; 2nd, the Seistanis also plunder me; 3rd, I am falsely acccused by the Barichis, Mingul, and others of inciting the Seistanis to plunder them. If your Highness will kindly give me food, I shall remain contented; if you do not, show me this kindness—please protect me from the accusations and enmity of the above people, I shall then be able to remain in my country. If any one accuses me of any fault in your Durbar, don't believe them. Whenever the Seistanis are on a plundering expedition I give timely information to the Minguls at Nushky; they therefore falsely accuse me. Kindly write to the people at Shorawak and the Barichis to abstain from all hostilities against me. Being helpless I was obliged to make my salams to the Persians. I would come and make my salam to you; but the Seistanis and Persians never cease plundering and raiding my country. I have sent my two sons, Mahomed Shah and Pussand, to visit you and perform any service that may be required of them either in Khelat or Kutchee.

Meer Pussand, Amirzai, who lives at Bandarana Hussinabad, instigates the Seistanis to attack Nushky and then puts the blame on me. Inquire from the Tokeys, of Chaga, and those who live in the hills, as also from Imam Khan and Kamal Khan, of Rodbar, whether I am to blame in any way, and if they say anything against me, do what you think advisable. With your friendship I am not afraid of the Seistanis. Dated 3rd Rujub=7th September.

It being the general wish of the Sirdars and other people of influence that his Highness' reconciliation to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed should be publicly notified by the presentation of a suitable khillut, I suggested this course to his Highness which he at once adopted. On Thursday evening I attended the Khan's Durbar with Captain Humfrey and Dr. Bowman; and in presence of a large assembly his Highness presented

Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed with the usual Wuzeer's khillut, consisting of one horse with handsome silver bridle and trappings, Cashmere shawl, kinkab kambarband, embroidered lungi, and gold mounted dagger.

Shukur Khan is at Mustung, but the Moonshees have not yet left Khelat. When visiting his Highness on Tuesday next, I intended reminding him that delaying my departure was on the express stipulation that these men should at once leave for Bagh. I also intend to urge his Highness to give me the written guarantee, to which allusion was made in my letter No. 127 of the 16th September.

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
23rd September 1872. Political Agent, Khelat.

No. 965, dated Indus, 19th October 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copy submitted to Government.

No. 119.

No. 6868, dated Bombay Castle, 23rd November 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of this Office No. 6395, dated the 5th instant, I am directed to transmit herewith, for submission to the Government of India, copies of the further diaries, marginally noted, from the Political Agent, Khelat, received through the Commissioner in Sind.

Diary for the week ending 29th September 1872.
" " " 5th October "
" " " 15th " "

Enclosure 1 in No. 119.

Diary, No. 34 of 1872, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 29th September 1872.

THE sons of the Chaga Chief, Sarfaraz Khan, Mahomed Shah and Meah Pussand, visited me on Saturday, the 28th, and handed me over a letter from their father, substance of which was, that he was a servant of the English Government and his Highness the Khan, and as the whole of Seistan was under Persian rule, he trusted that protection would be granted to him against Persian oppression.

2. Sirdar Alum Khan, Sakshani, and Pur Dil Khan, Mingul, residents of Nushky, left Shorawak on receipt of a letter from Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, and are now at Khelat. Sirdar Abdul Rahman, Zaggar Mingul, accompanied them, and there is every prospect of affairs being quietly settled at Nushky.

3. Sirdar Abdul Rahman and Pur Dil Khan paid me a friendly visit.

4. Daroga Attah Mahomed has appointed Shafi Mahomed, Mingul, Janeshin of Gundava.

5. Sirdar Azaad Khan writes to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed that his Highness' Naib had attacked Gaorjak in the Rakshani District, carried off all the dates, five flocks of goats, ready money, and other property, and killed a connection of his, Dost Mahomed.

6. Azaad Khan states that having confidence in the English Government and respecting Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's wishes, he has remained quiet at Kharan, and therefore hopes efforts will be made to induce his Highness the Khan to cause the above property to be returned or compensation given for the same.

7. The Naib of Dadar writes, a sepoy of Your Highness, Rahim Dad, met the Samalani Minguls at Seriab and Mach, where they had taken up positions; they told him they were in rebellion against your Highness.

8. On Wednesday, the 26th, Moonshees Saleh Mahomed and Gul Mahomed left Khelat for Kutchee,

9. His Highness has nearly concluded his marching arrangements and will probably start on the 4th or 5th proximo.

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

Enclosure 2 in No. 119.

Diary No. 35 of 1872, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 5th October 1872.

WITH the view of making arrangement for safe transit in the Bolan, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed wrote to Sirdar Nawab Khan, Dinarzai, to bring Shere Dil, Mazarani, with him to Khelat, Some days previous to the receipt of this letter Shere Dil had proceeded to the Tudri hills near Kahim, consequent on the delay that would have ensued in summoning him, Nawab Khan and the Shahgassee recommended his Highness to entrust these duties for a time to Kutab Khan, Satakzai Koord, a great friend of Shere Dil's. This his Highness agreed to, and it is hoped that on reaching Kutchee arrangements may be made to induce the Mazaranis and Koords to take joint charge of the Bolan. "To afford further security to merchants" Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed has persuaded his Highness to restore to the Dunimars and Kakars a small annual allowance of money and grain that had been discontinued for some years. Abdul Latiff, the Naib of Quettah, now at Khelat, has done his utmost to thwart these arrangements; both he and the Mustung Naib, Abdul Rahman, are annoyed with his Highness for dismissing Shukur Khan and the Moonshees, and threaten to resign their appointments; having been asked my advice by Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, I told him that he was at liberty to tell his Highness that in my opinion accepting their resignation would benefit him and all his subjects.

Naib Ali Jan complains that disaffection is kept up in Mekran by Sirdar Bhai Khan's wife, a daughter of Sirdar Faquir Mahomed; arrangements alluded to in diary No. 33 will doubtless put an end to these complications.

Sirdar Khan Mahomed, Kambrani, has been reappointed his Highness' Naib at Punchgoor.

Darogah Atta Mahomed and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed are cordially assisting Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, and nothing is wanting to ensure success except his Highness' honest and sincere support. Since the departure of those who biassed his Highness with their evil counsels, he has acted more sensibly, and would, I feel sure, have cordially accepted present arrangements had it not been for the unfortunate presence of the Naibs of Mustung and Quettah; as it is, he has given a written guarantee binding himself to carry out his treaty arrangements, and to adopt the advice given him by the Government of Bombay through the Commissioner in Sind. His Highness' intention of going to Kutchee, being a sudden resolve, some difficulty has occurred in procuring carriage. All necessary arrangements will be concluded in the course of three or four days.

Sirdar Azaad Khan has written to say that he cannot visit his Highness at Sohrab without his Highness the Ameer's permission, and that no necessity exists for such visit unless his Highness restores his stores and country.

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

Memo. No. 987, dated Indus, 8th November 1872.

WITH reference to paragraph 1 of the Khelat Diary for the week ending 29th September 1872, the Political Superindent, Upper Sind Frontier, is requested to inform the Chaga Chief, Sarfaraz Khan, through the Political Agent, Khelat, that if he wishes for safety and immunity from attack, he should prevent his people from proceeding to plunder in Persian territory, as has lately been the case.

2. Major Harrison should be called upon to report whether there is any truth in the statement made by Sirdar Azaad Khan, referred to in paragraph 5, that his Highness' Naib had attacked Gaorjak in the Rakshani District and carried off plunder therefrom.

3. Further report is awaited in regard to the Samalani Minguls at Seriab and Mach, mentioned in paragraph 7.

(Signed) W. L. MEREWETHER, Col.,
Commissioner in Sind.

Enclosure 3 in No. 119.

Diary No. 36, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 15th October 1872.

LEFT Khelat with his Highness the Khan on the 7th, reached Sohrab on the 9th, "halted one day," arrived at Pifseebent on the 13th, and calculate upon reaching Gundava about the 24th.

Fifteen hundred Murrees attacked the Brahooee tribes of Umrenis, Hafsoonis, and Lehris *en route* to Kutchee, at the bottom of the Bolan Pass, at a place called Choki. Thirty Brahooees and six Murrees were killed, and the former plundered of all their property except two camels and two flocks of sheep.

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Pashtkhana, the 15th October 1872. Political Agent, Khelat.

No. 984, dated 8th November 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner at Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information.

2. This is an instance of how very uncertain the Murrees are to deal with, and how necessary it is that they should have firm control exercised over them, considering that the question of their previous misconduct being condoned is now under consideration, their present action is most impertinent.

No. 120.

No. 8012, dated Bombay Castle, 6th December 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN continuation of my No. 6868, dated the 23rd ultimo, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying Diaries of the Political Agent, Khelat, for the weeks ending 21st and 29th October last, received through the Commissioner in Sind under his endorsement No. 1037, dated 27th ultimo.

Enclosure 1 in No. 120.

Dated Paniwan, 21st October 1872.

Diary No. 37 of 1872, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 21st October 1872.

THE only event of the week was Sirdar Faquir Mahomed Bezonjao having joined his Highness' camp with his eldest son, Meah Kaira, a halt was made at Pashtkhana and Jah, with the view of making arrangements regarding Kedj and Mekran. On the evening of the 20th it was reported to me that Sirdar Faquir Mahomed had agreed to resume his duties as Naib of Kedj. On the morning of the 21st his Highness presented the Sirdar and his son with suitable khilluts, and I also gave the former a kinkab and embroidered lungi. Sirdar Faquir Mahomed will shortly start for Mekran.

Consequent on my having sent his Highness the Khan a Persian translation of the Commissioner in Sind's letter, No. 933, he has written to say that Shukur Khan and Moonshees Saleh Mahomed and Gul Mahomed will be handed over to the British Government to live in English territory.

His Highness the Khan will arrive at Gundava, on the 25th instant.

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

Enclosure 2 in No. 120.

Dated Kimda, 29th October 1872.

Diary No. 38 of 1872, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 29th October 1872.

SHUKUR KHAN late Commandant of his Highness' regiments, and one of the most active in late disturbances in Khelat, has sought safety in Afghan territory, and was last seen at Sher Khod. Should he be allowed to remain at Peshin or Candahar he will be engaged in intrigues and give endless trouble. I would therefore suggest that his Highness the Ameer might be asked to deport him into British territory.

Moonshees Saleh Mahomed and Gul Mahomed are now in Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed's charge, and accompany his Highness to Jacobabad. His Highness having asked me whether the above Moonshees might be allowed to visit him, I pointed out that such a course would be inconsistent, and communication with them far from desirable.

Shere Dil, Mazarani, aided by other Murrees, waylaid certain Brahooees *en route* to Kutchi, as reported in a previous diary. The Brahooees have assembled a force of 500 to retaliate, but have consented to defer their movements until after his Highness' return from Jacobabad.

No. 1037, dated Kurrachee, 27th November 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government, with reference to Commissioner's No. 1036, dated 27th November 1872.

No. 121.

No. 8153, dated Bombay Castle, 12th December 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN continuation of the letter from this Office, No. 8102, dated the 6th instant, I have the honour, by direction of his Excellency the Governor in Council, to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying diary of the Political Agent at Khelat for the week ending 19th ultimo, received through the Commissioner in Sind under his endorsement No. 1058, dated 2nd December.

Enclosure in No. 121.

Dated Gundava, 19th November 1872.

Diary, No. 39 of 1872, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 19th November 1872.

ON the morning of the 11th, at Mahmul, Sirdar Sohrab Khan, Dhoombkee, informed me that during his absence from Lehri certain Dhoombkees, Boogtees, and Khybaris had proceeded against Fateh Khan, Boogtee, and Beluch Khan, Shirani Murree, both of whom had quarrelled with respective Sirdars of their tribe, Guzzun and Gulam Murteza, and carried off some sheep belonging to the Shiranis; no loss of life ensued on either side. Sirdar Sohrab Khan also stated that he had been asked by Gulam Murteza to attack Fateh Khan and Beluch Khan, but had declined to do so until he had ascertained the wishes of his Highness the Khan on the subject.

In diary No. 38 it was reported that the Brahooees had assembled with the view of retaliating on Shere Dil and the Murrees for having attacked and plundered them as they were *en route* to Kutchee, but had consented to defer their movements until his Highness' return from Jacobabad; instead of so doing they proceeded to Mundai. The Murrees hearing of this movement had driven the major part of their flocks further into the hills, and collected a force to oppose the Brahooees; a fight ensued, in which the Murrees were defeated, and 30 or 40 of their number killed. The Brahooees plundered about 200 sheep, a few bullocks and camels, and fifty mares; amongst the latter were several mares that had been plundered from the Brahooees.

His Highness the Khan is going to station two companies of infantry at Lehri. A strong detachment is also to be stationed at Kirta, in the Bolan, for the protection of kafilas.

His Highness the Khan re-entered Gundava on the 15th, and talks of going to Bagh after the Ramzan.

(Signed) C. H. Harrison, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

No. 1058, dated 2nd December 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government.

2. The Political Superintendent will be instructed to call the attention of his Highness the Khan, through the Political Agent, to the disturbances described in this diary, and to point out to his Highness that as he now has leisure, and is in Kutchee, it is very desirable that he should make arrangements under which these unseemly quarrels may be brought to an end.

No. 122.

No. 8204, dated Bombay Castle, 16th December 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of the letter from this Office, No. 8153, dated the 12th instant, I have the honour, by direction of his Excellency the Governor in Council, to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying diary of the Political Agent at Khelat for the week ending 25th ultimo, received through the Commissioner in Sind under his endorsement No. 1061, dated 6th December 1872.

Enclosure in No. 122.

Dated Gundava, 25th November 1872.

Diary No. 40 of 1872, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 25th November 1872.

Naib Abdul Aziz, who was stationed for some months at Mustung to assist the Sarawanis in collecting property plundered in the Bolan at the latter end of last year, has marched through the Bolan with a force, and is now stationed at Dadar. The Shahgassee, by direction of his Highness the Khan, wrote to the above Naib that, as the arrangements made by the Brahooees to pay Rupees 20,000 in two monthly instalments had failed, he is to exact restitution from those who were actually engaged in plundering the kafila. Naib Abdul Aziz writes that Yar Mahomed, after accompanying his Highness the Khan to Jacobabad and Sukkur, rejoined his father, Sirdar Alla Dina, and publicly announced that the British Government intended to compensate the merchants for $\frac{1}{3}$rd of their losses, his Highness the Khan $\frac{1}{3}$rd, and that they, the Brahooees, were only to be held responsible for the remaining $\frac{1}{3}$rd. Sirdar Alla Dina Koord, immediately after his son's return, moved his camp to Mishkab, and intends, so

Naib Abdul Aziz says, to seek safety in Seebee or the adjacent hills if coercive measures are attempted. The Bungulzais are the only tribe who are siding with Alla Dina and refuse to give up the plunder.

I spoke to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed in presence of Dr. Bowman regarding Yar Mahomed's statements, and Alla Dina's conduct in connexion with the former. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed stated that his only wish was to carry out what the chiefs had engaged to do at Jacobabad, and that he had neither directly or indirectly given anyone reason to suppose such arrangements were under contemplation as announced by Yar Mahomed. Referring to Sirdar Alla Dina Koord, Sirdar Moolla Mahomed stated he regretted not having severed from Alla Dina and his family as recommended by the Commissioner in Sind and myself, and that he had screened him for the past eight months, hoping a feeling of honour would induce him to act up to his engagements. Now, however, that he was behaving like a common thief, he begged it to be understood he had severed all connexion with Alla Dina, and hoped his Highness would punish him like any ordinary robber or thief.

I pointed out to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed that if Bakhtawar Khan of Seebee allowed Alla Dina and his family safe asylum, his Highness the Ameer would in all probability hold him responsible for recovering the merchants' property. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed felt convinced Alla Dina would meet with no encouragement from Bakhtawar Khan, but to ensure such being the case wrote to the latter on the subject. The Sirdar thinks that Alla Dina and those who accompany him may find shelter with the Kajjacks.

It was reported to me on leaving Jacobabad that Naib Mahomed Khan had been intriguing with Yar Mahomed and other Sarawanis, and tried to induce them to believe it was against their interest to give up the merchants' property. The Nawab's conduct in connexion with matters past and present has been reported on officially.

On Thursday, the 21st, his Highness received letters of congratulation from his sons from Khelat, Darogah Atta Mahomed and others, regarding the honourable reception he had received at the hands of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

Darogah Atta Mahomed wrote me a few lines, the only Khelat news was that the Seistanis had raided on a small scale close to Nushky, carried off a few sheep, and killed two or three men. The Minguls and Rakshanis went in pursuit, but did not come up with the Seistani plunderers.

On the 21st November a telegram arrived at Jacobabad for his Highness the Khan from Sirdar Faquir Mahomed:—"Respectfully inform you I have arrived at Kolwah and expect to reach Kedj in three days. Have met Captain Miles here. The country is quiet. Moola Rehmut-ool-la sends his salam."

On Friday, the 22nd, a detachment of 200 infantry and one hundred cavalry marched on Lehri. Arrangements are now being made to station 400 infantry and 100 cavalry at Kirta.

No. 1061, dated 6th December 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information.

No. 123.

No. 8430, dated Bombay Castle, 26th December 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN continuation of a letter from this Office No. 8204, dated the 16th instant, I have the honour, by direction of his Excellency the Governor in Council, to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying Diary of the Political Agent at Khelat for the week ending 8th idem, received through the Commissioner in Sind under his endorsement No. 1085, dated 17th December 1872.

Enclosure in No. 123.

Diary No. 42 of 1872, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 8th December 1872.

Syud Shere Dil, horse-dealer, alluded to in last week's diary, thought himself hardly used, because his claims could not be adjusted at once. On my telling him that there was no probability of immediate payment, he replied that he was not going to wait any longer, and that the Khan and myself might divide his loot between us; for this piece of impertinence I ordered him to leave my Durbar tent, intimating at the same time that I declined to take any further interest in his affairs.

His Highness the Khan's present intention is to leave Gundava, *en route* to Bagh, on Friday, the 13th instant.

(Signed) C. H. Harrison, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

No. 1085, dated Camp Bajar, 17th December 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copy submitted to Government for information.

No. 124.

No. 8558, dated Bombay Castle, 31st December 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of the letter from this Office, No. 8430, dated the 26th instant, I have the honour, by direction of his Excellency the Governor in Council, to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying Diary of the Political Agent at Khelat for the week ending 1st December 1872, received through the Commissioner in Sind under his endorsement No. 1080, dated 14th instant.

Enclosure in No. 124.

Diary, No. 41, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 1st December 1872.

On Tuesday morning I handed over to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, for transmission to his Highness the Khan, a carefully executed translation of the conversation held at a private interview between his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and his Highness the Khan of Khelat at Sukkur on Tuesday, the 5th November 1872. On the afternoon of the same day, on visiting his Highness, I alluded to the above translation, and hoped that he, the Khan, would lose no time in making arrangements for the safe transit of kafilas through the Bolan, suggesting at the same time that no good results would ensue unless the Naibs at Quettah and Dadar were really good men and would cordially co-operate with each other. My reason for making this remark was, that the Naib at Dadar was formerly a farrier in his Highness' cavalry, and has no influence whatever. His Highness the Khan received this advice, as far as I could judge, in a friendly spirit, but in replying to the same said he had now no authority in the country, and that there was no one fit to be Naib of any place; further that I and the Shahgassee * might do what we liked, and he would agree to any arrangements we might make. Consequent on this reply I reminded his Highness what his Excellency the Viceroy had said about not interfering with his authority so long as peace was maintained on the border and treaty arrangements carried out, and that I

* This is the greatest difficulty the Political Agent had in Khelat will have to meet henceforth. The interference which has been forced on us by the events of the last few years, which was always avoided as much as possible, must now occur more often, and will render a ruler of the Khan's disposition and temper captious and irritable, and the Political Agent will always have to most carefully guard against interference being too often excited. On the present occasion Major Harrison met the case very judiciously.

(Sd.) W. L. M.

must, therefore, decline any interference except friendly advice, but would urge him to take an interest in making such arrangements as would maintain peace and quietness in his country.

Sirdar Alla Dina Koord has written to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed. In the former letter he declines to pay up what he agreed to, wishes to rediscuss the question. To the Shahgassee, Alla Dina has had the impertinence to write that the Commissioner in Sind promised them assistance to settle the merchants' claims, and that as it had not been given, he would not pay his share, which he thought excessive. I told Sirdar Moolla Mahomed that as his Highness had given the British Government a written guarantee to settle the merchants' claims at an early date, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed had directed Naib Abdool Aziz to use force if stolen property was not restored by the Eed. I strongly advised Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and the Sarawan chiefs to leave Alla Dina to his fate; they acknowledged that he was worthy of punishment, but asked if matters could not be settled by confiscating his land and mortgaging it for sufficient to meet the demands against him. I referred him to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, and concluded by informing every one present I could no longer look upon Alla Dina or his sons as people of rank or respectability, and that in future they would never be allowed into my Camp or Durbar.

Syud Shere Dil, a resident of Quettah, in Khelat territory, alluded to in Cabul Diary for the week ending 26th September, visited me a few days ago; he claims Rupees 7,500 as compensation for losses sustained in the Bolan, but I should be sorry to admit the claim if I were his Highness without very satisfactory evidence. He admits that Rupees 1,000 for four kinkabs is a rough statement of value, as he was never informed of their actual price, and that the balance Rupees 6,500 was in cash. Knowing that merchants only carry sufficient money for actual expenses, I asked him whether he and the other horse dealers did not feel nervous at having to carry so much coin through dangerous passes; not understanding the drift of my question, he at once replied that neither he nor any other horse dealer ever thought of carrying money between Bangalore and Cabul, as they always purchased Hoondees.

His Highness when visiting me on Friday afternoon, stated that for some time past he had thought of making Abdul Latif Naib of Dadar, as well as of Quettah, but would, as a temporary measure, appoint Naib Abdul Aziz to the former place, who would arrange that his son, Faquir Mahomed, should be in charge of the detachment which started a few days ago for Kirta in the Bolan Pass.

No. 1080, dated Camp Bubak, 14th December 1872.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information. The Commissioner is now on his way to the frontier to endeavour to arrange, in communication with his Highness the Khan of Khelat, the Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind, and Major Harrison, for the better preservation of peace on the trade routes.

No. 125.

No. 22 P., dated Fort William, 4th January 1873.

From Officiating Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

WITH reference to your letter No. 6436, dated the 6th of November 1872, announcing a settlement of the recent difficulties in Khelat, I am directed to request that the Commissioner in Sind may be called on to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a special report showing, 1st, what has been done by the Khan towards recovering the property of the merchants plundered in the Bolan and paying their compensation; and, 2ndly, what remains to be done to compensate the merchants in full for their losses.

No. 126.

Substance of Letter from Afghan Commissioner to Officiating Under-Secretary, dated 23rd Ramzan, 1289 A. H.

REFERRING to the interview with his Excellency at Poona, and to the statement then made to him that the Khan of Khelat had been required to restore or give compensation for the whole of the property plundered from Afghan subjects, states the merchants are in Shikarpoor, and inquires to what authority they should apply for restoration of the plundered property. Asks that a letter to the Political Agent, Khelat, may be given to him (the Commissioner) in order that he may send it to the merchants, who, armed with this letter, may be enabled to apply to the Political Agent for restoration of their property.

Requests also, if it be deemed advisable, that the subject of the plundered property may be mentioned to the Ameer.

No. 127.

No. 49, dated Camp, 11th January 1873.

From Officiating Secretary to the Government of Punjab, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I AM directed to forward, for the information of the Supreme Government, copy of letter No. 270, dated 20th December 1872, from the Commissioner of the Derajat Division, with annexures, reporting the result of negotiations between Shere Dil Mazarani, and his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

Enclosure 1 in No. 127.

No. 270, dated 20th December 1872.

From Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to Officiating Secretary to the Government of Punjab.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor's information, copy of a letter No. 606, of the 14th instant, giving cover to translations of two letters from the Murree chief, describing the result of negotiations between Shere Dil, Mazarani, and his Highness the Khan of Khelat, as recently called for by you.

Enclosure 2 in No. 127.

No. 606, dated 14th December 1872.

From Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan, to Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

IN reply to your No. 455, of 23rd November 1872, calling upon me to report, for the information of Government, the results of the negotiations between the Shere Dil, Chief of the Mazarani section of the Murree clan, and his Highness the Khan of Khelat, I have the honour to submit translations of two letters received from the Murree Tomandar, which give the required information.

Enclosure 3 in No. 127.

TRANSLATION of a Report of Ghuzzun Kan, Murree Tomandar.

STATES that he met Shere Dil, Mazarani Murree, at Chakar Thang, and inquired from him of the arrangements come to between himself and the Khan of Khelat. He replied that, according to the orders of the Khan, he went to pay him his respects, who asked him why he had removed from Khelat territory, and that he had replied that he had only resided in the Khorasan territory on the strength of the Khan's friendship; but that when he was injured by the Brahooees and represented his grievances to his Highness, he met with no redress, and therefore he had quitted his Highness' territories. The Khan then

inquired under what conditions he would again return, to which he had replied, that as his son and five men of his tribe had been killed by the Brahooees, that the redress he looked for was the blowing away from guns of six men of the Brahooee tribe, and the restitution of the whole of the property, of which himself and tribe had been plundered, and that upon these conditions being fulfilled he would be willing to return. The Khan first agreed to these conditions, and sent for six Brahooees, with the intention of having them dealt with in accordance with Shere Dil's wishes, but previous to carrying his intention into execution, the Khan had sent for his Wuzeer, Shahgassee, who on being consulted, opposed the sacrifice of the lives of the six Brahooees, stating that if his Highness the Khan were afraid of Shere Dil's vengeance, he would take upon himself to meet him in the field; but to facilitate an amicable adjustment of the matter, he suggested that money compensation be made to Shere Dil for the lives of his son and five clansmen and for the property of which himself and tribe had been plundered. The Khan accepted his Wuzeer's advice and did not carry out the execution of the six Brahooees, but caused an agreement to be drawn up, which he signed himself and to which he also obtained the signature of Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, by which he agreed to pay Shere Dil within 15 days the under-mentioned compensation, viz.:—

	Rs.	a.	p.
Blood-money for the lives of the six Mazaranis, at Rupees 600 per life - - - - - - - -	3,600	0	0
Value of 14,000 sheep and goats plundered, at Rs. 2 each -	28,000	0	0
Ditto 400 donkeys ditto at Rs. 10 each -	4,000	0	0
Value of the property of 40 horses plundered, at Rs. 40 each -	1,600	0	0
Total - - -	37,200	0	0

The Khan then sent a body of 40 sowars with the six released Brahooees into the Mingul country with orders to collect from the tribe the amount of compensation which he had agreed to pay Shere Dil, but on the sowars making the demand for the money, the tribe refused to furnished it and drove them out of their country. The Khan on being informed of this refusal on the part of the Minguls wrote to Shere Dil, informing him that he was powerless to grant him the redress asked for, and that he (Shere Dil) was at liberty to take such measures for obtaining redress for himself as he might think necessary. On receipt of this letter from the Khan, Shere Dil collected a large force and attacked Derah Shahwani, killing 69 of the Brahooees and carrying away great booty, the loss on his own side being three Mazaranis killed and 30 wounded. Subsequent to this Shere Dil had made three more raids into the Bolan country, and had carried off three large herds of sheep and goats, which on being divided among his followers 60 fell to the share of each man. Shere Dil was prepared to make still further raids. He had stated his willingness to present himself before Captain Sandeman if sent for. Shere Dil and his followers are at present residing at Kot Mundai.

Enclosure 4 in No. 127.

TRANSLATION of a Report of Ghuzzun Khan, Murree Tomandar.

His Highness the Khan of Khelat is now at Bagh, and it is rumoured that he is collecting a force to fight the Murrees. The Brahoees are also with the Khan. A large force of Minguls and Brahooees have plundered a Shirani Murree village. The Murrees pursued and fought with them, but were beaten and retreated; three Murrees were killed and 20 wounded. They also lost 50 mares which the Brahooees took. The plundered property was not distributed, but each man took what he could get. The share of the kafila plundered by the Brahooees is estimated at Rupees 27,000. The Brahooees first refused paying, but have now agreed to do so. The Khan has promised to restore their jaghires to them.

No. 128.

No. 120P., dated Fort Wiliam, 18th January 1873.

From Officiating Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Dapartment, to Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

WITH reference to your letter No. 8558, dated the 31st of December 1872, forwarding the diary of the Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending the 1st idem, I am

instructed to intimate that his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council approves of Major Harrison's proceedings as therein reported.

2. His Excellency in Council awaits with interest the result of the arrangements now being made by the Commissioner in Sind on the frontier.

No. 129.

No. 392, dated Bombay Castle, 21st January 1873.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of the letter from this Office No. 8558, dated the 31st ultimo, I have the honour, by direction of his Excellency the Governor in Council, to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying diary of the Political Agent at Khelat for the week ending 14th idem, received through the Commissioner in Sind under his endorsement, No. 18, dated 8th instant.

Enclosure in No. 119.

Diary No. 43 of 1872, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 14th December 1872.

His Highness the Khan was to have left for Bagh on Friday, the 13th, but wishes the march deferred until after the 23rd, as a marriage takes place on the latter date at Ganjam, four miles from Gundava, between Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's eldest son and a daughter of the late Jalawan Chief, Taj Mahomed. I have urged that, as he has been here more than a month, it would be better to proceed at once to Bagh, and lose no further time in adjusting merchants' claims.

Letters from the Zaggar Mingul Chief, Sirdar Abdul Rahman, reported raids on Nushky, and that his people would be obliged to acknowledge Persian supremacy if his Highness did not make arrangements for them on his return. Copies of letters were forwarded at once to the Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

(Signed) C. H. Harrison, Major,
Gundava, the 14th December 1871. Political Agent Khelat.

No. 18, dated Camp Khairpoor Natheshah, 8th January 1873.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government for information.

No. 130.

No. 436, dated Bombay Castle, 23rd January 1873.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of the letter from this Office, No. 392, dated the 21st instant, I have the honour by direction of his Excellency the Governor in Council, to forward for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying diary of the Political Agent at Khelat for the week ending 21st ultimo, received through the Commissioner in Sind under his endorsement No. 22, dated 9th January.

Enclosure in No. 130.

Diary No. 44 of 1872, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 21st December 1872.

NAIB ABDUL AZIZ has written to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed stating that Piara Murree Tangany had visited him, requested employment, and was prepared to work with Bakhtiar and Kotah. His services, however, had been declined, and intimation given that in case of any improper conduct on his part, he, the Naib, would punish him. Shere Dil, Mazarani, also wrote to Naib Abdul Aziz that he was prepared to undertake any duty that he might he entrusted with, but was told that, though he had been forgiven previous misconduct, he had again acted so badly that if he came to Dadar, he would be handed over to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, who would decide what was to be done with him.

Merchants from Candahar have written to Abdul Latif, Naib of Quettah, not to allow any kafilas to proceed by the Bolan Pass unless satisfactory arrangements have been made by the British Government and his Highness the Khan with the Murree tribe.

Sirdar Azaad Khan, of Kharan, writes to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed :—"His Highness "the Khan has written to the Punchgoor Chief, Ghazi Khan, as also the Janishin to "turn my cousin, Ibrahim Khan, and sister out of the fort of Khudabudan. If any "attempt of the kind is made, I will raid Punchgoor." Sirdar Azaad Khan also mentioned that if his Highness the Khan had given the assistance he suggested, Kharan, Shorawak, and Nushky could have kept the Seistanis in check. Nothing, however, had been done, and thirty Seistanis had been able to do a great deal of mischief, as his Highness' 50 sowars were afraid to face them.

A general earthquake was experienced in Kutchee on the 15th at about half-past 8 p.m., the shock being transitory towards the west, but continuous in the east at Gundava and adjacent villages. The shock, though severe, only lasted two minutes or so. Several houses fell down, and the walls of his Highness' residence cracked in every direction. At Lehri and neighbouring villages the earth quaked nearly the whole night. The fortifications at the above-named place fell down, and the whole town became a wreck. 150 Hindos and 20 Mahomedans were killed, several wounded, and great loss of cattle and property. In Iccar 50 residents were killed and several wounded.

Sirdar Sohrab Khan has pointed out to his Highness that no supplies are now procurable for his troops, and begs that provision may be made for them. He also solicits a further reinforcement, as they are at the mercy of the Murrees now that the fort has fallen down.

His Highness the Khan sent a detachment of 40 men on the 19th instant to Mahmul to receive charge of 139 Khorasanis deported from British territory. His Highness left Gundava on the same date for Bagh.

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON,
Political Agent, Khelat.

Russul Bux-ka-gote,
21st December 1872.

No. 22, dated Camp Mehar, 9th January 1873.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information.

No. 131.

No. 525, dated Bombay Castle, 25th January 1873.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN continuation of the letter from this Office, No. 436, dated the 23rd instant, I have the honour, by direction of his Excellency the Governor in Council, to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying diary of the Political Agent at Khelat for the week ending 28th ultimo, received through the Commissioner in Sind under his endorsement No. 30, dated 11th January 1873.

Enclosure in No. 131.

Diary No. 45 of 1872, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 28th December 1872.

Naib Abdul Aziz, of Dadar, writes to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed that Shere Dil, Mazarani Murree, through the influence of Bibi Said Ma Bibi, had visited him, stating he withdrew all claims for blood-money, and left his Highness the Khan to realize for his own benefit any fine that might be inflicted, as the Samalanis were his (" Shere Dil's ") enemies. Shere Dil further stated the only road open for him was to perform any duty that might be assigned to him by his Highness the Khan and Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, and that he was prepared to remain with his son either at Dadar or Kirta, but could not summon his tribe from the hills, until his Highness the Khan had punished Raho Samalani for the murder of his son, and made satisfactory arrangements for the Mazaranis. Shere Dil also requests that his Highness will exact a guarantee from the Mahomed Shai and Shawanis not to molest him.

Abdul Aziz, in reference to the above, requests that the Shahgassee will get his Highness to write as follows:—" I am aware of your circumstances through Naib Abdul Azeez; rest assured that you will not be molested by any Brahooee; should they do so, I ('the Khan') will punish them."

Mahomed Yar, commanding troops, after visiting his Highness at Gundava, informed me that his Highness' instructions were to attack and plunder Baho wherever he might be found should opportunity occur. I will obey these orders.

I am busy returning the wool that was plundered and sold to bunias by the Brahooees.

If his Highness the Khan will give me his support, I will make such arrangements in the Bolan that it will be as safe as any bazar.

I am anxiously awaiting replies to my letters to your address.

Mahomed Yar, Captain, commanding troops at Dadar, writes to his Highness that Shere Dil, Mazarani, through fear of the Sarawans, arrived at night through the assistance of Bibi Ma Bibi; as far as I can learn Baho and the Samalanis are in the neighbourhood of Shorun and Sanch; Karim Khan with his branch of the Samalanis are at Nooshky; Shere Dil has visited the Naibs; withdrawn all claims for compensation; and wants terms made for him with the Sarawans. The Naib sent for Jundar Shawani and others, but they said they must first consult their Sirdar and would then give an answer. The Murrees visit the Naibs, who have entertained some of them. Your Highness should instruct the Brahooees to abstain from further hostilities; for this reason that the Anjam should be complete and satisfactory as the Murrees have withdrawn their claims.

Sirdar Alla Dina Koord arrived here on the 24th and wished to visit me, but I declined to receive him until he had returned all stolen property in his possession.

Mahomed Azum, Mahomed Akrum, Noor Mahomed, and others have written to me from Dadar, saying that Naib Abdul Aziz and his son, Faquir Mahomed, are giving them every assistance, and request me to aid them in recovering the wool that was taken into British territory.

Sirdar Sohrab Khan Dhoombkee visited his Highness the Khan and solicited assistance to rebuild the fort, as also that some abatement in revenue and taxes should be granted to compensate people for losses sustained through the earthquake. His Highness having declined to give any kind of assistance, the Dhoombkee chief returned to Lehri far from being satisfied at his Highness' views on the subject.

Sirdar Moolla Mahomed rejoined his Highness' camp on Thursday, and his son returned with his bride to Seebee.

(Signed) C. H. Harrison, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

Bagh, 28th December 1872.

No. 30, dated Camp Thar-ri, 11th January 1873.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government for information.

No. 132.

Docket, No. 42, dated 13th January 1873.

From Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan, to Political Superintendent of Jacobabad.

HAS the honour to enclose, for his information and for submission to the Commissioner in Sind, an extract from the Political Diary of the Dehra Ghazee Khan District for the month of December 1872.

Deputy Commissioner does not desire it to be supposed that he believes the information, he merely sends it as it was received by him. Requests the favour of being informed if Commissioner in Sind desires such reports to be received. The custom pursued hitherto has been to allow all individuals to submit any news from the hills which they may consider interesting and of any importance.

Very exaggerated reports have been received here of the earthquake in Kutchee and elsewhere.

P.S.—Copy forwarded to Secretary to the Government of Punjab.

Enclosure in No. 132.

EXTRACT from the Political Diary for the month of December 1872.

No. and date.	Receipt.
24. December 30th.	Tomundar Boogtee reports that Moolla Mahomed Raisanee and Wuzeer Sahib Moola Mahomed Shahgassee have become friends and have turned against the Khan of Khelat. The Khan has fined the Sirdar of Magasis Rupees 18,000, and the Sirdar of the Ramdanis Rupees 5,000.

No. 175, dated Jacobabad, 18th January 1873.

Endorsed by Officiating Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

TRUE copy submitted to the Commissioner in Sind.

No. 76, dated Camp Shikarpoor, 25th January 1873.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

REFERRING to his endorsement, No. 175, dated the 18th instant, the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, is requested to inform Captain Sandeman that the Commissioner in Sind will always be glad to receive from him, through the Political Superintendent, any information communicated by chiefs of the Khelat tribes, with whom Captain Sandeman may have official connexion regarding affairs relating to Khelat subjects, which he may consider sufficiently important to submit to his own Government.

No. 77, dated Camp Shikarpoor, 25th January 1873.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies, with accompaniment, submitted to Government. The information given by the Boogtee Tomundar to Captain Sandeman shows how facts may be misrepresented by these people, and how such statements might mislead. The real state of the case is that Moolla Mahomed Raisani is now cordially acting with the Wuzeer Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed in working for the best interests of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, not

against the latter. The complexion given by the Boogtee Chief probably arose from reports of differences between the Khan and his Wuzeer, but the latter only does his best for his master.

No. 78, Camp Shikarpoor, 25th January 1873.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esquire, C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Calcutta, for information.

No. 133.

No. 545, dated Bombay Castle, 27th January 1873.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN continuation of the letter from this Office, No. 525, dated the 25th instant, I have the honour, by direction of his Excellency the Governor in Council, to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying diary of the Political Agent at Khelat for the week ending 4th idem, received through the Commissioner in Sind under his endorsement No. 37, dated 15th January 1873.

Enclosure in No. 133.

Diary No. 1 of 1873, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 4th January 1873.

As far as can be judged, Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and the Sarawan chiefs are now exerting themselves in recovering the property plundered from merchants at the latter end of 1871.

Shere Dil, Mazarini, arrived with the Dadar Said on Wednesday.

Captain Marsh, of the 18th Bengal Cavalry, arrived at Dadar on the 27th, reached Bagh on the 30th, and proceeded on the 1st instant to Sukkur *viâ* Rojan.

Naib Meer Khan Mahomed, Kumbrani of Punchgoor, writes to his Highness.

"I have received no answer to the letter I wrote on a former occasion. You have placed no force at my disposal, and the residents of Punchgoor will not assist me against Sirdar Azaad Khan's nephew, Ibrahim Khan Nowsherwani. If you think it will benefit you sacrificing my life to Ibrahim Khan, I will not hesitate on your sending a reply to this letter. The Belooch will not pay proper transit dues, only what they think fit. By next post I will send an account showing what has been realized. I have not been able to realize $\frac{1}{20}$th of what is due. What can be done in a large country like this with only ten sowars. The Mahomed Husenis who came here had a dispute about transit dues, cut off my slave's hand, and wounded a Kiahzai. Since your departure from Khelat the inhabitants of Punchgoor have formed other plans. Please recall me, I have committed no fault, and you decline answering my letters, why I cannot understand, for no revenue has been collected to embezzle if I had felt so inclined."

Sirdar Gaji Khan of Punchgoor to his Highness the Khan of Khelat:—

"I have committed no fault against your Highness, though on a former occasion you considered me responsible for the acts of my people which I had not power to restrain. I explained this to your Highness in a former letter, but received no answer. Since the arrival of your Naib I have worked night and day on your behalf. If you entrust me with any duty, I will perform the same; if you wish me to attend on you, I will come at once; on the other hand, if you don't require my services, tell me to leave your country, and I will do so, trusting to God and the Prophet to provide for me; under all circumstances, I shall be faithful and obedient."

By the same post complimentary letters were received by his Highness from Shah Beg Attah Mahomed, Mulazai, and Meer Morad.

Sirdar Syud Khan, Bamuzai, has arrived at Seebee to collect his Highness the Ameer's revenue.

On Friday afternoon, when his Highness visited me, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed suggested the following arrangements to put an end to recent feuds between the Sarawan Brahooees and the Murrees, *viz.*, that as the Samalanis, a Brahooee tribe, aided by other Sarawans, had commenced the quarrel by raiding the Mazaranis, any retaliatory measures should be overlooked and condoned, and that the Mazaranis should forego what they were entitled to as blood money, or compensation for loss of property, as the losses they had inflicted exceeded those they had sustained.

It was also suggested that the punishment of the Samalanis was to be left in his Highness' hands.

On Saturday morning Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, with the Sarawan chiefs, visited me with the Shahgassee, and agreed to adopt the latter's suggestion regarding the Mazaranis, and to intimate the same to his Highness the Khan.

Judging from the conversation I had with the Brahooees, they are perfectly willing to give up raiding the Murrees, if any guarantee can be given that the latter tribe will not molest them.

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

Bagh, the 4th January 1873.

No. 37, dated Camp Bakrani, 15th January 1873.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information.

No. 134.

No. 727, dated Bombay Castle, 1st February 1873.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN continuation of the letter from this Office, No. 545, dated the 27th ultimo, I have the honour, by direction of his Excellency the Governor in Council, to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying diary of the Political Agent at Khelat for the week ending 11th idem, received through the Commissioner in Sind under his endorsement No. 64, dated 23rd January 1873.

Enclosure in No. 134.

Diary No. 2, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 11th January 1873.

A DONKEY kafila from Shikarpoor arrived at Bagh on the 8th; on the merchants requesting me to state whether or not they could proceed in safety through the Bolan, I told them as far as any one could judge the pass was safe, but that the responsibility of going by this route rested with them and his Highness the Khan.

One hundred and thirty-nine Khorasanis arrived under escort on the 2nd instant; they have petitioned his Highness to go to Beylah and return to their country *viâ* Bunder Abbas. As this was merely a scheme to get back into English territory, I advised his Highness to escort them as far as Quettah, and leave them to return to their country by one of the northern routes.

Imam Dad, Naib of Nushky, reports that Sirdar Azaad Khan sent one of his retainers, Eedu by name, to plunder in Seistan, and that he carried off considerable property, which, however, the Seistanis recovered before he got clear of their territory.

Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan writes to his Highness the Khan:—The Seistanis come monthly and raid Nushky; unfortunately the Rukshanis are not on good terms with me, on this account defensive powers are divided, as each person looks after his individual interest and protects the village he lives in. I wrote to the Barrichis, the latter collected 1,500 men and proceeded to raid Boso, at which place I joined them with thirty sowars, and made defensive arrangements with them as follows, *viz.*, that in the event of any marauding Seistan force coming towards Shorawak and Nushky, we should both arm

and rendezvous at Shah Ishmael's tomb; we have now scouts out to give us timely notice of the Seistanis' movements. One force had assembled, but hearing of the arrangements were dispersed. Sirdar Azaad Khan has returned from the Jalk boundary. About 200 Seistanis attacked the Safsoolis Bululis at Raig Shorawak; 18 of the latter were killed and three Barrichis. The Seistanis lost three men, but carried off a drove of camels.

No. 64, dated Camp Shikarpoor, 23rd January 1873.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copy submitted to Government for information.

No. 135.

No. 877, dated Bombay Castle, 10th February 1873.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IN continuation of the letter from this Office, No. 727, dated the 1st instant, I have the honour, by direction of his Excellency the Governor in Council, to forward for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying diary of the Political Agent at Khelat for the week ending 18th ultimo, received through the Commissioner in Sind under his endorsement No. 93, dated 31st idem.

Enclosure in No. 135.

Diary No. 3 of 1873, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 18th January 1873.

Bagh, 18th January 1873.—Naib Abdul Azeez left with a detachment of cavalry early in the week to escort one or two kafilas that had arrived at Dadur. He has left his son, Fakeer Mahomed, at the latter place, and will remain himself at Kirta. Both father and son give every reasonable assurance that transit through the Bolan will be devoid of risk or danger. Two or three smaller kafilas have passed through Bagh *en route* to Dadur, and several camel-owners have gone up the pass with their camels to bring down wool and other articles of export belonging to buniasan d merchants in Quettah.

Sirdar Moolla Mahomed left some days ago to visit his family at Seebee, but intends to return to Bagh shortly. Since his Highness the Khan's arrival at this place, about Rupees 11,000 have been collected for the merchants who were plundered by the Sarawanis.

Merchants plundered by the Murrees, are at Bagh, hoping something may be done for them. The recovery of their property appears to be hopeless, tea and other articles of no value to Murrees were wantonly wasted, and other merchandize, camels, donkeys, &c., appear to have been sold for nominal sums to people who cannot be traced.

A Moonshee of the Maharaja of Cashmere complained to me that his Highness the Khan had directed his officials to levy a tax on 120 cows he had purchased for the Maharaja, and that he, the Moonshee, had declined to pay the same. I explained to this individual that his Highness the Khan, being sovereign of the country, might consider the wholesale purchase of a valuable breed of cattle injurious to his interests, and therefore wish to discourage their exportation.

His Highness, I subsequently heard, had taken this view of the case, explaining that any person might buy four or five cows free of all restriction, but that wholesale purchases would be discouraged, or the breed of cattle would soon become extinct.

His Highness the Khan, when visiting me on Friday afternoon, was particularly anxious to know whether he would be invited to meet the Commissioner in Sind, or whether Sir William Merewether would visit him in Kutchee. He also made particular inquiries regarding the desert canal, and appeared to have realized how beneficial to him the carrying out of this project may be. In reply I told his Highness that I could not give him any information, but thought it just as likely as not, that the nonsensical talk at Gundava might cause the Commissioner in Sind to make some change in previous

arrangements, and that as regards the canal, if the project was not undertaken, it would be most probably for the same reason that might cause the Commissioner to forego his intended visit. The object in replying as above was to let his Highness perceive that foolish talk is not so harmless as he imagines and may cause him regret and inconvenience.

Sirdar Abdool Rehman writes to his Highness the Khan—" A small force of Seistanis " killed two Jamaldini Zemindars at the Baghuk boundary. Naib Imdad and I went in " pursuit, and had a skirmish with them at the Jabar boundary, which resulted in their " defeat. Imdad behaved very well, and we should have done better had we had Sowars " instead of Zemindars. Please let Major Harrison know this, so that he may inform " the Commissioner in Sind, who will make some arrangements to protect us against the " Seistanis."

Early in the week it was reported that a raid had been made against the Murrees. So I asked Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed to inquire who had originated this raid and to punish those who were to blame; from inquiry it appears that a man called Noze Boogtee Rahija informed Nawab Khan Gevund Buduzai that there were some Murree flocks close at hand, with only an old man to protect them. The Buduzais, 47 in number, were joined by two or three Dhoombkees, three or four Boogtees, a few Samalanis Minguls, and three or four Khybiris amongst the latter, Atibar Khan's son. These men, in all about 100, proceeded to the Ghori river, killed the one old man, and carried off 240 goats and seven bullocks, which they divided amongst themselves. The above party organised another raid against the Murrees and had got close to the hills, when a messenger arrived from Sirdar Sohrab Khan stating that raiding the Murrees had been strictly forbidden, upon which the party dispersed.

The Murrees, it is reported, raided the Raijah Boogtees at Sibri, carried off a flock of sheep and another of goats; being closely pursued they left the sheep and escaped with the goats.

No. 93, dated Camp Araiji Pul, 31st January 1873.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies submitted to Government for information.

No. 136.

No. 99A., dated Camp Bakhtiarpoor, 3rd February 1873.

From Commissioner in Sind to Governor and President in Council in Bombay.

IN accordance with Government Resolution, No. 420, of the 22nd ultimo, I have the honour to report that soon after his Highness the Khan returned to Gundava it was intimated to him that the Sarawan Brahooees of Mustung, who had been called upon to contribute Rupees 20,000 as their share of the property plundered from the kafilas, had failed to do so, orders were then issued by his Highness that restitution was to be at once exacted from those who were actually engaged in the plunder. Since the Khan's arrival at Bagh Rupees 11,000 have been collected from the Sarawans generally.

2. Alla Dina, the Khoord chief, who managed to possess himself of the greater part of the plunder, was required by his Highness the Khan to give it up, but he refused, and no steps have yet been taken to make him do so. This man is one of the worst characters in the whole of Beloochistan, and a most inveterate plunderer as the merchants all assert, and his brother Sirdars now admit. Major Harrison has very properly refused him admission to his camp or Durbar, until he has disgorged all the stolen goods in the possession of himself and tribe. His son, Yar Mahomed, accompanied his Highness the Khan to Sukkur, and on his return falsely gave out it had been decided the British Government would give one third of the compensation for the plunder, the Khan a second, and the Brahooees were only to pay the third.

3. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisani has exerted himself well, and is still doing his best to recover the property stolen; but this is said to be most difficult, much having been destroyed, and the greater part sold or removed. Moolla Mahomed has entirely separated himself from Alla Dina, and expresses regret he ever consorted with him. The Wuzeer, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, has done his utmost to bring about restitution or

compensation, and being cordially joined in his efforts by Mool
the Sarawans, there is little doubt he would have greatly
thoroughly supported by the Khan.

5. Of his Highness the Khan's proceedings in promoting
property to the merchant or its equivalent, I regret to say I c
favourably. Before leaving Khelat he paid as an advance ou
Rupees 30,000 for the merchants plundered in the Bolan, and R
despoiled by Noordeen Mingul at Kozdar. But since his ret
Sukkur, notwithstanding the solemn assurances he gave at
September, and the highly honoured way in which he was received
Viceroy, as well as what was said to him by his Excellency on tha
taken the energetic action expected of him, nor displayed a sinc
fulfil his promises. He has issued some orders, but he has not give
to the Shahgassee in the sensible measures the latter has proposed fo
property and early settlement of the merchants' claims.

6. The reimbursements or collections had only amounted to Ru
portion of the whole; but the latest accounts from Bagh, where hi
say that further recoveries have been going on, and that Rupees 13,
paid to the merchants.

7. I had informed his Highness the Khan at Sukkur that I h
pleasure of seeing him again before long on my return to Upper Sin
consideration the accounts of the supineness of his Highness in regar
of the merchants' claims and to his conforming to his treaty engagem
me that arrangements for an interview with him should not be made
measures were adopted, and the merchants at all events satisfied wh
his Highness the Khan might afterwards adopt for recovery from
Directly, therefore, the exact time of my arrival at Jacobabad could
I addressed his Highness the Khan in the words of the letter, copy of
and which will, I trust, meet with your Excellency's approval. I
reply to that letter before adopting further measures.

8. Major Harrison will meet me at Jacobabad in a few days, and I s
discussion with him, have the honour of submitting a full report on the
affairs in the Khelat dominions.

Enclosure in No. 136.

Dated Camp Abad Melani, 29th January 1873.

From Commissioner in Sind to his Highness the Khan of

In October last I wrote to your Highness stating the great sa
me to hear of your having determined on adopting a course
sovereign of your country, and in accordance with yo
Government.

2. To prove to your Highness how satisfactorily a
his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-Gene
taking part with your Highness during his E
3. That meeting was happily carried
Viceroy received your Highness with
expressed to you his satisfaction at the
lately existed. But I must remind
distinctly warned you that recurr
caused the withdrawal of the Brit
same favourable consideration t
4. At parting with your H
returning to Upper Sind, a
interview with you to arr
the British border.

5. I am now appro
the above intention.
passed since your
you have used
perform, and that you have failed to benefit by the wise counsel his Excellency the

strictly prohibit any repr[illegible]. Such being really the case, I can entertain little hope that Langaos might be told e[illegible]with me will lead to any beneficial results.
recover their camels. It [illegible]lighness delivered to Major Harrison at Khelat on the 29th
merchants that trade sho[illegible] last you affirmed that on your arrival in Kutchee you would
Futteh [illegible], soliciting [illegible] the restoration of the property plundered last year from the
On Thursday letters [illegible]ants for which you were responsible, or give them the equivalent
Khan, Shahgassee Wul[illegible]
ledging the invitation t[illegible]ve now elapsed since you entered Kutchee, and I am still without
Ghazee Khan.
Letters were also rec[illegible]your Highness that the claims of these poor people have been
of accepting the invitat[illegible]
is expected in the conn[illegible]ssary therefore for me, before completing arrangements for the
The Bolan Pass is [illegible] desired and which I should be loth to abandon, to request that
past week a large kafil[illegible]inform me whether you have carried out your avowed promises in
merchandize. One or[illegible]on to the merchants into full effect, and whether claims have been
The direct route to [illegible]
by those who have co[illegible] endeavours always for the welfare of your Highness and for the
[illegible] will convince you that it is with extreme regret I have felt called
Camp Bagh, the 8[illegible] you. But my regard for your best interests as well as my duty to
[illegible]nt compel me to do so. In the hope that I may speedily receive a
[illegible]factory reply, I subscribe myself, &c., &c.

Fro[illegible]

No. 137.

You are aware [illegible]
Highness the Am[illegible] Dated Camp Bagh, 25th January 1873.
disposed people at [illegible]
appropriating prop[illegible], Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 25th January 1873.
A report has just [illegible]
the Langao tribe [illegible]ziz writes that when he had reached Khoudlan in the Bolan, the Raije
of animals plund[illegible]d him that the Murrees, who had plundered them, were at Noshman in the
[illegible]t territory. On receipt of this information he, the Naib, sent Sowars to hold the
[illegible] first Af[illegible]ri Passes, but on reaching Kirta heard that the Murrees had started for
[illegible]uld [illegible] Two companies of infantry were sent in pursuit and came up with the
[illegible]y at Hud Raikini, two shots were fired when the Murrees fled leaving
[illegible]erty, "which was restored to the owners." Naib Abdul Aziz has requested
[illegible]bas or sandals may be sent for the men, as shoes are of no use, also some
[illegible]
[illegible]arrived at the Dusht from Quettah, and a party sent by the Naib to
[illegible] the Bolan; another kafila from Dadar had reached the Dusht under
[illegible]wn
Mohldin [illegible]f Ramipur is expected to arrive here to-morrow.
[illegible]olla Mahomed [illegible]returned on the 23rd from Seebee.

No. 109, dated Camp Jacobabad, 6th February 1873.

Endorsed by C[illegible]missioner in Sind.

[illegible]UE copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, in reference to his letter No. 174P., dated 25th January 1873.

No. 138.

News-Report ending 31st January 1873.

SIRHANG HUSEN KHAN, of Gaib, intends to rebuild the fort at Teez near Charbar, and has arrived there for the purpose. Sirtip Ibrahim Khan, the Governor of Persian Beloochistan, has arrived at Bunpoor from Kirman.

2. An affray has taken place near Gwadur, in which several people of Nigore and a Dizzuk caravan were killed and wounded.

3. Naib Abdul Aziz is engaged in escorting through the Bo
at Dadur; he has left his son, Fakir Mahomed, at this place,
Both father and son give every responsible assurance that tra
be devoid of risk or danger. Several small kafilas have passed
Dadur. Camel owners have also gone up the pass to bring do
now in Quettah, belonging to bunias and other merchants.

The Khan of Khelat is at Bagh, where arrangements are goi
the property plundered from the kafilas last year. His Highn
those tribes who looted the poor people in Kutchee during the d

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Docket No. 104, dated Camp Beloochabad, 5th Febr

From Commissioner in Sind to Secretary to the Government
Department.

SUBMITS News-Report ending 31st January 187

No. 139.

Diary, No. 6 of 1873, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week end
1873.

A KHUREETA from the Commissioner in Sind for his Highness the
and delivered on Saturday at 1 p.m.

On Sunday afternoon I visited his Highness and advised him to l
in settling with those merchants who had been plundered by the M
to use my influence with them to accept 10 annas in the rupee, p
payment was guaranteed.

On Monday I went over the accounts with the merchants; their cl
nted to
Rupees 92,000, including compensation for camels and donkeys. On
presenting
to Akhoond Abdul Majid Kafilabashi that with cash payment of 10 an
in the rupee,
merchants would more than recoup the difference by being early in the Candahar market
with piece goods, they cheerfully compounded for Rupees 49,000 (origi al claim Rupees
78,400), and held themselves responsible for the claims of all merchants. The owners of
camels and donkeys had tried to impose by claiming Rupees 13,600 as compensation for
nearly twice as many animals as their Dadar Pass showed. Compensation was offered
for the number certified by the Naib of Dadar's Pass at the rate of Rupees 40 per camel
and Rupees 20 per donkey, total Rupees 6,620; this was considered a fair adjustment
by all respectable merchants, but not accepted as such by the owners.

On Tuesday I visited his Highness and pointed out what terms the merchants were
willing to accept, and he expressed himself highly pleased at the arrangement and
anxious to carry out the same.

On Wednesday his Highness had an interview with the merchants, and explained
that as he had no money, they must wait until the amount required could be realized
from revenue. This offer they declined, stating their claims had been compounded on
condition of receiving immediate payment. Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed then had an
interview with me, and asked if the British Government would advance his Highness'
annual subsidy, or allow an order to be given to the merchants antedated to the 1st
April. The Shahgassee assured me that his Highness had every wish to pay the
merchants, but really had not got the money. No encouragement was given regarding
the subsidy, and the following arrangement was ultimately arrived at by his Highness:
Rupees 15,620 in cash, and two hoondees for Rupees 20,000 each at one and two
months' sight, payment guaranteed by Saucar Saju. This amount, Rupees 55,620,
settles every claim.

A special cossid from Daroga Atta Mahomed arrived on Wednesday, reporting that
a man, called Toti, with several of his friends, had seized 26 camels at Shorawak
belonging to Langaos in lieu of what had been taken from him by the Sarawan Brahooees
at the latter end of 1871. The Langaos proposed retaliating on the first Afghan kafila
that entered Khelat territory, and instructions were solicited by Daroga Atta Mahomed.
On the above report being placed at my disposal, I strongly urged his Highness to

[redacted]isals, as such proceedings would obstruct trade, and that the [redacted]fforts would be made through the Governor of Candahar to [redacted] being for the interest of Afghanistan, Khelat. and British [redacted]uld not be obstructed by retaliatory acts. I addressed Sirdar [redacted]his kind offices, &c., &c. Copy of letter is annexed.

[redacted] were received from the Boogtee Chief by his Highness the [redacted]lee Mahomed, and myself; Gulam Murteza's delay in acknow- [redacted]o meet the Commissioner in Sind arose from his being at Dehra

[redacted]eived from Guzzun Murree, who appears to make a great favour [redacted]ion. No reply from Karim Khan, Bijarani. Shere Dil, Mazarani, [redacted]se of a day or two.

[redacted]perfectly safe for merchants, travellers, and cossids. During the [redacted]a has arrived at Dadar with about 1,000 camel-loads of wool and [redacted] two large donkey kafilas also passed through the Bolan.

[redacted]Kurrachee *viâ* the Raj-road is freely used by merchants particularly [redacted]nsignments of wool.

(Signed) C. H. Harrison, Major,
[redacted]th February 1873. Political Agent, Khelat.

Enclosure in No. 139.

[redacted]n Political Agent, Khelat, to Governor of Candahar.

[redacted]hat his Highness the Khan is doing his best to compensate his [redacted]er's subjects who were plundered in Khelat territory. Certain ill- [redacted] Shorawak on a former occasion tried to compensate themselves by [redacted]erty belonging to merchants, amongst whom were British subjects. [redacted]been received by his Highness stating that 26 camels belonging to [redacted]have been appropriated by people at Shorawak in lieu, as they state, [redacted]ered from them in the Bolan. The actual owners of camels are in Khel[redacted] The Langaos have asked his Highness' permission to take 26 camels from the [redacted]ghan kafila that arrives; but I have strongly urged that no such pro- ceedings sho[redacted]be allowed, as acts of this kind would obstruct trade and cause further complications. As this is a subject in which his Highness the Ameer's subjects are equally interested in, I would ask your friendly aid in restoring the Langao camels, and preventing such acts in future by people in Shorawak. You will have learnt from Akhoond Abdo[redacted]l Majid, Mahomed Akram, Said Ahmed, and others what has been done on their behalf.

No. 133, [redacted]ted Camp Jacobabad, 13th February 1873.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government. The balance Rupees 55,620 herein stated to have been paid to the merchants appear to have been taken by them in full settlement of their claims for compensation.

2. Major Harrison's assistance happily given has brought this difficult matter to a satisfactory conclusion. Arrangements are therefore being made by the Commissioner for an interview with his Highness the Khan of Khelat early next week. A copy of these papers has been forwarded direct to the Government of India.

No. 140.

No. 7, dated Bagh, 15th February 1873.

Diary by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 15th February 1873.

On the 9th the kafilah reported as having arrived at Dadar in diary No. 6 passed through *en route* to Kurrachee. It consisted chiefly of wool and dried fruits. On the road between Haji-ke-Shur and this four camels with their loads strayed into the jungle; one was recovered next morning by his Highness' officials and returned to the merchants, the others, when found, will be handed over to Abdul Majid, merchant.

On Monday Sher Dil, Muzarani Murree, after making his salam to his Highness the Khan, left this with a few followers for Jacobabad. The same evening Sirdar Gholam Murteza, accompanied by a large number of his tribe, arrived from Jacobabad. Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed pointed out their encamping ground, and furnished them with supplies of grass, wood, &c. The next morning they made their obeisance to his Highness in public Durbar, afterwards visited me when I advised them, as they had complied with the wishes of the Commissioner in Sind and Political Superintendent, to return to Jacobabad with as little delay as possible. They left this on the morning of the 12th.

On Wednesday a khureeta from Sir W. L. Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, for his Highness the Khan, was received and delivered at 12.30 the next day. The Shahgassee personally delivered to me his Highness' reply to the same, which I forwarded to the Commissioner in Sind. The Shahgassee stated his Highness was much gratified at its receipt, and was using every endeavour to march upon Shahpoor, so as to arrive there on the date specified. His Highness has forwarded invitations to the Sarawan, Jalawan, Kind, and Magsi Chiefs to accompany him; he proposed marching on the morning of the 16th by Janú and Chatar.

On the 11th his Highness received a letter from Guzzun Khan, Murree Sirdar, in which he still hesitates to accept the invitation to meet the Commissioner in Sind at Jacobabad. No reply from Karim Khan, Bijarani.

On the same day a private letter from Candahar to the address of his Highness was received for perusal. The writer states that the current opinion at Cabul regarding the Camp of Exercise at Hasan Abdul is that the troops have been assembled to watch events in Seistan; also t at a news-writer from Lahore had been sent to live at Candahar.

At Seebee Bakhtiar Khan, Baruzi Chief, and his nephews, Akbar Khan Sirbuland and Ismail Khan, have had a family quarrel, the latter left Khurk and have taken up their residence at Dapal.

This morning a letter to his Highness from Abdul Aziz, Naib of Dadar reports, that some Pathans made a raid upon Sher Dil, Muzarani Murree's village and carried off the villagers' property. His Highness' Regiment, the Wazeeree, stationed at Kirta, followed up the robbers, recovered the stolen property, and returned it to the Murrees. Six Pathans were killed, one Regimental Moonshee, Faiz Mahomed, was slightly wounded on the shoulder.

(Signed) R. Bowman, Assistant Surgeon,
In Charge, Political Agency, Khelat.

No. 141.

News-Report ending 24th February 1873.

The Bolan Pass is freely made use of by merchants, travellers, and kafilas, and is quite safe. At present cossids have arrived at Dadar with about 1,000 camel-loads of wool. A few large donkey kafilas have also passed down. A good many merchants have also followed the direct route to Kurrachee, the whole way from Khelat through the hills *viâ* the Rajroad.

2. The balance due to the merchants as compensation for losses sustained last year has been paid by his Highness the Khan, and received by them in full settlement of their claims.

3. The Commissioner met his Highness the Khan at Shahpoor, and visits were interchanged on the 20th and 21st instant.

4. It is now reported that several slight shocks of earthquake have been felt at Bagh and other places, since the severe shock which did so much injury in December last.

(Signed) W. L. Merewether, Col.,
Commissioner in Sind.

No. 178, dated Camp Shikarpoor, 26th February 1873.

From Commissioner in Sind to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Forwards, for the information of the Supreme Government, news-report ending 24th February 1873.

No. 142.

No. 479P., dated Fort William, 12th March 1873.

From Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Commissioner in Sind.

I AM instructed to acknowledge receipt of your endorsement No. 133, dated the 13th of February last, forwarding copy of the Khelat Diary for the week ending the 8th February, in which it is reported that his Highness the Khan of Khelat has settled the claims of the merchants who were recently plundered in the Bolan.

2. I am to convey both to yourself and Major Harrison the acknowledgments and thanks of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council for the exertions which have resulted in bringing about this favourable termination of affairs. His Excellency in Council trusts that the firm and yet conciliatory manner in which compensation has been insisted on will do much to ensure the future security of the Bolan Pass. Major Harrison may be authorised to express to the Khan the gratification of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council at the settlement of the case.

3. His Highness the Ameer of Cabul has been informed through the Punjab Government of the manner in which the claims of his subjects have been settled, and he has been asked to do what he can to procure the restoration of the camels plundered by his subjects at Shorawak from the Langaos.

No. 480P.

Copy, together with a copy of the letter to which it is in reply, and of the paper noted on the margin, forwarded to the Punjab Government for information, with a request that in informing the Ameer of Cabul of the settlement of the claim preferred by his subjects, his Highness may be asked to do all in his power to procure restoration of the camels plundered from the Langaos at Shorawak.

From Afghan Commissioner, letter dated 23rd Ramzan 1289 A.H.

No. 143.

No. 52 of 1873.

Government of India, Foreign Department, Political.

To his Grace the Duke of Argyll, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE, Fort William, the 28th March 1873.

IN continuation of our Secret despatch No. 83, dated the 20th December 1872, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers* relating to Khelat affairs, from which your Grace will perceive that his Highness the Khan of Khelat has compensated the merchants who were plundered in the Bolan.

2. It will be seen from the diary of the Political Agent at Khelat for the week ending 8th February last, that certain persons at Shorawak, in Afghanistan, had seized 26 camels belonging to the Langaos of Khelat. In directing the Punjab Government to communicate to the Ameer of Cabul the settlement of the claims of his subjects who were plundered in the Bolan, we have desired that his Highness should be moved to procure the restoration of these camels.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
" NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
" R. TEMPLE.
" B. H. ELLIS.
" A. HOBHOUSE.
" E. C. BAYLEY.

* Nos. 118 to 142.

No. 144.

No. 1599, dated Bombay Castle, 15th March 1873.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In forwarding to you the correspondence noted in the margin, I am directed to state that his Excellency in Council understands the detention of the persons referred to be now a matter for disposal by the Government of India. I am, however, to add that this Government would have greatly hesitated to adopt the course which Sir W. Merewether appears now to recommend of actually committing the persons concerned to a place of confinement, and it is concluded that should their imprisonment be held necessary, the warrants will be issued by the Government of India.

1. Letter from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 1036, dated 27th November 1872.
2. Letter to the Government Solicitor, No. 8142 dated 12th December 1872.
3. Opinion of the Government Solicitor, No. 1333, dated 30th December 1872.
4. Letter to Commissioner in Sind, No. 623, dated 28th January 1873.
5. Letter from Commissioner in Sind, No. 174 dated 25th February 1873.

Enclosure 1 in No. 144.

No. 1036, dated Kurrachee, 27th November 1872.

From Commissioner in Sind, to Governor and President in Council, Bombay.

In forwarding the accompanying copy of a letter from Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, with its accompaniments, I have the honour to state that, taking into consideration what has passed during the last six months at Khelat, I consider it a matter of great importance that the ill-advisers who induced his Highness the Khan to act so inconsiderately should be kept away from him, or they will be only perpetually endeavouring to revive their old intrigues. These men are:—

(1.) Shukkur Khan, Commandant of one of his Highness' regiments of infantry.
(2.) Moonshee Saleh Mahomed.
(3.) Moonshee Gool Mahomed.

2. These men were brought into Sind lately by his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and being delivered over to the local authorities were left by my direction on the frontier districts. I instructed Colonel Mainwaring, the Political Superintendent, to locate them for the present at Thul, the central talooka of the frontier district, where the Mooktiarkur resides, and ordered that they should be simply watched that they abstained from engaging in any communications with people beyond the border.

3. These people are quite capable of maintaining themselves, and therefore no expense will be incurred by their remaining in British territory. But the question of their legal detention may be raised, and in case it should, I have the honour to request that I may have warrants from your Excellency, under Act III. of 1858, and Act XXXIV. of 1850, authorising the detention of the three men above mentioned.

4. It is just possible that the use of these warrants may not become necessary, but it would be very important to have them in hand, so that should these men at any time give trouble the law may be duly enforced towards them. If they choose to remain quiet, they will be in no way molested.

Enclosure 2 in No. 144.

No. 146, dated Paniwan, 21st October 1872.

From Political Agent, Khelat, to Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

I have the honour to report, for your information, that I sent Persian translation of the Commissioner in Sind's letter, No. 935, to his Highness the Khan, "with the "exception of paragraph 1." In connexion with paragraphs 3 and 4, I pointed out to his Highness that he might convince the English Government of his sincerity by directing Shukkur Khan and the Moonshees to live in British territory, and that if he was prepared to accept this suggestion, I should be most happy to take him to Jacobabad to meet his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

His Highness' reply, with translation, is annexed.

Enclosure 3 in No. 144.

From his Highness the Khan of Khelat, to Political Agent, Khelat.

GOD be praised that we are both well. Your friendly note of the 12th instant reached me at a good time and made my heart happy. I also received translation of a letter from "Alijah Moolla Paega," Sir W. Merewether, to Alijah Colonel Mainwaring, and am aware of its meaning from beginning to end. As regards what was written about Shukkur Khan and Moonshees Saleh Mahomed and Gool Mahomed residing in English territory, I write to you as a friend that my only wish and happiness is to please your Government, and that I will act according to their wishes. On arrival at Gundava I will send for the Moonshees, and will also send a man to fetch Shukkur Khan. Rest satisfied, and me informed of your welfare.

Enclosure 4 in No. 144.

No. 8142, dated Bombay Castle, 12th December 1872.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay to Solicitor to the Government of Bombay.

I AM directed to forward to you the accompanying copy of a letter from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 1036, dated the 27th ultimo, and to request that you will advise Government as to the steps necessary to effect the legal detention in British territory of the persons referred to by Sir William Merewether as State prisoners. Drafts of the necessary warrants should be prepared and submitted by you at the same time.

Enclosure 5 in No. 144.

No. 1333, dated Bombay, 30th December 1872.

From Officiating Solicitor to the Government of Bombay to Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your No. 8142 of 1872, under date 12th instant, and to state that if it be necessary to detain in British territory the persons referred to by Sir William Merewether, *in accordance with the Indian statutes*, the object can only be attained by giving them into charge of a sheriff of a gaol, of the commandant of a fortress, or officer in charge of any gaol or other place of confinement.

2. I am unacquainted with the nature of the duties of the Mooktiarkur referred to as residing in the village where the persons in question are located, but it occurs to me to doubt whether this location can be considered as in accordance with the Acts for the custody of State prisoners.

3. Care should therefore, I think, be taken if the necessity arises for the warrant, that the same is directed to a person contemplated by the Act, and that such person should be actually in charge of the State prisoners.

4. I may mention that I have shown these papers to the Hon. the Acting Advocate General, and I am authorised to state that he approves of the form of warrant, and concurs in my remarks in this letter.

Enclosure 6 in No. 144.

DRAFT REGULATION.

To

WHEREAS the Governor in Council of Bombay for good and sufficient reasons has resolved that

shall be placed under personal restraint at

You are hereby ordered in pursuance of that resolution to receive the person above named into your custody, and to deal with him in conformity to the orders of the Governor in Council of Bombay, and the provisions of Regulation 25 of 1827, and Acts XXXIV. of 1850 and III. of 1858, of the Legislative Council of India. Bombay, the day of December 1872.

By order, &c.,
Chief Secy. to Govt. of India.

Enclosure 7 in No. 144.

No. 623, dated Bombay Castle, 28th January 1873.

From Secretary to the Government of Bombay to Commissioner in Sind.

REFERRING to your letter, with accompaniments, of the 27th November last, No. 1036, on the subject of the detention in British territory of certain individuals from the territory of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, I am desired by the Hon. the Governor in Council to forward for your information the annexed copy of a letter,* and of its enclosure, from the Officiating Solicitor to Government with reference to this matter, and to state that your further report will be awaited.

* No. 1333, dated 33th December 1872.

Enclosure 8 in No. 144.

No. 174, dated Camp Jacobabad, 25th February 1873.

From Commissioner in Sind to Governor and President in Council, Bombay.

IN reference to Mr. Secretary Gonne's letter No. 623, of the 28th ultimo, and its accompaniment from the Officiating Solicitor to Government, I have the honour to state that as it is necessary, according to the Indian statutes, that people in question should be given in charge to some officer in charge of a gaol or place of confinement, they can be best located at Umarkot in Lower Sind, where there is a gaol and gaoler. I would request therefore that your Excellency will favour me by causing the necessary warrants to be issued for the delivery into the custody of the gaoler of the Umarkot of the three men marginally noted.

1. Shukkur Khan.
2. Moonshee Saleh Mahomed *Wullud* Shaikh Abdool Kabir.
3. Moonshee Gool Mahomed *Wullud* Shaikh Abdool Kabir.

2. From all I have seen and heard lately here, I am more than ever convinced of the great desirability of keeping these men away from Khelat territory, and their being removed to Lower Sind is the best course that can be adopted.

3. In the Thul Talooka they were only under the surveillance of the Mookhtiarkur, this is shown by the Solicitor to Government to be incorrect. I have therefore issued instructions for them to be passed on to Umarkot, and would beg that the warrants may be supplied at an early date.

No. 145.

DIARY No. 11 of 1873, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the Week ending 16th March 1873.

ON Monday his Highness the Khan had a private interview with Noordeen Mingul, at which the ex-Vakeel of Jacobabad, the Kazee of Bagh, and Moollah Jumma were present. I heard indirectly that his Highness, at the advice of these people, had decided upon appointing Azaad Khan, of Kharan, Governor of the whole of Mekran, and his cousin, Belooch Khan, Naib of Punchgoor; also that Noordeen had been informed no active measures were to be taken against Beyla, and an express had been sent by the latter to intimate this intelligence to Ali Khan Jamote.

On Tuesday, when visiting his Highness, he told me of his intentions regarding Azaad Khan and Belooch Khan, and that the former was to pay him Rupees 20,000 per annum. I begged his Highness to reconsider the question, as Azaad Khan was a treacherous unreliable person, and his cousin quite recently an acknowledged feudatory of the Persian Government. I further pointed out that such action on his Highness' part could not be received with indifference by my Government. His Highness agreed not to act without further consideration, but informed me people of Azaad Khan and Belooch Khan's character were required for the Mekran Province, as Faqueer Mahomed, Bezonjao, was the person who instigated the Sarawans to rebel, and the Kedj and Punchgoor Chiefs were altogether out of hand.

On Wednesday Shalgassee Wullee Mahomed advised his Highness to summon Sirdar Gaji Khan of Punchgoor, to meet him at Khelat on a certain date with the revenue of his province. His Highness wrote this letter, but at the same time wrote to Esau Khan, Gitchki, that he would appoint him Sirdar, *vice* Gaji Khan, and to meet him at Sohrab with Belooch Khan, who would be made Naib.

On Friday, when his Highness returned my visit, I asked if he had made any appointment with Sirdar Azaad Khan and Belooch Khan to meet him at Sohrab, and, on his acknowledging he had invited them, I again pointed out how distasteful these measures would be to my Government, as they would most assuredly lead to rebellion and disorder. His Highness replied that, though these Nowsherwan chiefs were to meet him, it did not follow they would be taken into his service; with reference to contemplated disturbances, they could not be avoided, as neither the chiefs nor people would pay their revenne.

This most undesirable interference with the arrangements his Highness adopted at Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed's suggestion emanated from the people with whom his Highness conferred; as far as I can learn, the object is to cause enmity between the Minguls and Bezonjao, so as to prevent their taking further interest in the Sarawan country. Sirdar Azaad Khan being taken into favour is also to alienate him from Moollah Mahomed. If his Highness carries out the programme drawn up for him by the ex-Vakeel, there will be a serious rebellion all through Mekran, as also through the Jalawan country from Kozdar to Lus Beyla.

Shortly before his Highness arrived on Friday a khureeta from the Commissioner in Sind was received. I urged his Highness to take steps regarding Lus Beyla. He replied: "The Shahgassee had repeatedly told him it could be easily retaken with Brahooee levies, and that it was a favourable opportunity for Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed to prove what he had said. He, the Khan, did not believe repossession could be so easily effected as the Minguls would be obstructive; on my pointing out some of his regulars might be employed on this service, he informed me his troops were not loyal; those he trusted were required for his personal protection, and it would be useless to detach those he had no confidence in; even, however, if all were loyal and true, my suggestion could not be carried out, as no expedition could be organized or despatched without money, and he had none.

I tried my utmost in a friendly and quiet manner to induce the Khan to meet difficulties and overcome them. The only response to anything I advised was my Government might do what they liked, as he himself was perfectly indifferent to all matters connected with the government of his country, and never intended to take any further interest in them.

His Highness wished to withdraw the detachment from Kirta, but I have asked him not to do so until the kafila season is over. During the past week kafilas have been daily passing through Bagh from Candahar and Shikarpoor; two of the largest were from the former place and brought about six hundred camel-loads of wool.

His Highness leaves this on Wednesday, and expects to be at Gundava on Saturday, the 21st; he wishes to proceed up the Moolla Pass with as little delay as possible.

Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed informed me that his Highness wished to know if there was any objection to his giving his agent proceeding with indigo to Meshed a letter to the Governor of the latter place. I replied that writing to Persian officials might be misunderstood, and that, under all circumstances, it might be as well not to do so.

His Highness, alluding to disturbances in Seistan, stated the Persian Government would soon have a large force in those parts and punish the rebels. His Highness persists in stating that Sirdar Yakoob Khan has a friendly compact with the Persians, and will never assist his father, the Ameer, against them. His Highness informed me of his having written to Sirdar Yakoob Khan, but made no allusion to the contents of his letter.

In Diary No. 7 of 1873 a misunderstanding in the Barukzai family was reported. The ex-Vakeel has solicited permission from Buktyar Khan to reside at Seebee and been refused. Buktyar Khan's nephews, Surbulund and Ismail Khan was sent for from Seebee by advice of Mahomed Khan and Moollah Jumma, and arrived at Bagh yesterday. No good object is in view if reports can be relied upon.

Yesterday Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed suggested the advisability of his resigning on arrival at Gundava, and proceeding from thence to Kurrachee. He states his Highness has a policy of his own, which will be carried out in spite of any advice that he or I may give. His Highness contemplated arrangements in Mekran; interference with affairs at Seebee; and other circumstances support Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed's statements, and makes me doubt the inert attitude his Highness has chosen to assume.

(Signed) C. H. Harrison, Major.
Political Agent, Khelat.

No. 291, dated Camp Gharo, 2nd April 1873.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Calcutta.

No. 146.

Diary No. 12 of 1873, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the Week ending 23rd March 1873.

ON Monday I visited his Highness the Khan, as he professed himself anxious to consult me with reference to the Commissioner's khureeta, dated 10th March. The conversation that ensued on this occasion was reported on the 20th instant in letter No. 44.

Sirdar Azaad Khan collected 1,000 Barichis and proceeded to Seistan, in spite of Sirdar Futteh Khan's prohibitory orders.

The Roonjaos of Lus Beyla have written to the Jamshir of Khozdar asking whether they should send presents to his Highness or meet him on his road back to Khelat. For some time past this tribe has been most anxious that his Highness should take possession of Lus Beyla, and put an end to the fighting and plundering that is going on.

Traffic through the Bolan is satisfactory.

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

No. 308, dated Kurrachee, 8th April 1873.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

No. 147.

No. 935, dated Jacobabad, 9th April 1873.

From Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Commissioner in Sind, Kurrachee.

I HAVE the honour to report, that in reply to a communication I made to Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan, on the receipt of your instruction contained in No. 217, dated 14th ultimo, that officer reports as follows:—

"I have the honour to acknowledge your No. 596 of 20th March 1873, on the subject of a reported raid on the Murree clan, and to state that further reports did reach me, but the raiders were said to have been Pathans. I never heard that some Murrees had been caught in the Bolan Pass, and if it was the case they have carefully concealed the fact from me.

"I have sent a special messenger to the Tomandar to inquire into the truth of these reports, and as I shortly expect to meet his brother Meeroollah at the Sakhi Sarwar fair, I will then be in a position to report more fully on the matter, which I will do if the information received is of sufficient importance to warrant my doing so."

Enclosure 1 in No. 147.

From Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan, to Political Superintendent, Jacobabad.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that information has reached me from the Murree hills that a party of Brahooees attacked the Murree town of Mundai and killed eleven Muzzerani and Sheeranee Murrees, capturing a very large number of cows, sheep, and goats.

2. Should further particulars reach me, and should they appear of interest, I will forward them.

Enclosure 2 in No. 147.

No. 634A., dated Camp Ghanspoor, 2nd April 1873.

From Officiating Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Commissioner in Sind, Kurrachee.

IN reply to your letter No. 217 of the 14th ultimo, having reference to the report made by Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan, on the 27th February 1873, that a party of Brahooees attacked the Murree town of Mundai, and killed eleven Muzzerani, &c., &c., I have the honour to inform you that Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, states the attack made on the Pathans by his Highness' troops after the latter had attacked and plundered the Muzzerani Murrees under Sher Dil, reported in my diary of the 15th February last, is probably what has misled Captain Sandeman.

2. None of the Sarawans have as yet left Kutchee, and they have assured me the news communicated by Captain Sandeman is without foundation as far as they are concerned.

3. No reply to my letter on this subject has as yet been received from Captain Sandeman.

Docket, No. 217, dated Kurrachee, 14th March 1873.

From Commissioner in Sind.

REFERRING to his endorsement No. 655, dated the 5th instant, the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, is requested to be so good as to state whether the Muzzeranis alluded to by Captain Sandeman are the same as those caught in the Bolan, or whether this is a new case? If the latter a full report should be submitted.

No. 148.

No. 717P, dated Fort William, 10th April 1873.

From Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

I AM to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 1599, dated 15th ultimo, regarding the detention in British territory of the persons marginally noted.

Shukkur Khan.
Moonshee Saleh Mahomed.
Moonshee Gool Mahomed.

2. The first Section of the Bombay Regulation No. XXV. of 1827 provides that the Governor in Council may cause a person to be apprehended, and when apprehended, delivered over to any person in whose custody it may be deemed expedient that he should be placed. The warrant of committal runs to the effect that the Governor in Council has resolved that A.B. shall be placed under personal restraint at Y.Z., and the officer is ordered to receive A.B. into his custody and deal with him in conformity with the orders of the Governor in Council and the provisions of the Regulations. Section II.

of the Regulation provides that such warrant shall be sufficient authority for the detention of any State prisoner in any fortress, gaol, or other place within the zillahs subordinate to Bombay.

3. This Regulation appears to the Governor-General in Council to secure all that is wanted. Apprehension may be effected by simply exhibiting the warrant, and the term "custody" is consistent with any degree of liberty which it may be deemed expedient to allow. The question of the detention of the men above named does not appear to be affected by the Acts of 1850 and 1858 which were passed to remove doubts about the conflict of the State prisoners' regulation with the jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts, and need only be referred to when the detention of the prisoners is required in some place within the jurisdiction of those Courts.

4. The Governor-General in Council is of opinion that the proper course is for the Bombay Government to issue under Regulation XXV. of 1827 warrants for the detention of the persons referred to, who should be placed only under such surveillance as may be considered sufficient to prevent them from escaping or intriguing. The prisoners, however, should be warned that any attempt to violate the conditions under which they are detained will be followed by arrest and imprisonment. The warrants should be sent to the Court in Sind with instructions not to put them in force, unless he has reason to believe that the persons in question are making a bad use of the liberty allowed them.

No. 149.

No. 13, dated Shoran, 30th March 1873.

Diary by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 30th March 1873.

Darogah Imam Dad, of Nushki, writes to Darogah Attah Mahomed that all the Minguls, at the instigation of Mahomed and Pur Dil, have gone into the hills and intend attacking Nushki. Sirdar Abdool Rahman, his nephew, cousin, and immediate relatives are the only people now in Nushki, the whole of the Minguls having deserted their Sirdar.

2. Sirdar Azaad Khan has laid siege to the fort of Chaga, belonging to Surfaraz Khan, Sangram, and explained to the latter that he must compensate the Barichees for the camels he plundered some time ago, also to furnish 1,000 men to assist him in a raid against the Seistanees. Surfaraz Khan explained to Sirdar Azaad Khan that the Barichee claim had been settled long ago, and declined to surrender. All standing crops have been destroyed, and Azaad Khan is pressing the siege. It is reported that the Bakshanees of Nushki intend going to Seistan. Dost Mahomed and Jam Beg, Bakshanees, write to his Highness that Mir Dad Kurreem, son of Dost Mahomed, had joined Azaad Khan with 30 followers, and the rest of the Minguls had left their lands and would not give them to anyone, consequently there would be no cultivation this year, finally they, Dost Mahomed and Jam Beg, only remained trusting to his Highness for support.

3. Darogah Attah Mahomed writes to his Highness that the nephew of Wuzeer Yar Mahomed Khan Akulzai, formerly Governor of Herat, is at Khelat, and wishes for employment. His Highness having asked me whether it would be advisable to give him service, I replied it would be better to adhere to his old policy with reference to Afghan refugees, viz., to show them hospitality for a few days and then request them to settle elsewhere than on his frontier.

4. Sirdar Fukeer Mahomed, Bezonjao, Naib of Kedj, has sent the following as last year's revenue, and explains that the small amount Rupees 4,260, Rupees 10 gold, Rupees 468 silver, four camels, Rupees 560, is owing to the people having refused to pay their revenue, and that no further collection can be made unless his Highness will place regular troops at his disposal. Sirdar Bhai Khan, Gitchki, writes to his Highness that if he acts according to his, the Khan's, orders, his tribe will desert him, and that he must yield to their wishes unless his Highness is prepared to support him.

5. A large kafila from Candahar, about 300 camel-loads of wool and jiri, passed through Bagh on Wednesday.

6. His Highness the Khan left Bagh on the 28th, and will arrive at Gundava on the 1st April.

7. On Friday, Yar Mahomed Koord-Junda Shawani, Mahomed Khan Rustomzai, and Aref Khan Lehree were sent by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed to arrange about the Sarawan subsidy, but as his Highness the Khan and Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed were busy making preparations for their march that evening, the above Sirdars were directed to accompany his Highness to Gundava.

8. Sirdar Noordeen visited me the other day, so I told him he would neither benefit himself nor his friends by interfering with affairs at Beyla or keeping up a surreptitious correspondence with his nephew. My object in making this remark was that a servant of the ex-Jam's son, by name Dadu, had just arrived with letters from Haidarabad.

(Signed) C. H. Harrison, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

No. 335, dated Kurrachee, 16th April 1873.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Calcutta. The disturbances in Seistan are gradually drawing others into them.

2. Major Harrison has been informed that his reply to his Highness the Khan, regarding the nephew of Sirdar Yar Mahomed of Herat, is approved.

3. The Superintendent of Police has been called on for explanation as to how the messenger from the son of Sirdar Meer Khan (ex-Jam) of Lus was allowed to go from Haidarabad to Bagh without permission being first obtained.

No. 150.

No. 349, dated Kurrachee, 18th April 1873.

From the Commissioner in Sind to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with Governor-General.

News-Report ending 15th April 1873.

An attempt was made to injure the Mekran telegraph line between Charbar and Jask. The perpetrator was caught, but on the way into Jask was forcibly rescued by friends. The case is under inquiry.

Several elders of Baho, respected greatly by the people for their sanctity, had proceeded to Mand with the view of endeavouring to induce the Rinds to restore the property these latter had taken from an inhabitant of Nigore. They have now returned to Gwadur partially successful.

Several cases of outrage have occurred lately on the Kafila route between Kurrachee and Khelat just beyond the British borders. They have all been committed by Nowsherwan Chota and Dewriah Bundejo, two lawless petty chiefs. His Highness the Khan has been called upon to punish these men and to make immediate arrangements for the establishment of better order in this part of his dominions. The Khan was at Gundava, and would shortly leave for Khelat.

No. 151.

No. 815P, dated Simla, 30th April 1873.

[redacted]om Officiating Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with Governor-General, to Commissioner in Sind.

[redacted]ITH reference to the concluding paragraph of the Sind News-Report ending with the [redacted] of April last, forwarded under cover of your docket No. 349, dated the 18th idem, [redacted] directed to request that you will be good enough to furnish particulars regarding [redacted]utrages on the Kafila route between Kurrachee and Khelat.

No. 152.

No. 837P, dated Simla, 2nd May 1873. (Extract.)

[redacted]rom Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to Commissioner in Sind.

[redacted] IN forwarding for your information copy of the accompanying despatch from the [redacted]ecretary of State, No. 1, dated 21st March, I am directed by his Excellency the [redacted]Viceroy and Governor-General in Council to request that you will submit with as little [redacted]elay as possible, a full report on the present aspect of affairs in Khelat and on the Sind [redacted]rontier generally, with any suggestions you may have to offer with a view to bring about the efficient establishment of order and good government in Khelat, the security of trade, and the improvement of our relations with the Khan and the frontier tribes.

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No. 153.

No. 839P, dated Simla, 2nd May 1873.

From Officiating Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Commissioner in Sind.

I AM instructed to request that you will be good enough to submit at an early date the Khelat Diaries Nos. 8 to 10, and also a copy of your khureeta to the Khan of Khelat, dated the 10th of March last, and of Major Harrison's letter No. 44, dated the 20th diem, to both of which latter papers allusion was made in paragraph 1 of the Khelat Diary, No. 12, for the week ending with the 23rd of March last. A copy of the khureeta alluded to in paragraph 6 of Diary No. 11 should also be forwarded.

2. I am to take this opportunity to observe that it is highly desirable that the Khelat Diaries, together with a copy of any correspondence alluded to in them, should be forwarded regularly even when they contain matter of little importance.

No. 154.

No. 400 of 1873.

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

SIR, Commissioner's Office, Kurrachee, 3rd May 1873.

I HAVE the honour to submit for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General the following report on proceedings in connexion with the Khelat State.

2. Before, however, entering on recent events, I must briefly revert to some circ stances that occurred before, in order that the present state of affairs may be thorou understood.

3. Until a Political Officer was appointed to Khelat, business with that Goverr was transacted through a Wukkeel, who as a rule resided at Jacobabad, but occasio visited the Khan's Head Quarters, wherever they might be, in Kutchee or at Kl On a British officer being placed with his Highness the Khan, the Wukkeel wa kept on at Jacobabad, as it was convenient his being there to arrange local matter about revenue questions, which then began to crop up in regard to lands in the K territory that were cultivated by means of water given from our Sind canals. Tl person who held the post of Wukkeel was one Moolla Ahmed, a fairly respectabi courtier who, though he did not always exactly adhere to the truth, was believe General Jacob, myself, and Sir Henry Green to exert himself sincerely, and do al he could to promote the interests of both the Governments, Khelat and British, he l quite shrewd enough to be sure that his master's interests would be best served by maintenance of cordial relations with the latter. He died at a good old age in 18 and was succeeded by his son Moolla Mahomed Khan, then quite a youth, and as he h been a great deal at Jacobabad with his father, seen his policy, and watched his actio it was thought he was the best person that could be selected, and that he would alwa follow the same course his father had done. He did so for some years, but latte having become rich, and thinking he saw an opening for his own advancement in t dissensions that occurred between his Highness the Khan and his Wuzeer, the Sha gassee, he has very greatly changed, become a gross flatterer, most untrustworthy in h statements, and an incessant intriguer. He is naturally clever, and had he only be possessed of some physical courage, he might have done a great deal more mischief tha he has.

4. In 1870–71, Mahomed Khan, the "Moolla," is seldom, if ever applied to him now, accompanied Major Harrison to Khelat, and then commenced his attempts to supplant the Wuzeer, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed. By fulsome flattery and innovations that brought about temporary increase to the revenue, he soon succeeded in establishing himself in the good graces of the Khan. The Shahgassee saw it all, and held himself aloof, until the disturbances broke out at Moostung in September 1871. These were in some measure brought on by certain acts of the Khan, carried out on the advice of Mahomed Khan. In spite of all that had occurred, the Shahgassee, when called upon by the Khan, displayed his usual fidelity and bravery, at once took the field, defeated the rebels at Moostung, and had he not been severely wounded, would have followed up the scattered rebels, and have prevented their ever collecting together again. Unfortunately his wounds were so long in healing, that the rebellion gained new vigour in Kutchee, and it became absolutely necessary to despatch a strong body of troops from Khelat to put it down. The Khan thought at one time of going himself, and it would have been well if he had, but disturbances were threatening on his Western Frontier, and he did not like to leave his capital. The selection then unhappily fell on Mahomed Khan, who was still at Khelat. He started with immense protestations, declared that the time for giving the rebels any consideration was passed, and that only their destruction or complete dispersal was left. All who knew this man's character foretold that only evil would come of his being sent with the troops, but the Khan would not believe that a man who talked so largely could be so utterly untrue. So it proved however. Though he had a much stronger force than the rebels, he feared to attack them, and immediately he got face to face with them, he commenced treating, and ended in making a compact with them, which was most dishonourable and degrading to his master, and entirely destructive of the latter's position as ruler in the country. At first this shameful conduct was attributed to cowardice only, but from what I have learned, and seen since, I am now convinced that deliberate treachery to his master's best interests, with a desire to be in good esteem with the rebel Sirdars, had as much to do with his behaviour as the want of courage.

5. The Khan was most justly indignant when he heard what had occurred, and expressed himself to be most angry with Mahomed Khan. On my reaching the frontier in December 1871 I found Mahomed Khan had arrived there with the intention of bringing the rebel Sirdars to have their compact ratified before the British officers. His conduct was very severely commented on by me to the Wukkeel personally, when he presented himself at Jacobabad. He was ordered to return immediately, and to tell the Sirdars to do the same, and further that he most rejoin his troops, and act with them as his sovereign had ordered.

6. When ultimately the Sirdars were allowed to come into Jacobabad, and a settlement was effected in the name of and for the Khan, Mahomed Khan was not allowed to have anything to do with matters he had so shamefully mismanaged. When all was completed I pointed out to the Wuzeer that as Mahomed Khan had behaved so badly he ought to be removed from his appointment of Wukkeel and some more faithful person appointed in his stead. The Wuzeer quite acknowledged the justice of this, but in the goodness of his disposition, and forgetful of the other previous treachery towards himself, he pleaded hard for the Wukkeel, and begged that he might this time be forgiven. Although all had ended so well I was extremely averse to accede to the Wuzeer's request, but he was so very urgent that I at last consented to let Mahomed Khan remain at Jacobabad if his Highness the Khan wished it.

7. I was not then aware of what was passing between the Khan and Mahomed Khan; indeed I was under the impression that the former was still angry with the latter. I have since learned that all the time I was engaged at Jacobabad in endeavouring to bring matters to a satisfactory conclusion, Mahomed Khan was busy misleading the Khan in regard to what was passing, and formed a compact with Shukkur Khan, the military commander, the two Moonshees, Saleh Mahomed and Gool Mahomed, and some of the Khan's relations, to counteract all that was being done at Jacobabad. Their object was to persuade the Khan that Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed had joined in with the Brahooee Sirdars, and that the intention of the British Government was to depose him, the Khan, and put his eldest son, Meeah Mahomed Khan, on the throne. Subsequent events at Khelat, and the Khan's strange behaviour last autumn, proved the effect their representations had had, and how completely the Khan had accepted them, in spite of all that I had written to him and all that was told him by Major Harrison after his return to Khelat last year.

8. I may here mention what is the family of his Highness the Khan. He has three sons:—

1. Meeah Mahomed Khan, about nine years of age now; of good family by the mother's side; intelligent and pleasing.
2. Shah Nuwaz, about five and a half years old; mother not well connected; bright and intelligent.
3. Meeah Azeem Khan, about two and a half years old; mother is sister of the Gitchkee chief of Punjgoor; a promising child.

A roll of the wives and children of his Highness is appended.

The Khan dislikes his eldest son greatly, as is almost always the case among Asiatic sovereigns, fearing he may be made to supplant him. The Khan has an ambitious sister, Bibi Futteh Khatoon, married to a chief of the Eltarzye branch of the Brahooee royal family. She is sedulously working against the Khan, in the hopes of his being killed or removed, that then her eldest son, who is about 15 years old, might have a chance of succeeding to the throne. He is not, however, at all a brilliant youth, and is not likely to be chosen, being out of the direct line. She does not see this, but joins in all Mahomed Khan's intrigues heartily, taunting the Khan with want of spirit in not showing sufficiently his power and independence of the British Government.

9. When the Khan of Khelat was passing through Kutchee *en route* to Sukkur to visit his Excellency the Viceroy, Mahomed Khan joined the Khan *en route*, and at several interviews remonstrated with him for having yielded to the wishes of the British Government in giving up Shukkur Khan and the Moonshees, telling him he would never derive any benefit from being on friendly terms with that government. He also cautioned his Highness against going into Sukkur, as he would in all probability be made a prisoner. It was from this man the absurd idea first originated of intended treachery against the Khan, which was at that time very generally believed in, and which led to the ridiculous scene that occurred on board his Excellency's yacht, when the Khan thought the foretellings had come true. Mahomed Khan also, in the hopes of getting his master into bad odour, and so to break with the British Government, spoke to several of the Sarawan Sirdars urging them on no account to give up the property plundered from the Kafilahs, or its equivalent.

10. The Shahgassee and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee at that time discussed Mahomed Khan's character and proceedings with Major Harrison, and they both agreed in saying that he had for his own purposes deliberately and cunningly worked on the bad traits in the Khan's character, and was ruining him.

11. It was thought that the safe return of the Khan and the highly honourable way in which he had been received by his Excellency the Viceroy would have opened the Khan's eyes to the untrustworthiness of his adviser. At first he seemed very much pleased, and as if he really intended to exert himself in causing the restoration of the plundered property, and had given up his mischievous counsellors. If he had, it was only for a short time, for they soon got control over him again and worked evilly on him by pointing out that after all he had come back without attaining his chief object, the release of Shukkur Khan and the Moonshees. The inhabitants of the harem had been before brought to bear on him on this subject, and they were now very bitter when he returned as they said empty-handed, excepting with a few presents. The interpretation by the adverse party of the nature of the presents was, that the presentation of a sword and shield was a hint to him to exterminate his enemies. And as regarded the remarks made by his Excellency the Viceroy, the Kazee of Bagh, who is the Wukkeel, Mahomed Khan's chief assistant, explained that as the British Government had no wish to interfere with him, the Khan, in the management of his country, he might do whatever he liked. These people also at this time induced the Khan to believe that the proposed Desert Canal was intended to injure him; to lead to the annexation of his country by the British.

12. The Khan went from Sukkur to Gundava, and while he was there during November and December, reports got spread about that forgetful of the written guarantee he had voluntarily given in September for the safety of the Wuzeer, the Khan had again revived the folly he had contemplated at Khelat. At first Major Harrison expressed his total disbelief in such stories, and did his best to assure people there could be no foundation in them. But in December the Shahgassee went to him and said there was no doubt treachery was intended towards him, that the Khan had even gone the length of talking openly in the Durbar that he would have the Shahgassee and others of his relations and friends killed, and it was known that four men of the regiment Shukkur Khan used to command had been paid to watch their opportunity to assassinate him, the Shahgassee. Major Harrison mentioned further that it was generally reported that if the Shahgassee was assassinated, an attempt would be made to prove that it was purely accidental, or that the deed was committed by men whom the Shahgassee himself had hired to take the life of his Highness the Khan.

13. All this time his Highness was most civil to Major Harrison, and profuse in the expression of his intentions of carrying out all he had undertaken. Whether the reports circulated conveyed more truly what were his real views than the words he used to Major Harrison, time could alone show, but certainly little or nothing was done towards collecting the merchants' property. The Khan did not exert himself, but rather appeared to wish that the unpopularity of forcible recovery should rest on the Shahgassee alone. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee seeing the present state of affairs would not risk his personal safety by advocating coercive measures against the Sarawans, as they would desert him and leave him powerless in the hands of the Khan.

14. The Khan was aware that I proposed paying a visit to the Frontier, and desired to have an interview with him. I therefore felt confident that whatever truth there might be in the above reports, nothing would be allowed to take place before that interview, and any interference if ever required had better be delayed. But it did not seem to me that the Khan was really exerting himself to carry out the promises he had made at Khelat, and if he really was not, it would not be fitting that the interview should take place. I therefore, on nearing the Frontier, addressed him the following letter :—

" No. 27 of 1873

" To his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

" Camp Abad Malani, 29th January 1873

" *After Compliments.*—In October last I wrote to your Highness stating the great satisfaction it had afforded me to hear of your having determined on adopting a course suitable to your position as Sovereign of your country, and in accordance with your obligations to the British Government.

" To prove to your Highness how satisfactorily and cordially this change was estimated, his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General was pleased to assent to a meeting taking place with your Highness during his Excellency's tour through Sind..

" That meeting was happily carried out in November last. His Excellency the Viceroy received your Highness with high distinction and honour, and personally expressed to you his satisfaction at the fortunate termination of the difficulties that had lately existed. But I must remind your Highness that at the same time he also distinctly warned you that recurrence of any of the circumstances which so nearly caused the withdrawal of the British officer from your Court could not meet with the same favourable consideration that have been on that occasion accorded.

" At parting with your Highness at Sukkur, I mentioned that I should shortly be returning to Upper Sind, and that it would afford me much pleasure to have a further interview with you to arrange certain matters for the mutual benefit of your country and the British Border.

" I am now approaching the Frontier, and would be glad to arrange for carrying out the above intention. But I regret to have to state that from all I learn of what has passed since your Highness' return to your own country from Sind, it would appear that you have used no real endeavour to carry out what you had solemnly promised to perform and that you have failed to benefit by the wise counsel his Excellency the Viceroy addressed to you. Such being really the case, I can entertain little hope that personal communication with me will lead to any beneficial results.

" In the paper your Highness delivered to Major Harrison at Khelat on the 29th September last (25th Rujub), you affirmed that on your arrival in Kutchee you would take immediate steps for the restoration of the property plundered last year from the different bodies of merchants, for which you were responsible, or give them the equivalent thereof.

" Several months have now elapsed since you entered Kutchee, and I am still without any intimation from your Highness that the claims of these poor people have been fully satisfied.

" It becomes necessary therefore for me before completing arrangements for the interview I so much desired, and which I should be loth to abandon, to request that your Highness will inform me whether you have carried your avowed promises in regard to compensation to the merchants into full effect, and whether their claims have been entirely satisfied.

" My unwearying endeavours always for the welfare of your Highness and for the good of your country will convince you that it is with extreme regret I have felt called upon thus to address you, but my regard for your best interests as well as my duty to my own Government compel me to do so. In the hope that I may speedily receive a favourable and satisfactory reply, I subscribe myself,

" Your true friend and well-wisher,
" W. L. MEREWETHER, Colonel,
" Commissioner in Sind."

15. His Highness replied as follows :—

" From his Highness the Khan of Khelat, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I., and C.B., Commissioner in Sind.

" *After Compliments.*—Your letter of the 29th January, No. 27, reached me at a happy moment and made my heart glad. I reply to the same in a friendly spirit, that I have made every effort to carry out what I guaranteed to do at Khelat on the 25th *Rujub*, and have fulfilled the same.

" You have always been a friend to me, and decided that the Brahooees were to make good what they had plundered from merchants. Seeing the delay that ensued, I advanced 30,000 rupees to reassure the merchants, and since my arrival in Kutchee have so far succeeded in getting compensation for the merchants that their claims can be readily adjusted.

" To the merchants who were plundered by Sirdar Noordeen I gave 5,000 rupees, and the above-named chief's lands are mortgaged until the claims against him are liquidated.

" You, my friend, have written to me regarding the kafilah plundered by the Murrees. You, my friend, are well aware that for some years past the Murrees have not recognized my authority, and have taken every opportunity to plunder my ryots and country. Seeing that it was the wish of the English Government that the merchants plundered by this tribe should be compensated, I had every intention of carrying out what I undertook on the 25th *Rujub*, reckoning that no difficulty would occur in selling my grain.

Up to the present my tithes have not been paid, and I have not sufficient money to settle this claim.

" My kind friend, on receipt of your letter of the 29th January, I saw what the wishes of the English Government were, and settled with the merchants for 55,620 rupees, as follows:—Cash 15,620 on 7th February, two hoondees by Soucar Sajram for 20,000 each at one and two months' sight, payment guaranteed by the above Soucar. In this manner merchants' claims were settled at once; for your information I send a copy of their receipt. You, my friend, know well that I realised nothing from last year's revenue, or would have compensated the merchants. In everything that happens I recognise the kindness of the British Government and yourself, for instance, last year, taking my circumstances into consideration, I was presented with a lac of rupees, from this sum I previously advanced merchants 35,000 rupees, and have now paid 15,620 rupees; the balance has been expended in other ways. My only reason for paying these merchants is that the British Government may be kind to me, and that I may visit you.

" You, my friend, know what my revenues are, as also the character of the Murrees and Brahooees. I myself see no prospect of being able to recover the 90,000 rupees I have advanced, any attempt to do so would cause a disturbance in the country.

" My friend, I have a great wish to meet you, as I have several things to talk about, and should like your advice. Always show your kindness by writing, and believe me your friend.

" KHODADAD KHAN.

" *Receipt.*

" The merchants, Moolah Mujeed, Mahomed Jan Akhoondzada, Abdool Huk, Mahomed Oomur, Shah Nam, Moolah Mahomed Aiyas, Luteef, Mahomed Yusuf, Shere Khan, Deen Mahomed, and other merchants, have agreed to accept 10 annas in the rupee for the kafilah plundered by Murrees in the Bolan, and have received payment in full as follows:—Ready cash from his Highness the Khan on the 7th *Zoolhuj*, 15,620; written guarantee for 20,000 rupees payable 8th *Mohurrum* 1290; and a further sum of 20,000 rupees payable 8th *Sufur* 1290. The above payments are guaranteed by Soucar Sajram of Gundava, and will be drawn when due and after money is realised; no further claims will be made, should any be made we are responsible. In case of nonpayment by the Soucar when the guarantees fall due, we shall renew original claim.

" (Signed) MOOLAH MUJEED, &c., &c., &c.

" (True translation)

" C. H. HARRISON, Major,

" Political Agent, Khelat."

16. From reports received from Major Harrison it appeared that after reaching Bagh his Highness the Khan had bestirred himself somewhat in recovering compensation from some of the Sarawan chiefs, even Alla Dina Khoord had been made to pay, and as stated by his Highness in his reply above given, all claims were satisfied in the beginning of February, and copy of receipt from the merchants accompanied his letter. Major Harrison had also reported what had been arranged in his diary dated 8th February. His constantly repeated advice, firmly maintained, aided by the hearty support and exertions of the excellent Wuzeer, undoubtedly brought about this satisfactory settlement of this very difficult and troublesome question. On the advice of Major Harrison and the Shahgassee, the Khan after some little trouble had been induced to make very good arrangements for the protection of the Bolan traffic. His Highness the Khan having acted thus wisely and well in these matters, no obstacle remained to prevent my meeting him, and arrangements were immediately made for an interview to take place at Shahpoor in his Highness' territory. I thought this was preferable to his being put to the inconvenience of making a long journey again into British territory, and Shahpoor was about equi-distant from Bagh, where he was, and from Jacobabad.

17. I hoped when I met the Khan to be able to carry out the arrangements suggested at the Mittunkote conference for the better management of the Murree and Boogtee tribes, subjects of the Khan, but who for some time past had paid him but very faint allegiance. Also to make good permanent arrangements for the protection of the trade-route through the Bolan and Kutchee. Provision for the protection of kafilahs coming down the Bolan had just been made by the Shahgassee, under the Khan's orders, and at the pressing instigation of Major Harrison, as above mentioned. And I may here mention that it has answered admirably up to the present time, the Bolan being still

reported as perfectly safe, and traversed by travellers without the least fear or difficulty.

18. In regard to the Murree and Boogtee question it was necessary that the chiefs of those two tribes should present themselves at Jacobabad, and any arrangement made explained to them personally. For a time past the idea had gained favour with some officers on the frontier that it would be best to deal with the Murrees and Boogtees directly, and entirely as independent tribes, ignoring the fact that they owed allegiance to the Khan of Khelat. This I have always considered a grave mistake. It was commencing to dismember a kingdom, and that one it was our best interests to maintain in its completeness. Certain of these Murrees and Boogtees had been taken into the pay of Government on the Punjab frontier, to promote maintenance of peace and order on that side. The Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan had stated that these tribes had acted well up to their engagements, and as the principle of so employing them answered as far as that frontier was concerned, it was desirable not to disturb anything that had been done there, so far as it could be avoided. There was, however, one disadvantage in the system in vogue there. It drew these tribes to look to a separate Government, and separate officers from those on the frontier of Upper Sind, in whose hands was the conduct of political affairs with the Khelat State, and it had the effect of fostering in them a feeling of independence of the Khan of Khelat to which they had already a strong leaning, though outwardly they professed to regard him as their Sovereign, and I believe really that they liked to have him still as such, though it may appear somewhat paradoxical to say so. There is always among these wild people a certain amount of superstitious respect for hereditary authority, and they do not easily throw it off entirely.

19. With a view to bringing these tribes back to proper allegiance, and to improve the Khan's position as much as possible, I directed that they should be summoned by and through the Khan, and instructed the Officiating Political Superintendent accordingly. The Boogtee chief, Goolam Moorteza, obeyed the summons, and has been rewarded accordingly. But the Murree chief made improper and frivolous excuses, and was altogether so impertinent in some of his letters, that I was compelled to cause them to be returned, and he simply told that no communications would be received from him, nor any favour shown to him, until he wrote in a proper style, and what was of first importance until he obeyed the orders that had been sent to him by the Khan. One of his excuses was that whenever he was required to attend anywhere, two persons of importance were sent to bring him, and that when the Khan and the British send two each, he would come, not before. This was most insolent, arrogating to himself a position he was not entitled to, and endeavouring to get it acknowledged by us that he was a person of sufficient importance to be so dealt with. I know as regards procedure on the Sind border that such a thing was never done before, and it would be establishing a very bad precedent to permit it now. While allowing these people every proper consideration and treating them with judicious kindness, it is of the first consequence that they should be kept exactly in their place, and not have any opening given them for assuming what is not really their due. They are quick enough to take advantage of it, if given. On the other hand they are thoroughly able to understand firm straightforward management, and fully respect the power that keeps them in proper order. One of the reasons why Guzzun held aloof was his knowledge that he had misrepresented things most shamefully in regard to the share he and his people had received when the kafilahs were plundered. He had told the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan that they gained very little, and when called upon by my order to restore what they had, or the equivalent, he sent in a few camels, and made no further attempt in the matter. The real facts of the case are, that his people, or the Kahun Murrees, as they are styled, to distinguish them from other branches, received a very large proportion of the plunder, and Guzzun Khan, the Sirdar, got for himself alone one fifth of the whole amount taken from the wretched merchants.

20. I considered that the conduct of the Kahun Murrees in joining in that outrage was particularly bad, because the chief Guzzun was receiving pay from the British Government at the very time they joined in an attack on harmless merchants who were bringing their goods to British market. I therefore ordered last year that until the Murrees had made restitution of the property they had got possession of, they would forfeit the favour of the British Government. A very small portion as above mentioned was given up. I maintain that it is only just and proper the rest or its equivalent should

also be surrendered by them, before certainly any new arrangements can be made with the head of the tribe which are intended to benefit them. The Khan of Khelat has lately paid large sums of money to the merchants who suffered the losses. Part of this was recovered from the Sarawan chiefs, but the greatest part has been paid out of his own Treasury, and I am decidedly of opinion we should give no encouragement to men like the Murrees, who have been the cause of the greatest amount of loss to him, unless they first make due restitution.

21. That this can be enforced I am quite certain. It only requires a little firmness and plain speaking to them, and at the same time letting them clearly understand that they will lose by non-compliance. Their not presenting themselves to me through the Khan will cause some delay in the completion of what was to have been done, but that should make no difference, our position is the just one, and should be firmly held, if any real power over these people is to be maintained. I left full instructions with Colonel Loch, now Officiating Political Superintendent, on the subject, as the annexed documents will show, and I am quite satisfied that he will carry them out with becoming decision and judgment.

22. There was nothing to prevent taking the Boogtees into pay under the Mittunkote arrangement. Indeed there was everything in favour of it. Their chief had obeyed orders. He and his people have behaved very well for some time past, and he and they were well deserving of encouragement, at the same time the valuable favour accorded them will have the best effect. It will show to the Murrees how much they have lost by their foolish and improper behaviour.

23. I had instructed the Officiating Political Superintendent to invite Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazee Khan, to be present at Jacobabad when the proposed arrangements with regard to the Hill tribes were being carried out, as in respect to them he is under the Political Superintendent, and it was right he should see and know what was done. He attended accordingly, but the holding back of the Murrees prevented anything final being settled, and after he had given me a return of all the Hill Belooch he had in his pay on the Punjab Frontier, he was detained no longer but allowed to return to his districts, which Colonel Munro, the Commissioner of the Derajat, had informed me was much required.

24. The meeting with his Highness the Khan was fixed for the 20th February. Accordingly I crossed the desert from Jacobabad, accompanied by Colonel Loch, Officiating Political Superintendent, and escorted by the 1st Regiment Sind Horse, the Mountain Train, and a Wing of the 30th Native Infantry, or Jacobs Rifles. On the 20th visits were interchanged, but purely of ceremony. His Highness came to my camp at noon, accompanied by his Wuzeer and all the principal Sirdars, including Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, Noordeen Mingul, &c. All the British officers were present. I took the opportunity of introducing Colonel Loch, who had lately assumed the office of Political Superintendent, and who had not before met the Khan, asking his Highness to communicate fully and freely with Colonel Loch, as with me, that he would find the interests of both Governments best served by doing so, Colonel Loch having my fullest confidence, and being an officer of high distinction and great experience. In the evening I returned his Highness visit, attended by Colonel Loch, Major Harrison, Mr. Moore, Assistant Commissioner, and the officers commanding regiments.

25. The Khan being desirous of having a perfectly private interview came to my tent next day alone. The conversation that took place was lengthy, but I regret to say entirely unsatisfactory. He came apparently with the determination of trying solely to get effected the release of Shukkur Khan and the two Moonshees, and would not enter fully into any other subject. I at once explained to him that such a thing was impossible, that his Excellency the Viceroy had given him an answer at Sukkur, which for the present must be considered final. When attempt was made to discuss any other subject, he would after talking a short time say it was no use his doing anything, he had no power in the country now, he could not even protect, and keep by him three poor creatures like Shukkur Khan and the Moonshees. I felt perfectly confirmed from his manner that he had been urged on to this by others, and I have since learned that the ladies of his Palace even had been prompted to taunt him with the subject, and urge him to make a stand on it as the one thing that unless agreed to he could and would do nothing. It was also said that when he returned to Bagh from Shahpoor,

they were so vexed at his want of success, that they would have nothing to say to him. The principal movers in this are his Highness' mother and sister, both of whom have been among his worst advisers throughout. Finding it was useless to get him to engage in the various important points I desired to discuss with him, I endeavoured to get him to see the absurdity and impropriety of the course he was adopting under evil counsels, but to no effect, he would only return to the one subject. He at one time remarked that every one was against him, that Major Harrison even who had formerly done everything that was correct now listened to stories against him. He thought therefore the only thing left for him was to abdicate. I pointed out to him what he termed stories could no longer be considered such, when they were exemplified by events such as occurred at Khelat last autumn, which must be fresh in his Highness' memory, and that I considered Major Harrison had shown extreme patience, and always acted most sincerely for his, the Khan's best interest. The interview had to be concluded without any good result being arrived at. In the evening, when paying a return private visit, I told again he was adopting a very wrong and foolish course, which must bring upon him the disapproval and disfavour of the Government of India, and that I begged he would reconsider before too late. That it was useless attempting to talk further with him, but I would write to him on the following day to show him what seemed to me best for him to do, and which I intended telling him orally.

26. After his Highness left me in the morning, the Wuzeer Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed paid me a visit in accordance with the wish of the Khan that he should do so. The Shahgassee dwelt mainly on the very difficult position he was placed in owing to the unfortunate dislike his Highness the Khan had taken to him since he attended the meeting at Jacobabad in March 1872. He had then endeavoured to do the best for his master and country, and what he had done was he knew approvingly written of by me to the Khan at the time, but in spite of all, designing people had poisoned the Khan's ear against him, and everything he attempted to do now was either viewed with suspicion or secretly thwarted, showing he had lost the confidence of the Khan.* He was quite ready to work on to the last, if he would do any good, but as matters stood he thought it better that he should resign the Wuzeership on returning to Khelat, so that someone else might be appointed whose offices would be more agreeable to the Khan, and with whom the latter would be able to work more frankly. He said he could not account entirely for the change that had taken place in the Khan's demeanour of late years, but it had certainly altered greatly, and nothing now progressed satisfactorily. The disturbances that had broken out between the Khan and the Sirdars had been settled, and had he received the full support of the Khan, he would have easily recovered all the plundered property that was in possession of the Sarawan chiefs. But somehow the Khan would not enter cordially into the matter, so that only a portion was got back, and the remainder of the compensation paid by the Khan to the merchants had to come out of his, the Khan's own Treasury. In spite however of the restoration of peace, and the merchants being satisfied, he regretted to say there was nothing final decided for the general settlement of the country. He should still endeavour to his utmost as long as held office to bring about improvement in this respect, as was his duty, and with God's blessing he hoped matters would mend. I could see however that he was very despondent and that, though naturally a most brave and determined character, the opposition he now always met with, and the reports that were spread about of the Khan's openly shown animosity towards him, as well as stated threats of ill-usage, had had the effect of making even this faithful and good old servant distrustful of his master, and anxious about his own fate. I told him generally I was very sorry to hear what he said, that of his fidelity and zeal for his master's best interests and those of his country,* there could be no doubt these had been displayed in so many instances, but that as his Highness had unhappily chosen to withdraw his confidence from him, and it was impossible that the State duties could be efficiently carried on when the ruler and his first minister were not in perfect accord, I thought his intention of resigning was a wise one; his Highness would then have an opportunity of trying others, and would soon be able to judge from whom he received best counsels and most faithful service.

* It has been reported that the Khan had on one occasion told the Shahgassee in Durbar before every one, that he had no cause to thank him for the arrangements that had been made at Jacobabad.

* Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, the most powerful and influential Sirdar in the country, has repeatedly acknowledged to Major Harrison that the Shahgassee is the only man fit to be Wuzeer, owing to his stanch fidelity and good sound sense, and that he was the only man who could maintain order in the country.

27. It was also desired by the Khan that I should receive the Sirdars of Beloochistan who had accompanied him from Bagh. At the conclusion of the interview with the Shahgassee, he brought and presented them to me at an afternoon Durbar. I took the

opportunity of telling them that the restoration of peace in the country was a matter of great gratification to the British Government, and that I trusted it would continue. That what was most desired to be seen was a strong Government in the country, supported by the united good feeling of all people, high and law. This would be best brought about by the Sirdars showing their Sovereign, the Khan, they were always ready and willing to work with and not against him, and so draw his consideration and favour towards them, in which case it would soon be felt by all that their interests were one and not separated, as unfortunately had so much been the case. I also warned them that disturbances such as had occurred in Kutchee close to the British border in 1871–72, disordering everything, could not be tolerated, and should such occur again, the people engaged in them would be regarded as simple robbers and treated accordingly. All present gave their assurance through the head Sirdar, Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, that they would do their very best, and it would not be their fault if peace were again disturbed.

28. When his Highness the Khan paid me the first formal visit, Sirdar Noordeen Mingul accompanied him. In consequence of his persistence in rebellion last year, and his repeated acts of hostility against the Khan, he was removed from the headship of the tribe, a cousin named Meer Mahomed having been appointed by the Khan in his place. This Noorden choose to take offence at, because he was not assigned the place of Sirdar in that Durbar, and stayed away from the Durbar held by the Khan in the evening to receive me. This was most disrespectful towards to Khan, and the more insolent, as the Khan had shown him great favour less than a year before by allowing him to surrender with the guarantee of his life, notwithstanding all his ill-conduct. I noticed his absence at the time, and being afterwards told the reason by Major Harrison, I forbade his, Noordeen, being permitted to accompany the other Sirdars, when they came to pay their respects to me.

29. On the morning of the 22nd I marched from Shahpoor to Minotee, and then addressed the following letter to his Highness the Khan :—

" To his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

" After Compliments.—During the conversation I had with your Highness yesterday I found with much regret that it was impossible to engage your attention on any other subject than one, the release and return to you of the three men who were dismissed from your Highness' service and brought into Sind. Notwithstanding that I at once, on your opening the subject, distinctly informed your Highness that such a request could not be listened to, this matter was repeatedly reverted to by you, and was the only one you were disposed to give full consideration to. His Excellency the Viceroy of India in replying to a similar request at Sukkur, decided ' that to reverse the dismissal of these ' men at present, would only have the effect of weakening your authority and would ' afford encouragement to other evil-doers. Under these circumstances therefore it was ' quite impossible for the British Government to countenance their restoration, though ' at some future time if events proved favourable it might be found possible to reopen ' the question.' The very recentness of the unfortunate events which were brought about by the evil machinations of these men could not have been forgotten by your Highness, and should have shown that there was no reason for the presumption you seemed to entertain that the present was the fitting moment alluded to in the latter part of his Excellency's reply. I can only therefore now again say, as I repeatedly stated yesterday, that the decision of his Excellency the Viceroy rejecting the request for the release of these men must be strictly adhered to, and as your Highness' best friend, I would most strongly urge not only that you should cheerfully accept that decision, but that you should remove from your mind all idea of the probability of any appeal in their behalf being received or listened to, as such expectation most prejudicially affects your actions, and the satisfactory performance of the duties of the high position you hold.

" Perceiving that further conversation in your Highness' present frame of mind would be productive of no good, I considered it best not to prolong my stay at Shahpoor, but to return to Sind, and to lay before you in writing the points which I had wished to have discussed orally with you. They are as follows, and to them I would ask your Highness' best and most careful consideration, and the favour of the expression of your views, after mature thought, on the several points brought forward, that I may submit them to my Government.

" It cannot be expected that the disorders which have so unfortunately prevailed in

your Highness' dominions can be remedied all at once. Time must be allowed for this. But if you will devote your earnest attention to this work, and use your utmost endeavours to win the hearts of your Sirdars to yourself, there can be no doubt that success must attend your efforts, that peace and good order will be established in your kingdom, and prosperity be restored to the advantage of yourself and subjects; of this being a happy time for such exertions on your part, there is abundant proof of the reconciliation with your Sirdars effected last year in the present tranquillity in your dominions, and in the important works about to be carried out by the British Government, either in, or in the immediate neighbourhood of your country. I allude to the Grand canal being made to bring water from the Indus at Kusmore to fertilise the present desert part between Sind and Kutchee, which will give employment now, and improved means of subsistence hereafter, to a large number of your people, and to the railway through Sind, which cannot fail to attract merchants from Affghanistan, and very largely increase the traffic by them through your country.

" I have learned with much pleasure from Major Harrison of the good and successful arrangements you have made for the re-opening of the Bolan Pass, and the protection of merchants desirous of following that route. Such improved measures will add largely to your good name, as well as to your advantage, and the officers who have so well carried out your Highness' orders are deserving of the highest commendation.

" The question of permanent arrangements for the safety of the Bolan passage was one I wished particularly to discuss, as my Government is anxious to give all reasonable aid to your Highness in carrying out a measure of so much importance to your country and those on either side of you.

" You have represented to Major Harrison that the subsidy of Rupees 30,000 per annum which you receive from the British Government does not by a considerable sum reimburse you for the loss you sustain by the reduction in the duty tariff agreed to at the time of the Treaty concluded in 1854. Such being the case, I need hardly assure you that a clear statement in this respect will certainly receive every consideration at the hands of Government, and if you will favour me with data showing the amount annually received on this account into the Khelat territory before the Treaty, and the amount realised annually under the new tariff since then, I shall have great pleasure in submitting it to Government for favourable review.

" Meanwhile, with the view of aiding in preserving safety throughout the Bolan, I had intended proposing to you that a sum of Rupees 500 per mensem, or Rupees 6,000 per annum should be paid by the Political Superintendent on the frontier of Upper Sind in your Highness' name to Shere Dil Muzzeranee Murree, who has on former occasions served you well, and is able and willing to undertake the task of protecting travellers through the part of the Bolan he and his tribe inhabit. That a further sum of Rupees 1,000 per mensem, or Rupees 12,000 per annum, should be paid by the same officer also in your Highness' name to the chief of the Sarawans, on condition that certain bodies of horse or footmen be employed to assist in maintaining security in the Bolan. The details of time and mode of payment at Jacobabad to be made afterwards by the Political Superintendent.

" I have proposed the latter arrangement with regard to the Sarawans, first because the Bolan route passes through their lands, and next, which I consider of most importance, because it should be your Highness' object to gain over the Sarawans to your side, and by giving them employment as well as a direct interest in the maintenance of order, draw them away from the temptation of associating with evil disposed characters, who may try to renew disturbances, especially from the habitually discontented and restless Jalawan Sirdar, Noordeen Mingul. By the above means you will be relieved from much care and anxiety, and I should be glad to have your Highness' assent to the proposal.

" It is also the desire of my Government that a portion of the Murree and Boogtee tribes in the hills be taken into service in your Highness' name, with a view of putting a stop to the injury done at times to your province of Kutchee by raids from the hills. The recent misconduct of the former, in the disrespect they showed to you and to the British authorities, render it impossible to show them any liberal consideration now, but should they by subsequent good conduct prove they are sorry for the way they have misbehaved, they may perhaps be re-admitted into favour, and dealt with as considered then most advisable. The Boogtees having followed a more becoming course, and shown themselves anxious to do good service, will be employed at once.

" I would call your Highness' attention to the urgent necessity that exists for early arrangements being made for the proper administration of the rich district of Beyla, now

for so many months left without any official to represent and maintain your authority. This is required in justice to your subjects there, but it will likewise tend greatly to your advantage in the largely increased revenue that will come into your Treasury.

" I would also press on your Highness that nothing tends so much to the honour of a king, and to the prosperity of his country, as the careful selection of good governors or Naibs for the different districts. They should be men of known weight and good repute, such as while asserting your authority will also have a just regard for the welfare of your subjects over whom they are placed.

" I regret to have to inform you that I find it utterly impossible that the duties of Wukkeel at Jacobabad can be left longer in the hands of Mahomed Khan, the present holder, and I must beg your Highness will appoint some other person in his place. This man's conduct for some time past has been such as to seriously injure your Highness' interests and good name. Last year during the disturbances then taking place, when he was sent against the rebels in command of your troops, he proved himself an arrant coward and deliberate traitor. Since then he has, as you well know, never ceased to endeavour to misrepresent matters to you with a view of leading your Highness to misunderstand the wishes and actions of the British Government. The Political Superintendent on the frontier will cease to transact business through him, and I would request the early appointment of his successor.

" I took the opportunity of a visit paid me yesterday by your excellent Wuzeer, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, to enjoin on him a steady continuance of the fidelity and zealous exertions he has always shown in your Highness' service, and he assured me, as I was well convinced would be the case, that his best efforts and faithful labours had been and would be at your disposal, even to the sacrifice of his life. At a subsequent Durbar when, with your approval, all your Sirdars paid their respects to me, I publicly enjoined on them that their first duty was true and cordial support to their Sovereign in all things; that they must clearly understand the sole desire of the British Government was that there should be a strong Government and one head in Beloochistan, without which prosperity and happiness was impossible; that the British Government could only regard them as supporters of the Government through the Sovereign, and any favour ever extended to them must be through him, and for him. They all expressed their anxious desire to obey and serve your Highness in all things.

" In conclusion, I will only repeat what I have often said before, that as your oldest and most sincere friend, I have only your Highness' welfare at heart, and that in all I have done and said I have only worked for your good. Major Harrison, who has resided with you so many years now, and is so well acquainted with your people and country, has, as your Highness knows, my fullest confidence, and any advice he may tender to you will most assuredly be only for your benefit. In considering the different points I have mentioned above, I would recommend that you should freely take advantage of the counsel and support he will readily give you, and in the confident hope that you will act in the way that is most beneficial to the interests of yourself and country, I subscribe myself

Your sincere friend and well-wisher,
W. L. MEREWETHER, Colonel,
Commissioner in Sind."

30. In my letter to the Khan I adverted to the question of the deficiency of the present subsidy to meet the loss the Khan has sustained since the introduction of the new schedule of rates on merchandise in transit through his country, because I well know this is a matter that has been reckoned to have added greatly to his difficulties, is a subject of dissatisfaction on his part, and therefore the sooner it is thoroughly cleared up, and rectified, if necessary, the better. Returns from the Khelat Treasury records would at once show whether there is real foundation for the statement, and, if it is proved, I feel confident his Excellency the Viceroy would desire that the cause of complaint should be removed.

31. The proposals to subsidize the Muzzeranee Murrees and Sarawan chiefs partly were mentioned with the view of carrying into effect the arrangement agreed to at the Mittunkote conference. The Kahun and Bijaranee Murrees having failed to present themselves, as directed, were to be left for the present, until by good behaviour and acting up to what was required of them, they showed themselves deserving of being treated with favour and liberality, and that they could be trusted in. The Boogtees had behaved exceedingly well for some years past.

32. The district of Lus Beyla had been without a Governor for more than a year, ever since the Shahgassée Goolam Jan had been forced to fly from it through the treachery of the regular troops. The Khan was constantly urged by Major Harrison last summer, after tranquillity had been restored, to send some suitable person to represent him in this important part of his kingdom, but he would decide nothing then, and has not been able to make up his mind since. The result is the district has been getting into a worse state of disorder every month, and has now become quite unsafe to travel through. There is no one actually in opposition to the Khan and his authority excepting Ali Khan Jamote, and he is a very petty chief, with but a small following. He has taken up his cousin Sirdar Meer Khan's cause merely on family grounds. The disturbances partly proceed from an old clan feud between the Chootahs and the Jamotes, the latter being egged on by Noosherwan Chootah, uncle of the present chief of the former tribe, Sirdar Khan, and who has ever since his brother Oomed Ali's death been doing his best to take the chief power from his nephew. This man Noorshewan has also allied himself with a notorious ill-doer, Deoriah, Bundijo, and the two have lately attacked and partially plundered some small kafilahs of merchants on their way from Kurrachee to Khelat, en route to Afghanistan. These acts have been committed in Khelat territory just beyond the border, across the river Hubb, and it is generally reported they have been prompted by Noorden, the Mingul Sirdar, who advised them to act thus that they also might be paid to keep the road safe.* It is also now stated that Noordeen was instigated to this by people about the Khan, who told him it would help to restore him to favour, because it was what the Khan wished to prove he was right in what he had said about the uselessness of subsidising the Sarawan Sirdars to keep the Bolan route safe. At the time the Khan was addressed, these last-mentioned outrages had not taken place, but the state of Lus Beyla was such as to cause considerable anxiety, and to make it necessary to urge on the Khan the necessity of taking early steps to introduce proper rule there once more. The Roonjahs, one of the principal tribes in Beyla, and some others, had themselves petitioned the Khan to send a governor without delay, whom they would receive well and gladly obey.

* This road would not be used if the Bolan route were made permanently secure.

33. The question of the selection of good officials to hold charge of the different districts was one calling for immediate steps, as little or nothing good had been done in this way since the last rebellion, when the Naibs generally most signally failed in their duty towards their master.

34. The conduct of Mahomed Khan, the Wukkeel at Jacobabad, both during the rebellion and since, had shown how utterly unfit he was for so important a position, and how impossible it was for the Political Superintendent on the frontier to place any confidence in him, or to continue to transact business through him which related to the interests of the British Government and that of Khelat. This man's proceedings at Khelat in the summer of 1871, his treachery towards his master in his dealings with the rebellious Sirdars in the autumn, and cold weather, and all his actions since prove that he only cares for his own selfish ends and his personal aggrandisement. As long as he attained his present object he would not mind what happened, thinking he would be able to right matters afterwards. Added to this, he has lately plainly shown that he entertains most vindictive feelings against the British authorities, and to gratify them would not hesitate as to who he sacrificed. It is the more ungrateful on the part of this man as he has always been treated by the frontier officials with marked favour and consideration, for the sake of his father who preceded him, and also on account of the high position he held as representative of the Khan of Khelat. On my reaching Jacobabad this time I decided not to have anything to do with him, and directed that no more business should be transacted through him. I considered it therefore essentia that the Khan should be requested to appoint another Wukkeel. From the time of my reaching Jacobabad I had refused to let him come before me.

35. His Highness the Khan gave the following reply :—

"From his Highness the Khan of Khelat to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind.

"After Compliments.—I received your friendly letter at a happy moment. In it you intimate that there was no intention of releasing my three servants. My great friend, when I succeeded to the Khanate my late brother's Wuzeer Gungo was in office; he committed no fault whatsoever, and performed his duties in a truthful and

honest manner, but of friendship to the British Government I agreed to remove him from his position, and he went to live in Roree. Subsequently he was imprisoned, and only released after having overcome a thousand difficulties to die in his own house.

" Lately it was the pleasure of the English Government to deport three of my servants from Khelat. Although they had committed no fault, each of these men performed their respective duties without interfering in any other person's business, they served me well in every possible way. The removal of these men has injured my reputation throughout the country. In spite of all my representations Major Harrison would not listen to what I had to say; being helpless I had to make them over to the British Government, but told Major Harrison I should discuss the question with the Governor Sahib and the Commissioner in Sind.

" On leaving Khelat for Sukkur, I had great hopes in my heart that I should be allowed to discuss matters connected with the maintenance of order in my country, &c., &c. On visiting the Governor Sahib, I hinted regarding the release of my three servants. My request was not conceded, but I was told that arrangements would be made at some future date. Seeing no attention was paid to this trifling request, I considered how other representations would be treated, and remained silent.

" I have just visited you, my friend, at Shahpoor, and how often did I speak to you regarding my three servants. As you would not listen to what I had to say, no benefit has resulted, and my name has been disgraced. My friend, whatever was in my heart I revealed to you from beginning to end.

" At Khelat, when my afore-mentioned servants were suspended, it was agreed that they might remain undisturbed in their respective homes. At Pusht Khana, in the Moola Pass, I received a letter from Major Harrison, stating that his Government wished these men to live in Sind. I placed them under surveillance, and brought them to Sind as requested by the British Government, though it was a great disgrace to me.

" You, my friend, write that treating my Sirdars with consideration will add to my reputation, and ensure peace, and quiet for my ryots and country. This is true my friend. Last year a treaty was made in your presence to return property belonging to merchants and ryots: what has become of this treaty? I yielded all personal claims. The merchants and ryots have not received anything. You, my friend, know all the circumstances of the case.

" You write a desert canal is to come from Kusmore through uncultivated lands in Sind and Kutchee, and that it will benefit the country and people: also that the railway will be beneficial to merchants and traders. My friend, when visiting you, I talked about my country and all other matters. My country belongs to the British Government, and I am willing to abide by their wishes.

" You request information regarding transit-dues before and after my treaty with the British Government. In reply I beg to state no change has taken place in transit-dues in Affghanistan and other countries, but the British Government reduced the rates in my country to less than one half, causing a loss of 80,000 rupees, and it being their pleasure reduced rates only are taken.

" The British Government, for the protection of the Bolan, have proposed to give Shere Dil Muzeranee Murree Rupees 500 per mensem, and Rupees 1,000 monthly to the Sarawans. My friend, it appears to me that safe transit through the Bolan cannot be ensured until my Government is strong. You know that when my authority was felt and recognized, arrangements for the Bolan were satisfactory: until my power is re-established, transit in the Bolan is difficult. If you carry out what you propose, the Jalawan Sirdars will also expect to be subsidized, and it is a doubtful question whether safety in the Bolan would be ensured. The British Government are masters.

" You have also written about Murrees and Boogtees employment to prevent raiding in Kutchee. Since the Boogtees have been subsidized, they have been quiet and done no injury to my country or ryots. The Murrees are a bad set of people, and if subsidized by your Government and myself, would not refrain from plundering: there is no other remedy except to exterminate them, and carry off their property. The Murrees do not acknowledge my authority, and I do not wish to have anything to do with them. The British Government are masters.

" Regarding what you wrote about Lus Beyla some time ago, I punished the Sirdar of that country, Jam Meer Khan, and drove him out of Beyla. Ali Khan Jam had not power to act as he has done, the disturbances in Beyla were brought about by the Sarawan chiefs. Rebellion at the present time is not merely confined to Beyla, Punchgoor and Kedj are also disaffected. If I had had no other disturbances or work to attend to, I should long ere this have repossessed myself of Lus Beyla.

" You request me to appoint another Wukkeel at Jacobabad. My friend, since the Wukkeelship was first instituted, it has been held by Nawab Mahomed Khan and his father, and from first to last they performed their duties faithfully to both Governments. Their services are known to the whole world. You, my friend, know that when I was at the Noorwah, how faithful Mahomed Khan was, what services he rendered, and that he was prepared to lay down his life for me. The above facts are as clear as the sun. There is no one to equal Mahomed Khan, or suited for the appointment. He has my fullest confidence, and there is no one besides him who would perform the duties of both Governments, especially towards the British Government. If your Government does not agree to this, they are at liberty to appoint who they like, and Mahomed Khan will remain with me, in case people of this country should injure him: if not, he will go to Lehree, of which place he is Naib, if the Government wish it, and guarantee that he will not be molested in any way.

" You write that the Sarawans may be alienated from Noordeen Mingul. My friend, if the present state of affairs is considered strong government, rebellious people will not sever from Noordeen, neither will he sever from them.

" You say that Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed will perform his duties with the same faithfulness, truthfulness, and loyalty that he has always done, also that advice given me by Major Harrison will benefit me; this is true, I have always followed his advice and intend to do so. What I had to say regarding Major Harrison and Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed was communicated at Shahpoor.

" My hope was, that I, my country, and resources might some day be of use to your Government in such a way as to add to my name and reputation. When your Government intention was such, it was also well. By the blessing of God all is well here. Comfort my heart by writing to me, &c. &c."

36. This reply was most unsatisfactory. It in fact conveyed nothing beyond a sort of indifferent assent. Major Harrison reported that the delay in answering my letter was caused by the Khan waiting the arrival of Mahomed Khan, late Wukkeel from Jacobabad. The answer was then prepared after confidential consultation with Mahomed Khan, the Kazi of Bagh, and a hanger-on, called Moolla Jooma. These had now become the Khan's chief advisers. I now addressed the Political Superintendent, in the letter below given, and forwarded another khureeta for his Highness the Khan, in the hope that he might be stimulated to some cordial action and to show some real desire to work actively and truly for the good of his people and country, as well as to prove he was really anxious to carry out the Treaty obligations he was under to the British Government.

From the Commissioner in Sind, to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, No. 214, dated 10th March 1873.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a translation of a letter received from his Highness the Khan of Khelat, in reply to mine of the 22nd ultimo, and of a further communication addressed by me to his Highness.

His Highness the Khan, in his answer to me, does not give any decided assent to the proposals made to him, but says in reference to the main points the British Government is master. This conveys nothing, and unless he is prepared to heartily join in the course suggested, and to identify himself therewith, there will be little use in attempting to carry any of the measures into effect, and others will have to be adopted.

In the letter which accompanies this, and which I request you will forward by the quickest means to Major Harrison, for delivery to his Highness the Khan, I have simply confined myself to calling on his Highness to state distinctly whether he intends to accept and act on the advice given to him or not.

In presenting this letter, and in any conversation that may occur, Major Harrison should particularly impress on his Highness that the course of conduct he has lately adopted, and persists in following, cannot fail to lead to a change in the friendly feelings, and willing support which have hitherto been invariably extended towards him. His persistence in adhering to men who have been proved to have been acting most injuriously for his interests, and to be utterly unworthy of the confidence of a great ruler, is not merely unbecoming, but it shows he is weak, and that he listens to the words of unreasoning people, who think only of personal matters, not the good of the country. There can be no disgrace in evil counsellors being removed, it can only attach to the selection of such, and to their being taken into marked favour.

" Last year a dangerous rebellion was brought to a favourable conclusion, and quiet restored in his Highness' country, when his own efforts to quell it had proved unsuc-

cessful. What was then done was done by the Commissioner of Sind in his Highness' name, and should have been considered a sacred charge to be carried out to the letter by him, the Khan. Had he acted on the good advice that was tendered to him, all would have ended well, and the plundered property, which has only as yet been partially restored, would all have been given up. The Sirdars have delivered up some, and would have complied fully with the stipulations they had bound themselves to, if firmness and energy had been shown by his Highness, and the advice of his best counsellors had been followed.

"The Boogtees are well behaved, for which his Highness may thank the British authorities on the Frontier. The Murrees would now be made equally so if His Highness would accept the proposals lately set forward. It is not at all intended they should be at once taken into favour, as the instructions left with you will show. A copy of these should be forwarded to Major Harrison for his information, and that he may explain to his Highness the exact plan that is intended.

"Major Harrison should particularly enjoin on his Highness the urgent necessity that exists for early arrangements being made to put the district of Beyla in proper order and bring it under some authority. Recently disturbances have occurred there which are solely attributable to the absence of all governing authority, and not to any distant intrigues, as his Highness would desire to have it understood. Such disturbances, close to the British border, cannot be allowed to continue, and unless prompt measures are taken by his Highness to restore order there, the matter cannot be regarded with indifference. The district of Beyla is a very rich one, and if properly provided for, would add largely to the Khan's revenues. The disregard of this, as lately shown by his Highness, is a significant sign that unconcern and apathy are taking the place of interest and energy in the Government of Khelat.

"As respects the late Wukkeel, Moolla Mahomed Khan, his shameful falseness and treachery have been of late too plainly shown to leave any doubt as to his utter unfitness to be the channel of communication between the Khelat Government and the British authorities on the frontier. I knew his father Wukkeel Moolla Ahmed well, and believe he always worked to the best of his ability for his master's interests and to secure the favour of the authorities he was accredited to. When he died at Jacobabad I was very willing his son should succeed him. But now that that son has forgotten to follow the faithful path of his father, and regards his own selfish ends more than the honour and welfare of his master, or the gratitude he owes the British authorities, it is impossible he should be retained in the office. I see no objection to his residing at Lehree, or anywhere else in Kutchee his Highness may choose to permit, but his Highness should clearly understand that it is not correct or desired that he should hold any confidential position about his, the Khan's person, or proceed in any capacity to Khelat."

"Khureeta, from the Commissioner in Sind to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, dated 10th March 1873.

"After Compliments.—I have received your Highness' letter dated 3rd Mohurrum, in reply to mine of 23rd February 1873, and regret that its contents can only be regarded as most unsatisfactory, in that they show clearly that you are unable to save yourself from the trammels of evil advisers, and that you pay more attention to the idle talk of foolish persons, than to the sound advice of those who work only for your good.

"I regret extremely to notice that you have so soon forgotten the danger of the position from which you were saved last September, and that you entertain the idea that advantage can come from having about you such low and ill-suited advisers as the Bunnia Gungaram, and the three men who have recently left you.

"The circumstances which rendered Gungaram's removal necessary were fully explained to you at the time by General Jacob and Sir Bartle Frere, and should not have been forgotten. He did your Highness immense injury at the commencement of your reign. The three last-mentioned were doing the same. They are correctly classed with him.

"It is unbecoming to further discuss the removal of these three men, your Highness having been distinctly informed by his Excellency the Viceroy that the decision arrived at in regard to them could not be altered.

"To use many words when grave interests are at stake is not good, and may lead to misunderstanding. I will therefore confine myself now to earnestly urging on your Highness that you should carefully reconsider before too late the course you have recently so unhappily adopted, that you should repel the counsels of those weak and silly people who would lead you to regard petty matters as affairs of first importance, while your rule

is falling to pieces from neglect of those who have your honour and welfare at heart, and who have the will and the power to promote the stability of your throne and Government.

"The British Government has no wish to interfere, or to do anything except for the good of yourself and of your country. I have always, as you know, steadily endeavoured to promote both. The present very unsettled state however of your kingdom cannot but be regarded with much concern, and I therefore recently addressed you, pointing out the necessity of remedial measures being adopted, and what appeared to me best to be done. But unless your Highness cordially accepts in its integrity the advice that was proffered, and acts sincerely and truly upon it, as if the thought were originally your own, no advantage can follow from attempts to carry out any of the proposals made.

"The manner in which you convey your concurrence in the proposals I submitted in regard to the protection of trade is not such as can be accepted. The arrangements suggested were only to be carried out in your Highness' name, and for your advantage, and unless you as ruler of the country do take them as your own, and determine to forward them to the best of your power, it is quite useless to engage in them.

"I must therefore ask your Highness to inform me simply whether you desire to act on the advice offered, or whether you decline to accept it, that I may be enabled to place the matter before Government in a clear and certain light, and that it may be seen what arrangements should be made for the future.

"Trusting that you will be guided only by regard for what is best for your people and country, and that the friendly feelings which have so long existed may be strengthened only by the course you will adopt, I subscribe myself, &c. &c."

37. During the time that these letters were passing, the Khan remained at Bagh, Major Harrison reported in his diaries that the Khan had at first only intended to send a courteous acknowledgment of the receipt of my letter, and no steps were taken to prepare a reply until the ex-Wukkeel, Mahomed Khan, arrived from Jacobabad, when the one received was prepared after consultation with Mahomed Khan, the Kazi of Bagh, and the man called Moolla Jooma, who appears to have great influence with the Khan.

38. At a visit the Khan paid Major Harrison on the 28th February, his Highness had expressed a strong wish that Mahomed Khan should accompany him to Khelat, but Major Harrison very properly informed him that he was at liberty to act on his own wishes, but if Mahomed Khan did go to Khelat after what had occurred, it was certain he, Major Harrison, would not do so also. His Highness begged that such might not be the case, as disturbances would infallibly occur directly Major Harrison left. At the above interview Major Harrison did all he could to induce the Khan to take interest in the subjects brought to his notice by me, and talked to him with the greatest kindness and patience, but all to no purpose. The Khan merely repeated that he had no intention of ruling the country or taking any interest in its affairs, until Shukkur Khan and the Moonshees were released; that the British Government, the Shahgassee, and Major Harrison might do what they liked. Major Harrison pointed out to his Highness that the only wish of Government was to see him accept his position as head of the country, and to exercise his authority in such a manner as to ensure peace and quiet in his dominions, and that his position as representative of the British Government merely required he should give friendly advice, and he must disclaim any intention of taking any other. The suggestions regarding the proper settlement of Lus Beyla were referred to, but his Highness doggedly maintained the position he had assumed of being neither willing nor able to rule his country.

39. In spite of these assertions it was found that the Khan was raising another regiment of infantry, the command of which he proposed giving to Farrier Abdool Waheed, late Naib of Dadur, a worthless character. The previous force of about 3,000 men had not been paid for three months, and to raise money to pay them the Khan was forcing the Bunnias in Kutchee, Quettah, and Moostung to buy up his grain, which was causing great discontent. The addition of this other regiment can only add greatly to his difficulties, while he certainly would not need them if he followed the advice given to him. The Bolan passage was quite safe under the arrangements made through the counsel of Major Harrison and the Shahgassee, and the payments proposed to the Sarawan Sirdars and Muzzeranee Murrees would have made the arrangements lasting. In Beyla no regular troops were required, the people, excepting Ali Khan Jamote and his small following, being ready to accept and support any good governor the Khan would send. The Murrees in the hills had expressed a desire to be allowed to come in, but the Khan

replied to them that he would have nothing to say to them himself, they might go into Jacobabad, and the British Government might make any arrangements with them if they liked, provided he, the Khan, was not held responsible for the acts of the Murree tribe. He further told them they had made a great mistake in not coming when first sent for, as they would now probably not be received by the officers of the British Government. As far as his own feelings towards them went, he said he would never forget having had to pay Rs. 55,000 on their account—referring to the plundered kafilahs—and that if it was ever in his power, he would punish them most severely.

40. On the 4th March the Sarawan Sirdars with Moolla Mahomed Raisanee were allowed to leave Bagh and return to their homes. On the following Monday, the 10th idem, the Khan granted a private interview to Noordeen Mingul, at which the ex-Wukkeel Mahomed, the Kazi of Bagh, and Moolla Jooma were also present. These people advised that the Khan should appoint Azaad Khan of Kharan* Governor of the whole of Mekran, and his cousin Belooch Khan to be Naib of Punjgoor, whilst Noordeen was assured that no active measures would be taken against Beyla. Next day, the 11th, Major Harrison visited the Khan, who then communicated the intention he had formed about Azaad Khan, who was to be bound down to pay annually Rs. 20,000 into the Treasury. Major Harrison at once begged the Khan to reconsider the question, as Azaad Khan was a treacherous, unreliable person, and his cousin, Belooch Khan, was quite recently an acknowledged feudatory of the Persian Government, pointing out also that such arrangements by his Highness could not but be viewed with indifference by the British Government. His Highness agreed not to act without further consideration, but said that people of Azaad Khan's and Belooch Khan's nature were required for the province of Mekran, as Fukkeer Mahomed, Bezunjao, was the person who had instigated the Sarawans to rebel, and the Kedj and Punjgoor chiefs were altogether beyond control. On the Friday following, the 14th, when the Khan returned Major Harrison's visit, the latter asked him if he had made any appointment with Sirdars Azaad Khan and Belooch Khan to meet him at Sohrab on his way to Khelat. The Khan acknowledged he had invited them. Major Harrison then again pointed out that such measures would be most distasteful to the British Government, as they would most assuredly lead to rebellion and disorder throughout his Highness' dominions. The Khan replied, that though these Nowsherwan Chiefs, Azaad Khan and Belooch Khan were to meet him, it did not follow that they were to be taken into his service, and as regarded contemplated disturbances, they could not be avoided, because neither the chiefs nor people would pay their revenue.

* The Khan's inveterate enemy.

41. The arrangements that were existing in Mekran to which Fukkeer Mahomed had been restored, were made at the recommendation of the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed. The proposed alteration was said to emanate from the Khan's new advisers, and the object to be to cause enmity between the Minguls and Bezunjaos in the south, so as to prevent them taking further interest in the Sarawan country in the north. Sirdar Azaad Khan being taken into favour is to alienate him from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee. If these new plans are carried out there will be a serious rebellion all through Mekran, as also in the Jalawan country from Kozdar down to Beyla. Major Harrison again urged the Khan to take some steps to restore order and rule in Beyla, but the Khan said he could not manage it, that he could send no troops down there without money, of which he had none. Continued efforts were made in a friendly and quiet manner to induce the Khan to meet present difficulties, and overcome them. The only response that could be obtained from him was that the British Government might do what it liked, he himself was perfectly indifferent to all matters connected with the government of his country, and never intended to take any further interest in them.

42. The Khan, in alluding to the disturbances in Seistan, stated that the Persian Government would soon have a large force in those parts, and punish the rebels. His Highness persists that Sirdar Yacoob Khan has a friendly compact with the Persians, and will never assist his father against them. The Khan informed Major Harrison of his having written to Sirdar Yacoob Khan, but made no allusion to the contents of the letter. Lately the Khan would seem to have taken more interest in Persian affairs and proceedings than he used to do, though the Shahgassee has always steadily declared that he does not believe his Highness has had any direct communication with that Government.

43. On the 15th March the Shahgassee proposed that he should resign the Wuzeer ship on reaching Gundava, and go to Kurrachee, because his Highness had a policy of his own, which he would carry out in spite of any advice that he, the Shahgassee or

Major Harrison, may give. The latter remarking on this said that the Khan's contemplated arrangements in Mekran, his interference with affairs at Seebee, and other circumstances, support the Shahgassee's statements, and make him, Major Harrison, doubt the inert attitude the Khan has chosen to assume.

44. The reasons for the Khan adopting the line of conduct he had lately followed were not at all clear. Major Harrison about this time was of opinion that disappointment at not having been more fully assisted in a pecuniary way to enable him to completely coerce the chiefs and keep them down, also an exaggerated idea he had been led by evil counsellors to form of the importance of himself and his country to the British Government in connexion with the now much talked of advance of the Russians towards India, and working on this idea he had only to oppose whatever was suggested to get much larger sums of money given to him. On one occasion he had actually mentioned to Major Harrison that he thought the least the British Government would offer him would be two lakhs of rupees per annum, as the Ameer of Cabul was said to get twelve.

45. I dare say both of the above reasons have a great deal to do with the adverse change that has taken place in the Khan's demeanour. But there can also be no doubt that he has chafed very much at the increase of interference in the affairs of his government which recent events had made necessary, and he did not therefore give the British Agent that confidence and consideration he had formerly so readily yielded. It further appears clear that he is wearied out with 16 years of a disordered reign, and though affairs in his country have been placed on a good footing for him, the rebellious chiefs brought under control, and anxious for repose, the inhabitants of Beyla solicitous that an official should be sent to take charge of that district, Mekran settled and quiet, and the Bolan trade-route made perfectly safe, so that with a regular system laid down, order might easily be thoroughly established, and the state revenues be allowed to recover themselves; the Khan has not the energy or will to engage in the work, and prefers giving heed to any advice which suggests expedients to relieve him from difficulties that may arise.

46. The Shahgassee in discussing these matters with Major Harrison said there seemed only two courses left; one, that the Political Agent should withdraw, he (the Shahgassee) accompanying him, to let the Khan act entirely for himself and realise the true nature of his position, and to manage as he best could; the other, for the Wuzeer to endeavour to carry out what was right, whether the Khan concurred or not, he (the Wuzeer) being supported by the British Agent. Major Harrison at once pointed out that this last scheme could not be thought of for a moment, as he could not either directly or indirectly countenance usurpation of the Khan's powers. It was his duty to give advice, but to interfere no further. Copies of letters from Major Harrison, Nos. 37, 38, and 39, dated respectively the 3rd, 4th, and 5th of February are appended.

47. On the 20th March Major Harrison submitted the Khan's reply to my letter of the 10th idem, and in doing so wrote as follows:—

"In forwarding the accompanying letter from his Highness the Khan, I have the honour to report a conversation that ensued on Monday last in connexion with the various suggestions made by the Commissioner in Sind in his khureeta of the 22nd ultimo.

"His Highness appeared to think the ex-Wukkeel's case of primary importance, and having settled that Naib Mahomed Khan's family should remain at Jelal Khan's Gote, and his Moonshee settle all outstanding revenue matters, he (the Khan) declined further procedure in this business, stating I or the Shahgassee might appoint any one we liked as Wukkeel at Jacobabad. It is needless to state this responsibility was not accepted, and his Highness again urged to nominate some one, with what result may be inferred from his Highness avoiding this subject in toto in the letter now forwarded.

"The second point his Highness discussed was subsidising the Murrees and Sarawan Brahooees, with the view of maintaining order in Kutchee and safe transit through the Bolan. His Highness at first maintained he had fully answered this suggestion, but I told him a general expression that the English Government were masters did not convey anything like cordiality or support, and that it was essential that he did signify his hearty co-operation and assistance before my Government would make any subsidising arrangements. His Highness said he would think over this, but would not hold himself responsible for any further raids that might be committed on Kafilahs by Murrees. Ultimately, through pressure on the Shahgassee's part, his Highness has signified his intended co-operation. How far it may be relied upon is doubtful. His Highness's real

feelings towards the Sarawans are well known, and at the present time he is intriguing with the nephews of the Seebee Chief to compass the death of their uncle and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed. The abrupt dismissal of the Murree Chief's Wukkeel, reported in Diary No. 10, also shows what his Highness's sentiments are with regard to this tribe.

"The Beyla question was evaded in every possible way, and his Highness still carefully avoids giving the Commissioner in Sind any information what his arrangements are likely to be. I pointed out no difficulty whatever existed, and that re-possession might be easily effected, either by a Brahooee levy or detaching some of his troops, instead of massing them at Khelat. Want of funds, their horses and camels, as also that his Sepoys did not care about the heat, were set forth as insurmountable obstacles. Finally, his Highness informed me, when his heart opened, he might take some interest in the question. On being asked when this might occur, and what it implied, he said it might be years, it might be never, and his heart would only open when the British Government gave him assistance and support, instead of interfering with his Government and domestic affairs. I continued talking on this subject with the greatest patience and kindness, hoping his Highness would take a sensible view of the matter. This part of our conversation, however, ended by his Highness stating he did not care for Kutchee or his immediate possessions, still less for the distant province of Beyla, and that my Government might do what they liked.

"Shortly before leaving, his Highness informed me that I had altered a great deal, and implied that my society was distasteful; formerly he thought I was willing to be influenced, whereas I now tried to influence him and oppose his wishes. I replied my advice at present, as in former years, was for his welfare and the good of his country.

"Circumstances noted in the above and preceding paragraphs show his Highness does not appreciate good advice, as his reply to the Commissioner implies. Everything tends to show that his Highness, whilst professing utter indifference to his position as ruler of the country, is actively following a policy of his own that must end in disaster and rebellion.

"I before submitted Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed's suggestion of withdrawal for Government consideration, and I am still of opinion this would be the most advisable course to adopt under present circumstances. His Highness, in spite of all he may write, is not in a friendly mood or willing to take advice; and as far as I can judge from passing events, last year's complications will be revived in an exaggerated form, and may not be so easily adjusted."

48. His Highness the Khan's letter was to the following effect:—

"From his Highness the Khan of Khelat to Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind.

"After Compliments.—Your kind letter of the 10th March reached me at a happy time, and I have mastered its contents from beginning to end.

"You write me to send you a distinct answer to each proposition in my former letter. I willingly agree to everything you suggested, and realised that those suggestions were to assist me and benefit my country and people.

"Referring to the Bolan route in connexion with the Murrees and Brahooees, I wrote as I did, fearing results expected would not be realised, viz., the safety of the Bolan through means of the above tribes. The English Government know no dependence can be placed either on the Murrees or Brahooees; however, I am pleased at the prospect of employment being given to the Murrees. Guzzun and Muzeeranee, as also the Sarawan Brahooees, consent to the same, and with God's help will give all the assistance in my power, and use my best endeavours to ensure the success of this scheme.

"You ask whether I accept or refuse the advice you gave on a former occasion. My friend, I never intend to leave the course I have hitherto followed with your Government. The advice you gave in a former letter I accept with a willing heart, and will never act in opposition to good advice given by the British Government.

"Referring to what you wrote about Lus Beyla, my arrangements are made to proceed to Khelat. When I arrive at the latter place you will know what arrangements have been made regarding Beyla. All is well here. Kindly correspond and keep me informed of your welfare."

49. About the same time I received from Colonel Loch, officiating Political Superintendent, the letter below given, and as it is answered at the same time as a further communication was made to his Highness the Khan, it will make the narrative more clear if it is given here. Colonel Loch wrote:—

"I have the honour to forward copy of translation of his Highness the Khan of Khelat's reply to your khureeta of the 22nd ultimo, which I regret to say through an oversight on my part did not accompany his Highness the Khan's vernacular letter, as I had intended; also copies of the letters noted in the margin, from Major Harrison.

Letters Nos. 37, 38, and 39, dated Bagh, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th February 1873.

"In submitting these letters I would beg your particular attention to that portion of Major Harrison's letter No. 38, dated 4th instant, in which he says, 'I would solicit 'Government's consideration to the Shahgassee's first proposition to withdraw and leave 'the Khan to his own devices,' and to request your particular instructions on this subject, as both Major Harrison and the Shahgassee appear so strongly in favour of it.

"From my having so lately taken over charge of the Political Superintendent's office, I am rather diffident in offering an opinion, but from what Major Harrison writes and has explained to me verbally of his Highness the Khan's previous history, his fickleness, his undecided character, his aptness to listen to and act on any bad advice given him by the many evil advisers by whom he is surrounded, his inactivity in governing his own country; his evident wish, as evinced by his action, or rather want of action, regarding the settlement of the Beyla and Murree countries, to allow misrule to continue; his apparent want of faith in the English Government, and consequently his determination to act in direct opposition to the advice so lately given him by you; his inattention to the views of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India regarding the governing of Khelat, his great avidity for money, his steady persistence in requesting the recall of the three Moonshees, and his so publicly honouring and listening to the bad advice given to him by the ex-Wukkeel, Mahomed Khan, so lately dismissed in disgrace from Jacobabad, all tend to show that sooner or later Major Harrison's suggestion, viz., that of withdrawing our Political Agent from his Highness' court, and leaving his Highness and his Sirdars to settle the question of the future government of Khelat amongst themselves, will have to be adopted; and it now remains for you to recommend whether Major Harrison, reinforced by one troop of cavalry under a European officer and two companies of Jacob's Rifles, also under a European officer, should be allowed to accompany his Highness to Khelat, or if the time has arrived when we ought to withdraw our Political Agent. At present Major Harrison has only one troop of cavalry with him.

"Looking at the present aspect of affairs in Khelat, as represented by Major Harrison, I feel sure you will agree with me, that it would not be safe to allow Major Harrison to accompany his Highness with a smaller force than I propose sending. I would however wish it to be borne in mind that in sending this force for the protection of the Political Agent, Khelat, a sum of nearly (40,000) forty thousand rupees will have to be sent with them, as in all likelihood Major Harrison will be absent for eight months, and the great difficulties experienced last year will again be felt unless their pay is sent with the troops.

"Major Harrison reports that his Highness the Khan's troops have not received pay for three months, and consequently are not very well affected towards his Highness, and are getting importunate for their arrears, which he seems to doubt his Highness beingable to give them even when he receives his annual subsidy, as his Highness as well as his son, Meah Mahmood Khan, are both trying to take up large loans.

"Under the circumstances, and recalling to mind the occurrences of last year, I await your instructions as to whether it will be best to allow Major Harrison to proceed to Khelat, taking with him this amount of treasure (which if, as seems to be the case, his Highness' troops are disaffected) might be an incentive to them to mutiny when at Khelat, or at once to withdraw Major Harrison from his Highness's Court, allowing Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed to accompany the Political Agent, should the Shahgassee feel disposed."

50. It had now become quite evident that it was utterly useless attempting any further to induce the Khan to act up to what he said; he was ready enough with assent, and assertions of desire to please, but nothing was done to show he would heartily endeavour to carry out what was desired. I therefore addressed the following instructions to Colonel Loch, and sent through him a final letter for his Highness the Khan:—

"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter from Gundava, No. 659, dated 8th instant, with accompaniments. Since then, I have received a further letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat, in reply to the one I wrote to him on the 10th March, in answer to his letter of the 3rd idem.

"In his last communication his Highness the Khan affects to agree cordially to all that had been proposed to him, but as you will observe from my reply, copy of which is herewith forwarded, I find it quite impossible to accept his assurances as being sincere, or to believe that he has any real intention of heartily joining in the course recommended

to him. His actions now and for some time past point to exactly contrary conclusions, and I feel sure it would only lead to grievous disappointment, if not worse, were any faith to be attached to these written protestations.

"Of the two proposals submitted by the Shahgassee to Major Harrison, the latter officer was perfectly right in rejecting the second; it would have been engaging in an excessive amount of interference in the affairs of the Government of Khelat, quite contrary to the orders and wishes of Government, and it must have been a course most distasteful to the Khan, and in the end objectionable to those he ought to rule over, but whom by such an arrangement he would really cease to govern.

"The other proposal is certainly the most suitable, and taking into consideration the present state of affairs, the Khan's unfortunate obstinacy, his persistent disregard of the counsel and offices of his Wuzeer, as also of the advice of the Political Agent, at the same time readily following the suggestions of low, unqualified, and irresponsible people, and finally the utter indifference he is displaying as to the good government and state of his kingdom, I am quite of opinion that it is the proper course to adopt, in order that the Khan being left to himself, may gain some practical experience of the folly and inexpediency of the line of conduct he has unfortunately been following of late.

"I have therefore in my letter informed him that no alternative is left, but that Major Harrison should be withdrawn from his Court. The vernacular original is herewith sent, and I have the honour to request that you will forward it to Major Harrison for delivery to his Highness the Khan, and that after having done so, Major Harrison should return with his escort and people into British territory.

"As no advantage will be gained by the Shahgassee attempting to carry on the duties of Wuzeer, and as he has throughout, from the time of his being appointed to the office, which was with the approval of the British authorities most earnestly exerted himself to promote cordial action between the two governments, he should certainly be permitted to accompany Major Harrison if he desires to do so.

"I do not anticipate for a moment that any act of insult or injury will be displayed towards Major Harrison, or his people, if his Highness the Khan could prevent it. But considering the very uncertain state of affairs, and the doubtful condition in which his Highness' troops seem to be, I consider it is a very wise and judicious precaution you have observed, and of which you informed me by telegram, to send the full escort to join Major Harrison at Gundava, the same that was intended to have accompanied him had he moved to Khelat. Your proceedings in that respect have my entire approval, as well as your instructions to Major Harrison to withdraw at any moment should any emeute take place, and to permit the Shahgassee to accompany him, should the latter wish it."

51. To his Highness the Khan was written the following:—

From the Commissioner in Sind, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, dated 31st March 1873.

"In your Highness' letter dated the 20th Mohurrum (19th March), now received, you express yourself willing to agree most cordially to all the arrangements proposed by me in my letter of the 22nd February, from Minotee, and further you say that, if it pleases God, you will render great assistance, and support in the proposals submitted to you. I wish I could unreservedly accept this is a sincere expression of your Highness' feelings and instructions, but I regret exceedingly to have to say that, judging by your public actions, these expressions are mere words, and that nothing is being done by your Highness which would convey to me the assurance that you are really earnest in a desire to carry out any plans that will conduce to the good of your country, the welfare of your subjects, or the improvement of your Government.

"If such were your true wish, you would have used the services of your legitimate adviser and first officer, your Wuzeer, whose actions have always received the approbation of the British Government, and who has never failed to act with the most perfect fidelity to your Highness, and to devote his best energies in your service. You would have sought and acted upon the advice of the British officer deputed to your Court, who you were informed by his Excellency the Viceroy possessed the confidence of the Government of India. And especially after what occurred last September at Khelat, you would have been careful to avoid resorting to the counsels of low, irresponsible people, who ought never to be allowed near you, who are utterly incapable of doing anything else but lead you to serious disaster, and one of whom I had lately been compelled to inform your Highness could no longer be permitted to transact business with the Frontier Superintendent on account of his disgraceful cowardice and his treacherous conduct, both as regarded your Highness' interests and those of the British Government.

"In spite of all that has been urged on you, I see no sign of your Highness making any effort on your own part to restore order to your troubled country. Repeated outrages are reported to me from Lus Beyla, and lately merchants have been plundered there when following the high road. A year and a half has elapsed since any one representing your authority was in that district, and now you only say arrangements for it shall have your attention after your return to Khelat, notwithstanding that measures for the restoration of order in that part of your dominions had been repeatedly pressed on you by your Highness' proper adviser and by the Political Agent. You have more than once mentioned that your finances were in a very embarrassed state, yet I am informed that your Highness is raising another regiment of infantry, which can only prove further embarrassing burden on your State funds.

"You say peace prevails in your country, and certainly the serious disagreements that existed between yourself and your Sirdars have fortunately been brought to an end, so that this increase to the strength of your regularly maintained troops can in no way be required, and can only be regarded as the reckless procedure of one who cares not how he rules, or what becomes of the interests intrusted to his charge. This increase to your troops also cannot fail to be an element of weakness to your Government, when delays in payment cause dissatisfaction among them, and the means of meeting their just dues are not at your disposal.

"All that has passed lately and is passing now goes to show that it is utterly useless attempting to aid your Highness with advice, or to make your position better by the support afforded to you in the presence of a British officer at your Court. The value and benefit of that support seems not to be appreciated by you now, nor the honour it conveys understood.

"I have, as your Highness is well aware, steadily and earnestly endeavoured to maintain your authority in Beloochistan, and such has always been the desire of the British Government; it is therefore with extreme regret I have come to the conclusion that it is inconsistent with the objects for which a British officer was placed with you, as well as derogatory to the honour of my Government, to allow the Political Agent to remain any longer at your Court.

"I have therefore instructed the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to direct Major Harrison to return to British territory, there to remain until such time as your Highness may be disposed to act more openly and sincerely, to work only with your legitimate advisers and officers, and discarding evil advisers, to endeavour truly and honestly to promote sound and good government in your country, so that your power as ruler may be consolidated and your authority once more respected.

"In the earnest hope that you may speedily free yourself from the unworthy thraldom you have lately fallen into, and that you may revert to the more wholesome procedure of former years, I would still desire to subscribe myself as

Your sincere friend,
W. L. MEREWETHER, Colonel,
Commissioner in Sind."

52. To prevent any chance of ill-advised display on the part of any of the Khan's followers, it was very properly arranged by Colonel Loch that the strengthened escort of cavalry and rifles, which was intended to accompany Major Harrison had he gone to Khelat, should join him at Gundava. They did so by the 3rd April. My letter to his Highness the Khan intimating the withdrawal of the Political Agent reached on the 5th, and was delivered on the 7th. His Highness then asked that he might see Major Harrison, but under the circumstances the latter declined, and bearing in mind what had occurred in September last, I think the course adopted was the best one, viz., Major Harrison taking leave of his Highness by letter, and not at a personal interview. On the evening of the 8th Major Harrison accordingly left Gundava, accompanied by the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, with his relations and friends, amounting to some 150 men. In his report dated 24th April, from Jacobabad, Major Harrison writes:—

"After careful perusal of the Commissioner's letter of the 31st ultimo, addressed to his Highness the Khan, and bearing in mind how utterly the latter had repudiated all he had written and said to induce me not to withdraw from Khelat, as directed, I felt further discussion would be useless, as any promises made would be disregarded on the first convenient opportunity; also that it might be for his Highness' ulterior benefit and the interests of his country to show him, in as marked a manner as possible, that he had for a time at least forfeited the friendship and support of the British Government. With this object in view, I forwarded the Commissioner's letter, with one from myself, a copy of which is annexed, intimating that my instructions would be carried out at once. In the afternoon I was visited by a confidential servant of his Highness, asking whether I

would take leave of his Highness, or whether he should visit me. In reply I alluded to that portion of the Commissioner's letter in which his Highness was informed that as he had failed to realise the benefit, support, and honour conveyed in having the presence of a British Officer at his Court, further residence was considered derogatory to my Government. I also mentioned that my instructions were clear and decided, and as the Commissioner in Sind had written all that could be said on the subject, I had taken leave of his Highness in writing, feeling that an interview under the circumstances of the case would be disagreeable to both parties.

"Acting as above was I considered giving effect to the Commissioner's instructions, as also to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General's remark to his Highness the Khan. When alluding to the Khan's position with the British Government in an early part of this letter, I mentioned that withdrawal might be of ultimate benefit. During the past year and a half his Highness' relatives, instigated by certain officials, have done everything they could to mislead the Khan, and create ill-feeling between him and the British Government. Sudden withdrawal left them without a policy of their own, and as far as I can now learn, both his Highness and his evil counsellors are doing their utmost to carry out what the Commissioner had so earnestly and repeatedly urged upon the Khan as the most expedient course to adopt. Whether it will succeed is doubtful, as the Sirdars have no confidence in his Highness, or the people by whom he is influenced.

"Directly it was known that the British Government had withdrawn their Agent, a general raid in Kutchee was contemplated, similar to what occurred in 1871, but my influence with the chiefs, and reminding them of what the Commissioner in Sind had said on the subject, has, I hope, effectually deterred them from creating disturbances close to our Frontier.

"My Wukkeel, after delivering the Commissioner's letter, asked me how it should be answered, so I told him my official connexion with his Highness had ceased after delivery of the letter above alluded to. His Highness has, I have since heard, written two or three letters which were posted at Sukkur, and allowed it to be understood that the departure of the Shahgassee and myself was at his particular request, and that another officer would be shortly appointed to his Court."

"From the Political Agent, Khelat, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

"AFTER COMPLIMENTS.—A letter from the Commissioner in Sind to your address has just arrived, which I now forward to you. From a perusal of the same, you will understand all the circumstances of the case.

"My friend, agreeably to the instructions of my Government, I leave this, and return to British territory, as arranged on a former occasion. Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed will accompany me. My kind friend, I write this for your information. All is well."

53. The night before Major Harrison left Gundava, Sirdar Noordeen Mingul had a long interview with the Khan, at which the latter tried to gain over the Sirdar, by promising to make him chief Sirdah of Jalawan, give him the standard, and ask for the release of his brother-in-law, the ex-Jam of Beyla, Sirdar Meer Khan, if he and the Mingul tribe would support him, the Khan. Noordeen agreed at the time, but next day came to Major Harrison's Camp at Nowshera, evidently undetermined what to do. Meeting with no encouragement there, he returned to Gundava and asked for leave to return to his native place, Wudd. This was refused by the Khan then, and several times since. Noordeen has sent to tell the Shahgassee he will escape on the first convenient opportunity. The Khan then requested Noordeen to use his influence to get Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee to join the Khan, and to assure the Sirdar that he, the Khan, wished to be on friendly terms with his Sirdars and people. Noordeen declined this, saying Moolla Mahomed had neglected his, Noordeen's, interests when at Jacobabad. His Highness on this sent two mace-bearers with a letter to Moolla Mahomed, but they were ill-treated by some Brahooees on the road, and had to return without delivering the letter. Efforts were then made through a friend of the Sirdar's, who was commissioned to tell the latter the Khan was anxious to carry out what had been arranged at Jacobabad, and would in future adopt a conciliatory policy towards him and the Brahooees. But the Sirdar declined, saying he had no confidence in his Highness, or his promises.

54. The ex-Wukkeel, Mahomed Khan, was sent for from Lehree, where he had gone, to come to Gundava to assist the Khan. He came, and at his instigation, it was said, a letter was written and sent direct to me. But it has never reached, if it was ever despatched. Mahomed Khan then returned to Lehree.

55. Some of the Sirdars asked Major Harrison plainly whether they were at liberty to take possession of Kutchee, now that the British Government had withdrawn. He replied he could not participate in any intrigue against his Highness, but as a friend

would remind them of what had been said by the Commissioner at Shahpoor, and what might happen if they created any disturbance on the border. The Sirdars appeared disappointed, saying that if the Khan got back to Khelat they could not protect themselves against tyranny and oppression, for he had forts, guns, &c., while they had only swords. They therefore hoped the British Government would take Kutchee, and allow them to settle down in peace and quietness therein. Major Harrison pointed out that such was not at all contemplated, as his withdrawal showed. The Lehrees and Mahomedshaies appeared disposed to trust in the Khan's promises, but the other Sarawan Sirdars clung to Moolla Mahomed. The Sirdars withholding from plundering in Kutchee is a good sign, showing they are sincere in a desire to carefully regard the expressed wishes of the British Government. Some of the Sarawan Brahooees had collected at Dadur with the intention of plundering in Kutchee, but they were immediately checked by Moolla Mahomed, who said he would not allow of anything of the sort, as it would annoy the British Government.

56. A slight disturbance took place at Seebee, where Moolla Mahomed was staying. He and Buktiar Khan Barookzye had heard of the evil intentions of the latter's nephews, Ackbar Khan, and Sirbullund, sons of the late Misree Khan of Seebee, to kill Moolla Mahomed. People were sent to quietly arrest the two young men, but they got intelligence of it, and received the party with a volley, killing seven men.

57. His Highness the Khan had great difficulty in moving from Gundava, but he was said to have started on the 18th April, and reached Kotree, the first march, that day. He proposed waiting there until he heard the result of the mission of Samundar Lehree, who had been sent by his Highness as a last attempt to win over Moolla Mahomed. Darogha Attah Mahomed, who has charge of the fort of Khelat, and all the Khan's people there, had written to his Highness commenting strongly on the folly of his conduct, and advising him to lose no time in returning to Khelat by the direct, shortest, road across the hills.

58. Major Harrison reached Jacobabad on the 14th April. In accordance with the instructions given him, he was accompanied by the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed. The latter brought his family with him, and domestic followers, in all amounting to about 150 persons. This excellent and most faithful old servant of the Khelat Government would not lightly have left the master he had steadily adhered to for fifteen years, ever since he was appointed Wuzeer in 1858; but he felt he was no longer able to do any good, owing to the extreme aversion the Khan had lately taken to him; he was only doing harm by remaining, and it was useless risking his life and that of his people when no advantage could possibly come of it. While by keeping out of the way now, he might be able to give his services hereafter, when the country has passed through the crisis, which must now come on from the Khan having so unfortunately joined in with the vain projects of a few short-sighted men, who have only their own selfish views at heart, and can do nothing for the real good of the country, or the enhancement of the honour and position of the Sovereign. A separate report on the future disposal of the Shahgassee, and his people will be submitted hereafter.

59. It has been with extreme reluctance that I have adopted the course of withdrawing the Political Agent from the side of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, but there was no alternative left. It had been fully intended that this step should be taken last September, but discretionary power was left with the Political Agent, and his Highness pleaded so earnestly that he should not be abandoned to what would then certainly have been a most disastrous fate, at the same time yielding apparently most sincerely, as well as thoroughly to all that was required of him, that Major Harrison used the power given him, and acceded to the Khan's urgent request that he would continue with him. This was fully approved, and it was hoped that the imminent danger which was before him, and from which he so narrowly escaped, would have the effect of opening the Khan's eyes as to where his only real safety rested, and that he would thenceforth carefully eschew evil counsellors, looking only to retain the support of the British Government by following unreservedly the advice that was tendered to him, and by exerting himself to rule with more discrimination and judgment, and with justice and consideration for all.

60. The policy that has been followed from the first in regard to Khelat affairs was to avoid in every possible way direct interference in the general government. His Highness the Khan, Meer Khodadad Khan, was "de facto" and "de jure" King of the country, and we had no more right to dictate to him how he should manage his chiefs and subjects than we had with any other potentate ruling independently over a State. As long as he conformed to the terms of the treaty existing between his Government and that of Her Majesty in India, and as long as our territory was free from aggression, or from disturbances caused by his subjects, we were bound to respect his right to rule in his own country as to him seemed best. Being on friendly, and close terms, and having

a Political Agent at his Court, we were in a position to offer advice, whenever it seemed necessary to do so, and it was always freely given, though at the same time care had to be taken that any representations so made should not appear meddlesome or dictatorial. Certainly until lately there was no difficulty found in getting his Highness to receive any suggestions addressed to him, and he promptly acted up to proposals laid before him. His character, as I have often said, is not of the best kind, but he is not different in this respect to the generality of Asiatic rulers, who have been brought up in the strict seclusion of the Harem, and who have seen around them nothing but the exercise of despotic power. He was called to the throne at the early age of 18, before which he had never been allowed to participate in any way in State affairs or public duties, and having at that time the credit of being weak in character, he from the very commencement of his rule was looked upon as a likely object to be moulded to the purposes of that one of the rival powers in the State which should be able to get the upper hand. Other circumstances also militated strongly against his success as a ruler over a very uncivilised restless body of chiefs, owning simply feudal obedience, which had been of a very uncertain and captious nature even to his predecessors. I allude to the fact of the near approach of a strong and settled Government as followed when Sind came under the British Crown, and order and system were brought up to his very boundaries. This had the effect of making any shortcomings in his mode of Government more glaring to, and to be felt more oppressive by, his chiefs and subjects, while the sight of firm and methodical rule made apparent to him, and all, the evils which must always attend the feudal system, wherein so much is left to caprice and chance. The barons being discontented, and unfortunately very poor beside, endeavoured to grasp all the power they could, while the Khan, finding he could not trust to them, and seeing the example in his neighbourhood of order successfully established by means of disciplined and regularly maintained troops, he naturally gave up looking to his unruly nobles for support, and took into his service mercenaries upon whom he thought he would be able to depend more certainly.

61. All this has caused a great social revolution in Khelat, and combined with continued disturbances brought on partly by the ambitious projects of the barons, and partly by the hasty and uncertain management of the Khan, promoted, it may almost be said, a total dismemberment of the body politic. The encouragement so unhappily given during recent years to the disaffected Sirdars had a very pernicious effect, while the interference which then became necessary not only helped to fatally undermine the Khan's authority, but it changed his disposition greatly, turning him from us.

62. Knowing the great importance of having one head in Beloochistan, and anxious that the wishes of Government for the establishment of a strong rule in that country should be fully carried out, I have always been most careful to do only what would help to promote the authority and power of the existing sovereign. The Political Agent, Major Harrison, has most patiently and sedulously worked to the same end, so that the withdrawal of that support to the ruler of Khelat which has been accorded in the form of an Agent at his court for the last 18 years, has not been hastily decided on, and is now only resorted to to save the country from falling into a worse state than it is at present, and to bring about a more healthy condition of affairs. As long as the Khan had something to fall back upon to recover from difficulties he had fallen into, he failed to realise the danger he was in. He will now soon learn how weak are the supports he preferred trusting to, and hard experience will bring home to him the value, indeed, vital necessity to him, of what he has so ill-advisedly thrown away.

63. It is of course impossible to say how long it may be before a serious crisis takes place, but it cannot be staved off any length of time. The Khan's treasury is empty, the troops—his sole dependence now—are in arrears, and will soon be clamorous for pay, and prove an element of extreme danger to him, while he has no one by him of ability, or influence sufficient to provide a remedy. His authority will then cease altogether, and he will either have to abdicate, as he said he proposed doing on return to Khelat, or he will have to fly the country again, if an opening is given for him to do so. He is said to have written and sent me a letter since Major Harrison's withdrawal, but none has reached me as yet, and it is probable he has been unable to make up his mind what to say. The presence of the Shahgassee at Jacobabad will facilitate obtaining good information as to what is passing at the Khan's court and in Beloochistan, and obviate in some degree the difficulties resulting from the absence of a Native Wukkeel, not appointed as yet by his Highness the Khan. On his Highness reaching Khelat, he will be again addressed, requesting a Wukkeel may be placed at Jacobabad to arrange about revenue matters and ordinary business, but beyond that I think nothing more should be done at present as regards our connexion with the Khelat Government. But if his Highness, after he has settled down at Khelat, does not show that he can restore order, and that he is

working to that end, it will be necessary for him to be distinctly told that the state of affairs in his kingdom has reached such a stage of disorder and misrule dangerous to neighbours, and destructive of the trade which should pass through it into British territory, that measures would be taken to enforce the order and safety to all, which the Khan has shown himself incapable of bringing about. The subsidy of Rs. 50,000 for this year has been withheld from the Khan, and will be so until he restores order in Beyla, appoints a suitable Wukkeel to reside at Jacobabad, and shows that he really intends acting fully up to the treaty under which that subsidy is allowed.

64. Several serious outrages have been perpetrated lately in Southern Beloochistan, quite close to the British boundary, and on merchants proceeding from Kurrachee to Affghanistan. The leading perpetrators are Nowsherwan Chootah and Dewria Bundhejo, The former is uncle of Sahib Khan, the present chief of the Chootahs, a very large and influential tribe located on the main road between Kurrachee and Khelat. Oomed Ali, the former chief of the Chootahs, and father of Sahib Khan, kept the tribe always in good order, but on his death his younger brother, Nowsherwan, has done his utmost to get the Puggree transferred to him instead of to his nephew, Sahib Khan, to whom it regularly went according to the custom of the country. Noorsherwan has several times attacked his nephew, but generally without success; now he has joined this Dewriah, who has long been noted for his lawless propensities, but had been afraid to engage in them for want of sufficient associates. The two combined have collected together some 60 or 100 reckless characters, and with these have attacked kafilahs directly after they have left British territory on crossing the Hubb river. It would be easy to capture these two men and their followers by means of the Sind police, but as the acts are committed within the Khan of Khelat's territory, he is left to deal with them, and reparation must be exacted from and through him. He has been called upon for immediate restitution of the property, or its equivalent, and punishment of the perpetrators of the outrage. It is generally stated that Nowsherwan and Dewriah have been stimulated to these disorders by Noordeen Mingul, in hope of its provoking our direct interference, and its acting to the disadvantage of the Khan, to whom he is in reality by no means friendly. He also thinks that pressure being brought to bear on the Khan, he will be induced to apply to the British Government for the return to his country of his, Noordeen's, brother-in-law, Sirdar Meer Khan of Beyla.

65. This report has been kept back until it could be made complete. I trust the measures that are detailed in it will meet with the approval of his Excellency the Viceroy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. L. MEREWETHER, Colonel,
Commissioner in Sind.

Enclosure 1 in No. 154

APPENDICES to Letter No. 400, dated 3rd May 1873, from the Commissioner in Sind to the Address of the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department.

NOMINAL ROLL of the WIVES of HIS HIGHNESS THE KHAN OF KHELAT.

No.	Name.	Caste.	Parentage.	Birthplace.	Present Age.	Children.	Remarks.
1	Beebee Jan Beebee.	Zurukzai	Daughter of Sirbar Taj Mahomed.	Gutt -	About 30	Two dead.	No children alive.
2	Beebee Asha	Gitchkee	Meer Esan Gitchkee.	Samee Punchgoor.	„ 35	—	—
3	Beebee Sundeen.	Gitchkee	Azam Khan -	Punchgoor.	„ 30	Third son of his Highness, Meah Azam Khan.	Beebee Sundeen is a sister of the present Punchgoor Chief, Gazee Khan, her son Meeah Azam Khan is about 1½ years old.
4	Beebee Ala Ruckia.	Iltazi -	Kurrum Khan	Baghwana	„ 35	His Highness' first son.	Meeah Mahmood Khan is the eldest son; intelligent and about eight years old.
5	Beebee Khan Beebee.	Sharoanee	Abdool Russool	Shulhoh -	„ 32	One daughter, age not known.	Khan Beebee's former husband was Shere Dil, his Highness' cousin.
6	Mai Lalook	Solai -	Mulhee -	Mustoong	„ 30	One daughter, 4½ years.	Mai Lalook's father was a Mustoong Zemindar.
7	Bhoojee -	Slave -	Slave - -	Baghwanah	„ 37	One daughter and one son.	This woman was an Iltazi slave, and purchased by his Highness for Rs. 1,000 from Mahomed Khan Iltazi; by her one daughter 9 years of age, Shukur Khatoon, and his second son Shah Nawaz about 4½ years old.

C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

Enclosure 2 in No. 154.

No. 171 of 1873.

Political Department.

From the Commissioner in Sind, to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, Jacobabad.

Commissioner's Office,
Camp Jacobabad, 25th February 1873.

SIR,

GOVERNMENT having sanctioned a sum of Rs. 32,040 to be expended in making, in the name of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, improved arrangements for peace and security in Kutchee, and for safety on the trade-route through the Bolan Pass from Quettah, adopting as a principle the subsidising system, I have proposed to carry out the arrangements which will be explained below.

2. To aid the Officials on the Punjab Frontier in the southern portion of the Derajat, it appears from a report submitted by Captain Sandeman (copy of which is annexed) that 35 Murree and 20 Boogtee horsemen are entertained and paid monthly by that officer as follows:

35 Murrees at Rs. 20 each	Rs.	700
20 Boogtees at Rs. 20 each	„	400

In addition to the above, a personal allowance of Rs. 100 per mensem is paid to the brother of the Murree Chief, as Jemadar, and Rs. 20 to a Moonshee, also Rs. 100 to the son of the Boogtee Chief, as Jemadar, and Rs. 15 to a Moonshee, or in all—

To the Murrees	Rs.	820
„ Boogtees	„	515
Per mensem	Rs.	1,335
Per annum	Rs.	16,020

3. On the Sind border Colonel Phayre, for the purpose of obtaining information, I conclude, recently took into service hill-men as below:

15 Murrees at Rs. 15 each	Rs.	225
16 Boogtees at Rs. 15 each	„	240
Per mensem	Rs.	465
Per annum	Rs.	5,580

These arrangements will be left as they are.

4. The original idea sketched out by me in 1869 bore reference only to the Murrees and Boogtees, the maintenance of peace and security in Kutchee, and the protection of merchants passing through that plain, but subsequent events have shown that is advisable to assist his Highness the Khan in guarding the line of the Bolan Pass as well as Kutchee.

5. It has been proposed therefore to his Highness the Khan that a sum of Rs. 500 per mensem, or Rs. 6,000 per annum, should be paid by you in his name to Shere Dil Muzzeranee, Murree, who resides on the Bolan, and for some years did good service in securing the safe transit of Kafilas through that Pass. That a further sum of Rs. 1,000 per mensem, or Rs. 12,000 per annum, should be paid in the same manner by you to the Chief of the Sarawans, on condition that certain certain bodies of horse or footmen be employed to assist in maintaining security in the Bolan. The Sarawans generally are very poor and having little or nothing to do just now, they would be sure to make difficulties, as they could easily do, without even its being easily detected, and stoppage in transit would be liable to take place at any time, their Camels lying at the head, as also along the Bolan, and below in the plains of Kutchee. An influential person with five Sowars from both the Sarawan Chief and Shere Dil should always be at Jacobabad with you to enable you to communicate with the chiefs, and for them to receive orders from you. The pay should also be handed monthly over to these deputed persons, in the presence of the Wukkeel of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, who should affix his seal with yours to the Purwana forwarding the pay, as also to the Acquittance Roll, which should be kept in your Office.

6. The present quota of Boogtees to be made up to 40 Sowars by an addition of 24 at Rs. 15 each=Rs. 350 per mensem, or Rs. 4,320 per annum, and a personal allowance

of Rs. 100 per mensem, or Rs. 1,200 per annum, to Goolam Moorteza, the Boogtee Sirdar, making a total of new payments to the Boogtees of Rs. 5,520 per annum. Directions with regard to this portion of the subject are given in a separate memorandum.

7. The Murrees under Guzzun, the chief of the whole clan, have now 15 Sowars at Rs. 15 each=Rs. 225 per mensem, or Rs. 2,700 per annum. I had intended to at once increase this number up to 50 Sowars with a personal allowance of Rs. 100 to Guzzun, and of Rs. 50 to Kurrum Khan, head of the Bijaranee branch. Of these 50 Sowars, 30 would be under Guzzun, and 20 under Kurrum Khan, Bijaranee. One influential person with 5 Sowars being present always with you at Jacobabad, and the payments would be made through Sirdar Guzzun in the same way as with the Boogtees. Such payment would only be made during the good behaviour of the tribe, and their abstaining from acts of violence and aggression in the Khan's and British territory, either in the plain or on the line of the Bolan Pass. The extra charge on account of this tribe then would be—

15 Sowars* to Guzzun	Rs. 15 each	-	Rs.	225
20 Sowars to Kurrum Khan	„ „ „	-	„	300
Personal Allowances	„ „ „	-	„	150
Total per mensem		-	„	675
Total per annum		-	„	8,100

* Making 30, including present ones.

But the Sirdar of this tribe, Guzzun, has in the most insolent manner neglected to obey the summons of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and of yours forwarded through the Khan. He has also failed to collect and restore the plundered property of the merchants shared in by himself and tribe, though called upon to do so, and distinctly told that unless he did, favour could not be extended towards him. Under these circumstances it is impossible to accord the same treatment to him and his tribe as has been granted to the Boogtees who have behaved well in all respects. Any further grant to them cannot therefore but be withheld for the present, and if the Chief still persists in his disrespectful and impertinent course, it will be necessary to take from him the present small subsidy of 15 Sowars, but before doing so, I request you will in the first instance refer to me, giving your reasons for desiring the withdrawal. Should the Sirdar, however, come in himself, or send some suitable person to represent him, and should he set to work to restore the plundered property or its equivalent, (he having received himself one fifth of the plunder from one Kafilah) the 15 Sowars might be left to him now, and he told that should his conduct during the current year be such as was satisfactory to you, and he and his tribe abstain from all acts of aggression or violence, either in his Highness' territory of Kutchee, or the Bolan Pass, what had passed would be forgiven and forgotten, and arrangements similar to those now carried into effect with others might be adopted towards him and his tribe.

8. The new scheme when completed would then financially be as follows:

To Shere Dil Muzzeeranee, Murree, per annum	-	Rs.	6,000
„ the Sarawans	-	„	12,000
„ „ Boogtees	-	„	5,520
„ „ Murrees	-	„	8,100
		„	31,620

The balance of Rs. 420 would be at your disposal for any chance expenditure connected with these arrangements.

9. The portion relating to the Boogtees may be carried into effect at once, but the other parts concerning the Muzzeranee Murrees and Sarawans should await the receipt of his Highness the Khan's reply to my letter of the 22nd instant, copy of which was forwarded to you and which may be expected any day.

I have, &c.
W. L. Merewether, Colonel,
Commissioner in Sind.

Enclosure 3 in No. 154.

Memorandum.

Most of the sowars given in the list noted below, are employed in police and political duties, though a few are entirely under the orders of the military, and must reside in the posts.

Murree Sowars.

Name of Section.	Number of Sowars.	Cost per Mensem.
		Rs.
Ghazani - - - - - - -	15	300
Bijarani - - - - - - -	5	100
Loharani - - - - - - -	15	300

In addition there is one Jemadar, the brother of Ghuzzun, the Tomandar, who gets Rs. 100 per mensem. There is a Moonshee at Kahun on Rs. 20 per mensem. I allow the Tomandar, when it can be spared, a few puts of grain from the Pahurpur farm.

Boogtee Sowars.

Name of Section.	Cost per Mensem.	Number of Sowars.
		Rs.
Shumalani and Kulpur - - - -	5	100
Mazari - - - - - -	10	200
Nutani - - - - - -	5	100

In addition to the above, the Tomandar's son, Shahbaz, gets Rs. 100 as Jemadar. There is also a Moonshee at Lehaf on Rs. 15. The Tomandar is allowed a certain quantity yearly of grain from Pahurpur, but he can be forced by his agreement to give a certain number of cultivators to entitle him to the grain. A small number of Murree Sowars generally reside at district head-quarters in charge of the Murree Wukkeel, Sahan Khan, who gets 30 Rupees a month.

Two Murree Sowars ought to be stationed at Asmee with Meerun Khan, Chief of the Dreshules. He is responsible for that border. Five Murree Sowars ought to reside at Rojun and Rajunpur. Sometimes two or three do so. They are not in addition to those given below.

Of the Boogtee Sowars, 13 ought to do duty in the posts, but the Mazari Chief on account of some private agreement he has with Goolam Moorteza generally does the duty with Mazaris.

Some seven or eight Mussion Sowars are stationed at Hurrund at the disposal of the Goorchani Chiefs.

There are a few Kudenpur Boogtee Sowars in the posts, but they are entirely under the military.

ROBERT SANDEMAN, Captain,
Deputy Commissioner,
Camp, Jacobabad, 7th February 1873. Dera Gazee Khan.

Enclosure 4 in No. 154.

Memorandum regarding Subsidy to the Boogtee Tribe.

Commissioner's Office, Camp Jacobabad, 24th February 1873.

At present the following Sowars are entertained :—

On the Punjab border, under Captain Sandeman, 20 Sowars at Rs. 20 each,=Rs. 400. Besides the above, Shahbaz Khan, the son of the Boogtee Chief, receives Rs. 200 per mensem as personal allowance, making a total then of Rs. 500.

On the Sind border, 16 Sowars at Rs. 15 each,=Rs. 240. It is proposed to increase this number of Sowars up to 40, by adding 24 Sowars at Rs. 15 each=Rs. 360, and to give the head of the tribe, Goolam Moorteza, a monthly sum of Rs. 100 as personal allowance to himself, making additional Rs. 460, or Rs. 700 in all from the Sind border.

This amount will be paid monthly, in the name or on behalf of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and in presence of his Wukkeel, at Jacobabad, to the Boogtee Chief, Goolam Moorteza, or any person deputed by him, as long as he conducts himself to the satisfaction of the Political Superintendent on the Frontier of Upper Sind.

It will be required from him to prevent any of his tribe plundering or committing outrage in British territory, or in that of his Highness the Khan of Khelat outside the hills. Should any of the tribe so commit themselves, the Sirdar will at once have them

seized, and sent prisoners either to his Highness the Khan's officers, or to the Political Superintendent at Jacobabad, as may at the time be required.

The Boogtee Sirdar, Goolam Moorteza, will obtain the earliest and best information of what is going on in his neighbourhood in the hills as to the intentions or movements of other tribes, and communicate it with due quickness to the Political Superintendent on the Frontier of Upper Sind at Jacobabad. He will also do his utmost to assist in protecting the villages and lands on the Teywagh in Kutchee from the incursions of evil-disposed persons.

He will place an influential person with five Sowars at Jacobabad to remain there always with the Political Superintendent to arrange for quick and certain inter-communication.

W. L. MEREWETHER, Colonel,
Commissioner in Sind.

P.S.—The above arrangement to come into effect, as far as payments to be made, from this date (24th February), and the different sums should be paid on the completion of the month for which they are due.

Enclosure 5 in No. 154.

No. 37 of 1873.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to the Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

SIR, Camp Bagh, 3rd March 1873.

I HAVE the honour to forward his Highness the Khan's reply to the Commissioner's Khureeta of the 22nd ultimo. The reply was received this morning, and no delay has occurred, except in taking an office copy and making a translation for your information.

In translating the same, I observed that his Excellency the Viceroy is merely called the "Governor Sahib;" as there are words in his Highness' office showing what the address should be, this rudeness is scarcely excusable. There are also one or two passages which are decidedly rude and discourteous.

It is as stated here, but I question whether it was premeditated, and therefore did not refer to it in my reply.
W. L. M.

2. As I propose submitting a report in the course of a day or two, I will not add more on the present occasion.

I have, &c.
C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

Enclosure 6 in No. 154.

No. 38 of 1873.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to the Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

SIR, Camp Bagh, 4th March 1873.

IN connexion with the concluding paragraph of my letter No. 37, I think it may not be inappropriate on the present occasion to place before you certain reasons which have no doubt tended to make his Highness the Khan unreasonable and dissatisfied, also my opinion regarding the present state of affairs, concluding with a few remarks on his Highness' reply to the Commissioner in Sind's Khureeta dated 22nd February.

2. Referring to the first part of the subject to be discussed, viz.: what reasons can have influenced his Highness, I have no hesitation in stating that his Highness' views regarding the Government of his country differ most materially from the suggestions that have been offered to him by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, the Commissioner in Sind, and myself, and he is disappointed at not having received sufficient pecuniary assistance to carry out coercive measures, the only policy in his Highness' opinion calculated to maintain order in his territory. Early in 1872 his Highness unreservedly delegated his powers to the Commissioner in Sind, but was dissatisfied that a reconciliation was effected in place of putting him into a position to carry out his own policy.

3. Another undoubted reason for his Highness' change of demeanour is that he considered Russian progress and Russian aggression would make him indispensable to the British Government, and that they would be only too glad to subsidise him largely. A day or two ago he informed me that the least my Government could offer him would be ten lacs of rupees per annum, as they gave his Highness the Ameer of Cabul twelve.

4. To proceed to the second part of my report. Until within the last few days affairs were in such a state that no insuperable difficulties existed to prevent peace and quiet being restored throughout Beloochistan ; rebellious chiefs anxious for repose ; Roonjahs at Lus-Beyla solicitous that an official of his Highness should take charge of the province ; safe transit through the Bolan, and difficulties in Mekran adjustable. In spite of these favourable circumstances it has been apparent for some time past that his Highness is more anxious for failure than success, and this induced the Shahgassee to propound two schemes—first, that he and I should be withdrawn, leaving the Khan and Sirdars to settle their own differences ; second, he was prepared to do what was correct in spite of the Khan, if I gave him my support and had an escort sufficiently strong for protection purposes. In reply to this alternative scheme I told the Shahgassee I could not directly or indirectly sanction usurping the Khan's powers, that my duty was merely to give advice, and there responsibility ended. Affairs have not improved since the revival of the ex-Wukkeel of Jacobabad, Mahomed Khan. He now holds the position of chief adviser to his Highness, and is engaged intriguing with the Brahooees and his Highness' force, hoping to succeed to the Wuzeership. Seeing how cordially his Highness has welcomed the ex-Wukkeel, and that he prefers his advice to that of the Shahgassee and myself, I would request Government consideration to the Shahgassee's first proposition to withdraw and leave the Khan to his own devices.

5. In conclusion, I would briefly allude to his Highness' reply to the Commissioner in Sind. As far as I can judge the whole tenor of his Highness' letter is wanting in respect and regard to the British Government, and if taken in conjunction with circumstances in Diary No. 9, shows the contemptible position of incapacity his Highness has chosen to assume, also passive opposition to all assistance and advice.

I have, &c.

C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

Enclosure 7 in No. 154.

No. 39 of 1873.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to the Political Superintendent, Frontier, Upper Sind.

SIR, Bagh, 5th March 1873.

AFTER despatching my letter No. 38 to your address, I visited his Highness the Khan, and during the conversation it was apparent he was scarcely satisfied with the reply he had sent to the Commissioner's khureeta, and did not realise what he had said regarding the Sarawans might be considered as a decided refusal of the assistance the British Government were willing to give. His Highness also alluded to the pecuniary state of his affairs. With this premise I will give a brief summary of the conversation.

2. His Highness the Khan asked me somewhat nervously if the Commissioner would keep his reply or send it on, and if so to whom. On my telling him it would in all probability be forwarded for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, he replied, " I shall get a very severe answer in return."

3. All the Sarawan chiefs were present at his Highness' durbar, and asked permission to take their leave and make preparations for the usual exodus from the plains. His Highness asked me if their departure would not interfere with the arrangements my Government were willing to make, so I told him after the views he had expressed it was doubtful whether the subject would receive further consideration ; to this his Highness replied he had written regarding the Sarawans with the best intentions, as the Jalawans would also expect money, and behave badly if they did not get it. The only people he considered unworthy of being subsidised were the Hill Murrees under Guzzun, and they ought to be exterminated. The Muzeranees he looked upon as Brahooees more than Murrees. After the Sirdars took their departure his Highness informed me if the British Government would give Rs. 30,000 to the Sarawans, Jalawans, and Muzeranees, satisfactory arrangements might be made. He also hoped they would give him two lacs of rupees per annum, as he was literally without funds and was trying to raise Rs. 75,000 to compensate merchants and pay his troops, who were three months in arrears.

4. In conclusion, I would bring to your notice that his Highness' reply to the Commissioner in Sind was drafted by the ex-Wukkeel, Mahomed Khan, and the Kazi of Bagh, and that the former since his arrival at Bagh has tried to persuade his Highness the Khan and some of his officials and native officers that sooner or later they would be treated by the British Government as he had been. I would also remark that his Highness' impecuniosity is a reliable fact. Money is being raised in Kutchee for reasons

above specified, and his Highness' eldest son, Meah Mahomed Khan, at Khelat has had to borrow Rs. 6,000 for current expenses. With finances in such a state, hopeless confusion may be anticipated.

I have, &c.
C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

No. 155.

No. 1270, dated Jacobabad, 9th May 1873.

From Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Commissioner in Sind.

I DO myself the honour to give below copy of a news report received from Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, containing the latest intelligence from Kutchee: —

"Sohrab Khan, at the instigation of the ex-Vakeel, sent a party into the hills to raid the Murrees; they succeeded in carrying off 80 sheep and killed Hyder Loonie Koosh and Moobareck Soomar. The Murree chief remonstrated with Sohrab Khan for having committed this raid, retaliated by carrying off 124 sheep and 26 head of cattle from a place near Chuttur, and intimated to Sohrab Khan that the Murrees would shortly revenge themselves on him. Mahomed Khan was at Lehree a few days ago and wished to entertain 300 Dhoombkee sowars. Sohrab Khan wanted Rupees ten per sowar, but the ex-Vakeel would only give a daily allowance of jowari, which was refused. Mahomed Khan sent for the Kazee of Bagh to Lehree, having something important to communicate. Mahomed Khan has appointed Moollah Jumma Janisheen at Lehree, and is to live himself at Bagh."

No. 156.

No. 1269 of 1873.

Political Department.

From the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to the Commissioner in Sind, Kurrachee.

Political Superintendent's Office,
Jacobabad, 9th May 1873.

SIR,

HAVING so lately assumed political charge of the Frontier Upper Sind district, I do not feel myself in a position from my personal knowledge to furnish a detailed report of Khelat affairs: I have therefore called on Major Harrison, the Political Agent, Khelat, to furnish me with a report on the events which occurred in that State during the past twelve months, which I herewith forward.

2. Just prior to my taking over political charge in the end of January last, Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, and Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dhera Ghazee Khan, had been invited by the Commissioner in Sind, Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I., and C.B., to Jacobad, in the beginning of February, where in conjunction with the Officiating Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, he intended to decide on the best mode of subsidising the Frontier tribes in accordance with the plan proposed at the Mittunkote conference in 1871, and sanctioned by Government.

3. For this purpose Guzzun Khan, the Murree Tomandar, and Goolam Moorteza, the Boogtee Tomandar, had been summoned through his Highness the Khan of Khelat to attend at Jacobabad. The latter Tomandar obeyed the order, but Guzzun Khan, partly through fear of his being made to disgorge the plunder which he had received when Sher Dil Muzeranee Murree attacked and plundered a kafilah in the Bolan Pass in April and May 1872, and partly from a disinclination to own himself a subject of his Highness the Khan, or to obey any orders sent him through his Highness, did not come to Jacobabad.

4. It was arranged by the Commissioner in Sind that the plan he had proposed for increasing the Boogtee subsidy by taking this Tomandar and 23 Sowars into our pay should be adopted, but as Guzzun Khan had neglected to obey the summons sent him through his Highness, and had written one or two disrespectful letters on the subject to the Commissioner in Sind, and Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, it was determined that no increase of subsidy should be given to the Murrees for the present at least.

5. In the middle of February the Commissioner in Sind, Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I., and C.B., accompanied by the Officiating Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, and the Political Agent, Khelat, met his Highness the Khan of Khelat at Shahpoor by appointment, for the purpose of discussing a plan the Commissioner in Sind had drawn up for the protection and safe transit of merchants and others travelling through the Bolan Pass and Kutchee, and to this end in the Khan's name subsidizing the Sarawans under Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, and the hill Murrees under Sher Dil Muzeranee and Kurum Khan Bijaranee, but his Highness was found to be not only quite impracticable on this, but on every other matter connected with the better government of his country, and the welfare of his subjects, more especially so in the matter of the disorder and misrule prevailing in Lus Beyla, regarding which he refused to listen to any advice or counsel given him. The Commissioner in Sind seeing the condition of the Khan's mind and temper, as well as the manner in which his Highness received all the kindly and wholesome advice given by so old and tried a friend as the Commissioner himself, felt that nothing could be done, and so returned to Jacobabad.

6. After leaving his Highness, the Commissioner in Sind wrote to his Highness, thinking then, that even at the last hour he might be induced to listen to advice, so kindly proferred, but with no better results, as all the Khan's replies showed an apathy, either real or feigned, with regard to his country and subjects hardly to be understood, and a total disregard to all good advice or counsel.

7. Major Harrison reported matters in Khan's Camp getting from bad to worse, and it way decided by the Commissioner in Sind that unless his Highness sent him decisive replies to his communications, Major Harrison was not to leave Kutchee. After this it was found necessary to reinforce Major Harrison's escort, and his Highness with that apathy before remarked on, did not make any attempt to conciliate the Commissioner; he neglected to listen to the advice given him any by any of the British Officials, listening only to the work of those by whom he was surrounded, to wit, the ex-Wukkeel or Jacobabad, Mahomed Khan, a man of very bad character, and a known coward, Mahomed Hyat, the Kazee of Bagh, who bears an equally bad character, Noordeen Mingul, and a few others of a like sort.

8. As matters still appeared to get worse, instead of improving, Major Harrison was ordered by the Commissioner to withdraw and leave the Khan to his own devices. Major Harrison returned to Jacobabad, and the old Shahgassee, finding how matters stood, with as many of his family as could then get away, in all about 200 people, accompanied the Political Agent and came to Jacobabad, where he was given a safe asylum, and where he and his people now are.

9. From what I can learn, Major Harrison having been withdrawn from his Highness' Court, and the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed having left of his own accord, it is the intention of his Highness to act up to the counsel and advice given him by the Commissioner in Sind, so far as it lies in his power, and thus to lead the Commissioner in Sind and Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to suppose that the whole of the disorder and mis-government now prevailing in his Highness' country has been brought about by the obstructiveness of the British officer at his Court, and his old faithful and well-tried Wuzeer, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, whom the British Officers have always found such a true and faithful friend. But up to the present no steps have been taken by his Highness to place some trustworthy person at the head of the Lus Beyla State, on the contrary, as his request that the Jam of Lus Beyla might be released and sent back, was refused, he appears to take no interest in this portion of his kingdom; and although matters have as yet passed off quietly, the road from Kurrachee through the Lus Beyla country is not safe for merchants or other travellers. The detachment posted at Kirtah in the Bolan Pass has, I am informed, been reduced to 80 men, a force quite inadequate for the protection of the traffic by this route.

10. The Boogtees are behaving in the most friendly and becoming manner, and their Tomandar, Goolam Moorteza, and his son, Shabaz Khan, are doing their best, and with the greatest effect, not only to prevent plundering on our Frontier, but to put a stop to the constant feuds which have always existed amongst the various tribes of those half savage hill-men, and although as a rule I do not approve of subsidizing, I believe in the present instance it was necessary to assimilate to a certain extent the system carried on our own and the Punjab Frontier, and so far as we can judge of its working it has had a beneficial effect.

11. In consequence of the misbehaviour of the Murrees in neglecting to obey the Commissioner in Sind's and the Political Superintendent's, Upper Sind Frontier, orders, and in committing one or two overt acts, their subsidy has for the present been entirely stopped, but when they fully understand and appreciate the great benefits there are to

be derived from being on good and friendly terms with the British Government, and they contrast their present position with that of the Boogtees, their neighbours, I trust they will come to their senses and beg to be treated in the same way as the Boogtees now are, and in the end with equally good results.

12. In conclusion I would beg to draw your attention to the capital arrangements that were made for the transit of merchandise through the Bolan Pass during the past season, by which a very large number of kafilahs were enabled to pass down safely: traffic however since the 8th ultimo has greatly decreased.

13. I would also beg to point out that although his Highness the Khan has behaved in a most unbecoming manner, and in every way unlike what a Sovereign ought to act, still he has done his best to liquidate the sums due to the plundered merchants, and actually paid in hard cash 95,000 Rupees.

14. In winding up this report I think it my duty to bring to your notice that the present quiet state of Kutchee is solely owing to the wise advice given to the Brahooee Sirdars by Major Harrison, the Political Agent, Khelat, before he left his Highness' Camp: had it not been for this, I am led to believe that by this time the whole of the Sirdars would have been up in arms, and Kutchee would have been plundered from one end of the country to the other.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS LOCH, Colonel,
Political Superintendent, U.S. Frontier.

Enclosure in No. 156.

No. 60 of 1873.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to the Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

SIR, Jacobabad, 29th April 1873.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report regarding Khelat affairs during the years 1872 and 1873.

2. At the close of the last official year hopeless anarchy and confusion existed in the Khelat State. Insurrection commenced at Mustoong; disaffected Sirdars and people having watched their opportunity when most of the troops were on detached duty succeeded in seizing the fort at the above place, but failed in their designs on Khelat and Quettah, no time was lost in meeting the rebels, and after severe fighting they were defeated; unfortunately Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed was too severely wounded to follow up his victory, so the rebels rallied in Kutchee and were joined by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, who had been an exile in Candahar. Nawab Mahomed Khan was sent with a well-organized force, and it was confidently expected order would soon be restored. His cowardice however was such that he commenced treating with the rebels instead of punishing them, and as soon as this was known, the outlying provinces of Mekran and Beyla followed the examples set by the Sarawans, and compelled his Highness' representatives with the forces at their disposal to retreat towards Khelat. Disorder in Kutchee had reached a climax, owing to the incapacity of Nawab Mahomed Khan, kafilahs being plundered, and no protection for life or property. Consequently the Commissioner in Sind with Government sanction offered to effect a reconciliation between his Highness and the rebel chiefs, and the former was invited for this purpose to Jacobabad. Not deeming it advisable however to leave Khelat, he gave full powers to the Commissioner in Sind to act on his behalf, and deputed Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed to give any assistance that might be required; the latter left Khelat on the 11th February, arrived at Jacobabad on the 1st of March, and was engaged in mediatory arrangements until the early part of April. All the Sarawans Chiefs availed themselves of the Commissioner's invitation to meet him at Jacobabad, and the same consideration was shown to Noordeen Mingul, a Jalawan Chief. He however preferred creating a disturbance in the neighbourhood of Baghwanah, and thought by bombarding Kozdar and plundering a kafilah he would be able to make his own terms and demand the release of his brother-in-law, the ex Jam of Lus Beyla. What success attended his efforts will be subsequently shown.

Letter No. 73, dated 5th Oct. 1871.

Commissioner's letter to his Highness the Khan, dated 20th January 1872.

Letter No. 22 of 1872, from Political Agent, Khelat.

3. How carefully inquiry was conducted and how suited, the Commissioners arrangements were to restore peace and quiet, is too well known to need recapitulation, suffice to

say that the Shahgassee and Sirdars left Jacobabad on the 10th April, thinking his Highness the Khan would give his cordial support to what had been guaranteed in his name. At Gundava it was stated by the Naib of Kotra, Aitibar Khan, that his Highness was dissatisfied, and the Shahgassee would get into trouble for the assistance he had given the Commissioner. No one however put much confidence in reports circulated by the above Naib, and nothing of interest occurred until we entered the Moollah Pass. I then heard of fresh complications brought about by the Sumalanee Minguls having attacked the Muzeranee Murrees, and that the latter having good cause to believe what had occurred, has at his Highness' instigation revenged themselves on him by attacking kafilahs in the Bolan. The merchants on the first occasion repulsed the Murrees, with trifling loss, but the latter being reinforced by Murrees from different clans, intercepted and plundered a large kafilah near Much and Abigoom. His Highness in writing to me tried to insinuate that the Sumalanees had been instigated to this by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, whilst the latter declared that the raid was originated by his Highness and carried out by his officials at Mustoong and Quettah. With both parties mutually accusing each other, it was difficult to arrive at right conclusions, until some months later, when weight of evidence and his Highness' conduct led me to think the onus of this transaction rested on his Highness and his officials.

Reported from Kohoo in Diary No. 10.

Letters Nos. 84 and 89.
„ No. 95 and accompaniment.
„ Nos. 100 and 101.

Diary No. 13.
Letter No. 73.

4. On the 4th May we arrived at Kozdar, and as Sirdar Noordeen had only raised the siege on hearing of our approach, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed thought it advisable to take active measures against the above chief before proceeding on our road to Khelat. With this object he proceeded to a Mingul village, Ferozeabad, five miles off, and informed Noordeen that if he liked to surrender, give up his Highness' guns, mortars, &c., captured at Beyla, and make good what he had plundered from kafilahs, his life would be spared; these terms were accepted, and the Shahgassee rejoined me with Sirdar Noordeen. No further event of importance occurred until we arrived at Sohrab, where we met Darogah Attah Mahomed and a large force that had been some time before sent from Khelat to assist the Naib of Kozdar against Azaad Khan and Noordeen. The Darogah not being a bold man, refused to leave his camp and risk an engagement, whilst at this place I heard of the second attack on a kafilah alluded to in paragraph No. 3.

Diary No. 11 of 1872.

Diary No. 12 of 1872.

15th April.

Letter No. 73.

5. On the 18th April I left with the Shahgassee and the Darogah, reaching Khelat on the 20th May. After the usual visits of ceremony, I went with the chiefs on the 22nd to visit his Highness, and explained to the latter how greatly the British Government were concerned at the disorder that had prevailed of late through misunderstandings between him and the Sirdars, and hoped as the latter had expressed their sorrow for the past, and a desire to give him their full support in future, he would overlook past faults and grant them the same privileges they had enjoyed in his late brother's reign. His Highness having stated his desire to comply with the above suggestions, as also his appreciation of the Commissioner's kind services, there was every reason to hope that with his Highness' cordial support a satisfactory state of affairs would be rapidly effected. The sincerity of his Highness' sentiments was at once put to the test by Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, who openly told the Khan of the Sirdars having expressed their inability to the Commissioner to recover merchants' property without assistance, and he as Wuzeer had therefore guaranteed aid would be forthcoming when required. Consequently he hoped his Highness would at once detach Darogah Attah Mahomed with a suitable force to assist the Sirdars in carrying out what they had undertaken. When the matter was thus placed before his Highness, it soon became apparent what he had stated was for effect, and not with any real wish to support what had been done for him in an honest and cordial manner, as he at once refused to adopt the Shahgassee's suggestion, but for appearance sake detached Naib Abdool Azeez with an inadequate force, allowing, or as it was said instructing, the Naib of Mustoong to prevent what the Sirdars had undertaken being carried out. Failing to see why his Highness should be so blind to his own interests, I inquired from various sources to find out what antagonistic influence was at work, for I had always up to that time found him not only willing to follow any advice that had been given, but grateful for the same; it then transpired that the Wukkeel at Jacobabad, from personal motives, determined to try and thwart the Commissioner's

Diary No. 14 of 1872.

arrangements; having influence in the Zenana with his Highness' mother and sister, and making it the interest of other people to assist him, he kept up constant communication with his Highness all the time the chiefs were at Jacobabad, and so poisoned his Highness' mind with his views and opinions, that he (the Khan) never took the trouble to arrive at right conclusions by careful study of the correspondence placed at his disposal, but adopting other people's ideas, did his utmost to render the Commissioner's arrangements null and void, by passively, if not actively, opposing the Sirdars in carrying out what they had undertaken.

6. With his Highness in this frame of mind, it was discouraging to try and induce him to work out what had been guaranteed in his name. I however urged him, both verbally and in writing, to recover merchants' property, or compensate them for the same, secure the safety of merchants passing through his country, and see justice done to Shere Dil Muzeranee, Murree; this advice was not received in the spirit in which it was intended. His Highness appeared to think the Commissioner's arrangements absolved him from all responsibility regarding the kafilah plundered by the Brahooees, and obstinately maintained he was equally irresponsible regarding merchants plundered by the Murrees, refusing to acknowledge them in any way as his subjects. His Highness was also averse to a fair and honest inquiry regarding the Sumalanee raid, and therefore gave good grounds for believing the statement of Shere Dil regarding the action of his Highness' Naib in this matter.

No. 81 of 1872.

7. A very few days after my arrival at Khelat, his Highness expressed disapproval of the Jacobabad arrangements, stating Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed was much to blame, knowing as he did how impracticable it was for him and the chiefs to live in the same country, also that the latter would never carry out what they had undertaken; everything tended to show that though his Highness had unreservedly delegated his powers to the Commissioner in Sind, he had hoped a less conciliatory settlement would have been arrived at, and that the British Government would have given him assistance in arms and money to carry out coercive measures, the only policy in his Highness' opinion calculated to maintain order. In a friendly but firm manner I pointed out that his Highness' Government could only be on a firm and satisfactory footing by his being on good terms with his Sirdars and people, and this policy was most warmly advocated by Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed. His Highness however stigmatized it as "Cutcha Lulloo Puttoo Kam," and that he hated the Sirdars so much, that after death if they went to heaven, he should prefer being in hell. A month had not elapsed when his Highness' feelings of resentment towards the Shahgassee, for trying to carry out what had been agreed upon at Jacobabad, culminated in a plot against the old Wuzeer's life, and compelled him to seek safety in my camp. From the 15th June his Highness placed himself unreservedly in the hands of Moonshees Goolam Mahomed and Saleh Mahomed, and Shukkur Khan, and kept up a regular correspondence with the Wukkeel at Jacobabad. The people above-named had influence with his Highness' mother and sister, Beebee Futteh Khatoon, and were admitted to secret conferences at all hours of the day or night. The Moonshees and Shukkur Khan wished to compromise his Highness with the British Government, but their foolish advice to attack my camp was of no avail, owing to the sensible conduct of a native officer, called Faquir Mahomud, who saw what danger his Highness was drifting into. But out of bravado, noisy patrols were sent round our camp, but discontinued when Captain Humphrey arrived with another company of Rifles. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed not feeling at all sure as to the honesty of his Highness' intentions towards himself, asked my advice about getting five or six hundred of the Sarawans to join him. I advised him not do so, as it might be considered he had taken the initiative against his Highness; to this he agreed, but the Sarawans were uneasy regarding their Sirdars, and assembled at Moonguchur so as to join him in case of emergency.

Letter No. 38 of 1873.

No. 89 of 1872.

8. The unsatisfactory conduct of his Highness having been reported, I received instructions in your letter marginally noted to withdraw to Baghwanah or Kozdar, and there await further instructions. His Highness was also informed what was required by the Government of Bombay, in accompaniment to your Office letter No. 2251 of the 31st August. Darogah Attah Mahomed at this juncture did his utmost to induce his Highness to fulfil the terms of his treaty, and dismiss the Moonshees and Shukkur Khan. Beebee Gunjan and a Pathan merchant, Abdoola Jan, in his Highness' confidence, also urged him to comply with the wishes of the British Government. Through pressure on their part his Highness disbursed

No. 2004 of 1872.

Diary No. 32 of 1872.

35,000 rupees to merchants plundered by the Sarawans and Noordeen Mingul, but positively refused to dismiss the people above alluded to. There being no other alternative, I made every arrangement to march on Sunday, the 15th September, and went late on the afternoon of the 14th to take leave of his Highness.

Diary No. 32 of 1872.

After a protracted interview his Highness yielded the point, and as he gave a written guarantee which induced me to believe he had realised what a false position he had placed himself in, I agreed to defer my departure until his Highness could make arrangements to accompany me. Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed also agreed to leave my camp and return to his duties.

9. From the 15th his Highness was most cordial, and appeared anxious to conform in every way with the wishes of Government. We marched on the 7th, and on arrival at Gundava proceeded by invitation to meet his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General at Sukkur on the 4th November. At the interview which took place on the afternoon of the 4th, his Excellency the Viceroy spoke very seriously to his Highness, informing him it was far from probable the same consideration would be shown on a future occasion, at the same time to show what had occurred had been condoned, and hope existed that his protestations of loyalty and anxiety to please the British Government would be proved by following a wiser course than he had lately pursued. He and his retinue were presented with very handsome khilluts. His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India, when returning the Khan's visit, informed him of the conversation at his Durbar having been placed on record, and that a copy of the same would be forwarded for his information.

10. The marked distinction with which his Highness had been received spread far and wide, and ought to have induced him to shake off all evil influences and realise who were his true friends.

11. As we passed through Jacobabad en route to Gundava, his Highness without pressure of any kind handed over the Moonshees and Shukkur Khan. Unfortunately, however, the Wukkeel Mahomed Khan had constant interviews with him, and must have submitted his views and opinions to his Highness' mother and sister, for on arrival at Gundava they abused and insulted him for having given up the Moonshees and Shukkur Khan, and so irritated him that he at once reverted to the procedure which had almost necessitated my withdrawal from Khelat. Remonstrances checked this outbreak of feeling to a certain extent, as his Highness hoped to meet the Commissioner in the course of a month or so; in fact, when I was able to give him an approximate date when such a meeting might take place, he was amenable to reason, but had not accepted the responsibility devolving on him by treaty regarding the Muzeranees and other Murrees. On the Commissioner writing to his Highness declining to meet him until he had compensated all merchants plundered in his territory, immediate action was taken in the matter; those plundered by Murrees compromised their claims (*vide* Diary No. 6 of 1873), whilst others had been liquidated to a certain extent, or arrangements of a satisfactory nature made. His Highness being thus enabled to make a favourable report, I conveyed his reply without delay to Jacobabad, and in consideration of his Highness' compliance with what had been stipulated, he was invited to meet the Commissioner at Shahpoor.

12. His Highness the Khan and Doctor Bowman arrived at Shahpoor on the 18th February, and suitable arrangements were made to receive the Commissioner on the 20th. Ceremonious visits were paid, and on the following day both his Highness the Khan and Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed had private interviews with the Commissioner. The latter, perceiving further conversation with his Highness would be productive of no good, left Shahpoor and wrote * at considerable length to his Highness, explaining why he had been obliged to curtail the visit, and asked his Highness' careful consideration and expression of opinion on subjects that would have been discussed orally had he been inclined to do so. His Highness deferred replying to this communication for some days, and ultimately despatched an answer, drafted by the ex-Wukkeel and the Kazee of Bagh, which had to be seriously noticed by the Commissioner, and induced his Highness to effect a cordial assent to all that had been proposed. The Commissioner, however, could not accept these assurances as being sincere. His Highness' procedure then and for some time previous being opposed to all friendly relations, orders were therefore issued to withdraw from his Highness' Court.

Diary No. 8 of 1873.

* 22nd July.

13. Whilst the above correspondence was going on I tried to induce his Highness to follow the Commissioner's suggestions regarding the province of Lus Beyla, and also pointed out the advantages he would derive by my Government subsidising the Boogtees, Murrees, and Sarawans. Goolam Moorteza, the Boogtee chief, having visited his Highness, arrangements with his tribe were duly carried out. His Highness would not,

however, have anything to say to the Murrees, and dismissed the Sirdar's agent, as reported in Diary No. 10 of 1873.

14. From the time his Highness left Shahpoor he assumed an air of utter indifference as to what might occur, stating the British Government might do what they liked, as he was indifferent to all matters connected with the government of his country, and had no intention of taking further interest in state affairs. This sentiment was fully acted up to when I urged his Highness to comply with the Commissioner's wish regarding Lus Beyla.

No. 44 of 1873, from Political Agent, Khelat.

15. In letter marginally noted I stated that no insuperable difficulties existed to prevent peace and quiet being re-established throughout Beloochistan. His Highness when writing to the Commissioner would not admit such to be the case, and was about to make arrangements in Mekran which will, if carried out, verify his statements regarding the above province. What those arrangements were I reported in Diary No. 11 of 1873.

Political Superintendent's No. 38 of 1873.
His Highness' letter to Commissioner in Sind, forwarded 3rd March 1873.

16. The province of Lus Beyla has been in an unsettled state since 1871. The Roonjahs have for some time past been most anxious that his Highness should repossess the country and put an end to faction fighting. How his Highness has disregarded all advice, and failed to undertake what was easy of accomplishment, is too well known to need further remark.

17. The harvest in Kutchee has been abundant, so much so as to seriously affect the revenue. Bunniahs would not willingly purchase his Highness' grain. He, however, compelled them to do so, and though the rates were moderate, the procedure was considered tyrannical and caused great dissatisfaction.

18. By placing an intelligent and respectable man, Abdool Azeez, at Dadur, as Naib, and occupying Kirta with a detachment of regular troops, safe transit through the Bolan was ensured.

19. Being about to withdraw from his Highness' court, I tried to find out from Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed and other people what policy his Highness would be likely to adopt, and I was told every effort was being made by his Highness the Khan, the ex-Wukkeel, and Kazee of Bagh to conciliate the Sirdars and people, and that they were in fact carrying out for their own safety and welfare the very policy they had obstinately opposed during the past year. Most of the Sirdars, knowing that the Khan and ex-Wukkeel will only adhere to their promises so long as it suits their convenience, are not likely to place themselves in his Highness' power, and disturbances will occur sooner or later directly it was known I was withdrawn. Several Sirdars asked if they might plunder Kutchee. So I reminded them of what the Commissioner had said at Shahpoor, and as they are all anxious to comply with the wishes of our Government, particularly Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, they will, I feel sure, avoid, if possible, making any disturbance on the border, and not interfere with merchants passing through the country.

I have, &c.
C. H. Harrison, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

No. 466 of 1873.

Political Department.

Commissioner's Office, Kurrachee, 19th May 1873.

Forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esquire, C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, in continuation of Commissioner's letter No. 400, dated 3rd instant.

2. The unfortunate breach between his Highness the Khan and his Sirdars, worked by designing people, seems to have made the Khan utterly unreasonable. The Sirdars behaved very well in not disturbing Kutchee, but there must be serious disturbances above the Pass before long which will decide the fate of the Khan. Major Harrison has shown great patience and good temper throughout, and under most difficult circumstances, and the Commissioner trusts that officer's proceedings may meet with the approval of his Excellency the Viceroy.

W. L. Merewether, Colonel,
Commissioner in Sind.

No. 157.

No. 469, dated Kurrachee, 19th May 1873.

From Commissioner in Sind to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In forwarding the accompanying documents * for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy, I have the honour to state that until matters have more developed themselves at Khelat, and until a final decision can be come to by his Excellency as to the course that should be adopted towards his Highness the Khan, I consider it advisable simply to address the letter of warning to him, copy of which is annexed. To the Sirdars I could only, for the present at all events, continue the injunctions I have always given them, that they should abstain from taking the initiative in disturbances, and while they do so any representations from them will have due consideration. The present system of government followed by the Khan of Khelat cannot possibly last, and will probably come to an end in a month or so. The Sirdars have therefore only to hold quietly aloof and leave affairs to run of themselves; by this there will be the least amount of disturbance and injury to the people when the crisis does come.

2. With regard to the outrages that have lately taken place in Lus Beyla, on which a separate report is being submitted, I have directed the Political Superintendent to call on his Highness the Khan for immediate reparation, in either the restoration of the property plundered or payment of its equivalent and the punishment of the perpetrators.

* Letter No. 1220, dated 3rd May 1873, from the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to the Commissioner in Sind.

Major Harrison's letter, No. 61, dated 30th April 1873, to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

Moolla Mahomed Raisanee's letters, dated 24th April 1873, to Major Harrison and to Colonel Loch, with accompaniments.

Colonel Loch's reply to Moolla Mahomed, dated 3rd May 1873.

Moolla Mahomed's two letters to the Commissioner in Sind, dated 24th April 1873.

Commissioner's reply to Moolla Mahomed, dated 19th May 1873.

Commissioner's letter No. 468, dated 19th May 1873, to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

Commissioner's letter, dated 19th May 1873, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

Enclosure 1 in No. 157.

No. 1220, dated Jacobabad, 3rd May 1873.

From Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Commissioner in Sind.

I have the honour to forward herewith a letter in the vernacular to your address, received from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, also vernacular letter and translation from him to myself, and my reply to the same, and one to the address of Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat.

2. Before leaving his Highness the Khan's camp, Major Harrison advised all the Sirdars to keep quiet, to prevent their followers committing any overt or foolish acts, to respect the rights of merchants and other travellers, as well as the innocent and harmless cultivators; and up to the present, I am happy to say, they have listened to the good advice given, and abstained from plundering or oppressing innocent inhabitants, or creating any disturbances in Kutchee.

3. I would beg to draw your attention to that portion of the Sirdar's letter in which he says: "His Highness has now confiscated hereditary lands belonging to the Raisanees, "ignored his arrangements with the British Government, and again commenced tyranny "and oppression on all his subjects. My only hope is in your Government; for this "reason I wish to point out to you that I shall be in no way to blame if those who are "oppressed create disturbances as the only chance of saving their lives, and hope, should "anything occur, you will not be annoyed with me."

4. From what I have learnt from various quarters, I believe what Sirdar Moolla Mahomed states regarding the Raisanees' hereditary land being confiscated and many of the Khan's subjects being oppressed, to be perfectly true, and all this I am led to suspect is brought about by the advice and assistance of the ex-Vakeel Mahomed Khan, who is still at Lehree.

5. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's brother-in-law, Meer Aladad Khan, informed me that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed was particularly anxious to be allowed to find an asylum in British territory; but this I do not think would be advisable, as it would not only give him hopes and pretensions for the future, but most probably in the present unsettled state of affairs would lead the rest of the Sirdars and others to suppose the British Government were going to espouse their cause in opposition to that of his Highness the Khan, and thus the same state of disorder and anarchy which prevailed so lately in his Highness' dominions might again be brought about.

6. In replying to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's letter, I considered it most advisable neither to hold out any hopes of assistance nor of an asylum in British territory being

given him or any of the other Sirdars, but merely to impress on him the good advice given him and the other Sirdars by Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, in the hope that this might induce them to remain quiet for some little time longer, so that the disturbances which I fear must eventually take place in Kutchee may be delayed at least for a time.

Enclosure 2 in No. 157.

No. 61, dated Jacobabad, 30th April 1873.

From Political Agent, Khelat, to Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

I HAVE the honour to forward original letter from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed to my address, with translation of the same.

Enclosure 3 in No. 157.

Dated 26th Sufur 1290 = 24th April 1873.

From Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee to Political Agent, Khelat.

YOU know well that the Commissioner in Sind, as a well-wisher of his Highness the Khan, and regardful of the interests of the country, handed us over obedient to the Khan, and that we have committed no fault up to the present time, but served his Highness heart and soul. His Highness has broken the arrangement he made with the British Government, and confiscated jaghire lands belonging to the Raisanees at Lehree. I wrote to you regarding this, and in reply you wrote that you had been recalled by the Commissioner and were about to leave the country. I have written to the Commissioner in Sind and Colonel F. Loch of the oppressions and tyranny recommenced by his Highness. You are aware of this, and that those who have been oppressed may in self-defence create disturbances; we have in no way acted against the Commissioner's orders, but remained obediently in his Highness' service. All our future hopes rest on the British Government. His Highness failed to perceive that the Commissioner's treaty was for the good of this country. He has now recommenced his tyranny and oppression, and confiscated Raisanee lands at Lehree; so if those who are oppressed create disturbances the Commissioner in Sind and British Government must not be angry with me. For this reason I have written to you.

After your departure his Highness the Khan sent me two orders by Ali Yar Khan Raisanee, as also a verbal communication through Sumundar Lehree. I have sent copies of all the correspondence, &c., and from perusing the same you will understand all the circumstances of the case. I have sent my brother-in-law, Meer Aladad Khan, to you, and he will communicate certain matters verbally that I have explained to him. Kindly look upon him as a trustworthy person. Always consider me your well-wisher, and gratify me by occasionally writing. May your health and wealth increase, &c. &c.

Enclosure 4 in No. 157.

Dated 26th Sufur 1290 = 24th April 1873.

From Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee to Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

You are well aware of my circumstances, and that his Highness the Khan committed every kind of oppression on the Sarawan and Jalawan Sirdars until they became so disaffected that the Commissioner in Sind sent for us to Jacobabad and made arrangement for the welfare of our country, viz., that in future his Highness would treat the Sirdars properly, committing no act of tyranny or oppression, and we in return were to cheerfully afford him our services. Agreeably to this understanding, we joined his Highness the Khan and remained with the latter until he visited the Commissioner at Shapur, when the latter again made further arrangements calculated to ensure peace to his Highness the Khan, as also content and prosperity to his subjects. His Highness has now confiscated hereditary lands belonging to the Raisanees, ignored his arrangements with the British Government, and again commenced tyranny and oppression on all his subjects. My only hope is in your Government; for this reason I wish to point out to you that I shall be in no way to blame if those who are oppressed create disturbances as the only chance of saving their lives; and hope, should anything occur, you will not be annoyed with me, but consider me always the servant and well-wisher of your Government. You and Major Harrison are well aware what kindness his Highness is likely to show us. His

only wish and desire is to injure us; it was therefore necessary to petition you on the subject.

After Major Harrison's departure from Gundava, his Highness twice sent letters to me by Ali Yar Khan Raisanee, as also a verbal message by Sumundar Lehree. I send copies of the correspondence for your perusal, as also substance of verbal communication, from perusal of which you will understand all the circumstances of the case. I send my brother-in-law, Meer Aladad Khan, who is authorised to represent matters verbally. Kindly look upon him as a trustworthy person, and that what he says may be relied upon. The British Government have many well-wishers. Consider me one of them, and show me consideration by writing to me of your welfare, &c. May your prosperity always increase.

Enclosure 5 in No. 157.

Dated 10th Sufur 1290 = 8th April 1873.

From his Highness the Khan of Khelat to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee.

You should trust in my kindness. I now send Ali Yar Khan Raisanee to you. I agree to the arrangements made by my friend the Commissioner in Sind. You may enjoy all you had in my late brother's reign, and should serve me truly and faithfully. You are my chief Sirdar and well-wisher. God forbid that I should do you or anyone else any injury. Accept my service; I have your interests under consideration; it is necessary for you to assist me truly and faithfully, and to rest assured that my kindness towards yourself will daily increase. Do not doubt what I have written.

Enclosure 6 in No. 157.

Dated 15th Sufur 1290 = 13th April 1873.

From Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

CHERISHER of the poor. By your kindness the letter sent by Ali Yar Khan Raisanee has reached me, and was to the following effect, viz., that your Highness agreed to the arrangements made by the Commissioner in Sind, and that it was necessary for us to take service with you. Cherisher of the poor! may God preserve you in your kindness. My petition is that God has given you great sense and wisdom, and it is therefore unnecessary to give you advice. It, however, appears to me that it was inexpedient for the Saheb * to have left your country; if it pleases your heart having done so, you are master. Your Highness states you agree to the Commissioner's arrangements; so do we, for you are our legitimate sovereign. When you treat us kindly we shall serve you to the best of our power. Consider me your humble servant and well-wisher. Show me kindness, and may God increase your wealth and prosperity.

* Major Harrison.

Enclosure 7 in No. 157.

Message from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, through Sumundar Lehree.

You are the head chief and well-wisher of my Government; it is necessary for you to mount your horse and join me, as I will treat you with kindness that cannot be realised.

Enclosure 8 in No. 157.

Reply to the above.

I HAVE no other remedy. Your Highness being the legitimate descendant of our sovereigns, distrusting you I cannot come, for this reason:—First, you swore to me on the Koran, but ignored your oath and tried to injure me; second, you agreed to abide by arrangements made by the British Government, but have not done so. How, therefore, can I trust you sufficiently to mount my horse and join you as directed. We shall remain quietly and watch in what way your kindness will be shown.

Enclosure 9 in No. 157.

Dated 19th Sufur 1290 = 19th April 1873.

From his Highness the Khan of Khelat to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee.

I RECEIVED your truthful letter, and there can be no doubt of your being my well-wisher. Ali Yar Khan informed me regarding your welfare, &c. From the very first I have always looked upon you as my well-wisher, and consequently again send Ali Yar Khan to you, who will communicate verbally what is going on here. Trust him. Everything is well here. On receipt of this note believe that my kindness towards yourself will daily increase, and that it behoves you to act on what I have written.

Enclosure 10 in No. 157.

Dated 26th Sufur 1290 = 24th April 1873.

Verbal communication from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, through Ali Yar Khan.

You are my head Sirdar; have no other thought but trust in me, and proceed at once by the Bolan to join Khelat. You will be treated kindly and considerately in every way.

Enclosure 11 in No. 157.

Remark by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed.

ALI YAR KHAN is still with me, and I have not answered his Highness' letter. In the Commissioner's letter there is a postscript, substance of which Ali Yar Khan will communicate to you.

This postscript does not appear anywhere.
(Signed) W. L. M.,
Commissioner in Sind.

Enclosure 12 in No. 157.

Dated Jacobabad, 3rd May 1873.

From Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee.

I HAVE received your letter of the 24th ultimo, and it has given me much gratification to learn that you and the other Sirdars have acted up so well to the sound counsel given you by Major Harrison, the Political Agent, Khelat, before leaving his Highness the Khan's camp. I have received your letter and its accompaniments to my address, also one to the Commissioner in Sind, all of which have been forwarded to Sir William Merewether, C.B., K.C.S.I., and when his reply to them has been received the same will be communicated to you. Until the Commissioner makes known his wishes I can give you no counsel or advice better than that already given you by the Political Agent, Khelat, namely, not only to keep quiet yourself and to commit no overt act, for which you might have to answer hereafter, but to persuade the other Sirdars and your own people to follow in the same course.

Whatever you do, I recommended you to bear in mind what the Commissioner in Sind, when at Shapur in February, attempted to impress on all the Sirdars, and to prevent any disturbances taking place in Kutchee, for, as you and the other Sirdars well know, should any disturbances and plunderings take place in that country, it will be put down by the British Government with a strong hand. My advice to you is to remain quiet yourself, and to keep the other Sirdars and your followers from committing any evil or stupid acts, respecting rights of merchants, as also harmless and inoffensive cultivators.

Enclosure 13 in No. 157.

Dated 26th Sufur 1290 = 24th April 1873.

From Moolla Mahomed Khan Raisanee to Commissioner in Sind.

IT is known to you what descriptions of oppressions and hardships were practised by his Highness the Khan of Khelat on myself and all the other Sarawan and Jalawan Sirdars. In order to put an end to this, and to introduce better government in Beloochistan, you were kind enough to propose measures, according to which I, with all the

other Sirdars, presented ourselves before his Highness the Khan, and commenced to render him service and obey his orders. We were also present at Shapur before you in company with the Khan, and have done all we could since then to propitiate his Highness the Khan. Notwithstanding this, you may have learnt that after his departure from Shapur he confiscated the hereditary holdings of all the Raisanees at Lehree. I informed Major Harrison of these new oppressions of the Khan, mentioning at the same time that we look to British Government to redress our grievances, and that we consider ourselves attached to British Government. Major Harrison in reply wrote to me that he was called back and was to leave. Nothing, however, was done for us. Now I beg to state that these renewed acts of tyranny by the Khan on my Raj and Ooloos are likely to be productive of mischief by the disturbed people from fear of their own lives. As I consider myself attached to and a well-wisher of the British Government, I trust I will not incur their displeasure if disturbances take place. The Khan has entirely failed to carry out the good arrangements concluded by you for the peace of the country and for his own welfare. You may also be aware that on marching from Gundava the Khan sent me two letters by Ali Yar Khan Raisanee, and also sent me oral messages through Samundar Khan Lehree; what I wrote in reply to his Highness the Khan, or told to the messenger, is detailed in the accompanying copy. I in every respect consider myself an humble servant of your own and that of the British Government, and I trust I will be distinguished with the honour of being favoured with your kind letters.

Enclosure 14 in No. 157.

Dated 26th Sufur 1290 = 24th April 1873.

From Moolla Mahomed Khan Raisanee to Commissioner in Sind.

It may be in your Honour's recollection that last year, in my depositions given before you, I had fully represented the want of confidence in Meer Khodadad Khan, the oppressions and breach of faith committed by him, and the circumstances under which he had forfeited any reliance whatever being placed on his oaths or words. As you are the greatest British representative, and hold an august position, with full authority from Government, we had great confidence in your judgment and promises. The best policy of a ruler is always to maintain his word and carry out his promises firmly. Bearing this principle in mind, I carried out your wishes and acted up to your advice, by having presented myself before his Highness the Khan. According to your decision, it was declared that his Highness the Khan should behave well, regulating his proceedings by the counsel of the British agent and his own Wuzeer, and that he should act in the interest of his subjects, Raj and Ooloos. Now he has done exactly the reverse, having reverted to his old habits by confiscating the holdings of the Raj and by violating the British arrangements. He has been oppressing his ryots, Hindus and Mahomedans, in various ways; he has entirely ignored your advice and has behaved fraudulently to the British Government. He follows the advice of Mahomed Khan, son of Moollah Ahmed, Vakeel, and several other low-bred individuals, such as Kazee Mahomed Hayat and other evil-minded persons; he has placed the reins of government in their hands. The Agent and the Khan's Wuzeer, disgusted at his deceit and other misbehaviour, have retired to Jacobabad. I therefore beg to remark, for your consideration, that the Khan has proved himself ungrateful for the many favours of the British Government, and discarded the British counsel. The reward received for the long and good service of his Wuzeer is already known to you; what hopes can then be entertained by us? It is evident that his Highness the Khan is not able to manage the country, and will never be so. We Sirdars, Sarawans and Jalawans, &c., lament exceedingly, and feel surprised that, notwithstanding the repeated cautions of the British Government, the Khan fails to carry out their wishes, and has been unable to maintain peace in his country. Now all we Sirdars are particularly obedient to the British Government, and would be satisfied with what that paramount power may wish to do for our welfare. We all are quite disgusted with the Khan's acts, but hope to continue to meet the wishes of the British Government. We beg that your Honour, as representative of the British power, will render us assistance in order to procure a better government and further our welfare. This will spread the fame of the British Government far and wide, and will have the best effect on the people of other countries. Owing to want of confidence in the Khan disturbances and complications are prevalent in the country and the kafila routes are stopped. The Khan will not be able to mend matters, and the interference of the British Government is needed. All are well acquainted with the Khan's deeds. It is hoped immediate measures will be taken, and we await your reply.

Enclosure 15 in No. 157.

Dated Kurrachee, 19th May 1873.

From Commissioner in Sind to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee.

I HAVE received your two letters forwarded through Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, and in reply have to inform you that I have heard with much pleasure how wisely and well you have followed the good advice so judiciously given you by Major Harrison.

2. Such disturbances as occurred eighteen months ago do most injury to the poor and harmless, most injuriously affecting the prosperity of your country and fellow-beings. They can never help to support the cause of any wrongs that may have been experienced, and a recurrence of them will always be viewed with extreme displeasure by the British Government, who will, in consequence of them, be prevented from listening to any just complaints, which otherwise might have received attention.

3. You should all join especially in seeing that the safety of travellers and merchants passing through your country should be sacredly preserved. The honour of yourselves and your country is closely involved in this, as well as the advantages which trade invariably brings with it.

4. As long as you follow the wise course you have now adopted you may rest fully assured that no effort on my part shall be wanting to promote the well-being of yourself and of the other Sirdars of Beloochistan, and to obtain, at the hands of your sovereign, proper recognition of the rights, privileges, and consideration you are justly entitled to.

Enclosure 16 in No. 157.

No. 468, dated Kurrachee, 19th May 1873.

From Commissioner in Sind, to Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 1220, dated the 3rd instant, with accompaniments from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, and in reply to inform you that I quite approve of the answer you gave to that Sirdar, and that the views you express in your letter are exactly those which should be followed in the state of affairs at present existing in Beloochistan.

2. It will be necessary to watch the course of events most carefully, and to obtain the best and earliest information in regard to all that is passing in the country. Major Harrison, having the assistance of the Shahgassee at Jacobabad, should be able to manage this part well. His political diaries should be continued as before.

3. I enclose two letters, with translations, for your information, one to the address of his Highness the Khan, the other to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, and have the honour to request that you will cause them to be forwarded to their respective destinations.

Enclosure 17 in No. 157.

Dated Kurrachee, 19th May 1873.

From Commissioner in Sind to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

A LITTLE more than a year ago your Highness' country was torn by rebellion. Your authority was reduced to the lowest, and your throne was in extreme danger. The offer of mediation between your Highness and your disaffected Sirdars was accepted by you. All power, as if you yourself were present, was confided in me by you, and you agreed to abide by the decision arrived at. That decision restored peace and order to your country. It was in no way derogatory to your honour, and though it was punitory to the Sirdars they cheerfully accepted it. For every reason, in strict honour and in sound policy, the terms of that decision should have been most closely and faithfully adhered to by you, while the Sirdars have endeavoured to honourably fulfil their part. I regret now to learn that your Highness has deliberately broken the solemn pledge you gave, in that you have caused to be confiscated certain hereditary lands at Lehree belonging to the Raisanee tribe, in the possession of which they were confirmed by the decision before mentioned. There are also grave complaints of other acts of oppression and misrule.

2. It is now my duty to warn your Highness that the above breach of faith, the renewed complaints of misgovernment, and the general disordered state of your country, so inju-

riously affecting trade communications, cannot be lightly considered, or be a matter of indifference to the Government of India, to whom I have now reported the whole circumstances, and whose instructions I shall have the honour of communicating hereafter.

No. 158.

Dated Jacobabad, 10th May 1873.

From Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Commissioner in Sind.

I HAVE the honour to forward for your information the following news just received from Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat :—

His Highness the Khan of Khelat reached Khelat by the Tehree route in eleven days. Darogah Attah Mahomed met the Khan at Kurgan near Ibattaji. Sirdar Noordeen was presented with a khillut at Mur, recognised as the Jalawan Sirdar, and allowed to return to Wud. His Highness entered Khelat about the 27th of last month.

The ex-Vakeel Mahomed Khan and the Kazi of Bagh met at Lehree to try and entertain Belooch levies for the protection of Kutchee, but every one refused to serve. The Mugzees and Rinds were called upon to furnish 200 sowars, but only sent fifteen or twenty men.

Heavy rain has fallen about Khelat, but no cultivation possible, all the zemindars having been pressed to build stables for his Highness' horses.

It is rumoured that the raiding in Lus Beyla has taken place at the instigation of the ex-Vakeel Mahomed Khan, who represented to his Highness that if three or four kafilahs were plundered, the Commissioner in Sind would remonstrate, and all his Highness would then have to do would be to acknowlege his inability to restore order, and solicit the pardon and release of the Jam of Beyla. By following this policy Noordeen Mingul's support might be relied on.

I am unable at present to say what degree of truth there is in the foregoing rumour, but in a few days hope to know.

No. 472, dated Kurrachee, 19th May 1873.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copy forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

No. 159.

No. 1140, dated Jacobabad, 29th April 1873.

From Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Commissioner in Sind.

I DO myself the honour to bring the following before you, in the hope that you may be induced to bring the same favourably to the notice of Government.

2. When the Political Agent was withdrawn from the Court of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, in the beginning of the present month, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed and some of his relatives, in all about 200 persons, were compelled to seek protection in British territory.

3. Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed has extensive inam lands both in the neighbourhood of Khelat and Kutchee, the latter situated on the bank of the Sirwah Canal, which the Shahgassee represents would yield a fair income if a cutting from the above could be granted to him, but this, from the present condition of the Sirwah, cannot be sanctioned. Situated, however, as the Shahgassee is, it is more than probable that his Highness will confiscate the above lands, as well as any hereditary possessions Wullee Mahomed may have.

4. Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed as Wuzeer received certain grants which gave him an income of twenty thousand rupees per annum; but his hospitality to all classes of people has been such for years past that he has always lived up to his income. I do not propose to support all who have accompanied the Shahgassee, but to mark the esteem and respect with which the Shahgassee has always been received by the British Government on account of his long and faithful services to his master the Khan, and

the assistance which he has always rendered the British, I would beg to recommend that he be granted personal allowance during such time as he is forced to remain in British territory, and I feel sure all classes in Beloochistan would appreciate some such token of regard being shown to the well-tried and faithful old Wuzeer.

5. To meet such an expenditure no extra budget would be required, as during such time as Major Harrison and Surgeon Bowman are withdrawn from the Khelat Court their travelling allowance of four hundred and fifty rupees per mensem, contingent allowance averaging about fifty rupees per mensem, and limited toshakhana expenditure about two thousand four hundred rupees per annum, would be available; thus making in all a sum of seven hundred rupees per mensem, six hundred of which might be paid to the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed without putting Government to any extra expense, leaving a margin for any trifling contingencies in the Agency, for so soon as Major Harrison is able to return to the Court of his Highness the Khan of Khelat the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed would of course accompany him, and his monthly allowance would then stop.

6. Trusting you will take a favourable view of the old Wuzeer's case.

Enclosure in No. 159.

No. 476, dated Kurrachee, 21st May 1873.

From Commissioner in Sind to Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

In acknowledging the receipt of your letter No. 1140 of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to inform you that your proposals with regard to the personal allowance of Rs. six hundred per mensem to be made to the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed meet with my entire approval, and I have to request that you will make payments accordingly to the Shahgassee, in anticipation of the sanction of Government, to be considered as commencing from the date of his arrival at Jacobabad.

2. In all probability all the lands previously held by the Shahgassee in Kutchee or elsewhere will be resumed by the Khan of Khelat, including those on the Sirwah Canal mentioned in the 3rd paragraph of your letter; but should they not be, the question arises whether the Sirwah Canal can give the water necessary for the proposed cultivation. On this point you should refer to the Executive Engineer in charge of that canal, who will be able to say whether there will be a sufficiency of water to allow of a new branch being taken off.

No. 477, dated Kurrachee, 21st May 1873.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies submitted to Government. As the allowance to the Shahgassee involves no new or additional expenditure, and as it will cease when the funds temporarily appropriated for this purpose are again required for what they were originally granted, I have sanctioned the Political Superintendent's proposal, and directed it to be carried into effect, in anticipation of the sanction of Government, otherwise the Shahgassee might be greatly inconvenienced. It has often before been mentioned, but may be repeated here, this excellent Sirdar was appointed Wuzeer at Jacobabad in 1858, when his Highness the Khan was on a visit there to meet the Commissioner in Sind. It was done with the full approval of the Political Superintendent at the time, General Jacob, and of the then Commissioner in Sind, Sir Bartle Frere. Indeed, both those officers urged strongly on the Khan that the Shahgassee would prove the best adviser and most faithful servant he could select, to which the Khan assented, and the appointment was afterwards ratified at Gundava in presence of all the Sirdars of Beloochistan. With unswerving fidelity to his master, and thorough honesty of purpose in respect to his own Government and country, the Shahgassee has never failed to carefully regard the wishes and interests of the British Government, and to act most cordially and sincerely with the Political Agent placed at the Court of his master the Khan. He, therefore, I think, deserves every consideration at our hands, especially when it is recollected that his present exile from his country is, in a great measure, brought about by his earnest endeavours to induce his master to follow implicitly the course recommended by the British officials.

2. Copies of these papers have been sent to the Government of India.

No. 478, dated Kurrachee, 21st May 1873.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information and approval.

No. 160.

No. 485, dated Kurrachee, 23rd May 1873.

From Commissioner in Sind to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

WITH reference to Letter No. 815P., Foreign Department, I have the honour to state that the outrages recently committed on the Kafila route between Kurrachee and Khelat are as follows:

2. On the 21st March it was reported by a Shikarpooree merchant named Mengraj Mal *wullud* Motumal, residing in Kurrachee, that a kafila consisting of 80 camels, with from 30 to 35 camelmen, which was on its way from Kurrachee to Khelat carrying cloth and other merchandize, had been attacked a little beyond the Hubb in Khelat territory, and a camel with its load carried off. A man of the name of Taj Mahomed Brahooee, belonging to the Kafila with others, pursued the robbers and came up with them; shots were exchanged, when Taj Mahomed was killed. The camel was recovered but the load was taken off by the robbers. About the same time a laden camel was carried off from a Kafila bringing wool to Kurrachee from Khelat. This occurred at almost the same place, and was the act of the same band, consisting of twelve robbers, followers of Nowsherwan Chotah and Dewriah Bundejo. Amongst the twelve the following were recognized:— Bahardin Bundejo, Lukhmir Bundejo, Nubbu Bundejo, and Hussein Bhalul Chotah.

3. A few days afterwards Nowsherwan and Dewriah's followers robbed some Pathans travelling along the road within Khelat territory of four loaded donkeys.

4. Two other outrages were committed towards the end of March by the same people. In one case two Brahooees were said to have been robbed of property valued at Rupees 1,200, and in the second, Rupees 60 in cash and Rupees 10 worth of cloth were taken from a Pathan.

5. In the beginning of April Mahomed Khan Brahooee, a pensioned havildar of the Belooch regiment, was robbed of Rupees 1,250 in cash, and ornaments, when on his way to his home in Beloochistan.

6. About the same time a kafila of Candahar and Khelat merchants, carrying cloth, sugar, &c., were set upon by some thirty armed men directly after crossing the Hubb river and getting into Khelat territory. They, however, drove off the robbers without losing anything. On the 5th April a similar occurrence took place with the same result.

7. Towards the end of April a kafila belonging to Mahomed Deen Khan, Pathan, proceeding *en route* to Candahar, was plundered in Khelat territory, about 60 miles after leaving the British border. The kafila consisted of 100 camels with 55 men. The robbers, armed with swords and guns, mustered some 80 strong. Two camels were killed at the first onslaught. The kafila people tried to beat off their assailants with stones, when the robbers fired a second time, killing Zinda Shah, a Syed, resident of Shawlcote, and wounding a Brahooee, a Pathan, and seven other men severely. Altogether 13 camels were either killed or carried off. The value of the merchandize stolen is not known, the owners not being present.

8. Another kafila belonging to one Hazee Mahomed, merchant, started from Kurrachee for Khelat about the middle of April. Shortly after entering Khelat territory it was attacked and plundered of property of the aggregate value of Rupees 5,869-11-0, according to a list submitted at the time. They found resistance was of no avail and offered none, the robbers threatening to kill them if they did.

9. Directly the first outrage was reported, all merchants were warned against attempting the route across the Hubb through Lus Beyla, on account of the disturbed state of the country, and advised to go through Sind and Kutchee, up the Bolan, which was quite safe. All the after-departures were in spite of this warning, and merchants ran the risk of their own free will. This, however, does not absolve the Khan of Khelat

from the blame of having his country in such a state as to admit of such outrages being committed without punishment immediately following. I at once instructed the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to call on the Khan of Khelat for restitution of the property or its equivalent, and the punishment of the perpetrators, but nothing has yet been done that I have heard of.

10. The directors of these outrages are Nowsherwan Chotah and Dewriah Bundejo. The former is brother of Oomed Ali, the late chief of the Chotah tribe, one of the largest on the Khelat border, their possessions extending from near Kurrachee up to the latitude of Larkhana. On Oomed Ali's death, a few years ago, he was succeeded in the Sirdarship by his son Sahib Khan, quite a young man. Nowsherwan at first tried to gain influence over his nephew, but during the last five years he has gone further and endeavoured to oust his nephew from the Sirdarship of the tribe. The mass of the Chotahs having a natural reverence for hereditary right, oppose Nowsherwan's pretensions, and support Sahib Khan, the legitimate head. For a time Nowsherwan was allowed to reside in British territory, but as he only took advantage of his secure position to molest his nephew, whenever opportunity offered, he was refused further asylum. Since then he has been moving about in Khelat territory with a few followers, joining anyone who would act with him against his nephew and clan, or in any disturbances that were going on.

11. Dewriah is a chief of the Bundejos, a minor clan residing on the west side of the Hubb, and very inferior in status and strength to the Chotahs. This man had been for long a notorious robber, engaging in petty plundering from neighbouring clans. About three years ago he declared he would become a reformed character, and was allowed to pay his respects in my camp, when I was marching along the Hubb. He promised then most solemnly to live in peace with his neighbours for the future, and kept his word, I must say, until lately, when he was led away by Nowsherwan and prompted by others to engage once more in disorderly practices. Neither of these men have any influence in the country, and have certainly not more than 60 or 80 followers at present. But if they can ensure plunder to any who join them, their bands will soon increase, and prove most injurious to trade and the peacefully disposed. Their proceedings are quite distinct from those of Ali Khan Jamote, who has never plundered merchants, but merely acts in opposition to the Khan of Khelat in hopes of bringing about the return of his cousin, Meer Khan, the ex-Jam of Lus Beyla. But as Ali Khan has an old standing feud with the main clan of Chotahs he occasionally engages in hostilities with them, in which Nowsherwan is always ready to offer his services. I think, however, there is little doubt that Nowsherwan and Dewriah have been instigated to act as they have done by Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, and intriguers about the Khan to still further complicate the present unhealthy state of affairs in Beloochistan.

12. The dwelling-places of Nowsherwan and Dewriah are only just beyond the Hubb, the boundary between Sind and Beloochistan, and are well known. They could be easily seized by our police; but as these deeds of outrage are committed within the territory of the Khan of Khelat, I consider that sovereign should be held responsible for them and he required to make compensation as well as put an end to such disorderly practices.

13. The police posts on the frontier have been strengthened and orders given to them to put down immediately any disturbances that may occur near their beats, and arrest the people engaged in them.

No. 161.

No. 489, dated Kurrachee, 23rd May 1873.

from Commissioner in Sind, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. (Extract)

In reply to letter No. 839P, dated the 2nd instant, from the Under-Secretary, Captain Henderson, I have the honour to forward copies of Khelat Diaries Nos. 8 to 10, 14, 15, and 16. I regret that the omission to despatch these had been overlooked.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 161.

Diary No. 8 of 1873, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the Week ending 23rd February 1873.

His Highness the Khan left Bagh on the 17th, accompanied by Dr. Bowman, and proceeded to Shapur *viâ* Janoo to meet the Commissioner in Sind, arriving at the first-named place on the evening of the 17th. In his Highness' retinue were the principal Sarawan and Jalawan Sirdars.

The Commissioner in Sind and Political Superintendent arrived on the morning of the 20th and were received with the ceremony usual on such occasion. About noon his Highness and chiefs were received by the Commissioner in Sind at a Durbar attended by all officers. Robes of honour were presented to his Highness and Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, as also presents for Highness' three sons. At 5 p.m. the Commissioner in Sind and Political Superintendent, with heads of departments, returned his Highness' visit. Horses, riding camels, &c., &c., &c., were presented. All his Highness' chiefs were present, except Noordeen Mingul, who refused to attend.

On Thursday the Commissioner had private interviews with his Highness the Khan and Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, as also a Durbar for the Sirdars in the evening; the Commissioner in Sind, Political Superintendent, and Assistant Commissioner paid a friendly visit to take leave of his Highness.

On Friday it was reported that a section of the Muzzerani tribe of Murrees had attempted to intercept a kafila in the Bolan, but were repulsed by the merchants and followed up without delay by Naib Abdool Aziz and the Kirta outpost, who arrested all concerned, 40 in number. Copies of original reports with translations were forwarded under cover of letter No. 32 of the 21st February 1873, for the Political Superintendent's information.

On Saturday the Commissioner, Political Superintendent, and party left for Jacobabad *viâ* Manuti.

His Highness left for Bagh *viâ* Janoo on Sunday morning.

I have been visited on two occasions by Syed Fazul Shah, who calls himself the Murree Chief's Vakeel. His statements have been so contradictory that it is useless to record anything. He seems most anxious to attribute all misunderstandings regarding Guzzun* to the ignorance and incapacity of his Moonshee, and states that the Sirdar and leading men are anxious for employment and quite willing to pay their respects to the British Government and his Highness the Khan. Syed Fazul Shah had left Khan before Guzzun's impertinent letters were returned to him.

* A Murree chief, who failed to visit the Commissioner in Sind at Jacobabad in January last.

Transit through the Bolan is safe and satisfactory.

Two men were killed at Poolajee by some Murrees during the past week.

Enclosure 2 in No. 161.

Diary No. 9 of 1873, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the Week ending 1st March 1873.

A khureeta from the Commissioner in Sind was delivered to his Highness the Khan on Tuesday the 25th, requesting the latter's serious consideration to subjects that would have been discussed at the private interview at "Shapur," had he not discouraged all conversation except that which related to the release of Shukur Khan and the Moonshees.

A reply to the above khureeta has been daily solicited. His Highness at first maintained that no answer beyond a courteous acknowledgment was necessary, and no steps were taken regarding a reply until the arrival of Mahomed Khan, ex-Vakeel, from Jacobabad; since then several rough drafts have been written and destroyed. I am am daily led to understand that a fair copy will be sent to me for transmission to Government.

On Thursday afternoon, Mahomed Khan above alluded to arrived and was cordially welcomed by his Highness the Khan and is now chief adviser; for appearance sake, little or no communication takes place in the day-time except through the Kazee of Bagh and a man called Moollah Jumma. After dark Mahomed Khan visits his Highness and letters of a secret nature are written by the former's Moonshees, and forwarded to their destination.

On Friday I was visited by his Highness; he particularly solicited that Mahomed

Khan should accompany him to Khelat. I replied he was at liberty to consult his own wishes and interests, but as my views and opinions were not in accordance with the ex-Vakeel's I should have to ask the Government to excuse my accompanying him to Khelat. His Highness begged me on no account to do anything of the sort, as there would be a general disturbance directly I left. Kutchee not being considered a safe refuge for Mahomed Khan, his Highness said he should advise him to settle at Bhawalpur, so that if he, the Khan, were driven out of the country he would have some one to live with.

At this interview I did all I could to induce his Highness to take an interest in the subjects brought to his notice by the Commissioner in Sind, and talked to him with the greatest kindness and patience, all to no purpose however, for he reiterated the substance of his private conversation with the Commissioner, stating he had no intention of ruling the country or taking an interest in affairs until Shukur Khan and the Moonshees were released; that the British Government, the Shahgassee, and myself might do what we liked. I pointed out to his Highness that the only wish of my Government was to see him accept his position as head of the country, and to exercise his authority in such a manner as to ensure peace and quiet in his country, and that my position as representative of the British Government was to give him friendly advice, and I begged to disclaim any other.

The Commissioner in Sind's suggestions regarding Lus Beyla, appointing another Vakeel at Jacobadad, &c. were discussed, but his Highness maintained the position he has assumed of being neither willing nor able to rule his country.

Syed Fazul Shah, the Murree Chief's Vakeel, has been here some days. His Highness is sceptical as to the advantages of subsidising, and therefore declined to receive Guzzun; at the same time he expressed himself willing to send men of position to escort the Murree Chief direct to Jacobabad for the British Government to make any arrangements they may desire, provided he, the Khan, is not held responsible for the acts of the Murree tribe.

His Highness is raising another infantry regiment, which is to be commanded by Farrier Abdool Wahud, late Naib of Dadur. His present force, about 3,000, have not been paid for three months, and to raise sufficient money to pay them and meet present requirements he is forcing Baniahs in Kutchee, Quettah, and Mustoong to buy his grain. Great discontent is felt at this act of oppression.

A kossid from Candahar has just passed through the Bolan, and reports that Naib Abdool Aziz's arrangements are so satisfactory that solitary people may go through the pass with perfect safety, halting wherever they like to sleep or cook their food. Several kafilas have passed through, and others are *en route*.

Meer Mahomed, Mingul Sirdar, whilst visiting me on Saturday, mentioned he had just received information from Beyla, stating that Ali Khan Jamote and Sirdar Ibrahim Khan Roonjao had quarrelled; three Roonjaos were killed, and further disturbances were most likely to occur.

Enclosure 3 in No. 161.

Diary No. 10 of 1873, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the Week ending 9th March 1873.

Syed Fazul Shah, Sirdar Guzzun's Vakeel, remained several days at Bagh, and it was hoped his Highness the Khan would send for Guzzun and the principal Murree chiefs. Ultimately his Highness intimated to the above Vakeel that his Sirdar and the Murree chiefs had made a great mistake in not coming when sent for, as they would not now be received; further that he, the Khan, would never forget having had to pay 55,000 rupees on their account, and if it was ever in his power would send all the Murrees, great and small, to Jehannum.

On Tuesday afternoon Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and the Sarawan chiefs requested and received permission from his Highness the Khan to return to their respective homes. Late in the evening great excitement prevailed, as a report was circulated that his Highness' troops had received orders to turn out and arrest them, as also the Shahgassee.

Shere Dil Muzzerani Murree returned to Bagh on Friday, and after paying his respects to his Highness the Khan rejoined the Naib of Dadur to assist him in kafila arrangements.

Sirdar Sohrab Khan reports that two Tullanees, who had gone with their bullocks to fetch grass from the hills, were waylaid by Sheeranee Murrees on the 7th instant, and

deprived of their cattle. Syed Fazul Shah, Guzzun's agent, was at Lehree when the Tullanees reported what had occurred, and begged Sirdar Sohrab Khan to take no notice of what had occurred, as he would guarantee the bullocks being returned before evening. This promise was not fulfilled, and the Dhoombkee chief represents that no immunity from petty thefts or raids can be expected, as it is generally known his Highness' subjects have been forbidden to take retaliatory measures.

Traffic through the Bolan is still satisfactory.

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

Enclosure 4 in No. 161.

Diary No. 14 of 1873, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the Week ending 6th April 1873.

CAPTAIN MCNAIR, with a troop of the 1st Sind Horse, joined my camp on the 1st instant at Gundava, and Lieutenant Smith of the Rifles, with two companies of his regiment, on the 3rd.

A khureeta from the Commissioner in Sind to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, intimating withdrawal of the Political Agent from his court, was received on Saturday afternoon, and will be forwarded on Monday morning, with a letter stating my intention of at once carrying out the orders received.

Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee writes to me that Mahomed Khan, Naib of Lehree, "late Vakeel at Jacobabad," has through enmity confiscated the inam lands of Mahomed Ali Raisanee, although they have been in his possession from the great Nusseer Khan's reign until the present time.

Compensation for the kafila plundered by the Murrees has been adjusted in the manner agreed upon and reported in Diary No. 6 of 1873.

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

Enclosure 5 in No. 161.

Diary No. 15 of 1873, by Political Agent, Khelat, for the Week ending 13th April 1873.

ON Monday afternoon, after receipt of the Commissioner's letter, his Highness sent a confidential servant, requesting I would call upon him or allow him to visit me. In reply I stated that as the reasons of my withdrawal were fully stated in the Commissioner's letter, further discussion was unnecessary, and as visiting under present circumstances would be unpleasant, I had taken leave of him by letter.

On Tuesday morning I marched on Nowshera, eight miles from Gundava, accompanied by Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, his friends and relatives, in all about 150 people.

On Monday night Sirdar Noordeen had a long interview with his Highness the Khan, who promised to make him head Sirdar of the Jalawan country, give him the standard, and solicit the release of the ex-Jam, his brother-in-law, if he and the Mingul tribe would support him, Sirdar Noordeen agreed to his Highness' proposition but joined my camp at Nowshera, evidently undetermined what to do. Meeting with no encouragement he returned to Gundava and solicited permission from his Highness to return to Wud, which was refused, and he, Noordeen, requested to use his influence with Sirdah Moolla Mahomed to induce him to join his camp, and to assure the Sirdar. He, the Khan, now wished to be on friendly terms with his Sirdars and people. Sirdar Noordeen declined to comply with his Highness' request, stating Moolla Mahomed had neglected his interests when at Jacobabad. Consequent on the above refusal his Highness sent two macebearers with a letter to the Sirdar's address; they were maltreated by some Brahooees and had to return without delivering the Kkan's message. A friend of the Sirdars was then commissioned by his Highness to inform Sirdar Moolla Mahomed he, the Khan, was anxious to carry out what was arranged at Jacobabad, and would in future adopt a conciliatory policy towards him and the Brahooees. The Sirdar declined to join his Highness, stating he had no confidence in him or his promises.

His Highness, on receipt of the Commissioner's letter, sent off an express for the ex-Vakeel Mahomed Khan, stating that as he had forfeited the friendship of the British Government by supporting him, he, Mahomed Khan, must join his Highness the Khan's camp at once and make all necessary arrangements. Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed informed me that both his Highness and Mahomed Khan would in all probability do all they could to carry out what had been suggested by the British Government so as to make it appear that he, the Shahgassee, as also the Political Agent, were the obstructive persons and brought about late misunderstandings.

His Highness was to have marched on Friday morning, but it is stated he had no one who could arrange like the Shahgassee for his carriages, supplies, &c., through the Moolla. His Highness, it is stated, is in a depressed frame of mind, and the force on which he relies don't seem to be in very good spirits at the prospect of being called upon to quell a general rebellion.

Several of the Brahooee chiefs asked me plainly whether they were at liberty to take possession of Kutchee now that the British Government had withdrawn. I replied I could not participate in any intrigue against his Highness, but as a friend would remind them of what the Commissioner said at Shahpur, and what might happen if they created a disturbance on the border. The Sirdars appeared greatly disappointed at my reminding them of what might occur, stating if the Khan got back to Kelat they could not protect themselves against tyranny and oppression, for he had forts well-garrisoned, guns, &c., whereas they only had swords. Being, therefore, helpless they hoped the British Government would take Kutchee and allow them to settle down in peace and quietness. Sumundar Lehree was the spokesman, so I told him what he suggested was not contemplated, as shown by my withdrawal. The Lehrees and Mahomedshais appear inclined to trust to his Highness' recent promises: all the other Sarawan Sirdars have joined Moolla Mahomed at Seebee.

Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, his friends and relatives, entered British territory on Saturday, camping at Soban-ke-Guri; on the following day they entered Jacobabad and occupied houses that had been hired for them in the town.

Enclosure 6 in No. 161.

Diary No. 16 of 1873, by Political Agent, Kelat, for the Week ending 20th April 1873.

In the early part of the week a slight affray at Seebee was reported, the effect of his Highness' intrigue with Akbar Khan and Surbulund, sons of Misree Khan, Barukzais, Buktyar Khan, their uncle, and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed having received information of what was intended towards them made arrangements to quietly arrest Akbar Khan and Surbulund; the latter, however, received timely warning and fired a volley on the party sent to arrest them, killing seven men.

Ali Yar Khan Raisanee was sent by his Highness the Khan to assure Sirdar Moolla Mahomed. He would in future treat his Sirdars and people with kindness and consideration, and carry out what was agreed upon at Jacobabad. The Sirdar replied that he had no confidence in anything he might say or write. His Highness then sent Sumundar Lehree to try and induce Sirdar Moolla Mahomed to join his camp.

Sirdar Noordeen Mingul has asked permission to leave his Highness' camp on several occasions and been refused. He has sent to tell the Shahgassee he will escape on the first convenient opportunity.

The ex-Vakeel Mahomed Khan visited his Highness at Gundava, but returned at once to Lehree. A letter, it is said, was written at his instigation and sent direct to the Commissioner in Sind.

Nubbee Buksh, Naib of Lehree, has been appointed to Bagh until Abdool Luteef, of Quettah, can take up the appointment.

Aitbar Khan of Kotra, a friend of Mahomed Khan, has been appointed to Kozdar *vice* Gholam Mahomed, a brother-in-law of Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed.

Some of the Sarawan Brahooees had collected close to Dadur with the intention of plundering in Kutchee, but were stopped by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, who said he would not allow anything of the sort, as it would annoy the British Government.

His Highness the Khan left for Kotra on Friday, and it is said will remain there a day or two until he hears from Sumundar Lehree what Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's intentions may be.

His Highness the Khan received a letter from Darogah Atta Mahomed, who, after commenting on the folly of his Highness' conduct, advised him to lose no time in returning to Khelat by the Takree hills.

No. 162.

Diary No. 17 of 1873 by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending from the 19th to the 25th May 1873.

GOHUR KHAN DINAREE, a resident of Kharee in Kutchee, returned on the 22nd with replies from his Highness the Khan to letters despatched by Political Superintendent on the 3rd instant. He gives the following news :—

I arrived on the 10th, and delivered my post in the evening; saw his Highness in Durbar, and according to custom, asked his Highness what the news was; he declined to give me any, saying I was merely a postman. I replied that I had been sent by the British Government, and if he, the Khan, did not think fit to give me any news, "he was master." His Highness only spoke to me on general subjects, asking how many days I had been on the road, whether the cultivation was good in the plains, &c. &c. During the time I was at Khelat I was under surveillance, and his Highness was very angry with Zemindar Suffer Mahomed, an old friend of mine, for having put me up. I went morning and evening to his Highness' Durbar during the five days I was at Khelat. On the first day he intimated his intention of asking me the Jacobabad news, but changed his mind; the reason of this I afterwards ascertained to be "that his Highness feared displaying curiosity of any kind might be attributed to fear." On taking my leave, he begged me to give his compliments to Colonel Loch, Major Harrison, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, and Shahgassee Gholam Jan.

Sirdar Noordeen was anxious to leave his Highness at Nurr, but he would not allow him to do so and took him on to Khelat. His Highness on two or three occasions offered to make Noordeen the Head Chief in Jalawan, but he persistently refused, upon which his Highness taxed him with having evil intention towards himself. It is generally supposed that Sirdar Noordeen will fall in with the Khan's wishes, and his Highness is preparing a khillut for Noordeen suitable for the Chief of Jalawan, and will hand over the standard to him. Noordeen on several occasions represented that Gohur Khan Zuruckzai, a near relative of Taj Mahomed's, ought to be the Jalawan Chief. All the principal Sirdars in Jalawan have refused to acknowledge Noordeen—Chakur Khan Juttuck, Kaisa Khan Moosani, Moodut Khan Pundrani, Kumal Khan Lotani, Fakir Mahomed Bezonjao, &c. &c. His Highness on receiving the post that I took, asked Sirdar Noordeen to send some of his sowars to Nowsherwan and Sahib Khan, but he refused, saying that they were much the same as he was "as far as rank and position went," and that he, the Khan, had better send some of his own people. His Highness gave orders for sowars to be sent, but they had not started when I left Khelat. Sirdar Meer Mahomed is at Khelat, but disaffected at the treatment he has received. Gohur Khan Zuruckzai hearing that it was his Highness' intention to make Noordeen Head Chief, left his Highness' camp at Nurr and went to his own village, Guzan, in the Zehri Valley.

Darogah Attah Mahomed handed over charge of Khelat to Ali Jan, and started for Gundava to urge his Highness to allow him to go to Jacobabad with his son, Mahomed Khan, and Beebee Gunjan, to beg Major Harrison and Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed to return to his Highness' camp. The Darogah met his Highness at Kurzan, and, not being able to carry out what he wished, returned with his Highness. The latter has since his return urged Attah Mahomed to accept the Wuzeership, but he has declined; this has given offence to his Highness, who has informed the Darogah that if he does not accept the appointment, he will look upon him as a friend of Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed; to punish him, give the Wuzeership to Abdool Luteef, Naib of Quettah, and Shahgassee Gholam Jan's appointment to Alif Khan Chobdar.

His Highness' intention was to have placed Mekran in charge of Azaad Khan, and thus secure his good services. His Highness, however, felt doubtful about placing himself too much in this chief's power, so left Kedj in Sirdar Fakir Mahomed's hands, and sent for his father-in-law, Meer Esan, to make him Chief of Punchgoor, vice Sirdar Gassee Khan, who had refused to obey his orders. Belooch Khan's father has accompanied Meer Esan to Khelat. Belooch Khan * himself is to be Naib of Punchgoor, vice Khan Mahomed Kumbrani.

* A Nowsherwan and cousin of Azaad Khan of Kharan. Early in 1871 this man was at Bampur, and professed to be a Persian subject.

(Sd.) C. H. H.

No disturbances have yet occurred in the hills, Kozdar, Sohrab, Khelat, Mustoong, or Quettah. The Brahoees are quite ready to rebel, but are afraid of incurring the displeasure of the British Government; if the Sarawans rise they will be joined by the Jalawans.

Withdrawal of Major Harrison and retirement of Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed has caused the greatest regret at Khelat. His Highness' mother and sister, Naibs Abdool Rahman, Abdool Luteef, Aitibar Khan, as also Alif Khan Chobdar, are the only people who are glad at the turn affairs have taken. His Highness in public feigns a cheerful manner, but he looks harassed, worn, and thin, and is only cheered up by daily reports sent by Mahomed Khan and the Kazee of Bagh. Every one states that the Khan is completely in the hands of his mother and sister, that what has occurred has been at their instigation, and that all his acts depend on their approval. Mahomed Khan sends off daily expresses of what goes on at Jacobabad, and through his instrumentality it was generally understood that the Shahgassee has met with scant courtesy at the hands of the British Government, he and all his friends having been left unheeded and uncared for on the maidan. I contradicted this report by stating the Shahgassee had been presented with a nice garden containing a suitable private residence and public reception room; further, that all his friends were comfortably housed. His Highness is in a nervous state of apprehension, has all his valuables ready packed, and, in case of emergency, has made arrangements with the Nooshky Sirdar, Abdool Rahman, to assist him across his own border into Seistan. Hemraj and Wullee Khan, Bunniahs, besides other people, give information of everything that goes on at Jacobabad.

Consequent on the arrival of the Brahooees into the hills, his Highness has sent cavalry detachments to Mustoong and Quettah.

The apricot, mulberry, and other fruit trees are utterly barren this year, and people believe it is due to the withdrawal of the British Agent and retirement of Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed. The loss to his Highness and the inhabitants of Khelat will be very great.

At Kirta there are still one hundred infantry and about sixty irregular horse under Nawat Khan, Dinarzai. Naib Abdool Azeez is at Dadur, and his son, Fakir Mahomed, with his Highness the Khan.

Gohur Khan when returning through Kutchi heard that the Dhoombkees had sent another party to raid in the Murree Hills. Sohrab Khan, it is said, is encouraged in making these raids by the ex-Wakeel, who thinks his Highness the Khan will approve of this policy towards the Murree tribe.

It is currently reported that his Highness' troops are deserting in large numbers as they have not received pay for three or four months; it is also said a native officer of the Nurwai Regiment, "an Afghan," had a dispute with Mozan Khan, his commanding officer, and on being threatened with punishment by his Highness, he defied him to do anything, and deserted with one hundred and ten men of the regiment, carrying off arms, accoutrements, &c. These men marched towards Candahar; ten or twelve other deserters have come into the Frontier Districts and Shikarpoor.

No. 537, dated Kurrachee, 5th June 1873.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla, for information.

No. 163.

No. 18, dated Jacobabad, 1st June 1873.

Diary by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 1st June 1873.

THE only news of any importance during the past week relates to a scheme propounded to his Highness by the Kazi of Bagh as calculated to weaken the power of the Sarawans, viz., to imprison the Rhind Sirdar Imam Buksh, and make his cousin, Taj Mahomed, head of the tribe. The Kazi having been directed by his Highness to discuss the advisability of carrying out this scheme with the ex-Wakeel joined Mahomed Khan at Lehree. The latter strongly deprecated anything of the kind taking place, as Sirdar Moolla Mahomed would at once raise the Sarawans to revenge the insult on his brother-in-law.

There is a report that the men who deserted from his Highness' regiment were followed up by their commanding officer and men he could trust to Siriab, and a fight ensued in which six of the latter were killed; it is also rumoured Alla Dina Khoord had availed himself of these dissensions amongst his Highness' troops to create a disturbance at Quettah, the Naib of that place having confiscated some land belonging to him. Four kossids have been sent with various despatches of the Political Superintendent to his Highness, and on their return will be able to give correct information of what is going on in the immediate neighbourhood of Khelat.

No. 540, dated Kurrachee, 6th June 1873.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copy forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla, for information.

No. 164.

News report from Khelat, ending 11th June 1873.

THERE is no particular news from Khelat. The Khan has called on the Sirdars to come to his capital and pay their respects. A few have done so, but the principal ones, Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, Alladinna Khoord, the Mahomedshai and Dinarzai Sirdars, have not.

2. The Khan has sent people to summon Nowsherwan Chootah to Khelat to answer for and surrender the property plundered from the kafilahs, but it is thought the latter would not attend.

3. There has been a quarrel regarding water in the Baho district, on the Mekran Coast, in which one of the principal men was killed, but it is thought the matter may be compromised.

4. Syed Abdool Aziz, who formerly held Gwadur for a time, is reported to have left Bombay for the purpose of recovering Gwadur. Kafilas coming to the coast mention having seen swarms of locusts the whole breadth of the country.

5. Fever is at present very prevalent at Gwadur.

No. 568, dated Kurrachee, 12th June 1873.

From Commissioner in Sind.

Forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

No. 165.

No. 19, dated Jacobabad, 8th June 1873.

Diary from Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 8th June 1873.

SHAHGASSEE WULLEE MAHOMED received a letter from Sirdar Nawab Khan Dinarzai on the 4th June; being an honest, trustworthy man, the information given by him was submitted without delay to the Political Superintendent.

No allusion having been made about disaffection amongst his Highness' troops, or misunderstanding between Sirdar Alladina Khoord and the Naib of Quettah, it is concluded previous reports were premature and without foundation.

The four cossids sent with the Political Superintendent's letter to his Highness have not yet returned.

A very bad type of fever prevails at Bagh; about 200 people have died during the past three weeks.

No. 583, dated Kurrachee, 17th June 1873.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

No. 166.

No. 21, dated Jacobabad, 15th June 1873.

Diary by Political Agent, Khelat, for the week ending 15th June 1873.

On Friday a confidential servant of Buktiar Khan, of Seebee, arrived with letters from himself and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed addressed to the Commissioner in Sind, the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, and Political Agent, Khelat. Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed also received a note from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, in which he gives the following news: "My brother Meer Haibut went to the village of Mohurrum, and on his return stayed at Bagh and was visited by Kazi Hyat Khan, who sent me the following message from his Highness the Khan: 'I sent Ali Yar Khan 'Raisanee, directing you to mount your horse and join me; if still unable to do so, 'send your son, and consider me the root from which you should thrive. Don't let 'Wullee Mahomed say I left Kohistan and the whole country collapsed. If I, the 'Khan, lose the country you will not get the revenue; any benefit to be derived 'from rebellion or fighting will fall to other people; it is necessary for you, Moolla 'Mahomed, to look upon me as the root, and be one with me. Whatever you say 'I will do; you are my head Sirdar.'" The Sirdar writes that he has no faith or confidence in his Highness, and has therefore sent an evasive answer by Ali Yar Khan Raisanee, promising to send his son Azad Khan as soon as his marriage ceremonies had been completed. The Sirdar wishes to visit the Political Superintendent and Commissioner in Sind, and implied doing so would enable him to maintain his influence with the Sarawan tribe.

Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, it is well known, is in such a destitute state that he is selling all the ornaments of his wives and daughters.

Kureem Khan Bijarani has, it is said, written to Sohrab Khan that if he is led away by Mahomed Khan "ex-Wukeel" to attack Buktiar Khan Baruzai, their treaty must be considered broken and he shall assist the Baruzai chief, who is a friend of his. The Kujjuk chief, Luskhur Khan, has visited Mahomed Khan near Bagh, and has promised to assist Sohrab Khan against the Baruzais.

Private letters from Bagh state that the fever which was so fatal is declining, but still prevails in neighbouring villages.

No. 602, dated Kurrachee, 23rd June 1873.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

No. 167.

No. 1512 P, dated Simla, 9th July 1873.

From Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Commissioner in Sind.

In reply to your docket No. 478, dated the 21st of May last, I am directed to state that, under the circumstances represented by you, his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council is pleased to sanction the payment to Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed of an allowance of Rs. 600 per mensem for the period during which he may be compelled to remain in British territory.

No. 168.

No. 1530 P, dated Simla, 10th July 1873.

From Secretary to the Government, India, Foreign Department, to Commissioner in Sind.

In acknowledging receipt of your letter, No. 469, dated the 19th of May 1873, regarding the confiscation by the Khan of Khelat of certain hereditary lands belonging to the Raisanee tribe at Lehree, I am directed to inform you that his Excellency the Viceroy

and Governor-General in Council approves of the communications on this subject which you have addressed to his Highness and to the Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee.

2. Matters in Khelat should now be left to adjust themselves, and no further interference in the relations between the Khan and his Sirdars should for the present be exercised, unless you are appealed to by his Highness.

No. 169.

No. 1546P, dated Simla, 11th July 1873.

From Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Commissioner in Sind.

YOUR letter No. 400, dated 3rd May last, reporting on the recent crisis in Khelat, which led to the withdrawal of the Political Agent from the court of the Khan, has been laid before his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council.

2. The special causes which have led to the present interruption of relations with the Khan appear to be (1) the influence of Mahomed Khan and other evil advisers, whose suggestions the Khan accepted rather than the advice of the Political Agent; (2) his persistent demand for the restoration of the three men who had been removed in consequence of their evil influence in Khelat; (3) his evasion of all arrangements to give effect to the measures thought necessary for the peace of the frontier; (4) his neglect to make arrangements for the good government of Lus Beyla and the suppression of the outrages committed on British traders passing through the country.

3. Considering the attitude assumed by the Khan, the Governor-General in Council concurs in your opinion that it was impossible for Major Harrison to remain longer at the Court of Khelat, and his Excellency in Council approves of your having ordered him to withdraw. Your proceedings have been entirely in accordance with the views expressed to the Khan by his Excellency the Viceroy at the Sukkur conference, and are accordingly approved and confirmed.

4. It remains now to consider the policy to be pursued towards Khelat as long as the present posture of affairs continues. His Excellency in Council concurs with you in opinion that no interference should for the present be exercised by Government in the internal affairs of Khelat. The relations between the Khan and his nobles should be left to adjust themselves. No advice as to their future course of action need be given to either party; but the course of events should be carefully watched, and every effort made to obtain the earliest and most accurate intelligence of all that passes.

5. You have for the present, and until such time as the Khan fulfils the provisions of the treaty of 1854, withheld the payment of the annual subsidy which the British Government engaged to pay to the Khan on condition of the faithful performance of his obligations under that engagement. The seventh article of the treaty provides that the British Government may withhold payment of the subsidy if during any year the conditions mentioned in the preceding articles shall not be faithfully performed by the ruler of Khelat. Your proceedings in withholding payment under the circumstances described in your letter are fully approved by his Excellency in Council.

6. The obligations of the Khan under the treaty to protect trade and secure the peace of the frontier remain unaffected by recent events, and I am to request that, in formally communicating to his Highness the determination of Government to withhold the subsidy, you will at the same time distinctly inform him that, in the event of any disturbances occurring on the frontier, the British Government will be compelled to take its own measures for preserving order, and further that, if satisfaction is not afforded by the Khan for the outrages committed in Lus Beyla, it will be necessary to exact reparation in such manner as the British Government deems most suitable.

7. Of the measures for giving effect to the proposals made at the Mittunkote conference, which are detailed in your letter to the Political Superintendent, Sind Frontier, No. 171, dated 25th February 1873, the only portion actually carried out appears to be the grant of Rs. 5,520 to the Boogtees. For the present no further steps in this direction need be taken. If, however, the Khan does not assume a more friendly attitude within a reasonable time, and the state of affairs in Khelat does not improve, it will be necessary to make arrangements for the protection of trade direct with the tribes. The Murree Tomandar will of course be required to apologise for his conduct before any payment can be made to his tribe.

8. With reference to paragraph 64 of your letter regarding the outrages committed in Lus Beyla, his Excellency in Council desires that, in the event of the Khan's failing to

restore order, and after due warning has been given to him of the consequences of his neglect, the Sind police should make every effort to arrest Nowsherwan Chootah and Dewriah Bundijo with their gang. The responsibility of punishing these men rests of course with the Khan; but if he should be unwilling or unable to assert his authority, measures must be taken independently of him for the protection of the lives and property of our traders.

9. The question as to a temporary provision for the Shahgassee forms the subject of a separate communication. Major Harrison will continue for the present to reside at Jacobabad, drawing his full salary as Political Agent, Khelat.

No. 170.

No. 129 of 1873.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. POLITICAL. (Extract.)

To His Grace the DUKE OF ARGYLL, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE, Simla, the 28th July 1873.

IN continuation of our despatch No. 52, dated the 28th March last, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further papers,* regarding Khelat affairs.

2. The letter from Sir William Merewether, No. 400, dated 3rd May last, contains a full and interesting account of his proceedings from the date of the interview between his Excellency the Viceroy and the Khan at Sukkur, particulars of which were reported to Her Majesty's Government in our despatch No. 83, dated 20th December last. To the Commissioner's report we would refer your Grace for a narrative of the events which have led to the withdrawal of our Political Agent from Khelat. The Foreign Secretary's letter No. 1546P, dated 11th July 1873, contains a brief review of the Commissioner's proceedings, communicates the approval of the Government of India thereto, and lays down the policy which for the present we consider it advisable to pursue towards Khelat. We trust that the instructions we have issued will meet with the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

* * * * * *

We have, &c.
(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
R. TEMPLE.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.

No. 171.

No. 136, dated Camp, Bakorah, 8th February 1874.

From Commissioner in Sind to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt to-day of your letter No. 301 P., dated the 30th ultimo, and to report for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy as follows:—

2. I received some days ago direct from the Punjab Government a copy of Captain Sandeman's letter No. 18 of the 6th January, and forwarded it to Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, for any remarks he may wish to offer. I have not yet received his answer, but it is unnecessary for me to wait for it before sending my replies to the inquiries contained in your letter.

3. I would, however, first observe that I do not quite understand Captain Sandeman's reason for now bringing so prominently forward the action of the Murree tribe against the Khetran and Moossa Kheyl Patan tribes. To my certain knowledge the Murrees have been fighting with, and plundering as well as being plundered by, those two tribes from the time they have lived adjacent to each other, certainly for long before

* Nos. 144 to 169.

we had any acquaintance with either of them; and I am not aware that any one of these tribes has for many years past changed its position on the hills in which they have resided. I do not see, therefore, why their usual custom of raiding each other should seem to threaten the Dehra Ghazee Khan border now a bit more than it did heretofore.

4. In the fourth paragraph of his letter, however, Captain Sandeman mentions that Guzzun Khan, the nominal head of the whole Murree clan, led one of the raids in person; that "he is getting quite rich on plunder, and is in consequence becoming very unreliable and the tribe itself more and more demoralized." The former is certainly an unusual circumstance for a man of Guzzun's habitual apathy; the next is easy enough to understand, considering the large quantity of plundered property he has managed of late years to possess himself of and retain, while the last is only the natural consequence of these wild spirits being allowed to do wrong with impunity, and being treated at the same time as if they had no way misbehaved.

5. I conclude from the way Captain Sandeman writes, as above quoted, he anticipates that Guzzun Khan will become so inflated with his success and fancied power that he will, like the frog in the fable, go on swelling himself out until he provokes his own destruction by leading his tribe against the frontier of Dehra Ghazee Khan, also that he and his tribe are fast getting beyond any control.

6. As regards the former, I think it not at all unlikely. In the latter view I entirely agree. It is what I have been pointing out for some time past, viz., that the Murrees were getting, indeed had got, quite out of hand. The reasons are obvious. For long the Murrees have had almost the uncontrolled command of the best raiding grounds in the neighbourhood. Owing to the weakness of the Khelat Government the Murrees plundered in the Khan's territory when and where they liked; and though we were supposed to help indirectly to check them, the efforts used were rendered nugatory by there being two systems at work in the management of them by us. They harried Kutchee and robbed travellers in the territory of their ruler and our ally, the Khan of Khelat; but as they respected the Punjab border and acted up to conditions entered into by them with the authorities there, they continued to receive payment from us and received no correction for their ill-doings elsewhere.

7. Early in 1868 they plundered a kafila near Hajee ka Shuhr, in the very centre of Kutchee, on the direct road from Dadur to Shikarpoor, and in the autumn they made inroads into Kutchee, molesting sorely the Khan of Khelat's subjects. In December, I think, of that year (I write from memory, not having the papers with me), I addressed the Bombay Government, urging that the Punjab Government should be moved to consent to a blockade of the Murree tribe from the plains, and suspension of all payments to them until they come to understand that they would receive no favour from us as long as they acted so outrageously towards their sovereign, the Khan of Khelat, precisely similar measures being adopted on the Sind and Khelat sides.

9. It was unfortunate this arrangement could not be carried out, as I firmly believe it would have fully answered then. It was the bold and clear way of dealing with these people, such as they would readily understand. At that time they had few friends around to aid them, or to give what they wanted and used to get from the British territory. They had not become more powerful than the neighbouring tribes, neither were they particularly feared; and they would have soon felt the inconvenience of being quite alone. Their coercion then would have kept them under easy control afterwards, and it would in all probability have prevented much of the harm that was done by them recently, and which has helped so much to raise their confidence in themselves. The plan could not, however, be assented to, because, as I understood, of the necessity it involved of strengthening the military force on the lower frontier of the Punjab.

10. As an alternative, it was urged that further help in money should be given to his Highness the Khan of Khelat to allow of his trying to bring the Murrees to order. This led to the conference held at Mittunkote in February 1871, to consider the best means of controlling the hill tribes and assimilating the Punjab and Sind systems. It was resolved at that meeting to try the subsidising plan, the same as had been used on the Punjab frontier. It had been successful there because it had been in the hands of an officer, Captain Sandeman, who happened to be particularly well qualified for such a task, he having succeeded in obtaining much influence among the people in the hills. The modus operandi also was most acceptable to the Murrees. They had everything to gain by it and little to lose. They had only to forego plundering the Rajunpoor and Ghazee Khan frontier on the east (a thing they never had done on any large scale), to receive regular pay, while they had still open to them a comparatively easy harvest of plunder in Kutchee and on the kafila routes to the west, what they

called their shikar grounds, as well as the Khetran and Pathan countries to the north, with no practical hindrance from anyone. With the Boogtees there was experienced even less difficulty. Only a small portion used to misbehave, the Shimbanees principally, who had separated from the head of the clan, and had become a rallying point for all vagrant and unsettled spirits. Some Murrees would occasionally join them, and their chief, indeed almost only, field for action was the Rajunpoor frontier. After the death of Gholam Hussein, the spirited leader of this faction, it broke up, and the Boogtees as a rule have only acted well and faithfully on both sides, Punjab as well as Sind, for years before; that their conduct on the Sind border had been most correct, and is so still, but then they had been forced into obedience.

11. The plan agreed to was, that Rupees 32,000 should be placed at the disposal of the Political Superintendent on the Frontier of Sind to entertain under their chiefs such Murree and Boogtee horsemen as he found necessary, to use them as police to check the rest, and to regard the regular payment of money to the chiefs and their followers as a kind of bond to keep the rest of the tribe well behaved. It was also arranged that the Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan should be under the Political Superintendent on the Frontier of Sind as regarded the management of the Murrees and Boogtees, but nothing more.

12. The sanction of the Government of India to this arrangement was not received by me until December 1871. By that time certain of the Sirdars of Beloochistan had risen in active rebellion against the Khan of Khelat, and the conduct of the Murrees appeared so suspicious that it was not considered desirable to attempt any subsidising measures with regard to them, as such would certainly have been misunderstood. Indeed it was very doubtful whether the tribe was worthy of any favourable consideration. The correctness of this view was almost immediately after proved by their joining the rebellious Sirdars in deliberate outrages on peaceful kafilas passing down the Bolan Pass. The differences between the Khan and his Sirdars were adjusted at Jacobabad in April 1872. It was decided that the Sirdars should restore their share of the plunder seized from the kafilas, and of course the Murrees were called upon to do the same. They were distinctly told that unless they delivered up what they had got possession of the favour and countenance of the British Government would be withheld from them. Captain Sandeman proffered his offices to assist in obtaining restitution by means of his influence with the Murree Sirdar, but this only resulted in the delivery of a small number of camels and a few bales of goods, a very insignificant payment of the immense quantity of loot carried off by the tribe.

13. In November 1872 his Excellency the Viceroy received his Highness the Khan of Khelat at Sukkur, and in February following I proceeded to the frontier for the purpose of having an interview with his Highness the Khan, and with the view of carrying into effect, in connexion with him, the scheme projected at Mittunkote. Knowing well the habits of the people concerned, and bearing in mind the recent lawless acts of the Murrees, as well as the policy of both, strengthening the position of the Khan, and bringing the Murrees under better control, the Political Superintendent on the frontier was instructed to call upon the Murree and Boogtee Sirdars to meet me at Jacobabad, that the arrangements with them might be initiated there and afterwards confirmed when I met his Highness the Khan. To show what was being done was really intended to strengthen the Khan in his authority over his subjects, the calls were sent through his Highness. I was the more particularly prompted to do this, because the Murrees had for some time been endeavouring to get themselves regarded as independent and separate from the Khan, and I had noted a determined endeavour on their part to be permitted to avoid receiving orders from the Political Superintendent on the frontier of Sind, who, if there was to be any real control, must have the supreme management in his hands, as being the person who was entrusted with the conduct of political affairs connected with the Khelat Government. I considered it, therefore, most material to the future success of the scheme that both the Khan's authority should be fully recognised and that the Murree chiefs should at once be made to understand that they were to look first and only to the head on the frontier and not to the subordinate officer at Dehra Ghazee Khan. The first was in accordance with the instructions of the Government of India, and the latter manifestly the only course which could have any soundness in it, or be suited to the circumstances where dealings are with semi-civilised people, who must be ruled absolutely or will not be at all.

14. The Boogtee Sirdars answered promptly and readily, presenting themselves at Jacobabad, visiting first, as I had ordered, the camp of his Highness, then in Kutchee, where also was the Political Agent, Major Harrison, to whom the summonses had been originally sent, that they might have the Khan's confirmation. Shere Dil,

Muzzeranee Murree, who has for long been separated from the larger portions of that tribe, also came and was duly received; but Guzzun Khan and the other Murree Sirdars who were summoned, instead of readily responding, raised frivolous and unwarrantable objections, amongst others that they could not visit the Khan and the Political Superintendent without "mootaburs" or influential people being sent from both authorities to escort them in. This was a course that had never been previously followed on the Sind border, and was clearly intended as an attempt to arrogate to themselves an additional status, to which they were in no way entitled. The Boogtee Sirdar, Gholam Moorteza, did not wait for such a ceremonial observance. The Political Superintendent was instructed to inform Guzzun Khan that such a custom, being unusual and quite unnecessary, would not be followed; that if he wished to gain the favour and consideration of the British Government, he must at once obey the summons and present himself, accompanied by the other Sirdars of his tribe. Up to the present time he has failed to conform to the instructions communicated to him. He has several times written to the Political Superintendent, reiterating his impertinent demand for "mootaburs" to be sent to him. Each time Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent, has very properly replied that such will not be done, and further added that, besides presenting himself unconditionally, it was required of him that he should make restitution of the large share of plunder which he and his tribe had secured from the goods taken from the kafilas. He (Guzzun Khan) had, in accordance with the custom of these predatory tribes, received very much the larger share, and he was bound to make restitution in the same way that the Sirdars of Beloochistan had been compelled to do. Had his request of being escorted in by "mootaburs" been complied with, it would have been tantamount to recognising him as a more powerful chief than Gholam Moorteza, the head of the Boogtees; acknowledging that he possessed *quasi* independence, and giving him a position which he not only is not entitled to, but which I hold it is most desirable should not be accorded to him.

15. It is utterly impossible to maintain continued influence over these wild people by being too lenient with them. Treat them by all means with kindness and justly, but at the same time with unchangeable firmness. They must be taught that implicit obedience to orders is the first essential to gaining favour and reward either from the Khelat Government or from us; and above all things it must be conveyed to them unmistakeably that they are, as regards us, to receive their orders from and obey one head only, the Political Superintendent on the Frontier of Sind, to whom and to his Highness the Khan they must look for everything, whether for weal or for woe. This must be strictly adhered to if the system to be carried out is to be identical and for the benefit of all, whether on the Punjab or the Sind border. We have had now full experience of how a plan that answers well for one place acts most injuriously on the other, and the proper fusion of interests cannot possibly be made to exist unless the people to be controlled are made to look to one head for guidance and consideration in every respect.

16. I have always been most ready to acknowledge the influence Captain Sandeman has gained among the hill tribes, the judicious way in which he has generally exercised it, and its value to a certain extent. But personal influence with such restless, wayward creatures as the Belooch cannot be depended upon alone. It will last as long as it is accompanied by advantages to the individuals over whom it is exerted, and as long as the latter are satisfied with those advantages. Directly those cease to be sufficient, and a greed for more springs up amongst the recipients, or jealousies become excited amongst those who think they do not receive a sufficient share, or the whole become so wealthy by other means as to render them indifferent to what before their poverty made them prize, the system breaks down and personal obligations are forgotten. With wild, unruly tribes fear of the wrath of the paramount power must always be kept alive, as well as gratitude and affection springing from favours bestowed.

17. I have above briefly sketched the events of past years to save time in reference to previous papers, and also to set forth the policy I have deemed it right to follow and have considered to be soundest in reference to the restless and as yet little civilised tribes beyond our borders. I will now proceed to point out the course I would recommend in order to curb the increasing arrogance of the Murree Sirdar. Unless it is firmly checked and at once, I consider there can be little doubt that the peace on the lower border of the Punjab will be disturbed and active measures be rendered necessary.

18. What appears to me should now be done is, that arrangements for shutting out the Murrees from the Punjab and Sind should immediately be made, so that in case of such a measure being necessary it may be carried out promptly and effectually.

The means already exist on the side of Sind, and his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab would now perhaps be able to reinforce for a time the portion of border from Dehra Ghazee Khan to Sind, so as to render any aggressive attempt by the Murrees impossible of success and fatal to them. I should then be instructed to desire the Political Superintendent on the Upper Sind Frontier to inform Sirdar Guzzun Khan that his disobedience of repeated orders to proceed to Jacobabad was viewed with extreme displeasure by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India, and that unless he, Guzzun Khan, did now present himself at Jacobabad before the Political Superintendent within a certain number of days (giving sufficient time to come in and no more), and crave forgiveness as well as show himself prepared to make restitution of the property plundered by his tribe from the kafilas, he and his tribe would be considered to have forfeited the favour of the British Government; that all payments for service of any kind hitherto made, whether from the Punjab or elsewhere, would be immediately stopped; that all members of the tribe would be debarred from that date from entering the Punjab or Sind, or any other portion of the British territory, and any who did attempt to cross the border line would be seized and treated as enemies of the State.

19. I trust his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab will agree with me in the advisability of these measures. They will have a fair chance of being effectual when the Murrees perceive that their outrages on peaceful people are not overlooked, though, in consideration of their good behaviour in some instances, more consideration and time in making reparation had been allowed them than would otherwise have been granted. The terms are only just, and should, I respectfully urge, be enforced. Should it so happen that the Murree Sirdar dares to hold aloof and defy the power of the Government of India, it would then, in my humble opinion, be absolutely necessary that a well-selected and sufficient, though not large, force should be sent into their hills to punish them as they deserve, and enforce conditions which they would be unable to break in future. With our present knowledge of the hills there would be no difficulty in doing this, and as the Murrees have succeeded in thoroughly embroiling themselves with all the tribes around the time required for their subjection would not be long, for they would have no escape.

20. The present Political Superintendent on the Frontier, Colonel Loch, is an officer of long standing and experience as a soldier, and one in whose judgment I have the fullest confidence. The carrying out either of the blockade or of any subsequent operations may be safely entrusted to him, measures at the same time being adopted by me to see that he wanted nothing in assistance or support that I could give.

No. 172.

No. 176, dated Camp, Huttoonga, 17th February 1874.

From Commissioner in Sind to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

REFERRING to letter No. 114 P., dated 12th January last, I have the honour to state, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, that the Doomur tribe are a lawless set owning real allegiance to nobody. They reside in hills at the southern border of Afghanistan and to the north-east of the Bolan Pass. Properly, I believe they should be considered to belong to Afghanistan; whichever way it be, it would be difficult, if not impossible, as matters stand at present, to punish them for their attack on Dilawur Kossid.

2. This, however, does not absolve his Highness the Khan from the blame of having his country in such a state of insecurity that messengers cannot pass down the principal thoroughfare without being subjected to such an outrage as that committed on Dilawur.

3. The same remarks apply to the case of the murder of Baboor Kossid alluded to in letter No. 58 P. of 28th November, and No. 88 P. of 9th January. In Khelat Diary No. 40, ending 2nd November, it was reported that Baboor had been killed by the Doomurs, but in the Candahar news-letter No. 41, dated 26th October, it is stated, "a kossid just returned from Shikarpoor informed me that he found Baboor, who had "charge of my letter No. 36, murdered close to Kirta, and that he recognised deceased "by his clothes." Kirta is near the bottom of the Bolan Pass and some distance from the Doomur country, so it is not certain the act was committed by them. Up to the 7th January nothing further had been learned on this subject, but Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, was still engaged making inquiries as to who were

really the perpetrators, the result of which will be reported. It is now awaited and has been expedited.

4. In regard to the Naib of Bagh having intercepted and detained a letter sent by Colonel Loch to Shere Dil Murree, I instructed that officer to write to his Highness on the subject. The reply of the latter has been received, and is not only most unsatisfactory, but so improperly expressed that I have considered it right to address his Highness myself on the subject, and at the same time to require explanation and suitable *amende* both for this and for a letter previously received by Colonel Loch, in which the usual courteous and respectful style of reference to British authority had been disregarded. Copies of the correspondence are appended.

5. In connexion with the outrages committed in Lus Beyla, his Highness the Khan wrote, as he received communications regarding each, that he had issued orders for the apprehension of the perpetrators and restitution of the property, and that he had sent Sirdar Noordeen Mingul (who it appears was restored to favour) with troops to carry out the above orders and to restore order in Lus Beyla. I deemed it right to give the Khan time to show whether he was really in earnest about the apprehension and restitution, and have waited patiently until now, but nothing has come of his professions, and if he was sincere, he has been either too indolent and careless to see his orders carried out, or had not the power to enforce them; whichever way it may be, it has become necessary to adopt some further measures, and I have therefore addressed his Highness the Khan in a letter bearing in view the instructions previously conveyed to me in your letter of July last. Copy of my letter is attached, and I trust it will meet with the approval of his Excellency the Viceroy in Council.

6. It can hardly be expected, judging from recent events, that the Khan will make any change in the mode of procedure he has adopted of late, but I considered it only just to leave him an opening for recovering himself if he wished to do so, and at the same time availed myself of his Excellency's instructions to place the position in as clear and unmistakeable light before him as it was possible to do.

7. The present state of affairs in Khelat territory is certainly not favourable to the continuation of peace or order among the people of that country. Certain of the Sarawan Sirdars headed by Moolla Mahomed Raisanee complain that the Khan acts tyrannically towards them and confiscates their hereditary estates; but the complaints are only worded generally, and I have been unable to gather reliable accounts of any remarkable acts of tyranny, or of any particular resumptions or appropriation of lands by the Khan, excepting the one instance reported of the Langaos. The Khan on his part has to urge that he is unable to trust the Sirdars, and that they hold aloof from him. There is certainly no identity of feeling or affection between either, and each is only watching for an opportunity to get the better of the other.

8. I think it unquestionable that the Khan's adherents in Kutchee, in the persons especially of the ex-Vakeel, Mahomed Khan, and the Kazee of Bagh, with the Naib of Bagh, Abdool Azeez, have been engaging in the quarrels going on between the Kujjuks and Baruzais in the neighbouring district of Seebee, Afghan territory. Siding with the Kujjuks they hope to bring about injury to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, who has taken asylum with the Baruzais. It is stated that the Khan is himself directing this, but there is no absolute proof yet of such being the case; it is not impossible, for his hatred towards Moolla Mahomed has lately become more excessive than ever, and he would not stop to consider much if he saw an opportunity of gratifying it.

9. All accounts tend to show that the Sirdars are quietly preparing for the crisis, which every one appears to think imminent. They were told by me at Shapoor this time last year, when they attended to pay their respects on my leaving, that all that was desired was to see in Khelat a strong and united Government, and that outbreaks such as had occurred in the previous year which injured most the poor and unoffending would always meet with decided disapproval; at the same time I warned them that such disturbances as had before taken place near our border would not be tolerated for a moment, and those who promoted or engaged in them would be treated as common robbers and punished accordingly. The Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed is of opinion that if the Khan endeavours to coerce the Sirdars by means of his regular troops, the latter would not now act against the Sirdars, but in all probability would on the outbreak of hostilities turn against the Khan. If the Sirdars therefore were unanimous in desiring to get rid of their present ruler and establish a new one, they might effect it by proceeding against the Khan at Khelat itself, when the Khan would have either to abdicate or try and seek safety in flight. The Sirdars, however, prefer commencing hostilities in Kutchee, where better prospects of easy plunder present themselves, and they are by that means enabled to gather more retainers around them.

10. Since the withdrawal of Major Harrison, when that officer repeated to the Sirdars my injunctions against disturbances near our border, a strictly neutral course has been steadily followed by me. In December last the Sirdars wrote for permission to come into Jacobabad to pay their respects. I informed them that I should be only there a few days accompanying his Excellency the Governor of Bombay on his tour through Sind, and that under present circumstances I could not receive them. They also sent a messenger to ask whether in the event of the Khan maltreating them or their families they were at liberty to take their own measures for protecting themselves without being actively opposed by the British Government. The messenger added that the Sirdars had studiously and obediently complied* with the wishes of the British Government with no result, what course then would be followed towards them should they be compelled to act differently? That the Khan and Sirdars had remained quiet for the following reasons:—The former was anxious to see whether Government would punish him for his late conduct,* and the latter were desirous to know what benefit would accrue to them, and if any arrangements would be made to ensure living in their country unmolested. They further wished to say that should nothing be done during the Commissioner's visit to Jacobabad, his Highness would renew his persecutions, the Sirdars would defend themselves, and a general rebellion be more than probable. The Brahooees were numerous and not under any regular discipline; should any act of his Highness or his officials cause them to rebel, the Sirdars not to be answerable. This was all very straightforward, and had much that was fair and reasonable in it, but having in view the advisability and justice of observing neutrality in the then state of affairs, I considered it would not be right to accord any reply to these messages. Now, however, should his Highness the Khan's reply to my letter of yesterday's date be unsatisfactory, and should he in no way conform to what is required of him, I would respectfully suggest that I may be authorised to inform the Sirdars that no interference will take place on the part of the British Government in any events that may take place between his Highness the Khan and his Sirdars in behalf of either one or the other, or against one or the other, provided that anything that may happen does not act prejudicially on the quiet and security of the British border, and that any active measures that may be taken by either party do not disturb the peace of the immediate vicinity of that border, or affect the interests and safety of travellers and merchants passing through Beloochistan from Afghanistan or elsewhere to Sind. If this course be approved by his Excellency the Viceroy in Council, I would beg to be favoured with intimation to that effect by telegram so as to be ready to act on receipt of the reply from his Highness the Khan.

* This is quite true.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

* Which the Sirdars would prefer of course.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

11. Meanwhile Colonel Loch, in whose discretion and judgment I have every confidence, has instructions to watch events carefully, and on no account to interfere with anything that takes place beyond the frontier further than to ensure that should any outbreak occur in Kutchee, it should not be allowed to approach the British frontier. This may be effected by judicious patrolling, the means for which he possesses, and is all that is at present required. The action of the Naib of Bagh in proceeding to Shorrun against the young Rind chief, which was thought at first likely to bring on serious results, has ended quietly so far, as communicated by telegram to you. But any ill-treatment of this young chief will assuredly hasten the expected crisis, as he is the head of all the Belooch.

Enclosure 1 in No. 172.

No. 3356, dated Camp, Kusmore, 3rd December 1873.

From Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Commissioner in Sind, Sukkur.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a letter in original, and translation of the same, from his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and I would beg your attention to the want of respect shown throughout the whole of it. His Highness apparently has entirely ceased to prefix the usual titles when either mentioning your name, or in speaking of the British Government, and the remark, "I know that you have done "this at the instigation and request of a person who is the instigator of all distur- "bances and misunderstanding," contained in the last paragraph of his Highness' letter, I presume is meant for Major Harrison and shows his Highness' entire want of respect for that officer.

2. With reference to the restriction placed on persons coming into Sind, I was

informed that numbers of people were flocking into British territory from Kutchee and other parts of his Highness' country, many of whom were recognised as sepoys formerly in his Highness' army, others were known then to be actually in his Highness' service, and it was supposed that these men only came as spies through Jacobabad and Shikarpoor, returning by some other route, having collected all the information they could of what was going on. Many of them bringing letters from Buniahs and others to their relatives and friends in Sind.

3. As this appeared most objectionable, I at once issued an order (copy of which was sent to the Naib of Bagh through the Political Agent, Khelat, for promulgation) that in future any persons visiting Jacobabad must have a pass signed by one of his Highness' officials setting forth the duty or business on which he was travelling, and that any person visiting Jacobabad unprovided with such a pass would be arrested and at once sent back to Kutchee.

Enclosure 2 in No. 172.

Dated 29th Ramzan 1290 = 20th November 1873.

From his Highness the Khan of Khelat to Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

YOUR letter informing me of your welfare reached me at a good time, and I understand all that was written, namely, circumstances connected with the murder of Tegoo Mull, Hindoo, resident of Kurrachee, by Mitta Jamote, and the order of the Commissioner in Sind to arrest the murderer and recover property plundered.

In a friendly spirit I reply that I have sent Meer Noordeen Mingul to Lus Beyla to arrange cases of this description; if through him safety on the road can be restored, murderers and thieves arrested, and property of merchants recovered, well and good; should he fail, I, your friend, by God's help and by force, will make such arrangements for the safety of the road, the arrest of murderers and thieves, and recovery of property, that you will hear of it. All is well here by God's blessing. Make me happy by writing.

P.S.—I hear from my Naibs and officials in Kutchee that you have published an order that people of Kutchee will be sent back, unless they can show a written pass from a Naib or Janesheen. Your Government country and mine are contiguous. My subjects go night and day into Sind on business. Naib Peer Jan and Moonshee Noor Mahomed stationed at Nusseerabad have to go constantly into Sind on business. I know that you have done this at the instigation and request of a person who is the instigator of all disturbances and misunderstandings. I have ordered all my Naibs and Janesheens that if they sent anyone to Sind, they must give a pass. All is well here.

Enclosure 3 in No. 172.

No. 3537, dated Jacobabad, 22nd December 1873.

From Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

I WOULD beg to bring to your Highness' notice that a letter from me directed to Sher Dil Murree, dated 18th November, was taken from kossid who was carrying it by the orders of the Naib of Bagh, Abdool Azeez, and after having been detained for many days was handed to Shere Dil Murree opened. As this is a gross act of discourtesy and disrespect not only to me personally, but as the representative of the British Government on the frontier, I do myself the honour to request your Highness to take immediate notice of it, and that your Highness will have the kindness to report to me what steps your Highness has taken in the present instance, and to prevent a recurrence of any similar act of disrespect occurring on the part of any of your Highness' officials.

Enclosure 4 in No. 172.

No. 3555, dated Jacobabad, 23rd December 1873.

Endorsed by Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

TRUE copy submitted to the Commissioner of Sind, in reference to memorandum No. 1223 of 20th instant. Shere Dil Murree, who came to Jacobabad on the 19th

idem, stated he had received the Political Superintendent's letter of 18th ultimo from the Naib of Bagh, Abdool Azeez, opened, and he brought a letter from the Naib stating that the letter in question had been handed to Shere Dil.

Enclosure 5 in No. 172.

No. 232, dated Jacobabad, 22nd January 1874.

From Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Commissioner in Sind, Kurrachee.

In forwarding the accompanying three letters from his Highness the Khan of Khelat I would make the following observations. With reference to letter marked (*a.*), his Highness denies that a kossid, bearer of a letter to Shere Dil Murree, was detained, and that the letter was opened and afterwards forwarded to its destination, and suggests that the kossid might have been delayed owing to Shere Dil's absence, as he is a wild uneducated man, sometimes with his tribe, sometimes at a distance, but I cannot help feeling his Highness knows this is not the case, as in a letter to the Political Agent, Khelat, Naib Abdool Azeez acknowledges to having forwarded my letter of the 18th November to Shere Dil on the 15th December, or nearly a month after its receipt, and Shere Dil himself told me that the letter was open when he received it, and there is little doubt that the delay which occurred was owing to the letter in question having been sent for his Highness' perusal prior to its being forwarded to Shere Dil, and this, to my mind, is borne out by the fact of the Naib having, as his Highness says, informed him regarding the letter in question.

Note.—It will be difficult to prove this. I have therefore considered it best not to refer to this point in my letter to the Khan.
(Signed) W. L. M.

2. With regard to letter (*b.*), Moonshee Noor Mahomed, when in here in the middle of last month on the pretence of settling about the liquor contractor being obliged to pay a certain fee to the Khelat State for his Highness the Khan, was most impertinent both to Major Harrison and myself in his manner and address, and as I was informed he was a man of bad character, I desired him never to make his appearance again in Jacobabad. I did not report the matter to his Highness, as I looked on it as too trivial to require any further notice being taken of it. I will, however, now write to his Highness, and explain the circumstances under which Moonshee Noor Mahomed is prohibited from coming to Jacobabad. As far as all transactions being at a stand-still, because this Moonshee is not allowed to come and go as he pleases, this is not so, as all matters connected with leases of land and revenue matters in general can be carried on by his Highness through Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, without the aid of these Moonshees. Had the Khan only attended to the advice so frequently urged on him by you, viz., to appoint another Vakeel in place of Naib Mahomed Khan, who had proved himself in every way unworthy of that post, no complications, such as have lately arisen, either in regard to land or other matters on this frontier, would have taken place.

Enclosure 6 in No. 172.

(*a.*)

Translation of a Letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, dated 20th Zoolhaj 1290=10th January 1874.

Your kind letter informing me of your good health reached me at a happy time, and its perusal afforded me great pleasure; in it you wrote that Naib Abdool Azeez had forcibly* detained a kossid, bearer of a letter addressed to Shere Dil Murree, and had forwarded it after opening the same, and request arrangements may be made to prevent any servants acting in such a way again. In reply to the above, the statement is altogether false and untrue; whoever told you this told a lie.

* Incorrectly quoted. The word "forcibly" is not used in Colonel Loch's letter. But it is curious to note that in Major Harrison's Diary ending the 7th December "forcibly" appears. This would seem as if either the Khan was made aware of what was written in the Political Agent's English office, or that Colonel Loch's Moonshee had without authority introduced the word. Inquiry has been made in regard to the latter.
(Signed) W. L. M.

Should any servants of mine ignorantly act in such a manner, God willing, he will be destroyed root and branch. Moolla Abdool Azeez never acted in the way stated. Naib Abdool Azeez informed me regarding this letter. Shere Dil is a wild uneducated person, sometimes with his tribes, sometimes at a distance, perhaps the kossid was delayed from Shere Dil's absence. I have now issued orders on this subject, and it

will be out of anyone's power to act as supposed. By God's blessing everything is well here. Make me happy by writing, &c. &c.

Abdool Azeez in a letter to Political Agent, Khelat, acknowledges that he only forwarded Political Superintendent's letter, 18th November, to Shere Dil on the 15th December.

(Signed) C. H. HARRISON.

Enclosure 7 in No. 172.

(*b.*)

Translation of a Letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

I HAVE just been informed that people from this country going into your territory on business are reported to you by people at the latter place as spies. When the border of the British Government and your friend's country are contiguous to each other, men go night and day from this side of the border to the other, especially Naib Peer Buksh and Noor Mahomed Moonshee, who have been appointed by me to Nusseerabad and the country in that neighbourhood, and have to go and discuss the claims of zemindars and revenue on lands taken from one to seven years. Peer Buksh and Moonshee Noor Mahomed hearing the above fear to go to Jacobabad, and all transactions regarding land are at a stand-still. I consider myself obedient to the British Government, how then should my people go as spies. I therefore write in a friendly spirit that you should consider what I have written, and make good arrangements, so that my people may come and go to discuss business matters without fear or hindrance. All is well here. Make me happy by writing.

Enclosure 8 in No. 172.

(*c.*)

Translation of a Letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, dated 20th Zoolhaj 1290=10th January 1874.

YOUR kind letter informing me of the theft of some bullocks from the district of Nuggur Patta, and that the tracks of the animals had been followed to the village of Kamal Khan, and found in the possession of Rahee Brahooee, and that the people implicated refused to give up the bullocks, has been duly received. You request me to make some arrangement regarding this business. I, your friend, understand all that has been written, and in a friendly spirit reply that I have sent a written order to Meer Noordeen Mingul to arrest the thieves and recover the cattle. All is well here. Make me happy by writing, &c.

NOTE.—This only refers to a common theft of bullocks from Sind, and which were afterwards traced into Khelat territory.

Enclosure 9 in No. 172.

Dated Camp, Kuttoonga, 17th February 1874.

From Commissioner in Sind to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

I HAVE been informed by Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent on the Frontier of Sind, that your Highness in a letter dated 29th Ramzan, or 20th November last, omitted the usual observances of respect when writing of the British Government or of me. Again, in replying to that officer by another letter dated 20th Zoolhaj, or 10th January, on the subject of a communication from Colonel Loch to Shere Dil, Muzzaranee Murree, having been intercepted and detained by your Highness' servant, Abdool Azeez, Naib of Bagh, there appear as used by your Highness the following expressions: "The statement is altogether false and untrue, whoever told you this told a lie." Such words used in such a style of correspondence as was adopted by you in the first-

mentioned letter are as unbecoming in your Highness to use as they are for me to receive, and I must demand from your Highness explanation how such could have happened, and suitable apology for such grave discourtesy towards the British Government. With reference to the proceedings of Naib Abdool Azeez, I must further observe that in a letter addressed to the Political Agent, Khelat, Abdool Azeez acknowledged that he only forwarded the letter of the Political Superintendent to Shere Dil Murree, dated 18th of November, on the 15th December, so that Colonel Loch's packet was unquestionably delayed en route for nearly a month. I have to request therefore that you will at once take severe notice of this highly disrespectful conduct of the Naib of Bagh.

Enclosure 10 in No. 172.

Dated Camp, Huttoonga, 17th February 1874.

From Commissioner in Sind to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

COLONEL LOCH, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, by my desire brought to your Highness' notice various gross outrages committed last year by your subjects on merchants and peaceful people passing through the district of Lus Beyla or the Choota country.

2. The chief actors in these were recognised at the time, and their names been communicated to you, being Nowsherwan Choota, Devria Bundijo, Shere Khan Jamote, Oobai Choota, Sooma Guddoo, Kulloo Guddoo, Hufsoo Bukuk, Philoo Choota, and with them were following of Nowsherwan Choota, Ali Mahomed Boorrals, Ali Khan Jamote, and Devria Bundijo. Much valuable property was taken from the merchants and others, statements regarding which were likewise forwarded to your Highness. Colonel Loch was further desired to call on your Highness to punish the perpetrators of these crimes and to cause restitution of the property stolen, or its equivalent.

3. Your Highness' replies to Colonel Loch received at different times conveyed promises of redress and assurances that you had issued orders for the restitution of the property and apprehension of the offenders, that you had sent troops for this purpose, and had deputed Noordeen Mingul to proceed to Lus Beyla to restore order there.

4. I have waited patiently for some months in the hopes of seeing your Highness' promises fulfilled, but up to this moment not one of the men concerned in those outrages have been arrested even, and no measures for the restitution of the plundered property have been adopted.

5. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that your Highness has become wholly forgetful of the assurances you have given of your responsibilities as ruler of the country and of your obligations under treaty engagements. Also that you have become utterly indifferent to the retention of your good name, as well as to the establishment of peace and good order in your country.

6. Within the past few months messengers passing through your country bearing letters addressed to British officials have in two cases been brutally murdered and in one sorely maltreated. The enactors of these deeds of violence may not have been Khelat subjects, but that such could be committed within your Highness' territory is only too evident proof of the absence of all proper arrangements for protection and security, for which your Highness must be held responsible.

7. I have for years past steadily and earnestly used every endeavour to support your Highness, and to aid you in the establishment and maintenance of good government in your country. But I regret to have to record that no good results have followed. Your persistent preference for the counsels of evil and unsuitable persons, as well as marked disregard of the sound advice always readily accorded by your good friend, Major Harrison, Political Agent, rendered it necessary to withdraw that officer from your Court in April last. Your having failed to make efficient arrangements for security in your country and protection to travellers passing through it, which you were bound to do under the terms of the treaty of 1854, caused the subsidy, which had been previously paid to you under the seventh article of that treaty, to be withheld; and your having, as it would now appear, designedly avoided adopting any of the suggestions proffered, or the requests contained in my letter of February last, written from Minotee, show clearly that it is as useless as it would be unbecoming that I should attempt to make any further effort in your Highness' behalf.

8. It therefore becomes my duty to inform your Highness plainly and distinctly, and I do so under instructions from his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General

of India, that the obligations your Highness lies under according to the treaty of 1854 to protect trade and secure the peace of the frontier remain unaffected by recent events. That the subsidy will continue to be withheld until such time as your Highness complies wholly and completely with the terms of the treaty. That in the event of any disturbances occurring on the frontier the British Government will be compelled to take its own measures for preserving order; and further, that if satisfaction is not afforded by your Highness for the outrages committed in Lus Beyla, it will be necessary to exact reparation in such manner as the British Government deem most suitable.

9. I trust that your Highness may yet, before it is too late, perceive the danger your recent proceedings have placed you in, that I may be enabled to continue to subscribe myself as your friend and well-wisher.

No. 173.

No. 336, dated Camp, Badamee, 10th March 1874.

From Commissioner in Sind to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

SINCE my letter of the 17th ultimo,* Meer Ala Dad, brother-in-law of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, came to Jacobabad bringing letters and verbal communications from that Sirdar, concurred in by others. Colonel Loch was at first doubtful whether he ought to allow the messenger to enter Jacobabad, as the Sirdars were known to be in opposition to the Khan, though not engaged in active hostilities as yet. But he decided on admitting him because he considered that by refusing he would be placing the Sirdars at a disadvantage, when there would be no just reason for doing so. I quite approved of this decision.

* No. 176.

2. Colonel Loch being absent in the districts, Major Harrison received the messenger and learned from him the Sirdars wished to submit to the British Government; that shortly after the withdrawal of Major Harrison and the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed his Highness the Khan sent a message to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, stating he still adhered to the arrangements made by the Commissioner in Sind, and had only been prevented acting up to the same through obstructiveness on the part of Major Harrison and the Shahgassee. The Sirdar thought it advisable to temporise until the Sarawans returned to Kutchee; he therefore promised to send his son to Khelat. Since the Sarawans came into Kutchee his Highness' officials have repeatedly sent to the Sirdar and chiefs, saying that his Highness bore no ill-will towards them, but only towards Major Harrison and the Shahgassee, because they reported that the country would be disorganized when they left. That his Highness wanted to be on good terms with them so as to disprove the above statements and lower the character and reputation of Major Harrison and the Shahgassee in the eyes of the British Government. If the Sarawan chiefs would not agree to make their salaam, or send their sons, they were asked to sign a general letter that they were on good terms with his Highness. As the Sirdar would not yield to these suggestions, his Highness' officials entered into intrigues with the Kujjucks, bribed some of the chiefs, and altogether made the position in Seebee so unbearable as an asylum, that the Sirdar had no other alternative than to avail himself of the opportunity now offered when the tribes are assembled in the neighbourhood of Dadur preparatory to returning above the passes to try his strength against his Highness' officials. Owing to the restless habits of the tribes, and the chance that they might move off by themselves, as also to the want of money, it was intended by the Sirdars that they should attack Dadur within ten days or a fortnight.† The messenger further added in explanation of the views of the Sirdars that his Highness the Khan's policy towards them, in spite of all he may say, was fully declared by causing Sirdar Imaum Buksh Rind to be arrested and taken prisoner with his family to Bagh. It was also implied that the Sirdars had every hope of succeeding, want of money only being their great difficulty.

† From 24th February.

Meer Noordeen Mingul had written to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, saying the Khan had deceived him about the release of the ex-Jam of Lus Beyla, so he intended to raise the Jalawan country and had been promised support by the tribes. Moolla Mahomed had replied that Meer Noordeen had so often deceived him that he placed no dependence on his statements. He himself knew what were the Khan's feelings towards the Brahooees; they would be treated in the same way Sirdar Imaum Buksh had been.

The messenger added that Naib Abdool Azeez and the Kazee of Bagh had arrived

at Dadur with 200 sowars, and talked of attacking the Brahooees when collected together.

3. The instructions sent by me to the Political Superintendent were as stated in my telegram of the 2nd instant, that we should remain strictly neutral and leave the Sirdars to fight it out or not as they liked, but they were to be distinctly informed that in the event of rupture taking place between the Khan and them, they would be made to answer for any injury that might be done by them or their adherents, to merchants or travellers passing through the country, or for any disturbance of order on the British border through their acts.

4. The latest news from Kutchee was that the Sirdars were assembled at Mittree, 16 miles south of Dadur, but undecided as to their movements, owing to the want of means, and it was also said owing to some few of the influential ones amongst them having been bribed over by the Khan's officials. Unanimity, therefore, was not so much trusted in, and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed was reported to be thinking of seeking refuge in the Murree Hills. The orders Naib Abdool Azeez had received from the Khan were either to coerce the Brahooee Chiefs or obtain their submission before they left Kutchee. In the event of his not being able to do either he was to follow them up the Bolan, and another force would be sent to meet them at the head of the pass.

5. I have received no reply as yet from his Highness the Khan to my letter of the 17th ultimo. neither have I heard of his having attempted to comply with the requisitions made upon him for restitution of the property plundered in Lus Beyla, or punishment of the robbers, further than those mentioned in my letter* to you of the 17th idem. But an event has recently occurred which I think is decisive that further forbearance towards his Highness the Khan of Khelat cannot be permitted, and that his incapability of carrying on the Government of his country, or of maintaining any kind of order therein, demand that immediate and vigorous measures be adopted to compel a better observance of the treaty engagements entered into by him with the Government of India.

* No. 175.

6. A party of 200 armed men of the Sassoolee-Brahooee tribe crossed the British border near the Goj River in the Shikarpoor Collectorate, and forcibly carried off certain slaves who had taken refuge in British territory. It appears from the deposition, copies of which are appended, that these families of slaves living with the Sassoolee tribe of Brahooees† conceiving themselves ill-treated, fled from their masters, and came on the 10th February for refuge to the village of Khubbur Pahee, near Salaree, at the foot of the hills in the Kukkur talooka of the Shikarpoor Collectorate, well within the British boundary. On the following afternoon Police camel sowar Kundoo Khan reached the same village on his way to the Hurbab Pass. The slaves reported themselves to him, and he advised them to proceed further into Sind.‡ A few hours afterwards, at about 8 p.m., 200 armed men headed by Pahur Khan, Chief of the Sassoolees, and Chakur Khan, his brother, entered the village and forcibly carried off the females and children of the slaves, also certain property; the grown males managed to escape. The policeman states that he attempted to check the Sassoolees, but they would not listen to him, and kept him in charge of 15 or 16 of their party, while the others carried off the women, children, and property, leaving apparently at once. The Thannadar of Kukkur, in his deposition, states that the Sassoolees had their swords drawn and matches of their firearms lighted; but this does not appear in the evidence of the camel sowar, Kundoo Khan. This, however, does not materially affect the main question. British territory was entered by an armed body of men, and people who had sought refuge there were forcibly carried away from it.

† The Sassoolees reside in the summer at Zeedee near Kozdar in Khelat territory, but in the cold weather they come to the Goj River near the western border of Sind.

‡ He ought to have taken them at once to his thanna at Kukkur.

7. No one else in the village was molested, so the object of the invaders was clearly only to recover their fugitive slaves; but this cannot be considered in any way to lessen the gravity of the outrage. It is well known throughout Beloochistan that individuals who may be slaves there are free the moment they come on British ground. And should they carry off any property of their former masters, the latter know that on representation through their Khan to the British authorities full investigation would be made, and if robbery was proved, the culprits would be given up for punishment for that crime.

8. The act, therefore, can only be styled as a most insolent and gross outrage, for which the ruler of the country whose subjects could dare to act in such a manner

must be held responsible. The police on the spot and in the neighbourhood consisting of—

At Kukkur - - -	1 chief constable, 2 head constables, 5 constables—1 mounted, 4 foot,
At Gool Mahomed-ke-put -	1 head constable, 1 constable mounted,

were quite insufficient to follow such a body with any prospect of success, and before a party of cavalry could be sent from Jacobabad the Sassoolees would be far back in their hills.

9. The correspondence during the past few years will show that no effort has been spared to endeavour to support his Highness the Khan of Khelat in the good government of his country, and to carry out the spirit of the treaty between the British and his Government. It is, therefore, with great reluctance that I have now to point out that the present inaction of the Khan and absence of restraining power over the action of his subjects, as evidenced in this late gross insult to the British Government, render it, in my opinion, necessary that a different course should be adopted, and the Khan, as well as the whole country, shown that while the Government of India had no desire to interfere in the internal relations of the State of Beloochistan, it would immediately and severely resent any act that at all affected the British possessions. It is the feeling among the wild Brahooees that such would inevitably follow, as also our known support of the Khan's authority that has hitherto kept the lengthened boundary line on the west of Sind from the northern frontier to the sea, a distance of some 300 miles, safe from any violent breach of the peace, and capable of being held by only a very small body of policemen. If the present outrage is not promptly and severely met, any of the numerous petty chiefs along the border may follow the example of the Sassoolees, and make it necessary for the protection of British subjects that a strong force should be stationed along the whole line down to the sea.

10. As stated in my telegram of to-day's date,† though the season is somewhat advanced, there is yet time to enforce due observance of the treaty on his Highness the Khan, and demand full reparation for this insult, as well as for the outrages committed on travellers last spring, should his Excellency the Viceroy so wish it. During the cold season operations in the neighbourhood of Khelat are not easy, owing to the inclemency of the weather and difficulty in obtaining supplies; but in the spring, summer, and autumn, there is nothing whatever to prevent our troops working when once they are above the passes; and provided they can be in the higher and cooler positions by the end of April, there need be no difficulty experienced whatever.

† Copy enclosed.

11. To ensure the expedition being thoroughly successful, and to restore order once for all, I would venture to recommend that two light columns should be dispatched, one from Kurrachee viâ Lus Beyla and Khozdar to Khelat, the other from Jacobabad viâ Bagh, Dadur, and the Bolan to Moostung and Khelat. The first would instil order in the southern portion, the second do the same in the north, and prevent the Khan attempting to escape at the last towards Seistan.

12. The Kurrachee column might consist of—

A field battery of artillery.
Two 10-inch mortars.
*A regiment of Sind horse from Jacobabad.
Wing European regiment.
Regiment Native Infantry.

The Jacobabad one—

Mountain train now at Jacobabad.
Regiment of Sind horse.
Wing European regiment.
Jacob's rifles.

The mountain train is manned by soldiers from Jacob's rifles, so the two should go together. Provisions for two months should accompany each column, and they should all start as early in April as possible. They would have to spend the summer at Khelat. The whole to be under Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier. The Kurrachee column moving under the command of the senior officer with a political officer detached by Colonel Loch with him. The column marching

* This might be reduced to a wing or two squadrons, so as not to remove too many of the cavalry from the frontier.

through Kutchee should take possession of it, to be held until the expedition is concluded; well-selected officials of the country who could be trusted being put in charge of Bagh and Dadur, with small levies from the Belooch (who would readily join us) to support them. These to be paid from the State revenues of Kutchee, which would easily meet the charge. Postal communication to be kept open by Belooch sowars, who would be paid regularly in the same way. Private property, or that of the Sirdars remaining quiet or tendering submission, to be scrupulously respected.

13. The wing of the European regiment, with its stores, camp equipage, &c., and requirements for the Jacobabad column, could be sent by steamer to Sukkur from Kotree in nine days, or probably less at this season of the year, and would march thence to Jacobabad, &c.

14. To supply the place of the troops thus taken from Sind it would be necessary to give an European and one Native regiment from Bombay. These would come in two or three days by steamer. A wing of a Native Infantry regiment would have to be sent from Lower Sind to Jacobabad to take the duties now performed there by the Jacob's Rifles. A wing would I think be sufficient. It could also proceed by steamer up the river.

15. In the event of this movement being decided on, I would further venture to recommend that a proclamation should be issued by the Government of India, pointing out the exact reasons that have rendered it necessary, and showing that the operations are solely intended to ensure the exact observance of the treaty his Highness the Khan had entered into with the British Government, which has lately been directly neglected by him, to re-establish order and proper rule in the country, and to provide that rights and privileges of all shall be guaranteed for the future.

16. The Sirdars generally will not join with the Khan against us I feel convinced. The openly discontented ones certainly not. But to prevent our being in any way pledged to them, or to appear as if we were supporting them in their opposition against their ruler, I have, as his Excellency the Viceroy will have learned from previous correspondence, most carefully abstained from giving them any countenance, and I think this will be the fairest and most just plan to follow still. It is for this reason I propose the wording of the proclamation being only general. But it might be added that all who remain quiet in their houses, abstain and make their followers abstain from all acts of violence or disorder during the operations, will have every consideration accorded them, and be confirmed in all their hereditary possessions.

17. I shall be glad of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General's early instructions in this matter as the time left is very short. I would only add that the movement against Khelat would overawe the Murrees for a time. If not the one regiment and a half of Sind Horse left on the frontier would be sufficient to deal with them should they attempt anything on the side of Sind. And should their conduct render such necessary they might be made to answer for their evil deeds in the following cold season by the troops from Khelat, or a portion of them returning through their hills and enforcing their obedience.

Copy of this correspondence will be forwarded direct to the Government of Bombay as usual.

Enclosure 1 in No. 173.

No. 640, dated Camp, Khoraiseo, 2nd March 1874.

From Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Commissioner in Sind.

I DO myself the honour to forward, for your information, the accompanying correspondence* (which I shall feel obliged by your returning) received from the Collector of Shikarpoor.

* *Vide* translation appended.

2. From the statements made by Futteh Ali, Saidad, Khumber, Suffo, and Yaroo before Head Constable Kundoo Khan, it appears that these persons, as well as those who were carried off by force, were the slaves of Pahur Khan, Sassoolee Sirdar, and his brother Chakur Khan, and that they having unlawfully possessed themselves of cattle and other property had left his Highness the Khan's country and taken refuge in British territory in the hopes of receiving protection from the British authorities.

3. From the report made by the Thannadar and police constables, it would appear that these persons arrived in the Larkana district on the 10th of February, and on the following day Pahur Khan and Chakur Khan followed them, and having taken possession of as many of their slaves as they could find, carried them and all their families, cattle, and other property back with them, but that they neither molested

nor did harm to anyone else living in the village; it therefore appears reasonable to suppose that these two Sassoolee Sirdars entered British territory for this purpose alone.

4. This, however, does not alter the fact of these Sirdars, residents of Zeedee near Kozdar in his Highness the Khan's country, having invaded British territory, and carried off by force certain slaves, cattle, &c. &c., belonging to them, and the fact of their followers, amounting, it would appear, to about 200 in number, having their matches lighted and swords drawn, shows that they fully intended to act on the offensive had the British authorities attempted to stop them.

5. I consider the police are very much to blame for allowing these slaves, with all their cattle and property, to be given an asylum in British territory; for considering the present most unsettled state of his Highness the Khan's country, it cannot be wondered at, if thieves and robbers are received into our districts, that those who have been robbed attempted to seize the robbers and recover their property. This, however, in no way lessens the cool insolence and impertinence of Sirdars Pahur Khan and Chakur Khan, Sassoolees, and I have the honour to request what measures you would wish me to adopt as to the recapture of the slaves and the recovery of the property, as well as the punishment of the Sirdars.

6. In the hot weather Sirdars Pahur Khan and Chakur Khan live at Zeedee near Kozdar, and in the cold season at Ghoj, which is separated from the Larkana District by the Lak Ghât.

Enclosure 2 in No. 173.

No. 337, dated Camp, Badambe, 10th March 1874.

From Commissioner in Sind to Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

In acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to inform you, that all the circumstances of the outrage on British territory have been communicated to the Government of India, whose instructions will be awaited. Meanwhile my telegram will have informed you of my desire that demand should at once be made on his Highness the Khan of Khelat that the Sassoolee chiefs Pahur Khan and Chakur Khan should be immediately delivered up to you, with the women, children, and property carried off by them from British territory, that they (the chiefs) may be made to answer for the insolent outrage committed by them.

2. I do not think the police were to blame further than that the Sowar Kundoo Khan should have at once taken the fugitive slaves and their property to the thanna at Kukkur directly he was made acquainted with the circumstances under which they had entered British territory, when the thannadar would have at once reported the matter and applied for orders. Instructions to this effect have been issued to the Police Superintendents of Shikarpoor and Kurrachee for future guidance.

Enclosure 3 in No. 173.

No. 713, dated 25th February 1874.

From Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Political Agent, Khelat.

Seven papers with endorsement No. 500, from the District Magistrate of Shikarpoor, are enclosed. You will kindly inform me if you know any of the depredators named in the correspondence, and where they live.

Enclosure 4 in No. 173.

No. 500, dated 20th February 1874.

From District Magistrate, Shikarpoor, to Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

The enclosed papers in 14 pages are forwarded. It will appear that the persons named have acted most culpably. Although the people whose property, children, &c. they have carried away were their slaves, yet when they entered the British border they were quite free men, and the depredators had no right then to enter the British border and behave as they did. You will kindly cause the delinquents to be appre-

hended and sent to me, so that they may be treated according to law; you will also kindly obtain possession of the children, women, property, cattle, &c. they have taken away and send them to me.

Enclosure 5 in No. 173.

No. 254, dated 19th February 1874.

From Magistrate, Mehur Division, to District Magistrate, Shikarpoor.

A REPORT from the Second-class Magistrate, Kukkur, is enclosed with another report, No. 323, and accompaniment, for such arrangements as may be necessary.

Enclosure 6 in No. 173.

No. 319, dated 14th February 1874.

From Thannadar of Kukkur to Magistrate of Kukkur.

TO-DAY, the 14th February 1874, about 3 o'clock afternoon, Mussoo Khan, Thannadar, Put Gool Mahomed Talooka, Kukkur, informed me that three days ago, or 12th instant, Fakeer Bukhsh, constable of the Kuppoee Pass, brought to his notice that on the previous day, or 11th February, at 8 p.m., some 200 mounted and foot armed men entered the village of Kubburpahee, near Salaree Talooka, Kukkur, and committed outrages. I started at once and met Kundoo Khan, camel constable, at the village of Towur, who informed me that he had halted in the village of Kubburpahee, on his way to Hurbab Pass. About 200 mounted and foot armed men came there from the Khan's territory, and stated that the three families who had previously migrated into that village were their slaves, and that they would forcibly take them away. The male members of those three families, by name Dillawur Futteh Ali, Saeedad, Khubbur, Saffoo, Yaroo, disappeared in order to save their lives; he (the camel sowar) checked them, but about 15 or 16 men of the mob laid hold of him, while the rest of the malefactors carried away the children, women, household property, &c., five camels, and six cattle belonging to the above three families. As he (the camel constable) was alone, he would have been murdered by them if opposition was offered, as they were armed with naked swords and with their matches lighted, and appeared ready to fight. I made inquiries on arrival at the place, and found the information given by Mussoo Khan confirmed. The several male members of the above families who had disappeared came to me and stated as follows:—

"That Pahur Khan and Chakur Khan *wullud* Jehan Khan Sassoolee Brahooees, who reside within the Khan's limits, are our Sirdars; we are their slaves. They divested us of all the property we possessed there. To protect ourselves from their outrages we came and settled in British territory. Pahur Khan and Chakur Khan with their followers came and carried away by force 12 of our children and women, as also property."

This statement was confirmed on the inquiry conducted by me independently of them. The intruders have not touched the property or person of any other person in the village. They only carried away by force children, women, and property of the above-mentioned three families, whom they called their slaves. It was difficult for us, one or two policemen, to follow such a great mob. I have therefore brought with me the above-mentioned injured parties, as also the camel sowar, Kunda Khan, The following are the names of the principal men who led the mob.

In this case evidence has been taken from Mussoo Khan, head constable, under section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It rests with the court either to get the district magistrate to correspond with his Highness the Khan of Khelat for punishing the party of upwards of 200 men who made inroad in the British territory, or to pass such other order as he may deem right. The several injured persons and Kundoo Khan, the camel sowar, are sent to the court for any inquiry that may be necessary. I will await the orders of the court.

Names of the principal men above alluded to:—

Pahur Khan, Chakur Khan, Rechee, Gowur Khan, Door Mahomed, Sher Shan, Peer Mahomed, Jafir Khan Saeedino, Dil Moord, Mirza, Soomur, Khuttoo, Khyro, Musafir, Sahno.

Enclosure 7 in No. 173.

No. 321, dated 15th February 1874.

From Magistrate of Kukkur to Divisional Magistrate of Mehur.

COPY of a report from the Thannadar of Kukkur is enclosed for your information. You will learn from this the particulars of an inroad made by a party of 200 mounted and foot men into British territory, and carrying away by force the children, women, and property of certain families whom they called their slaves. When the several men, whose names are mentioned by the Thannadar, have entered British territory with a large number of followers, some arrangements might be made to punish them. The Thannadar's report reached me at 4 p.m. this day at Futtehpoor, and directly I submit a copy of it for your information. I shall take depositions of Dilawur, Futteh Ali, the police sepoy, and others to-morrow and despatch them to you.

Enclosure 8 in No. 173.

No. 323, dated 16th February 1874.

From Magistrate of Kukkur to Divisional Magistrate of Mehur.

IN continuation of my report No. 321, dated 15th February 1874, I beg to enclose four depositions of Kundoo Khan, camel constable, Thannah Hurbab, and the owners of the houses whose children, women, and property from British limits were carried away by Pahur Khan and other Brahooees of his Highness the Khan's territory. The names of the owners of the houses are Dilawur, Futteh Ali, and Wullee Dad. The Thannadar of Kukkur has sent for the elders of the village of Kubburpahee where the outrages took place; on their arrival their depositions will also be taken and submitted.

Enclosure 9 in No. 173.

Dated Futtehpoor, 16th February 1874.

Deposition on oath of Kundoo Khan, Camel Constable, given before Ootumchund, 2nd Class Magistrate of Kukkur.

MY name is Kundoo Khan, son of Rukhio Khan; my age is 36 years; by caste a pahee Mahomedan; by occupation a camel constable of the Thanna of Hurbab Pass.

My information is that it is the sixth day now when I left Kukkur for the Thanna of Hurbab Pass when I got to the village of Khubburpahee. The sun set. I stopped in the village for the night. Dilawur, Futteh Ali, Saeedad, Kubbur, Suffoo, and Yaroo, who had come the previous day from the Khan's country to settle in the village, made their appearance and informed me that they having escaped from their Sirdar Pahur Khan, who had deprived them of their property, had migrated into the above-named village with their children and families and the rest of their property. I advised them to proceed further into Sind. About 8 o'clock at night some 200 mounted and foot men with arms entered the village of Khubburpahee. I went to check them, but they did not listen to me. I then advised the principal men of the houses to escape, which they did. I was then laid hold of by about 15 or 16 men, while the others carried away the children and females, 12 in number, 5 camels, 6 cattle, and other household things of the above-mentioned persons. Fukeer Buksh, constable of the Thannah of Kussoee Pass, was at the place. I sent him to lay information at the Thannah of Put Gool Mahomed. When I was released by the mob I took with me the hidden persons, Dilawur Khan, Futteh Ali, Saeedad, Kubbur, Suffoo, and Yaroo, and proceeded to the village of Powar, where I met Mussoo Khan, Duffadar, head constable of the Put Gool Mahomed Thanna. I told him what had occurred. Mussoo Khan himself also made inquiries on the spot and found my report correct. The mounted and foot men referred to cleared out of the British frontier during the course of the same night.

Pahur Khan, Chakur Khan *wullud* Jehan Khan Brahooees, Reechee Khan, Gowur Khan, Door Mahomed, Shere Khan, Peer Mahomed, Jaffer Khan, Saeedino, Door Mahomed and Mirza, Brahooees, residing in his Highness the Khan of Khelat's territory, Khuttoo Khyroo, Moosafir, Soomur, Lalloo, Brahooees, residing within

British limits, were members of the assembly. It being night others could not be recognised. The several persons of the British territory live in the Hurbab Pass; now also they may be there. It is not known whether they have now absconded. Except to the above new comers no loss has been caused to the original residents.

Enclosure 10 in No. 173.

Dated Futtehpoor, 16th February 1874.

Deposition of Dilawur, given on oath before Ootumchund, 2nd Class Magistrate, Kukkur.

My name is Dilawur. I am son of Fowjo; my age 35 years; by caste a Khaskelee Brahooee (Mahomedan); by occupation I am a labourer; I reside in Ghoj in his Highness the Khan of Khelat's territory.

My account is that it is about one month when Pahur Khan our Sirdar despoiled us of one camel, one horse, about one hundred sheep and goats, and one sword. He was also inclined to deprive us of the rest of our property. In order then to protect our lives and property, as we were in danger of being murdered, I came to settle in British territory. Two other families of my brother Futteh Ali and Wullee Dad Brahooee also came, and we all three families settled in the village of Khubbupahee. It is the sixth day since we came. At midnight of the same day a force followed us. There were the following persons in the mob:—

Pahur Khan, Chakur Khan, Reechee, Gowur Khan, Door Mahomed, Gholam Mahomed, Dil Moorad, Jaffir Khan, Saeedino Shere Khan, and Mirza Brahooees. There were also five persons of the British territory, by name Soomur, Khyroo, Lalloo, Khuttoo, Moosafir Brahooees, who were recognised by us. To save our lives we disappeared. They carried away our children and females, 12 in number, 6 cattle, 5 camels, and other household property. The names of the 12 persons carried away are—

1. Faiz Mahomed *wullud* Futteh Ali.
2. Khyo Mahomed *wullud* Futteh Ali.
3. Pindo *wullud* Wulleedad.
4. Moorad *wullud* Wulleedad.
5. Imam Ali *wullud* Khubbur.
6. Bindee, daughter of Wulleedad.
7. Muryum, ditto ditto.
8. Kowree ditto ditto.
9. Gunjee, wife of ditto.
10. Suaza, wife of Futteh Ali.
11. Jecundee, my wife.
12. Ganjo, son of Khubbur.

Enclosure 11 in No. 173.

Dated Futtehpoor, 16th February 1874.

Deposition of Futteh Ali, given on oath before Ootumchund, 2nd Class Magistrate, Kukkur.

My name is Futteh Ali; I am son of Fowjo; my age is 30 years; by occupation I am a labourer; I reside in Ghoj of his Highness the Khan's territory.

My account is that about one month ago Pahur Khan our Sirdar deprived us by force of one camel, one bullock, one sword, and a flock of sheep and goats, about 150 in number. He also intended to take possession of the rest of our property; then to protect our lives and property about six days ago we came to live in Kubburpahee, Talooka Kukkur, within British limits. On the very day we arrived at Khubburpahee a force of about 200 men came in at midnight. Of them the following were recognized:—

Pahur Khan, Chakur Khan, Reechee, Gowur Khan, Door Mahomed, Jaffir Khan, Shere Khan, Gholam Mahomed, Peer Mahomed, Saeedino, Brahooee Sassoolees. To save our lives we escaped; our children and females, 12 in number, adults and minor,

were carried away by them; also 5 camels, 6 bullocks, and other household property. The following are the names of the twelve persons:—

1. Faiz Mahomed, my son.
2. Khyr Mahomed, my son.
3. Pindo *wullud* Wulleedad.
4. Moorad *wullud* Wulleedad.
5. Imam Ali *wullud* Khubbur.
6. Bindee, daughter of Wulleedad.
7. Muryum, ditto ditto.
8. Kowree ditto ditto.
9. Gunjee, wife of ditto.
10. Suaza, my wife.
11. Jecundee, wife of Dilawur.
12. Ganjo, son of Khubbur.

Enclosure 12 in No. 173.

Dated Futtehpoor, 16th February 1874.

Deposition of Wulleedad, given on oath before Ootumchund, 2nd Class Magistrate of Kukkur.

My name is Wulleedad; my father's name is Moorad; my age is 50 years; by caste I am a Brahooee, by occupation I am a cultivator; I resided in Ghoj of his Highness the Khan's territory.

My account is, that about one month ago Pahur Khan Brahooee deprived us of one camel, one bullock, one sword, and sheep and goats, and appeared inclined to plunder the rest of our property. We then came to live in Khubbupahree within the limits of the British Government. It is now six days since my family and those of Dilawur and Futteh Ali came there. At midnight of the same day a force came in. The following men were recognised:—

Pahur Khan, Chakur Khan, Door Mahomed Reechee, Peer Mahomed, Dilmoorad, Jaffir Khan, Saeedino, Brahooees of his Highness the Khan's country, and Soomur, Brahooee of the British territory.

We were advised at the time by the sowar to run away: we disappeared to save our lives. They carried away our children and women, 12 in number, 5 camels, 6 cattle, and other household property. The following are the names of the persons carried away:—

1. Faiz Mahomed *wullud* Futteh Ali.
2. Khyro Mahomed *wullud* Futteh Ali.
3. Pindo, my son.
4. Moorad, my son.
5. ImamAli *wullud* Khubbur.
6. Bindee, my daughter.
7. Muryum, my daughter.
8. Kowree, my daughter.
9. Gunjee, my wife.
10. Suaza, wife of Futteh Ali.
11. Jecundee, wife of Dilawur.
12. Ganjo, son of Khubbur.

Enclosure 13 in No. 173.

No. 68, dated 27th February 1874.

From Political Agent, Khelat, to Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

In reply to your letter No. 713, dated 25th February 1874, I have the honour to inform you that I made myself acquainted with what you wrote to me. Amongst the names given in the correspondence I know Pahur Khan and Chakur Khan. Pahur Khan is a Brahooee from Sassoolee Section, and is Sirdar of that section. Chakur Khan is his brother. In the hot season they live at Zeedee in Khozdar, and in cold season at Ghoj. The other names given must be those of his tribe whom I do not know.

No. 174.

No. 654, dated Camp Khoraisee, 3rd March 1874.

From Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Commissioner in Sind.

With reference to your memorandum No. 190 of the 18th ultimo, I would beg to point out that the quotation of the word "forcibly" in his Highness the Khan's reply is not erroneous as it appears in the vernacular translation forwarded to his Highness, copy of which is attached. The translation of my letter of the 22nd December last to his Highness was made by Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to whom the first report of the letter having been taken from the kossid was made, and I am induced to believe it probable that the kossid in reporting the matter did use the word "forcibly," and that Major Harrison having this fresh in his memory thus introduced it, although I had abstained from using it, as there was no positive proof that such was the case.

2. I regret that the introduction of the word "forcibly" should have escaped my notice when the vernacular translation was read to me prior to my signing it.

No. 341, dated Camp Seranee, 12th March 1874.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copy forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, in reference to Commissioner's letter, No. 176, dated 17th February 1874.

No. 175.

No. 593, dated Camp Thul, 24th February 1874.

From Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Commissioner in Sind.

In forwarding the accompanying two letters in the vernacular to your address, also two letters and translations thereof from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, and Sirdar Bukhtiar Khan, Baroozai, with my reply to them, I have the honour to inform you that on Sunday forenoon Yakoob Khan arrived in Jacobabad, bringing a letter from Sirdar Bukhtiar Khan, Baroozai; he at once reported his arrival to Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, and informed that officer that Sirdar Alla Dad, brother-in-law of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, had arrived at Sabaiah-ke-Gote, and requested permission for him to be allowed to come to Jacobabad, as he was the bearer of letters from his Sirdar to the Commissioner in Sind and myself.

2. After duly considering the matter I directed Major Harrison to inform Yakoob Khan that Alla Dad might be allowed to come to Jacobabad the following morning and deliver his letters, and I requested Major Harrison to explain to Alla Dad verbally and impress on him that Government would in no way assist the Sirdars against their sovereign; that it was the wish of the British Government to remain strictly neutral so long as the present misunderstanding existed between his Highness the Khan and his Sirdars, and that the peace of the border did not call for other measures.

3. My principal reason for admitting the Sarawan chief's messenger was that I was afraid if he was not allowed to pay his respects to Major Harrison in my absence and deliver his letters in the same way that his Highness' messengers are admitted, that the Sirdar's adherents and others in Kutchee might suppose that the Raisanee chief was in disgrace with the British Government, and that allowing such an opinion to get abroad would not only be most unfair to Moolla Mahomed after the way he has lately behaved, but that it would make his Highness' officials and troops more arrogant, overbearing, and tyrannical than they are now, and I feared it might be putting the match to the fire and so tacitly assisting his Highness, and thus be the means of setting Kutchee in a blaze, as the Naib of Bagh, Abdool Azeez, and the Kazee of Bagh, advised by Mahomed Khan, late Vakeel, have shown by their late acts that they would not be slow to take advantage either of estranging the Sarawan chief's adherents from him, or to attack him at once if they thought they had a fair chance of defeating him and those Brahoees who might remain staunch to him.

Enclosure 1 in No. 175.

Translation of a Letter from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, and other Chiefs, to Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, dated 29th Zoolhuj 1290=18th February 1874.

CHERISHER of the poor! When his Excellency the Governor of Bombay and Commissioner in Sind visited Jacobabad, I sent my brother, Alla Dad, to make his salaam to the Commissioner and yourself. In your reply to my petition you wrote that the Commissioner in Sind would reply to my letter, and I would then learn what he had to say. Cherisher of the poor! three months have elapsed since I wrote, and no answer has been received. I don't know the reason, or whether your servant has been guilty of any fault or disobedience that he has not been made happy by receiving a reply.

Cherisher of the poor! Both the Commissioner and yourself have written two or three times to me that I should be obedient and act as Government desired, and I should be rewarded; up to the present I have not diverged one hair's breadth from the Government wish and am still acting as desired, but I see no reward as yet for my good services and obedience. I am prepared to be obedient and serve—you are my master.

I send my brother, Alla Dad, with letters, so hope he will arrive safely at Jacobabad; he will represent all I wish to say. Kindly treat him as a person of position, and ask the Commissioner to reply to my former letter and the one now sent.

Consider me a servant at your door and make me happy by writing.

May your health and prosperity increase!

Enclosure 2 in No. 175.

Translation of a Letter from Meer Bukhtiar Khan, Baroozai, to Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, dated 29th Zoolhuj=18th February 1874.

I REPORTED all that has occurred in a former letter. The latest news is as follows:—A Doomur force proceeded by the rear of old Seebee and the Nari river towards Dadur; on the road between Seebee and Dadur the Muzeranee Murrees were camped. Shere Dil himself with two or three families was on this side of the river, the rest of the Toman who were on the other side were plundered and had to fly for their lives; 45 families were plundered; 12 flocks of sheep besides lambs, as also 160 bullocks and donkeys; one Muzeranee was killed; Sher Dil himself was not attacked. He went in pursuit with 50 men; he sent to the Dadur detachment, who went as far as Mishhale and then refused to proceed. Sher Dil finding he was outnumbered returned. I sent Moolla Yakoob with this letter, and hope he will reach Jacobabad. Consider him trustworthy and believe what he tells you, and kindly send me a reply by him.

Consider me a servant at your door and make me happy by writing.

May your authority always increase!

Enclosure 3 in No. 175.

No. 592, dated Camp Thul, 24th February 1874.

From Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Political Agent, Khelat.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of the two vernacular letters with translations, one from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, and the other from Bukhtiar Khan, Baroozai, and to request that you will write to the former as follows:—"Colonel Loch, "Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, having left for the districts, I forwarded "your letter to him, and he has desired me to write in reply and call your attention to "the Commissioner in Sind's letter written to you in June last, in which he says:— "'Be sure that those who abstain from violence, and do their best to restrain others "'from it, will in the end reap their reward. I do not anticipate that members of your "'Ooloos will misbehave as long as they have so wise an example set them by their "'Sirdar.' Better advice than this I cannot give you, and as for assistance, that is "quite out of the question, as it is the wish of the British Government to remain strictly "neutral; but you are thoroughly acquainted with the wishes of the Commissioner in "Sind and myself regarding his Highness the Khan of Khelat and his Sirdars and their "followers; that he should treat them in every way as a father should his children, and "on the other hand, that his Sirdars and subjects should show his Highness the respect,

" honour, and obedience that is due from the children to their parent, from the subjects " to their sovereign; but so long as his Highness is estranged from you and you from " him, I much fear that neither the Commissioner's nor my wishes can be fulfilled."

To the latter Sirdar please merely acknowledge receipt of his letter and say, through press of work I am unable to reply to it myself, but I will do so in a day or two. Letter to the Commissioner in Sind has been forwarded by to-day's post.

Add to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's letter that his letter to the Commissioner in Sind will be forwarded by to-day's post, and that the Commissioner in Sind has, I believe, been prevented replying to his former letter through excessive amount of business consequent on his Excellency the Governor of Bombay visiting Sind, but I feel sure that the Commissioner will some day reply to it as he promised.

Enclosure 4 in No. 175.

No. 350, dated Camp Koowah, 16th March 1874.

From Commissioner in Sind to Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the papers received with your letter No. 593, dated the 24th ultimo, and to inform you that the reply given to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisanee, is entirely approved.

No. 351, dated Camp Koowah, 16th March 1874.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

No. 176.

No. 679 P., dated Fort William, 17th March 1874.

From Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Commissioner in Sind.

I AM directed to communicate to you the orders of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council on your letter No. 176, dated 17th ultimo, regarding the present position of affairs in Khelat.

2. His Excellency in Council approves of the tenor of your letter of the 17th February to the Khan. Should the reply of the Khan to this communication prove unsatisfactory, your next letter should be a simple ultimatum informing him that until he shows a proper appreciation of his position and obligations towards the British Government, no further communications will be held with him. You will also inform his Highness that, failing his performance of the obligations, the British Government will adopt such measures as circumstances may require for the defence of their frontier and the protection of their subjects; and that any of his people maltreating British subjects, or violating the frontier, will be treated as common robbers. Further, that no interference will be exercised in the quarrel between himself and his Sirdars, and no assistance given him in any difficulties in which he may be entangled.

3. His Excellency in Council doubts the expediency of holding any communication with the Sirdars at present on the subject of their relations with the Khan in the manner proposed in the conclusion of paragraph 10 of your letter; at any rate before authorising such a course he will await receipt of the full information which has been called for on the subject of your telegram of the 12th instant.

No. 177.

No. 722 P., dated Fort William, 21st March 1874.

From Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Secretary to the Government of Punjab.

IN continuation of the docket from this office, No. 302 P., dated the 30th of January last, regarding the two raids recently committed by the Murrees in the immediate neighbourhood of British territory, I am instructed to forward herewith a copy of a

letter from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 136, dated the 8th ultimo, on the subject, and to request that the Government of India may be furnished at a very early date with an expression of the opinion of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor on the proposals of Sir W. Merewether for the punishment of the Murrees.

No. 178.

No. 391, dated Camp Bagani, 28th March 1874.

From Commissioner in Sind to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy, translations (with originals) of two letters received from his Highness the Khan of Khelat in answer to my letter of the 17th February last.

2. As will be seen they are utterly unsatisfactory, full of promises and assertions, but nothing more; and he makes no proper amends for the disrespectful style of writing he had adopted.

3. I am afraid that no good will be done by any further endeavours to bring the Khan to a right understanding of his position until he sees that Government is really in earnest and will not submit to his continued evasion of treaty engagements. His present advisers have told him that he has only to write letters and make promises and nothing would be done to him. It is time I think that his Highness should be undeceived on this point.

4. The letter his Highness alludes to as having been sent to me direct was forwarded to me from Kurrachee, and I returned it through the Political Superintendent on the Frontier, requesting him to inform the Khan I could not receive it; first, because it was deliberately sent by the Khan, not through the usual channel; and next, because it was full of statements which I could not accept. It consisted chiefly of statements reflecting on the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, the only really true servant he ever had about him; also it contained remarks reflecting on the proceedings of Colonel Loch and Major Harrison.

5. As the kossid was about to leave Khelat his Highness the Khan despatched Abdoolla Jan, son of the late Daroga Gool Mahomed, on a secret mission to Candahar, the Khan giving the instructions from his own mouth to Abdoolla Jan. The latter objected to carrying the message, whatever it was, but the Khan insisted, and at last he left. Endeavours are being made to obtain information from Candahar as to the nature of this mission, and something may be learned before long at Jacobabad.

Enclosure 1 in No. 178.

Translation of a Letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to the Commissioner in Sind, dated 22nd Mohurrum 1291.

YOUR letter conveying the news of your welfare and happiness reached me at an auspicious moment and made me glad. You have been pleased to write that last year merchants were injured in various ways by the people of Lus Beyla within the district of the Chootahs; that in reply to a letter from Colonel Loch, I wrote that arrangements would soon be made for the apprehension and punishment of the robbers and restitution of the merchants' property, and that though so many months had elapsed none of my promises had been fulfilled, which showed that I had forgotten the assurances given by me, my responsibility as a ruler, and my obligations under the treaty engagements mutually entered into by me and your Government. My friend, I am certainly responsible for the above acts, and I appointed Meer Noordeen Mingul solely for the purpose of arresting the robbers, obtaining restitution of the stolen property, and restoring peace on the road. Some time after Meer Noordeen Mingul's arrival in Lus Beyla he wrote to me that the identical property of the merchants could not be obtained, but other camels and cattle were being offered in their stead. This I did not approve of, and in reply I informed him that such proceedings would not be sanctioned; the property of the merchants plundered, or its full equivalent in money, would be required. Further it seems that night and day messages from the ex-Jam's son are received by these people assuring them that he (the Jam's son) is shortly to return to Lus Beyla. These foolish people have consequently not yet adjusted the merchants' claims, and have

put them off from day to day by excuses. It is necessary now that I should personally take steps in the matter. God willing, shortly I shall appoint one of my servants and place troops under him, so that he will apprehend the malefactors, obtain restitution of every farthing's worth of the merchants' property, and punish the robbers heavily for their acts to serve as an example for the future. You write that two kossids carrying letters for British officials have been murdered in my district, and that the fact of the perpetrators not having been punished shows that there was no management, peace, or order in my country, for which I am responsible. My great friend, some months ago one kossid was seized by injudicious Murrees and deprived of the letters in his charge. My troops that were posted at Kirta for the protection of kafilas having learnt this followed the Murrees by night, killed one Palo, brother of Saleh, and then returned to their post. I am quite ignorant of the case of the second kossid. There is not the least doubt that the Murrees have become lawless. Last year I reported to you from Bagh that they were insubordinate and were not entitled to be my Ooloos. You know how peaceful and quiet the state of my country then was. The disorders which have recently prevailed are owing to instigations and intriguing of restless characters. God willing, with the aid and help of friends I will shortly put an end to this state of affairs. You kindly state that for some years now you have steadily and earnestly endeavoured to assist me in enforcing peace and good government in my country, but no good results have followed, because I had listened to the advice of some ill-designed people and had failed to act on the excellent suggestions of my friend, Major Harrison. It is quite true that you have always interested yourself in the affairs of this country, and I hope for the same favours being continued. I have never followed the advice of evil persons, and have never allowed such people to remain in my presence; but the above gentleman disbelieving my statements placed reliance on the adverse assertions of Wullee Mahomed. All my endeavours on this subject were of no avail, and fearing that matters might daily get worse I started and made myself happy by visiting you on two occasions. Whatever I had to say or propose I told you at Shahpoor, and in order to meet the wishes of the British Government I consented without hesitation to all matters, even such as I thought were derogatory to my prestige. It is mentioned in your letter that the subsidy paid to me was withheld owing to my failing to maintain the good government and order I was bound to do by treaty engagements. My friend, from the first I have adhered to the terms of the treaty of 1854, and have never acted in violation thereof. For the sake of myself and my country I place every hope in you and your Government. Last year in reply to your letter I informed you from Bagh that though I suffered a loss of about Rupees 80,000 annually in transit duties I did not care, but accepted the sum the British Government had fixed. Although the claims of merchants should have been satisfied by the Brahooees I paid them myself as desired by the British Government, in the hope that with your assistance I should receive a substantial consideration from the British Government to compensate me for the losses so sustained, and never expecting that my annual subsidy would be stopped. You wrote that I had not acted on the suggestions contained in your letter written from Minote, and under instructions from his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India you inform me that if any disturbances take place on the frontier, owing to my failing to fully carry out the terms of the treaty entered into in 1854 to protect trade and to preserve peace on the frontier, it will be necessary for the British Government to take their own measures to ensure peace. For my own renown I have at all times endeavoured to maintain peace and order, and will continue to do so. If, however, this is the determined wish of the British Government I and my country are at their disposal in any way they please. As regards the expression that if I do not give satisfaction regarding the outrages committed in Lus Beyla districts the British Government will exact reparation in the best way they deem advisable. I would state that I have not neglected the management of Lus Beyla affairs, but my endeavours have been frustrated by the designs of Wullee Mahomed and the son of the ex-Jam of Beyla, who night and day send messages, encouraging the people to create disturbances. At the conclusion of your letter it is written that before it is late I should think of the dangerous position in which I have thrown myself. My friend, I have never put myself in danger. Having acted carefully and intelligently, I have always resigned myself to the will of God, who is the cause of everything. As is apparent, I placed every hope in the British Government, and desired that my country, my property, and myself should pass to the British Government in preference to other (Humsurs) equals. I sent *viâ* Kurrachee a previous letter to your address, from which you will have learnt everything. Comfort your mind and make me happy by writing.

Enclosure 2 in No. 178.

Translation of a Letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to the Commissioner in Sind, dated 24th Mohurrum 1291.

YOUR letter reached me at a happy moment and made my heart glad. You write that in my letter, dated 29th Ramzan 1290, to the address of Colonel Loch, words wanting in respect and courtesy to the British Government and yourself were used. My friend, from the beginning up to this day I have considered myself dependent on the British Government, and have always looked to your kindness and support. How shall I then fail in this respect. A copy of my letter, dated the 29th Ramzan, is enclosed for your perusal. There appear no disrespectful terms in it. If any error has crept into it you will kindly mark it and let me know. You also write that in another letter, dated 20th Zoolhuj 1290, addressed to the above-named gentleman in connexion with Abdool Azeez and the "perwana" sent to Sher Dil Muzzeranee Murree, unsuitable words were used when speaking of the British Government, and that you wanted an explanation of the same. My friend, it is improbable that I would apply such unbecoming terms as "Dirogh" and "Iftirah" to the above gentleman. Never!! Never!! I have used them for my enemies and ill-wishers whose tongues continue to utter unbecoming things. These words also have probably been pointed out by such persons. In the matter of Sher Dil's letter Abdool Azeez did only this much, viz., he gave intimation to Colonel Loch of the receipt of the letter. There were no instructions to make over the letter to any other person. Sher Dil lived among the hills, daily moving from one place to another, and escorted kafilas through the Bolan. At the time when the perwana reached Bagh, Sher Dil was not with his Toman. These circumstances and a man having to go in search of him and bring him to Bagh were the cause of delay.* The letter was afterwards delivered to him. This is the account of the detention of the letter. When I myself would not allow such irregularities to occur in the affairs of the British Government, how could my servants dare to perpetrate them? If any of my servants were to commit such an act he would be so punished that he would serve as an example for others.

* This is evasion and I regret to say not true. (Sd.) W. L. M.

No. 179.

No. 757.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab and its Dependencies, to H. Le Poer Wynne, Esq., Officiating Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.

Foreign.

SIR, Dated Lahore, 29th April 1874.

I AM desired to forward for the information of the Government of India copy of a letter from the Deputy Commissioner, Derah Ghazi Khan, No. 524, dated 18th inst., with enclosures, regarding the present state of the Murree and Boogtee tribes, subjects of the Khan of Khelat, and the effect such is likely to have in the Punjab frontier.

I have, &c.

T. H. THORNTON,
Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Enclosure 1 in No. 179.

No. 524, dated 18th April 1874.

From Captain R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Derah Ghazi Khan, to the Secretary to Government, Punjab.

HAS the honour to forward copy of a letter No. 523, dated 17th inst., to the address of the Political Superintendent, Jacobabad, regarding the present state of the Murree and Boogtee tribes, subjects of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and the effect such is likely to have on the Punjab frontier.

Enclosure 2 in No. 179.

No. 523, dated Derah Ghazi Khan, 17th April 1874.

From Captain R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Derah Ghazi Khan, to the Political Superintendent, Jacobabad.

In accordance with my request you were kind enough to direct that Shah Baz Khan, the eldest son of the Boogtee Tomandar, should meet me at the Sakhi Sarwar horse fair, which he did on the 10th of this month. I desired Shah Baz Khan's presence for several reasons, but chiefly on account of similar reports having reached me to the one made in letter from the Mazari Chief to my address, copy of which, along with others, as per margin, I enclose. I had also heard that of late the Massuri Boogtee chiefs had actively opposed their Tomandar, Gulam Murteza, and I wished to know if it was true. I further had heard that Hyder Khan, the brother of the once noted outlaw, Gulam Hossein, who was killed when leading a combined raid of Murrees and Massuri Boogtees on Harrand, had joined the Murrees with all his people, and that it was their intention to, as in former days, raid on their neighbours.

From Babal Khan, Chief of the Khetrans.
Gulam Murteza Khan, Tomandar Boogtee.
Bozdar Vakil, Yar Muhammad.

2. When I met Gulam Murteza, the Boogtee Tomandar, in the cold weather at Wattakeri in our own Lagari Chief's country, he told me of the misconduct of the Massuris, but attributed all to Guzzun Khan, the Murree Tomandar, being allowed to receive discontented men of his tribe, and he asked my aid to prevent this. Gulam Murteza on his part promised me to do his best to put a stop to the Massuris and others of his tribe "looting" the Luni and Shahdozai Pathan Chief and others bringing horses to the fair. This, however, he has not been able to accomplish. I heard at the fair from his son, which was corroborated by Babal Khan, that the Massuris had sent word to their chief's remonstrances, that did the Luni Pathans attempt to visit the fair they would plunder them *en route* if they could. The helpless position of Babal Khan enables them to do this with impunity.

3. On meeting the young Boogtee Chief he acknowledged that all I had heard was true, that his father had little or no control over the Massuris, who, he said, had again, for some time past, joined the Murrees for the purpose of committing raids.

4. I submit, as stated above, in the vernacular and English, in addition to the Mazari Chief's letter, copies of reports that reached me at the fair and since my return to Derah Ghazi Khan. One is from Babal Khan, the Chief of the Khetrans, giving particulars of the state of his affairs, the other is from the Vakil of the Bozdars, telling of a raid on that tribe by a combined body of Murrees and Boogtees. Babal Khan has been reduced on account of Guzzun Khan's late interference in his affairs almost to a helpless condition. At the fair several of the hill chiefs told me that Guzzun Khan now wrote to some of the Khetran headmen, calling them his "ryots," as he had agreed not to raid on them if they paid him a certain share of the produce of their lands and acknowledge his supremacy. In reply to Babal Khan's letter, I have intimated to him that I have addressed Guzzun Khan and the chiefs of his tribe to ask what their real intentions are, and if they again intended in force to attack Babal Khan. I reminded them of their agreement with me not to do so without previous notice. You will observe that the tone of Babal Khan's letter is very desponding. This is caused by the fact that Guzzun Khan's action in the quarrel between him and his nephew has so weakened him that there is every fear that, as surmised by himself in the petition enclosed, his downfall is only a work of time. Should this occur he will be a great loss on this border. He is an old and very friendly chief, and has been long in communication with the political officers on this frontier, and has ever evinced a most loyal feeling towards our Government; this, I was informed at the fair, has not a little to do with the present combination against him.

5. The report from the Bozdar Vakil telling of the combined Murree and Massuri raid on the Musa Khel Pathans, and its results, is also a striking one. I send these reports because I think it most desirable at the present time that both you and the Commissioner in Sind should know thoroughly what is taking place on this frontier. I am fully aware that to a certain extent, for long, feuds have existed between the Khetrans, Luni Pathans, and Bozdars and his Highness the Khan's subjects, the Murrees and Boogtees. These were, however, greatly checked by the results of the raid on Harrand in the early part of 1867. I was also in hopes that a thorough understanding between myself and the Political Superintendent on the Sind frontier would enable us together to devise means to put a stop to these combined raids which ruin the country. It is solely due to them that the trade routes into this district from the countries to the westward were, until late years, closed. Moreover, the present action of Guzzun Khan

and the Massuri faction of the Boogtees is again closing these roads more firmly than ever, thereby destroying the labour of years which has been expended in opening them out. Under these circumstances I have considered it right to submit the reports I enclose in this, for your consideration. They speak for themselves, and prove how very disturbed matters have now become on this frontier. You will observe that the attack by the Boogtees and Murrees on the Shahdozai Chief of Tull Chotiali, in which two of the latter were killed, was very rapidly followed by those on the Musa Khel and Bozdars. These occurrences taking place so soon after the late attack on the Dhoombkees, in which, according to Guzzun Khan's own report, 80 of that tribe were killed, makes me consider that Murree affairs are approaching a crisis, and that I cannot possibly much longer hope to preserve the peace of the Punjab frontier, which, on account of the numerous passes leading from the Murree country into it, is greatly exposed to Murree and Boogtee depredations.

Since writing the above I have received a report (I enclose a translation) from Sirdar Jamal Khan, Chief of the Lagaris, telling that the party who plundered the Bozdars had carried off some cattle belonging to the hill section of his tribe, the Haddianis.

Enclosure 3 in No. 179.

Rajanpur, dated 23rd December 1873.

From C. E. Gladstone, Esq., Assistant Commissioner, Rajanpur, to the Deputy Commissioner, Derah Ghazi Khan.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 26th of November Ramzan Numari, his wife Bakht-bhari, and Milawar Bhitarah, were proceeding from Shahpur to Dad Kotha.

Case A. When they were within 200 yards of the district high road, at noon, they were attacked by five men, muffled and armed, wearing Belooch chaplis. They were seized, bound, and taken to the jungle, where they were, under threats of death, compelled to remain quiet till evening. The robbers then fled, leaving the robbed men bound in the jungle. In the morning they came to the thanah and reported. From their report it became evident that the robbers were Beloochis.

On the next day (27th) a man named Dilalah and a lad named Uttam were going at noon from Shikarpur to Isan Kotlah, when they were attacked by three men, armed and

Case B. dressed as Beloochis. Dilalah fled, but Uttam was captured. He was rifled and released.

In Case A. the property stolen amounted to Rs. 42, in Case B. to Rs. 10. The robbers took a westerly direction, those in Case A. being followed up by Hargopal Das, Munshi of the Fazilpur Thanah, those in Case B. by Jallab Khan, Thanahdar of Rajanpur. In both cases without delay.

Suspecting the men to be Lusharis, and thinking that there might be some difficulty if the men reached the hills, I rode out to Harrand hoping to cut across the line taken by the thieves. Here I got information that the thieves had been tracked to Mirapur (near Harrand), where they had in the night set fire to a bunniah's shop. On the 3rd of December I got news that Jallab Khan had again hit off the track and carried it up to a place near the Chachar Nallah. On the morning of the 4th, in the company of Ganah, brother of Mir Khan Lushari, I went with Jallab Khan and the Chiefs of the Gurchanis and Drishaks to the Shalobah nullah. The tracks went down this for some distance and then turned off towards the Chachar. They were lost, however, about 200 yards from the Shalobah, their direction being towards some Lushari villages on the other side of the Chachar. We had now got among the low hills, and the ground was far too stony to allow of any further tracking. The Shalobah lies between the Mir-ullah and the Chachar, but the tracks had gone south of the Shalobah towards the Chachar, so that the responsibility lay with the custodians of that pass. Leaving this place I went to see if the Fazilpur Munshi had been successful in Case A. I found him near Fattehpur. He had tracked the robbers to the village of Taggu Lushari, but being new to the work and district, had been baffled and bullied by the Beloochis and was at a loss. I left Miran Khan, the chief of the Drishaks, Jallab Khan, Thanadar, and three trackers to help him, and with this assistance the tracks were carried on to the village of Taggu Lushari, four miles to the west of Fattehpur. Here they were lost. It was of course in both cases impossible to identify any person by his tracks, for they had only to change their chaplis to be secure. All eight robbers wore chaplis. I had and Ganah, the two headmen of the Lusharis (Mir Khan was at Jampur at the Horan time), seized, as well as all the men of Taggu's village. I have sent them to Derah

Ghazi Khan on security. I trust that severe measures will be taken, as the Lusharis are getting perfectly unruly. This is the second time in the last three months that they have committed highway robbery. On the former occasion the robbers were followed up by Ghulam Muhammad, Thanadar of Jampur, into the Lushari hills, and an acknowledgment to that effect taken from the headmen of the Lusharis. In conclusion, I can speak in the highest terms of the indefatigable energy of Jallab Khan, Thanadar of Rajanpur, and Hargopal Das, Munshi of Fazilpur. The former especially, I believe, hardly rested during the pursuit.

No. 180.

No. 779, dated Lahore, 1st May 1874.

From Secretary to the Government of Punjab to Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In reply to your letter No. 722 P., dated 21st March, transmitting copy of a letter from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 136, dated 8th February, proposing certain measures for the punishment of the Murree tribe and desiring a very early expression of his Honour's opinion on the subject, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of the correspondence noted on the margin, containing the views of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, Officiating Commissioner of the Derajat, and Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan, together with the maps referred to in original.

From Commissioner of the Derajat, No. 101, dated 23rd April, and enclosures.

2. As the Lieutenant-Governor is on tour in the Kangra District, I have deemed it best (to save time) to forward the papers direct to the Government of India, as a week or more must elapse before his Honour's orders can be received. Meanwhile I am in a position to state generally his Honour's opinion upon the subject as follows:—

3. In the first place, I can assure the Government of India that if, after duly considering Captain Sandeman's objections to the adoption of the measures proposed by the Commissioner in Sind, his Excellency in Council thinks a blockade advisable, he may count on Mr. Davies' best co-operation in giving effect thereto.

4. At the same time his Honour is of opinion that before resorting to this or any other measure of coercion, it would be advisable that Captain Sandeman's great influence with and knowledge of the border tribes should be made use of in endeavouring to bring the Murree chief to terms.

5. The Lieutenant-Governor suggests therefore that Captain Sandeman be sent on the part of the Commissioner in Sind to Ghuzzun Khan with this object, and empowered if necessary to convey a formal ultimatum on the part of the British Government. In this way his Honour thinks the Murree chief will clearly understand that the Government is not divided, and that if he continues his present attitude he must expect united action against him both from the side of Sind and the Punjab.

6. The measures to be adopted in the event of a blockade being determined upon are being carefully considered in the Military Department, and the correspondence with the Brigadier-General Commanding the Frontier Force on the subject can be forwarded when required.

7. The matter discussed in Deputy Commissioner's letter No. 333 of the 8th April relating to the effect said to have been produced on certain clans of the Lugharee and Gurchanee tribes by a misconception of orders on the subject of "Batai" or division of the crop recently passed by the Lieutenant-Governor, has been dealt with by the Commissioner in his No. 489-1422, dated 15th April 1874, but you will find the orders of the Punjab Government on the subject in Foreign Proceedings of this Government for the month of January last.

Enclosure 1 in No. 180.

No. 101-1574, dated 23rd April 1874.

From Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to Secretary to the Government of Punjab.

In acknowledgment of your No. 46C.-570A. of the 27th ultimo, and its enclosures, which is herewith returned, as directed, I have the honour to submit copies of reports received from Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan, on the subject of Sir William Merewether's proposal to blockade the Murree tribe.

Submits Deputy Commissioner, Dhera Ghazee Khan's reports on proposed blockade of Murree tribe.

2. The Deputy Commissioner's reports are accompanied by an excellent map of the countries to be affected by the proposed measures, which is also forwarded under separate cover to your address.

Reports accompanied by a map.

The remark made in the concluding paragraph of Captain Sandeman's supplementary letter, No. 333 of the 8th instant, appearing to me to call for notice on my part, I enclose copy of my reply showing that if any misconception exists as to his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor's views and orders in regard to the system of "Batai" hitherto prevailing among some of the Belooch Tununans in the Dera Ghazee Khan District, the Deputy Commissioner and Settlement Officer should have guarded against the possibility of misunderstanding the principles laid down for guidance in paragraph 29 of the Government Proceedings No. 18 of 2nd January last having been very clearly enunciated.

Reply to supplementary letter.

3. Captain Sandeman's intimate knowledge of and influence over the hill tribes on his border are well known, and are acknowledged by the Commissioner in Sind in the 16th paragraph of the enclosure to your letter under reply. Moreover the Deputy Commissioner has recently made a tour in the tracts beyond his border, lying between the Murree and Boogtee possessions to the south, and those of the Khetrans, Musa Khels, and Luni Pathans to the north; he has been in personal communication with all the chiefs and leading men, including Ghuzzun Khan, the Murree chief himself, and he is therefore in a position to give the Government the freshest intelligence regarding the state of affairs on our southern border, and the present temper and feelings of the different tribes.

Deputy Commissioner's knowledge of and influence over tribes.

His recent tour.

Facilitates his reporting with confidence.

4. After sketching the locations of the different clans and our border system of defence, including that of Sind, the Deputy Commissioner notes the marked difference between that established in Sind and the system of protection existing along the lower border of the Punjab from Dera Ghazee Khan downwards. A large tract of country from Chotee Bala to Drigri beyond the line of outposts is occupied by British subjects of the Lugharee and Gurchanee tribes, who are entirely exposed to raids from the westward. The outposts in Sind have been built on the frontier line, or even beyond it, in some parts, and these facts are adduced to show that a blockade of the Murrees from Sind is a matter of much easier accomplishment than from the Punjab under the circumstances described.

Differences between Sind and Punjab systems of frontier defence.

Punjab frontier much more exposed.

Murree blockade easier from Sind than from Punjab.

5. The Deputy Commissioner mentions instances in which the hostile action of the Murree tribe proved very serious on the Asni and Harrand borders, referring particularly to the great raids of 1857 and 1866, and he shows that the Shambhani Boogtees took but a small part, if any, in these incursions.

Former Murree raids.

6. The difference in the systems of frontier defence in Sind and on the lower border of the Punjab is stated by Captain Sandeman to arise from the fact that the Sind system was created by British officers, whilst we in the Punjab took over at annexation and continued that which had been established by the Sikhs. The first is founded upon strictly military principles, but the second leaves much to be effected through political management of border tribes tending to maintain peaceful relations, and a good understanding between Belooch subjects and the independent tribes beyond.

Causes of difference in system of defence.

7. It is, I think, not too much to say that no officer has devoted so much time and energy to the securing of these latter objects as Captain Sandeman himself; and the results in regard to the security of life and property on the Dera Ghazee Khan border cannot be better exemplified than by reference to the enclosure of my No. 92 of the 17th instant to your address.

Captain Sandeman's own exertions.

Their results.

8. The Deputy Commissioner does not recommend a blockade of the Murrees for the reason that they would scarcely be affected by it, whilst British subjects would be exposed by its establishment much harassment and loss, owing to the peculiarities and indefinite nature of the frontier border line from Dera Ghazee Khan to Sind. The difficulties from local circumstances are described that large bodies of the Lugharee and Gurchanee tribes especially would be roads by the Murrees unless entirely withdrawn within our line of outposts, ld be tantamount to an abandonment of a considerable part of their tribe whom we resolve to punish.

Deputy Commissioner does not recommend a blockade.

Reasons for opinion.

9. The arrangements approved at the Mittunkote conference in the beginning of 1871, by which the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan was placed *qua* the Murree and Boogtee tribes under the control of the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, have since prevented the Commissioner of the Derajat from being so conversant as formerly with the particular doings and movements of these tribes, and I am, therefore, in a less favourable position for giving a confident opinion in regard to the proposed blockade than I should possibly have been under former system.

Results of Mittunkote conference.

Derajat Commissioner not required to superintend political relations with Murrees and Boogtees.

10. My knowledge of the Sind system is not so intimate as that of Captain Sandeman, who has been in contact with it for six or seven years, and has during the last three years served under Sind officers in conducting our relations from this side with the Boogtee and Murree tribes, referring only to me on occasions which may have pointed to a possible disturbance of the peace on his lower border. Captain Sandeman by carrying out subsidizing plan referred to in the 10th paragraph of Sir William Merewether's despatch has undoubtedly succeeded, as therein acknowledged, in hitherto preventing Murree raids on the Rajanpoor and Dera Ghazee Khan border.

Deputy Commissioner's contact with Sind system.

Serves under it.

Subsidizes the Murrees.

11. The position and relations of the Murree tribe with us appear to be very peculiar. Ever since annexation of the Punjab, and previously, I presume, since the conquest of Sind, it has been deemed advisable for reasons with which I have not had opportunities of becoming well acquainted to consider them as subjects of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, but it is notorious that the tribe have generally behaved as if they owed no allegiance to the Khelat State, carrying on a system of marauding all round, often attended with much bloodshed, occasionally trenching upon British territory, and usually maintaining a state of chronic contention with the neighbouring hill tribes, north and south Belooch, and Pathan alike, without reference to any controlling authority whatever, that of the Khan of Khelat being the weakest and least influential that can be imagined.

Our relations with Murrees from Sind and the Punjab.

Murree subordination to Khan of Khelat a fiction.

Their independent action

Everywhere as it suits themselves.

Ignoring the Khan's authority.

12. In these circumstances the Murrees have ever been looked upon from the Punjab as a tribe really independent, and their more recent exploits against Khetrans and Lunis sufficiently demonstrate that they consider themselves to be so, and act accordingly when and where it suits them. Had his Highness the Khan of Khelat any control over them whatever, the descriptions of their sanguinary depredations both in "Kutchee," and amongst the hill tribes to the north of Kahan, with which the Political Diaries have been filled for one or two years past, could not have been written.

Murree late doings demonstrate their conscious independence.

Described in Political Diaries.

13. I gather from the papers before me that the object of the Sind policy is to show the Murrees that we do and shall continue to look upon the whole tribe as subjects of the Khelat State. The Commissioner in Sind, judging from the 14th paragraph of his despatch, is not disposed to acknowledge that Ghuzzun Khan, the Murree Chief, even possesses a quasi-independence, and the proposed blockade is intended to demonstrate that if he do not speedily present himself before the Political Superintendent at Jacobabad and submit to the terms to be declared to him there, he will forfeit British favour, cease to receive any subsidies, and be ultimately treated as an enemy of the British Government; he and his tribe being debarred from entering our territory, and ultimately punished in their own hill fastnesses by a military expedition to be organised and sent against them.

Apparent object of Sind policy.

14. Viewing these proposals from Captain Sandeman's point of view, which is that with which I have particularly to deal, I cannot disguise from myself and the Government that the results of carrying out the proposed measures may prove much more serious on this than the Sind side, for the reasons adduced by the Deputy Commissioner, and already touched upon above. It seems clear from the Deputy Commissioner's Report that no such state of things exists as yet on his lower border as would justify a blockade of the Murrees from the Punjab side, and a consequent cessation of the amicable relations hitherto maintained between him and the Murree Chief, partly, no doubt, owing to the subsidizing system, but very largely, I believe, to the friendly intercommunications kept up between the Belooch Chiefs, both within and

Possible results on Punjab border.

Relations on Punjab side with Murrees do not call for a blockade.

Reasons why.

beyond our border, under the indefatigable supervisions of the Deputy Commissioner himself.

15. How two apparently opposite systems of dealing with the Boogtee and Murree tribes came to be pursued in Sind and Dera Ghazee Khan respectively, under the circumstances alluded to in paragraphs 9 and 10 of this letter, it is not for me to explain, but it has ever appeared to me to be a very anomalous result of the conference held at Mittunkote previously to my receiving charge of this division. As yet the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan has succeeded in upholding friendly relations with the Murree leaders, who have hitherto in passing and repassing on plundering expeditions elsewhere scrupulously avoided committing themselves on our border. The Deputy Commissioner does not seem very confident, however, that this state of things can be maintained much longer, owing to Murree successes in other directions, the consequent demoralization of the tribe, and the utter inability of the effete Government at Khelat to restrain them.

Two different modes of treating with Murrees pursued in Sind and Punjab.

Anomalous result of Mittunkote conference.

Deputy Commissioner's success with the Murrees.

His doubts as to the future.

16. Captain Sandeman proposes as an alternative that we should revert to the recommendations made in 1869, when the Government of India sanctioned an expedition to the Shum plain, but afterwards recalled that sanction under circumstances explained in the correspondence which then took place. The scope and objects of that expedition are described in letter No. 1622, dated 12th November 1869, to your address, from the then Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, Colonel Phayre.

Deputy Commissioner's alternative proposal.

17. I cannot suppose that the Deputy Commissioner's alternative proposition will find much favour with the Commissioner in Sind, judging from the general tenor of his despatch, but it is my duty to draw to draw particular attention to Captain Sandeman's anticipation as to the probable results on the border of his district of a blockade of the Murree clan. He considers a rupture to be inevitable, calculated to frustrate the objects of many years' labour. It would necessitate a strengthening of our border defence from Chotee Bala to Sind, with regular troops, at the most unfavourable season of the year now just setting in. He does not expect that a mere blockade would be effective, and the following it up by such an expedition as Sir William Merewether appears to anticipate or recommend would be inevitable.

Not likely to accord with view of Commissioner in Sind.

Probable results of Sind proposals as regards Punjab.

Ineffective nature of a mere blockade.

Military expedition to follow.

18. I feel myself rather at a disadvantage in dealing with a subject of such importance as that under report, for reasons already given, but I would, in conclusion, express my opinion to the effect that if considerations of imperial policy or of the maintenance of a system in Sind, which is shown to have differed considerably from that pursued on the Lower Punjab border, demand that a strict blockade of the Murree tribe be carried out, to be followed in all probability by a military expedition to punish a tribe nominally under the rule of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, but really independent, the local Government must prepare for eventualities of a harassing and troublesome nature on the Dera Ghazee Khan border, the defence of which will require strengthening in proportion to the dangers to be guarded against.

Commissioner rather at a disadvantage in treating of the subject.

Necessity of a blockade from this side only demonstrated at present from considerations of imperial policy.

Probable eventualities of a blockade, and measures required to meet them.

Enclosure 2 in No. 180.

No. 329, dated 6th April 1874.

From Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazee Khan, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your No. 432–1247, dated 2nd instant, and its enclosures as per margin, on the subject of the late conduct of the Murree clan, directing me at an early date to furnish a comprehensive report on the very important subject treated of therein. I will do this as briefly as possible consistent with a fair discussion of the question at issue.

No. 46C., dated 27th March 1874, from Secretary to Government, Punjab, to Commissioner, Derajat Division.
No. 722P., dated 21st March 1874, from Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to Secretary to Government, Punjab.
No. 136; dated 8th February 1874, from Commissioner in Sind to Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.
Submits under separate cover sketch map showing position of Boogtee and Murree clans.

2. In order to help towards a clear understanding of what I desire to place before the Government, I submit a sketch map giving the position of the Murree and Boogtee clans on this and the Sind borders.

3. A reference to the map will show that the Boogtee clan occupy the country right in front of Sind and the lower Derajat borders. The Murree country on the other hand lies just beyond it and rests on Kutchee (Khelat territory) and on the Punjab, hence it happens that these two borders are so subject to Murree raids. The entire Punjab borders from the Sabzil-ke-Kot post in the Dirshak country to Chotee Bala, a border village in front of Dera Ghazee Khan in the Lugharee country, is open to the raids of the Murrees. The position of the military posts on the Sind and Punjab borders can also be seen from a glance at the map. The Sind posts are Guranari, Sunri, Sooee, and Gundooee. The three first named are occupied by the regular troops of Sind. The Gundooee outpost in the Boogtee hills is entirely held by Boogtees (fifty I believe) who are retained there under the chief of that tribe, and forms a part of the Sind border defence. All these outposts are either on the immediate Sind border line or just beyond it, while the Gundooee outpost is situated about 16 miles by the map within Khelat territory.

Describes the geographical position of the posts on the Sind and Punjab borders.

4. The Punjab posts are Shaikhwali, Bandawali, Sabzil-ki-Kot, Drigri, Harrand, Ganair, and Choti, but only Drigri, Harrand, and Bandowali are occupied by regular troops. The other posts like Gundooee are occupied for purposes of defence and for police purposes by the tribes of the country in which each is situated. It will be observed, however, that while the Sind posts are pushed right on to the frontier, and beyond it, and cover Sind, such is not the case with the Punjab posts. A considerable tract of country from Drigri to Chotee Bala is occupied by our revenue-paying subjects who are entirely exposed and unprotected from Murree raids, and it is this fact, as well as the geographical position of the Murree clan itself, that makes a blockade of that tribe so very much more serious a business for the Punjab than for Sind. Indeed on account of the position of the Boogtees and the hold the Sind posts maintain over them they serve as "buffers," so to speak, between the Murrees and Sind, who can only with difficulty get into Sind. On the other hand the Punjab like Kutchee is open to their every depredation.

Describes the garrison occupying the Sind and Punjab posts, and how their retentive positions affect a blockade of the Punjab.

5. Before coming to the immediate subject of your letter under reply, I will now briefly allude to the contents of the Commissioner in Sind's No. 136, dated Camp Bakrah, the 8th February 1874, to the Secretary to the Government of India. There are one or two points in it connected with this frontier regarding which explanation here may be of value and not be out of place. I therefore submit it.

Alludes to Commissioner in Sind's letter and explains it.

6. The Commissioner in Sind does not, he remarks in paragraph 3, understand why I have this year so prominently brought forward the raids of the Murrees on the Khetrans and the Musa Khel, but he concludes that I anticipate for reasons he gives that the Murree tribe is fast getting beyond all control. It is perfectly true as remarked by the Commissioner that the Khetrans have all along been annoyed by the Murrees, at the same time until this year it never occurred before that Ghuzzun Khan himself headed an army of 1,200 men and took an active part in Khetran's quarrels. The story is as follows :—

Explains the attack by Ghuzzun Khan on the Khetrans.

7. The Chief of the Khetran Babal Khan has been recognised by us since annexation as the head of the Khetran tribe. During the last year a nephew of his by name Kadir Buksh tried to depose Babal Khan from power, and he went off to Ghuzzun Khan to Kahan, the Murree chief town, for assistance. This Ghuzzun Khan, for reasons unnecessary to relate, gave by raiding with an army on the Khetrans, and in doing so came with his force quite on to the British border, in front of Dera Ghazee Khan, a thing never known before : one result of this was that two kafilas proceeding to Dera Ghazee Khan from Tull and the Zerkan Pathan country were immediately looted, Babal Khan complaining, which was quite true, that his power to maintain security along the trade route from Tull Chotiali to this had been well nigh broken by the action of Ghuzzun Khan, against whose interference he asked for my protection.

Ghuzzun Khan's reasons for attacking Khetrans.

Ghuzzun Khan's attack on Khetrans results in the plunder of two kafilas.

8. Regarding attacks on the Musa Khel by the Murrees, there is nothing in the annals of my office to show that they ever took place before this year. At least I never heard before of 2,000 Murrees going against them, which was the case this year. I myself have been along the route the Murree army took. The Musa Khel, as you

Describes the nature of the Murree raid on the Musa Khel Pathans, and gives it serious character.

know, reside above the Kasranis, whose country borders the Sanghar pergunnah of this district, and certainly 150 miles distant from the Murree country proper. The raid I complained of was one of the most determined ever made by the Murree clan. The chief who conducted it acknowledged to me during my late tour in the hills that they killed 32 Musa Khels and carried off 16,000 cows, sheep, and goats. I saw the place where the spoil was divided, which is situated at the mouth of the Hun Pass leading from the Khetran country to Tull Chotiali. This raid of the Murrees on the Musa Khel, like the one on the Khetrans, resulted in still more firmly closing all the trade routes into the Punjab; hence I represented it. Before the Murrees can get to the Musa Khel they must cross our own Lugharee chief's country of Barkhan and pass along the Tull Chotiali route for some distance. Jamal Khan, like the Khetran chief, is now perfectly helpless to prevent their invading his country when they like, and he has, to enable him to at all cultivate his valuable lands, to pay the Murree chief black-mail.

9. In paragraph 10 of the Commissioner in Sind's letter he relates what led to my giving service to the Murrees, and says it was given to prevent their raiding on the Punjab border, "a thing they had never done on any large scale." I feel sure you will agree with me that the Commissioner in Sind is misinformed regarding this. I could name several raids made by them in force. One you yourself can remember, when the Drishak chief, Bijar Khan, his eldest son, and a number of his tribe were killed. The main body of the raiders were Murrees, although led by Boogtee spies. There were also 500 Murrees concerned in the great raids on Harrand, when the villages along that exposed tract were set on fire and much damage done to property. Nearly 50 Murrees were killed on that occasion, and 23, and a nephew of the Loharani Murrees chief, were made prisoners.

Gives the character of the late Murree raids into the Punjab.

The Commissioner in Sind is mistaken in supposing that the Shambanis had anything to do with this raid. Gholam Hossein, who led it, and was then killed, was not a Shambani but a Mussuri Boogtee. I could also point to raids by the Bijarani Murrees when a party of them actually got within a very few miles of Rajanpoor, placing in imminent danger the life of the present chief of the Drishaks. A detachment of the 5th Punjab Cavalry and the Mazari clan moved out against them, and the Mazaris did succeed in killing a few of the Murrees on their way back to the hills. I will not increase the length of this explanation by showing that the position of the Murrees and Boogtees with regard to Sind is vastly different in every point of view from what it is with regard to the Punjab. Suffice it to say that I can demonstrate by facts, which a glance at the map even ought to some extent to substantiate, that in no one way can that position be compared, with anything like justice, with the one they hold on the Punjab frontier, and this I am sure no one would sooner admit than Sir William Merewether himself, had he the knowledge of the difficulties there are to encounter on this frontier which you possess. One very evident reason is, that after the conquest of Sind British officers created the Sind system of border defence according to their own ideas of what it should be. On the Punjab border we accepted Runjeet Sing's system of defence, as far as there was one, and have maintained it. No post was advanced to cover British territory, but some were withdrawn; hence it is that even to the present day many of our subjects are unprotected either by our posts or by their fellow clansmen. During the Sikh rule they had the help of the latter, but our system does not permit this, and the result is that now many of our subjects are worse off than they were in the days of Runjeet Sing; more especially is this the case with the Gurchanee clan, who were formerly subjects of the Khelat State.

States that the Shambani Boogtees did not take part in the raid led by Gholam Hossein, who was a Mussuri Boogtee.

10. In the 18th paragraph of the Commissioner in Sind's letter he proposes (1) a blockade from the Punjab and Sind; (2) in the event of its not succeeding, that troops be sent to punish Ghuzzun and his tribe.

Proposed blockade.

That some measures of a repressive nature are necessary to restrain Ghuzzun Khan I am fully convinced. I was for long in hopes that this could be taken by his Highness the Khan of Khelat, whose subject he is. All my writings, if examined, will bear ample testimony to the fact that any recommendations made by me in connexion with the management of Khelat affairs, the object which I had in view, and the end at which I aimed, was to see the Khan's Government in a strong enough position to enable it to control all its subjects, and amongst them the Murree clan, and be responsible for the peace of the border, according to treaty. This apparently the Commissioner in Sind does not deem possible, judging from his letter, as he does not name or propose such a measure.

Object of Deputy Commissioner's previous communications was the establishment of the Khelat Government on a proper footing in order to control the Murrees.

I do not recommend a blockade, because it would hardly affect the Murrees at all, and whatever result it did have would fall indiscriminately on all, but no party would suffer from its evils half so much as our subjects, who from their position would be almost entirely at the mercy of the hillmen, for although we might to a limited extent cover the border like the Sind one with troops, the position is nevertheless from local circumstances very different.

Blockade not recommended, and reasons for the same.

As you are aware, only lately I had Ghuzzun Khan, the Murree Tomandar, in my camp for nearly a week; I had to send for him regarding several important matters. As reported in this office, No. 261, dated 19th ultimo, I had to call him in about three highway robberies which had been committed just at the close of the year by the Lusharis, who had, as in former days, after committing these sought and obtained a refuge with the Murrees. I also had to discuss with Ghuzzun Khan his invasion of the Khetrans described above. At first I had much difficulty with Ghuzzun Khan. He was very stubborn as to his right to invade any country not under British rule, such as Kutchee and the Khetran country.

In reply I pointed out to him how displeased the Sind authorities were with him in regard to Murree depredations in Khelat, and I showed him that his action in Khetran affairs would, I felt sure, be viewed by the Punjab Government with grave displeasure also. I pointed the unfriendliness of the act, and all the minor Murree chiefs joined me, and we together forced Ghuzzun Khan to yield, and he promised no longer to attack the Khetrans without at all events first giving me notice.

Personal conference with Ghuzzun Khan relative to his late raids.

13. But for all this I did not at the time, and do not now, conceal from myself the fact that Murree affairs in regard to this border have assumed during the past year a very different aspect to what they have of late years done. There are several causes for this which I do not consider it necessary to enter upon; they will readily occur to you; but one is the defeat of the Khan's troops and the capture of his guns by the Murrees. This has caused not only a great change in Ghuzzun Khan's conduct, but also in his policy. He is much more difficult to deal with than heretofore, and several of his chiefs gave the late victory as the reason for the change, and told me that now his immediate followers termed him by the title of the "Nawab of the Hills." I was enabled in the present instance to arrange matters with Ghuzzun because the service I gave the tribe included all the chiefs, and not merely Ghuzzun Khan himself. It has been my invariable custom, when an important question like the Khetran one had to be decided, to assemble all the chiefs in our pay, and not leave the settlement to Ghuzzun Khan alone. The chiefs, as a whole, have, as on the occasion named, invariably stood by me and forced Ghuzzun to do what was right. I remember explaining to Sir William Merewether, during my visit to Jacobabad last year, that this was the mode I had adopted in giving service to the Murree clan. I mentioned that my reason for so acting was on account of Ghuzzun Khan's well-known character.

'Change in Ghuzzun Khan's conduct,' and reasons for the same.

14. To blockade the tribe, therefore, would be, as explained above, not only to bring, on account of the exposed position of our own subjects, very great hardship and severe distress on them, but it would also force me to break with all the friendly chiefs of the Murree clan, several of whom, I believe, I can depend on.

Hardships likely to result to our own subjects rom a blockade.

15. The only alternative measure, then, as we cannot get aid from the Khelat Government, is to employ force, but I believe, from what I know of the Murree country, doing so need neither create a rupture of our relation with the Murrees as a whole, or a "little war." I believe a demonstration of the regular troops in force would have the desired effect of bringing Ghuzzun Khan to his senses, while it would enable us to maintain our friendly relations with his clan.

Captain Sandeman's proposed measures would not cause war with the Murrees.

16. As my opinion is asked on this very important question, in which not only the peace of this frontier is concerned, but I firmly believe its future progress and prosperity also, I would respectfully and with diffidence recommend that similar orders, only allowing for change of circumstances, to those contained in W. S. Seton-Karr's letter No. 879, dated Simla, the 28th June 1869, to T. H. Thornton, Esquire, should be issued. I believe that were an expedition like the one sanctioned in that letter properly conducted, and the tribes made fully to understand that we had the power, and intended in the public interest to use it, to decide that Ghuzzun Khan must behave, and, if necessary, give hostages for his future good conduct, either to our Government or to his

Captain Sandeman recommends an expedition to be sent against the Murrees of a nature similar to the one sanctioned by Government of India in June 1869.

sovereign the Khan, it would have a far better effect than any openly hostile expedition we could send against the entire clan. The one would assuredly end in bloodshed, with the certain result of our destroying both friends and enemies indiscriminately, for we would treat both alike; the other would, I am persuaded, have the contrary result. It would strike terror into the hearts of our enemies, but at the same time it would reassure our friends and demonstrate how truly we realised the position of affairs by not treating friend and foe alike. I believe a blockade of this frontier must end in a hostile expedition before we would obtain our desired end, and I am not sure that to order it would not be the very thing Ghuzzun Khan at present desires and has lately aimed at, for it would bring about an entire rupture with the clan and at one blow destroy the result of years. Furthermore, if a blockade is ordered, it will be absolutely necessary to reinforce by troops the border from Chotee Bala to Rajhan. The season is now far advanced, and is very unhealthy for troops on the Harrand frontier for several months towards the end of the hot weather.

17. An expedition of the nature recommended by me would be viewed with the utmost satisfaction by the Belooch and Pathan tribes, who are without a single exception inimical to the Murrees, and have one and all suffered severely from their depredations. I believe that directly the object of the expedition was made known that every chief of note would, if invited, join it, and that Ghuzzun himself, through force of circumstances alone, would gladly submit to any terms offered him. A blockade, on the other hand, would harass every one, especially our own subjects, and do infinite harm along this border, while my local knowledge of the true position of Murree affairs tells me it would not in itself have a successful issue, but would again rouse the fierce and bitter blood feuds between the Murree clan and our own subjects, which have to a great extent, on account of the friendships and intermarriages which have of late years taken place between them, been healed and are now to some degree almost forgotten.

Believes such an expedition would be joined by all the chiefs and other tribes.

The enclosures of your letter are herewith returned.

Enclosure 3 in No. 180.

No. 333, dated 8th April 1874.

From Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazee Khan, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

WITH reference to this office No. 329, dated 6th instant, and in continuation of it, on the subject of the proposed blockade of the Murree tribe, I have thought it desirable to represent to you separately from my reply to the recommendations of the Commissioner in Sind, that there are several other reasons besides those given by me in the above-named letter why a blockade of this frontier would at the present time have a very disturbing effect.

2. I find on the Chotee and Gurchanee borders that on account of the recent inquiries directed regarding the continuance or not of the system of batai, there is very serious tribal disorganisation, and I doubt if we could enforce the responsibility hitherto required of the chiefs of these two tribes with the same prospect of success hitherto obtained, because some of the villages about Chotee and Harrand and their neighbourhood have regularly risen in opposition to their chiefs, and I consider the defalcations of the Chungwani and Barmani sections of the Lugharee tribe is with a view to such operations.

3. It is only just to Jamal Khan and Gholam Haidar, the Tomandars of these tribes, to say that I don't consider, and I have inquired into the matter with the co-operation of the Settlement Officer on the spot, that they are in any way responsible for the existing state of affairs between them and these discontented sections of their tribes. The feeling has got abroad amongst their people that petitioning against the chiefs will ultimately free them from his control, and the minor chiefs of at least one or two sections having been lately employed entirely separately from the chief in canal and other matters, have had engendered in them a desire for perfect independence. This feeling is spreading, and I believe to a dangerous extent, supposing it is the desire of Government to maintain, as hitherto, the responsibility of the chiefs on the frontier.

4. Since the visit of the Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor to this district I have noticed a great change in the temperament of the clans towards their chiefs, simply, I believe, because his Honour's orders have been misunderstood, and the clans not made clearly to understand what these orders really are and what they aim at.

Enclosure 4 in No. 180.

No. 489–1422, dated 15th April 1874.

From Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazee Khan.

Referring to paragraph 4 of his No. 333 of the 8th instant, in which it is stated that his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor's orders, as contained in paragraph 29 of Government Proceedings No. 18 of 2nd January last, "have been misunderstood, and the clans not made clearly to understand what these orders really are, and what they aim at," the undersigned conceives that it was the duty both of the Deputy Commissioner and Settlement Officer, when in communication with the Lugharee and Gurchanee chiefs and their tribesmen on the subject of the continuation of the partial system previously in force in some of the Tummun villages of levying by batai, to satisfy themselves that no misunderstanding should prevail on the subject.

2. The orders of the head of the Government are very explicit, and no misunderstanding in regard to them should be allowed to exist. Whilst admitting the claims of the chiefs to liberal and generous treatment, his Honour deemed it of equal, if not greater, importance, that this liberal treatment should not be provided at the expense of the cultivating proprietors, and to prevent this in future principles were laid down for guidance. Possibly the change of temperament towards the Tomundars which is stated in the letter under acknowledgment to have been observed since his Honour's visit to the district by some of the clans, may be caused by the fact of their discovering that their rights as cultivating proprietors cannot be ignored by the State, and that they are exempted by this authoritative recognition from anything like servile submission to the chiefs henceforward in regard to the assertion of these rights.

No. 181.

No. 722, dated Kurrachee, 19th May 1874.

From Commissioner in Sind to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In accordance with the instructions contained in your letter No. 863 P., dated 13th ultimo, Captain Sandeman was called upon through the Political Superintendent on the Frontier to submit report on the two points set forth in that letter, and I have now the honour to forward Captain Sandeman's reply.

2. I do not consider Captain Sandeman's letter as at all satisfactory or conveying the information required by his Excellency the Viceroy, and I should have directed a further reference to be made to him for more direct and clear answers to the questions put, but that it would cause great delay, and as Captain Sandeman does not appear to have anything more to adduce than is already on record, a few remarks from me will perhaps suffice to explain what needs clearing up.

3. Captain Sandeman quotes from a letter written by him on the 13th August 1872, from which I conclude it is intended to be conveyed that the Murrees of Kahun, where Guzzun the principal Sirdar resides, had little to do with the plunder of the kafilahs passing through the Bolan in January and April 1872. Now it was distinctly shown at the time, and should be as well known to Captain Sandeman as it is to every one on the frontier, that a body of Murrees first joined the rebellious Sirdars in January 1872 and engaged in the plunder of the kafilahs attacked by the Sirdars, and a portion of the Kahun Murrees also joined Shere Dil Muzzaranee Murree in his onslaught on the kafilahs in April of the same year. The correspondence forwarded under my endorsement No. 713 of 23rd July 1872, as well as much other, will show the relations between the Muzzaranees, Murrees, and those under the Chief Guzzun at Kahun. But there is one point which bears most materially on the question, which I would mention here, and that is, no matter what had happened before between the various sections of the Murrees, it is well known not only that a lot of property was taken to Kahun, but that Guzzun himself received his share of it as chief of the clan, and this will doubtless be part of the riches referred to by Captain Sandeman in his report No. 18 of 6th January last, as being the cause of the chief becoming unreliable.

4. In spite of what had occurred, and of my having said at Jacobabad in March previously, that in consequence of the misconduct of the Murrees in joining in plundering in the Bolan I could have nothing to say to them, nor would carry out the

arrangements come to at Mittunkote until all property plundered from the merchants was given up, Captain Sandeman in June 1872 telegraphed, proposing to send a kafilah to Candahar through the Murree country, because the Kafilabashi feared Bolan. I replied—"After the way the Murrees have behaved lately in plundering kafilahs in "the Bolan, I neither can nor will have anything to say to them until the plundered "property is given up. I consider it, therefore, very inadvisable that the Murrees "should be treated with as if nothing had happened, or that kafilahs should be allowed "to enter their country from ours. The Moolla is quite safe and open to the kafilahs, "and so would the Bolan be but for the misconduct of these Murrees." Captain Sandeman replied—"I have issued instructions to send kafilahs to Jacobabad. I will "attend willingly to any instructions you send. My demi-official of 4th explains the "necessity for moving troops to Hurrund if I break off relations with Murrees. By "unity of action I believe it is quite possible to coerce Murrees into surrendering "plundered kafilah property." On the 12th June Captain Sandeman proposed having a friendly interview with Murree Tomandars about his own border affairs, but after above referred for orders. The following telegram was sent to him :—

"I consider it most desirable that Murree Chief should be made to understand that "late conduct of tribe in regard to kafilahs in Bolan cannot be put up with, and pressure "should be brought to bear on them to give up plundered property. I certainly will "not enter into any arrangements with Murree chiefs until the property is given up, "and you are authorised so to inform the head. Under these circumstances it would, "I think, be better that you should put off your interview with Chief if your work can "wait, giving above also as reason." Captain Sandeman replied on 13th—"I will at "once attend to your instructions. If you determine that tribe must restore property, "I suggest that coercive measures be taken from Punjab, Sind, and Khelat. The "Murree country is quite open and accessible from Hurrund. I know every road "leading to it, and believe strict military blockade would result in the surrender of "plunder. Shall I submit my view for approval? I will cordially co-operate in "any measure you decide on taking, but these ought not to be delayed if you are to "recover the property, which under any circumstances must be matter of difficulty. "Murree chiefs are now assembled at Kahun in council "*probably** to consider how to dispose of plunder."

* Italicised by me.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

5. On the 20th June Captain Sandeman asked if I would approve his meeting Tomandar to negotiate surrender of property, offering to go to Kahun for that purpose. I replied that arrangements were under consideration, and I did not think it either necessary or right he should go to Kahun.

6. On 1st July Captain Sandeman telegraphed—"Murree Vakeel has arrived with "letter from Murree Tomandar. He asserts that Shere Dil's encampment at Murrol "was without any provocation attacked by the Khan's people, his son and 11 "Murrees killed. Five thousand sheep and 200 donkeys, besides all household property, "carried off. Shere Dil retaliated by attacking kafilahs, &c. Particulars by post." I replied on the 3rd—"I know all circumstances of attack on Shere Dil's camp by "Summalanee Minguls, Khan's subjects, but that is no justification for outrages on "kafilahs. Khan has been moved and is working to restore cattle, &c., taken from "Shere Dil's people. Shere Dil and all Murrees concerned in late raid on kafilahs "should at once collect and have ready to give over all the property taken from "kafilahs. If they will do this, I shall be ready to receive Murrees with favour, and "will then arrange according to Mittunkote correspondence, but not before, also will "use influence with Khan to do exact justice in Summalanee outrage case. You "may inform Murree Vakeel so." His answer on 4th July was—"It will be my "anxious desire to carry out your instructions to the best of my ability. Government "has instructed me to summon Murree chiefs. I trust you will not object." I replied—"I have of course no objection to offer to your carrying out the orders of "your Government to summon Murree chiefs. The Political Superintendent will "communicate with you from Jacobabad my views regarding them and plunder of "kafilahs." On the same date Captain Sandeman telegraphed—"I have explained to "Vakeel your telegram of yesterday. He says that after plunder of kafilah the "Minguls followed raiders and overtook them; Minguls and Murrees dividing the "property, Minguls getting largest share. Kindly say if this is true." I replied same day—"Minguls were nowhere near when kafilah was plundered by Murrees. At last "attack near Seeree Bolan, Alladina Khoord was said to be a spectator and to have "shared in plunder, for which he will have to answer."

7. On the 6th August Political Superintendent telegraphed—"Sandeman telegraphs "as under :—Please inform Commissioner that Tomandar Guzzun is with me. Guzzun

" will make any arrangements and pay any compensation Commissioner considers pro-
" per after hearing explanation. Can I continue my friendly arrangements with tribe ?
" I believe chiefs in earnest. I have recovered cattle
" plundered at Chota Bala.* Please reply sharp." I answered—" Inform Sandeman I never intended friendly relations to be taken off
" unless conduct of Murree tribe with reference to plundered property proved unsatis-
" factory. I am quite ready to receive and consider any representation Guzzun has
" to make, and Sandeman should receive and immediately forward it through you.
" At same time he should tell Guzzun that to show he is in earnest he should at once
" deliver up all plundered property recoverable, and the manner of compensation for
" the remainder will then be decided on."

* Near Punjab Frontier.
(Sd.) W. L. M.

8. On the 9th came a further telegram from Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier:—" Sandeman telegraphs—Guzzun pleads that because of division of
" property he is unable to do more than surrender plunder in Kahun. He will send
" you fifteen camels at once, all there is. For the rest, as approved by Commissioner,
" he agrees to give money compensation, if held to be responsible." My reply was—
" Inform Sandeman his report is very satisfactory and creditable to his management."
On the 12th September the Political Superintendent reported the arrival of fifteen camels sent in by Guzzun, of which two shortly after died; but nothing more came of the arrangement reported by Captain Sandeman on the 9th August.

9. Captain Sandeman's report, No. 707 of the 13th August, was received and forwarded by me to the Bombay Government with my letter No. 950 of 5th October, and both submitted to the Government of India under endorsement No. 951 of 7th idem. In the 4th paragraph of his letter now transmitted, Captain Sandeman mentions my recorded intention of visiting Jacobabad in the coming cold season, and alludes to what the Murree chiefs had agreed to, but he does not explain why they did not carry out their promises, which is really the important point. No further attempts were made by the Murrees towards restitution beyond the delivery up of the camels, which were a small item in the amount plundered; I considered it therefore absolutely necessary that if the Murrees were to be received at all, they must come to me straight through his Highness the Khan of Khelat and the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, not through the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazee Khan, and ordered accordingly. This Captain Sandeman would seem to adduce as a reason why his arrangements for restitution had not been carried out. I do not see how this affected it, but at the time I know I was quite convinced that if ever we wished to have any effectual and lasting control over these Murrees, it must be by bringing them to understand clearly that they were regarded solely as subjects of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and that they must obey his orders, and look only to the Political Superintendent on the frontier of Sind for instructions as regarded matters affecting the interests of British territory. The telegram of the 16th April 1873 was long after I had visited the Khan of Khelat, and the Murree Sirdars had failed to attend as directed. The orders that had been issued to them in January 1873 were plain and explicit and admitted of no misunderstanding, and their action was a deliberate evasion, for which they are, and must be, made responsible. Guzzun had ample time to carry out the arrangement for the restitution of the plundered property, or its equivalent, before those orders were issued, but did not do so. It is not clear therefore why the chief's subsequent disobedience of orders should be regarded as a reason for his not adhering to his compact, unless it is intended to show that the normal condition of the tribe is disobedience, and that must be taken as justification for all they do wrong.

10. Captain Sandeman in the 8th paragraph of his letter does not answer directly the question as to the amount of plunder still in the hands of the Murrees, but refers generally to their lawless acts for any time past, and says—" But as the Murree clan
" for years have made depredations on kafilahs, and as it is notorious that they have
" respected no trade route whatever when in the pursuit of plunder, I think I may fairly say that many lakhs of rupees would be required to cover the loss that trade
" in general has sustained by their depredations on all the trade routes leading from
" Afghanistan and Central Asia in this direction into the Punjab and Sind, and for
" the protection of which by treaty his Highness the Khan was in a degree respon-
" sible." In the first place, this is not the question at issue. What was required of Captain Sandeman was to state the amount of the property in the hands of the Murrees that was plundered in the Bolan from kafilahs in January and April 1872, and this was plain enough. Next I am not aware of such extensive plundering of merchants on trade routes by the Murrees as to amount to lakhs of rupees. As far

as they are concerned and the Bolan route, I can speak positively from personal knowledge that the only occasions on which they plundered kafilahs since the beginning of 1868 were once in April of that year, near Hajee-ka-sher in Kutchee they attacked a kafilah, and the Khan of Khelat compensated the merchants to the extent of some Rupees 8,000, which was all that was claimed, and the only other occasions were in January and April 1872, as before stated. But from this statement of Captain Sandeman's arises the very grave question of how it was he has continued to support the payments to, and subsidizing of, a tribe who have thus been deliberately compromising their ruler, our ally, with whom we have treaty engagements, and by their lawless acts causing direct breaches of that treaty.

11. In his last paragraph I consider Captain Sandeman begs the question as to whether the contumacious portion of the tribe are in receipt of any payment from the British authorities, and states he does not consider the Murrees contumacious as far as he is concerned, because they have acted up to their agreements with him; yet in the previous paragraph he had stated that the Murrees have for long past harried every trade route from Afghanistan and Central Asia into Sind and the Punjab, for the safety of which our ally, the Khan of Khelat, was in a great degree responsible. It has been repeatedly shown to him on various occasions that the conduct of the Murrees and their raiding in the Khan's district of Kutchee, while they were in receipt of British pay from the Punjab side, was most unjustifiable, so he should have had no difficulty in understanding who were meant as the "contumacious." Recent correspondence should also have led him to see clearly what was intended. But to learn exactly who he actually had in his pay I telegraphed to the Political Superintendent to call on Captain Sandeman for exact number of Murrees in Government pay on Punjab border, names of Jemadars and of their sections, and number of men entertained from each section. The reply is, Captain Sandeman reports, "total number "of Murrees employed—two Jemadars, Mehuroolla and Sher Mahomed; one Duffadar, "Jallee Khan; one Vakeel, Shahan; and fifty-three "sowars. All three sections* supply sowars when re-"quired. General arrangements left to Guzzun Khan; but if he does not behave, "I act according to necessity. The arrangement is purely a political one."

* 1. Guzzun section. 2. Bijaranees. 3. Loharanees.

12. The jemadars, sowars, &c., are entertained from all three sections, but as a rule I believe the amount of the whole pay is handed over either to the principal chief, Guzzun, or portions to the heads of the other two sections. It is therefore a subsidy given to the whole, not payment to individual sowars, and the entire clan have been more or less concerned in the plunderings that have taken place. Guzzun has further deliberately disobeyed the orders of the Khan and of the Political Superintendent on the Frontier, and ought not to be received with favour, or at all by a subordinate authority. Captain Sandeman lately pointed out he, Guzzun, was getting so elated with the plunder he had gained of late that he had ceased to be trustworthy, and thought danger might approach the Punjab border in consequence; very natural it should, when such misconduct as that of the Murrees is not noticed from that side. But even more is at stake, our name for justice suffers, when it is observed that we continue to treat with favour in one place men who commit bloodthirsty outrages in another, and are constantly rendering the homes of poor people desolate close to our very doors. I would therefore again urge that vigorous and prompt measures should be adopted against the Murrees to bring them to order once for all, and to teach them that there is a power that can and will enforce good behaviour, peace, and order.

Enclosure in No. 181.

No. 598, dated Dera Ghazee Khan, 2nd May 1874.

From Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazee Khan, to Political Superintendent, Jacobabad.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your No. 1161, dated 27th ultimo, and its enclosures as per margin,* directing me to report, for the information of his Excellency the Governor-General in Council, on several points connected with the late conduct of the Murree clan. I will do so *seriatim*.

* Secretary to Government of India, No. 863P., dated 13th April 1874; No. 501, dated 22nd April 1874, from Commissioner in Sind to Political Superintendent, Jacobabad.

Reports on several points connected with the late conduct of the Murree clan.

2. The first point his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council requires information regarding is what led to my reported failure to procure entire restitution of the plunder carried off by the Murree clan during the disturbances of 1872.

Information required regarding failure to procure entire restitution of property plundered by Murrees.

3. In reply to his question I have the honour to refer you to this office No. 707, dated Dera Ghazee Khan, the 13th August 1872, to the address of the Commissioner in Sind. That letter gives a very full account of my meeting with the Murree Chief, and what was arranged between us; therefore before a fair understanding of the question at issue can be arrived at, a great deal of what I then wrote ought to be repeated here. I, in that letter, endeavoured to show what property I then understood the Murree Chiefs had in their possession, and for the surrender of which I believed them to be responsible. For easy reference I will here quote the entire 4th paragraph of that letter, as it gives the pith of my inquiry and demonstrates in as far as I could the connexion the Murree tribe had with the plundering of the kafilahs then being inquired into in the Bolan Pass and elsewhere. It runs as follows :—

Explanation of the reasons for the failure.

" From the above extract from the statement of the Murree Tomandar, as well from conversations which I have held with him, I am able to assert that his wishes and those of his Chief are—

" (1.) That if it suits the purpose of his Highness the Khan of Khelat to employ the Muzzaranee section of the Murree clan in the protection of kafilahs passing through the Bolan Pass, they cannot accept any responsibility in the matter.

" (2.) That the Bijaranee section of the Murrees has no longer any feud with the Muzzaranees, or jealous feeling regarding their employment in the pass.

" (3.) That the protection of the pass should rest with, and be undertaken without reference to, the Murree clan by the Khan of Khelat in whose country it is.

" (4.) That if his Highness employs the Muzzaranees, they should be for the future considered as the Khan's servants and not as a part of the Murree tribe.

" (5.) That with the aid of Government they can prevent the Bijaranee Murrees from plundering kafilahs, and would under certain circumstances (to be named hereafter) undertake the responsibility of this.

" (6.) That on account of circumstances arising out of the late war, and because they considered they had a right to share in the kafilah fees, the Minguls (subjects of his Highness the Khan) attacked the Muzzaranee Murrees, who were at the time loyally performing the Khan's service.

" (7.) That on account of similar circumstances the Khan was unable to right the Muzzaranees, which led to their attacking the kafilahs.

" (8.) That from circumstances over which they had no control a few of the Khan Murrees did join in the plunder of the kafilahs; therefore they are prepared to be held responsible in as far as is considered fair, but they desire it to be understood as an undoubted fact that the Muzzaranees were employed for the protection of kafilahs entirely by the Khan and on his responsibility, and at the time they were attacked by the Minguls (the Khan's subjects) they were not at feud with the Murree tribe; they did not pay them any portion of the kafilah fee, and were acting independently of the Murree tribe under the protection of the Khan himself and Bungulzai Brahooees.

" (9.) That they will do their best to meet the wishes of Government in whatever way it is considered to be advantageous."

4. In submitting the letter above referred to which contained my proposal about the surrender of the property, and of which the foregoing is an extract, the Commissioner in Sind, in his transmitting letter No. 950, dated 5th October 1872, to Government of Bombay, decided to proceed himself to Jacobabad in the ensuing cold weather, and there in consultation with the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazee Khan, and the Khelat authorities, to make arrangements for the future. I had myself, previously to the Commissioner's decision to go himself to Jacobabad, informed him by telegram that I believed the Murree Chiefs, in consequence of what I had explained to them, would pay up all the plundered kafilah property they could collect at the time, and that an equivalent for the remainder could be arranged for in cash.

Commissioner's intention of visiting Jacobabad to settle matters.

Deputy Commissioner explained in 1872 that he could arrange with Murree Chief satisfactorily for the recovery of the property, or its equivalent.

5. In pursuance of the above resolution of the Commissioner in Sind, I was sum-

moned in the ensuing cold weather to Jacobabad to meet Sir William Merewether. The Murree Chiefs, as you are aware, I had been directed not to summon. They were told to join the Khan of Khelat in Kutchee, and this I understood from you, when at Jacobabad, they had declined to do, which for the time being brought all negotiations to a close.

The Murree Chiefs directed to attend at Jacobabad, and their disregarding these instructions.

6. But for easy reference I will again quote here your two telegrams on this subject conveying to me your orders and the Commissioner's wishes :—

"Dated 21st January 1873.

"From Political Superintendent of Jacobabad to Deputy Commissioner.

"Murree Chiefs will be summoned from Jacobabad through Harrison to meet Commissioner on 3rd February. Karam Khan and Shere Dil will be included. All will come here direct."

Deputy Commissioner again in 1873 proposed to arrange matters with Murree Chiefs, and requested Commissioner's instructions.

I again on the 16th of April 1873, by telegram from Dera Ghazee Khan, referred the point to you in the following words :—

"Murree Chiefs are here. Their late conduct seems more the result of misunderstanding our intentions regarding them than from any other cause. Can I do or say anything to bring about a proper understanding? I have told them I am entirely subordinate to Commissioner, and can do nothing without his permission."

To this you answered :—

"There should have been no misunderstanding on the part of the Murree Chiefs. They had clear orders to attend at Jacobabad through his Highness the Khan and deliberately disobeyed those. If they wish for consideration, they should at once of themselves and by themselves present themselves to me at Jacobabad. No intervention is required. These people must be made to understand that they are to do what they are told and obey orders properly. The Commissioner has no objection to my receiving the Murree Chief, but Guzzun Khan and his brothers must come alone. Neither Imam Buksh Mazaree, nor anyone else from Gazee Khan's side, should accompany them."

Commissioner's reply.

7. I have recorded the above telegrams with the object of making it clear that the failure of my endeavours to procure restitution of the entire amount of plunder carried off by the Murree clan, in accordance with their original agreement with me contained in the letter already referred to above, may be fairly attributed to the fact that Guzzun Khan, the Murree Tomandar, did not obey the orders of the Commissioner in Sind conveyed to him by you as described in the foregoing telegrams.

Failure of obtaining restitution due to disobedience of Commissioner's orders by Murree Chief.

8. The next point I have to reply to is the amount of plunder I consider still in the hands of the Murrees. This question perhaps I ought not to attempt to answer, as the kafilahs of the greatest value were plundered in the Bolan Pass and Kutchee in Khelat itself, and you are in a better position than I am to do so. But as the Murree clan for years have made depredations on kafilahs, and as it is notorious that they have respected no trade route whatever when in the pursuit of plunder, I think I may fairly say that many lakhs of rupees would be required to cover the loss that trade in general has sustained by their depredations on all the trade routes leading from Afghanistan and Central Asia in this direction into the Punjab and Sind, and for the protection of which by treaty his Highness the Khan was in a great degree responsible.

Value of property not restored.

9. In regard to the question as to whether the contumacious portion of the Murrees are in receipt of any payment from the British authorities, with every respect I would beg to say in reply that I am somewhat at a loss to interpret the word "contumacious" as now applied. From the first, a fact I can if necessary prove, my agreement and arrangements with the Murree clan, as reported at the time, and most fully approved by your predecessors, and subsequently sanctioned by the Government of India and Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, were entirely separate from and were never intended when entered upon to have anything to do with Khelat affairs or matters in which his Highness was concerned; on the contrary, it was especially required that they were to be distinct and concerned the Punjab alone. In as far, therefore, as the tribes arrangements with me are concerned, I can honestly say no contumacious portion of the clan is in my pay.

Reply to the inquiry as to whether contumacious portions of the Murrees are in receipt of pay from British authorities.

No: 182.

No. 930, dated Kurrachee, 25th July 1874.

From Commissioner in Sind to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

REFERRING to my letter No. 462, of the 10th April last, I have the honour to recommend that I may be authorised to give compensation to the members of the kafilas plundered in their passage through Lus Beyla, in accordance with the list submitted with the above quoted letter, and the amount be charged against the subsidy now withheld from the Khan of Khelat.

2. Under the present state of affairs in Beloochistan it is useless expecting his Highness the Khan to make or enforce restitution, and as all the other kafilas have been reimbursed for their losses, I think it would be fair and politic to extend the same consideration to these.

3. I regret to say I know of nothing to show that his Highness the Khan has more power in his country than has previously been described. The recent flight from Hydrabad of Ali Khan, son of Sirdar Meer Khan, formerly Jam of Lus Beyla, is of no very great political importance as regards the general state of Beloochistan, as the Sirdars of Sarawan and Jalawan still appear to work only for their own, not for united interests. But the presence of this young Sirdar in Beyla will make it more difficult for the Khan to reassert his power in that portion of his dominion.

4. The young Sirdar, Ali Khan, with his wife and two sons, also Ibrahim Khan Mingul with two followers, escaped from Hydrabad on Saturday the 4th instant, and reached Beyla the following day. Further report will be submitted on receipt of result of investigation now going on.

5. There were two wives of Sirdar Meer Khan residing at Hydrabad, one the sister of Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, the other, sister of Sirdar Khan, chief of the Noomrias, residing at Kokee in Sind. The former of these ladies died at Hydrabad on the 17th instant from exhaustion consequent on severe attack of fever. Her remains were brought down to Kurrachee, and I permitted them to be taken at once to Lus Beyla, a party of police seeing them safely to, and across, the border. The latter is still at Hydrabad. I have given orders that the many followers of the ex-Jam who have been hanging about at Hydrabad for so long should be told they are at liberty to go where they like.

6. Information of the flight of Sirdar Ali Khan was immediately communicated to the Government of Bombay, with suggestion that his father, Sirdar Meer Khan, should be more than ever carefully watched, as it was probable he might attempt to escape also; and I had information that endeavours would be made to assist his flight, two men having left Kurrachee for that purpose. Meer Khan's presence in Jalawan just now would greatly complicate matters, as he is ambitious and most intriguing. It is desirable, therefore, he should be kept where he is in the Deccan.

No. 183.

No. 1857 P., dated Fort William, 27th August 1874.

From Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Commissioner in Sind.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 930, dated the 25th ultimo, recommending that compensation should be paid to the owners of the kafilas plundered in Lus Beyla in 1873, and that the amount should be charged against the subsidy, the payment of which is now withheld from the Khan of Khelat.

2. In reply, I am directed by the Hon. the President in Council to state that as these caravans were plundered before the withdrawal of the subsidy, the Government of India consents to their case being treated as special and exceptional, and to the compensation being paid and adjusted in the manner recommended by you. It must, however, be clearly understood that the subsidy formerly paid by the Government of India in order to secure protection to trade through the territories of the Khan of Khelat, and now withheld because the conditions on which it was granted are not fulfilled, is not to be considered a fund from which compensation is to be drawn for merchants (more especially for merchants who are not British subjects) plundered in those territories. You should therefore make it generally known that the British Government does not accept any

liability for losses from outrages which may hereafter occur within the dominions of his Highness, and that caravans must in future proceed at their own risk.

3. Regarding the escape of the son of the ex-Jam of Lus Beyla and others from Hydrabad, his Honour the President of the Council awaits the further report promised in paragraph 4 of your letter under reply.

No. 184.

No. 2214 P., dated Fort William, 9th October 1874.

From Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Commissioner in Sind.

I AM now directed by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council to address you on the subject of Khelat affairs with more special advertence to your letters noted in the margin.

No. 136, dated 8th February 1874.
„ 336, „ 10th March „
„ 722, „ 19th May „

2. In your letter of 10th March you reported the occurrence on 11th February of a raid on British territory, committed by a party of 200 armed men of the Sassoolee Brahooee tribe, who carried off some of their fugitive slaves who had taken refuge in the Shikarpoor district. Being of opinion that, unless the outrage were promptly and severely met, the example of the Sassoolees might be followed by other petty chiefs on the border, and a strong force would have to be stationed along the whole frontier line to the sea, and believing that the Khan of Khelat had now no restraining power over the action of his subjects, you recommended that two light columns should be despatched, one from Kurrachee *viâ* Lus Beyla and Khozdar to Khelat, the other from Jacobabad *viâ* the Bolan; that a proclamation should be issued pointing out the exact reasons which rendered the expedition necessary; and showing that the operations were intended solely to ensure the observance of the Khelat Treaty, to re-establish order and proper rule in the country, and to provide that the rights and privileges of all should be guaranteed for the future. You were further of opinion that the district of Kutch Gundava should be occupied till the expedition should be concluded, and the revenues taken by us till reparation should be gained.

3. The other letters quoted refer to the contumacious proceedings of the Murrees whom you proposed to exclude from the Punjab and Sind, informing their Chief Ghuzzun Khan that—unless he should present himself at Jacobabad within a given time, crave forgiveness, and show himself prepared to restore the property plundered by the Murrees—he and his tribe would be considered to have forfeited the favour of the British Government, all payments for service of any kind hitherto made, whether from the Punjab or elsewhere, would be stopped, all members of the tribe would be debarred from entering British territory, and any who did attempt to cross the border line would be seized and treated as enemies of the State. Should these measures fail it would then in your opinion become absolutely necessary that a well-selected force should be sent into the Murree Hills to punish the tribe and enforce conditions which they would be unable to break in future.

4. Having given long and anxious consideration to these proposals and to the circumstances in which they originated, and having communicated with his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab on the subject of the proposed blockade of the Murrees, his Excellency in Council has come to the conclusion that it is not advisable to have recourse to armed intervention with a view to the settlement of the affairs of Khelat.

5. His Excellency in Council has long ceased to expect from the Khan any efficient action towards the establishment of even a respectable administration. During the last seventeen years the British Government has done everything in its power to strengthen his hands and enable him to fulfil his treaty obligations. Extra subsidies have been given him; he has received from us presents of money; we have by friendly mediation adjusted the quarrels between him and his Sirdars; he has had moral support from the presence and advice of a British Agent; he has been received by the Viceroy with distinction; in short, everything has been done by the British Government that could have been done to raise him in the estimation of his subjects, and to enable him to discharge the duties which devolve upon him as the ruler of the Khelat State. But all has been of no avail, and his Excellency in Council has at last been compelled most reluctantly to enforce the 7th Article of the Treaty of 1854 and withhold the subsidy of Rupees 50,000.

6. His Excellency in Council, however, is not convinced that matters would be permanently improved by an invasion of Khelat in the manner proposed. The attitude assumed by the Khan appears to result more from want of power to control his subjects, than from hostility to the British Government. If we were to intervene in force to support his authority, it would be necessary to inquire into and guarantee the rights of those whose alleged grievances have driven them into what may possibly be a justifiable rebellion. On the other hand, if the Khan were removed from power, there appears to be no one in Khelat who has any prospect of ruling with greater success. Even the Sirdars are divided among themselves, and appear to have no aim in common, except raiding and plundering. There seems to be no recognised or dominant party in the State on whose influence we can reckon in re-establishing order. Under these circumstances, armed interference in the affairs of Khelat would commit Government to a military occupation of the country for a period indefinitely prolonged, and to the virtual assumption of the Government, and might possibly produce ulterior results of a serious kind.

7. It cannot be too distinctly understood that his Excellency in Council does not consider it to be the duty of the British Government by armed intervention to settle the administration of Khelat, or to adjust the quarrels between the Khan and his nobles, or to help the Khan to assert a nominal suzerainty over tribes who refuse to acknowledge his authority and over whom he has not been able to establish his power. Moral and material support have been freely accorded to the Khan. Further than this his Excellency in Council is not prepared to go.

8. The objects which the Government of India chiefly desire to secure are, first, the prevention of plundering and outrage within or near the British frontier; and, second, the safe transit of trade. The latter object can scarcely be looked for while anarchy is so universally rampant as at present in Khelat; it may, however, to some extent follow the re-establishment of peace and order on the frontier. When the raid of 11th February occurred, there was some reason to fear that it might be the commencement of a series of similar outrages, under pressure of which his Excellency in Council might possibly have been compelled to have recourse to armed force. Fortunately these anticipations have proved unfounded, and the raid of February last, which was not in itself a serious matter, and did not in its attendant circumstances indicate any general disposition on the part of the raiders to violate British territory, remains the solitary raid on record. His Excellency in Council therefore does not see in the present state of things on the frontier any necessity for an armed demonstration to deter the tribes from committing outrages within the British border.

9. The policy of endeavouring to deal with the frontier tribes entirely through the Khan, and of giving them to understand that they are regarded solely as subjects of his Highness, has failed after long and patient trial. His Excellency in Council is therefore of opinion that the time has now arrived for having recourse to the alternative measure, which has more than once been pointed out,* but which has been deferred from time to time solely out of consideration for his Highness—the alternative, namely, of making our own arrangements direct with the frontier tribes and without reference to the Khan.

* See letters Nos. 1546P., dated 11th July 1873, and 679P., dated 17th March 1874.

10. His Excellency in Council does not consider that our present relations even with the Murree tribe, which appears to be the most turbulent of all, are such as to preclude the adoption of such measures. Their quarrel is rather with the Khan than with us. It is true that their chief, Ghuzzun Khan, has not disgorged all his plunder and has evaded appearing in person at Jacobabad; but his restoration of a portion of the booty and the deputation of his nephew to Jacobabad indicate a certain deference to authority which leads his Excellency in Council to believe that matters may still be satisfactorily settled with him, if we do not make too severe a tax upon his pride, and if we dissociate our demands from the enforcement of an unpalatable allegiance to the Khan. At any rate his Excellency in Council does not consider our differences with Ghuzzun Khan to be so serious as to necessitate a blockade, which in the opinion of officers acquainted with the Punjab frontier would entail more hardship upon our own subjects than upon the Murrees, would involve a rupture with some of the minor chiefs of the Murree tribe who are by no means unfriendly to us, and would necessitate a strong reinforcement of the troops on our border.

11. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab is of opinion that before resorting to a blockade or other measures of coercion we should endeavour to bring about an amicable settlement with Ghuzzun Khan and the Murrees. It has been suggested that the country should be visited by a party of Sind and Punjab officials in the manner proposed in 1869, and that those officers should be empowered to arrange the neces-

sary measures with Ghuzzun Khan, to explain to the tribes our desire for peace on the frontier and protection to trade, to carry out the details of the arrangements sanctioned* for the entertainment of tribal levies, and generally to endeavour to effect an adjustment of inter-tribal quarrels, and arrangements for the safe transit of caravans. His Excellency in Council approves of these suggestions, and desires that you will place yourself in direct communication with the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, with a view to arranging the details of the composition of the party, the route they should take, the escort by which they should be accompanied, and the instructions to be given to them. When you have come to an understanding on these matters with the Lieutenant-Governor, I am to request that a full report may be submitted for the consideration and orders of the Governor-General in Council.

* To Bombay Government, No. 2336P., dated 27th October 1871.
To Commissioner in Sind, No. 1546P., dated 11th July 1873. (Copy to Bombay Government by No 1548P. of same date.)

No. 185.

No. 2270 P., dated Fort William, 15th October 1874.

From Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

With reference to my docket No. 2216 P., dated 9th instant, forwarding, for the information of the Government of Bombay, a copy of instruction sent to the Commissioner of Sind in regard to Khelat affairs, I am directed by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council to inquire whether, under the circumstances therein described, it is not desirable that for the present at least the appointment of Political Agent in Khelat should be abolished and the establishments in connexion therewith broken up.

2. It is now a year and a half since the Political Agent left Khelat. In the interval he appears to have remained at Jacobabad, and to have been employed mainly in collecting information regarding affairs beyond the frontier, a duty which could apparently be equally well discharged by the Political Superintendent in Upper Sind.

3. Unless there be strong reason, of which the Governor-General in Council is not aware, for maintaining the appointment on its present footing, his Excellency in Council is of opinion that, under the altered circumstances referred to in paragraph 1, it might with advantage be abolished.

No. 186.

No. 6306, dated Bombay Castle, 30th October 1874.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am directed by his Excellency the Governor in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 15th instant, No. 2270 P., inquiring whether, under present circumstances, it is not desirable that the appointment of Political Agent in Khelat should be abolished.

2. In reply, I am to state that this Government does not feel itself in a position to offer an opinion of value on the propriety of retaining in employment the Political Agent in Khelat, which must depend on the probability of restoring satisfactory relations with the Khan. His Excellency in Council hopes that if the abolition of the office be decided upon, it will be in the power of his Excellency the Viceroy in Council to make some other provision for Major Harrison, whose conduct has always won the approval of Government.

No. 187.

No. 1859, dated Lahore, 30th October 1874.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to Government of Punjab, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am desired to acknowledge receipt of the correspondence on the subject of Khelat affairs forwarded under Foreign Department endorsement No. 2215 P., dated 9th

October, and to report, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, that Captain Sandeman has, with the approval of the Commissioner in Sind, been directed to proceed to Jacobabad to draw up in concert and communication with Colonel Loch a full report on the measures they would propose for carrying out the arrangement referred to in the 11th paragraph of your letter to Sir William Merewether.

No. 188.

No. 39, dated 25th Shaban 1291=7th October 1874.

CANDAHAR NEWS-LETTER.

NUZUR ALI KHAN, son of Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, has, through the instrumentality of his Highness' son, Abdoolla Jan, received a cheque on Government Treasury for Rupees 50,000; a letter from Abdoolla Ján accompanied the cheque directing the officials to lose no time in paying the same. Sirdar Sher Ali Khan has written to his son and friends as follows: that this sum had been simply given him to purchase camels, horses, mules, and tents, and begged them to lose no time in making these purchases. Sirdar Sher Ali Khan has also directed that his tents should be sent to Cabul.

2. Dilawar Khan, son of Sirdar Sultan Mahomed Khan, Peshawaree, who is now at Candahar, has heard from his brothers at Cabul that at first his Highness the Ameer had so reduced their pay that they could scarcely exist upon it, and told them that if dissatisfied they might go where they liked; now, however, his Highness had kindly increased their pay to the old rates which they had always received. It was our right to marry into Mahomed Aslum Khan's wife's family, but we could not arrange this. Now his Highness the Ameer has directed one of us to marry into the family. The kindness of his Highness the Ameer to us, as also to Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, is attributable to Sirdar Yakoob Khan refusing to come to Cabul. Should the Sirdar go to Cabul all this kindness would be discoutinued.

3. Shikarpoor bunniahs have written to their Candahar agents that the Commissioner in Sind had issued the following proclamation, viz., "whatever merchants or "people went to and from Beloochistan and suffered loss of any kind, the loss would "rest with them and not with the British Government." The Collector of Shikarpoor sent for all the leading merchants and informed them as above, and took a signed paper from them stating that they had been duly warned. The Shikarpoor bunniahs have written to their agents saying that as the responsibility and loss has been placed on their shoulders they must write and petition his Highness the Ameer. All the merchants and bunniahs assembled at the Zunjeer Serai. Sultan Mahomed, Collector of Revenue, went at once to your correspondent, who has since died, and asked him for the written order he had received on the subject; he took a copy of the same and sent it with a representation from the merchants to Cabul for his Highness the Ameer's information.

4. A post has just arrived from Herat; it was sent on at once unopened to Cabul; no one knows what was written. Should I hear I will let you know.

No. 1140, dated Kurrachee, 5th November 1874.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

TRUE copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

2. The Commissioner in Sind would respectfully observe that the Khan of Khelat not being longer compelled to adhere strictly to his treaty engagements, and the merchants having all risk thrown on them for outrages on their kafilas in Beloochistan, in accordance with the instructions contained in Government of India letter No. 1857 P., dated 27th August 1874, the effect cannot but be most injurious to the prestige of the British Government, while the result will be most serious on the commerce of Sind and the adjacent frontier countries.

No. 189.

No. 1145 of 1874. Political Department.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Calcutta.

Commissioner's Office, Kurrachee,
5th November 1874.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 2214 P., dated the 9th ultimo, and with reference to the subjects thereof, would respectfully venture to make the following observations for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council.

2. In recommending that the outrage committed by the Sassoolee tribe should be promptly and severely met, I had in view that, unless such a gross outrage was taken proper notice of, not only every petty chief along the border but the followers of all such would not be afraid to enter British territory to plunder or avenge supposed wrongs as they pleased, while the small body of policemen which had hitherto maintained peace would no longer be equal to the task, and disorder would prevail along the whole line, leading to the necessity of having a strong line of military outposts instead of only a few men.

3. Though nothing on so extensive a scale as the Sassoolee inroad has occurred since last March, repeated acts of violence have been committed on British by Khelat subjects, and not only is no redress obtainable from the ruler of the country, but the heads of villages, and the villagers themselves in Khelat territory, have begun to adopt a most insolent tone, refuse to aid our police in the capture of thieves, and on several occasions have used threatening language to our people, police, and owners of stolen property, all proving that what was anticipated is steadily and assuredly coming on, and that serious injury to the interests of the British Government must follow on the increasing state of disorder the Khelat State has fallen into.

4. Were it not for this, I should consider the decision arrived at by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, as conveyed in the 4th paragraph of your letter, final, but under the circumstances I feel it my duty to bring the matter again before his Excellency, and to respectfully urge reconsideration.

5. While watching events and awaiting reply to my letter of the 10th of March, I drew up a memorandum on the state of affairs in Khelat, and collected all the information that could be obtained about routes, supplies, arrangements for the force, if one were sent, &c., and beg now to submit these papers for his Excellency's perusal.

6. The career of the present Khan of Khelat has been a very unfortunate one throughout. At the very outset his liberty of action, if not of person, was threatened by a serious outbreak of the chief Sirdars of the country, and endeavours on their part to get him into their power. This caused a division between him and his nobles, which has been kept alive by repeated differences, due it must in justice be said to faults on both sides. The Khan, though by no means a pattern ruler, is equal to the average of general Native princes, and had his worst qualities, suspicion and vindictiveness, not been early worked upon, he would probably have made a fairly decent sovereign. There was one clear point in his character which I can certify to, that for the greater part of his reign he was most earnest in his attachment to the British Government, and to do all that was required of him. Change only occurred when he found support was so ill-advisedly being given to his rebellious barons, which encouraged them in their factious opposition to him.

7. During the past two to three years he has avoided his good advisers and given himself to the guidance of bad counsellors. He has maintained a dogged passiveness, promising largely but doing nothing, indeed not attempting to do anything, just allowing matters to glide on as they would. This of itself is bad enough, and could only bring about disorder and misrule, but of late he appears to have become somewhat desperate, fearing the result of his inaction, and has gone the length of deliberately breaking the treaty by corresponding direct with the ruler of Cabul on the subject of the disposal of his (the Khan's) country.

8. This shows a growing opposition to the interests of the British Government, and a want of faith, which would lead him to any other act adverse to the Government of India. To support his authority now would therefore be a fault, and I consider that the first object of moving a force to Khelat would be to depose him for his breaches of faith and of treaty engagements. There would then be no need to inquire into

the differences between him and his nobles, a thing I have always been of opinion we should never have engaged in. All that would be required would be to state that the British force had solely been sent to punish the Khan for his misdeeds towards the British Government. On his removal from power, the custom (Brahooee) would be followed of calling on the Sirdars to elect their sovereign. This choice would most probably fall on the eldest son of the Khan, for they will have one of the reigning family. He being a minor could not assume the powers of sovereignty, but these would be managed by a well-qualified Wuzeer, with a regent or council of regency as found most advisable. All proper rights and privileges would be confirmed to the Sirdars, and they would be allowed to remain in possession of their hereditary estates. The whole of these latter points are perfectly well known and would be most easily settled. The Sirdars would be perfectly satisfied, and would most gladly settle down to the rest and quiet which has been absent from them for so many years.

9. The Sirdars are divided amongst themselves because there is nothing to keep them together. It is, however, a mistake to suppose that they have no other aim than raiding and plundering. Such is the nature of the Belooch, the Murrees, Boogtees, &c., but though prominent just now, they are only a very small portion of the people of Beloochistan, occupying one comparatively little corner of the Khanate. The Brahooee Sirdars who possess the greater part of the country are very different. They are quite content, indeed most anxious, to remain at peace with each other, and until the unfortunate circumstances of 1871–72, had for years engaged in no raiding or tribal fighting; their only exhibitions of violence were directed against their ruler the Khan. When they did commence outrages in 1872, one of their main objects was to try and force the British Government to interfere in their affairs, for which reason they attacked the kafilahs in the Bolan, and it was openly stated at the time they had been advised to do this to call in British intervention. The attack of the Summalani Minguls (Brahooees) on the Muzzarani section of the Murrees was a very questionable transaction, and was generally believed then to have been brought about by some of the people about the Khan (indeed some said by the Khan himself) out of spite to the Muzzaranis and their chief Shere Ali.

Living in the Bolan, apart and quite distinct from the other portion of the Murree tribe.

10. Unless something is speedily done the Sirdars will become desperate. They will adopt their own measures for their individual interests, totally regardless of each other and the general Government of the country. Their followers, who are yet under their control, will break loose, and anarchy and the wildest confusion will fill the land. They can be used in a legitimate manner now to support a Government, and if they are told that the elected Khan would be staunchly supported by the British Government, fair treatment being guaranteed to them, I am certain they would join in supporting the rule. A few years hence this even will be impossible, and then for the safety of the British possessions occupation of Beloochistan will become inevitable. The only way left to prevent entire occupation is to see to the establishment of a real Government again, and with proper management it should be stronger than any that has been for a long time. It should grow under the protecting influence of the British Government. Moral aid should be freely and heartily given, but there should be after the change had been established no further armed intervention. The Political Agent should be re-established, and have with him a suitable escort but no more, and that should be considered simply for his protection, and to assert the dignity of his position.

11. If anarchy and absence of all governing power—such as is the state now in Beloochistan—is allowed to continue, there will be no limit to plundering and outrage near the British border, and trade will be utterly unprotected as it passes through that country. It will not then be merely that we shall have to provide against the comparatively contemptible action of a small body like the Murrees, affecting merely a portion of the border, but the whole will be injured, and the people harassed by the incessant plundering of petty bands from all the Brahooee tribes down to the sea. The impunity enjoyed by some will be envied and sought after by others, and there will be no one to be held specially responsible. The insolence of the Murrees is getting excessive, and unless it is properly controlled, and some punishment speedily inflicted on them, the other tribes will find they are losing instead of gaining by behaving well, and will return to the old pursuits, which they cannot help seeing are the means of giving great wealth to the Murrees, and enable the latter really to defy the British power. Such is their attitude now certainly, though for convenience sake they pretend deference to the authorities on the Punjab side, it suiting them best at present to do so.

12. With regard to the "policy of endeavouring to deal with the frontier tribes

" entirely through the Khan, and of giving them to understand that they are regarded " solely as subjects of his Highness," that argument has only been used in reference to the Murrees, and I would deferentially observe can scarcely be said to have failed, because it has never been properly carried out. While it has been acknowledged that such policy was right and just, what support has been given in maintaining it? The Murrees have been told that they must respect the territories of the Khan, but when they have deliberately disregarded this injunction, has any real notice been taken of this disobedience? Have they not, on the contrary, been treated with exactly the same consideration as before, and received the same favour as if they had been perfectly well behaved the whole time? They obtained immense plunder from the kafilahs in 1872, which the Khan of Khelat was compelled by us to make good to the owners. But what compulsion was brought to bear on the Murrees to compel them to disgorge their large share? They were called upon to make restitution, and at one time I was led to believe that the Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan's demands on the Chief Ghuzzun were going to be complied with, but it only ended in the delivery of a few camels and some insignificant goods; the bulk of the booty is with the tribe still, and yet there is no diminution of the favour with which they continue to be treated. It is impossible to enforce obedience unless some penalty is attached to deliberate disregard of orders, and the policy above alluded to could certainly not be carried out unless its observance was enforced on all parties.

13. The Murrees have no grievances against the Khan, and never had. This Captain Sandemen at last acknowledged after personal inquiry from them, and after he had fancied for some time that they had. Their quarrel is so far with the Khan that they have persistently plundered his country, and killed poor unoffending people where and as they pleased. The Khan has been unable to punish them as they deserved, and we, who might have helped to punish all this, have really done nothing. The Khan of Khelat, our ally hitherto, and still, is the aggrieved party, and the people who have so injured him are high in our favour and treated as if they had done no ill.

14. It is certainly quite time that this mode of procedure should be changed, and it was with this object I proposed the blockade. The success and impunity enjoyed by the Murrees are not only rendering them most insolent and bold, but they are causing demoralization among the adjacent tribes, especially the Boogtees, who are breaking up into factions which join the Murrees and assist them in their plunderings. I recommended blockade in 1868–69, but it was then not thought feasible, and the system of negotiation, adjustment, and payment tried. This it is that has really failed. It of course suited the Murrees admirably. They had only to be a little careful as regards the Punjab border, to have as much license as they chose on the Kutchee side. Such a plan will, I am well assured, never answer with such people as these wild mountaineers. They do not understand forbearance. They regard it as weakness, and increase in audacity and insolence in proportion. They must be taught obedience to ensure any permanent peace and security, and must be made to understand that the British power is to be unhesitatingly feared.

15. This cannot be obtained by presents or payments, conciliation now will only make matters worse, confirming the Murrees in the belief that their power is feared. The persistent refusal of the Murree Chief to go into Jacobabad to pay his respects is a significant proof of what he thinks he may do and the lengths he may go. His restoration of the very small portion of the booty was merely to gain time, he hoping that the delivery of the remainder would not in the end be enforced, and the deputation of his nephew was a mere evasion, which should not be accepted. There will no satisfactory settlement come I am convinced from yielding to this chief's views, most unwarrantable as they are. It will be a victory to him which cannot but be most lowering to our power over him, his tribe, and others about.

16. The allegiance to the Khan is a thing they don't really object to, indeed they have always said they wish for a Khan, and to be acknowledged as his subjects. What they do object to is being prevented plundering in his country of Kutchee, which they know would be put a stop to if their real allegiance was enforced. I hold we are bound not to recognise their independence when such an act carries with it the license to harry the Khan's country and subjects as the Murrees like.

17. The blockade would not entail much greater display of military force, and it would be over in one year, or further punitive measures would be adopted, and there would be no difficulty in inflicting the fullest punishment on the tribe in their own hills if the Murrees succeeded in holding out, and such were found necessary. There should be no hardship on our own subjects, when the British possessions were properly

protected and all attempts at injury promptly and severely punished. And as regards the rupture with the minor chiefs, I know of none that are not in the same boat as Ghuzzun, and require equally being brought under proper control. Better, however, far that there should be some little temporary inconvenience, than that years of disorder and disasters should follow from the want of timely firmness and due enforcement of authority. Such an opportunity as at present offers will probably never occur again.

18. My proposals may be briefly stated to be these: that as Beloochistan, which includes the whole tract of country from the Murree Hills and the valley north of the Bolan Pass to the sea-coast below Lus Beyla, is fast drifting into a state of anarchy and general disorder from the absence of proper ruling power, measures should be adopted to establish a new Government in accordance with the customs of the people, and that to ensure the peaceable carrying out of this design, a suitable force should be despatched to Khelat in the month of March next.

That the troops should spend the summer above the passes so as to allow of the new arrangements being well introduced, and that they return to the plains in the autumn.

That in consequence of the outrageous acts of the Murree tribe during the past few years; of the total disregard the chief has shown for all orders conveyed to him by the Political Superintendent, Frontier of Upper Sind, and his failing to pay his respects to that officer, the tribe should be denied all access to, or communication with, British territory, either on the Punjab or Sind side, until such time as the Murree Chief makes suitable amends for his misconduct and restores all the plundered property, or its equivalent, captured from kafilahs in 1872, or since, from subjects of the Khan or of the British Government.

That should the blockade thus instituted not prove sufficient, the troops returning from Khelat in the autumn should proceed through the Murree Hills and bring that tribe into thorough subjection.

19. Meanwhile the instructions conveyed in the 10th paragraph of your letter will be at once carried out, and the report called for duly forwarded. I have been in communication with his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and it has been arranged that Captain Sandeman should join Colonel Loch at Jacobabad, that the required report may be drawn up and submitted by them.

20. In writing the remarks which I have considered it my duty to lay before his Excellency the Viceroy in Council, if I appear to have written too strongly, I trust that the very great importance of the subject may be accepted as excuse, and allowance made accordingly. No one I feel sure can dispute the absolute necessity that exists for having one front as safe and secure as it can possibly be made, and no one can gainsay the fact that the present state of affairs in Beloochistan is exactly opposed to that condition.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. L. Merewether, Colonel,
Commissioner in Sind.

Enclosure 1 in No. 189.

Memorandum.

In April 1873 the Political Agent at the Court of his Highness the Khan of Khelat was withdrawn, and the annual subsidy of Rupees 50,000, which had up to that date been regularly paid, was stopped, because his Highness failed to carry out the provisions of the treaty entered into in 1854, and had latterly shown a studied disinclination to act cordially in accordance with the wishes of the Government of India, as communicated to him by the Political Agent. The excellent Wuzeer, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, accompanied the Political Agent, not thinking it safe to remain with his master since the latter had so changed his views.

2. From the above date it may be said that there has been practically no governing management in the Khelat dominions. The Khan leaving Gundava immediately returned to Khelat, and all the Brahooee Sirdars, with one exception, followed his example, retiring to their homes above the passes. The exception was Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, who fearing the hostility of the Khan, considered it safest to resort to his old retreat in the Afghan province of Seebee, where he still remains.

3. The Khan has allowed matters to drift on as they may, following the advice of three men who have always shown strong feelings against the British Government, and who have throughout endeavoured, for their own present advantage, to encourage the Khan in the adverse course he has lately adopted, and to further increase the complications between the two Governments which have so unfortunately been brought about. Those men are—

I.—Abdool Uzeez, an inferior official, appointed Naib of Kutchee, when the *Wuzeer, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, retired into British territory with the Political Agent.

* The custom is that the Wuzeer is ex-officio Naib of Kutchee, and he usually appoints a deputy to transact business there while he is in attendance on the Khan of Khelat or elsewhere.

II.—Mahomed Hyat, the Kazee of Bagh, a determined enemy to British interests.

III.—Mahomed Khan, ex-Wukkeel at Jacobabad, who was removed from his post for his pusillanimous and treacherous conduct during the disturbances in 1871–72.

These men, as the records will have shown, lost no opportunity of acting insolently towards the British officials on the frontier, and prompting their sovereign to maintain the dogged obstructiveness he had so foolishly entered upon. It is even reported that the Naib, Abdool Azeez, on one occasion went the length of speaking in open Durbar in most disrespectful terms of the British officials. His conduct was brought to the notice of the Khan, but the latter took no measures to correct or punish him, but on the contrary, by saying he considered the Naib had done no wrong, he accepted that official's acts as his own.

4. No Wuzeer was appointed on the departure of Wullee Mahomed. The post was several times offered to Daroga Atta Mahomed (the son of Daroga Gool Mahomed, an old staunch upholder of the Khanate, and famous in the revolution of 1840), but Atta Mahomed persistently declined, disapproving entirely of the present action of the Khan.

5. Though the Political Agent had been recalled, relations were not entirely broken off with the Khan, it being necessary to maintain them in reference to any border differences that might occur. Representations have had to be repeatedly made concerning such, but have only been met by the stereotyped reply from the Khan that he was about to make arrangements for the restoration of order in those parts where the occurrences had happened, and with the blessing of Providence the culprits demanded would be punished and the property claimed restored. But nothing whatever has been done up to this day, commencing as the occurrences did with the plunder of kafilahs in the Lus Beyla territory in April 1872. Appended is a list of the outrages represented, for none of which has any reparation been made, and attention is specially called to it.

6. On the 17th February last letters were addressed to his Highness commenting on the indifference and supineness displayed by him in regard to these outrages, and the non-fulfilment of the many promises of redress he had made, and he was told then that "the only conclusion that can be drawn is that your Highness has become "wholly forgetful of the assurances you have given, of your responsibilities as ruler "of the country, and of your obligations under treaty engagements; also that you "have become utterly indifferent to the retention of your good name, as well as to "the establishment of peace and good order in your country." His Highness' attention was also drawn to the insecurity for travellers passing through his country, and to certain modes of uncourteous address which had been used both by himself and his officials in writing to British officers, and he was in conclusion informed plainly and distinctly as follows:—"That the obligations your Highness lies under according "to the treaty of 1854, to protect trade and secure the peace of the frontier, remain "unaffected by recent events. That the subsidies will continue to be withheld until "such time as your Highness complies wholly and completely with the terms of "the treaty. That in the event of any disturbances occurring on the frontier, the "British Government will be compelled to take its own measures for preserving "order, and further, that if satisfaction is not afforded by your Highness for the "outrages committed in Lus Beyla, it will be necessary to exact reparation in such "manner as the British Government deem most suitable."

7. The replies were received in March and forwarded to Government. They were thoroughly unsatisfactory, full of mis-statements and empty promises, and making no proper *amende* for the disrespectful style of writing that had been complained of. It was currently reported that his three advisers had counselled him that he had only to write letters full of promises and nothing would be done to him. He certainly appeared

to be acting under this view, and it was urged that immediate measures of a stringent order should be adopted to undeceive him on this point.

8. A little previously a letter came from the Khan through Kurrachee direct to the Commissioner. This was quite contrary to correct rule and custom. This letter likewise was replete with untruths and remarks disparaging to the late Wuzeer, to Colonel Loch the Political Superintendent, and Major Harrison the Political Agent. The letter was therefore immediately returned to the Khan through the Political Superintendent.

9. Before the Khan's replies to the letters of the 17th February arrived, intelligence was received of a most gross outrage having been attempted on the western border in the lower part of the Shikarpoor Collectorate such as had never before been committed in British territory. Some 200 armed Brahooees of the Sassoolee tribe, headed by the Chief Pahur Khan and his brother, entered the village of Khubbur Pahur, well within the British boundary, at 8 o'clock on the evening of the 10th February, and carried off the families of certain slaves who had fled from their masters the Sassoolees, in consequence of the way in which they, the slaves, had been ill-treated. A policeman on the spot attempted to check the Sassoolees, but he was not listened to, being kept in charge of a portion of the invaders, while the others collected the slave females, their children and property, and carried the whole off into the territory of the Khan. Thus British territory was entered by a large body of armed men, and people who had sought refuge therein were forcibly carried off. Such an act could only be considered as a most insolent and gross outrage, for which the ruler of the country whose subjects could dare to act in such a manner must be held responsible.

10. A demand was at once sent to his Highness the Khan for the immediate arrest and delivery up of the leaders of this outrage, as also of the women, children, and property carried off by them. His Highness the Khan replied that Pahur Khan and his brother were about to be ordered to Jacobabad, and having arrived there without delay, will themselves answer the charges brought against them. Up to this day, however, they have not been sent, and no sign has been shown of the Khan intending to act up to his promise. No mention either was made of the restitution of the families and property, and though a second demand was made for them, nothing has been done by the Khan in the matter.

11. The occurrence of this outrage showed clearly that the subjects of the Khan had no longer any fear of his power to control them, or that if he had the will to do so, he did not choose to exert it. Every endeavour had been previously made to support him in his Government, and to enable him to maintain order in his dominions. This having failed, and he being the person really to blame, it became necessary to recommend that active measures should be adopted without delay to compel him to carry out the engagements he was bound to by treaty. It was shown that if the above outrage was not promptly and severely met, any of the numerous petty chieftains along the extensive border from Upper Sind to the sea, a distance of some 300 miles, might at any time follow the example of the Sassoolees, and so it would become necessary for the protection of British subjects that a strong force should be located along the whole line.

12. It was therefore proposed that a military force should be sent against the Khan, to consist of two columns of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, one to advance from Kurrachee through Lus Beyla, Wudd, and Khozdar on Khelat, the other to the same final destination, but starting from Jacobabad and proceeding by the Bolan Pass to Quetta and Moostung. The first would in its passage restore order and rule in the lower portion of the Khelat dominions, the latter the same in the northern part, and the two meeting at Khelat would compel better arrangements to be made for the future good government of the country. The troops would then be withdrawn to Sind, only leaving sufficient to form a suitable escort for the Political Agent, who would then be re-installed at the Court of Khelat.

13. No decision was arrived at in time for these operations to be carried out before the hot summer months rendered movement of troops impracticable, and the subject is still under the consideration of the Government of India. Though it was unfortunate that owing to the shortness of the time nothing could then be done, and on such occasions prompt measures render action and success so very much more easy, it is now most earnestly urged that the next spring should not be allowed to pass without the required notice being taken of the state of utter misrule that now exists in the Khanate, and full reparation exacted for the above-mentioned outrage, and for the many wrongdoings of late by subjects of his Highness the Khan.

14. There are two seasons during which operations can be carried on above the passes in Beloochistan—spring and autumn. The latter, however, gives too short a

time, owing to the severity of the winter, making it inexpedient to keep troops in the highlands. Supplies are scarce, and forage for cavalry and cattle generally very difficult to procure. The spring is followed by a most temperate summer, when all supplies are more easily obtained, and the troops could without inconvenience remain there, returning to the plains in the autumn before the excessive cold sets in.

15. During the interval that has passed since the recommendations submitted in March last, the fullest information has been collected regarding best information of the force to be employed, routes, provisions, and extent of carriage required, and Brigadier-General Addison, C.B., Commanding the Sind district, has placed at the disposal of the Commissioner some very creditable papers drawn up by Captain F. Adam, Assistant Quartermaster-General, entering fully into all the necessary details and wants connected with the movement of such a force as is deemed necessary to ensure the successful execution of the object in view. Copies of these papers are appended, and attention is respectfully drawn to them. Almost all the necessary arrangements can be made in Sind itself, the requisite carriage can be obtained without any difficulty. A regiment of European and one of Native Infantry would have to be sent up from Bombay, to replace those that would be employed, but nothing more. For the general idea, reference is asked to letter No. 336, of the 10th March last.

16. Though there has been nothing similar in extent to the Sassoolee inroad in February last, much has taken place along the border, showing that great injury has happened to the British influence and prestige from no reparation having been yet exacted for that glaring contempt of British power, and nothing being done to compel the ruler of Beloochistan to enforce his authority over his subjects and to maintain proper sovereignty in his country. Formerly, in ordinary cases of cattle-stealing, when animals were carried off into Khelat territory, the Sind police would follow up the thieves and stolen property across the border to the nearest village, and always received ready assistance from the authorities, thus recovering the cattle at once and getting the thieves arrested at first, or they were afterwards delivered up. Now the police meet with opposition, and often armed intimidation, only occasionally regain the property, never obtain the thieves, and on requisition being made to the Khan, the only reply is, that he is going to send some one in authority to that part of the country when the culprits shall be seized and given up. Nothing, however, has been done up to the present time, and the thieves are getting confident and more bold from the impunity they enjoy.

17. Appended is a statement of cases referred to his Highness the Khan of Khelat during the past two years which still remain undisposed of, and appear likely to remain so. In one case of murder in March 1874, the perpetrator is well known, as also his residence; but not only is he still at large, but he is known to have boasted that he owes a grudge to another person in British territory, which he will pay off by killing the man when he chooses. He had no fear of anything being done to him, for had not the proceedings of the Sassoolees been passed by unnoticed? This murderer lives near the Sassoolees, but others more distant reason much in the same way.

18. Unless something is soon done to remedy the present state of affairs, crime will so increase on the western borders of Sind, that the small police force stationed along it will be utterly unable to cope with its extent. Appended is a list of the number of police employed at the different posts from the sea up to where the Upper Sind Frontier line ends at Khyree Ghurree, 34 miles south-south-west of Jacobabad. Such a small body has been only able to give security to the people of that part of Sind by means of the aid they received from the Khelat authorities, and the moral power which the name of the British Government carried with it. Let this latter be found to have no longer existence or effect, and so few policemen will be utterly useless.

19. The Sirdars of Sarawan prepared at the usual time in the spring to return to their lands in the higher country. They all assembled at Dadur, with the exception of Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, who would not leave Seebee, and at one time it was thought they intended recommencing hostilities against the Khan. Naib Abdool Azeez, on hearing this, promptly went to the spot from Bagh, and by means of promises, with judicious distribution of money, he succeeded in sowing dissension amongst them and they dispersed to their homes. They have remained quiet there during the summer, and will shortly now be again returning to Kutchee.

20. The Jalawans, with the exception of Meer Noordeen Mingul, have kept aloof from his Highness the Khan. Noordeen thought that by pretending submission he might induce the Khan to make him "Premier Noble" in the south of Beloochistan, and get him to apply for the release of his relative the ex-Jam of Beyla. Neither of these have come to pass as yet, but Noordeen was desired by the Khan to go to

Beyla to restore order there, and seize the people whose arrest had been demanded. He went, but all he did was to collect what revenue the people would give him, which he appropriated to his own uses and retired to his lands at Wudd.

21. A disturbance took place in the Zehree country which at first promised to be rather serious. A party of the Khan's regular troops that had been despatched from Khelat to collect revenue from the Zehrees, found themselves cut off from return by the routes being closed by the Zehrees in force. The predicament was an awkward one, but after a while the troops were extricated, it is supposed by means of bribery, and nothing whatever came of it, as is so often the case with any attempted movement in Beloochistan.

22. The son of the ex-Jam of Beyla, who since his father's removal to the Deccan had been allowed to remain at Hyderabad under the surveillance of the police, managed to elude the vigilance of the latter and escape to his old home in Beyla. He is, however, not a person of any political importance, being quite young, inexperienced, and without any influence. There is a rupture between him and his uncle, Noordeen, on account of the latter's appropriation of the Beyla revenue and refusing to give any account. The Beyla people will most of them probably pay their dues to this son of Meer Khan, it being a matter of little consequence to them who receives the revenue, and the young man will endeavour to send funds to his father. The latter should not be allowed to receive them, or anything more than the sum fixed for his maintenance. Careful watch should also be kept over him more than ever, for he will take the first opportunity of trying to re-enter his old country, and would then at once recommence his intrigues and endeavour to promote disturbances.

23. In Mekran there is considerable danger of frontier disturbances from the Rhinds of Mund having committed inroads into Persian territory. Fukkeer Mahomed, the Khan's Naib at Kedj, was called upon to restrain the Rhinds and direct them to restore the plundered property, but he replied he was quite unable to do so, that he had no troops placed at his disposal, and the Rhinds would take no notice of what he said.

24. Azaad Khan of Kharan is restless, and threatening again to interfere with Khelat affairs. He has written to Moolla Mahomed Raisanee and Noordeen Mingul urging them to raise the standard of revolt once more and he would join them. The former is said to have declined, the latter's reply is not certainly known.

25. The Murree Chief Guzzun has continued to maintain his insolent attitude towards the Sind Frontier authorities. He has made no attempt to restore the large amount of plunder he and his tribe gained from the kafilahs in the Bolan, and he persistently neglects to obey the summons of the Political Superintendent to come into Jacobabad and pay his respects. This latter is a point that most assuredly should be insisted upon. It is simply a trial on the part of Guzzun to assert his importance and superior strength above the other Belooch tribes, which if once recognised, there would be no bounds to his arrogance, and no real check on the lawless proceedings of himself and tribe. The Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan stated it had been reported to him that the Chief Guzzun was getting quite rich in plunder, and was in consequence becoming very unreliable, while the tribe itself was more and more demoralized, and no wonder, when they found that their raiding practices could be carried on with perfect impunity, and that as long as they showed a tolerably decent observance of their engagements with the authorities on the Punjab Frontier, they could plunder elsewhere, especially in the Khan's territory—rich hunting grounds for them—whenever and as much as they pleased.

26. It is full time that this was put a stop to and with a strong hand, or others will follow their example, seeing how well it pays. Already the Boogtees, who have for some years past been behaving remarkably well, have shown signs of similar demoralization. The tribe is breaking up into parties, leaving the Chief, Goolam Moorteza, on any trifling difference, and going off to join the Murrees, where there is more to be gained. Only recently a mixed body of Murrees and Boogtees perpetrated a raid just outside the Sind line of outposts and carried off a large number of cattle, and unless such proceedings are speedily checked, similar ones will repeatedly recur, and the border be harassed along the whole length.

27. It is a great mistake to suppose that these wild tribes can be kept in order by simple arrangements and negotiations. They regard them as signs of weakness, and only become more bold and insolent each time that their lawless acts do not meet with the punishment they deserve. Soft measures will never answer. They must be made to feel the strength of the paramount power, and then anything may be done with them. Above all, the two systems in vogue on the Punjab and Khelat side are acting

most prejudicially to the interests of both. Of course the Murrees will try to keep in with the Punjab authorities as long as they get regular pay and presents from them, and nothing is done to prevent their malpractices elsewhere.

28. It has been recommended that a blockade of the Murrees should be established, both from the Sind and Punjab side, to compel their obedience. This could be most easily carried out without calling for the employment of much additional force, and it should be done before matters become worse, and the main portion of the Boogtees have to be dealt with as well as the Murrees. Should it not succeed, a force should be sent into and through the Murree country, to enforce thorough submission once and for all. With the knowledge now possessed of that country, there would be no difficulty whatever in this, the more especially as the Murrees by their continued acts of hostility against the surrounding tribes, have made them nearly all most deadly enemies, so that they could gain no asylum out of their own country, but must stand or fall where they are.

29. In conclusion, it may be briefly stated that the point to be considered is this. Is it wise to allow the present state of affairs in Beloochistan to slide on as it now is, until the whole society falls entirely to pieces, and the British border, extending nearly 600 miles in length from Dehra Ghazee Khan to the sea, becomes liable to aggression from a large number of independent chiefs, over whom there is no control whatever, and against the individual attack of every one of whom sufficient provision will have to be made? Or is it better that, before it is too late, measures should be adopted to restore real and good government throughout the country, and revise the arrangements between the two Governments, that in future security for all, especially for trade, may be maintained? Is it wise, too, considering the progress of events in Central Asia, the country immediately before us should be torn by factions, and be the prey of the first strong power that should choose to seize it? It is already known that the present Khan, driven to despair, and ready to cling to any straw, offered his country and allegiance to the Ameer of Cabul, writing, in direct contravention of the Treaty of 1854, to that potentate, if he has not done the same to others, and it is strongly suspected he has.

30. As long as the Khan was not turned from us by unfortunate direct interference in his State affairs, he was willing and ready to do all that was required of him to the best of his ability. He is now, however, completely, alienated from us, and his late procedure has rendered it quite impossible that any future arrangements could be carried on through him. The main object of the despatch of the force to Khelat would be to remove him from the throne, and then allow the Sirdars of the country, as is the custom, to elect a new sovereign, explaining to them that the elect would receive the fullest support of the British Government—peace, order, and good government being insisted upon.

31. With the object of the movement fully explained by proclamation, and the Sirdars fairly told that if they remain quiet on their estates and afford all assistance asked of them they will have all their rights and privileges strictly recognised and confirmed, there would be little or no opposition. The mass of the people are sick and tired of uncertainty and misrule, and would cordially welcome the chance of change for the better. The troops the Khan has collected about him seeing that resistance was hopeless, and that their occupation would be gone with the removal of their employer, would be only too glad to make the best terms they could. The force that was used to bring this about would, after spending the summer above the passes, return to the plains in the autumn without having added a rood to British territory or involved ourselves one whit more in external affairs than we are now. Unless this is done it requires little of the prophet to foretell that on the complications occurring in Central Asia, which most people now are obliged to allow must come before long, we shall be compelled to advance into Beloochistan, and make our frontier on the sandy desolate line of Mekran to Seistan, instead of retaining the present far more secure and suitable one of Sind.

W. L. MEREWETHER, Colonel,
Commissioner in Sind.

P.S.—Since the above was written, Darogha Atta Mahomed has accepted the appointment of Wuzeer, and was ordered by the Khan to proceed to Beyla to restore order there, but he had not left Khelat by last advices, and there seemed no probability of his doing so. His heart is not in the work, and the Khan does not appear to like to press him.

W. L. M.

Enclosure 2 in No. 189.

STATEMENT of CASES referred to HIS HIGHNESS the KHAN of KHELAT, through the POLITICAL SUPERINTENDENT, Frontier Upper Sind, during the past Two Years, which remain undisposed of.

No.	Date of Offence.	Name of Complainant.	Place where the Offence was committed.	Nature of Offence.	Value of Property.	Name of Offender.	Number and Date of Commissioner's Reference to the Political Superintendent.	Nature of reply received from his Highness the Khan of Khelat.
	1873.							
1	About 17th Feb. -	Mohbat Khan, a member of a kafilah from Kandahar *en route* to Kurrachee.	Weera Hubb, one mile beyond British territory.	Robbery of a camel-load of wool.	- - -	Nowsherwan Chooto and Dewriah Bundejo, with 12 followers.	273, 27th March -	Reply received with Political Superintendent's letter, No. 1407, dated 21st May 1873, stating that prior to the receipt of the Political Agent's letter, he had sent sowars with letters to Sahib Khan and Nowsherwan Chootas, as also to the Bukkaks, ordering them to restore the property, if not he would punish them. His Highness further stated that when other matters of importance between him and the British Government had been settled, order could easily be restored in Lus Beyla.
2	About 18th Feb. -	Mengrajmull wd. Mootoomull, a Shikarpoor merchant, residing at Kurrachee.	Bam Jung, in the Khelat territory.	Robbery of a load of silk, belonging to a kafilah, *en route* to Kurrachee.	Rs. 600 0 0	Nowsherwan Chooto and Dewriah Bundejo, with 12 followers.	273, 27th March -	Ditto.
3	Some time in Feb. 1873; exact date not known.	Kurmo, son of Timay, resident of Moyadan.	Hubb river - - -	Theft of cattle. The owner succeeded in recovering the cattle, but for the outrages committed on the owner and others, the Khan was asked for the surrender of the offenders.	- - -	Oobayo Chooto, Soomo Gado, Kulloo Gado, Hussoo Bukkuk, and Phulloo Chooto.	526, 25th April -	Ditto.
4	About 3rd April -	A report from the District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee, No. 213, dated the 5th April 1873.	Ledhanee, near Sahib Khan's village.	Plundering a pensioned Havildar of the Belooch regiment, by name Mahomed Khan Brahooee, and 18 others.	Cash and ornaments - 1,250 0 0 Camels - - - Unknown.	Boorrahs, Bundejos, and Chootas, followers of Nowsherwan and Dewria.	644, 4th July - -	In his reply received with the Political Superintendent's letter, No. 2191, dated 6th August 1873, his Highness the Khan stated that on a former occasion he represented Meer Noordeen *Mingul* as having been sent to Beyla to restore order; he (the Khan) hoped that in the course of a few days the plunderers will be apprehended and property restored.
5	About the 21st April.	1. Hajee Mahomed - 2. Mahomed Zaman. 3. Khoodadad. 4. Atta Mahomed. 5. Dad Mahomed.	Six miles from the Loonwaree Pass, in the neighbourhood of Abshor.	Plunder of a kafilah, merchandize, &c.	5,284 9 0	The robbers belonged to a force collected by Sher Khan Jamote to retaliate against Sahib Khan, from the people of Ali Mahomed Boorro, Dewria Bundejo, and Nowsherwan Chooto.	421, April 7th - 444, May 12th. 518, May 30th. -	In his reply received with the Political Superintendent's letter, No. 1602, dated the 10th June 1874, his Highness the Khan stated that prior to the receipt of the Political Superintendent's letter, his attention was directed towards the province of Beyla, that a force was sent to Kozdar, and that if Ali Khan Jamote, Sahib Khan, and Nowsherwan, Chootas, as also Dewriah Khan Bundejo, surrendered the property, well and good, if not his force will compel them to do so.

Statement of Cases referred to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, &c.—*continued.*

No.	Date of Offence.	Name of Complainant.	Place where the Offence was committed.	Nature of Offence	Value of Property.	Name of Offender.	Number and Date of Commissioner's Reference to the Political Superintendent.	Nature of reply received from his Highness the Khan of Khelat.
	1873.				Rs.			
6	About 23rd April -	Shamdass Goverdandass, on behalf of Mahomed Deen, a Kandahar merchant.	About 40 miles from the Hubb river, in Nowsherwan Choota and Oomed Ali's District.	Plundering a kafilah, merchandize, &c. - 13 camels - - -	4,921 0 0 1,300 0 0	About 40 or 60 followers of Nowsherwan Choota.	385, April 29th - 379, April 26th. 397, May 5th.	The reply to Nos. 1, 2, and 3 include this also.
7	About 23rd April -	Sher Dilshah, son of Boorahukshah, resident of Shalkot, on behalf of his deceased brother, Jinda Shah.	About 40 miles away from the Hubb, in Nowsherwan Choota and Oomed Ali's District.	Plundering a kafilah, and killing Syud Jinda Shah. Merchandize, &c.	5,380 0 0	About 40 or 60 followers of Nowsherwan Choota.	427, May 8th - -	Reply received with the Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind's letter, No. 1837, dated the 3rd July 1873, stated that 70 cavalry and 200 infantry had been sent on detachment to Kozdar on the 9th May, and directly they arrived, Ali Khan Jamote, Sahib Khan, and Nowsherwan Chootas were alarmed, and they were consulting about giving up the property and offenders. Should they not do so, for the sake of his reputation he would coerce them.
8	2nd or 3rd May -	A report from the District Superintendent of Kurrachee Police, No. 357, dated the 6th May 1874.	A place called Augutakdina, about 1½ koss beyond the Hubb.	Assaulting and plundering band of mendicants proceeding on a pilgrimage to Hinglaj.	300 0 0	Thirty thieves, servants of Chooto and Dewria Bundejo.	446, May 13th - -	Reply received with the Political Superintendent's letter, No. 1602, dated the 10th June 1874, stating that the unsatisfactory state of the Lus Beyla district had been brought to his notice on previous occasions, and that it was well known he had no authority in the province, as the people were in rebellion and had no Sirdar. His Highness attributed the bad conduct of the people in Lus Beyla to his having been obliged to compensate merchants plundered by the Brahooees and Murrees, as also to want of kindness and consideration towards himself by the British Government.
9	19th May -	*Vide* report from the District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee, No. 600, dated 30th June 1873.	Bahudooree, near Mukan Kai, within the British territory.	Inroad into British territory, and carrying away 9 camels and 45 head of cattle belonging to Gubboles and Chootas; 2 Gubboles were killed.	895 0 0	Followers of Ali Khan Jamote, Nowsherwan Chooto, and Dewria Bundejo. Ali Khan Jamote's tents were within three miles of the occurrence.	649, July 6th - -	The reply to No. 4 refers to this also.
10	10th July -	Vernacular report, No. 5970, dated the 22nd July 1873, from District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee.	Dikaree canal, in the British territory.	Theft of a camel belonging to one Rookun Wallahdad.	40 0 0	Husso Bukkuk, servant of Nowsherwan.	Vernacular letter, No. 75, of 30th July.	His Highness the Khan's reply received with the Political Superintendent's vernacular letter No. 1524, dated 13th October 1873, stating that sowars were sent with strict instructions to Sahib Khan and Nowsherwan Chooto to recover and make over the stolen property or the offenders to the sowars.

Statement of Cases referred to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, &c.—*continued.*

No.	Date of Offence.	Name of Complainant.	Place where the Offence was committed.	Nature of Offence.	Value of Property.	Name of Offender.	Number and Date of Commissioner's Reference to the Political Superintendent.	Nature of reply received from his Highness the Khan of Khelat.
	1873.							
11	August - -	Assistant Political Agent Gwadur's report, No. $\frac{a}{112}$ dated 16th August, 1873.	Village of Runjo, in Persian territory.	Committing a raid, and carrying away the following property belonging to Persians :— 50 bullocks, 4 camels, 6 donkeys, 6 rozais, 6 carpets, 6 jawals, 4 cooking pots, 2 horses, 7 swords, 9 guns, 1,000 rupees in cash, and other valuables.	- - -	The Rhinds of Mund -	881, September 4th -	Reply dated the 28th September 1873, stating that his Highness the Khan's subjects had not plundered in the Persian territory, but the Persians always injure and plunder his subjects; that although the British Government interfered, matters remain the same as before, and that he has written to the Naib of Kedj that if the Murrees have acted in the manner reported, they should be punished in such a way as to prevent the recurrence of similar conduct.
12	16th August -	Nooroodeen and Sher Shah.	Tarorashah, 6 marches from Kurrachee.	Attacking 10 men and 2 women, and depriving them of their property.	Rs.	Jungee Khan and Dilshad, Minguls, with 100 followers.	923, September 19th	In his reply received with the Political Superintendent's Memorandum, No. 2987, dated 24th October 1873, the Khan said that he had sent to apprehend the thieves and recover the property, and that he will write again on the subject directly the sowars return.
				Cash - - - -	100 0 0			
				Sheep - - - -	80 0 0			
				Dried fruits - - -	5 0 0			
13	18th September -	Kabool Rais - - -	Deh Chootta Chund, Talooka Tatta.	Theft of 21 head of cattle	147 0 0	Meean Dud Bura - -	District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee, dated 23rd December 1873, to the Political Agent, Khelat.	Reply received with the Political Superintendent's, No. 381, dated 5th February 1874, stating that Noordeen Mingul was written to to make good arrangements for the recovery of the cattle.
14	18th September -	Kundo Shora - -	Joongshai - - -	Theft of 8 head of cattle.	Not known -	Kamal Khan Patel wd. Moobaruk and Rohi Brahooee.	District Superintendent of Kurrachee Police's No. 1329, dated 11th December 1873, to the Political Agent, Khelat, and Commissioner's No. 936, dated 3rd July 1874.	*Vide* Political Superintendent's letter No. 2064, dated 9th July 1874, stating that his Highness the Khan says, that in consequence of the neglect shown by Noordeen Mingul, he (the Khan) intends making other arrangements for the Lus Beyla district, the arrest of thieves, and the restoration of stolen property.
15	About the 16th or 17th September 1873.	*Vide* remark on the Kandahar News Letter, No. 35, of September 1873.	Bolan pass - - -	Intercepting and ill-treating a British Kossid, and tearing the letter in his possession.	- - -	Muzaree Murrees -	Commissioner's letter to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, dated 17th February 1874.	*Vide* his Highness the Khan's reply to the Commissioner in Sind, dated 22nd Mohurrum 1291, stating that he knew of the case of one Kossid only who was seized by the Murrees, and deprived of the letter in his possession; that his troops posted at Kirta hearing of the occurrence, followed the Murrees and killed one of them, and that the Murrees were a lawless tribe, and for their insubordinate character did not deserve to be his Highness' Ooloos.
16	About the 25th September 1873.	*Vide* Khelat Diary, No. 40, for the week ending 2nd November 1873.	Bolan pass - - -	Murdering a Kandahar Kossid named Baboor.	- - -	Doomur Pathans -		
17	About the 25th October 1873.	*Vide* Khelat Diary, No. 40, dated 2nd November 1873.	Bolan pass - - -	Severally ill-treating a Kandahar Kossid named Paeel.	- - -	Ditto -		
18	October 1873.	*Vide* Kandahar News Letter, No. 42, dated 2nd November 1873.	Bolan pass - -	Do. do. named Dilawar -	- - -	Ditto -		

Statement of Cases referred to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, &c.—*continued.*

No.	Date of Offence.	Name of Complainant.	Place where the Offence was committed.	Nature of Offence.	Value of Property.	Name of Offender.	Number and Date of Commissioner's Reference to the Political Superintendent.	Nature of reply received from his Highness the Khan of Khelat.
19	1873. About the 20th October 1873.	Topunmull wd. Tejanmull, and Chundiram wd. Jashanmull.	On the road to Beyla, near a place called Yasham.	Murdering one Tejoomull, a resident of Kurrachee, and carrying away his property.	Rs. 600 0 0	One Mithoo Jamote and four others.	1056, October 29th -	Reply received with Political Superintendent's letter, No. 3356, dated 3rd December 1873, stating that he had sent Meer Noordeen Mingul to Lus Beyla to arrange cases of this description. If through him safety on the road cannot be restored, thieves arrested, and property recovered, he (the Khan) by force will make such arrangements that the Political Superintendent will hear of it.
20	1874. February 11th -	*Vide* Political Superintendent Frontier Upper Sind's letter, No. 640, dated the 2nd March 1874.	Village of Khubbur Taee near Salaree, Talooka Kukkur.	Inroad into British territory, and carrying away certain slave refugees with their property.	- -	Pahur Khan and Chakur Khan wd. Jehan Khan, Sassoolees.	337, March 10th -	*Vide* Political Superintendent's letter No. 976, dated the 3rd April 1874. His Highness the Khan, in reply, stated that Pahur Khan and his brother Chakur Khan were about to be ordered to Jacobabad, and on arrival there, without delay, will themselves answer the charges brought against them.
21	February 18th -	Khooda Bux Boorfoot, *vide* District Superintendent of Kurrachee Police's report, No. 215, dated 14th April 1874.	Near the Moedan post, within the British frontier.	Carrying away one Khooda Bux, a pensioner, to the village of Bara, and releasing him after robbing him of his clothes and other articles.	34 5 6	1. Hajee wd. Eshak Boorra of Bara. 2. Rawul wd. Rarho ditto. 3. Saleh wd. Sanjo ditto. 4. Mungun wd. Mahomed.	566, April 23rd -	Reply received with the Political Superintendent's endorsement, No. 1538, dated 22nd May 1874, stating that he (the Khan) had on several occasions written severely to Sirdar Meer Noordeen for the arrest of the thieves; that he will again write to him in severe terms, and that if Meer Noordeen, during his expected visit to Khelat, brings the robbers with him, they will be well punished, if not he will make good arrangements for Beyla without delay.
22	March 29th -	Yaroo Jumah and Seedee, women, *vide* correspondence ending with a letter from the District Magistrate, Kurrachee, No. 611, dated 29th May 1874.	About 14 miles from the border near Nye Angjee Chatoojee Bhur, Talooka Dadoo.	Murder of a Government police constable, Shahhak, and woman named Gowree.	- - -	1. Gahee, son of Mewo Jumalee. 2. Moosa, son of Tagio Jumalee. 3. Shahab, son of Manik Jumalee.	801, June 5th - -	His Highness the Khan's reply received with Political Superintendent's endorsement, No. 1639, dated 2nd June 1874, stating that intimation was given on a previous occasion that Noordeen Mingul, who was written to, will bring the thieves with him to Khelat, and that if he did not do so, he (the Khan) will make good arrangements and quickly arrest the thieves. In reply to a second requisition, his Highness the Khan said (*vide* Political Superintendent's Memorandum, No. 1968, dated 1st July 1874), that Noordeen Mingul's negligence was clear from his failure to arrest the thieves, according to his written orders, and that he (the Khan) will make good arrangements for Lus Beyla and arrest the thieves and bad characters.

Statement of Cases referred to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, &c.—*continued.*

No.	Date of Offence.	Name of Complainant.	Place where the Offence was committed.	Nature of Offence.	Value of Property.	Name of Offender.	Number and Date of Commissioner's Reference to the Political Superintendent.	Nature of reply received from his Highness the Khan of Khelat.
	1874.							
23	March - - -	*Vide* District Superintendent of Kurrachee Police's report, No. 498, dated the 22nd June 1874.	About 14 miles from the border near Nye Angjee Chatoojee Bhur, Talooka Dadoo.	Kidnapping a girl named Namurdee, daughter of the murdered woman Gowree; *vide* above cases.	- - -	One Zaroor Brahooee -	906, June 26th - -	Reply received with the Political Superintendent's, No. 2428, dated August 1874, stating that on several occasions he has written before, that when he has well considered his plans for Lus Beyla, and has the country in his power, arrangements will be made about all these matters.
24	March 29th - -	Butchi, woman - -	Khar - - - -	Theft of 80 goats - -	Rs. 250 0 0	Hamidan Guddo - -	Vernacular, No. 34, dated 21st April 1874.	
25	April 26th - -	Walidad Noth of Mole, *vide* District Superintendent of Kurrachee Police's report, No. 296, dated 13th May 1874.	Mole - - - -	Theft of six she-camels, one of which was found near the Hubb, and the five others recovered from the thieves in the village of Mohr Jubul Vendur.	295 0 0	1. Powar Jamote - - 2. Mooreed do. 3. Mungun do. 4. Batcho do.	705, May 18th - -	Reply received with the Political Superintendent's endorsement, No. 1924, dated 26th June 1874, stating that Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, who was deputed and made responsible for the management of Beyla, safety of the road, and apprehension of the thieves, had neglected his duty, and that he (the Khan) will consider what steps to take to make good arrangements for Lus Beyla and arrest the thieves.
26	About 30th April -	Malang wd. Mathala, resident of the village of Gadap.	Village of Gadap, Kurrachee Collectorate.	Theft of a camel - -	60 0 0	Muthara wd. Esa Khan, resident of the village of Adap Chuppur, in the Khan's territory.	943, July 4th.	
27	During the week ending the 10th May 1874.	*Vide* Khelat Diary, No. 19, dated 11th May 1874.	Khur Lak, head of the Bolan Pass.	Assaulting and plundering a British Kossid from Kandahar (Moostafa), and destroying the letter in his possession.	- - -	Doomur Pathans - -	610, May 19th - -	Reply received with the Political Superintendent's endorsement, No. 1924, dated 26th June 1874, stating that the Doomurs were not his subjects or obedient to him, and he could not punish them.
28	About 25th May -	Choohur wd. Damuch, resident of Toung, Talooka Kohistan.	Jungle, in the vicinity of Toung.	Theft of 6 sheep - -	- - -	Muthra wd. Esa, Soomro wd. Choonur, and Bahlool Chootto.	1143, August 14th.	
29	June 10th - -	*Vide* District Superintendent Kurrachee Police's report, No. 513, dated the 25th June 1874.	Vicinity of Moorad Khan's Bund, on the Hubb river.	Theft of cattle - -	- - -	Ismail wd. Walidad Chooto Hotiani, and Rodo, brother of ditto, both of Sahib Khan Choota's village.	935, July 3rd - -	In his reply, received with the Political Superintendent's letter, No. 2304, dated the 1st August 1874, his Highness the Khan stated that, as previously mentioned by him, the plan and arrangements for the arrest of thieves, &c., were not fully concluded, and that now to secure the object, force and authority will have to be used.
30	June 10th - -	Makan Gaddo - -	Moorad Khan's Bund -	Theft of cattle - -	96 0 0	1. Ismail wd. Walidad Chuto Hotmani. 2. Rado wd. Walidad Hotmani.	935, July 3rd.	

Statement of Cases referred to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, &c.—*continued.*

No.	Date of Offence.	Name of Complainant.	Place where the Offence was committed.	Nature of Offence.	Value of Property.	Name of Offender.	Number and Date of Commissioner's Reference to the Political Superintendent.	Nature of reply received from his Highness the Khan of Khelat.
	1874.				Rs.			
31	June 16th - -	Chooto Meerjut - -	Vicinity of a place called Rahelo.	Theft of a she-camel -	50 0 0	Taria Barija, in the village of Munga Barija.	945, July 4th - -	The reply given to No. 29 refers to this also.
32	June - - -	Chooto - - -	Raila, Talooka Kotree -	Cattle-lifting - - -	- - -	Pario Barcho - -	1458, November 4th.	
33	July 3rd - -	Khaku and Morio Shora	Khund - - - -	Theft of a mare and of two goats.	54 0 0	1. Zuroor wd. Pujan Bikkuk. 2. Ismail wd. Walidad Chooto.	——	
34	August 15th -	Ramchund - - -	Near the Khar post -	Theft of a camel - -	60 0 0	Miha Wasaio Chooto -	1294, September 25th.	
35	August 14th -	Hussun wd. Jagan -	A garden near the Soldiers' Bazar, Kurrachee.	Two bullocks, which were recovered.	45 0 0	Miha Wasaio wd. Nim of Lus Beyla.	1423, October 28th.	
36	September 30th -	Nanajee, Bunia - -	Between Kurrachee and Toung.	Theft of cash - -	482 6 0	Hajee wd. Mahomed Shahool Brahooee.	1422, October 28th.	
37	September - -	*Vide* District Superintendent of Kurrachee Police's report, No. 971, dated 30th September 1874.	Village of Jam Jokhio, near the Mulleer.	Robbery of cash - -	576 0 0	Emdad Ali Shah wd. Roshan Ali Shah.	1324, October 3rd -	Reply received with the Political Superintendent's endorsement, No. 3018, dated 27th October 1874, stating that the Khan had given orders to Darogha Atta Mahomed on the subject, and that when he enters Beyla he will make satisfactory arrangements for the arrest and punishment of criminals in that province.
38	September - -	*Vide* District Superintendent of Kurrachee Police's report, No. 1003, dated 7th October 1874.	- - - -	Theft of a bullock and a cow, which were recovered.	50 0 0	1. Saleh wd. Soonja Boorah. 2. Adam wd. Duriai Boorah.	1356, October 13th.	
39	In September or October.	Munnoo, Bunia - -	On the road near the village of Barejunjo.	Robbery of a donkey and other property.	14 15 4	1. Pinya wd Dhoora Gunja of Dhiratch. 2. Ibrahim wd. Oobaio Gunja of Dhiratch.	1368, October 16th.	

W. L. MEREWETHER, Colonel,
Commissioner in Sind.

No. 190.

No. 2543 P., dated Fort William, 24th November 1874.

From C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters Nos. 1145 and 1156, dated respectively the 5th and 9th instant.

2. Your suggestions for the re-establishment of order in Khelat will be discussed by the Governor-General in Council on your arrival at Calcutta. With regard, however, to the violation of British territory by Zaroor, Brahooee, with an armed band on 14th August last, his Excellency in Council observes that some explanation should be submitted of the reason why the case was not reported to this office until the 9th instant. I am further to inquire what steps were taken by the local authorities on the occurrence of this outrage.

3. The Governor General in Council desires also to be furnished with full details of the "repeated acts of violence" committed on British by Khelat subjects alluded to in paragraph 3 of your letter No. 1145, dated the 5th instant, and of the measures thereon adopted.

No. 191.

No. 1213, dated Camp Saidabad, 28th November 1874.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to Honourable Sir R. H. Davies, K.C.S.I., Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

COLONEL LOCH, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, having submitted to me his report drawn up in accordance with Government of India letter No. 2214 P. of 9th October 1874, also that of Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan, I have the honour to forward them both to you, together with a memorandum drawn up by me on the subject under discussion. I believe this course will best meet the views of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council, as it allows of your passing any remarks you may wish to make before the whole is laid before Government, and I hope be satisfactory to you.

2. Colonel Loch, in forwarding to me copy of Captain Sandeman's report, states he did so without that officer being aware of it, and that if this was irregular Captain Sandeman was in no way to blame.

Enclosure 1 in No. 191.

No. 1212, dated Camp Saidabad, 28th November 1874.

Memorandum by Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind.

AFTER careful perusal of the two reports annexed hereto, especially of the one by the Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan, Captain Sandeman, I can only repeat what is stated in my letter No. 1145, dated 5th November last, especially paragraphs 11 to 17 inclusive, and with even greater emphasis.

2. In parts of paragraphs 14 and 15 I said of the Murrees :—

"They do not understand forbearance. They regard it as weakness, and increase in audacity and insolence in proportion. They must be taught obedience to ensure any permanent peace or security, and must be made to understand that the British power is to be unhesitatingly feared.

"This cannot be obtained by presents or payments; conciliation now will only make matters worse, confirming the Murrees in their belief that their power is feared."

This is my firm opinion formed after an acquaintance with these people of nearly thirty years, and one which I think all experience will prove is the true and sound one.

3. Captain Sandeman's arguments are based mostly on wrong premises, or his conclusions are incorrectly drawn from his being unacquainted with all collateral circumstances, and not having been on the frontier at the time when some of the facts he

alludes to took place. He also, naturally enough,—considering his deficiency in knowledge of the most important parts of the questions at issue, and his regard is firstly and most strongly directed to the advantages to be derived for his own charge—attaches too much importance to the idea of settling the Murrees only by any means—everything and everyone else may be left alone to come right or not as it or they please. This might answer for a time for the frontier in the Lower Derajat, but not for the British border as a whole. It would, as Colonel Loch justly observes, only make matters worse. Others would follow the lawless example of the Murrees, seeing the advantages the latter had gained, and the Murrees themselves would after a while become more exacting than ever.

4. As I propose sending this memorandum with the two reports direct to his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab for his perusal, and any remarks he may desire to add in their transmission to the Government of India, I will make brief comments on those parts of Captain Sandeman's report in which I consider he has been adopting a line of argument which might lead to very erroneous conclusions.

In paragraph 11 appears—

"To be successful in our dealings with the tribes, we must bear in mind that their chieftains are independent of us, and not subject to our rules and orders." This is a very wrong and dangerous position to take up. It is giving the Murrees and other tribes that seem to be alluded to—but which are intended I do not know—suddenly a status they never had, never dreamed of having, and such as they ought never to be allowed to have. It is making them completely independent, and placing them on a par even with the Government that begins to treat with, not command them. The Murrees are properly subjects of the Khelat Government, and this they have never denied, neither have they really ever objected to being so, on the contrary they still adhere to the old feudal feeling towards their legitimate sovereign, though they are regardless of strict obedience. If we ignore the Khelat Government, and assume the position it formerly held towards the Murrees, we must inevitably lose character and power unless we also assume the right of exacting and commanding obedience; and unless we do bring them under our rule and orders, we had better leave them alone and treat them as they show themselves, lawless thieves and robbers. Half-and-half measures will never answer with any Asiatics, still less with such wild reckless people as these. To have any real influence over them we must order and they must obey. If they do the latter thoroughly, treat them with every consideration and favour, but if they are disobedient in the least, punish them immediately and severely. It was this course that brought the Boogtees to order.

5. The quotation from Sir Henry Green's letter shows that the Khan of Khelat was ruler over the hill tribes, but had difficulty in controlling them. It no way proves that these tribes were independent, or that they were ever regarded or treated as such. The second extract is suggestive of the Murrees being treated simply as robbers, whose evil deeds should be met by alertness and the strong hand. That if caught *in flagrante delicto* they would be punished. If they escaped for the time with plunder, the responsibility of the Khan in regard to them as his subjects would be enforced, and their responsibility to him. This is the first time I ever heard attributed to Sir Henry Green that he did not hold the Murrees or any other tribes responsible for plundering British subjects, and his words certainly do not bear out such a view. The Murree chief knows perfectly well what "orders" mean, and that he is presuming greatly when he disobeys them. Treaty would certainly be out of place. But when the chief receives payment and favour from a superior power, it surely is not unreasonable to suppose that he will be at least obedient to what is commanded by that power. As for his not having the power to restore the plunder, Captain Sandeman must know as well as everyone else does, that the whole or its equivalent could and would have been restored had proper pressure been enforced. But when excuses were accepted he would have been silly to yield.

6. I most certainly consider that if any order is to be maintained on the border, the public avowal of the Murree Chief's submission and his personal appearance before the Political Superintendent should be firmly insisted upon before any idea of negotiations is entertained, and that then we should dictate the future terms, and if he refuses make him stand the consequences. I do not concur in any part of Captain Sandeman's 14th and 15th paragraphs. There are no people so keen to detect and take advantage of a temporising and mild course as these wild chieftains, and none at the same time better appreciate bold and determined demeanour towards them. If Guzzun Khan's pride from successful plunder and long impunity has reached that extent that he dares to refuse obedience and redress for a series of misdeeds, and when demanded direct from him, it

must be curbed, and by a good thrashing if his persistence renders it necessary. We must compel them to respect our power. Then all present difficulties will vanish. Not to insist on this is only deferring the issue for a time with constantly recurring disturbance, which he will again say he is unable to put a stop to. Confidence will not be secured unless firm strength is clearly shown.

7. Any experiment must fail that commences with a display of weakness, and as regards Guzzun's letters, those addressed of late to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, and all relating to affairs on the frontier of Upper Sind, have been most insolent and unbecoming. As before often stated by me, he chose to behave loyally enough to the Punjab side, because it suited his purpose well to do so, but that is no justification for his disloyalty and lawless acts in all other directions, and the sooner he is made to understand this the better. The fact of his having lately given back two camels to Sirdar Imam Buksh is mentioned in his favour. It is not a very hard thing for him to return two camels, when by doing so he has every reason to expect he may retain hundreds.*

* The present conduct of the Murrees, and the success to them which has attended it, is also rapidly demoralizing the Boogtees, who lie between them and the British border.
(Sd.) W.L.M.

8. Colonel Loch is perfectly right in considering that simply taking the Murrees into pay will have no real or lasting effect now in protecting trade through the Bolan and Kutchee. Circumstances have changed greatly since the Mittunkote Conference, and what was admitted by me then to be possible has ceased to be so. Through untoward events the breach between the Khan of Khelat and his Sirdars has been widened, past closing, and the power of the Khan to enforce his authority, as well as unfortunately his wish to act cordially with us, has sunk to the lowest ebb.

9. The conditions of that conference were to have been carried out in conjunction with and in the name of the Khan. This cannot now be done as the Government of Khelat is at present constituted. The Brahooee tribes on the line of the Bolan, such as the Summalani Minguls, Khoords, and others, also the Kakurs, would immediately follow the example of the Murrees to get the same reward, and the Murrees would only have to remain quiet to be regarded as perfectly loyal, while the trade would be molested as much as ever. If the Murrees attempted to act it would only increase inter-tribal feuds, with no security to merchants, and no clear responsibility on anyone.

10. Khelat politics were carefully excluded at the Conference after consultation between his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor and myself, because his Honour considered, I believe I am correct in saying so, that they were beyond his control and province. The proposal to take the Sarawans into pay and Shere Dil Muzzeranee Murree was an after arrangement consequent on the continued misconduct of the main portion of the Murrees. But it was only to have been carried out in communication with the Khan of Khelat, and as his assent was not given the thing fell to the ground. It would have strengthened his hands in that quarter, and have permitted of his using all his power to keep Jalawan, the southern portion, in order. But as he did not accept it, and his power has since decreased, it is manifest that Colonel Loch's view of the Jalawans likewise requiring subsidizing is a true one, and the infallible result of such a course being followed while there is no working Government in the country.

11. Whether the Murrees behaved ill or well has never had any material effect one way or the other on the differences between the Khan and his barons. So Captain Sandeman's plan would be no assistance to him. On the other hand, subsidizing them notwithstanding the injury they have of late done to his country and people, and publicly withdrawing them from the allegiance which they never themselves denied, must act injuriously on his position and that of any subsequent ruler. It would have all the other bad effects noted above, inducing his Sirdars to fly more and more away from his control, and to join a system which is manifestly more paying than obedience.

12. The course pursued by General Jacob, as quoted by Captain Sandeman, does not resemble that arranged for at the Mittunkote Conference. The Jakranees and Dhoombkees were Belooch tribes residing within the British border, south of Jacobabad. They were entertained as scouts and guides to be attached to the regiments of Sind Horse, and collected intelligence or accompanied detachments on patrolling duty. They do so still. The outpost of Gundava was from the first, and until Colonel Phayre inadvisably altered it, occupied solely by Boogtee sowars under the famous Alum Khan, Kalpoor. They were only placed there after the tribe had received most severe punishment and fully tendered their submission. Their duty was to watch and send in early intelligence of intended forays, not for the protection of the Sind frontier. That was well cared for by the regular troops, the regiments of Sind Horse. This arrangement was most materially different to that spoken of by Captain Sandeman. If the Murrees were brought to their senses equally with the Boogtees, I have no doubt they would do equally good work as

the Boogtees under Alum Khan and others did. That very fine specimen of a border Lootoo, Alum Khan, Kalpoor, unfortunately after some 20 years of excellent service allowed himself to fall into a trap, and be led astray by the machinations of those who were jealous of him, and had to be removed from his post. He died a few years ago, but before that fully acknowledged the grave fault he had committed, and his regret at having been so foolish as to allow himself to be taken in, as he undoubtedly was.

13. As to the force to be used, I quite agree that should such an expedition be sent into the hills ever, it should be of such strength as to overcome any opposition that might be offered, and to enforce whatever was demanded if compulsion became necessary. The troops mentioned would answer the purpose well. Full powers should, however, be given to the head of the expedition to use his own judgment and act as he considered best to carry out the instructions he may receive. He should certainly not have to wait passive until a reference can be made if active measures must be taken. It would be a most dangerous thing to do. I would not advocate burning and destroying, carrying fire and sword through the country. If the Murrees proved obstinate and had to be coerced they should be followed wherever they go until they fight or surrender. They could not get away as all around now are deadly hostile to them, and they must stand. After defeat or surrender a heavy penalty should be laid on the tribe, which should be scrupulously exacted and hostages taken for future good conduct. Beyond the above, property should be respected, and especially all crops be carefully left untouched. It is most cruel as well as highly impolitic to destroy the little food these people might possess, thereby driving families into starvation or desperation. This proper forbearance, so different to what they would do themselves, would have a much more telling effect than the other style of lenity.

14. We know the country well and there would be no difficulty in conducting operations to a successful issue. Captain Sandeman is not quite right in supposing that hill campaigns have always failed in their object. Major Billamore's in 1839 was a great success. Sir Charles Napier went into the Boogtee Hills, not after the Boogtees, but in pursuit of the Jakranees and Dhoombkees who had fled there from the plains of Kutchee. They were captured and located in Sind. On that occasion the Boogtees were passive. The Murrees were in close communication with us and gave useful assistance. The Dhoombkees and Jakranees being at last driven into a corner and unable to retire into the Murree Hills, surrendered. It was after this in 1846, and only because the Dhoombkees and Jakranees were taken out of the way, that the Boogtees commenced plundering in Sind. The heavy punishment they received in 1847 and 1848 brought them to order.

15. Sir Henry Green's expedition with the Khan against the Murrees was most successful. They submitted entirely and gave in hostages. But the good effect was nullified afterwards by political intrigues at Khelat, which led to the flight of the hostages back to their own hills.

16. In respect to the route to be taken and the places to be visited, that may well be left to the commander of the expedition after the first object of settling the Murrees has been gained. But under any circumstances I should not be prepared to recommend too extensive a parade, and would not advise its being carried into Tull Chooteallee, and certainly not to the Khakur country, which is most difficult and would involve us with subjects properly belonging to his Highness the Ameer of Cabul.

17. In conclusion it only remains for me to add that, in the present state of affairs in Khelat, I consider it will be little use dealing with the Murree question alone, unless it is intended to bring that tribe into thorough obedience, and to substitute a dominant power over them in place of that of his Highness the Khan's, and strictly maintain it. From all, however, that I have written and advocated, I think it will be understood that I consider the treatment of this tribe separately as wrong in policy and quite contrary to the principles that should be held in view in arranging for peace and security on the western border of Sind. It might answer for the Lower Punjab Frontier, but it must inevitably cause greater disorders and more difficult complications in Beloochistan. It cannot possibly improve safety to merchants passing from Afghanistan through Kutchee in Sind, and it is almost certain to make that line of route even more dangerous that it is now. To my mind the control of the Murrees and the rearrangement of the Khelat Government are and must be inseparable, and that the former should follow rather than precede the latter. I would, therefore, most strongly urge that no expedition into the Murree Hills should be attempted until decision has been arrived at in reference to the proposals I have had the honour to submit regarding the course which should be adopted to bring about more

satisfactory management in the Khelat Government, and a sounder state of affairs in Beloochistan generally.

[Here follows copy of letter from Commissioner in Sind to Foreign Department, No. 1145, dated 5th November 1874. Vide page 490.]

Enclosure 2 in No. 191.

No. 20–3, dated Jacobabad, 20th November 1874.

From Colonel F. Loch, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your endorsement No. 1146, dated 5th November 1874, forwarding for my information copy of letter No. 2214, dated 9th October 1874, from the Secretary to the Government of India, and of your reply thereto, No. 1145, dated 5th November 1874; and with regard to the former, I trust I may be forgiven for expressing my opinions regarding the treatment I would recommend being now adopted towards the Murree tribe, as they are opposed to those of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council and the Punjab Government.

2. I feel it would be wrong in me if I did not, with the greatest deference, point out that I much fear any leniency and forbearance shown to the Murrees in their present proud and arrogant state of mind will be altogether misunderstood by them, and unless their Sirdar, Guzzun Khan, is first of all made to obey orders, and thus prove to all the other chiefs that the orders given by the British authorities are to be strictly adhered to, that the line of policy adopted on the Punjab, and which his Excellency the Viceroy would desire to be introduced on the Sind Frontier, if now put in force towards the Murrees, would in the end only lead to disappointment, as it would be weakening the position and power of the Political Superintendent on the Frontier, lowering to the prestige of the British Government, and must in my opinion slowly but surely lead to the worst results, for having thus evaded carrying out the orders issued through me in February 1872 and since, and not being obliged to keep his promise made to Captain Sandeman relative to the restoration of the plundered booty, would not only make the Murree chief more contumacious, insolent, and difficult to manage, but the fact of a deputation of European officers being sent to settle the Murree differences and to arrange for subsidizing them, when it was well known that he, Guzzun Khan, refused to come to Jacobabad for this purpose, would have the very worst effect, not only on him and the Kahun Murrees, but I greatly fear that the other chiefs seeing that Guzzun Khan had by obstinate persistency and steady neglect and disobedience of all orders had at last gained his end and object, and had been treated as a prince instead of a petty chief, would be induced to follow in his footsteps, and thus we should have to treat with each successive chief, commencing from the Seree Bolan to the Mekran coast to the south, and all along the Sind Frontier to the Punjab in the east, as every one of the chiefs, however small, would consider he had a right to some share of the subsidy for keeping quiet, never mind how trifling his position might be, and this, I think, I am borne out in saying by the speech made by his Highness the Khan to Major Harrison, quoted in his letter No. 39 of 5th March 1872, viz., "that he, the Khan, had written regarding the "Sarawans with the best intentions, as the Jalawans would also expect money and "behave badly if they did not get it," thus showing the then prevalent feeling throughout the tribes.

3. If a deputation of European officers were sent to arrange matters with the Murree chief, no one sooner than his Highness the Khan of Khelat would become aware of the fact, and it would be an incentive for him to pay still less heed to the requests of the British officers for the extradition of certain chiefs, thieves, and blackguards of sorts than he even now does, if that is possible, and his officials naturally would take their tone from their sovereign, and thus the present state of affairs in Kutchee, Lus Beyla, and which is bad enough now, would it appears to me become worse instead of better, and in the end lead to greater complications and more bloodshed than if an armed force was now sent to coerce both his Highness and his refractory subjects, the Kahan Murrees, into subjection.

4. I am aware it is Captain Sandeman's opinion, and I believe that of many others, that it would be cruelly murdering a number of inoffensive persons if an armed force

was sent against the Murrees, as we would not only have to fight those of the Kahan section, but the Loharanees, Gurchanee, and others, but this I disagree to, for if the treatment which has been followed so long on the Punjab frontier has had a proper effect, those tribes who have benefited by the peace and tranquillity on the border, and others who wish for the same benefits, will, or ought to, if they wish for peace and tranquillity, force Guzzun and his followers to give in and to obey orders; or in the event of coercive measures being adopted, they would assist us against the Kahan Murrees, and attempt to prevent them from escaping, instead of opposing us, and thus bringing punishment on themselves. Moreover, the fact of our not having forced the Murree Sirdar into obedience would spread far and wide, being magnified as it was repeated, and would thus not only lead those who are now constantly committing depredations on our border to carry them on to a still greater extent, but others at present peaceably disposed, having heard of the treatment the refractory Murree chief received at the hands of the British Government, would feel that they like him had only to continue persistently in their bad ways, and have the same amount of punishment meted out to them.

5. I altogether concur in the opinion expressed by you in your reply to the Secretary to the Government of India, and feel convinced that the end predicted by you will eventually come to pass, if the Murree Chief and others situated like him are permitted to set the orders of the British officers at defiance as he has done; and should his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council still desire the instructions conveyed in paragraph 11 of letter No. 2214 of the Secretary to the Foreign Department, dated 9th October 1874, carried into effect, I would, with all due respect, suggest that the Murree Sirdar, as set forth in letter No. 1546 of the 11th July, from the Secretary to the Government of India, be directed to apologize for his conduct within a certain time, and that he be required to make restitution of the plundered booty and return all cattle carried off from Kuttun in August last, and when this was done any orders and instructions Government might deem fit to issue relative to the subsidizing of the various tribes could be carried into effect.

6. I am well aware that my predecessor, Colonel Phayre, C.B., strongly advocated the Punjab policy, that of subsidizing being introduced into the frontier, and it was so far carried out during his tenure of office, that 15 Murrees and 16 Boogtee sowars were taken into Government pay, but I would ask with what effect? None as far as I can see; for in February 1872, as you are well aware, it was with the greatest difficulty that the Boogtee Sirdar, Gholam Moorteza, was prevailed on to meet the Commissioner in Sind, and as already stated the Murree Chief never has come to Jacobabad, putting off his attendance with all sorts of equivocal excuses, although I personally at Shahpoor told his Vakeel, Syud Fazal Shah, that he had better go back to his Sirdar and tell Guzzun that now is the time, come at once, make your obeisance to your Khan, get his permission to pay your respects to the Political Superintendent and the Commissioner in Sind, and return with them to Jacobabad; but even this kindly advice was neglected, and the only reply was a letter full of excuses similar to many already received. It is true until lately the Boogtee have been behaving very well, little or no cattle-lifting has been carried on by them, and on almost every occasion of cattle having been taken from Sind the Boogtee Sirdar has managed to cause their restoration. This, however, I do not entirely ascribe to the beneficial effect of subsidizing, but to the great moral effect taught them by General Jacob and his officers, viz., that if they followed their own wild desires, and disobeyed the Sirdar's orders by plundering on the frontier, they not only could but would be punished. Had the Murrees ever been treated with this forcible description of argument and advice, I believe Guzzun Khan and his followers would now understand their position with regard to us better than they do, and that they would consequently be more obedient and amenable.

7. The Murrees have for some years past, it is true, given up plundering on the Punjab border, because it suits their interest to be friends with some of the British officers, in the hopes, I believe, that in the event of their at length getting into extremes with us, they may have some one to intercede for them, and thus assist in warding off the punishment they feel they deserve at our hands. But has subsidizing the Murrees ever in any way prevented their plundering in Kutchee, or wreaking their vengeance on their neighbours and carrying off their flocks and herds. I answer no, and I am borne out in this by the following words made use of in Captain Sandeman's letter No. 18, dated 6th January 1874:—

"I have the honour to report that during the past few weeks the Murree clan have

made two very serious raids on tribes residing just beyond the British border, which have caused much uneasiness amongst our own frontier tribes.

"2. The first raid was led by the Tomandar Guzzun Khan himself, and was made on the Khetrans. The Murree force came quite close to the British border in front of Dehra Ghazee Khan itself. It numbered 700 footmen and 500 horse. The Khetrans lost seven killed, and a large number of cattle, sheep, and goats, besides a few mares. The Murrees lost two men killed.

"3. To-day a second raid is reported by the Murrees on the Musa Kheyl, a Pathan tribe, also raiding just beyond our border. The Murrees are said to have numbered 2,000 fighting men and to have killed 16 Pathans. Their loss is said to be only two killed. The booty carried off is said to be very large.

"4. I have thought it necessary to report these two raids, more especially because this is the first time I have ever heard of the Murree Tomundar Guzzun taking the field in person. It is reported to me that he is getting quite rich on plunder, and is in consequence becoming very unreliable, and the tribe itself more and more demoralized; moreover, this is the first time I have known the Murree army come so near to the Dehra Ghazee border in force. Hitherto they have, when making their raids, confined themselves beyond and on the Rajunpoor border.

"5. A copy of this report will be submitted to Colonel Loch for the information of the Commissioner in Sind."

And as will be seen on reference to letter forwarded under my endorsement, No. 3170, dated 11th instant, they have just committed another great raid on the Kakur Pathans, killing no less than 60 of them. This surely does not say much for any moral improvement on the wild and lawless Murrees, and the late raid committed on this border by a combined party of Murrees and Boogtees, referred to in paragraph 23 of Captain Sandeman's report accompanying, still further proves the force and correctness of my arguments.

8. The Murrees are getting more wealthy every month I believe, and as they attain wealth so they increase in pride, arrogance, and lawlessness, and I very much fear that, until they are taught to feel that they are not the wonderfully brave and invincible clan that they now think themselves, we shall have no real or lasting peace on the border. Subsidizing a people of this description will to my mind only increase instead of diminishing their present exalted ideas, and lead to worse raiding and more bloodshed than now, for if these tribes or sections which suffer so much at their hands and wish for peace will not now assist us to prevent their dreaded neighbours, the Murrees, gaining power, it is not likely they will do so hereafter when the Murrees have become still more powerful.

9. The Boogtee Sirdar, I fully believe, is faithful to the British Government, and tries his best to keep his tribe from plundering or in any way injuring any British subjects, and until lately has succeeded well. Of late, however, from some cause which I cannot at present fathom, many of his Mottabars, elders, are dissatisfied with him and have left him, some of them joining the Murrees. I cannot help feeling that there is some underhand influence being carried on by his enemies, to the end that Gholam Moorteza may be induced to give up the position of ruler of the Boogtee tribe, in order that his son Shabaz Khan, a young man apparently of strong passions and desires, but of a malleable disposition in the hands of a clever and wily man, may be elected their ruler or chief, in the hopes that he might by bad advice be drawn into some foolish act such as he was lately guilty of, and which if repeated would by degrees lead to the disgrace and possibly in the end to the utter ruin of the tribe.

10. By advocating the foregoing line of policy, I am aware I may be accused of aiming at the eventual annexation of Beloochistan and the occupation of Quettah, but such is not the reason for my recommending coercive measures now being adopted. All I desire is to see a strong and lasting peace established along the whole of this border, and our connexions again on a proper and healthy footing with his Highness the Khan of Khelat and his turbulent subjects; but until some strong and severe measures are adopted I fear no lasting peace can be looked for.

11. I again respectfully hope that I may be forgiven for writing this much, knowing it to be opposed to the opinions expressed by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, but at the same time should his Excellency still desire the line of policy proposed at the Mittunkote Conference in 1869 to be carried into effect, I will, in conjunction with Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan, strive with my utmost endeavours to meet with his Excellency the Viceroy's wishes, and give the new policy at least a fair chance of succeeding.

12. Having said this much, I will now proceed to state what I conceive would be the best means for attaining the object aimed at, viz., that of establishing peace on this as well as on the Punjab frontier by means of subsidizing or taking into our pay a certain number of each of the tribes. If this merely referred to the Murrees and these tribes on our frontier, there would be little or no difficulty attending its adoption, as I presume the Murree Sirdar, Guzzun Khan, Kurrum Khan, Bijaranee, and the other chiefs, on being informed of our desire to make peace on certain conditions, would readily accept our terms so long as the duty to be performed met with their approval. But this would only be carrying into effect a very small portion of the grand scheme, and consequently would be liable at any moment to collapse. If this arrangement is to be carried out at all, I would recommend that the terms decided on at the Mittunkote Conference be adhered to so far as our altered attitude towards his Highness the Khan of Khelat will admit of it, and that if it is considered necessary to exclude his Highness from this new line of policy, his nobles the Sarawan and Jalawan chiefs be taken into our pay, as well as the other minor chiefs through whose country the kafilas pass; but this would again lead to further difficulties and complications, as we should have to treat with the Bezunjaos and Jamotees under Ali Khan, who has only lately made his escape from Hyderabad in Sind, where he had been under surveillance since 1870.

13. In paragraph 11 of the Foreign Secretary's letter, to which my particular attention has been directed, there are three points Captain Sandeman and I are called to report on: first, the composition of the party forming the expedition; secondly, the route they should take; and thirdly, the instructions to be given to them.

14. With regard to the first, that is the composition of the party, Captain Sandeman and I are quite of one opinion regarding the officers to form it, and the strength of the escort to accompany it, viz., Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier; Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat; Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan, and the two officers in command of the troops. The escort to consist of one regiment Sind Horse, one wing Jacob's Rifles and Jacobabad mountain train, one regiment Punjab Cavalry, and one regiment Punjab Infantry, and we are induced to recommend such a large force to overawe the tribes, and make them feel that we have the power to coerce them if it was the object or intention of Government to do so.

15. The route to be taken will depend much on the final orders of Government as to how far they intend the arrangements for the safe transit of caravans and traders being now carried into effect. If it is the intention of Government that the present party should only settle the Murree question, then the plan proposed by Captain Sandeman should be adopted, viz., that he and the troops from the Punjab, and I and the troops from this, should start so that we could join forces on the Shum Plain on a certain date. From there we should march together to and encamp on the large plain near Barkan Lugari, at which place all the chiefs of the Murrees and other tribes inhabiting this part of the country should be invited to meet us on a certain date. In the event of an amicable arrangement being come to, the party should then visit all the large Murree and Pathan towns, taking the escort with them, as I am inclined to think that a display of troops amongst these wild people might have a good effect, and if necessary, the party could then proceed *viâ* the Hunn Pass through the Looni Pathan country, and then get on Captain Sandeman's road which goes from the Lookee Surwah Pass to the head of the Bolan, where they would meet with the Dhoomur, Kakur, and Muzaranee chiefs. Unless it should be considered desirable that, after having finally arranged with the Murree chiefs, the party should proceed by the shortest route, viz., by Khott Moondai into Kutchee, where the Sarawan, Jalawan, and Khoord Sirdars with the smaller chiefs already mentioned should be assembled. In which case the Punjab portion of the force could return at once from Barkan Lugari, or so soon as we considered it desirable to sanction its departure, and another regiment of Sind Horse, if necessary, could join the party in Kutchee.

16. The instructions to be given to party, I would respectfully urge, should, in my opinion, be most explicit and unmistakeable on all points, more especially regarding the course to be adopted towards his Highness the Khan and his nobles, which appears to me the most difficult question we have now to deal with, more especially as this question was not discussed at the Mittunkote Conference. As the aspect of political affairs on this border has considerably altered since then, I do not well see how the Khan and his Sirdars can now be left out of the proposed arrangement, if peace and tranquility are expected on our western frontier. It is well known to Government that at present a state of lawlessness bordering on anarchy pervades the whole of his Highness' country, extending from the head of the Bolan to the sea coast, and

therefore to produce a different state of affairs, whereby plundering and outrage within or near the British western frontier may be prevented, one of two measures must be adopted, viz., that of using armed force or a persuasive policy, and the Government have declared their intention to follow the latter course.

17. The position now assumed by his Highness the Khan towards the British Government has been so frequently reported on by the Commissioner in Sind that it is needless my touching on it, excepting expressing my opinion that unless some agreement or treaty is entered into with his Highness, I fear that any arrangements which we might make for the protection of trade and tranquillity of our frontier could be upset by his Highness, and it will therefore be necessary to determine whether the Khan should be permitted to join the conference with his nobles and the minor chiefs, should he desire to do so, and under what terms and conditions the Government would accord their sanction to such a proposal if made by his Highness the Khan.

18. It is very evident that to ensure the end aimed at by Government, the measures to bring about such a state of affairs must be worked either through his Highness the Khan or his nobles, but if the latter, it must in time increase instead of lessen the bitter feeling which now exists. I therefore do not see how his Highness could well be excluded from taking a part in the meeting of his nobles and chiefs should he intimate his anxious desire to do so.

19. Another matter regarding which some specific instructions will be required is the sum Government would consider sufficient to complete the proposed arrangements. At the Mittunkote Conference it was suggested, and afterwards approved of by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, that a sum of Rupees 32,040 per annum should be sanctioned for the entertainment of certain horsemen of the Murree and Boogtee tribes; but if the Brahooee Sirdars and the chiefs of the various tribes along our western frontier are to be taken into our pay in the same way that the Murrees and Boogtees have been, a much larger sum than this will be required. The Commissioner in Sind in his letter No. 171, dated 25th February 1873, proposed as follows: that the Sher Dil Muzaranee Murrees should receive Rupees 6,000, the Sarawans Rupees 1,200, Boogtees Rupees 5,520, and the Murrees Rupees 8,000 per annum, but only that portion of it relative to the Boogtees and Sher Dil Murree has been carried out, and the latter only partly so. As already stated, the sum proposed to be allotted to the Sarawan chief did not meet with his Highness the Khan's approval, and he informed the Political Agent, Khelat, that if the sum of Rupees 30,000 per annum was paid to the Sarawans, Jalawans, and Muzaranees, satisfactory arrangements might be made; a similar amount therefore to that paid to the Sarawan chiefs, viz., Rupees 12,000 per annum, would, I presume, have to be paid to the Jalawan chief to ensure his aid and assistance. It therefore becomes necessary for the Government to decide as to whether they consider the benefits to be derived authorise the expenditure of such a large yearly subsidy. In the event of his Highness the Khan's subsidy of Rupees 50,000 not being restored to him, there would be no difficulty in granting the amount required I presume, but I feel that if such an arrangement was made it would lead to further ruptures between his Highness and the Sirdars, which would not only widen the breach now between them, but would in the end defeat the present object of the British Government; and in letter No. 3167, dated 15th July 1871, his Excellency the Governor of Bombay stated his disapproval of his Highness' subsidy being reduced for this purpose.

20. The course we have to pursue towards the Murree tribe is, I understand, as follows:—First, to explain to the chiefs and their headmen most fully the desire of the British Government for peace on the frontier and protection to trade; to listen to all they may have to bring forward regarding their supposed or alleged grievances; to inquire into the rights and privileges formerly enjoyed by the various tribes as to the receipts of certain fees for the protection of trade down the Bolan Pass through Kutchee and to the Punjab frontier; to determine what sums should be paid them now according to ancient custom; to settle the number of sowars to be entertained, and the duty required of each tribe in return.

21. The Kahun and Bijaranee Murrees should also be obliged to depute some one of standing amongst them, if possible connected with the chiefs, with from eight to ten sowars each, to remain as security for their future good behaviour, and the chiefs on the Punjab frontier should be required to furnish similar security. The subsidy to be paid as now by the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to the tribes on his border, and by the Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan, to those along his frontier.

22. I am of opinion that the political officers should meddle as little as they possibly

ean with the inter-tribal quarrels, and that no interference should be attempted excepting in cases of extensive raids or serious feuds likely to endanger the tranquillity of the border. The chiefs should be taught to feel and understand that the peace and quiet of each tribe depended almost entirely on that of their neighbours, so that in time, in the event of one tribe proving unruly, those in their immediate neighbourhood, if necessary, might be employed to coerce the tribe behaving thus into subjection.

23. My predecessor, Colonel Phayre, C.B., recommended that Murree and Boogtee posts should be stationed at certain points in the Murrow and Sangseela valleys, but this I do not consider in any way necessary, as I do not believe the fact of stationing a certain number of armed men between the Murrees and Boogtees, or between them and the other tribes, would prevent either raiding or inter-tribal quarrels. I am of opinion that we should merely explain most fully and clearly what the wishes and instructions of the British Government are, what remuneration the tribes will receive if they act up to them, leaving the details of how the proposed arrangements are to be completed to the chiefs and their tribes.

24. In the event of any cattle or other property being plundered from British territory, the chiefs should be obliged to hold themselves responsible for the restoration of the same and the punishment of the offender.

25. If any arrangements for the protection of kafilas coming through the Bolan, and prevention of plundering and outrage on our western border, are now to be made, it will be necessary to summon the Sarawan and Jalawan and Koord Sirdars, as well as all the minor chiefs of the Dhoormurs and Kakurs, Muzarees, Rhinds, Dhoombkees, Mugzees, Jamotees, Bezunjaos, and Chootas, to meet the expedition either at Barkan, Lugari or Kutchee, and I am inclined to consider it would be better if this was to take place at Bagh in Kutchee, more especially so in the event of his Highness the Khan desiring to attend and being permitted to.

26. After the desire and intentions of the British Government had been fully explained and entered into with all the chiefs, the duties and obligations required of them, and the remuneration they would receive in return for their service put forcibly before them, if they agreed to the terms, all the details of placing posts for the protection of trade and the payment of the various tribes, as well as the settlement of petty quarrels, could easily be left to the Sirdars and their chiefs.

27. With regard to the date of the party starting, Captain Sandeman and I are at issue, as he is of opinion that the expedition should start at once. I, on the other hand, consider if Government should decide to send a party it would be better to let the chiefs and their tribes know some time beforehand that on a certain date it is the intention of Government to depute certain officers with an armed escort to proceed into the Murree country to make arrangements for the peace of the border and protection of trade, and that this party will visit some of the large towns belonging to the Murrees and Pathans, if necessary, proceed either by the Bolan, Khott Moondai, or through Kahun into Kutchee. If this is not done, and time given to the chiefs fully to realise what is intended, I fear that they may take alarm, and simply through fear absent themselves from the meeting, and thus at the outset nullify the object of the expedition.

28. After this last most severe inundation I consider it is most necessary that I should be at Jacobabad during your whole stay here, as there are many most essential points which can only be brought forward and discussed by myself regarding my civil duties, and on which the prosperity of the people, the increase of revenue, as well as the suppression of crime in this district, depend. His Excellency Sir C. Staveley having intimated his intention of paying Jacobabad a visit in the end of January, I am sure you will agree with me that I, as Commandant on this important frontier, ought to be present to meet him, there being many subjects of great importance connected with the military portion of my duties which I feel ought to be discussed with the new Bombay Commander-in-Chief.

Enclosure 3 in No. 191.

No. 2, dated Camp Jacobabad, 16th November 1874.

From Captain R. G. Sandeman, on Special Duty, Jacobabad, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

I HAVE the honour to reply to your letter No. 1858, dated Lahore, the 30th October last, forwarding for my information and guidance the correspondence noted in

the margin. My particular attention was directed to paragraph 11 of the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 2214, dated Fort William, the 9th October 1874, to the address of the Commissioner in Sind. It conveyed the sanction of his Excellency the Viceroy in Council to a friendly expedition proceeding into the hills west of and beyond the border, of the nature of the one proposed in 1869. The officers composing the expedition are to be empowered to arrange the terms of peace with the Murree clan, and to explain to the tribes generally the desire of our Government for peace on our frontier and protection to trade. They are to put in force the arrangements sanctioned in the letters noted in the margin, and generally to effect an adjustment of inter-tribal quarrels for the safe transit of kafilahs.

To Bombay Government, No. 2336P., dated 27th October 1871.
To Commissioner in Sind, No. 1546, dated 11th July 1873.

2. But before permitting the expedition to start, his Excellency the Viceroy in Council required from the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and the Commissioner in Sind certain information of the nature named in the Foreign Secretary's letter quoted above, to enable the Government of India to issue detailed instructions for the guidance of those composing the expedition. This information you directed me to obtain in concert and consultation with Colonel Loch, the Political Superintendent on the Frontier, and to proceed to Jacobabad for the purpose. I at once did as directed, as already reported, and having fully consulted Colonel Loch regarding the information called for, I have the honour to submit herewith the result of our deliberations.

3. The points regarding which the Government of India require detailed information are :—

I. The composition of the party and the escort to accompany it.
II. The route it is proposed the expedition should take and the places it should visit.
III. The instructions which should be issued to the officers composing the expedition.

4. After fully discussing with Colonel Loch point No. I., we are of opinion that the escort should consist of a small but efficient body of troops of all arms. We would recommend its being composed of the troops given in the margin. Our reasons for considering so many troops to be necessary will be placed before you when I come to discuss point No. III. Regarding the composition of the party, we consider it should consist of Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent and Commandant, Sind Frontier Force; Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat; Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan, and the officers commanding the Sind and Punjab troops.

Sind Mountain Battery.
1st Regiment Sind Horse.
1st Punjab Cavalry.
350 Jacob's Rifles.
1st Regiment Punjab Infantry.

5. The next point regarding which our opinion is required is the route the expedition should take, and the places it ought to be authorised to visit did circumstances permit of its doing so. We consider that the rendezvous to be named where the Sind and Punjab troops should assemble on the date fixed should be the Shum Plain. It is easy of access from Jacobabad and from Rajunpoor. From the Shum Plain the expedition should march westward to Lugari Barkan, a distance of from 40 to 45 miles. It belongs to our own Lugari chief, Jamal Khan, and is therefore neutral ground. In other respects it is very favourably situated. It commands the approaches to the Murree chief townships of Kahan, Khott Mundai, and Mahomed. Direct and easy routes reach it from the Khetran country, which adjoins it from Bora Lall Chobuli, the countries of the Musa Kheyl Zirbar Patans, Luni Patans, and Bozdars. It possesses a very large plain from 20 to 30 miles in extent, through which a perennial stream flows, from which an abundant supply of fodder for the troops and baggage animals can be obtained. Altogether it is admirably situated from which to carry on negotiations with the tribes, whether they belong to Khelat, the Punjab, or Sind.

6. At Lugari Barkan the expedition should be joined by the heads of the tribes as per margin and their leading men. Here the Murree and other political questions should be disposed of. This accomplished, the troops, or at least the Punjab portion of them, should return to British territory, and the expedition escorted by the chiefs, hill and plain, each with a few of his followers, should proceed to visit Tull Chotiali *viâ* the Hurm Pass. After this should political difficulties not arise, Bora might be visited. When at Lull some of the party might inspect the routes leading towards Pesheen and Shawl Kot (Quetta).

Independent Pathan tribes, Khetrans, Luni Pathans, Musa Kheyl, Sarain Pathans from Lall, Hill Belooch tribes, Murree, Boogtee, Dhoombkee, Bozdars, Kuzranees, Hudranees, Dorkanees, Belooch tribes, Muzzarees, Lugarees, Gurdenees, Dishalees, Kosahs, Lunds, Tibbee, Londum.

7. From Lull the expedition should return *viâ* the Bijaranee Murree country through the Kotee valley belonging to the Zorhan Patans to the Bijaranee townships of Mahomed and Khott Mundai. From this latter place circumstances might render it desirable for the expedition, or a portion of it, to visit the points near the Bolan Pass and Kutchee, where the Murrees assemble before making descents on kafilas *en route* through the Bolan Pass, Kutch Gundava.

8. But as the necessity for doing this must greatly depend on the result of our negotiations with the tribes and the scope of our instructions regarding these, we are of opinion that the matter ought to be left an open question to be decided at the discretion of the Political Superintendent, who would act as circumstances seemed to render necessary.

9. But should it not be necessary to visit these places last named with the object of placing there Murree police posts, should the tribe so desire it, the expedition would return home from Khott Mundai *viâ* Kahan, or by the direct route, as may appear at the time most desirable.

10. I now come to point No. III, viz., the instructions for guidance to be issued to the political officers entrusted with the negotiations. These should be of as comprehensive a nature as possible, having for their basis the policy agreed to at the Mittunkote conference by the Sind and Punjab Local Governments, and in the spirit contemplated in paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 of the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 2214 P., dated the 9th October 1874, to the address of the Commissioner in Sind, sanctioning the expedition.

11. I have discussed very fully with Colonel Loch the conduct of the Murree Tomundar Guzzun Khan, and while concurring generally with him in considering that our Government must deal firmly with him and his tribe, at the same time I am as clearly of opinion that in negotiating with the Murrees as a clan we must be conciliatory also. To be successful in our dealings with the tribes we must bear in mind that their chieftains are independent of us, and not subject to our rule and orders.

12. To establish that this reasoning applies at the present time with peculiar force to Guzzun Khan and the Murree tribe generally, I will here record Sir Henry Green's reply to me when I submitted claims for compensation made by British subjects on account of losses caused by the Boogtees and Murrees in the great raid on Hurrund in 1866. Regarding the position of these tribes to the Khan of Khelat on the 6th December 1866, Sir Henry Green thus describes it:—"I have to acknowledge receipt "of yours of the 10th instant regarding a Murree raid and other frontier matters. "With regard to the raid, the Murrees being Belooch are certainly nominally subjects "of the Khan of Khelat, and are held by him under the same control as the "Afreedees of the hills surrounding the Peshawur valley are by the ruler of Cabul, "and any complaint to the Khan would be of about as much use as the Commissioner "of Peshawur bringing to the notice of the Ameer of Cabul the conduct of the said "Afreedees." In the same letter Sir Henry Green described the political position of the highland clans of Khelat towards the Khan and the British authorities in the following words:—"The Murrees now and then try and raid on my frontier, and I "trust to the alertness and activity of my frontier posts for their defeat, and to the "influence of the Khan of Khelat if they succeed in carrying off my cattle. My "native officials suffer, but I should certainly not complain to the Khan on account "of the want of activity of my own people." These words speak for themselves, and show that at all events during Sir H. Green's term of office on this frontier it was never contemplated to hold such tribes as the Murrees responsible even for plundering British subjects. By what course of reasoning then can we now hold men such as Guzzun Khan responsible, not only for plundered property carried off in Khelat, for the restoration of which we have no contract or treaty with him, but even for what in these days we are pleased to regard as disobedience to orders, because the chief in reply to demands made on him by our Government declines to comply, urging as a reason that he has not the power to do so.

13. But to return, Colonel Loch is of opinion that the Murree Tomundar's conduct to the Sind authorities has been so contumacious that a public avowal of his submission to Government ought to precede our entering upon negotiations with him and his tribe after we have all met at Lugari Burkan.

14. I am quite willing, and trust anxious, to do my best to influence the Murree Tomundar to comply with Colonel Loch's wishes, and no effort on my part will be wanting to obtain for the Sind authorities the redress expected and asked for. At the same time, in dealing with a man of Guzzun Khan's known character in such a matter, we must be careful so to frame our request that our negotiations at the outset are not

brought to an end by his refusal to comply with our request. In short, in the words of the Foreign Secretary's letter directing the nature of the policy to be adopted in our dealings towards Guzzun Khan, "we must not make too great a tax on his pride."

15. I feel convinced that at the coming negotiations with the tribes, if we are only guided in our dealings with them by the spirit pervading the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 879, dated Simla, the 25th February 1869, to the Secretary to Government, Punjab, they will end successfully. But if, on the other hand, we issue orders we have not the power to enforce without resorting to arms, then our peaceful proceedings must fail; while desiring most fully to endorse Colonel Loch's wishes as to the mode according to which we should deal with Guzzun Khan, I feel I can best do this by here stating that even in obtaining his apologies for past misconduct, we should do it in such a way as to avoid all irritation or offence. Our efforts should be directed to win the confidence of himself and his minor chiefs, without whose aid an experiment like the one we desire to introduce must fail.

16. That such an experiment is capable, if only prudently conducted, of a successful issue is proved by the two annexures to this letter which I forward with that object. The one is a letter from Guzzun Khan to me pointing to the fact of the pay of his sowars, regarding which I will address you separately, being in arrears, and calling my attention to the loyal way he was held to his agreement, and offering to send to me Kader Buksh Khetran with his own brother, Meer Oolla, in order that I may settle the Khetran quarrel which so seriously affects the safety of the kafilah routes leading into Dehra Ghazee Khan. The other is a letter to Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan, telling him of the return of two Muzzaree camels which had been stolen by Boogtee thieves and sold to the Bijaranee Murrees.

17. But while admitting the success of our arrangements with the Murree clan, Colonel Loch is inclined to dread the effect the taking of Murrees into our service for the protection of Kutch Gundava and the safety of kafilahs *en route* through the Bolan Pass will have on the Brahooee clans of Sarawan and Jalawan. A reference to the Mittunkote correspondence will show that the arrangements then agreed upon at the Commissioner in Sind's request did not contemplate taking these clans into our service; they were purposely excluded for reasons then given. But notwithstanding that this was so, I think it is right for me to state here, now that Government are considering the entire question, that I do not in any degree share Colonel Loch's fears on this head. Keeping the Murrees out of the plains of Kutchee and enlisting them on the side of order, if we do indeed succeed in effecting this desirable end, must in any case be of advantage to his Highness the Khan, and render the solution of the difficulty between him and his chiefs, should the opportunity ever offer of doing so as a whole, more easy of accomplishment.

18. The plan accepted at the Mittunkote conference of employing Murree sowars for the protection of Kutch Gundava and the Bolan Pass does not seem to me materially to differ from the course pursued by General Jacob when he enlisted the Jakranees and Dhoombkees in our service and established the Boogtee post of Gundoee in the Khelat Hills, garrisoning it with Boogtee sowars with the avowed object of protecting the Sind Frontier.

19. In naming the troops we consider should form the escort as far as Lugari Burkan, Colonel Loch and I have had regard to the present position of affairs on the frontier generally. I am quite of Colonel Loch's opinion that the employment of so large a body of troops on the duty is desirable; their presence will give primness and dignity to our negotiations, which without them they would want, and will materially aid us in bringing them to a peaceful issue. They will demonstrate to the tribes that while our Government desires peace through the means employed, it has the power, if willing, to enforce its own demands. It should, however, clearly be understood by the officers responsible that these are the objects aimed at, and that on no account without special permission from Government is armed interference to be permitted.

20. I concur heartily with Colonel Loch in thinking that there is nothing in our present relations with his Highness the Khan of Khelat or his Sirdars to prevent our admitting them if desirous of coming to the conference at Lugari Barkan. I think we should invite the Sirdars, and intimate to the Khan that if he desired to come himself, or preferred to send an agent, we would be glad to see either. Our avowed object is simply, through the means we propose to adopt, to ensure peace on our own frontier, and obtain in as far as we can protection to traffic passing along the kafilah routes. I would not, however, hold out to the Khan and his Sirdars that through attending they will thus obtain service for the Brahooee clans also. Men of their clans have never been employed by our Government for the protection of our frontier or to secure the

safety of kafilas, nor do I believe that there is the smallest necessity for so employing them. On the other hand, it is an undeniable fact that we have had Belooch service such as those we propose entertaining in our service from the Murree clan since the first days after the annexation of Sind and the Punjab to the British Empire: the status and position of the Belooch clans are wholly different from that of the Brahooee clans, and so is the position of Guzzun Khan Murree and Goolam Moorteza Boogtee when placed in juxtaposition with that of the Khelat Sirdars. In this Colonel Loch does not concur, and considers that we should protect the kafila routes by giving service to the Sirdars and their tribes independently of the Khan, unless he is able to become responsible himself for the safety of kafilas passing through his country. To do this would widen the breach between the two parties in the State, and would, in my opinion, probably prevent our ever healing it, while it would certainly not ensure the object we aim at, viz., safety to life and property of those employed in traffic, simply because it would place authoritatively the Sirdars in opposition to the Khan, which I see no excuse for our doing. In support of this view see Commissioner in Sind's letter No. 340, dated Camp Jacobabad, 5th April 1872, paragraph 33, forwarded to Government of India under cover of Bombay Government letter No. 2343, dated 29th April 1872.

21. The last but by no means the least important point to be decided by Government is the date on which the expedition should start. I fully concur with Colonel Loch in considering that the present position of affairs fully demonstrates that evil influences are at work somewhere to disturb the peace of the country and frontier; the sooner therefore that we commence to counteract those the more probable will be the ultimate success of our efforts to do so. We think therefore, holding this view of the state of affairs, that the expedition should start as soon as possible, but we feel that without special orders there is a real difficulty in the way of its doing so. Colonel Loch finds that it is most desirable and important that he should meet the Commissioner, who is expected here next month, to discuss with him administrative matters connected with his civil duties. The Bombay Commander-in-Chief is also expected here in January, and as Colonel Loch commands the Sind Frontier Force, he feels he could not without special permission absent himself during his Excellency's inspection of the troops and outposts.

22. Doubtless these are sound reasons for delaying the expedition, but I consider that those I am about to advance are of so cogent and urgent a nature for not doing so, but rather for adopting the opposite course, that I trust when Government comes to consider them it will be clear that at the present time and in the present state of affairs further delay can be permitted in putting in force the orders issued in 1869.

23. Since the Mittunkote conference took place the position of affairs in Khelat and on the Sind frontier has altered greatly for the worse, so much so in fact as to necessitate the entire cessation of the Sind authorities of all political relations with the Khelat State and the Khan's nominal subjects, the Murree clan. Grave complications have arisen on the Sind frontier itself in consequence of recent depredations by the Murree and Boogtee clans on Sind cattle, which, contrary to standing orders on the subject, were taken in large numbers beyond the line of regular posts, and in consequence they were lifted by hill robbers to the number of from 1,500 to 2,000 head. A quarrel of a somewhat bitter kind has been formented between the Chief of the Mazarees, Imam Buksh Khan, and the Chief of the Boogtees, Gholam Moorteza Khan; the correspondence which took place between Colonel Loch and myself regarding it was sent for some time ago. The young Chief of the Boogtees, Shabaz Khan, was captured in attempting to lift cattle on the Sind frontier, and he is now a political prisoner in Sukkur. He committed the act, it is believed, in retaliation, because he was not permitted to have his own way in a domestic matter which came before the Political Superintendent.

24. Taking then the occurrence named in the last paragraph to demonstrate a very serious state of affairs on this frontier (including that of the Punjab), and having consideration to the fact that this is by no means the first time that I have visited Jacobabad with the avowed and well-known intention of taking part in peaceful negotiations with the tribes as laid down at the Mittunkote conference, but which ended, through force of circumstances which I had no power to control, in the returning to my district without anything having been done to accomplish the object for which I came, if on this still another occasion of my visiting Jacobabad with a like purpose I again return to Dehra Ghazee Khan, with apparent results similar to those already stated in that

case, I deferentially submit that my trip here this time will have a very bad effect on my own frontier especially, and probably lead to results of such a nature that the success of our peaceful negotiations with the Murrees, when they do take place, will be far more doubtful and rendered far more difficult than they are at present.

25. At the present moment I can, I believe, if permitted to adopt the treatment towards the Murree clan recommended in this letter, command their horsemen either at Lugari Barkan, or wherever it may be decided we are to meet the tribe, and I see no reason to dread the success of our measures if they are carried out at once in the spirit of the Foreign Secretary's letter sanctioning the expenditure. But if the matters are to remain on this frontier in *status quo* as at present, or until Colonel Loch is ready and has leisure to accompany the expedition, which he says cannot be until February, I should fear greatly that by that time, considering the present aspect of affairs as described by me, something of a still more serious nature may occur and prevent a peaceful expedition starting at all. I would with much deference point to the great delay which has already occurred in putting in force the provisions of the Mittunkote conference come to by the highest local authorities, and apparently by the Government of India, with the object of securing, in as far as our efforts could obtain it, peace from Murree depredations on the frontier of Khelat, the Punjab, and Sind, and I would urge that on account of what has occurred since then, the putting of them in force without further delay is more urgently necessary than it was at the time they were first agreed to.

26. Before leaving the subject of the danger of further delay in putting in force the policy resolved on in 1869, it appears to me only right to place before you what would probably result were a warlike expedition sent against the Murrees to dictate to them our own terms of peace. They are very differently situated towards us in comparison with the Bozdar tribe, on whom such an expedition had an excellent effect. Let us suppose that in our anger at the Murrees an expedition did go out carrying fire and sword into their country. We had destroyed Kahun, Mamund, and Mundai, and scattered the Murree clan over the face of the country; let us ask ourselves how we are to arrange for the future? How are we to protect the kafila routes which traverse their country, the Bolan Pass, and the plains of Kutch Gundava? Next to peace on our own frontier this is the object Government desires to accomplish. Has the object of civilising the Boogtee been obtained by Sir Charles Napier's campaign which took place shortly after the conquest of Sind? Did they carry off less cattle from Sind in the recent depredations? the reverse is the fact, for they conducted the Murrees to make depredations, and it is said they have now the greater portion of the spoil. A similar course of reasoning applied to Sir Henry Green's campaigns against the Murrees. In no way can I discover that it has had a civilising effect, or make the tribe after it was withdrawn more easy of management.

27. With the concurrence of the Commissioner in Sind, Colonel Loch starts with me in a few days with the object of meeting Gholam Moorteza, the Boogtee Chief, and Imam Buksh Khan, the Chief of the Muzzarees, to endeavour to arrange their dispute amicably. Thus a beginning will have been made to peaceful negotiations. I trust, after considering the representations now made, the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor may be pleased to recommend to the Viceroy in Council that there should now be no interruption, but that the expedition should start with as little delay as practicable, and accomplish as soon as it conveniently can the object for which it has been sanctioned.

28. Regarding my own future movements, I have the honour to solicit your instructions by telegram. I would suggest for his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor's consideration that in the event of further delay being unavoidable, whether in that case it might not be a good plan in the interest of peace and the success of the measure sanctioned at the Mittunkote conference for me to employ the interval with the tribes and in their country itself with the object of ascertaining after patient inquiry the true causes which have led to these continued disturbances. Were such a course sanctioned, it would be necessary for me to have free intercourse wherever and with whom I desired; this, at the present juncture of affairs, could not do harm, as all *political* relations with the Khan of Khelat have ceased.

No. 192.

No. 2686 P., dated Fort William, 5th December 1874.

From C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind.

WITH reference to your endorsement No. 1140, dated the 5th ultimo, I am instructed by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council to state that the orders conveyed in my letter No. 1857 P., dated 27th August last, do not in any way absolve the Khan of Khelat from his treaty engagements.

2. The Government of India never has accepted and cannot now accept responsibility for the safety of caravans in Khelat territory. The compensation recently paid by the Government of India, in certain cases, from the suspended subsidy, was quite an exceptional measure.

3. In consequence of the failure of his Highness to carry into effect the obligation which is contained in the 5th Article of the Treaty of the 14th of May 1854, the annual subsidy of Rupees 50,000 which the British Government undertook to pay year by year on condition of a faithful performance of the conditions of the treaty has been withdrawn.

4. The British Government lies under no obligation by treaty to maintain the security of the communication through the Bolan Pass, or to take any further steps for that purpose.

5. The question of the course to be followed in the present condition of the affairs of Khelat will be discussed in communication with you on your visit to Calcutta, but in the meantime it is essential that there should be no misconception as to the position and obligations of the Government of India, and as to the entire freedom of action which they possess in dealing with the present condition of Khelat and the Bolan Pass.

No. 193.

No. 2047.

From T. H. Thornton, Esquire, Secretary to Government, Punjab and its Dependencies, to C. U. Aitchison, Esquire, C. S. I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Foreign.

SIR, Dated Lahore, 9th December 1874.

WITH reference to your letter marginally noted, I am directed to transmit the annexed communication* from Captain Sandeman regarding the measures to be taken in dealing with the Murree tribe. Although the Lieutenant-Governor is not yet in possession of the views of Sir W. Merewether, he thinks it unadvisable to delay passing on Captain Sandeman's letter, on which he desires to record the following observations :—

* Page 514.

2. Since the receipt of your letter above noted fresh complications have occured. The Boogtee tribe, aided by some Murrees have committed a serious outrage in the Sind territory, and have carried off some 2,000 head of cattle, Shahbaz Khan, the son of the Boogtee Chief, dissatisfied with a decision adverse to himself pronounced by Colonel Loch, was concerned in this outrage, arrested, and is now detained as a prisoner at Jacobabad. The effect of these complications is to embroil the two tribes directly with the British Government; whereas previous to their occurrence there was no complaint against the Boogtees, and the culpability of the Murrees consisted in the contumacious attitude assumed by the chief and tribe towards their superior, the Khan of Khelat.

3. Consequently, while Captain Sandeman and Colonel Loch are agreed on the strength of the military force to be taken into the hills, and on the routes to be selected, they are at variance as to the tone to be held with the Murree tribe—Colonel Loch insisting on some reparation at the hands of the Chief, Ghuzzun Khan, and, in default, on his coercion—Captain Sandeman, confident in his personal influence, deprecating the assertion of demands likely to prevent all negotiation.

4. The exact degree in which Ghuzzun and his tribe are committed is nowhere specified, but the Lieutenant-Governor gathers that they have played a secondary part to the Boogtees. If this surmise be correct, it is desirable, in his Honour's opinion, to

uphold the view taken by Captain Sandeman. Apart from the avowed objections, except in the last extreme, to the employment of military force against the hill tribes, the excessive poverty of the Murrees gives reason to fear that any damages inflicted on them would only force them into fresh raids and alienate them still further from our influence. Nor can the Lieutenant-Governor entirely forget their former good conduct in keeping faith with the British detachment which evacuated Kahan, and in offering to restore the British guns lost at Nifusk. Hence, in his opinion, the better course is to regard their participation in the late Boogtee raid as a minor point to be adjusted in the progress of the negotiations, but not to be put forward as the head and front of their offending, for which atonement must be exacted preliminary to their reception.

5. There can be little doubt but that the cause of Ghuzzun Khan's line of conduct hitherto was the facility existing for playing off the Sind and Punjab authorities one against the other. Comparatively tractable to the latter, he has rendered himself justly obnoxious to the former by violating openly and repeatedly his nominal subjection to the Khan of Khelat. The opportunity has come to put an end to this double dealing. The determination arrived at by the Government of India to deal directly with his tribe in future should render it impossible for him to evade his responsibilities. When these are distinctly defined his failure to fulfil them can always be sufficiently met by deprivation of the remuneration accompanying them.

6. The serious divergence represented by Captain Sandeman to exist between his own and Colonel Loch's views may give rise to some anxiety, and the Lieutenant-Governor is now inclined to think that negotiation having for its object the binding of Ghuzzun Khan and his tribe to future peace and quiet, is perhaps more likely to be brought to a successful issue by the former alone than jointly with the Political Superintendent of the Sind Frontier. Captain Sandeman is himself well known in the hills; but the Deputy Commissioner of Derah Ghazi Khan must, exclusive of personal qualifications, exercise therein a preponderant influence on account of the subordination to him of the Belooch Chiefs within the district, and more especially those of the Mazari and Lugari tribes. Through their instrumentality and counsel he is able to bring to bear on the tribes inside the hill tribal ideas and opinions to which they are at most times more or less amenable. This is an advantage the Lieutenant-Governor believes not possessed by the Sind authorities, and it appears to him that there must follow upon the settlement of the Murree difficulty an abolition of the double system of management and the committal to a single authority of the conduct of our relations with all Belooch tribes conterminous with the Punjab border.

7. Both Captain Sandeman and Colonel Loch, though for different reasons, consider the entry of regular troops into the hills necessary—Captain Sandeman on the ground that their presence will lend weight to the negotiations, Colonel Loch on the ground that military coercion is advisable. In the last paragraph of his letter Captain Sandeman makes the proposal that he should go by himself into the hills, pending the dispatch of the military expedition, "with the object of ascertaining by patient inquiry the true causes which have led to these continued disturbances." In paragraph 21 he says—"I fully concur with Colonel Loch in considering that the present position of "affairs fully demonstrates that evil influences are at work somewhere to disturb the "peace of the country and frontier."

8. Again, there is a difference of opinion as to the time at which the troops should move, Captain Sandeman being in favour of an early march, Colonel Loch wishing it deferred until February next. As, however, it is not possible for the regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force named by Captain Sandeman to reach Derah Ghazi Khan in course of the relief for several weeks to come, it is not probable that any advance can be made before the middle of January.

9. Under these circumstances, then, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks that Captain Sandeman's preceding the expedition would be advantageous. He would be accompanied by the subject Belooch chiefs and their followers, under whose pressure it might be easier for Ghuzzun Khan to yield than if in the presence of British troops, nor would there be the same risk of creating excitement among the neighbouring tribes. Captain Sandeman has been several times previously into the hills under the guidance of the Belooch chiefs, and in the present case his position would be stronger, inasmuch as he would be acting under the orders of the Government.

10. If his deputation met with the sanction of his Excellency the Viceroy in Council, and he succeeded in dictating satisfactory terms to Ghuzzun Khan, there would be no immediate necessity for the assembly of troops; and the question by what authorities the terms are to be enforced, and the subsequent relations of the tribe to the British Government controlled, may be left for future consideration.

11. But Captain Sandeman has referred to a matter distinct from the terms to be made with the Murree tribe, namely, the treatment to be extended to the Brahooees. Colonel Loch (if rightly understood by Captain Sandeman) "considers that we should "protect the kafila routes by giving service to the Sirdars and their tribes indepen- "dently of the Khan, unless he is able to become responsible himself for the safety of "kafilas passing through his country." This course does not recommend itself to Captain Sandeman's judgment. The Lieutenant-Governor does not feel called upon to give any opinion on this point.

12. As regards the Murrees, so long as it was deemed expedient to respect their nominal subjection to the Khan of Khelat the relations towards them of the Punjab authorities were extremely anomalous. To ensure the safety of the long frontier of the Derah Ghazi Khan district, the Deputy Commissioner found it necessary to conciliate the chiefs, which he did in various ways, and especially by entertaining and paying horsemen from the tribe. His end was attained; unwonted quiet was established along the border; intercourse beyond became more frequent; but all this was done independently of the Khan of Khelat, and the Sind authorities, with reason, complained that the Murrees harried his Highness' country all the more. The Mittunkote conference was designed to set this to rights. The Deputy Commissioner of Derah Ghazi Khan was in respect of his dealings with the Murrees and Boogtees placed under the control of the Commissioner in Sind, who on his part was to employ and pay the Murrees on the part of the Khan. No benefit, however, actually accrued to the tribe, and the conduct of the Khan was such as ultimately to cause the Government of India to set aside his nominal superiority and authorise direct dealings with the Belooch Chiefs. The Lieutenant-Governor considers that an escape is thus opened from a position of embarrassment, and the real circumstances are made available as the basis of a new and simpler connexion between ourselves and this isolated tribe.

13. But with the Brahooee tribes and their relations with the Khan of Khelat the Punjab is not concerned, and the Lieutenant-Governor is inclined to think that in the present state of affairs they should be dealt with entirely by the Sind authorities, and that in entering the hills Captain Sandeman should have nothing to say to them, and should merely report any information he may gather regarding them. It is not impossible that Colonel Loch may have in view the payment of the Brahooees directly for the security of the Bolan Pass. The Lieutenant-Governor is not able to say whether this measure, which is strongly deprecated by Captain Sandeman, is feasible and expedient or not. But in the event of its being adopted, and of any share of the subsidy falling to the portion of the Murree tribe acting in obedience to Ghuzzun Khan, his Honour is of opinion that it should be paid through the Punjab authorities, and that the responsibility of the chief to them should not be infringed upon. It would no doubt facilitate the restoration of safety to the Bolan Pass if Captain Sandeman could succeed in opening the alternative route by Tull Chotiali up to Pashin, where it joins the Kandahar route. The Murrees have always commanded and infested this route, and their abstinence from plunder might go far to revive the traffic. But some eighty miles or so lie outside their country, and the Kakars and Dumars, nominally subjects of the Amir of Kabul, who command a long portion of it, are notorious robbers and under no sort of control.

14. In conclusion, the Lieutenant-Governor would recommend the Government of India to sanction Captain Sandeman's proceeding to Lagari Barkan in the hills, or to such other place as he may deem convenient, with an adequate escort of the subject Beloochees, there to assemble the tribes, and to discuss, and, if possible, settle the terms on which the Murrees shall be allowed to enter into engagements with the British Government; such terms to be of no effect until sanctioned by the Government of India, and to embrace—

1. The obligations imposed on the Murrees in respect of the Punjab, Sind, and Khelat frontiers:
2. The consideration to be granted to the chief and tribe so long as the above obligations are fulfilled:
3. The obligations imposed on account of keeping open the Tull and Chotiali route.

(It is possible that if this article be approved some additional considerations may have to be provided for.)

The Lieutenant-Governor would give Captain Sandeman no authority to promise the Murree tribe any consideration on account of the Bolan Pass, reserving that question for settlement by the Sind authorities.

15. In the event of Captain Sandeman failing to obtain the acquiescence of the Murrees in his terms, the question will remain whether the military expedition should not move against them in February next for the purpose of punishing them in accordance with the recommendations of the Commissioner in Sind.

I have, &c.

Secretary to Government, Punjab.

No. 194.

No. 2078.

From T. H. Thornton, Esquire, Secretary to Government, Punjab and its Dependencies, to C. U. Aitchison, Esquire, C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Foreign.

SIR, Dated Lahore, 14th December 1874.

COPIES of Sir W. Merewether's and Colonel Loch's letters on the Khelat and Murree questions only reached the Lieutenant-Governor on the 12th instant, when he also had an opportunity of conversing with Captain Sandeman on these subjects.

2. As regards Khelat affairs, the Lieutenant-Governor is not in a position to acquire reliable information or to offer any opinion which could be equally weighed with that derived from Sir W. Merewether's long and intimate knowledge of the State and his personal superintendence of its politics.

3. As regards the Murree question his Honour does not find much to add to what he has previously written. It still appears to him that the resolution of the Government of India (announced in paragraph 9 of your letter No. 2214 P., dated 9th October last) "to make arrangements direct with the frontier tribes and without reference to the Khan," has greatly simplified the situation, and he is strongly of opinion that it should be firmly adhered to.

4. The points in which we are most interested are—

1st. Safety of Punjab border.

2nd. Safety of Kutchee.

3rd. Safety of Bolan and Tull Chotiali routes.

In consideration of these objects, and in payment of services towards their attainment, the sanction of the Government was given to the grant of Rupees 32,040 between the Boogtee and Murree tribes. Delays and misunderstandings have since occurred, mainly owing, in his Honour's belief, to the tribes not being dealt with by one representative of the British power. The resolution above referred to should terminate this dual management. It was a necessity so long as the impracticable theory of the Khan's inviolable sovereignty was maintained, but with that it should cease. There then remains the real problem how most effectually to restrain these poor and predatory tribes. Now the Sind border can, and has always been, as his Honour understands, well protected by the strip of desert intervening between the cultivated country and the foot of the hills. Pursuit of marauders over this is so imminent that they very rarely venture to pass it. On the other hand, in the Punjab, flocks and herds, and even hamlets, are found at the very mouth of the passes, far in front of the military posts, and fall an easy prey to robbers from the hills. The border, too, is of great length, penetrable at numerous points, and occupied by cognate Beloochee clans. Local circumstances have therefore suggested a conciliatory line of action. Boogtees and Murrees have been taken into the service of the Government as guides and horsemen, and the tribes have shown their appreciation of this treatment not only by abstaining from outrages, but by tolerating the visits of British officials to their country.

5. The interests at stake in the Punjab are greater than those in Sind, and the friendly influence which has been acquired should not lightly be thrown away. The contrast between the sustained jealousy of the Pathan tribes from the Black Mountain down to Vihoa with the comparative hospitality of the Beloochees should sufficiently assure us that such influence, as it has not been easily gained, might be lost for ever by reversing prematurely the policy which has produced it. When, indeed. the little success our efforts to inspire confidence have met with on other parts of the frontier is remembered, it would be matter of serious regret were our better relations with these Beloochees, and the effects which may follow on their improvement, without absolute necessity, interrupted.

6. Let then the Sind authorities continue to take advantage of their topographical advantages and use their excellent cavalry in repelling raids. But let all intercourse and negotiations be conducted by the Deputy Commissioner of Derah Ghazi Khan, who should also be the sole source of benefits and privileges and the instrument of enforcing all responsibilities to the British Government, in which would be included all obligations undertaken in respect of Kutchee or the Bolan Pass.

7. It is not the intention of the Lieutenant-Governor at present to enter upon details, and, in particular, he has not enough information to say confidently whether the Murrees, especially the Mazarani section of them, ought or ought not to have any share in the custody of the Bolan Pass, though for any act of plunder therein an account would be strictly exacted. Again, while his Honour believes that the opening of the route from Pishin to the Sakhi Sarwar Pass would tend more than anything else to the restoration of the security of the Bolan, the accomplishment of this design can only be effected by communication with the tribes concerned, and possibly with the Amir of Kabul. But his Honour adheres to the proposal made in my previous letter that Captain Sandeman should proceed into the hills on an early date and bring the Murrees to a settlement, and that no military expedition should start prior to the receipt of his report.

I have, &c.

T. H. THORTON,
Secretary to Government, Punjab.

No. 195.

No. 16 P., dated Fort William, 5th January 1875.

From C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, C.B., K.C.S.I., Commissioner in Sind.

I AM directed by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 1145, dated 5th November 1874, in which you repeat the proposals made in your former letters for the despatch of an armed expedition to Khelat to settle the affairs of that State and to coerce the Murrees; and further explain the grounds on which your proposals are based.

2. His Excellency in Council has considered your proposals with the care and attention due to the importance of the subject, to your position, and to the special knowledge which you are able to bring to bear upon the question. He has also had the advantage of personal communication with yourself in Calcutta; and the instructions I am now to convey to you are to be understood as containing the deliberate conclusion of the Government of India on the subject of the general policy which is, under present circumstances, to be pursued by all the officers on the Sind and Punjab frontiers who have dealings with the Khelat State or with the tribes that have hitherto been understood to owe allegiance to the Khan.

3. Paragraphs 4 to 8 of my letter No. 2214 P., dated 9th October 1874, set forth at length the reasons why his Excellency in Council did not then consider it advisable to resort to armed interference in the affairs of Khelat, and explain the principal objects which his Excellency in Council desires to secure in our dealings with the tribes beyond the border. Your subsequent letter and the communications which his Excellency has personally had with you have failed to convince the Government of India of the expediency of modifying those views, which I am instructed here to repeat. His Excellency in Council by no means wishes it to be understood that Government will under no circumstances send an armed force into Khelat. On the contrary, the state of affairs may at any time become such as to render it expedient that Government should exercise the general powers it possesses under the Treaty of 1854 of stationing troops in Khelat territory in addition to the posts already located there; or the condition of Khelat itself might become so dangerous to the peace and security of our own territories as to make an armed expedition unavoidable. But his Excellency in Council would consider it a cause of deep regret if armed intervention in Khelat had to be resorted to, and he is of opinion that, although the relations between the British Government and the Khan are at present not without gravity, nothing has occurred in Khelat to render such a course necessary or expedient. He therefore desires that, while on the one hand every precaution should be taken within our own frontier that may be necessary to secure our territories and subjects from outrage, and while

reasonable endeavours are made to render the trade routes safe and to cultivate friendly intercourse with the tribes and States on our border, on the other hand, any measures calculated to embroil us with the tribes and precipitate armed intervention, should, as far as possible, be on our part avoided.

4. As under present circumstances his Excellency in Council is not prepared to adopt the general policy advocated in your letter under reply, he has not thought it necessary to enter on the details of the proposal submitted for the expedition to Khelat. He has satisfied himself, however, that had such an expedition unfortunately been necessary, it must have been framed upon a scale considerably in excess of that which you have drawn up for consideration.

5. The chief objects which the Government of India desire to secure are, as already observed, two, viz., (1) the prevention of plundering and outrage within or near the British frontier, and (2) the safe transit of trade; in connexion with which the principal difficulty appears to be the settlement of the Murree tribe.

6. With respect to the former object, the returns enclosed in your letter show that a considerable number of offences have been committed within the last two years on that portion of the Sind frontier which lies between the 27th parallel of north latitude and the sea. These cases have occurred both on the Sind and Khelat side of the border. They have been committed by Khelat subjects, and although the cases (with one exception) are not of a serious nature, still they have remained unredressed, and you report that the heads of Khelat villages are becoming insolent, that they refuse to aid our police, and that serious injury to the interests of the British Government must follow on the increasing disorder into which the Khelat State has fallen.

7. His Excellency in Council considers that as the Khan of Khelat has failed to prevent these crimes, or to give satisfaction for them, and there is no reasonable expectation at present that the attitude of the Khan will be changed for the better, it has now become incumbent on the British Government to take its own measures for the prevention of such offences in future, and the exaction of reparation for such as may hereafter occur. I am therefore to request that the Khan may be addressed by you in a letter setting forth the cases in which he has failed to grant redress for outrages committed within British territory or upon British subjects. He should be informed that until such time as he manifests both a willingness and an ability to perform the duties of a good neighbour, we shall take our own measures without reference to him to protect our territories and the lives and property of our subjects; that any of his subjects who may commit offences in British territory and be apprehended there will receive the utmost penalty of the law; and that if they succeed in escaping back into Khelat territory, they will, whenever this may be practicable, be followed and punished, and satisfaction will be exacted from those who may shelter and aid them.

8. A draft of the letter to be sent to the Khan should be submitted for the approval of the Governor-General in Council. After its despatch all further communications with the Khan should, if possible, be avoided till such time as he comes to a better mind. Under these circumstances Major Harrison should for the present be employed on other duty, and the appointment of Political Agent in Khelat held in abeyance pending further orders. The services of the Agency surgeon and the establishments of the Agency may be temporarily utilized on such other duty as you think fit.

9. His Excellency in Council understood from you that it will not be necessary at present to reinforce the troops in Sind; and that as outrages have been confined to that portion of the border referred to in paragraph 6, a police force of about 100 men, in addition to the existing force, would be sufficient to enable you to carry out the measures described above. You are apprehensive, however, that disturbances may spread further north, in which case a considerably larger force would be needed. His Excellency in Council desires me to request that you will submit through the Bombay Government, for the consideration of his Excellency in Council, with the least possible delay, a statement of the strength and cost of the additional police force immediately required. The cost will be borne as an Imperial political charge. Should more men be needed for the protection of the upper part of the frontier line, you are authorised to entertain them in case of urgency, reporting in detail in due course for the consideration of the Bombay Government and the Governor-General in Council. I am also to suggest that the frontier police might with advantage be placed under a special officer, whose duty it would be to make himself thoroughly acquainted with the frontier tribes and their chief men, and to work through influence with them whenever practicable. On these subjects the Bombay Government will be communicated with.

10. The second object of our policy relates to the protection of trade and the settlement of the Murrees and other tribes concerned in the plunder of the caravans and in raids near our border and in Kutchee. His Excellency in Council understands that as yet no raids have been committed by these tribes in British territory, although the property of British subjects temporarily located beyond our frontier has on various occasions been carried off,

11. So long as the Government of Khelat remains in its present unsatisfactory state, it would be hopeless to expect complete security on the trade routes. At the same time much may, in the opinion of his Excellency in Council, be secured if our relations with the frontier tribes are on a satisfactory footing. With this object various proposals were made at a conference between yourself and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab at Mittunkote in March 1870, and sanctioned by Government. The principal measures then arranged for were the subordination of the Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan to the Political Superintendent of the Sind Frontier in all matters of policy relating to the Murrees and Boogtees, and the employment of members of the tribe in our service at a cost of Rupees 32,040 a year. Owing to the unsatisfactory behaviour of the Murrees, and the general confusion into which the affairs of Khelat have fallen, the latter suggestion has not been acted upon; but, in accordance with former arrangements, certain men of the tribes have been continued in service on the Punjab side; and this policy has been successful in securing the peace of that portion of our frontier.

12. You have remarked, and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab concurs in your view, that the reason for the line of conduct adopted by the Murrees has been to a considerable extent the dual system of management. While the Murrees have been comparatively tractable on the Punjab side, owing to the advantages they derive from the British Government, they have rendered themselves justly obnoxious to the Sind authorities by disregarding the policy of Government and raiding in the Kutchee plains. His Excellency in Council considers it necessary that this double management should absolutely cease. It is essential to any proper dealings with these tribes that the question as it affects the Punjab and Sind should be treated as one. If their behaviour is such as to justify their punishment on the Sind side, they cannot continue to receive favour from the side of the Punjab.

13. For this reason his Excellency in Council considers that the Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan should be the medium of all intercourse and communications with the Murree and Boogtee tribes in all their branches, but that he should be under the orders of the Commissioner in Sind, to whom he should report through the Political Superintendent all matters affecting those tribes, and from whom he should receive his instructions, copies of all such reports and instructions being sent to the Punjab Government for information.

14. With reference to other tribes than the Murrees and Boogtees, that is to say, tribes whose proceedings mainly affect Sind, and who have no direct intercourse with the Punjab, the Deputy Commissioner should take no action without previous reference to the Commissioner in Sind; and such action as may be ordered in respect to them should be undertaken jointly by the Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan and the Political Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier. Unity of policy and action is absolutely necessary, and no deviation from the policy prescribed should be permitted by the officers on either side without previous instructions from the Government of India.

15. With these precautions his Excellency in Council is sanguine that the system of service which has already been partially tried with some success on the Punjab border may produce good results with respect to the Murree and Boogtee tribes generally. The plan at all events deserves to be tried, and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab is of opinion that matters have already been greatly simplified by the instructions contained in my letter No. 2214 P., dated 9th October last.

16. Accordingly his Excellency in Council is of opinion that Captain Sandeman should be instructed in the first place to use all his influence to effect a settlement of existing inter-tribal quarrels, and that the arrangements agreed on at Mittunkote should be carried out in their entirety, subject to the modifications above prescribed in respect to the duties and position of the Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan. The separate payments to the tribes on the Punjab side for service must, however, now be treated as part of the general arrangement, and misconduct on the part of the Murrees and Boogtees in respect to matters for which the additional service is now sanctioned will be visited when necessary with cessation of service and payment on the Punjab side as well as on the side of Sind. The engagements and respon-

sibilities of the tribes will be treated as a whole, as also will the service and the benefits they receive. These responsibilities will be enforced, and those benefits will be conferred, through the Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan under the orders of the Commissioner in Sind in the manner already described.

17. Before proceeding to give effect to these measures, however, there are certain preliminary conditions to which Ghuzzun Khan, the chief of the Murrees, must submit. The chief has not yet surrendered the share his tribe obtained of the property plundered from a caravan in the Bolan in 1872, which he was required by the Commissioner's orders to give up. Nor has he presented himself to the Political Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier as required. From a letter dated 10th Shewal [20th November 1874], however, which he has recently sent to Colonel Loch, it would appear that he is anxious to make his submission, and his Excellency in Council understands that Captain Sandeman does not anticipate any difficulty in making him submit on both points. Unless Ghuzzun Khan does so, friendly relations with him will be broken off, a result which his Excellency in Council would much regret.

18. Captain Sandeman should accordingly proceed into the hills at an early date as proposed by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. He should there explain to Ghuzzun Khan and other chiefs the policy and resolution of Government, and should require Ghuzzun Khan to make proper arrangements for the payment of the value of the plunder which he has unjustly withheld, and to pay his respects to Colonel Loch, the Political Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier, at a time and place to be agreed upon. Should these preliminary conditions be fulfilled, Captain Sandeman may at once proceed to arrange the details of the measures now resolved upon.

19. His Excellency in Council expects and requires that the local officers, laying aside individual views which interfere with unity of action, will cordially co-operate to ensure the success of the policy now prescribed. While his Excellency in Council will not permit outrages to be perpetrated in British territory or upon British subjects with impunity, he is desirous that the tribes should be gradually taught that it is their own interest and for their own advantage to live on good terms with us. For this end patient, considerate, and conciliatory treatment is necessary. His Excellency in Council would deeply regret if the conduct of the tribes should render necessary a display of force on our part, and he enjoins all officers, both on the Sind and the Dehra Ghazee Khan Frontier, to abstain from any harsh or precipitate action calculated to bring about so undesirable a result, and rather to endeavour by all practicable measures to win the confidence of the tribes.

20. A copy of correspondence* with the Punjab Government is enclosed for information.

* Nos. 2047, 2063, and 2078, dated respectively 9th, 11th, and 14th December 1874.

No. 196.

No. 18 A.P., dated Fort William, 5th January 1875.

From C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

I AM directed to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Governor of Bombay in Council, the enclosed correspondence† relative to the affairs of Khelat.

† From Punjab Government, Nos. 2047, 2063, and 2078, dated respectively the 9th, 11th, and 14th of December 1874.
To Commissioner in Sind, dated 5th January 1875, No. 16P.

2. His Excellency the Governor-General in Council desires me to direct attention to paragraph 9 of my letter to the Commissioner of Sind, No. 16 P., of this date, and to request that his Excellency the Governor of Bombay will give early consideration to the measures which the Commissioner in Sind may submit for strengthening the police on the southern portion of the boundary between Sind and Khelat. These proposals should be submitted to the Government of India with the recommendations of the Government of Bombay. The cost of the extra police will be an Imperial political charge.

3. With reference to your letter No. 6306, dated 30th October 1874, you will observe that his Excellency in Council has decided to hold the appointment of Political Agent in Khelat in abeyance. The Governor-General in Council will therefore be glad if other employment can for the present be found for Major Harrison.

No. 197.

No. 13 of 1875.

Government of India, Foreign Department. Political.

To the Most Honourable the MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS, Fort William, the 22nd January 1875.

IN continuation of our despatch, No. 129 P, dated 28th July 1873, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers* regarding the policy to be observed towards the Khan of Khelat and the tribes beyond our frontier which owe him allegiance more or less real.

2. The occurrence on the 11th February 1874 of a raid on British territory by subjects of the Khan of Khelat in pursuit of their fugitive slaves, considered in connexion with the general disorder into which the affairs of Khelat had fallen, induced the Commissioner in Sind to propose to us the grave measure of armed interference in the affairs of that State. He also suggested that advantage should be taken of the presence of British troops to enforce the obedience of the Murree tribe, whose frequent attacks upon Khelat subjects and whose raids in the plains of Kutchee in Khelat had prompted him in a previous communication to recommend their isolation from Sind and the Punjab by a blockading force.

3. After careful consideration of Sir William Merewether's proposals we decided† that it was neither expedient to intervene by force of arms in order to settle the affairs of the Khelat State, nor necessary to blockade the Murrees. The distracted state of Khelat appeared to us to be due more to the inability of the Khan to control his subjects than to any hostile feelings on his part towards the British Government. We had freely given him our moral and material support for a series of years, and had endeavoured by every means in our power to strengthen his hands, but without success. It did not appear to us probable that a change of rulers in Khelat would give any promise of better results, and in the absence of any dominant party in the State, military intervention would, in our opinion, have committed us to the occupation of the country for an indefinite period, and the virtual assumption of the Government, while it might possibly have produced ulterior results of a serious kind. Moreover, as the raid of 11th February, although grave in itself, when considered as a violation of British territory, had neither been attended with circumstances of aggravation, nor followed by other outrages in our frontier, we did not see in the existing state of things any necessity for an armed demonstration for the purpose of preventing raids.

† Letter to Commissioner in Sind, No. 2214 P, dated 9th October 1874.

4. On the other hand, we did not feel ourselves called upon to assist the Khan in enforcing a nominal suzerainty over tribes who refused to acknowledge his authority; and as the policy of endeavouring to deal through him with the frontier tribes as his subjects had failed, we determined to make arrangements with them for the preservation of peace on our frontier without reference to his Highness. We were satisfied from the information received from the Punjab Government that our differences with the Murrees are not so serious as either to preclude the adoption of such a course, or to necessitate a blockade, which would entail greater hardships on our own subjects than on the Murrees, and would oblige us to add a considerable reinforcement to the troops on our border. At all events we were of opinion that before resorting to measures of coercion, an endeavour should be made as proposed by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to bring about an amicable settlement with the Murrees.

5. We accordingly approved of the proposal of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab that the Murree country should be visited by a party of Sind and Punjab officers, who should explain to the tribes our desire for the maintenance of peace and order, and should endeavour generally to effect an adjustment of inter-tribal quarrels, and arrange for the safe transit of caravans. The Political Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier and the Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan were instructed to report on the details for giving effect to these orders.

6. In the meantime the Commissioner in Sind reported that crime on the frontier of Sind south of Jacobabad was increasing, that the people in Khelat were exhibiting a bad spirit, that disorder in Khelat was extending, and that the Khan was showing more and more opposition to the interests of the British Government. He was of opinion that the measures we had ordered would be insufficient, and he repeated his proposals for armed intervention as the only effectual means of dealing with the difficulties that had arisen.

7. We have now had the advantage of perusing the reports of Colonel Loch and Captain Sandeman, together with the opinions of Sir W. Merewether and the Lieu-

* Nos. 171 to 196.

tenant-Governor of the Punjab, and the question has been further discussed in personal conferences with Sir W. Merewether at Calcutta. These discussions have failed to convince us of the expediency of modifying our views at present. The situation, though not without gravity, does not at present render it necessary or expedient that we should resort to armed intervention, or even that we should exercise the general powers we possess under the treaty of 1854 of stationing troops in Khelat territory in addition to the posts already located there. Apart from the immediate objections to the Commissioner's proposals which we have already described, we are unwilling at present to adopt measures which might have the effect of arousing suspicions in Afghanistan as to our intentions, and which, with reference to the present aspect of affairs in Central Asia, would be liable to misconstruction.

8. The chief objects we desire to secure are the prevention of plundering within or near the British frontier and the safe transit of trade. As the Khan of Khelat has failed to prevent or give satisfaction for the offences reported by the Commissioner to have occurred on the south-west frontier of Sind, we have determined to take our own measures for their prevention in future. We have accordingly directed the Commissioner to submit for our approval the draft of a letter to be addressed to the Khan, in which his Highness will be informed that any of his subjects who may commit offences in British territory will, if apprehended there, receive the utmost penalty of the law, and if they escape into the Khelat territory will be followed and punished, and that satisfaction will be exacted from those who aid and shelter them. To carry out these measures an additional body of frontier police will be required, and we have directed the Commissioner in Sind to prepare detailed statements of the increase he would propose, the whole frontier police being placed under the command of a special officer.

9. With regard to the second object we have in view, while we are most anxious to secure the safety of trade routes, and shall use all legitimate efforts for that purpose, we must be careful to accept no direct responsibility for the safety of caravans in Khelat territory. Under present circumstances we consider that the most expedient course is to improve our relations with the frontier tribes, and give them a direct interest in maintaining good order and abstaining from the plunder of caravans. The recent misconduct of the Murrees may in part be attributed to the dual system of management from the Punjab and Sind which has hitherto prevailed. It is essential that the question as it affects the Punjab and Sind should be treated as one. We have therefore determined that the Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan shall be the medium of communication with the Murrees and Boogtees under the orders of the Commissioner in Sind, to whom also will be referred any action proposed to be taken as regards the tribes whose proceedings mainly affect the Sind frontier.

10. With these precautions we are sanguine that the system of service partially tried with some measure of success on the Punjab frontier may produce good results. We have accordingly directed the arrangements agreed upon at the Mittunkote conference in March 1870, between the Commissioner in Sind and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, to be carried out. The engagements and responsibilities of the tribes, as also the services and benefits they receive, will be treated as a whole, and misconduct on the part of the Murrees and Boogtees will be visited, when necessary, with cessation of service on the Punjab side as well as on the side of Sind.

11. Before proceeding to give effect to these measures, we have directed Captain Sandeman to proceed to the hills at an early date, and explain to Guzzun Khan the Chief of the Murrees, and to others, our policy; to require him in conformity with the orders of the Commissioner in Sind to make restitution of the property plundered by him from a caravan in the Bolan in 1872, and to pay his respects to the Political Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier; these conditions fulfilled the Deputy Commissioner will at once arrange the details of the measures now resolved upon.

12. Finally, we have impressed upon all officials on the Sind and Punjab frontier the necessity for united and cordial action in ensuring the success of the policy we have prescribed, and for patient, considerate, and conciliatory treatment of the frontier tribes. This policy has been settled in personal communication with Sir W. Merewether, who, while expressing a decided preference for the stronger measures advocated in his written communications, is satisfied that short of armed intervention the course we have authorised is the one best suited to secure the ends we have in view.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
W. MUIR.

No. 198.

Political, No. 91.

To his Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council.

MY LORD, India Office, London, 8th July 1875.

Para. 1. I HAVE received and considered in Council the letter of your Excellency's Government in this Department, No. 13, dated the 22nd January last, forwarding, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, papers regarding the policy which you have decided to observe towards the Khan of Khelat, and the tribes beyond the British frontier which owe him allegiance.

2. Her Majesty's Government approve of the decision arrived at by your Excellency in Council in regard to the inexpediency, under present circumstances, of acceding to the recommendation of the Commissioner of Sind in favour of armed intervention in the affairs of the Khelat State. The difficulties, present and prospective, in the way of such a measure are of so grave a character that it could only be justified as a last resource, when all other means of remedying the evils endangering British interests have been proved to be ineffectual.

3. Much as Her Majesty's Government regret the distracted state of affairs in Khelat, they see no reason to question the justice of your opinion that it is due more to the inability of the Khan to control his subjects than to any hostile feeling on his part towards the British Government. In this view, armed intervention would appear an unfriendly act towards a State with which our relations have, until recently, been cordial, while it would possibly entail a prolonged occupation of the country, and might involve ulterior results of a serious kind in other quarters.

4. It is to be hoped that the result of the measures adopted by your Excellency in Council, with a view of improving the state of affairs on the Sind frontier, may meet with the success which you anticipate. What may be the effect of withdrawing the subsidy from the Khan, and the establishment of direct relations with tribes which have hitherto been treated as nominally, if not really, under the suzerainty of his Highness, must be uncertain, but Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt that those measures are the result of mature consideration on your part of all the details of the situation. Your orders in regard to a good understanding between our officers in the Punjab and in Sind, and the conciliatory treatment of the border tribes, can scarcely fail to produce good results. It is essential, however, that such co-operation should be insisted on, and Her Majesty's Government feel assured that you will visit with your severe displeasure any deviation from it.

5. Should the measures now reported produce their anticipated results, Her Majesty's Government trust that an early opportunity may be taken of again placing the relations between the Government of India and the Khan of Khelat on the friendly footing provided for by the Treaty of 1854, and thereby re-establishing a position of affairs desirable in the interests of the British Government, and essential to the continued existence of Khelat as an independent State.

6. If, on the other hand, failure should attend your well-considered efforts, it will be for your Excellency's Government to determine whether it may not be necessary to reconsider the whole question of the best mode of conducting your future relations with the Khelat State. I hope to take an early opportunity of addressing you more generally upon the changes which, under existing circumstances, seem necessary for the purpose of ensuring unity of policy in the Government of the most important Indian frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

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BILUCHISTAN, No. 2.

PAPERS

RELATING TO

THE TREATY

CONCLUDED

BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE KHAN OF KHELAT, ON THE 8TH DECEMBER 1876.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament [redacted] Majesty.



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1877.

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PAPERS

RELATING TO

The Treaty concluded between the Government of India and the Khan of Khelat, on the 8th December 1876.

No. 1.

No. 2819P., dated 16th October 1875.

Extract from the Proceedings of the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

RESOLUTION.—As the time is approaching when, under the instructions conveyed in the letter to the Punjab Government, No. 1460P., dated 14th May 1875, Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan, is to proceed into the Murree Hills and endeavour to effect a settlement of some of the disputes which of late years have distracted the country, it is advisable to review the recent correspondence regarding Khelat and Murree affairs, so as to set forth clearly the policy of the Government, and the objects which Captain Sandeman should keep in view in his proceedings.

2. On the 3rd February 1871 a conference of high officials of the Punjab and Sind was held at Mittunkote, with the view of securing unanimity of action in the management of the Murree and Boogtee tribes. In accordance with the suggestions then made, it was determined*—

* Resolution No. 2248P., dated 19th October 1871.

1st. That the control of the relations of Government with those tribes should be placed in the hands of the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, and that the Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan, in respect of the said tribes, should be placed under the Political Superintendent.

2nd. That in addition to the sum that had previously been paid to the Murree and Boogtee tribes for service on the border of the Punjab, Rupees 32,040 should be annually paid for the entertainment of certain horsemen of those tribes, with the view of maintaining the tranquillity of the Sind as well as of the Punjab frontier and of Khelat† territory. The amount thus sanctioned was to be handed over to the Chiefs in the name of the Khan, whose subsidy of Rupees 50,000 a year, which is paid to his Highness under the Treaty of 1854 on condition of his preventing all plundering or other outrage by his subjects within or near British territory, his protecting the transit of merchants, and permitting no exactions on traffic beyond a fixed duty, was not diminished. The payment of Rupees 32,040 was sanctioned for one year only, on the understanding that the whole question would be taken up shortly and discussed in all its bearings.

† Paragraph 13, letter from Punjab, dated 4th February 1871.

3. This measure proved ineffectual. In October 1871 a rebellion broke out in Khelat. Merchants were plundered in the Bolan Pass. Disorder spread into Kutchee. The attitude of the Murrees and Boogtees was uncertain, and the Murrees of the Bolan made no effort to oppose the progress of the rebels through the Pass, while their brethren under the Tomandar Guzzun Khan [illegible] to join the insurgent Brahoee Sirdars in their inroads upon Kutchee. At [illegible] placed himself in the hands of the Commissioner in Sind, who med[illegible] contending parties, and effected a settlement, one of the terms of w[illegible] plundered from kafilas during the disturbances should be given u[illegible] owners. The Khan received a lakh of rupees from the British Governmen[illegible] him in meeting urgent demands on his resources.

4. Matters, however, did [illegible] improve. In April 1872 the Brahooee Minguls, instigated as some supposed [illegible] Khan, attacked the Muzzeranee section of the Murree tribe, to whom had be[illegible] trusted the protection of the Bolan Pass. Shere Dil Khan, head of the Muzzeran[illegible] summoned the other Murrees to his aid, and retaliated by plundering kafilas o[illegible]eir way through the Pass. These proceedings produced a chronic state of di[illegible]d on the border of the Khelat and Murree country; and the Murrees made fre[illegible]nt raids on the low lands of Kutchee. The Khan attempted to evade his respo[illegible]ility for recovering the bulk of the plundered property from the Muzzeranees. [illegible]e was severely taken to task by Sir William Merewether, and informed that Governm[illegible]ent held him responsible under Treaty for the safety of traffic.

5. The subsequent conduct of his Highness was not such as to give confidence in this administration. He declined to look after the Government of the country; would not send a Governor to restore order in Lus Beyla; would not exert himself to procure

compensation for plundered merchants, and threw himself into the hands of favourites, who encouraged him in his dislike of his Minister Shahghassee Wullee Mahomed, and in opposition to the British Government, and this conduct was notwithstanding the warning he received from the Viceroy at a personal interview at Sukker in the autumn of 1872.

6. On the 31st March 1873, the Commissioner in Sind at last withdrew from Khelat territory the Political Agent, who was accompanied by the ex-Minister. This action was approved by the Government of India, who directed that the Khelat subsidy should be withheld, and the Khan informed that if disturbances occurred on the frontier, the British Government would be forced to take its own measures for preserving order.

7. In the winter of 1873 certain outrages were committed on British messengers in and near the Bolan Pass; nothing was done by the Khan to exact reparation. Numerous petty offences were committed by Khelat subjects on the border, and on the 11th February 1874, 200 armed Brahoees entered British territory and carried off the families of certain of their slaves who had shortly before made their escape.

8. In the meantime little progress had been made in carrying out the scheme of the Mittunkote Conference in regard to the Murree and Boogtee tribes. It had been the intention of the Commissioner in Sind to subsidize Shere Dil Khan Muzzeranee and the Chief of the Sarawans for the protection of the Bolan Pass, and to increase the service both of the Murrees and Boogtees. The contumacy of the Murree Chieftain Guzzun Khan in declining to attend upon the Political Superintendent of Upper Sind at Jacobabad defeated this intention regarding the Murrees; the failure of the Khan of Khelat to enter into the plan rendered abortive any attempt to make arrangements for securing the tranquillity of the Bolan; and the only part of the proposals of Sir William Merewether which was carried into effect was the payment of a small sum to the Boogtees whose behaviour had been good.

9. Before the irruption of the Brahoees into British territory took place, the Commissioner in Sind had sent to the Khan a grave remonstrance, to which an unsatisfactory reply was received. Sir William Merewether thereupon recommended that an expedition should be sent to Khelat to exact reparation for the outrage upon British territory, as well as for recent attacks on merchants proceeding through the province of Lus Beyla. He also proposed that the contumacy of the Murrees should be punished by the stoppage of all payments for service, whether from the Punjab or Sind, and by a blockade, or in the event of these measures failing, by a punitive expedition into the hills.

10. The Government of India did not consider that the condition of Khelat affairs, although grave, was such as to justify hostilities against the Khan, or that it was desirable at once to proceed to extremities against the Murrees. At the same time, the failure of the attempt to deal with the frontier tribes through the Khan made it necessary to revise the arrangements agreed upon at Mittunkote, and it was determined that a party of Sind and Punjab officers should visit the hills, explain to the tribes the desire of the British Government for the maintenance of peace and, order, and, if possible, make arrangements with them with that object.

11. Sir William Merewether made a second representation on the subject. He considered that the people of Khelat were exhibiting a bad spirit, that disorder in Khelat was spreading, and that the Khan was showing still greater opposition to the interests of the British Government than before; he represented that the Murrees persevered in their contumacy, and that the Murrees and Boogtees combined had descended upon the plains, and carried off numbers of Sind cattle that were grazing beyond the line of British posts, and recommendation for a military expedition. Before finally deciding upon the course to be pursued, Sir William Merewether was summoned to Calcutta, and the condition of affairs was fully discussed. The result was to confirm the opinion before expressed that the circumstances did not justify a resort to hostilities. The orders of the Government of India were contained in the letter of this Department, No. 16P., dated 5th January 1875. It was laid down that the Government of India desired to secure two principal objects,—(1) the prevention of plundering and outrage within or near the British frontier; (2), the safe transit of trade.

12. With respect to the first object, the returns submitted showed that a considerable number of offences, most of them trivial, had been committed by Khelat subjects on the Khelat and Sind border between Jacobabad and the Bolan, and had remained unpunished. The Commissioner was directed to address a letter to the Khan, setting forth the cases in which he had failed to grant redress for injuries committed within British territory and on British subjects; he was to be informed that until he manifested both a willingness and an ability to perform the duties of a good neighbour, the British Government would take its own measures to protect its territories and subjects; subjects of Khelat committing offences in British territory, if apprehended there,

would receive the utmost penalty of the law, and if they succeeded in escaping into Khelat territory, they would be followed and punished. For the purpose of carrying out this policy the police force on the Sind frontier between Jacobabad and the sea was strengthened in accordance with Sir William Merewether's recommendations.

13. A letter to the Khan, written in the sense of the above-mentioned instructions, was despatched by Sir William Merewether towards the close of March 1875. No reply to this communication has reached the Government, but signs are not wanting that the Khan has at last somewhat realized the gravity of the situation. In September 1874, his Highness called to his Councils a new Wuzeer, Moolla Atta Mahomed. This officer was deputed in the spring of 1875 to chastise the marauders on the southern portion of the Khelat and Sind frontier. He placed himself in communication with the Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee, and proceeded to take energetic measures against the offenders, one of whose leading men, Nowsherwan Choota, he arrested and imprisoned. Although the Khan of Khelat has not complied with the demands of the British authorities for the restitution of plundered property, the action of his Wuzeer has had a beneficial effect.

14. So far as regards the portion of the British frontier from the sea up to Jacobabad, the measures taken under the instructions of 5th January 1875 have been completely successful, and no such offences as those formerly complained of have since been reported.

15. The second object which Government had in view, viz., the safe transit of the trade with Afghanistan, seemed to depend mainly on the possibility of securing the services of the Murrees and other neighbouring tribes. As regards the Murrees and Boogtees, it was decided that the dual system of management from the Punjab and Sind should cease; the conduct of the tribes was to be considered as a whole, whether in reference to Sind or the Punjab; the Deputy Commissioner of Debra Ghazee Khan was to be the medium of intercourse and communication with the Murrees and Boogtees in all their branches, but he was to be under the orders of the Commissioner in Sind. Captain Sandeman was to use all his influence with the view of effecting a settlement of intertribal quarrels, and the arrangements of Mittunkote were to be carried out in their entirety, subject to the modification prescribed regarding the duties and position of the Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan; but it was added that the separate payments to the tribes on the Punjab side must be treated as part of the general arrangements, and that the submission of Guzzun Khan, his attendance at Jacobabad, and restoration of the booty received by him in 1872, must precede the re-opening of friendly relations with him.

16. The orders given by the Government of India received the full approval of Her Majesty's Government.

17. It is now necessary to examine how far they have succeeded in improving the condition of affairs in Khelat and on the frontier. Captain Sandeman's communications with the Murrees resulted in the submission of Guzzun Khan who visited Jacobabad, paid his respects to the Political Superintendent, restored his share of the plunder obtained in the raid of 1872, and recovered from the tribesmen of Kahun, as well as certain Sanganis and Bijeranis, their portion of the booty. Captain Sandeman also succeeded in tracing and recovering the cattle stolen from British subjects and from the people of Seebee by the Murree and Boogtee raiders. These results are not only creditable to Captain Sandeman, but give reason to hope that the arrangement by which the conduct of our relations with the frontier tribes has been entrusted to that officer will in time produce more substantial effects.

18. At the same time, although since the beginning of the present year no disturbance has occurred within the British frontier north of Jacobabad, and none of any importance near it, the Murrees have continued their raids in Kutchee, and there still remains the dispute between the Murrees and the Government of Khelat, which is closely connected with long standing intertribal quarrels, and which has not been touched by the engagements concluded under Captain Sandeman's auspices.

19. Captain Sandeman is of opinion that, under present complications in Khelat, which he believes to be, and which the Commissioner in Sind admits may possibly be, fomented by the Khan or his immediate officers, any attempt to prevent the Murrees from raiding in Kutchee by giving them service in the manner proposed in the orders of 5th January 1875 would prove ineffectual, and that such arrangements must be preceded by a meeting in Kutchee with the Chiefs of the tribes, at which an endeavour should be made by him to adjust the differences out of which the present troubles have arisen. To such a meeting the Commissioner in Sind is opposed, as he considers it would be unwarrantable, when political relations with the Khan have been suspended, to enter his country and hold council with his Chiefs as to the part he is taking in the

disturbances going on in his own country. Sir William Merewether, moreover, is of opinion that for Captain Sandeman to have anything to say to political questions affecting the State of Khelat generally would be opposed to the spirit of his instructions, and must lead to serious complications; that the object of granting extra subsidy to the Murrees was to induce them to abstain from raiding in Kutchee, in the same way as they have been induced to keep quiet within their hills on the Punjab side; and that Captain Sandeman should confine himself to endeavouring to effect this, and to preventing the Murrees and Boogtees from raiding their neighbours either within or without British territory.

20. Under existing circumstances, his Excellency in Council entirely approves of Captain Sandeman having abstained from offering additional service to the Murrees on condition of their committing no raids in Kutchee. His Excellency agrees with Captain Sandeman that there is little, if any, probability at present of such a measure proving successful. When his Excellency in Council included abstinence from raids in Kutchee among the conditions on which the Murrees were to receive further service, he had every reason to believe that the only difficulties to be contended with arose from the weakness of the Khelat Government. The case is materially altered when there is ground to suspect that the action of the Khelat Government may, to some extent at any rate, cause the troubles which it is our desire to settle.

21. The Governor-General in Council wishes to bring every influence which he can exert to bear in promoting peace and good order in Kutchee, as in other territories bordering on the British possessions. The condition of neighbouring countries greatly affects the prosperity of Her Majesty's subjects, and his Excellency in Council cannot be indifferent to the condition of the State of Khelat. But the duties and responsibilities of the Government of India in reference to raids committed by the nominal subjects of the Khan of Khelat upon their neighbours in Khelat or other foreign territory are essentially different from their duties and responsibilities in the case of raids committed in British territory. His Excellency in Council does not consider that it would be right to terminate arrangements which have secured the peace of our own border, because our efforts to restore order in Kutchee have not been successful.

22. The Governor-General in Council is accordingly pleased to modify the instructions contained in paragraphs 12 and 14 of letter No. 16P., dated 5th January 1875, to the Commissioner in Sind. The existing system of service for the protection of the Punjab and Sind frontiers will be maintained, and this service, in so far as it affects both provinces, will be treated as one. If the tribes to whom service is given commit any outrages in British territory or on British subjects on the Sind frontier requiring the stoppage of their service on that side, the service of the offending tribes will also be stopped on the Punjab side, and *vice versâ*, besides any other measures of a severer kind which the Government of India may find it necessary to take by way of punishment. But those penalties will not necessarily be inflicted, either on the Sind or the Punjab side, upon the commission of raids or other offences in Kutchee or elsewhere out of British territory.

23. It remains then to consider what means shall be taken to restore peace in Kutchee and protect the transit of trade within the territories of the Khan of Khelat.

24. Irrespective of the general interest which the Government of India have in promoting the peace and prosperity of neighbouring countries, they have a special interest in Kutchee. The boundary between Kutchee and Sind runs through an open country, so that any serious disturbances in Kutchee may affect British territory very closely. The raids, however, which have actually occurred in Kutchee have not as yet been of a kind to endanger the general peace of the British districts in Sind; and as the posts of the Sind frontier force are in advanced positions beyond the frontier, there seems no reason to anticipate that outrages will be attempted to their rear. Should such outrages be attempted, they should be promptly and vigorously dealt with. The advanced outposts on the Sind border then may reasonably be expected to secure a fair degree of order in the southern portions of Kutchee over which their power of prompt action extends. Any armed aggression within the Kutchee territory thus commanded by the outposts may be forcibly suppressed by them.

25. Beyond the point to which the power of the force stationed in the outposts extends, his Excellency in Council declines to accept any direct responsibility for the protection of life and property, though he will continue to exercise such influence in the interests of peace as he may be able to command in those countries. While, on the one hand, the Khan of Khelat appears to be either unable or unwilling to enforce his authority in those districts, it is clear on the other hand that it is not the duty of the British Government to maintain peace and order in his Highness' territories. So far as the influence and good offices of frontier officers can be used to promote peace and

good order, and settle disputes, whether among the tribes or between the tribes and the people of Seebee or the Government of the Khan, his Excellency in Council desires that they shall be freely exercised; but the responsibility for the government of the country and the maintenance of order does not devolve on the British Government.

26. At present the real causes of the quarrels and disturbances which prevail are but imperfectly known. Without fuller and more explicit information there is little prospect of the influence of the British Government being successfully applied to their settlement. His Excellency in Council therefore desires that Captain Sandeman shall proceed into the Murree Hills as early in the cold season as practicable, in order (1) to procure all the information he can respecting local feuds and quarrels among the Murree and Boogtee tribes, or between them and the Afghans, or between them and the Brahoees; (2) to endeavour as far as he can to bring about an amicable settlement of these quarrels; (3) to report for the information of Government, through the Commissioner in Sind, his views on such as he cannot settle; and (4) to report on the general relations between the Murree and Boogtee tribes and the Khan's Government. Sir William Merewether may, if he thinks fit, depute an officer from Sind to be associated with Captain Sandeman, but in subordination to him.

27. Captain Sandeman will also enquire and report whether anything, and if so what, can be done for the protection of trade viâ the Bolan, and whether a system of fixed tolls on caravans could not be arranged for, the proceeds of which would go to the tribes interested in the protection of the route. In respect to all or any of these objects, Captain Sandeman will have discretion to make any arrangements he considers to be advisable, within the total sum sanctioned after the Mittunkote Conference, viz., Rupees 66,960 per annum.

28. At the same time, considering the importance of the Candahar trade, his Excellency in Council thinks it advisable that an alternative route should be opened up whereby the trade may be rendered to some extent independent of the Bolan, and may not be liable to interruption by the feuds in Khelat. For this purpose the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab is authorised to take such measures as his Honour may think practicable to open up the old trade route from Candahar viâ Tull and Chotiali, and, if necessary, to communicate with his Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan with a view to enlist the co-operation of the Cabul authorities.

29. Should the measures now authorised be successful in affording reasonable security to trade through Khelat territory, and should his Highness the Khan show an earnest desire to co-operate for this end, and to return to a proper sense of his duties, it will afford the Governor-General in Council great pleasure, on receiving an expression of regret for what has occurred, to restore the former subsidy, and re-establish the old friendly footing with his Highness' Government.

30. It is the determination of the Government of India not to permit outrages to be perpetrated in British territory or upon British subjects with impunity; but at the same time his Excellency in Council desires again to inculcate upon the Commissioner in Sind the duty of dealing patiently and considerately with the tribes, and of avoiding harsh and precipitate action, which was impressed upon him in the 19th paragraph of Mr. Aitchison's letter of the 5th of January last.

Order.—Ordered, that a copy of the foregoing Resolution be sent to the Commissioner in Sind for information and guidance, and for communication to Captain Sandeman, and to the Punjab Government, and to the Government of Bombay for information.

No. 2.

No. 816 of 1875, Political Department.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla.

Commissioner's Office, Kurrachee,
21st October 1875.

SIR,

IN continuation of my letter No. 92 of the 9th February last (2nd and 3rd paras.), and No. 157 of the 5th March, I have now the honour to report, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, on the measures adopted on the south-west frontier of Sind, by Captain Wise, Superintendent of Kurrachee Police, in accordance with the instructions given to him by me under the Government of India letter No. 16 P, dated 5th January 1875.

2. Captain Wise's proceedings have, I consider, been conducted throughout with great ability and judgment. Though new to the province and people he at once, by display of good sound sense and frank bearing, gained a wholesome influence over, and good footing amongst, the tribes on both sides of the border, and the success that attended his efforts is entirely due to his ready tact and judicious management. I trust that his proceedings will receive the high approval of his Excellency the Viceroy.

Protection of south-western frontier

3. The Wuzeer, Atta Mahomed, acted throughout with an honest and sincere desire to effect the objects for which he was sent by his master, his Highness the Khan, and showed thorough cordiality in all his dealings with Captain Wise, as well as an unhesitating anxiety to carry out the wishes of the British Government. And had his Highness the Khan only confirmed the proceedings of his Wuzeer, and handed over the offenders who were taken back to Khelat, as was required of him, the success of the Wuzeer's deputation would have been complete. But I regret to state, as will presently be shown, that this has not been the case. On the contrary, since his return to Khelat the Wuzeer has been disgraced by his Highness, chiefly, it would seem, for having obeyed too well the instructions given him in the first instance at Khelat, and for having so closely conformed to the wishes of the British Government.

4. In his first report, dated 13th April, Captain Wise states:—

"In accordance with your instructions I reached this place ("Khar") on the bank of the Hubb River (which is the boundary line) on the 17th of last month, and found Moollah Atta Mahomed encamped with his force on the opposite or western bank. His force consists of about 200 Sowars, dressed in green tunics and armed with sabre and carbine, much the same as our own irregular horse, and they are fairly mounted; 400 of the Pathan Regiment armed with English muskets, two mountain train guns, which are carried on camels, and about 50 Sebundi Sowars, and 50 foot with their country weapons.

"On the morning after my arrival the Wuzeer and his principal officers visited me, and I had a long conversation with him regarding the work to be done on the frontier, and informed him what were your wishes, as communicated to me by you personally when I was summoned to your camp in February. I also demanded of him the surrender of the different offenders whose extradition had been required from his Highness the Khan during the last two years, and in the course of the day furnished him with a list, giving their names and particulars. At the same time I stated my willingness to assist him in every way, having been sent here by you for that purpose, and that I was prepared to apprehend and hand over to him all offenders who had taken refuge in our territority, on his satisfying me regarding their criminality.

"In reply, the Wuzeer stated that he fully understood what was required of him, namely, (1) to apprehend and punish those who had looted the Kafilas, (2) to arrest and hand over to me all the offenders whose extradition had been asked at different times, and (3) to make such arrangements as would ensure the safety of the Kafilas, and prevent cattle-lifting on our frontier in future. He said he hoped to carry out all these measures in such a way as to give you every satisfaction, that all the Sirdars had joined his camp, and had expressed their willingness to assist him in every way, and had done so up to the present time.

"On the following day I visited the Wuzeer in his camp, and there met Sirdars Noordeen, Ali Khan, Jubal Khan and others whose acquaintance I wished to make. They all stated their desire to assist the Wuzeer, and that they would do their best to arrest the different offenders from their tribes, and had sent people out for that purpose.

"Since that day up to the present time I have received visits from all the Sirdars, and have had several interviews with Wuzeer Atta Mahomed (he speaks Hindustani, so we have no difficulty in conversing together), and all has been going on satisfactorily. A few days after our first meeting he sent me a list, similar to one I had supplied to him, of all the people living in our territory that should be given up to him. On going through this list I found it included offences of six and nine years ago, and so returned it to him, saying he should confine himself to the last two years only, as I had done, for it would be impossible to do the work if we both went back so far. An amended list was accordingly submitted.

"I attach statements of the number of offenders that have been apprehended and handed over by both sides, and every exertion is being made to seize the remainder; but some have fled to long distances, or are hiding away; they will, however, all be seized and handed over by their Sirdars whenever they return. Besides those named in the list, Sirdar

Appended, and marked A. and B.—W. L. M.

Pahar Khan, Zaroor Brahoee, and Nowsherwan are in the Wuzeer's camp. The two former have committed offences in our territory, but will not be handed over at present.

"As regards the cattle stealers that are given up to me, I find it almost impossible to obtain such evidence against them as would ensure a conviction in a magistrate's court. In nearly every case the stolen animal was restored at the time it was traced, and the complainant having got his property back all right does not care now to come forward and prosecute. In most cases the cattle were handed back to our police by a third party, who told them that such and such persons were the thieves, but there is no evidence beyond this man's statement, and one magistrate to whom a case was sent up has ruled that he cannot punish a man charged with being a receiver of stolen property in foreign territory. The people, therefore, from whom our stolen animals are recovered cannot be punished unless we can prove they actually stole them in our territory.

"Such offenders as I cannot convict in our magistrates' courts I hand over to the Wuzeer for punishment. There they are asked on the oath of their caste whether they committed the offence or not, and if they admit it, are fined or security taken. You are aware that all offences in Khelat, even murder, are punished by fine, and accordingly heavy sums have been demanded from those who looted the Kafilas, and the Wuzeer has been busy seizing property of all kinds to collect it. Yesterday I was informed that Sirdar Noordeen had given security that he would collect and pay up the full amount in six months. This is a good arrangement, as the people's cattle that were seized were being sold at great sacrifice.

"As regards future arrangements, I have demanded that as there are no police in Khelat to assist us, each Sirdar shall be answerable for the thefts committed by the people, and shall give up the offenders for punishment, with such evidence as is forthcoming. I fear, however, that so long as witnesses have to go to Kotri, Kurrachee, and such places, very few will be obtained, even with the help of their Sirdars, as we cannot summon them. All the Sirdars have agreed to the above, and state that on a crime being traced to one of their tribe, they will give me every assistance in bringing him to justice. If they keep their promise in this, we shall have little frontier crime in future.

Captain Wise was afterwards invested with Magisterial powers, so that we might try and decide cases on the spot.—W. L. M.

"Before leaving this, the Wuzeer will give me in writing the arrangements made for the future prevention and detection of crime on the frontier. The names of the different Sirdars who are to be held responsible will be stated, and their signed agreement attached. All promise well at this time, and I trust now that I know them, to be able to work with them in a friendly way, and get every assistance in future."

5. On the 26th April, Captain Wise further reported from his camp at Khar as follows:—

"The Wuzeer, Atta Mahomed, started from this place, on his return for Khelat, yesterday evening. In accordance with your orders, I have been altogether nearly six weeks on frontier duty in connection with the above officer, and I trust that the work done may be considered satisfactory, and that the arrangements made for the future security of the frontier are such as will meet with your approval, and the results may prove all you could wish. I myself have every confidence in their doing so.

"In all some 42 criminals have been brought to justice, and a statement showing names, offences, and punishments awarded is attached for your information. There are still many accused persons at large, but they have fled to long distances, or are hiding away in the hills, and cannot at present be apprehended. The duty of arresting them has, however, been made over to their different Sirdars, and a statement of the same given to me in writing, a translation of which is appended for perusal. Putting these men aside, I am of opinion that enough has been done to give these frontier tribes a satisfactory lesson which they will not forget in a hurry.

Appended, marked C. and D.—W. L. M.

Appended, marked E.—W. L. M.

"In addition to the men shown in the statement of punishments, Nowsherwan, Jan Mahomed, Belooch Khan, Pahar Khan, and Zaroor Brahoee have been taken away as prisoners to Khelat. The former, as you are aware, has been the chief mover in all the looting and frontier outrages, and I trust he will be kept in confinement until such time as you may think right to sanction his release; the two latter are guilty of having forcibly carried off some slaves who had taken refuge in British territory, and the Wuzeer promises they shall eventually be handed over to you.

"Jan Mahomed and Belooch Khan were concerned in the attacking and looting of the Kafilas. The former was formerly well behaved, and has on more than one occasion given us assistance in getting back animals that were stolen from our territory, but owing

to his brother Sahib Khan Choota refusing to give him any allowance or share whatever of his raj, he of late years became the friend and companion of Nowsherwan, and went to the bad. I consider that Sahib Khan is to blame for the course he has taken with regard to his brother, but this is a family affair with which we have nothing to do.

"During the time I have been engaged on this frontier duty, I have kept before me the views expressed in Government of India Despatch No. 16 P., of the 5th January last (a copy of which you furnished me with for guidance), and have endeavoured to make the most of this opportunity to cultivate friendly intercourse with the frontier Sirdars, and their followers, and I trust with some success.

"On my arrival here I had a meeting with the principal Sirdars at the Wuzeer's camp, as already reported, and I then gave them to understand I should be glad to see them at all times, and accordingly they all visited me on several occasions, and last evening when they came to take leave, before starting with the Wuzeer, they expressed a desire to keep up the friendly relations here begun, and to assist me in every way to keep down crime on the frontier and bring criminals to justice, and to this effect they have each given me a signed agreement, translations of which accompany this report.

Appended, marked F.—W. L. M.

"In organizing the extra frontier force lately sanctioned, I have paid attention to the measures referred to in para. 11 of the Despatch above quoted, and with your permission have offered the Chief Inspectorship of the Frontier Police to Sirdar Sahib Khan Choota, and one of the Deputy Inspectorships to Sirdar Jubal Khan Brahoee, which they have accepted, and have also given places among the Sowars and foot police to several of their relations and followers, and those of other tribes also, and expect good results from this arrangement.

"Sirdar Sahib Khan Choota has always been well inclined towards us, and on all occasions given assistance when asked. His village is within a few miles of our frontier, and the Choota tribe inhabit the country on both sides of the boundary for nearly the whole length of our frontier line, that is, from Ghathi on the north to within a few miles of the sea. The Bundujos and Bikkuks, very lawless and troublesome tribes, also obey Sahib Khan, so that his services should prove of great assistance to us.

"Sirdar Jubal Khan is a Brahoee, and his tribe and those of other Brahoees occupy the country on the Khelat side of the boundary on the northern end of my frontier, that is, from Ghathi to the Gaj, for which portion he is willing to be answerable. Belooch Khan, the father of Jubul Khan, received a Jageer of Rs. 250 a year from the British Government, granted for services rendered to the police in cases of crime near the border (vide Government Resolution No. 2000, of 22nd June 1869), which on his death was continued to the son, who will, I think, do us good service.

"In conclusion, I have to remark that during such time as Wuzeer Atta Mahomed was working with me, I have every reason to believe he did his best to give me every assistance, and was honest in his desire to apprehend and make over for punishment all criminals, and to make good arrangements for the future."

6. Nowsherwan Choota (uncle of Sahib Khan, the Chief of that tribe,) who was the principal in all the attacks on the Kafilas, as also the chief disturber of the peace for years past, also Jan Mahomed Choota (his nephew, and younger brother to Sahib Khan), who has of late joined in with Nowsherwan, were made prisoners and taken away by the Wuzeer to Khelat. The Khan has imposed a heavy fine on Nowsherwan and keeps him confined to Khelat, but nothing more. Pahar Khan Sassoolee, the leader of the inroad into the Shikarpur district in February 1874, when [redacted] slave refugees were forcibly carried off by him, and Zazoor Brahoee, charged with the murder in British territory of a police constable named Shabak, and a woman Gowree, were also taken away prisoners.

Nowsherwan Choota and other offenders.

7. I have waited up to the present time in the expectation that some action would be taken by his Highness the Khan in respect to the punishment or delivery of the above to the British authorities, but I regret to say nothing has yet been done by him. He has fined Pahar Khan Sassoolee Rs. 3,000 for the murder of the latter's brother in a family quarrel, but has made no sign whatever of complying with the request made to him by me for the surrender of this and the other offenders. They are still at Khelat, with the exception of Jan Mahomed Choota, who has been allowed to return to his country.

Non-delivery by the Khan.

8. With regard to Jan Mahomed, the Khan has also adopted a more objectionable course even than the mere release, for he has appointed him Sirdar of the Choota tribe in place of his elder brother, Sahib Khan, and has written me a letter informing me of this. The reason assigned in

Appointment of Jan Mahomed by the Khan to be Chief of the Chootas.

* Translation appended. I have not considered it advisable to send any reply to this letter.—W. L. M.

this letter is, that Sahib Khan had failed to pay his respects to the Khan at Khelat, but this is not the true one, and it is so given out by Jan Mahomed since his return to his native place. The real cause is Sahib Khan having taken service under Captain Wise without permission of the Khan, and engaging with Captain Wise to check crime and arrest offenders.

9. This procedure of the Khan's is most deliberately disrespectful, but other can scarcely be expected with such advisers as the Khan at present has about him, and in his present frame of mind. It is also a natural consequence of our dealing with and employing Chiefs of his clans, when friendly relations and communications on our part with him no longer exist. Jubal Brahoee, who is likewise in Captain Wise's employ, has also been threatened with trouble for having taken service with us.

10. Jan Mahomed has come too near his brother's village, accompanied by a Chobdar and three Sowars of the Khan's. He gives out that he has been appointed Chief, which the Chobdar's presence confirms, and, with the aid of the latter, is engaged in forcing money and property from the people to meet the fine the Khan has imposed on Nowsherwan. This is causing great distress, and irritation, and is very likely to bring about disturbances, while it is not improbable that the people mulcted by Jan Mahomed will try to recoup themselves by attempting to lift cattle from within our border.

Success of Captain Wise's arrangement so far.

11. I am glad to be able to report that, up to this, Captain Wise's excellent arrangements have proved most successful, and there has been an almost total absence of acts of violence on the border in his charge since the departure of the Wuzeer. But I am afraid this will not long continue to be the case, now that this element of disorder has come in the supersession of Sahib Khan by his younger brother. Sahib Khan asks for protection, and assistance in obtaining reversal of his removal from the Sirdarship, but nothing under present circumstances can be done beyond to tell him, as I have, that we still recognise him, and him only, as Chief of the Chootas.

Khelat affairs generally.

12. On Khelat affairs generally I have the honour to forward a very complete and full report by Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind, also another by Major Harrison, the Political Agent at Khelat. The Khelat Agency was placed in abeyance from the first April last, in accordance with the instructions contained in Government of India letter No. 16P., of the 5th January, and the Political Agent, Major Harrison, with Dr. Bowman, Surgeon in charge of the Agency, both proceeded to England on medical certificate to recruit their health, which had suffered greatly from the trials of circumstances and climate they had undergone during the past years. The establishment of the Political Agency was broken up, part being discharged, and the remainder transferred to the office of the Political Superintendent.

Letter from his Highness the Khan. Copy of translation appended.

13. A reply was received from his Highness the Khan to my letter dated 26th March 1875. It is most unsatisfactory, and mainly an evasive one. In reference to the demand for the arrest and punishment of offenders against the peace, residing in the Province of Jalawan, he states that he has deputed Moollah Atta Mahomed, the Wuzeer, with troops to that Province, "to settle "these affairs, and he having reached that place is engaged in carrying out the duty "entrusted to him. God willing, under any circumstances, he will seize the robbers "and punish them, and recover the stolen property, or its equivalent." Moollah Atta Mahomed did perform the duty excellently well, and returned to Khelat with the prisoners, as well as a considerable sum of money which he had collected on account of the property plundered; but though some time has elapsed since the Wuzeer's return, the prisoners have been neither punished nor surrendered to me, nor has the value of the property been handed over, though his Highness is in possession of a list showing the amount. The tone of the letter is very objectionable, especially when he adverts to the escape from Hyderabad of Sirdar Ali Khan, the son of the Ex-Jam of Beyla, and to certain men of his, "who managed and held charge of the revenues of the Kutchee, "Jalawan, and Beyla Districts, and had to account for lakhs of rupees, who carried "away all my wealth and account books, and have settled free of all anxiety in British "territory." The people alluded to are the late Wuzeer, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, and his nephew, Gulam Jan, who were permitted to accompany Major Harrison on his withdrawal from the Khelat Court. The letter he refers to is one which was sent direct to me at Kurrachee last year, and was returned because it had not been forwarded through the usual channel, and moreover it contained unjustifiable reflections on British officers, as well as statements regarding what had passed, quite contrary to what had

really occurred, and such as should not have been addressed to me by his Highness the Khan. The latter being returned was sufficient reply to his Highness, so his statement that he had received no acknowledgment is incorrect. The demand of the arrest and extradition of the Shahgassee and others who had been allowed to accompany the British Political Agent, on the latter's leaving the Khelat Court, is a most unjustifiable one. His Highness' statement also that he has observed the duties of a good and really friendly neighbouring Sovereign, and has firmly adhered himself to Treaty engagements, is, I need hardly say, not borne out by the circumstances that have occurred during the past few years. He again refers to the subject of the confinement of his three servants in Sind, and claims their release in fulfilment of a promise made by his Excellency the Viceroy at Sukker. What passed, as quoted from the memorandum of conversation recorded at the time, was as follows:—"He (his Highness) then asked for the sanction of the reinstatement of his favourites, owing to whose intrigues much of the recent complications was to be attributed, and whose dismissal had only been very recently secured. To this request his Excellency replied, that to reverse the dismissal of these men at present would only have the effect of weakening the Khan's authority, and would afford encouragement to other evil-doers. Under these circumstances, therefore, it was quite impossible for the British Government to countenance their restoration, though at some future time, if events proved favourable, it might be found possible to re-open the question. Notwithstanding the above refusal, the Khan continued to press the matter of his favourites' restoration, urging the insignificance of these men, and the loss of dignity he would suffer if their dismissal was insisted on. His Excellency replied, that it was impossible to reply to the Khan in any other sense than he had already done, and that the decision given could not be altered." I venture to say that the Khan's conduct since that time in no way would justify the re-opening of the question, or his Excellency taking into consideration the conditional promise then made. His Highness the Khan, following the advice of evil councillors, has shown himself to be very far from a friendly neighbouring Sovereign, and has deliberately broken his promises of punishing or surrendering offenders against the British Government, whose apprehension had been required of him, notwithstanding that his Highness' Wuzeer Atta Mahomed had faithfully performed the duty of seizing the persons claimed. Neither has his Highness shown any sign of restoring the equivalent of property plundered from travellers which he was called upon to cause to be made good. He has also neglected to make any suitable attempts to restore order in his country, to the absence of which, and to the general discontent existing, his attention had in a friendly manner been drawn. In conclusion, his Highness refers to the withdrawal of the annual subsidy of Rs. 50,000, as if this was unreasonable, and an act of unkindness on the part of the British Government. His Highness is well aware that this money was paid to him under the stipulation that he should protect traders passing through his country. His failure in this respect was a breach of the treaty between the two Governments, and necessitated the withdrawal of the subsidy.

Reasons for not sending a reply to his Highness' letter.

14. At first I was disposed to draft a reply to this letter for the approval of his Excellency the Viceroy, but on more mature consideration, I do not see that one is required, or that any good will come of continuing correspondence under present circumstances, or holding further communication with the head of a State who so totally ignores his responsibilities, and persists in putting everything in an incorrect light. The wishes and intentions of Government have been clearly expressed to his Highness, and until he adopts a different course of action, or it is the desire of his Excellency and of Government to speak in more decided terms, it will, I think, be better to avoid any further interchange of letters.

State of affairs above the Passes.

15. There is, I regret to say, no improvement since the date of Colonel Loch's report in the state of affairs in the Khelat Districts above the Passes. His Highness the Khan, apparently hard pressed for money, has been inflicting heavy fines wherever he saw even the slightest pretext offered for his doing so. This has greatly increased the feelings of discontent that previously existed, and brought affairs to a very critical state, causing rumours to be very common of a probable general outbreak against his authority. At Khelat there are two parties, each striving for power and influence with the Khan. The one, said to be strongest, consists of Naib Mahomed Khan Ex-Wukeel, Abdoolla Jan, a merchant, Mahomed Hyat Kazi of Bagh, and Mohsim commanding the Wuffadar Pultun. With them was the Wuzeer Atta Mahomed, but he is now in disgrace, and it is said the Khan publicly turned him out of the Durbar, on the Wuzeer refusing to give in his accounts to an inferior subordinate, who belongs to the other party. The latter is formed of

Fukkeer Mahomed, commanding the Jungee Pultun, Abdool Azeez Naib of Bagh, his son Fukkeer Mahomed, and Shekh Faiz Mahomed Mustowfee Naib of Mustoong. There is great jealousy and enmity between these two parties. They are all working more for their own selfish ends than for the good of their country and their ruler, with the exception of Atta Mahomed, who showed himself really sincere in his endeavour to see the wishes of the British Government carried out, and to faithfully discharge the duties entrusted to him. For this he has been disgraced. He is the son of the old Darogah Gool Mahomed, who was in former times and to the last day of his life the most bitter opponent of the British, so that the enlightened and friendly action of the son is all the more creditable to him. Almost all the others are men of indifferent stamp and origin, and they know that were good government re-established, they would not hold their present places for a day. It is their object, therefore, to prevent the Khan becoming reconciled with the British Government.

Jalawan.

16. In Jalawan, the southern portion of Beloochistan, the Sirdars continue to hold aloof from the Khan, though they, nearly all, including Sirdar Ali Khan of Lus Beyla, paid their respects to the Wuzeer Atta Mahomed when he was in their country in the spring. Meer Noordeen, the head of the Minguls, and the most unsettled character in the whole country, positively refuses to visit Khelat, though repeatedly summoned by the Khan, and tempted by offers of recognition of him as chief Sirdar of Jalawan. Ali Khan, son of the Ex-Jam of Beyla, holds possession of the territory his father possessed, but not strongly. He is very far from popular, and has quarrelled with his uncle Meer Noordeen Mingul. He agreed to pay a small tribute to his Highness the Khan, but I have not heard of any having been actually forwarded to Khelat. Meer Gohur Zehri still remains in open rebellion, and harasses people passing up and down the Moollah Pass. Fukkeer Mahomed Bezunjo, Naib of Kedj, governs that province for the Khan, but sends him as little of the revenue as he can. There is deadly feud between the Bezunjos and the Minguls. This the Khan tried to work in hopes of weakening one or both, but neither of the tribes agreed to his proposals.

Sarawan.

17. In Sarawan there is grave discontent. The Khan's openly displayed hostility to the Summalani Minguls, who in 1872 he had himself employed against the Muzzeranee Murrees, has thoroughly estranged them from him. While the harsh conduct of the Naib of Moostung towards the several tribes living in that neighbourhood has raised a feeling of discontent, which only needs opportunity and a determined leader to turn into open rebellion.

Sirdar Moollah Mahomed Raisani.

18. Moollah Mahomed Raisani, the premier Sirdar of Sarawan, has never left his place of voluntary exile in Seebee, and has of late been very harshly treated by the Khan. The latter has confiscated all but 80 bunds* of this Sirdar's estates at Kunnuk, near Moostung. The Sirdar, deeply chagrined at this, has refused to keep the 80. This action of the Khan is directly opposed to the terms concluded by me on his behalf with the Sirdars at Jacobabad in 1872, but the Khan justifies it on the plea that the Sirdar obstinately refuses to resume his position at his Highness' Court, or to return to his hereditary estates. The Sirdar, on the other hand, excuses himself on the ground that he can place no faith in the Khan's sincerity, or in his protestations of revived friendly feeling.

* A bund means a piece of ground, varying in area from one to three or four acres, enclosed by raised mounds, within which the water is confined after rainfall. The water is thus made to soak into the ground, and directly the surface of the latter is dry, it is ploughed and seed sown. One supply of water thus given is sufficient to produce a moderate crop; second rain before maturity ensures a hurry one.

19. The Sirdar has written two piteous appeals to me on the subject of the hardships he has to endure owing to the Khan's disregard of the terms of the agreement entered into at Jacobabad, and which he (the Sirdar) states with a good show of justice were guaranteed by the British Government, but, in accordance with the letter I addressed to Moollah Mahomed on my return from Calcutta, I have not considered myself justified in sending any reply to either, and await his Excellency's instructions on the subject.

20. One of the Sirdar's appeals to Colonel Loch is so well worded, and so properly put, that I append it to this report. In justice to him I must state that everything he says is perfectly correct. He was warned, as has been reported to his Excellency on former occasions, to abstain from promoting disorders in Kutchee, immediately adjacent to the British border, as well as to prevent his followers from engaging in any. To this advice he has scrupulously adhered. But no benefit has accrued to him, because the changed relations with the Government of Khelat prevent any efforts being made in his behalf, or his representations being recognised.

21. Sirdar Guzzun Khan duly paid his respects to Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, at Jacobabad, in February. This had been brought about by Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Gazee Khan, in accordance with the instructions laid down in Government of India letter No. 16 P., of the 5th January. He also arranged for restitution by the Murrees and Boogtees of the cattle plundered from near Kuttun in August last, or for equivalent in money. Mr. Gladstone, Assistant Commissioner of Rajanpoor, to whom this duty was entrusted, carried out Captain Sandeman's instructions patiently and carefully, and on the whole treated the case very judiciously. The award was perhaps more liberal than the Murrees deserved, and it seemed almost a humorous view to take of the question when, as justification for the lowness of the compensation fixed, it was alleged that a number of the cattle originally stolen were again plundered from the robbers; many were in a poor state at the time of the robbery, and died in the hills; some were calves, and some were eaten by the robbers at the time. I do not see that any of the reasons above assigned lessen the loss to the owners of the cattle, or that the fact of the robbers not having realised the full value of the property stolen takes off from their responsibility for the acts of violence they had committed. I did not, however, wish to be too hypercritical, and bearing in mind the desire of his Excellency that all previously existing differences and difficulties should be smoothed away as soon as possible, I accepted and approved the award, requesting Captain Sandeman to convey my thanks to Mr. Gladstone for the care and pains he had taken in the matter.

Murree tribe.

22. I had pointed out to Captain Sandeman, both when that officer joined me at Jacobabad, and afterwards by letter, that the Murree Sirdar Guzzun Khan having made the *amende* required of him, to Colonel Loch, and the restoration of the cattle plundered from near the Sind border being disposed of, he (Captain Sandeman) was at liberty to carry out the remainder of the course laid down by the Government of India, viz., to make such arrangements as would seem best to induce the Murrees and Boogtees to abstain from predatory inroads into the district of Kutchee, in the same manner as they had been doing towards the Punjab, and to employ the money assigned at the Conference at Mittunkote in making those tribes remain quiet in their hills, and on friendly terms with their neighbours. Captain Sandeman held that to enable him to do this, it was necessary that the tribes between which at that time there were interchanges of hostilities should meet together in some selected place, and that Colonel Loch and he should endeavour to settle their differences. Without entirely assenting to the principle of this, I pointed out that the only two tribes with which the Murrees were then at issue were the Summulani Minguls* and the Dhoombkees at Lehree, in Kutchee; and that I would cause them to be summoned to come to Phat, in the Boogtee Hills, where he and Colonel Loch would meet them. The season, however, was so far advanced that the Summalani Minguls were on the move to the highlands, and for that and other reasons which they adduced, they respectfully asked to be excused; the meeting had therefore to be deferred. The Dhoombkee question was of the least importance, and could easily be settled at any time, so that was not entertained either.

Arrangements to be made with the Murrees.

* These reside during the summer above the Passes, but descend in the winter to feed their flocks in Kutchee.

23. As the Khelat diaries told of Murree raids in Kutchee, and further intended ones on a large scale, I on the 20th May called on Captain Sandeman to report what measures he had adopted to keep the Murrees within their own hills, and from such unwarrantable acts of violence as had been described. Captain Sandeman, in his reply No. 70, dated 29th May (submitted to Government with my letter No. 468, dated 22nd June), stated that he never understood that Government contemplated my (his) giving "the Murrees "a large sum of money merely to keep quiet," and further on—"I understand the Government of India, in the last-"named letter (No. 16 P., dated 5th January) to dis-"tinctly rule that, in extending service to the Murree "clan for the protection of Khelat† from Murree inroads, "it was to be given on the same understanding and on "the same principle as the service given to the clan for the Punjab border; in short, that the entire service was to be amalgamated."

† Sic. in orig.—This should have been "Kutchee" or "Khelat territory, adjacent "to the Murree Hills." Captain Sandeman is certainly not required to bring about the protection of Khelat, or to engage in any of the affairs of that State; indeed, he is specially to deal with the Murrees and Boogtees direct, irrespective of, and entirely apart from, the Khan or Government of Khelat.

24. Captain Sandeman quite misunderstood my meaning. I did not intend to convey that he was merely to give a large sum of money to the Murrees to keep them quiet, but that he was to use the large sum of money placed at his disposal in subsidising that clan, and employing them in such manner as he deemed best adapted for the object in view, which I maintain is to make them abstain from plundering in the plains of

Kutchee and parts of Khelat territory adjoining their hills, in the same manner as they abstained from plundering and acts of violence on the Punjab frontier.

25. This is plain and clear, and will lead to no other complications; and if the Murrees can withhold their hands from outrage on the Punjab side for a very much smaller amount of subsidy than that proposed to be given to them for the other side of their hills, it is intended that the extra sum allotted should be devoted to that object.

26. But Captain Sandeman goes further, and, according to his view, he is to have communication and dealings with all and every of the tribes of Beloochistan, Brahoee, or other, and hold councils in whatever part of that country he deems necessary, citing the procedure of the late General Jacob years ago as the grounds on which he would propose to act. I need hardly say that this appears to me to be directly opposed to the wishes of Government. The circumstances are totally changed. In the times quoted, friendly relations and open communication existed with the ruler of Khelat, and the Murrees were regarded then as amenable to that Sovereign's rule. Now relations have been broken off with the Khelat Government, and it has been decided to deal with the Murree and Boogtee tribes entirely apart from the Khan.

27. If Captain Sandeman's view were adopted it would lead to most embarrassing complications with the Khelat State, and endless difficulties and differences with the numerous tribes of Beloochistan, many of whom spend half the year above the Passes, far out of reach, and over whom we can have no possible control as matters now stand.

28. I addressed Captain Sandeman in the spirit of the above remarks in my letter No. 460 A, dated 18th June, which is before Government, and I have recently heard from him by telegram that he has not up to the present time expended a rupee of the extra subsidy on the Murrees.

29. The conduct of that tribe throughout the past summer has been most outrageous and insolent as regards Kutchee. They have repeatedly raided in that district, killing unoffending people, and carrying off large quantities of cattle. This has been done as if in open contempt of the British Government, for it must be, and was well known to them, that it was intended to deal favourably with them. It would go to show that they don't care for the favour of, and payments from, the British Government, as long as they can command rich booty from their immediate neighbours. These are not the results of any intertribal quarrels, but simply arise from the insatiate love of plundering possessing these people, and the assurance they feel they may carry it on with comparative impunity. The principal actors in these raids are the Bijarani Murrees, under their Chief Kurrum Khan; but some of almost all the other sections have joined, and even Boogtees have been reported to be engaged. The Chief of all the Murrees, Guzzun Khan, who is in our pay, is said to receive his regular share of all the booty but this at present has not been absolutely confirmed.

Conduct of the Murrees.

30. The reckless daring they display is almost incredible. One of the raids committed by them was on the Juttoees near Shoorun, a place on the opposite side of Kutchee, so that they had to cross and recross that broad plain. Fortunately the Khan's troops were more active than usual, and interrupted them on their return, punishing them fairly. But this, having been mainly from their own carelessness, has only made them more determined, and very recently five thousand of them cleared off immense numbers of cattle from the immediate neighbourhood of Dadur, returning to their hills scatheless. The people in Kutchee, dreading these onslaughts, are begging foran asylum in Sind, and if this state of affairs continues much longer the country will assuredly be deserted. One party of Murrees ventured as far south as to come between Bagh and Bushoree, and as this is approaching the Sind border, I have been compelled to direct the Commandant of the frontier to send patrols in that direction, in the hope that some of the bands may be fallen in with, to meet the punishment they deserve, and that they may be taught to keep clear of the British frontier.

31. The Boogtees are in an unfortunate state, broken up, and dismembered as a clan, quarrelling and traducing each other. It is thought by Captain Sandeman that this is due to the incompetency of the Chief Goolam Murteza. But knowing him and his people so well as I do, I am confident this is not the case. It is more correctly owing to differences having been fostered in his clan, and the minor Chiefs having been set against him, while, whenever they choose to dispute his authority, they are given ready refuge by the Murrees, whose object it is to make the Boogtees as weak as possible. Goolam Murteza is undoubtedly suffering greatly from mental disorder, but this is simply disquietude brought on by the knowledge of the powerful intrigues being worked against him. So far from encouraging the idea of his abandoning the Sirdarship, we should do everything we can to encourage and support him. His disquietude

Boogtee tribe.

would then rapidly disappear; he would soon become again the man he was a short time ago; and his tribe would once more rally round him. If disregard of his authority involved loss of our favour there would very shortly be less of it shown. He is a young man yet. I can recollect him without a hair on his face, and is naturally a fine manly one to boot (*sic*). But at present he hesitates to speak out boldly. If he would only do so all would soon be set to rights, and could he but feel confident of full and thorough support I am sure he would.

32. His condition and that of his tribe will have my first and most careful attention on my visit to the frontier in December next, and I trust that, with Captain Sandeman's assistance, a more healthy state of affairs both for Goolam Murteza and the tribe may be brought about. His eldest son, Shabaz Khan, is a prisoner in Bukkur Fort for a grave outrage committed by him near one of the Sind frontier outposts. Captain Sandeman has asked that he may be forgiven and released, with a view to his installation as Chief in place of his father. But I am confident this would be a very grave mistake. Goolam Murteza did ask for the release of Shabaz Khan, but this was under pressure, and without his seeing the evils to himself that would follow. Islam Khan, father of Goolam Murteza, abdicated in favour of his son more than twenty-five years ago, and living with the tribe unemployed and irresponsible, has never ceased to be a serious element of mischief amongst them. With two so situated, the prospects of restoration of unity and concord would be poor indeed. The removal of Islam Khan, who is a most restless intriguer, and most of all against his own son, would be the most fortunate thing that could happen to the tribe.

33. I have just received his Excellency's instructions to release Shabaz Khan, but I have to-day telegraphed earnestly begging that these orders may be allowed to remain in abeyance until I reach the frontier and make further enquiries. It is, I consider, a matter of the greatest importance just now that Goolam Murteza should not be removed, and I trust that my recommendations may meet with his Excellency the Viceroy's approval.

I have, &c.
W. L. MEREWETHER, Colonel,
Commissioner in Sind.

P.S.—The following later news, dated 5th October 1875, has been received from Seebee.

* Moollah Mahomed Raisani.

All the Murree Muccadums sent a messenger to the great* man living here, with the following message: —"We, "Muccadums, have heard that Khodadad Khan has confiscated your lands at Mehem. "We looked upon you as far superior to our own Sirdar; if you order us we will get "ready to fight. It is necessary that you should assemble all the Sarawans, so that "we and the Sarawans may with one accord ("ek ittafak se") create a disturbance; if, "however, the Brahoees will not act in this way, we are with you, and we are ready to "set fire to the country in such a way that it will tire the people to quench it.

Enclosure 1 in No. 2.

A.—Statement of Offenders who have been handed over to the District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee.

No.	Names.	Offence.	Remarks.
1	Ismail Chootta - - -	Cattle lifting - - -	Has escaped from custody, will be again apprehended.
2	Radha Chootta - - -	Ditto - - - -	Awaiting trial.
3	Mean Wussaya Barija - -	Ditto - - - -	Ditto.
4	Mehur Gudda - - -	Deserted from the town police with his kit.	Was sent before the City Magistrate for trial, who remanded him on bail, and he again escaped.
5	Mahomed Gudda - -	Ditto - - - -	Son of the above. do. do.
6	Puriah Chootta - - -	Camel stealing - - -	Awaiting trial.
7	Kheertur Chootta - -	Cattle stealing - - -	Ditto.
8	Taung Bundija - - -	Ditto - - - -	Ditto.
9	Nubboo Bundija - -	Ditto - - - -	Ditto.
10	Adam Boorrah - - -	Ditto - - - -	Ditto.
11	Hummud Boorrah - -	Ditto - - - -	Ditto.
12	Meandad Boorrah - -	Ditto - - - -	Ditto.
13	Pinya Gunja - - -	Highway robbery - -	Ditto.
14	Ebraim Gunja - - -		
15	Rumzan Chootta - -	Camel stealing - - -	Ditto.
16	Jarra Chootta - - -	Ditto - - - -	Ditto.
17	Soomar Chootta - - -	Sheep stealing - - -	Ditto.

No.	Names.	Offence.	Remarks.
18	Aukul Jamote - - -	Affray in which the Gubboles were killed.	Awaiting trial.
19	Sungur Jamote - - -		
20	Pulloo Chootta - - -		
21	Suttana Chootta - - -	Camel stealing - - -	Ditto.

NOTE.—There still remain about 50 men to be apprehended.

Police Superintendent's Office,
Camp Khar, 13th April 1875.

F. J. WISE, Captain,
District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee.

Enclosure 2 in No. 2.

B.—Statement of Offenders apprehended and handed over to Moollah Atta Mahomed, Wuzeer of Khelat, by the District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee.

No.	Names.	Offence.	Remarks.
1	Goomshad Bikkuk - -	Were of the gang that looted the Kafilas.	In custody in the Wuzeer's camp.
2	Kuttoo Bikkuk - - -		
3	Toung Bundijo - - -		
4	Nubboo Bundijo - - -		
5	Mahomed Ali Bundijo - -		
6	Moto Bundijo - - -		
7	Mujna Bikkuk - - -		
8	Peerana Bikkuk - - -		
9	Kurunut Bikkuk - -		
10	Visra Bikkuk - - -	Ditto, and several other robberies	Ditto.
11	Hussun Gunja - - -	Theft of goats, are all accused of murder.	Ditto.

NOTE.—Seventeen men remained to be apprehended, of these four are known to be in the Lus Beyla direction, so not in our territory, and one is at Baroda.

Police Superintendent's Office,
Camp Khar, 13th April 1875.

F. J. WISE, Captain,
District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee.

Enclosure 3 in No. 2.

C.—List of Persons apprehended and punished, or detained in custody by the Wuzeer of Khelat.

No.	Names.	Nature of Offence.	Convictions.	Remarks.
1	Mahomed Ali Bundija -	Attack on and loot of Pathan Kaffilas.	Amount of punishment not known, but a heavy fine has been inflicted, about 20,000 Rupees, on the whole gang.	All these men have been carried off in custody to Khelat, where they will have to undergo one year's imprisonment for looting, and further be kept in custody until their share of the fine is paid up.
2	Peerana Bikkuk -			
3	Kurmut Bikkuk -			
4	Mujnoo Bikkuk -			
5	Peeroo Chootta -			
6	Phelloo Chootta -			
7	Pubb Jamote -			
8	Sungore Jamote -			
9	Joomun Jamote -			
10	Alladad Jamote -			
11	Wullee Mahomed Jamote			
12	Meeya Wussaya Jamote -			
13	Natha Jamote -			
14	Baloch Jamote -			
15	Lushkurree Jamote			
16	Wassaro Bikkuk -			
17	Motho Bundija -			
18	Gumshad Bikkuk			
19	Khuttoo Bikkuk			
20	Hussun Bikkuk -	Theft of goats of Mitha Suchena.	Not known -	
21	Barran Belooch -	Murdered Meer Goond and Gool Mahomed Loree.	—	These men have also been taken away in custody by the Wuzeer, but had not been tried when he left.
22	Khodoo Loree -			
23	Peshee Loree -			
24	Shere Mahomed Loree			
25	Peer Mahomed Loree			
26	Dadoo Loree -			

Police Superintendent's Office,
Kurrachee, 29th April 1875.

F. J. WISE, Captain,
District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee.

Enclosure 4 in No. 2.

D.—List of Persons apprehended in the Frontier Cases, and put on their trial before Mirza Ali Mahomed, 1st Class Magistrate.

No.	Names.	Nature of Offence.	Convictions.	Remarks.
1	Peenia Gunja Chootta -	Robbery of Munnoo Bunia	Sentenced to 10 months imprisonment.	
2	Ebraim Gunja - -	Ditto - - -	Ditto.	
3	Jara Chootta - -	Theft of two she camels of Pinee Ludda Palary.	Sentenced to 14 months imprisonment, and a fine of Rs. 40.	
4	Soomar Chootta - -	Theft of six goats of Choohur Loranhee.	Sentenced to 14 months imprisonment.	
5	Radho Chootta - -	Theft of four head of cattle of Mukkun Gudda.	Sentenced to 14 months imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 8.	
6	Puria Chootta - -	Theft of a she camel of Chunnesur.	Sentenced to 14 months imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 25.	
7	Toung Bundija - -	Theft of goats belonging to Satana Boorra.	Sentenced to 2 years imsonment and a fine of Rs. 50.	
8	Nubboo Bundija - -	Ditto - - -	Ditto.	
9	Khumissa Lungho -	Ditto - - -	Released.	
10	Meeya Wussaya Boora -	Theft of two bullocks of Jugur.	Sentenced to 2 years imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 25.	
11	Hunneedan Gudda -	Theft of goats of Butchee, woman.	Released.	
12	Akul Jamote - -	Committed and murdered Decoity of Gubole.	Ditto.	
13	Salleh Boorra - -	Theft of two bullocks of Sungrasee.	Under trial.	
14	Rahezen Chootta - -	Theft of a she camel of Rukhio Chootta.	Released.	
15	Humud Boorra - -	Theft of a bullock of Burree Gudda.	Under trial.	
16	Ahmed Boorra - -	Theft of a bullock of Sungrasee.	Ditto.	

Police Superintendent's Office
Kurrachee, 29th April 1875.

F. J. Wise, Captain,
District Superintendent of Kurrachee Police.

Enclosure 5 in No. 2.

E.—Translation of statement received from Wuzeer Atta Mahomed regarding the offenders who still remain to be handed over to the British Government, and showing names of Sirdars who have been required to apprehend and make them over.

(1.) Sirdar Ali Khan of Lus Beyla.

1. Shere Khan Jamote.
2. Salleh do.
3. Wuddul do.
4. Durya Khan Jamote.
5. Sookhia do.
6. Hoosein Barija.
7. Powar Jamote.
8. Moorid do.
9. Muggun Guddo.
10. Bucho Jamote.
11. Tajo do.
12. Muzari Kauro.
13. Jooma walad Allahdad Burra.
14. Motio Jamote.
15. Lukho do.
16. Jooman Guddo.
17. Nithalo Burra.

(2.) Sirdar Sahib Khan Chootta.

1. Muttaro Chootta Sidkani.
2. Kohi Chootta.
3. Ahmed do.
4. Chooher Chootta.
5. Allahrakhia Chootta.
6. Arbie Chootto Othmani.
7. Kotiro Chootta.
8. Durya Khan Bundijo.
9. Jurnal Khan do.
10. Khumeesa walad Mewrul Bundijo.
11. Lalla Bundijo.
12. Chunga Gudda.
13. Baroo walad Piaro Bikkak.
14. Laroor walad Punjoo Bikkak.
15. Khorah Bikkak.
16. Easub do.
17. Bukhir do.
18. Soomar do.

(3.) Sirdar Jubal Khan Khidrani.

1. Peeroo Urif or Hajoo Shahole.

(True translation.)

F. J. Wise, Captain,
District Superintendent of Kurrachee Police.

Enclosure 6 in No. 2.

F.—Translations of written Agreements given to me by the Sirdars of the Khelat Frontier.

I.

I, Jam Ali Khan, son of Jam Meer Khan, ruler of Lus Beyla, here give under my hand the following:—

That all men inhabiting the territory of Lus Beyla, of whatever caste, shall not in future commit robbery and other crimes in British territory, or in the Khelat territory, or on the roads by which the Kafila merchants travel. If by chance any person should commit such an offence I will without delay seize him, and if the offence has been committed in British territory, hand him over to that Government, and if it should have been committed in the Khan Sahib's territory, will hand him over to the Khan Sahib. Should I not carry out what I have above written, I will be answerable to both Governments.

Dated 13th Rubbee Oolawal 1292. □ Seal of Ali Khan.

II.

I, Sirdar Meer Noordeen Mingul, declare that the Mingul Brahoees shall not in future commit crime and robbery in British territory, or on the roads by which the Kafilas and traders travel, and in the Khelat territory. Should any Mingul Brahoee commit any such robbery or other offence I will apprehend him without delay, and hand him over to the Government in whose territory the crime was committed. Should I fail in carrying out the above, I hereby declare I will be answerable to both Governments.

Dated 17th Rubbee Oolawal 1292. □ Seal of Noordeen.

III.

I, Wuddera Sahib Khan Chootta, declare that no Chootta shall in future commit crime and robbery in the British territory, on the Kafila roads, or in Khelat, and should it so happen that any such offence be committed I will apprehend the offender without delay, and hand him over to the Government in which the crime was committed. Should I fail in carrying out the above, I will be answerable to both Governments.

Dated 17th Rubbee Oolawal 1292. □ Seal of Sahib Khan Chootta.

IV.

We, Shuffee Mahomed, Jubal Oomed Ali, Durya Khan, Abdool Aziz, and other principal Kiddranees, declare that no Kiddranee Brahoee shall in future commit robbery and other crimes in British territory, on the Kafila roads, or in Kelat, and should it happen that any Kiddranee commit such offence we will apprehend the offender, and hand him over to the Government in whose territory the crime was committed. Should we fail in this, we may be held answerable by both Governments.

(Signed) Shuffee Mahomed.
Jubal Khan.
Oomed Ali.
Abool Aziz.
Ruza Mahomed.

Dated 17th Rubbee Oolawal 1292. □ Seal of Durya Khan.

(True translation.)

F. J. Wise, Captain,
District Superintendent of Kurrachee Police.

Enclosure 7 in No. 2.

Translation of letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat, to Colonel Sir W. L. Mereweather, K.C.S.I. & C.B., Commissioner in Sind, dated 18th Janiadival Sani 1292.

After Compliments.—Sahib Khan Chootta who, after the death of his father, was appointed the Chief of his tribe in the Lus Beyla district, having failed to preserve peace on the Kafila route, and to prevent outrages being committed on traders, has been informed that since bloodshed and violence on the merchants are daily increasing, Jan Muhammad Chootta wulud Wadero Umed Ali has been elected Sirdar of the tribe. Jan Muhammad will attend to his duties on return to the Lus Beyla district. If he happens to address you on any subject concerning the Chootas, be so kind as to receive his petitions and to give orders to the police to make over to him any criminal who may escape into British territory. All else is well.

Enclosure 8 in No. 2.

Translation of letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat, to the Commissioner in Sind, dated 7th Rabiool Awul, 1292, A.D. 12th April 1875.

After Compliments.—Your letter regarding the property of Kafilas and British subjects plundered by the malefactors during the last two years, reminding me that in spite of repeated references made to me the robbers have not been arrested and punished, nor has the plundered property been recovered, reached me at a happy moment, accompanied by a statement of the cases of robbery. Its contents were fully impressed on my mind. My generous friend, it is quite true that letters have from time to time been received from you, and for the last six months I have deputed Moollah Atta Mahomed with troops to Jalawan to settle these affairs, and he having reached that place is engaged in carrying out the duty entrusted to him. God willing, under any circumstances, he will seize the robbers and punish them, and recover the stolen property, or its equivalent. The above events have been occasioned by the following circumstances, *i.e*, of the amount, "fixed in your presence in the year 1872," to be paid on account of losses sustained by Kafilas, a portion has been recovered, and the balance remains with the "budmashes" unpaid up to this day. In order to meet the wishes of the British Government, I gave all my wealth in adjustment of merchants' claims: when the "budmashes" plunder the Kaffilas, and I have to pay for the losses, why should not this class of people feel emboldened and encouraged? The British Government, from a consideration and regard for me, imprisoned the son of Mir Khan Jamote, my great enemy. Although he was under custody sufficiently strict to make escape improbable, he deserted with his family, children, and followers, and is settled again at Lus Beyla. Since then the robbers have become more mischievous. It is now two years that some men who managed and held charge of the revenues of Kutchee, Jalawan, and the Beyla districts, and had to account for lacs of rupees, carried away all my wealth and account books, and have settled free of all anxiety in British territory. From a regard for the British Government, I have been unable to seize them and bring them here. Once before I communicated to you all the particulars of my case, and however anxiously I awaited for a reply. I was not gladdened with one. When I have always considered the British Government as my Sovereign, and under all circumstances made myself humble to them, I do not know what should have prevented an answer being sent to me. With these few lines, therefore, I write to state that you are my friend, my ally, and one upon whom I depend, so it behoves you to address* his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India about the affairs and requirements of my country, and to arrest and send to me the above-named officials in possession of my wealth. Such a course will not fail to be kindly entertained by me. You have been pleased to write that until such time as a real desire and ability is shown by me to manage the duties of a good and really friendly neighbouring Sovereign the British Government, without communicating with me, will make its own arrangements for the protection of its territories, and the lives and property of its subjects. My friend, from the day I have been connected with the British Government as their subordinate, I have observed the same course and policy, and have firmly adhered myself to the Treaty engagements, and I consider myself more friendly and obedient to the British Government than all the other neighbours and friends do, and from this line of conduct I have never departed, nor will ever do so hereafter. Besides this, three of my servants are in custody there, and at the interview at Sukker, I reminded his Excellency the Viceroy, when his Excellency observed that after some time arrangements would be made on the subject, but up to this time I am anxiously awaiting for the fulfilment of that promise. No sign, however, has yet been visible tending to their release. 50,000

* In the original "Mootaraz," to "entreat or beg."

Rupees were annually paid to me from the British Treasury in return for transit dues. At Shahpoor I told you that by this allowance I suffered a loss of Rs. 90,000. It is now three years that nothing has been settled about this matter. You might then judge whether such a state of things is due to kindness, or want of kindness on the part of the British Government. All else is well, &c.

Enclosure 9 in No. 2.

No. 1246 of 1875, Political Department.

From the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to the Commissioner in Sind, Kurrachee.

Political Superintendent's Office, Jacobabad,
13th April 1875.

SIR,

IN submitting the accompanying report from Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, for the past year, I think it will be best to give a short résumé of all that has taken place during that period on the frontier.

2. It will be remembered that at the close of my report for 1873–74, his Highness the Khan's representatives in Kutchee had by various means managed to cause such dissension amongst the Rhinds that they finally divided into two parties, one supporting Taj Mahomed, and the other Wuderah Imaum Buksh, and that his Highness' officials giving their support to the former, made Imaum Buksh act in having put his slave Dattoo to death, the ostensible reason for marching a force to Shorun, and carrying the old Sirdar off to Bagh a State prisoner. The policy of his Highness' officials and the Ex-Wukeel Mahomed Khan at that time being to alienate one section of the tribe from the other. Extreme measures could not well have been taken against the Sirdar without disgracing the Bungulzaies, who were then in the Ex-Wukeel's pay, as their Sirdar's cousin was the wife of Imaum Buksh Khan, and mother of the young Rhind Chief. The Wuderah, shortly after his arrival at Bagh, sent 2,000 Rupees and a horse as a present to his Highness' officials, but not satisfied with this, they fined the Wuderah Rs. 10,000, and on his refusing to pay, they announced their intention of levying the fine on the Rhinds and Lusharees, who were well disposed to Sirdar Imaum Buksh, and in consequence of this threat, as shown in my last year's report, many of the former left Shorun under their Chiefs Wahidad and Goolab Khan, and requested an asylum in British territory; this being refused them, they wrote to the Boogtee Sirdar, Goolam Murtaza, to allow them to settle in the Sungseela Valley, but this at my advice was also denied them, and they eventually pitched their tents near Dhoor Mahomed Jumali's fort close to the British border. It would appear, however, that before the Rhinds left Shorun, Wahidad and some of the other Chiefs had gone to Khelat, and had had an interview with his Highness the Khan, when Wahidad acknowledged to his Highness that he (Wahidad) had been the instigator of the slave Dattoo's death, and that he had come purposely to request his Highness to do what he pleased with him (Wahidad), but to release his Sirdar, Imaum Buksh, and not to allow his officials in Kutchee to oppress his tribe as they were then doing. His Highness replied that as Wahidad had given himself up he would not punish him, but that he would attach all the slave Dattoo's property, and his Highness gave Wahidad a letter to the Naib of Bagh purporting to contain instructions that he and the other officials were to refrain from oppressing the Rhinds, but how far these instructions, if they were ever given, were carried out, will be understood from the fact that after the receipt of this letter Ruza Mahomed, by order of the Kazi of Bagh, turned all the people, who were looking after the Rhinds' wheat fields near Shorun, out of them, had the crops reaped, and appropriated the grain, the value of which amounted to about 6,000 Rupees.

3. During the time the Rhinds lived near Dhoor Mahomed Jumali's fort, it was reported to me that Wahidad, the Rhind Chief, and a son of Sunjar Ramazaies, intended attacking the Mugzees in Kutchee and thus create a disturbance, but on my remonstrating with the Chiefs, and explaining to them what the consequences of such a step would be, they gave up the idea and put a stop to all further proceedings.

4. On one occasion the Rhinds attacked a Kafila of grain consigned to Buniahs in British territory, on the plea that the grain which was being brought from Shorun was that which had been taken from them by Ruza Mahomed, and that therefore it belonged to them, and they had a right to it. On being informed of this, an armed party was at once despatched with orders to arrest the Chiefs; this was done, and they were brought into Jacobabad and detained there until full restitution of the plundered property was made to the Buniahs.

5. His Highness, having a very old grudge against Dhoor Mahomed Jumali Sirdar, tried to prove that he was the instigator of this raid, but such was not the case, as he and Aitabar Khan Rhind, Ressaldar of the Belooch Guides, were the first persons to give me intimation of what had taken place.

6. The old Rhind Sirdar, Imaum Buksh, was released in May and allowed to return to Shorun after having promised to pay a fine of Rupees 15,000, and having paid up the first instalment and promising to pay the remainder after the first wheat harvest.

7. In August, Wahidad, the Rhind Chief, attacked Ruza Mahomed, and severely wounded him, also a woman named Cowrah, a "Jutnee," whose husband was arrested at Larkana on a charge of robbery; she managed to escape with Ruza Mahomed, with whom she is now living. A relative of Ruza Mahomed's shot Wahidad, who almost immediately died of his wounds, and on his death the Rhinds lost by far the best and boldest of their leaders. Ruza Mahomed (who now holds some post under the Kazi of Bagh) and the woman Cowrah were implicated in the above-mentioned theft committed in the Larkana district, and their extradition was demanded, but up to the present no notice has been taken of it.

8. In July, Ali Khan, son of Meer Khan, Ex-Jam of Lus Beyla, and Ibrahim Khan made their escape from Hyderabad, and reached Lus Beyla, where they were joyously received both by Ali Khan's uncle, Noordeen Mingul, the Jalawan Sirdar, and by the people, and it was supposed at one time that this might have been made a fitting opportunity for a general rising of the tribes, but such proved entirely without foundation. Shortly after the escape of Ali Khan, Ashiat, wife of the Ex-Jam, and sister of Noordeen, died in Hyderabad from fever.

9. On his Highness the Khan hearing of the arrival of Jam Ali in Lus Beyla, he sent for Darogah Atta Mahomed, and ordered him to start at once for Lus Beyla, but the Darogah declined to do so, saying he could put no faith in his Highness' intentions, as his Highness did not trust any of his officials. For this his Highness deprived Atta Mahomed of his Naibship and allowances.

10. In September his Highness wrote to Sirdar Noordeen, asking him to come to Khelat, but the Sirdar declined going unless he was permitted by the Khan to be accompanied by the other Chiefs of his tribe. This his Highness did not approve of, and in the same month his Highness appointed Attah Mahomed Wuzeer, and ordered him to proceed to the Jalawan country with a force of 600 infantry and cavalry, also two small hill guns, in addition to irregular levies, for the purpose of making arrangements for the safe transit of Kafilas through the Raj route; also to arrest and hand over to the British authorities a certain number of criminals whose extradition had been requested at various times; the new Wuzeer was also to proceed into the Zehree and Kozdar districts. On his being appointed Wuzeer, Atta Mahomed wrote to all the Belooch and Brahoee Sirdars, telling them that the future government of the country would be conducted in the same manner as in the reign of the late Nusseer Khan, and to be re-assured. He then proceeded into the Zehree country as far as Sohrab, where he halted, and sent to the Zurukzai Chief, Gohur Khan, to come and make his obeisance to his Highness, but Gohur Khan declined until he saw how the other Chiefs would behave.

11. In October his Highness wrote and ordered Noordeen Mingul to make good the balance of the Kafila plundered in 1872 by the Minguls whilst passing through the Raj route, but the Sirdar sent no reply to this. His Highness then invited Noordeen to come to Khelat and to bring the Ex-Jam's son, Ali Khan, with him, and that they would both receive dresses of honour and would be allowed to return; but if the Sirdars could not come, then his Highness would send Atta Mahomed his Wuzeer to Kozdar to pay Noordeen a visit of condolence after the death of his sister. Noordeen wrote in reply that when your Highness's Wuzeer arrives I will come with Azaad Khan Nowsherwani, Youssuf Khan Mahomed Hussein, the Bijonjaos and Shahezaies and visit him, relative to the visit of the Jam's son. His Highness on this ordered Atta Mahomed, Meer Kaira, and Mosum, commanding the Nurwai Regiment, to march with a force to Kozdar, to make arrangements for the safe transit of Kafilas by the Raj route, and to recover the money due by Noordeen, and if the Sirdar refused to pay he was to attack him.

12. Darogah Atta Mahomed proceeded to Kozdar on the 2nd October with the Nurwai Regiment, cavalry and artillery, and sent to Sirdar Noordeen to make his salaam; the Sirdar replied that if the Wuzeer would send his son and the commandant of the forces as hostages he would come, but not otherwise, and at the same time the Sirdar wrote to Jam Ali Khan of Lus Beyla for assistance in case of his being attacked.

13. After this, Sirdar Noordeen and the Chiefs, having heard that under the guise of friendly settlement treachery would be used, collected their forces, and Noordeen asked

Gohur Khan Zurukzai to join him, but the latter, not trusting the former, declined to leave his strong position at Meer Ghul, andsuggested that if he (Meer Noordeen) was really in earnest, he had better join him with what forces he could collect. In October Pahur Khan Sassoolee, who entered British territory in the beginning of last year with 200 armed followers, and whose extradition was demanded from his Highness the Khan, made his salaam to the new Wuzeer, and joined his camp, but up to the present, so far as I can learn, no notice has been taken by his Highness or his officials of the outrage committed by Pahar Khan and his tribe, and it is not believed that his Highness will attempt to arrest and hand over to the British this or any other equally influential Chief. It was even reported on reliable authority that when the Sassoolee Chief's extradition was demanded, his Highness instructed Aitabar Khan, the Naib of Kozdar, to give them the following message:—" You Brahoees think the British Government kind and just; " they insisted upon my surrendering my most trusted and confidential servants; your " extradition is now demanded, and this will be followed up by the British Government " insisting in my giving up Chiefs of the highest rank, such as Fukkeer Mahomed and " others; if you want to save yourselves look to me and do as I direct."

14. Darogah Atta Mahomed on his arrival at Kozdar sent people of position to offer his condolence to Meer Noordeen Mingul on the death of his sister. They remained at Wudh, whilst Noordeen himself proceeded and met the Darogah seven miles from Kozdar, who asked Noordeen to pay his respects to his Highness the Khan, and to assist him in making arrangements for the safe passage of Kafilas by the Raj route. Noordeen replied that he had committed no act against the Khan for which he required to make his salaam, that if his Highness would settle the grievances of the Sarawans, Hussanees, and Sirdar Azaad Khan of Kharan, he would do what was required of him. The Darogah did his utmost to induce Noordeen to visit Khelat, but he declined. On being asked why he declined, Noordeen produced a letter from Fukkeer Mahomed Bezonjao, Sirdar, advising him not to go, as he would be arrested, and this letter was sent by Atta Mahomed to his Highness the Khan, who in reply desired the Wuzeer and Noordeen to demand Mekran revenue from Fukkeer Mahomed, and if he declined payment, they were to attack the Bezonjaos. The Minguls have always been inimical to the Bezonjaos, and would doubtless assist Atta Mahomed, but it is supposed the Ex-Wukeel, Naib Mahomed Khan, now at Khelat, will do his utmost to prevent any hostile demonstrations in Kutchee, and thus support a statement lately circulated that the Khan and his Sirdars are much attached to each other, but that misunderstandings were originated and are still encouraged by the old Wuzeer, Wullee Mahomed, now residing in Jacobabad.

15. In January, Sirdar Noordeen Mingul wrote to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisani stating that he had got what he wanted from the Khan through Darogah Atta Mahomed, and advised Moolla Mahomed to visit the Darogah when he comes to Kutchee. It is supposed, however, that Moolah Mahomed will not act on this advice.

16. The last that has been heard of Darogah Atta Mahomed was that he was near the Hubb River. Meer Noordeen Mingul is with him, and it is mainly through his support that the Khan's troops have been able to proceed into the Choota country.

17. The Bezunjaos were asked by Darogah Atta Mahomed to accompany him, but they declined, unless the Darogah agreed to attack the Minguls at Wudh. The Darogah refused, and has been able to utilize the Minguls in carrying out what he has been ordered to do. After this, Darogah Atta Mahomed wrote to his Highness that he has made Nowsherwan Choota and other prisoners, and had thus performed the duty he had been sent on, and solicited permission to return to Khelat. In reply to this his Highness wrote that his real motive and desire was to repossess himself of Lus Beyla, and that when he (the Wuzeer) had done this he would have carried out all his heart's desire. It is rumoured that, through Sirdar Noordeen's instrumentality, Jam Ali of Lus Beyla has made his salaam to Darogah Atta Mahomed, and that there were great rejoicings at Khelat on these tidings being received.

18. The Wuzeer has fined the Chootas, Bundijos, and other tribes Rupees 80,000 to cover expenses of the force sent to coerce them, and compensation for plundered property. This money has not yet been paid, and will be most difficult to realise.

19. It will thus be seen that the new Wuzeer has been doing his very best to carry out his Highness' orders, and to restore quiet and order throughout the country; but considering the dislike all the Chiefs, both of the Sarawans and Jalawans, have to his Highness, and how they distrust every act of his, also the avaricious disposition of the Khan, who will stop at no act of injustice or cruelty to obtain money, it is not for a moment to be believed that any thing like order or good government can be found in a country with such a ruler.

20. It is only in January last (1875) that 30 of his Highness' regiment at Baghwana deserted to Lus Beyla, and 30 others were confined to prevent them deserting. The troops in Kutchee were also much disaffected, not having received pay for six months A disturbance also took place in his Highness the Khan's regiment at Khelat. This was. brought about by half the regiment of Affghans refusing to serve under Mahomed Yar Khan, a Native of Moostoong, and appointing Meer Bux Khan of Shoawah to command them. His Highness wished to disband the regiment, and ordered them to give up their arms and accoutrements, but the mutineers took up a position on a hill and refused to give up their arms until they had received the arrears of pay due to them, and his Highness finally compromised the matter by paying the troops the pay due to them.

21. The Commandant of the troops in Kutchee, Fukkeer Mahomed, and the other officials are not on the best of terms. Some months ago he (Fukkeer Mahomed) charged Kazi Mahomed Hyat, Taj Mahomed Rhind, and Abdool Azeez, Naib, with having embezzled 8,000 Rupees of the fine inflicted on Sirdar Imaum Buksh Rhind, placing the two first under close surveillance, and taking over charge of Kutchee himself, and the Kazi was eventually fined Rs. 50,000, which his Highness made him pay. Many complaints have been made to his Highness against his officials in Kutchee having taken bribes. Fukkeer Mahomed has been directed to tell every one who has been fined to send in their petitions, each case will then be carefully investigated, and if the fine has not been credited to his Highness' Treasury, the official who ordered the fine will be called upon to make the amount good.

22. It has also been reported to his Highness that although about 80,000 or 90,000 Rupees have been collected at various times in Kutchee during the past year and sent to Khelat, that his Highness' officials and the Buniahs who took the contracts for the revenue of Kutchee embezzled the revenue to a great extent, and it is stated the Ex-Wukeel, Mahomed Khan, and Naib Peer Jan, his son, are implicated in this charge, and that Nur Khan, who was formerly the Head Munshi in the Political Superintendent's Office at Jacobabad, and afterwards entered the service of his Highness, has informed against them.

23. In April 1874, the Zurukzaies, being joined by the Sallanees and Lotanees, attempted to organize a rebellion, and invited Noordeen Mingul Sirdar to join them, in the hope that if he did so there would be a general rising all over the country; the Mingul Sirdar however held aloof. The principal cause of complaint existing amongst the Zurukzaies has been brought about by his Highness the Khan of Khelat, in this way. Gohur Khan Zehree Zurukzai considers that he has a right to be elected Chief of the Jalawans in place of Sadaat Khan, who has been nominated as such by Mai Noor Beebee, mother of the late Chief Taj Mahomed, with the sanction and approval of his Highness the Khan. Both of these Chiefs are cousins of the late Chief Taj Mahomed. On the death of Taj Mahomed, some eight years ago, it will be recollected that his Highness was persuaded by many of his councillors to appoint Mustapha Khan, Chief of the Jalawans, and was only dissuaded from doing so by the good advice given him by the Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed. When Mustapha Khan died, some four years ago, his Highness approved of Mai Noor Beebee nominating Sadaat Khan, Chief, although his Highness was well aware that he was incapable, and in every way unfitted for the position, and that the Zurukzaies wished for Gohur Khan to be elected Chief, because his Highness knew that Sadaat Khan being nominated Chief of the Jalawans would cause dissatisfaction amongst the tribes, which in the end might lead to further ill-feeling and severance, and thus prevent the Jalawans uniting together in the event of any attempt being made by the Sarawan Chiefs to create a general rebellion. In consequence of the bad feeling existing on account of this disputed claim, Gohur Khan and his followers in May last seized the Sohnida Ghat, and allowed no one to pass, he and his forces subsisting on grain taken from his Highness' granaries. Gohur Khan then took up a position at Hussoon in the Moolah Pass, and actually started to close the Pass against Peer Buksh Turazai, Naib of Gundava, who being on his way down the Moolah and hearing of Gohur Khan's movements, promised Chakur Khan Guttuck, Chief, 1,000 Rupees to escort him safely through the Pass. When they reached Seer Lukka, hearing that Gohur Khan had closed the Pass, the Naib sent to Khelat for 200 infantry, and Gohur Khan was then joined by Pahar Khan with 300 Sassoolees, but on hearing that 200 of his Highness' infantry had left Khelat to attack him, he with 600 men took up a position at Guzun. His Highness' infantry encamped at Noogranah in the Zehree Valley, and were joined by the Moolah detachment. A skirmish took place between Gohur Khan's forces and his Highness' troops in June, in which 11 of his Highness' Sepahis were killed and 16 wounded. Reinforcements were sent for, and the Brahoees then retired on the Lohinda Ghat, which they held.

24. Jungul Khan Mingul (of Meer Noordeen's Kuliffa) collected the tribe in Baghwan-Valley to assist Gohur Khan, and Syud Khan, Chakur Khan's brother, with 200 Sassoor lees, also joined the Zurukzaies. After this the Brahoees attacked a detachment of his Highness' the Khan's troops at Noogranah, and killed eight of them, with a loss of four on their own side, and the escort being defeated, returned to Khelat; this detachment was escorting supplies to the troops at Noogranah. The Brahoees then blocked the roads leading to Khelat, and so cut off all communication between them and the troops at Noogranah. In June, Hybut Khan Summalani Mingul with 100 men also joined Gohur Khan's forces, and Chakur Khan Juttuck, not having been paid the Rs. 1,000 promised him by Naib Peer Buksh, also aided the Zurukzaies.

25. Naib Peer Buksh Turukzai and Mosum, commanding the Nurwin regiments, endeavoured to enter into negociations, but Gohur Khan and his people would not accept any terms; after this his Highness' officials, assisted by Kaiser Khan Moosanee, Sirdar, and Mai Noor, Beebee, so arranged that a truce should take place, and a number of the Chiefs went to Sultan Arrafeen to meet the Naib, with the intention of tendering their allegiance to his Highness and receive "killuts"; in the evening, however, after partaking of the meal prepared for them, Mosum, the commanding officer of his Highness' troops surrounded the tent and made prisoners of the under-mentioned Chiefs, notwithstanding both parties had made solemn affirmation on the "Koran" not to attempt treachery:—Muddut Khan Panderhanee, Sirdar, Chakur Khan Juttuck, Sirdar, Khyr Mahomed Barunzai, Rummul Khan Lotani, a son of Budai Juttuck, Abdool Rufsack Nechari, and 21 other persons of lesser note, and they were informed that they would not be released until the Brahoees had dispersed and returned to their homes, but Gohur Khan and Syud Khan, Chakur Khan's brother declined these terms. The Brahoee prisoners were then taken to Khelat, and his Highness wished to punish them severely, but Mosum remonstrated with his Highness, as he said the Sirdars had only been brought to make their obeisance to his Highness. They were, however, detained as prisoners. Gohur Khan then took up a position near Peer Kullunder on the Suddow Hill Truck, and he and the leading men wrote to Noordeen saying that his Highness had through treachery made many of the minor Jalawan Chiefs prisoners, and requested Noordeen as the principal Chief to assist them, but Noordeen was not disposed to espouse their quarrel.

26. Moolla Atta Mahomed's first act after he was appointed Wuzeer was to advise his Highness to release all the Jalawan Chiefs and other political prisoners, with the exception of Murrum Khan Summalani Mingul. This advice his Highness eventually accepted, and released the Chiefs. The Wuzeer also invited Gohur Khan to come and make his salaam to his Highness the Khan, but this Gohur refused to do, until he saw how the Brahoee Chiefs would act. Gohur Khan after this plundered a Kafila going to his Highness, as well as some presents which were being sent to his Highness by the Mugzee Chief. In November, Atta Mahomed sent a force to attack the Zurukzaies, who had taken to exacting transit fees from all the Kafilas passing through their country, but the position the Zurukzaies held at the Meer Ghat being almost inaccessible, the troops did not get beyond Paisht Khana, where they plundered all the property belonging to Nutwanees and the poorer tribes proceeding to Kutchee, and in retaliation for this the Brahoees plundered all *bonâ fide* Khelat Kafilas which fell into their hands. Gohur Khan and his people are still in rebellion.

27. It will be remembered that in March last, by order of his Highness the Khan, on a complaint made to him by Sher Dil Muzzaranee Murree against the Summalani Minguls, the whole of the latter's flocks, amounting to about 8,000 to 10,000 sheep, were seized by the Naib of Bagh, 2,000 of them being handed over to Sher Dil Murree, and the remainder confiscated. The Summalanis remonstrated, pointing out that the feud was originally brought about by his Highness himself having ordered them to attack the Muzzaranee Murrees, and it is said his Highness offered to restore the confiscated flocks if the Chiefs would come and make their salaams to him; they, however, fearing treachery, refused and replied they would sooner leave their own country and live with the Doomurs Nawab Summalani Mingul carried off the sheep which had been seized from him by his Highness' orders, also four belonging to his Highness from Cupota,* they were followed by Mosum with the Nurwani regiment and Naib Abdool Luteef without success, and the Summalanis settled down near Shorawak in Affghan territory, and from there they made a raid on Zehree and carried off 1,000 sheep and 50 camels, the property of his Highness, amongst the latter were 20 double-humped camels, which had cost his Highness about 300 rupees each. His Highness' infantry refused to leave the fort to attack the Minguls, or to go in pursuit. The Minguls continued to raid in the vicinity of Moostoong, and two merchants

* Close to Khelat.—W. L. M.

proceeding to Quetta were robbed of Rupees 700 in cash, and other property near Bund Mobee. After this the Summalani Minguls carried off some flocks of sheep from Koh Maran, about two miles from the town of Kelat; in August last the Minguls returned from Kharan, Nooshky, and Sarawak, and were joined by the Doomurs, and passing through Quetta settled on the Dusht near the Siri Bolan and the Koorluk Pass. His Highness then despatched a strong detachment to Moostoong, and sent a message to Sher Dil Muzzaranee Murree, and the other Murrees residing at Badra, to attack the Summalanis and Doomurs in front, whilst his troops were acting against them in the rear, but Sher Dil did not feel inclined to assist his Highness' troops on this occasion. The Summalani Minguls continued to give much annoyance to his Highness' officials by raiding daily in the direction of Quetta and Moostoong. About 1,500 Brahoees, chiefly Sassoolees and Summalanis, assembled in the beginning of September and came down the Bolan, but owing to the intervention of Azam Shah and other Syuds at Dadur, they did not attack his Highness' troops at Dadur, but passed quietly down the Sunnee and Mull with their families and flocks. In the same month some Rufsool Summalani Minguls attacked and plundered some pilgrims coming down the Bolan, they complained to the Naib of Quetta, who wrote to his Highness the Khan for instructions, and his Highness ordered Abdool Luteef, his Naib, to go with 600 infantry and punish the robbers; the troops came up with the Summalani Minguls close to Dozan, near the Khar Lukka Pass, and in the fight which ensued four Sepahies were killed and six wounded. The Brahoees took up a position on a hill, and the Khan's troops could not touch them. The same Minguls carried off 50 or 60 of his Highness' mares whilst passing down to Kutchee.

28. In January of this year the Murrees killed three of the Summalani Minguls at Mull, and carried off 40 of their sheep, this raid as well as similar ones, which have occurred since the Summalanis came to Kutchee, have been carried out by the Murrees at the instigation of Sher Dil Muzzaranee Murree, who now resides at Mahmoond or Kote Moondai, with Sirdar Kurrum Khan's purah, the Bijaranis, and who has still the old animosity and grudge to pay off. Rahoo Summalani went in pursuit, and did not overtake the raiding party, but by chance came across some Murrees and Dhoombkees near Lehree, and killed one Murree and two Dhoombkees, wounding a third of the latter tribe. The Murrees in retaliation killed four Brahoees, and the Summalanis then under Meer Begh wulud Kadur Buksh, with 450 footmen and 50 Sowars, plundered in the Murree Hills, carrying off 120 sheep, 20 goats and donkeys, and 12 bullocks, besides a koorun of grain. In this raid one Murree was killed. They then took possession of the different passes—Jahee, Gazee, Sarode and Goorak, leading into the Murree Hills, and plundered 13 donkey loads of merchandise going from Lehree to Kahun, about four miles from the latter place. After this the Summalanis carried off 300 sheep from near Tarkote, the property of the Notain Boogtees, who live at Surtag, and are on friendly terms with the Murrees. They after this raided the Murrees at Kote Moondai, carrying off six flocks of sheep and killing one Murree on the first occasion, and carrying off their flocks of sheep on the second. An influential Summalani Mingul, by name Hybutan, was arrested in Kutchee by Naib Abdool Azeez, but he has since been released. When near Bibi Nani on their way home, they were attacked by 1,200 Murrees, who carried off all their clothing, camels, and everything they had, killing 15 of their men. When the Murrees had marched and had got into a narrow gorge in the hills, the Summalanis collected their forces and followed the Murrees, killing 50 of them and recovering all their property, besides all the mares and other property left by the Murrees, who took to flight. It is reported that the last attack on the Summalanis was made without their Sirdar Guzzun Khan's knowledge. The Summalani Minguls and the other Brahoee tribes have not returned to the grazing grounds near Quettah, Moostoong, &c., but are all collected near the Siri Bolan and on the Dusht, and his Highness fearing that a general disturbance amongst the Brahoees may take place, has ordered Fukkeer Mahomed at Bagh to leave a sufficient number of troops in Cutchi and to proceed and join his Highness forthwith; this Fukkeer Mahomed will do, so soon as the Naib of Bagh, Abdool Azeez, who is now collecting the revenue from his Highness' cultivators on the border of the Upper Sind Frontier District, returns to Bagh.

29. Last month, by direction of his Highness, Hazaar Khan Chotai, a Mull Chief, residing near Dadur, and who had aided the Brahoees in the last rebellion against the Khan, was hanged at Bagh. Moolah Jumah was sent to him to tell him that his Highness required his services, and that the assistance he had given the Sarawan Chiefs in the rebellion in 1872 was forgiven him, and that he was to be appointed Thannadar of Haji-ki-Shehr. Hazaar Khan, not suspecting treachery, went with Moolah Jumah to Bagh, where he was received by his Highness' officers with the greatest cordiality,

and the next day he was hanged. This act of treachery has enraged the Sarawan Chiefs very much, Alla Dina Khoord, Wuderah, Kadur Buksh Bungulzai, and other Chiefs have sent to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisani to take protective measures, stating that if the Khan would not allow a person who had merely aided in the last rebellion to escape, it was self-evident that they (the Sirdars) would not be spared. Moolla Mahomed, however, replied he would not trust Alla Dina Khoord, as no reliance could be placed in him.

30. I have mentioned all these facts seriatim—trivial though they are in themselves,—for by a perusal of this short condensed narrative it will at once be seen how estranged the Khan is from all his Sirdars and people, and that the acts of treachery, such as that last described and which are not unfrequent, widen the breach and increase the bad feeling which has existed for so long between his Highness and his nobles. It is true that by the aid and advice of the new Wuzeer, Atta Mahomed, affairs in the Jalawan country appear to have assumed a quieter aspect, but it still remains to be seen whether his Highness will hand over to the British authorities his subjects whose extradition has been demanded on no less than 50 distinct and separate charges, commencing in February 1873, none of which up to the present have met with any attention, and whether the new Wuzeer has sufficient influence and energy to induce the Chiefs to proceed to Khelat and there make their obeisance to his Highness the Khan.

31. About the usual number of Kafilas passed through the various Passes during the year under review, but this was owing to the Kafilas collecting together and coming down in large numbers, and not to any arrangements made by his Highness or his officials for their safe transit.

32. During the last hot season, rain such as has not been known by the oldest persons living fell in the hills, and in Kutchee, swamping many villages and damaging others, and destroying life and property to a very great extent. In July it was reported that 15 men of the Khoords and Dinagani tribes had been killed by hail. The villages of Jellal Khan, Toonda, and Sallzai near Bagh were swept away by the River Gybee, a branch of the Naree, and the villages of Nowrah and Bursheree have been severely damaged. In July a Kafila, consisting of 140 camels laden with grain coming from Kutchee, was caught in a heavy storm, and being unable to proceed for some days, the grain was utterly ruined, and the owners had some difficulty in saving the camels. On the

Direct route from Gundava to Khelat.

Larkari Hill, in consequence of incessant rain, large masses of rocks were detached and rolled down, blocking up the Pass. At Shorun a large portion of the town was washed down, killing four persons. The villages of Runja Mooche, and Hya were washed away, eight persons being drowned. The villages of Abad, Nusseerabad, and Manotee were also destroyed by the floods, and his Highness' residence at Bagh is a heap of ruins. The number of flocks and herds, as wells as of camels, washed away and destroyed during the months of July and August is very great, causing great loss and consequent suffering amongst the poorer classes in Kutchee.

33. In November last Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan, was ordered to proceed to Jacobabad, and there, in conjunction with the Political Superintendent Upper Sind Frontier, to draw up a report as to the advisability of the Murree country being visited by a party of Sind and Punjab Officials in the manner proposed in 1869. The strength of the party and the route it should take, &c. &c.

34. Captain Sandeman accordingly arrived at Jacobabad on the 3rd November, and the required reports were submitted to the Commissioner in Sind on the 20th of the same month.

35. After this, in accordance with instructions contained in letter No. R. P. from the Secretary to the Government of India to the address of the Commissioner in Sind, dated 5th January 1875, Captain Sandeman was ordered to proceed into the hills and report all circumstances relating to the state of the hill tribes, and when Guzzun Khan, the Murree Chief, could visit the Political Superintendent at Jacobabad. On the 11th of February Captain Sandeman reported that Guzzun Khan was willing to visit Jacobabad and pay his respects to the Political Superintendent, and the Commissioner in Sind's sanction having been accorded on the 28th February, Guzzun Khan, accompanied by 185 Murrees, Imaum Buksh Mazari, Sirdar, and 32 followers, and Jumal Khan Lagari and 30 followers, arrived at Jacobabad; they paid their respects to the Political Superintendent Upper Sind Frontier the following day, and next day they all took their departure for the hills. Captain Sandeman visited the Commissioner in Sind at Jacobabad on the 7th March, when it was arranged that the instructions in paragraph 13 of the above quoted letter should at once, as far as practicable, be carried out, viz., that the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan should be the medium of all intercourse

and communication with the Murrees and Boogtee tribes in all their branches, but that he should be under the orders of the Commissioner in Sind, to whom he should report through the Political Superintendent all matters affecting these tribes, and from whom he should receive his instructions, copies of all such reports and instructions being sent to the Punjab Government for information.

36. It was also settled by the Commissioner in Sind that when Guzzun Khan Sirdar had visited the Political Superintendent at Jacobabad, refunded the equivalent plundered from the Kafilas in 1872, and restored the cattle plundered at Kuttun, near the Sind frontier, last August, an arrangement would be made to pay over to the Murrees and Boogtees the subsidy of Rs. 32,000 per annum, recommended at the Mittunkote Conference in March 1870, through Captain Sandeman, with the exception of a sum of Rs. 240 per mensem, which would be paid to the Boogtee Sirdar on account of the 16 Boogtees enrolled in the Belooch Guides by the Political Superintendent.

37. The Boogtees, I regret to say, have not been behaving so well during the past year as they did in 1873–74; this is owing to many of the different sections, such as Futteh Khan and Mewah Khan (Notaees) Roga, Kulpar Hyder, and Hybuttan (Mussoorees), and their followers, being still at variance with their Chief, Goolam Murteza. In the beginning of last year Roga Kulpur, in consequence of a misunderstanding he had with his Sirdar, left the Mutt plain, and he and some of his section went and resided with Futteh Khan Notani. Some time after this, Roga was coming with an armed party to raid some Sind camels, who had gone to Gundoee to collect "peesh," where they were met by the Sirdar's son, Shabaz Khan, who fired on Roga's people, killing one and wounding five of them; this caused an ill-feeling to spring up between Roga and Futtoohul Kulpur, as the latter and his followers were with the Chief's son when the former's people were attacked, and has led to frequent retaliations between these two. This quarrel has, however, been made up by Captain Sandeman, as well as the differences between Goolam Murteza and his Muccadams.

38. Shabaz Khan, the Chief's son, in May last wished to marry a Pathan woman of known bad character, living in the town of Jacobabad, and asked my advice. I explained to him that it was very unbecoming and imprudent of him (a Chief's son) to think of making such an alliance, and I refused to allow it, and wrote to his father accordingly, and received a letter of thanks from him for putting a stop to the marriage. After this, however, and in the face of my order, Shabaz Khan betrothed himself to the woman and paid her father Rs. 3,000 for her, and then requested my sanction to take her to the hills with him, and for permission for her father, two brothers, and her two sisters, children of about eight and ten years of age, to accompany her. This I, of course, refused, and in retaliation for this, I regret to say, Sirdar Shabaz Khan headed a raid on a herd of cattle belonging to the people of Sind, when they were grazing about Goo, in August, and was driving them off, when he was overtaken by a detachment of the Sind Horse from Sooee, who captured the Sirdar and the other Boogtees with him, and recovered all the property. The Sirdar and his companions were all sent to the Bukkur Fort, were they now are in confinement.

39. The old feud between Goolam Murteza and Imam Buksh Mazari Sirdar, still exists, the former accusing the latter of doing everything in his power to alienate his tribe from him and to ruin him, and I confess I think with some reason, although Captain Sandeman puts the whole of the accusations brought by the Boogtee Sirdar down to a diseased brain.

40. When Captain Sandeman and I left Jacobabad in November last we visited Kashmor, where the Mazari and Boogtee Chiefs (the latter accompanied by as many of his Muccadums and Moottaburs as he could bring with him) had been ordered to attend, in the hope of being able to carry out your instructions, and after due inquiry and investigation to settle this long-standing quarrel. Major Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, was also directed to meet Captain Sandeman and myself there, but unfortunately, owing to Goolam Murteza not being well, he could not meet us, although we waited for him from the 3rd to the 6th December 1874, when Captain Sandeman, in accordance with instructions received, returned to Dera Ghazee Khan, and Major Harrison and I marched to Drukkun on our way to Jacobabad.

41. The evening before we started I was told that the Boogtee Sirdar was on his way to meet me, but owing to indisposition he could only march by very easy stages, and he joined my camp at Kundkote on the 8th December 1874. The Sirdar then looked well in bodily health, but was depressed in spirits, and seemed as if something was preying on his mind, but he would give me no distinct cause for his being in this state, excepting that every one was against him, excepting myself, and that he looked to me for protec-

tion from those who were trying to do him harm. He did not openly accuse Imaum Buksh Mazari of attempting to do him harm, but he hinted at it in various ways.

42. When at Kashmor I was informed by one or two reliable persons that Goolam Murteza was afraid to come in, and that none of his Muccadums would, as orders had been sent them by Imam Buksh that they were not to attend, unless they were summoned through him; and the Mazari Chief himself distinctly told me that neither the Boogtee Sirdar nor his Muccadums would come.

43. After this, I was informed that when Imaum Buksh Mazari returned to Rojan from Kashmor he was visited by the Mussoree Muccadums, Hyder and Hybuttan, also Futteh Khan Notanee, and that he presented them with "loongees," and this the Mazari Sirdar owned to me had really taken place, although he was well aware these Muccadums had been directed to accompany their Sirdar to Kashmor to meet Captain Sandeman and myself. It therefore seems to me, to say the least of it, very odd and anything but proper conduct on the part of the Mazari Chief, to have allowed Futteh Khan and the Mussooree chiefs to have visited him, and to have openly rewarded them for their disobedience of their Sirdar's orders, for this act can be looked on in no other light, however the Mazari Sirdar may try to explain it away.

44. I have endeavoured, but in vain, to obtain any documentary proof that the Boogtee Chief's statement regarding Imaum Buksh's intentions against him are correct, but no evidence of a documentary kind can be found, although it is generally felt and believed that there is truth in Goolam Murteza's statements.

45. I have given this detailed account of the Boogtee Sirdar's present condition, as I fear that ere long he may on some pretence or other be deposed, and some one else, who is of a less firm disposition, and possibly better inclined towards the Mazari Sirdar, elected Chief in his place. Captain Sandeman, I am aware, is of opinion that the Boogtee Sirdar is suffering from some mental derangement, but I cannot agree in this idea. The Sirdar's father, Islam Khan, I look on as one of the worst enemies the Boogtee Chief has. A man of cowardly disposition, very avaricious, and a confirmed intriguer, he would, I believe, if paid, be very glad to assist in deposing his son, not caring who succeeded him, so long as he (Islam Khan) benefitted by it at the time, and consequently he is a cat's-paw in the hands of any wily and ambitious man who has the means to satisfy his greed for money.

46. Should it so happen that Goolam Murteza is deposed it will be a most difficult matter to find any one to succeed him, as all his sons, with the exception of Shabaz Khan, now in the Bukkur Fort, are too young to be able to control or advise the tribe, and it certainly would not be advisable to release Shabaz Khan from confinement for the purpose of taking up the position of head of the Boogtee tribe.

47. Owing to the unusually high floods which covered the whole of this district the owners of cattle, camels, and sheep had nowhere left to graze their herds and flocks. Permission had consequently to be given them to take their cattle to the foot of the hills north of the Desert Canal for the purpose of grazing, with most stringent orders that they were on no account to go into the hills for this purpose, but were to feed their herds and flocks within view of the outposts.

48. However, disregarding this order, many of the owners took their cattle into the hills and grazed them with the Mundrees, near the Mutt plain. This, as may be supposed, was too great a temptation, and too good an opportunity for persons possessing the insatiable love of plunder the Murrees and Boogtees have, to allow to slip, so together they formed a raiding party, headed by Futteh Khan Notani's brother, Rogah Kulpar's son, I believe, and a few Muccadums of no note, and carried off about 1,500 head of cattle belonging to the Sind Zemindars, killing one man and wounding another. Unfortunately, the outposts did not receive intimation of this raid until some time after it had occurred, and although they followed up the plunderers as quickly as they could, the raiders with the plunder had got so far into the hills by the time the first detachment reached Gundoee, that further pursuit was useless. No doubt of it that Goolam Murteza's Sowars at Gundoee were implicated, otherwise they would have given earlier intimation to the outposts. Most of the cattle were, I believe, taken to Kahun, the Boogtee Sirdar received a few, amounting to 70 or 80, which he restored to the owners, and Captain Sandeman has arranged with me for the owners of the plundered cattle to be present at Rojan on the 20th of this month, when I trust some arrangement will be made by which either the stolen cattle themselves, or others (if these are not forthcoming) given, or an equivalent in money will be paid.

The restoration of the cattle or payment of the equivalent in money has since been arranged by Captain Sandeman.

The terms agreed to were very favourable to the Murrees and Boogtees concerned in the raid, but under the peculiar circumstances of the case, and the desire to adjust this matter without delay, they were agreed to and approved by me.—W. L. M.

49. Batel Mussooree, Muccadum, with some of his followers and a few Murrees, committed a raid near Seebee at Thulli, carrying off 227 camels belonging to Moolla Mahomed, the Raisani Chief, and Sher Zuman, the Burozai Sirdar; 60 of these were given to the Murrees as their share, and 167 were retained by Batel and his followers. Captain Sandeman has induced Guzzun Khan, Murree Sirdar, to restore those in the possession of the Murrees, and he hopes to be able in a few days to induce Batel to restore those now in the possession of the Mussoorees. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's and Sher Zuman's agents are now at Rojan, at which place Batel is also, with Mr. Gladstone, Deputy Commissioner of Rajanpoor, trying to arrange matters.*

* This question has also been disposed of by restoration of the cattle arranged for by Captain Sandeman.—W. L. M.

50. The Murree and Boogtee Sirdars†, I believe, had nothing to do with this raid, but it is supposed that it was carried out through Kurrum Khan Bijirani at the instigation of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and Captain Sandeman is also of this opinion, see his letter No. 30, dated 21st March 1875.

† Guzzun Khan and Goolam Murteza. —W. L. M.

51. There is a very bad feeling between the Murrees and the Boogtees at present, which probably will end in a fight on a large scale‡ when the crops are reaped in the Murrow plain about a fortnight or three weeks hence. Lately two Rahejas belonging to the Sirdar's own section of the tribe were murdered by the Murrees, which has caused a very bitter spirit between the two tribes.

‡ Has not yet occurred.—W. L. M.

52. In April, Sohrab Khan Dhoombkee, Sirdar at Lehree, at the request of the Ex-Wukeel, Naib Mahomed Khan, offered the Murrees a share of the revenue of the Lehree District if they would abstain from plundering; the Murrees refused, and his Highness' officials after this agreed to give the Murrees Rs. 300 per mensem and the village of Tooneeija,§ if they gave up raiding in Kutchee; this, however, was not accepted. In May the Kazi of Bagh, Hyat Khan, and the Ex-Wukeel, Mahomed Khan, presented Doostrai-Soomrani Bijirani Murree, with a dress of honour and Rs. 80, and sent him to Kurrum Khan Bijirani with a request that he would take service with his Highness, and if so to station his brother Futteh Khan with 27 Sowars at Haji-ki-Shehr. This arrangement, however, was never carried into effect. Fresh arrangements were afterwards made with the Murrees, Kurrum Khan Bijirani undertaking to protect Kutchee with his section of the tribe from small raiding parties for Rs. 560 per mensem, but not against raiding parties of any strength.

§ Toonea was the village given to the Murrees some years ago by his Highness the Khan, on condition that they abstained from plundering. On their breaking this compact it was resumed.—W. L. M.

53. In September a small body of Murrees carried off from Seebee some cattle belonging to the Barozai Chief, Sher Zaman Khan, which were not recovered. Another raid was made by 15 Murrees and 10 Kujjuks, who carried off 80 head of cattle from between the towns of Jannoo and Chutter. A large number of cattle have also been carried off by the Murrees from near Haji-ki-Shehr. In December, eight Murrees carried off 12 camels belonging to the Barozaies and Brahoees from the Lehree River, and on another occasion they plundered four flocks of sheep in the Gegh Pass, close to Milk, belonging to the Pahderhanis, and killed two men, and again plundered five flocks of sheep at Kote Shawanee, close to Dadur, and killed one Shawanee.

54. During the time the Summalani Minguls were in Kutchee, there were constant raids and counter-raids commenced by the Murrees, and carried on until the Minguls had got through the Pass and above the hills. By your direction the Summalani Muccadums were summoned in March last to come to Jacobabad to meet me, and to proceed with me to the Putt plain, where they would be joined by Captain Sandeman and the Murree Chiefs, for the purpose of settling their present feuds, and making peace between them, but they civilly declined, giving as their reasons for so doing, that they were then above the Passes and could not return, and that they could not trust their Sovereign, and consequently they could not leave their tribe without leaders.

55. On the Summalanis returning to the plains next cold season, endeavours will again be made, I trust, to bring about a friendly understanding between them and the Murrees, but from what I hear, I have no hopes of a meeting, if it does take place, ending in such a happy result. The Murrees have been behaving in the same way as they did in 1872, 1873, and 1874, that is raiding where and when they can, never minding who the people are, or what the property is. It is only a few days ago there was a report of their having raided in Kutchee, and I do not believe that subsidizing, unless to an enormous extent, will induce the Murrees to keep their hands from cattle lifting so long as they have the chance. At present the Dhoombkees and Khyberees pay the Murrees black-mail, and yet they carry off these peoples' flocks and herds as often as they possibly can, without taking into consideration any agreements entered into the

previous week, or possibly only the previous day. From all I know of the Murrees, I do not think any faith can be placed in them, and therefore I much fear that the arrangements now being entered into with them cannot last for long. I trust, however, that my ideas on this matter may be wrong, and that Captain Sandeman's endeavours may succeed.

56. Sher Dil Muzzaranee Murree's subsidy of Rs. 175 per mensem was stopped by your orders in February last, as he had not for months past furnished me with any information of what was going on in the hills, and on which account alone he received this sum.

57. Sirdar Azaad Khan of Kharan visited Candahar in April last, and after his return, having quarrelled with Belooch Khan Nowsherwan, who had also quarrelled with Ibrahim Khan about some land near Kohuk, and regarding which there was so much discussion when the Perso-Belooch mission was in Mekran, and at Ibrahim Khan's instigation sent a force to aid him, Belooch Khan's son also having quarrelled with his father, joined Azaad Khan, Meer Morad Ibrahim Khan, and Shah Nawaz went with Azaad Khan's force. Belooch Khan having received intelligence of this, took the opportunity when Azaad Khan's forces were asleep and surprised them, killing his own son, Morad Khan, Meer Lalla, and 24 of their men. In November it was reported that Azaad Khan and Ibrahim Khan Nowsherwanees proceeded against Kohuk, where they fought two days and nights, carrying off many sheep and cattle, and some of the residents as slaves, amongst the latter, a man of position and influence and position, by name Yar Mahomed from Kohuk. Azaad Khan and Ibrahim Khan then proceeded against Bumpusht, where they plundered a number of cattle and sheep. Yar Mahomed having induced Azaad Khan to believe that the fort of Kohuk would be given up to him, if he asked the people, they returned to Kohuk. Yar Mahomed was sent into the fort to negotiate about its surrender, but never returned. Azaad Khan then marched on Kohanah, fought with Belooch Khan, and carried off 200 sheep. He then proceeded to the fort of Koodo Budan in Punchgoor, and having stayed there four days, returned to Kharan.

58. When Azaad Khan marched on Kohuk, Dilawur Khan was on the border, he collected a force and sent them with Meah Yar Mahomed Ruikhee and Moostuffa Khan Tomour, who plundered Azaad Khan's border. In March of this year (1875) some Seistan Belooch made a raid on Sirdar Azaad Khan's flocks, carrying off 60 camels. Nao Roza, Azaad Khan's son, was sent in pursuit with 200 camel Sowars, who overtook the raiders, killing 16 men and seizing 30 camels with loads. On the 13th March it was reported that by the order of Mahmood Bakur Khan, late Governor of Seistan, Meer Hoosain Alli raided in Azaad Khan's country, carrying off 60 or 70 camels. Nothing has been heard since of Azaad Khan's movements.

59. All continues quiet in Seebee, the peace made last year by Mirza Hyder Khoolio Khan being still in force. The Mirza paid his annual visit to Seebee, when he collected all the revenue due by the Burozaies, but the Kujjuks not being able to pay theirs, two of the leading men, named Azaad and Mahomed Khan, had to accompany the Mirza, and will remain in Candahar until the arrears due are recovered, and he has left Gulam Mahomed with five Sowars in Seebee to collect the amount now outstanding by the Kujjuks.

60. Moolla Mahomed Raisani, Sirdar, is still a refugee in Seebee, and has apparently been acting up to the line of policy recommended by you, by keeping himself aloof from all intrigues or attempts to create disturbances.* In May last he was in such terror of his life, however, that he asked to be given an asylum in British territory, if necessary, and this was sanctioned on the full understanding only that the Sirdar was to abstain from intriguing or intermeddling with the affairs of Kelat so long as he was in British soil. Moolla Mahomet's fears, however, proved false, and he had not to leave Seebee.

* This he has faithfully continued to do.—W. L. M.

61. In September it was reported that as soon as a large body of Brahoees (chiefly Summalani Minguls) had entered the plains, it was expected on the arrival of the other tribes that disturbances would take place on account of the very discontented feeling amongst the majority of the Brahoee tribes towards his Highness the Khan. Nothing, however, took place.

62. It was also reported that Mahomed Hyat, Kazi of Bagh, on his way to Khelat in June last, stopped at Nurmuck and tried to induce the Sarawan Chiefs to accompany him to Khelat to make arrangements for them with his Highness; he also proposed that the daughter of Kadurdina, brother of Alla Dina Khoord, Sirdar, should marry his Highness' eldest son, Meer Mahomed Khan; to both of these proposals the Chiefs sent a decided refusal. His Highness, after the Kazi's arrival at Khelat, sent Sumunder

Khan Lehree to the Sarawan Chiefs asking them to come and visit him. Alla Dina Khoord and Shadee Khan Bungulzai, the principal Chiefs above the Passes, declined going.

I have, &c.,
FRANCIS LOCH, Colonel,
Political Superintendent, U.S.F.

Enclosure 10 in No. 2.

No. 23 of 1875. Political Department.

From Major C. H. Harrison, Political Agent, Khelat, to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

Political Agent's Office, Jacobabad,
24 March 1875.

SIR,

IN submitting my report for the year 1874 and 1875, I fear that our position with the ruler of Khelat will make it even briefer and less interesting than that for the previous year.

2. At the close of the last official year his Highness' representatives, by a judicious expenditure of money, caused division and party feeling amongst the Sarawan Chiefs, and thereby averted a rising in Kutchee. After the tribes had left the plains, his Highness seemed to have no policy, and quite unable to exercise any power or authority, until Darogah Atta Mahomed accepted the position of Wuzeer, which he had repeatedly declined.

3. The new Wuzeer at once attempted to initiate the policy his Highness himself had attempted on my withdrawal from his Court, but failed in a great measure in Sarawan from his Highness' insincerity. In what manner, will be shown in the succeeding para., when briefly reviewing events in Sarawan during the past year.

4. In diary No. 13 of 1874, dated 30th March, it was noted that Shere Dil Muzzaranee, Murree, had complained to his Highness of the treatment received at the hands of the Summalani Minguls, who then ordered the Naib of Moostoong to seize their flocks, this he did to the number of 8,000 or 10,000, and his Highness presented 2,000 to Shere Dil. The Summalanis sent to remonstrate with his Highness, saying the feud with the Muzzaranees had been originated by his Highness himself having ordered them to attack the above tribe. His Higness offered to return the sheep if all the leading men of the tribe would tender their submission. This they refused to do, saying treachery was intended. In diary No. 13, dated 3rd May 1874, para. 4, it was reported that Rawut, one of the boldest of the Muccadums of the Summalani tribe, went to Cupota, close to Khelat, and recovered the sheep confiscated, as also others belonging to his Highness. From this time the Summalanis made their head-quarters at Shorawak, but raided so frequently, all the country from Quettah to Khelat, that people did not dare to venture far from their houses to cut firewood, &c. On the 12th August (diary No. 34 of 1874) it was reported that his Highness sent troops from Moostoong to attack the Summalanis who were then at Siriab, and wrote to Shere Dil Muzzaranee and the Budrah Murrees to attack them in front, whilst he took them in rear. On the 20th September (vide diary) No. 38 of 1874) the Khan's troops, 600 strong, again attacked the Summalanis at Dozan below the Khur Lakhee Pass for having attacked some pilgrims; about this time Darogah Atta Mahomed was appointed Wuzeer, and he at once wrote to the chief men of the tribe saying their grievances would be redressed if they would keep quiet. Believing in this, they deputed most of the fighting men on a retaliatory expedition against the Pathans, leaving only eight or nine men in charge of the families. It is reported, and currently believed, that his Highness the Khan's mother and sister (with sanction) wrote to the Naibs of Quettah and Moostoong to unite their forces and attack the Summalani Camp. The nine men held a narrow pass until they were reinforced by 80 of their own tribe; they then made a night attack on the Khan's force, and utterly defeated them, killing 29 Sepoys.

5. Since the Summalanis have been in Kutchee, the old enmity between them and Shere Dil has been kept alive by the latter, supported by the Bijirani Murrees. On the 7th January three of the Summalani tribe were murdered at Mull (vide diary No. 2 of 1875), and they retaliated, as reported in paras. 3, 6, and 7 of diary No. 3, as also para. 1 of diary No. 7 of 1875.

6. The old Summalani Mingul Sirdar, who has been a prisoner at Khelat, died a few days ago, the tribe insist that he has met with foul play at his Highness' hands, and letters, it is said, have been sent by the tribe to the branch Muccadums at Shorawuk and Nooshky to collect and take revenge.

7. The above facts exhaust all that there is to narrate about the boldest and most powerful tribe in Sarawan, and the account would not have been so full had it not been for recent enquiry why this tribe was on bad terms with the Murrees.

8. Regarding the rest of the tribes little can be said, the Chief Sirdar Moolla Mahomed is still a political refugee in Seebee. The other minor Chiefs when in the hills were quiet and not interfered with, and when it was time for them to descend into the plains, Sirdar Moolla Mahomed arranged with the Murree Towandar that they should graze their flocks unmolested at Mull. This arrangement was broken by the foolish conduct of the Peer Khanees, who were instigated by the Ex-Wukeel and Kazi of Bagh to plunder 500 sheep from the Shiranee Murrees,—vide diary No. 47, para. 7. Before Sirdar Moolla Mahomed could arrange to return these sheep, the Murrees retaliated by carrying off 60 camels,—vide diary No. 28, para. 5. Yar Mahomed Khoord also headed a large raid against the Pathans, but not with any remarkable success,—vide diary No. 8, para. 3, and diary No. 49, para. 5. The action of his Highness the Khan's officials towards Huzaro Chootai has caused great excitement, owing to his connexion with the Khoord tribe, through Sirdar Ala Dina's wife. In diary No. 8 of 1875 it was reported that the minor Chiefs had gone to consult their Sirdar; it is doubtful whether anything will result from this. I think, however, after the way the Summalanis and Huzaro Chootai were treated, the Sarawans will put no faith in any promises made by his Highness or his subordinates.

9. Early in April, the Tullanees, Zurukzais, and Lotanees broke into rebellion, as Mustee Khan, mace-bearer, had seized Bhowdeen Tullanee's property and burnt his house. Six hundred men took up a position at the Sohinda Ghat, between Pundram and Lehree. Troops were sent from Kutchi and Khelat against them, but could not effect a union, and as the Commandant felt far from certain as to the result, he got Sirdar Maisah Khan Moosanee and Noor Mai Beebee to go into the rebel camp, and persuade some of them not to fight, and to allow the Khan's troops to effect a junction at Noogranah. The Chiefs were invited to a friendly conference, and the following Sirdars, Syud Khan and Chakur Khan Jullucks, Muddut Khan Pundranee, Kumal Khan, and Subzul Khan Lotanees, Kheir Mahomed Baranzai, Bhowdeen Tulanee, went and were at once arrested and taken prisoners to Khelat, where they remained until Darogah Atta Mahomed was appointed Wuzeer and insisted upon their release. Gohur Khan Zurukzai, a near relative of the late Sirdar Taj Mahomed, was the ringleader of this rebellion, and on leaving the Sohinda Ghat proceeded to the hills in the neighbourhood of Pundram, expecting to be joined by Sirdar Noordeen. In this, however, he was disappointed, but managed to pick up a precarious existence by taking any caravans that passed through the Moolah. On the new Wuzeer's arrival at Bagwanah, Gohur Khan was invited to tender his submission, but declined, and is still in rebellion with a few followers.

10. The new Wuzeer delayed some days at Bagwanah until Sirdar Noordeen and some of the minor Chiefs make their salaam. The Bezunjaos, as also the Minguls, were asked to co-operate with him in re-opening the Raj route, and punishing those who had caused the obstruction.

11. The Bezunjaos wanted hostile action taken against their hereditary enemies, the Minguls, as the price of their service. This, Wuzeer Atta Mahomed was too wise to undertake, and felt able with the force at his disposal, with Mir Noordeen's co-operation, to do what was required in the Chootа country. Recent accounts lead me to hope that he may be successful, and put an end to the disorder that has prevailed on the Hubb and in Lus Beyla, it is, however, premature to offer an opinion. Pahar Khan, the Sassoolee Chief, who entered British territory with 200 armed men, is in the Wuzeer's camp, as also several other minor Chiefs. That the Minguls and other tribes did not support Gohur Khan is in a great measure due to Sirdar Noordeen, whose sole attention was devoted to Lus Beyla affairs, where he was the temporary administrator, hoping to effect the release of his brother-in-law, the Ex-Jam, as also of his sister and nephew; the latter managed to effect his escape from Hyderabad in Sind, but his mother, Meer Noordeen's sister, was unable to leave, and died shortly after from fever and subsequent exhaustion. The Ex-Jam's son, as far as I can learn, very soon quarrelled with his uncle about refunding the revenue the latter had appropriated, and has also made himself very unpopular with Jamotes and Roonjahs. The Wuzeer, Atta Mahomed, has been very anxious that he should make his salaam, but he has refused at the instigation of the Bezunjaos.

12. At the end of the last official year great excitement was caused by the arrest of the Rhind Sirdar, who was taken a prisoner to Bagh, he was, however, released during the current year on payment of a heavy fine. To realize this, the Ex-Wukeel, Mahomed Khan, and the Kazi of Bagh exercised such tyranny on all the natives of Shorun that

about 2,000 Rhinds and Lusharees left and encamped closed to Khyree Gurree, on the Sind Frontier, hoping to be allowed to settle in British territory; eventually they returned (diary No. 14 of 1874). Frequent references have been made to his Highness' officials in Kutchee for the extradition of criminals, and on other matters, but with no result. Peer Jam, his Highness' recognised agent at Nusseerabad, considered such references as mere opportunities to be rude and impertinent. Those whose influence with the Khan has been paramount for the last two or three years are evidently doubtful how long this favour may be continued. The Ex-Wukeel, Mahomed Khan, dare not leave the Khan, for fear anyone else might gain influence and effect his ruin. Kazi Mahomed Hyat is now a nonentity, and for the last cold season the only person who had power or influence in Kutchee was Fukkeer Mahomed, Commandant of the troops at Bagh.

13. Caravans and horse-dealers passed through Jacobabad from Candahar and Quettah, but not in very great numbers.

14. The Persians having expelled Meer Moorad and his family from Kohuk, was mentioned in diary No. 18 of 1874, as also a fight between Belooch Khan and Ibrahim Khan Nowsherwan, regarding some land at Kolewah, in which the former was victorious, though supported by Sirdar Azaad Khan.

15. A kossid sent from this to Punchgoor to collect information as to where Sirdar Azaad Khan had raided, returned at the latter end of November and gave the information reported in diary No. 47. Kolewah was plundered a second time by Azaad Khan's ghoolam Jamal, as noted in diary No. 50.

I have, &c.
C. H. HARRISON, Major,
Political Agent, Khelat.

Enclosure 11 in No. 2.

No. 2656 of 1875, Political Department.

From the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to the Commissioner in Sind, Kurrachee.

Political Superintendent's Office, Jacobabad,
7th September 1875.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith a letter to your address, also one to myself, and translation of the same, from both of which it will be seen that Moolla Mahomed Raisani Sirdar, the writer of these letters, is in the last straits of despair, and from what I can learn privately has every intention of, if possible, creating a disturbance in Kutchee so soon as the Brahoees come down in any numbers.

2. It will be remembered that Sirdar Alla Dina Khoord has made peace between the Doomurs and the Summalani Minguls, and has arranged with the Murrees that, if requisite, the families and flocks of the Brahoees should be allowed to remain, without any molestation from them, on the Dusht plain and above the Passes.

3. I have now been informed that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed has arranged with Sirdar Guzzun Khan that the families of the Sarawans living at Seebee should be given an asylum in the Murree hills, should they require one. It would therefore seem probable that the two Brahoee Sirdars are acting in union, and that it is their desire to avenge their wrongs, supposed or otherwise, this coming cold season. The news from Khelat that his Highness intends paying Kutchee a visit, further corroborates this supposition, for the fact of his Highness coming to Kutchee would entirely frustrate any intentions the Brahoee Sirdars may have of attempting a general rising throughout the country.

4. I have replied to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed that I have received his letter, and I have forwarded the one to your address to you, and that any reply you may be pleased to send to it will be duly forwarded. In reply to the letter to my address, I have advised him to weigh well the sound and friendly advice so frequently given him by you, to remain quiet, and to keep his people from molesting the people in Kutchee, or attacking and plundering Kafilas, and that no better advice can be given him now nor at any other time.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS LOCH, Colonel,
Political Superintendent, U.S.F.

Translati[illegible] Sirdar [illegible] Mahomed [illegible]
Pol[illegible] Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, dated Sechee the [illegible]
[illegible] 20th August 1875.

[illegible] compliments,—Since the time when the Commissioner in Sind and the British [illegible] made peace, and an arrangement between his Highness the Khan and [illegible] on every occasion that his Highness either intended to, or has done me or my [illegible] actual harm, I have made you acquainted with the same, or when his Highness [illegible] in opposition to the settlement made by the Commissioner in Sind, I have always informed you and always received the following reply from the Commissioner in Sind and yourself, "that it is necessary that you should endeavour by every means to "keep your people from creating any disturbances in his Highness the Khan's territory, "that you should on no account permit them to molest the cultivators and poor people, "and should restrain them from plundering any of the Kafilas, and that you should "assist his Highness to allow the people to live in comfort and safety, and that the "British Government will be pleased with such conduct, and good results will follow "consequent on your obeying those orders." Defender of the poor, since that time I have done nothing in any way in opposition to the Commissioner in Sind's or to your orders, but have remained staunch to your instructions, and have not deviated a hair's breadth from them. The property and cattle which were plundered from the Kafilas were, in accordance with the Commissioner in Sind's orders, restored to the merchants, although my followers were much annoyed with me for restoring the property. I did not attempt to act contrary to the Commissioner in Sind's orders, by whatever means I could, I took the plundered property from my people and restored it. I acted in such a manner that the British Government should have no cause to reproach me. Since that, no harm has been done either to the Khan's country or people by me, in order that on account of no harm having been done I should not be ashamed to meet the British Government. By obeying the orders given me, I have had some hopes from your Government, and have said in my heart that the Government and the English officers, after the manner of kings, would show some kindness to me and my people; that from seeing this treatment other people would become more staunch to the British Government, and that every one, bearing in mind my case, would obey orders and act in the same manner I have done. Up to the present, however, I have received no mark of kindness from your Government, but I am still hopeful that in the end your Government will recognise my good services and reward them. But for one reason, I am surprised that up to the present I have received no recognition of my services. His Highness Khodadad Khan has not acted justly regarding the arrangement made between us by the British Government. Every act of oppression which his Highness has committed I have reported to your Government, but your Government has never made any enquiry as to why his Highness has not acted up to his agreement. I have remarked that no notice has been taken of what I have represented, and that no explanations are required from his Highness the Khan. Now, without hope, I am quietly sitting and writing. I fully understand that if I write daily complaints against his Highness that the Government and its officers will believe that the reports are made from a spirit of enmity, and I have decided therefore that it would be better to wait and to explain at one time all the acts of oppression committed by the Khan, his breaking the agreements made by order of your Government, and the injustice done to me and my people. For the future I cannot stand his Highness' oppression, and I cannot wait any longer quiet; by writing as I have done my time has been wasted, and his Highness has determined to root every one of us out. It is now a year since the Khelat Agent was withdrawn from this country; since that time I will explain what his Highness has done to me and my people, and the reason for my rendering this explanation is, that hereafter your Government will not be able to say that they did not receive intimation of my intentions; had they done so I might have received justice, and the agreements ordered might have been fully acted up to. If the British Government, owing to the agreement which was made, or from a sense of honour, wishes to make any settlement, to inquire into the treatment I have received from his Highness the Khan since the agreement was made, either to make a strict investigation into the matter, or to carry it out by means of questions and answers, so that for the future his Highness will not act in opposition to the agreement entered into with the English Government, and that he will be kept from doing me harm—then, well. If, however, the Government will not prevent his Highness acting in the way he has lately done for the future, then, I trust that I, like many thousands of other persons who are given an asylum by the English, may be permitted to live under your protection, and that you will send for me and my family, and

will provide for us. If your Government will not permit this, and say that there is no agreement between us and them, and that they will not interfere between his Highness and us, then I will fully explain my meaning to you, that I cannot longer remain quiet. His Highness daily acts in opposition to the agreement made by the British Government, but they do not protect me, nor do they require any explanation from his Highness. Defender of the poor—his Highness has deprived me of my annual income—I am only living in this place by the faith I place in God, and by the power of the British Government; if the Government will not show me any consideration, what is the use in my remaining here? but it is far from my wish or intention to reproach the British Government. In this hapless state I must go wherever my fancy leads me, and do whatever I can; it cannot be said that I have disobeyed orders. I have not committed any fault. I have acted up to all orders given me as far as lay in my power. I have given you all this information, now there is no remedy. Where can I go? but wherever I go there I will be a dependent of, and obey the orders of, your Government. Until I receive an answer from you I will, however, remain here, and as you order so will I act. I am hopeful that I may receive a full and clear reply from the Commissioner in Sind and yourself to my letters, and I will act on them; but in case I do not receive a reply, this is my final representation. No one can act with force against Kings, but it is proper to make representations to them. What I can do I will do, this I let you know.

In another letter, which is herewith sent, I give you a full written explanation of all his Highness' acts regarding his breaking the agreement entered into with us, his not acting up to instructions, and the harm he has done to me and to my people.

Enclosure 13 in No. 2.

Translation of the second letter referred to in the concluding paragraph of the above.

The injury which his Highness the Khan has done to me is as follows:—It is now a year since traders have been prevented by his Highness the Khan from coming down the Bolan Pass. His Highness has given orders that they are to be forced to bring their merchandize by the Moolah route, and on this account I have not received a pie from the revenue drawn from this source, which I by rights am entitled to, his Highness receives it all. His Highness has sent an order to Abdool Azeez, Naib of Bagh, which the Naib forwarded to me with an order from himself. His Highness' order to the Naib is as follows:—" On the Jagir land of the village of Mehram, belonging to Sirdar " Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, Sirdar, there are 80 bunds, but he receives revenue from " more than 80. It is therefore necessary that he should not be allowed more than " the 80, all over this number must be confiscated, and the revenue made over to " Government." Now, in the Sunnud granted me by the great Nusseer Khan and Mirab Khan, and which is in my possession, I sent by the hand of my nephew, Mir Russul Buksh, for the inspection of the Naib of Bagh. My nephew went and showed the Sunnud to the Naib of Bagh, in which it is written that all the land belonging to the Town of Mehram, the land of the Machees is my Jagir land, my nephew explained to the Naib that it was so written in the Sunnud. If I had received more than my share from the Mehram lands for forty years, from Mir Nusseer Khan, Mirab Khan, and Khodadad Khan himself, and for four years agreement was made between his Highness and myself, how is it no one even said that I had been receiving more than my just share. If any one has now told his Highness that I receive more than the revenue due to me from the Town lands of Mehram, then, according to Mahomedan law and justice, according to the extent of cultivation, let him make the accusation. I did not receive this land as a lately granted gift, my father and I have been allowed this from his Highness' father, brother, and from his Highness himself. My nephew explained all this to the Naib, but the Naib would admit nothing. He only replied I had received orders from his Highness to confiscate certain land, and I have done so. I feel that his Highness has done this purposely without cause. I have sent for all my people from Mehram, and have given up the town of Mehram to his Highness. My nephew said before Naib Abdool Azeez that all this regarding the town of Mehram, and everything regarding the present state of the country, would be reported to the British Government, because I received the revenue derived from the lands of Mehram by an arrangement approved of by the British Government; and the Naib replied to him thus: " It is in your power to do so, why should you not report it?"

When the Commissioner in Sind made arrangements for us in Jacobabad, the agreements were as follows:—" That when the property belonging to his Highness himself " and the people of his Highness, which had been plundered by the Sarawans, had been " restored to him and his people, then for the future his Highness would have no claim

" or cause of complaint against the Sarawans, and the Sarawans would have no claim or " cause of complaint against his Highness."

In the days when I went to Ahmedshai, in Candahar, my people each sowed grain on his land, but his Highness reaped the whole of the grain. In the year when the Commissioner in Sind made peace and arrangement between us, it was so settled that every one was to be permitted to cultivate his own land. His Highness had sowed all the land with grain, which my people were permitted to cut in exchange for that formerly taken by his Highness, and his Highness never once laid claim to this grain before Major Harrison; now, however, his Highness has claimed this grain, and is trying to force my people in Khorasan to restore it, and his Highness says that the grain which my people sowed, and which his Highness reaped, is not to be taken into account or brought into calculation, but the grain which I sowed, that amount I will take from you. My people have written all this to me, and I have replied as follows:—" Do not give the grain " of your own accord; if any one takes it by force, do not prevent them, until I can " represent it to the British Government, so that the British Government may not be able " to reproach me." Since I sent this reply, I have heard nothing further. Besides this, his Highness has committed many acts on my people in opposition to the agreement entered into. His Highness has committed many similar acts, of which I only relate a few (literally I show these few acts, like a man shows a handful of grain, to prove that the whole Kurwar is of the same kind). His Highness has only acted in opposition to the arrangements made to try what the British Government will do, and to prove whether they will make any enquiry into his breaking his treaty with me. Take into consideration the following:—1st, collect my last year's revenue due on the Kafilas and pay them to me; 2nd, recover my land for me; and, 3rd, prevent my people having to give the grain. After this, if his Highness does me any injustice I will represent it. If the British Government are indifferent to the agreement entered into being broken, and will not make strict enquiries as to the cause of the same from his Highness the Khan, then God is all powerful. I have given you all this information as a wish to reproach is far from me. For the future you are master; order and I will obey. I have sent this by Moolah Yakoob, who will present it to you. For some little time past my son has not been well, I have done all I can in the way of giving him medicine, but he has derived no benefit from it. My son is now making ready to go to Larkana to visit a Peer there, or he will go to Shikapur to visit Peer Said Lenkui. Show kindness on me, and send me a safe conduct pass for him, and some Sowars, by the hand of Moolah Yakoob.

(True translation),

(Signed) FRANCIS LOCH, Colonel,
Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

No. 3.

Dated at Sea, 29th October 1875.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. & C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt, on the day of my departure from Sind for Bombay, of Government of India's Resolution No. 2819 P., dated 16th instant; and as I think it possible that after receipt of my letter No. 816, dated 21st instant, his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General may wish to issue some additional instructions, I would beg respectfully to submit the following further observations elucidatory of the present state of affairs on the Sind and Punjab frontiers, and in the adjacent territory of Khelat.

2. As shown in my letter above quoted, the expectation that the Khan has at last somewhat realized the gravity of the situation has, I regret to say, not been realized. Though signs of his doing so were patiently awaited, none have been given by him up to the present time. On the contrary, the Khan has not only deliberately ignored the excellent proceedings of the Wuzeer Atta Mahomed, and pointedly abstained from confirming and completing them, but he has publicly disgraced the Wuzeer; and there can be little doubt this was done because the Wuzeer had too well carried out what would be acceptable to and be approved of by, the British Government. The Khan has also designedly attempted to subvert the good arrangements made by Captain Wise, Superintendent of Police on the south-west frontier of Sind, entered upon in conjunction with,

and with the full concurrence of, the Wuzeer, viz., that certain Chiefs of the Khelat State, particularly Sahib Khan, the Chief of the large tribe of Chootas, should take service in the British Frontier Police, and assist in checking crime in that part of the country. In opposition to this the Khan has appointed Jan Mahomed, the younger brother of Sahib Khan, Chief of the tribe, with the object, evidently, of neutralizing the efforts of the Wuzeer and Captain Wise.

3. This has had no actual ill effect as yet, because it has been so recently done, but it unquestionably will have, and Sahib Khan naturally complains at his being made to suffer by deposition for having taken service with us. Captain Wise's arrangements have so far stopped the robberies which had become so frequent on the Kurrachee district border; but directly it becomes generally known that the Khan is opposed to them attempts at robbery will again occur, especially as the newly-appointed Chief of the Chootas is irritating the people by hard pressure to satisfy the demands of the Khan for a fine imposed on Noosheerwan Choota. All the above shows that the Khan still follows the advice of those who would keep him at variance with the British Government, and that he himself has no sincere wish for reconciliation.

4. As regards the Murree tribe, the Sirdar Guzzun Khan certainly made his submission at Jacobabad in February last, and Captain Sandeman procured restitution of plundered property, or its equivalent, under an award which I approved for reasons already stated; but the leniency and consideration then extended to this tribe has not had any of the effects desired. Their behaviour, excepting towards the Punjab frontier (against which they had not for long committed any offence), has shown no improvement; on the contrary, outrages by them in Kutchee, which has all along been one of the main charges against them, have been more frequently perpetrated, on a much larger scale and with greater audacity than has been ever known before. I would here again respectfully point out that these outrages have little or, indeed, nothing to do with intertribal quarrels, as is supposed. They have during the past summer been directed almost entirely against tribes with whom they had no quarrel—in fact, have been enacted in any part of Kutchee when good opportunity seem to offer them of successful loot. As stated by me before, the only two tribes with which they had a difference in the spring were the Summalani Minguls and the Dhoombhees of Lehree. The former went above the passes last March, and the latter have been only slightly troubled by a few Murree thieves.

5. These doings of the Murrees, to speak correctly, proceed almost wholly from the insatiate love of plunder possessing them, and the assurance they feel that they can carry it on with impunity. In my humble opinion, and I think recent events prove the correctness of it, nothing but severe measures and telling punishment will induce them to withhold from deeds of violence. And more even than that, I am convinced from my long experience of the character of these people that the impunity they enjoy in one quarter will only cause their arrogance and restlessness to increase, till they will cease to respect all obligations or to adhere to any limits.

6. The power of one head of the tribe will only last in as far as he joins in with the rest in their predatory excursions; and even now, though in our pay, and well aware that the lawless proceedings of the tribe are directly in opposition to the wishes and objects of the British Government, he regularly receives his share, as Chief, of every successful foray, and makes no effort to restrain them. It cannot, therefore, be hoped that any good results can follow the best peaceable arrangements, unless some check is put on this absorbing passion of violent acquisitiveness, and the wild possessors of it find it can no longer be indulged in.

7. I would also respectfully observe that there is really no dispute between the Murrees and the Khan of Khelat, unless the Summalani question is referred to, and that has only to do with the supposed action of the Khan in setting the Summalani Minguls on a section of the Murrees, the Muzzaranees, which at that time was living in the Bolan entirely separate from the remainder of the clan. The present action of the whole Murrees can hardly be said to be directed against the Khan on that account. Further, the Khan is himself pressing hard on the Summalanis; the two should be therefore "en accord" in that respect. The idea that the Murrees had any just claims on the Khan that had been disregarded by him has long ago been disposed of as groundless. And I know of nothing, as regards their possession towards the Khan, which could for a moment be held to warrant their present conduct towards the unoffending people of Kutchee. We are also now dealing direct with the Murrees and Boogtees, totally irrespective of the Khan, from whom we have severed, and his relations and dealings with them would not come within scope of present arrangements, unless we entered the Murree or Boogtee Hills, or unless Government again determined to re-open communications with the Khan, and to return to the old footing with him.

8. I certainly thought it possible that the Khan, or his officers using his name, might be intriguing with the Murrees to induce them to molest any bodies they (the Khan or his officers) might have a grudge against, for such is the way of Brahooees. But at the same time I considered it was not at all necessary it should be allowed to effect our proceedings. These are now direct with the Murrees, and they should elect whom they intend to serve. They cannot work truly with both. If they are to do our work faithfully and well they must have no engagements with others, and they need not have any, through which our arrangements may be in any way affected. I quite agree that, unless the above is provided for, any terms entered into with the Murrees will be perfectly useless. But if the Murrees are to be held in favourable consideration, I think that the above proviso is the least they should bind themselves to adhere to. If they choose they can easily avoid entering into such engagements. The Khelat Government is weak to a degree, and getting weaker every day. Its power to force the Murrees to do anything it wished was never less than it is now. The Khan's officers in Kutchee endeavoured during the summer to buy the Bijarani Murrees off from raiding there by paying Murreem Khan, the Chief, a small sum, but this failed through the pettiness of the amount and the officials not being able to increase it. The plains of Kutchee have been overrun by the Murrees since, and this is clearly the result of their own evil promptings, not from any on the part of the Khelat Government.

9. The main object of the Mittunkote Conference was to put an end to a system under which the Murrees, while respecting the Punjab frontier and being justly treated with favour by the authorities there, did not hesitate to harass the district of Kutchee belonging to our then ally, the Khan of Khelat, and immediately adjacent to the Sind borders. Their raids not only injured inoffensive people, disturbed the peace of the country, and disordered the minds of the wild tribes residing therein and within our own border, but it grievously affected the line of trade from Afghanistan, which, after leaving the Bolan, passed through the centre of that district. It was shown that, while such a system lasted, there was nothing to deter the Murrees from continuing their lawless acts in Kutchee. They received pay and favours from the British Government on one side, but utterly disregarded the wishes of that Government on the other, and became rapidly enriched by the valuable plunder they obtained. Unless, therefore, something is done to check them in their course of outrage, the state of affairs in Kutchee must become and is far worse than it was before the above conference was held.

10. It is true the Khan is no longer the friendly ally of the British Government he was, but all the other circumstances still exist, and have greater importance than before, owing to the increase of the Murrees' excesses. The people in Kutchee are becoming utterly demoralised, are losing heart altogether, and are begging to be given an asylum in Sind, or seeing the success the Murrees are gaining, state they must go and join them. If the present state of affairs lasts, Kutchee will be deserted, cultivation there will be none, and the kafilas will not dare to pass across it. Within our own border the spirit of adventure and love for plunder, which by years of steady management has been kept dormant amongst the old Lootoos, will be revived by their seeing the success the Murrees have ensured to them, and the difficulties that had to be encountered before 1847 will again arise. The Boogtees, who for so many years have behaved well, are fast losing the respect they had been taught to feel, indeed have already lost much, and in some of the recent raids have joined with the Murrees. The tribe is broken up by dissension, much of which is caused by their desire to share in the advantages the Murrees are now having.

11. Kutchee is the high road into Afghanistan. It is the best frequented by kafilas because it is the most direct—by far the easiest, brings travellers so much sooner clear of the hills than any other route, and until recently it had been for years perfectly safe. Now it has become more dangerous than any part of the route from Herat downwards. This will greatly perplex traders. Allowing Kutchee to be unsafe will force the kafilas to adopt the Moostoong, Khelat, and Moolla Pass, or Raj road through Jalawan routes to the sea. This will be exactly what the Khan of Khelat wishes. On that line he now takes all the duties to himself and allows no one else to levy, so he will be a gainer. The rule on the Bolan route was that each of the Brahooee Sirdars holding possessions on that line should receive a portion of the dues levied on traders, in return for which they were supposed to ensure safety to the travellers. The diversion of traffic from the Bolan will greatly injure the Sirdars, but not so much the Khan. When discussing the question of trade approach by the Bolan, it must be recollected that it is not merely that pass which is referred to but the whole distance from Quettah to Sind. It would be of little use to make the 72 miles of road from Quettah to Dadur safe, if the remaining 100 and odd from Dadur to Sind is overrun by robbers.

12. The Thull Chotiali route might possibly be re-opened, but I question very much the advantage of it, or any likelihood of its permanence. When Delhi was the centre of everything in India, a route from Afghanistan through Dhera Ghazee Khan to the large city of Multan was very useful; but now things are changed. Trade goes to the sea-board, and will look for the most direct route. Make the Bolan line safe, and so it must be some day; that will be the line generally adopted, and trade will return to it. The difficulties on the Thull Chotiali line are not confined to the exactions of the Murrees. The Kakar country is entered on leaving Pesheen, and this tribe is even more rapacious than the Murrees, and less amenable to control. Their country is very strong, and his Highness the Ameer of Cabul has no power over them.

13. Another thing with regard to Kutchee it is the best road, and the one that must be followed should it be necessary to move troops forward into Afghanistan. It will then be of the first importance that obstruction, irritation, and hindrance should not have to be encountered at the very outset, and that it should not be necessary to have strong posts along the whole line to keep the communication open. With Kutchee peaceable and quiet, it is calculated also that large supplies of grain and forage will be procurable throughout the length of it. Such would assuredly be the case, for it is naturally a very rich tract; but with the place deserted, or with cultivation suspended from fear, there will be nothing to be got.

14. I would beg respectfully to observe that the position of the Sind outposts beyond the frontier is not exactly that supposed in the 24th paragraph of the Government of India's Resolution. These posts, three, are Sooee, Sunree, and Goranaree. The first is 24 miles nearly north of Kusmore, close to the Punjab boundary; the next is about 30 miles south-west of Sooee, and the third six miles further west, and 38 miles east-north-east from Jacobabad, quite away from Kutchee. The object of placing these posts where they are was to get them in advance of the Sind cultivation, which had gone far in front of the old line of outposts, and to put them between it and the Boogtee Hills. Sooee was pushed a little further north, so as to hold a commanding position over any robbers who might venture to leave the Boogtee Hills to steal from Sind or the Punjab. Gundooee is not a real outpost. There are only a few Belooch sowars placed there as scouts to watch the movements of the hill people, and send intelligence to the Sind Horse outposts. None of the three posts above mentioned could in any way assist in maintaining order in the parts of Kutchee near the British borders. I have recently been compelled to direct that patrols should be sent from Jacobabad to the north and north-west, as the Murrees had actually dared to come as low down as between Bagh and Burshoree. This was necessary to allay somewhat the fears that were possessing all the people of lower Kutchee, and to make the Murrees keep a further distance.

15. This and my previous report will show his Excellency the Viceroy that there is really not much to be learned as to the causes of, and reasons for, the present state of affairs. They are patent now, and he who runs may read. There will be no safety for trade through Kutchee as long as the Murrees are allowed to plunder there at will, and the disorders that exist there cannot fail to very injuriously affect the adjacent British borders, and they will steadily increase. It would be of little use making arrangements by the levy of tolls in the Bolan for the protection of convoys through that pass if the latter are to be plundered by the Murrees directly they enter the plains; and expenditure on others of the money sanctioned for subsidising the Murrees will have no effect as long as the Murrees behave as they are now doing. If the Murrees won't conform to the wishes of the British Government it would be better to apply the money which was intended to purchase their compliance in some other way, which would, at all events, produce some result. At present it is not used.

16. I would respectfully recommend that I may be authorised this cold season to protect Kutchee with the force at Jacobabad against the inroads of the Murrees. This would most easily be done by placing along the front of the Murree Hills, from Chuttur to Mull, the cavalry, with a few infantry at certain points, to allow of all the cavalry going out when called. The Bolan, having to do with the political charge of the Superintendent on the frontier of Sind, might then be arranged for, and the money intended for the Murrees, and which they won't take, might be appropriated and placed at the disposal of the Political Superintendent for such wants as might appear requisite for the security of the Bolan. The Murrees would have to be informed that their outrageous proceedings in Kutchee cannot be tolerated any longer. It had been intended to take them into employ, and pay them handsomely; but as they do not show themselves willing to act as required of them, and do not withhold from most unjustifiably lawless practices, that plan was abandoned, and measures would be taken to prevent the tribe committing outrages in Kutchee. As long as they abstained from such no notice

would be taken of them, but any portion of the tribe daring to enter the plains for the purpose of plunder would be immediately pursued and punished as they deserved. The arrangement on the Punjab side might still remain in force as long as the Murrees respected that border, and Captain Sandeman would be able to use his influence with Guzzun Khan, who certainly seems quite sincere in his desire to remain on good terms with us. When the other portions of the tribe found Kutchee was barred to them they would become more inclined to listen to reason, and to try to behave themselves more peaceably towards their neighbours.

17. I would beg to assure his Excellency that I have always been most anxious to deal patiently and considerately with the tribes, and am always most ready to accept anything that can be said in their favour. I am truly desirous to be on most friendly terms with them. But I would most respectfully submit that there is a limit to patience, and that when a tribe acts near the British border in so outrageous a manner as the Murrees, and shows such contemptuous defiance of the power of the British Government, I should be neglecting my duty if I did not bring all the circumstances to the notice of his Excellency in Council, and urge, in every way I could, the early adoption of final measures to put an end to such an unsatisfactory and most dangerous state of affairs.

No. 4.

Dated Camp Toj, 20th November 1875.

Jacobabad news-letters by Colonel F. Loch, Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

You must know that a certain person who always sends me news from Kutchee has given me the following information: That all the Brahooees have come from Khorasan to the low country and are pitched around Dadur. Shadee Khan, son of Allum Khan Bungulzai, and Sirdar Alla Dina Khoord allowed their cattle to graze in the fields belonging to the people of Dadur, and they destroyed all the jowaree and cotton fields near that place. When this news was known to Sirdar Moolla Muhammad Raisani, he sent his son and put a stop to it, and he sent a message to the effect that if you commit such damage to the poor people, it is possibly your intention to plunder Kutchee. The reply given to this was, when the Muhammadshais, whose Sirdar is Syud Khan, reaches Kutchee we will settle to plunder Kutchee. Noordeen Mingul has written to Sirdar Moolla Muhammad that he has closed the Moolla road, and that should any of his Highness' the Khan's troops attempt to come by this way that he will oppose them, and that he will not allow any one to pass, and that it is necessary that Moolla Muhammad should close the Bolan road. To this the following reply was given: When the Muhammadshais come arrangements will be made to close the Bolan road. Noordeen also sent another letter, in which it was stated that he intends placing the pugree on the head of Gohur Khan Zarukzai in place of Taj Muhammad.

No. 950, dated on board the "Indus," 8th December 1875.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

No. 5.

No. 966, dated Camp Sukkur, 13th December 1875.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies of the following papers are forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

2. There is, unquestionably, active movement against the Khan contemplated by the Brahooee Sirdars, stirred by the energy displayed by Sirdar Noordeen Mingul. The desertion of the regular troops is very significant, showing certain failure in the Khan's power and influence, and if the Sarawan Sirdars only join thoroughly in the movement initiated by Noordeen Mingul, a short revolution with little bloodshed may bring about a change of rulers.

3. The Khan's prospects are most gloomy. He may manage to escape, but is more likely to be killed at the commencement of the outbreak. His son, Meer Mahomed Khan, would probably be set up.

4. Noordeen Mingul's recognition of Gohur Khan Zheree as Sirdar of Jalawan is directly flying in the face of the Khan. He, Noordeen, requested the Khan would send his son to the investiture of Gohur Khan. The Khan of course declined. Had Meer Mahomed Khan been sent, Noordeen Mingul would have proclaimed him Khan, and then marched on Khelat.

5. All interference with passing events will be carefully avoided, unless disturbances are caused in Kutchee by the Sarawan Sirdars, in which case measures will be adopted to prevent disorderly parties breaking the peace of the British border.

6. It would have been well had the Murrees been better in hand now, as they may add greatly to the disorders and misrule in Kutchee.

7. Orders have been sent to Captain Sandeman, now in the Murree Hills, to be most careful to avoid all communication with the Brahooee Sirdars or their people, and on no account to go beyond the Murree or Boogtee Hills towards the Bolan, Seebee, or Kutchee.

Enclosure 1 in No. 5.

From Sirdar Sher Zaman Khan, Baruzai, to Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, dated Koorkh, 2nd December 1875.

On the 1st Shawan, *i.e.*, 1st November, a letter came to me from his Highness the Khan of Khelat; I sent his Highness a reply; and on the 1st Zulkad, *i.e.*, 1st December, a second letter came to me, copies of the last letter and my reply are attached. I am hopeful that you may see them, and may learn all from them. The other news is, that on the 26th November Afizal Mingul brought a letter to Sirdar Moolla Muhammad from Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, and the messenger gave the following information: That Sirdar Noordeen Mingul was with a Jalawan force in Baghwana, and that he had presented Sirdar Gohur Khan Zarukzai with the Sirdari khillut, a dress of honour; the latter Sirdar is at Hurtorsah with 300 men. The Sowar said that when he left it was Noordeen Mingul's intention to proceed to Zehree. Ali Jan, son of Rohimdad, had been sent by his Highness the Khan to Noordeen, who had falsely agreed to go to Khelat; but, from what people say, he intends going there to create a disturbance. Jam Ali, son of Mir Khan Jamote, has entertained 500 infantry and 300 cavalry, and it is his intention to take part in the disturbances. A few of his Highness' Jungi Regiment have deserted and have taken service with Jam Ali Khan, about 100 men may have gone. His Highness called Fukkeer Mahomed, commanding, and said to him, the men of your regiment are always deserting; I believe that they desert with your permission. It so happened that that very night a Havildar and 12 men of the Nurwai Regiment were on guard over the Dildar Gate and deserted, taking their arms with them. Fukkeer Mahomed, commanding, said to his Highness, my men desert without taking their arms, but the Nurwai Regiment take their arms with them when they desert. People say that Jam Ali gives each of his sepoys Rupees 7 pay, besides one seer of flour and one-eighth of a seer of ghee and 2 pice daily, and for this reason every person is deserting and taking service with him.

Arab Khan Dewar was sent by his Highness to receive the property taken by Hybat Summalani who looted the kafila; the Summalanis refused to give it up, saying, that if his Highness would release our people who are in prison we will give up the property; but if not, without Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's order we will do nothing; he is our Sirdar and our ruler. Hybat has stationed 100 men in the Hurbooj Hill, and he has twice looted the people who were bringing wood from the hills to Khelat, and consequently no wood is brought to Khelat. The Shawani and the Muhammadshais, as well as the rest of the Sarawans, have left the hills and are now in Kutchee. These people who have come from Khorassan say that Rawul Khan and Russul Baksh Mingul carried off 11 flocks of goats from Quetta, Moostoong, and Mungchur.

On the 28th Shawal, *i.e.*, 28th November, all the Sarawan Sirdars came to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisani, and the Sowar who had come from Sirda Moolla Mahomed were sent to Sirdar Noordeen, and all the Sirdars remained with Sirdar Moolla Mahomed two nights and are all unanimous. They returned on the 30th November to their several stations, and their intention is to create a disturbance. Whatever happens I will let you know. Sirdar Sohrab Khan Dhoombkee has sided with the Sarawans. The Nari country is being plundered by the Brahooees. One night 20 Sowars cut the cultivation on two bands of a Chulgari village and carried it off. The Naib of Bagh will not allow his troops to go outside the town. All the Brahooees are living to the north of Bagh; none are farther south than Nari.

You are well aware of all the former news regarding his Highness the Khan. My reputation is on your neck. It will be comforted by whatever reply you send, so comfort my heart and make me glad by sending me a reply, so that I may be made a thousand times happy.

Enclosure 2 in No. 5.

Dated Burozai, 22nd Shawan 1292=22nd November 1875.

From his Highness the Khan of Khelat to Sirdar Sher Zuman Khan.

I have received your letter in which you write as follows:—That I am a dependent of his Highness the Ameer, and that I am not without some one to take care of me; it is true that this is so, but I have a greater opinion of his Highness the Ameer than you have. The Ameer's country and riches and my country and riches are as one, there is no difference between them, and one who is badly disposed to my Government will not be pardoned by his Highness, why do you allow evil-disposed persons to reside near you? you write that there has always been good faith and good feeling between you and my Government, that those who are friends of this Government are considered by you as friends, and the enemies of this Government you consider your enemies. The circumstances are really thus; this Government has always shown kindness to your forefathers and to you, those who are your evil-wishers I consider my enemies, and those who are your well-wishers I look on as my servants. If you permit people who are evil-disposed to my Government and disloyal to live near you, it is decidedly not good. Now you have written that I will not allow any evil-wishers of your Government to remain under my protection, very good, now that you intend to follow the old custom I will consider you my friend and well-wisher. If any person should create a disturbance in my country and go to you, or remain near you and intend creating a disturbance, do not believe that my country will suffer from my enemies or from you. It is necessary that you should follow the old customs and hope for the kindness of my Government. In every way be comforted and write to me of your welfare.

Enclosure 3 in No. 5.

Translation of a letter from Sirdar Sher Zuman Khan, Barozai, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

Defender of the poor, your letter which exalted me much was written after this manner. You write that the enemies of your Government are not pardoned by his Highness the Ameer, why have you given a place to evil-disposed persons and allow them to remain near you? if you allow my enemies to remain I will not suffer from the number of my enemies or from you. Defender of the poor, it is not proper for you to write such severe words to your well-wisher, nor is it proper for you to consider him your enemy from olden times. I have never done you any wrong, nor have I been an enemy of your Government, and will not be one, and I have no bad intentions; what I have done has not been done without the orders of his Highness the Ameer. I have received a letter from his Highness the Ameer, which I have in my possession, regarding giving Sirdar Moolla Mahomed refuge and showing him kindness. The contents of the perwanah are as follows:—

Give the Sirdar a place near you, give him land and water, and make him comfortable so long as the Sirdar is happy with you. Understand that I, the Ameer, am pleased with you, and always do the Sirdar's service as you do mine. You should take into consideration and ponder over these words. That when any master or officer gives his tenants or servants any order they must obey these orders. How can the tenants or servants act differently to the orders given. Besides this, the British Government have given me orders regarding Sirdar Moolla Mahomed being permitted to live here. Defender of the poor, when Sirdar Moolla Mahomed came to reside here, who is the head of the Sarawans, when the Sarawans came to their Sirdar, I have received no order from my master to stop them. Defender of the poor, since this Sirdar has come to live in my town he has done no harm to your country; when he had any intention of doing so he did so amongst his own people, and none of my people joined with in. Nothing can be proved against my people of having done any harm to your country. If you have any queries to make regarding this, apply to his Highness the Ameer and the British Government. I will willingly or unwillingly obey my master's orders, but without reason you have considered your well-wisher your enemy, and have written these improper words.

My forefathers never heard such orders from your ancestors. Consider me your true well-wisher and true friend. I have never done anything but wished wel for you, nor will I cease to do so. Keep your heart comforted and always make me happy by writing. May you have long life.

Enclosure 4 in No. 5.

Dated Jacobabad, December 1875.

From Colonel F. Loch, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Sirdar Sher Zuman Khan, Barozai Koorkh

I have had much pleasure in receiving your letter and its accompaniments, and I quite approve of your reply to his Highness the Khan. So long as you continue to act as your forefathers did, and do not permit your people to take any part in the disturbances against his Highness, or in any way to enter his country, or to oppress his people, your conduct will always meet with the approval of the British Government. I much fear that the Brahooee Sirdars intend creating disturbances, but I trust they may take the good advice so often given them, and think better of their present intention. Should they, however, not do so, I trust that you will hold aloof from them, and not allow your subjects to take any part in the disturbances. I have every faith in your good senses and good intentions. Write me any further news you may hear. I am always glad to get letters from you. All is well here.

No. 6.

Telegram, dated 13th December 1875.

From Commissioner, Sukkur, to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Revolution in Khelat clearly imminent. Noordeen Mingul working a likely conspiracy in conjunction with Fukkeer Mahomed, commanding regiment at Khelat, and others, object to depose Khan and set up eldest son. Sarawan Sirdars in communication with Noordeen, but principal ones being in Kutchee will probably only create disturbances there for diversion. Am proceeding to frontier to watch events, avoiding all interference. Sandeman in Murree Hills by last accounts; have told him of above, and instructed him to be most careful to avoid any communication with Brahooee Sirdars or their people, and on no account to go beyond Murree Hills towards Bolan, Seebee, or Kutchee.

No. 7.

Telegram, No. 3309 P., dated 16th December 1875.

From Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to Commissioner in Sind, Sukkur.

Your telegram of 13th regarding Khelat affairs. Policy of non-interference approved.

No. 8.

Dated Jacobabad, 14th December 1875.

Khelat Diary, No. 47, for the week ending 12th December 1875.

On the 22nd November a letter was sent by his Highness the Khan to the address of Sirdar Sher Zuman Baruzai at Kurkh, in which his Highness wrote that "His Highness "the Amir of Afghanistan does not allow persons evil-disposed towards my Government "to remain near him, how then have you given these evil-disposed persons a place to "reside in? If any person should commit any evil in my country, or have any evil "designs against me, I would have you to understand that no harm can come to me "either by you or them." Sirdar Sher Zuman Khan replied: "I am your well-wisher, "I have never done any harm to your country. Sirdar Moolla Muhammad has been "permitted to remain here by his Highness the Amir, and I have been ordered to do his "service, and to give him land and water. I have his Highness' written orders on this "subject; the British Government also have permitted him to remain here. If you "have any inquiries to make on this subject, you had better make them from his High-

‘ ness the Amir and the British Government. Ever since this Sirdar has come into this “ part of this country, he has never had any bad intentions towards your country: when- “ ever he had any designs, he always went and lived with his own people. None of my “ people have ever taken any part with him. It is not proper that you should write such “ hard words to me as you have done.”

2. There is great fear in Kutchee, everyone is taking their property out of the small villages and placing it in the large ones for safety. Much property has been taken to Shoran, where Waderah Imam Buksh Rhind lives, and Jalal Khan-ke-Busti, where Waderah Dost Muhammad Maghaira resides. His Highness' officials are quite unable to protect the standing crops of grain in Kutchee, and the zemindars have been obliged to hire a certain number of the Brahooees to take care of their fields.

3. Sirdar Noordeen Mingul sent two sowars to Wuderah Kaisir Khan Mugzi, and asked him to assist him with troops; the Wuderah replied that he could not assist him openly, but he privately sent the Jalawan Sirdar Rupees 4,000. Waderah Imam Baksh Rhind, at the solicitation of Abdul Aziz, Naib of Bagh, sent 100 Rhind sowars under Ruza Muhammad Rhind for the protection of Bagh, and Wuderah Kaisir Khan Mugzee has also sent 100 of his sowars under Muhammad Khan, Bhutiana Mugzee, for the same purpose, and they have all reached Bagh.

4. With reference to paragraph 4 of Diary No. 43 of the 8th November, and paragraph 4 of Diary No. 44 of the 23rd November, Khodadad Khan was the headman present with the Dhumars who robbed the kafilas on the 25th October and 5th November last, and he lives in the Zurgoon Hills. These Dhumurs were assisted by the Summalanis, who live with them in the Zurgoon Hills.

5. Regarding paragraph 3 of Diary No 35 of 13th September, wherein it was stated that some infantry and sowars had been sent with Sirdar Gazi Khan, Gitchki, to collect the revenue of Punjgoor, it is reported that at the instigation of Lulla Nowsherwani, nephew of Sirdar Azad Khan of Kharan, that everyone has refused to pay any revenue. On the arrival of the troops Sirdar Lulla Nowsherwani went to the fort of Khodabadan and began to collect a force with the intention of turning his Highness' troops out of the country. Sirdar Gaju Khan, seeing how matters stood, wrote to his Highness the Khan and asked for reinforcements, stating that, under present circumstances, it was a difficult matter for his troops. When this was reported to his Highness he remained silent and gave no orders. Sirdar Bhai Khan, Gitchki of Rij, who went to perform the Haj at Mecca, has not yet returned.

6. The Summalanis plundered four flocks of goats from Moongachur and one flock of goats from near Tehri, the Naib of Moostoong followed the plunderers, but did not come up with them.

7. A kafila was on its way from Afghanistan to Kurrachee, and another from Kurrachee to Afghanistan, and when they reached Sherimah in the Moongachur district, the Dhumars and Summalanis attacked both kafilas, two Pathans were wounded, but the plunderers managed to carry off only thirteen camels, all the rest of the kafila was saved.

8. Sirdar Pussund Khan Langoa, son of Rahimdad, and his brother, Saffar Khan, have quarrelled, they are residents of Moongachur, the latter with his family and followers has gone to reside in Shorawak in Afghan territory; and he has on two occasions plundered the cattle feeding near Moongachur, and has carried off two herds of camels belonging to the Langaos.

9. Nohuk Guzni and Pullia Koongrani, with some Talani Dhoombkees and Notani Boogtees, on the 6th of December about 10 p.m., carried off from near Mamool 103 camels, the property of certain Jutts residing there. The Jutts did not give information to the Sind Horse outposts, but sent word to Dhur Muhammad Jumali, who sent a man to the outposts at Rojan, the native officer went in pursuit, but too late to recover the property.

10. To-day news was brought to me that Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan, had reached old Seebee six days ago, and that at his invitation all the Sarawan Brahooee Sirdars had visited him. His intention was to proceed to Bibinani viâ the Bolan, and it is currently reported that Captain Sandeman had sent to his Highness the Khan of Khelat requesting his Highness to meet him there. Captain Sandeman went from Rahim, viâ Nat Dahu and the Goorg Pass. Sher Dil Muzzaranee Murree accompanied him as guide, and he was accompanied by Sirdar Imam Buksh Mazari.

No. 983, dated Camp Shikarpoor, 17th December 1875.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

2. Captain Sandeman during the past year was repeatedly ordered by the Commissioner to abstain from communicating direct with the Brahui Sirdars, or having anything to do with Seebee or Kutchee.

3. Recently, in reference to the Government of India Resolution, No. 2819P. of the 16th October, that officer was particularly instructed to collect all the information he could get in the hills regarding the subjects mentioned in the Resolution, but on no account to go beyond the hills into Seebee or Kutchee, or to have any communication direct with the Brahooee Sirdars. According to the report now forwarded, Captain Sandeman would seem to have deliberately broken all these orders. He has been called upon for explanation of this conduct, which, on receipt, will be submitted to the Government of India with the Commissioner's further remarks. But in the meanwhile the Commissioner would observe that Captain Sandeman's services were placed at his disposal with a view of proper control being exercised over the Murree and Boogtee tribes, over whom, from his connection with them as Assistant and Deputy Commissioner in the Lower Derajat, it was supposed, he, Captain Sandeman, had great and salutary influence, sufficient to induce them to behave peaceably on the western side of the hills in the same manner as they had been acting towards the east. On these grounds the Commissioner was glad to accept Captain Sandeman's services. But the Commissioner never contemplated that the Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan would venture to act independently and meddle with the political affairs of Khelat, with which he had nothing whatever to do, and manifestly from his position should not have.

4. The Commissioner would submit to Government that such disregard of his orders is most reprehensible on the part of Captain Sandeman. But, more than that, interference by the Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan, in political matters directly connected with Khelat, which are in the hands of the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, under the Commissioner in Sind, would at all times be highly objectionable. But at the present moment, when a grave crisis is imminent between the Khan of Khelat and his nobles, it is very much more reprehensible and most embarrassing. The Khan of Khelat and the Sirdars, on hearing of this independent action of Captain Sandeman, cannot fail to imagine that two principles are being worked; two authorities acting differently; one from Sind, the other from the Punjab; and a dual arrangement in its worst form comes into play. The policy of non-interference which was laid down by his Excellency the Viceroy last January is being strictly and carefully followed by the Commissioner, and while it is so another person appears on the scene acting without authority from him, and certainly in direct contra-distinction to the principal of non-interference. His going to the Sirdars at Seebee will be immediately regarded in some measure as a recognition of their cause, particularly as they are engaged in organizing a rebellion against their ruler. The Commissioner need scarcely point out what a false position this places us in with regard to the Khan of Khelat, and in the present state of affairs between the two Governments.

5. An express has been sent after Captain Sandeman directing him to return at once to his district, and to answer for his breach of orders, and the Commissioner would request that he may be in future kept to his place in Dehra Ghazi Khan.

6. The representations made originally by the Commissioner had simply to do with the management of the Murree tribe. Captain Sandeman has been unable to do anything towards restraining them in the manner desired, and the demeanour of that tribe now is far worse than has ever been known. Better revert to the old state of affairs than this, and the Commissioner would prefer doing so. He would, therefore, request that the money sanctioned after the Mittunkote Conference may again be placed at the disposal of the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, for use in reference to that frontier, and that the Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazi Khan, may simply attend to his own frontier, as before.

No. 9.

Telegram, dated 17th December 1875.

From Commissioner in Sind, Shikarpoor, to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Captain Sandeman is stated to have visited Seebee and Dadur and communicated with Brahooee Sirdars. This is directly contrary to my orders; would be objectionable at any

time, but at the present moment most improper and embarrassing: any appearance even of separate political action from that I have been ordered to carry out cannot be too carefully avoided. I have sent express to Captain Sandeman to return at once to his districts, and would beg he may be kept here. Papers by post.

No. 10.

Telegram, No. 3343P., dated 20th December 1875.

From Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to Commissioner in Sind, Shikarpoor.

Yours of 17th. While directing Sandeman not to interfere in the troubles apparently impending between Khan and his subjects, you should take care not to interfere with Sandeman's execution of orders he has received from Government of India, and particularly not to be hasty in condemning his conduct before he has explained it. Sandeman's movements among Murrees should not be interfered with.

No. 11.

Telegram, dated 22nd December 1875.

From Commissioner in Sind, Khanpur, to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Yours of 20th. I do not understand and cannot suppose Sandeman has orders for what he has been doing, as it is directly contrary to policy laid down by Government of India, and gravely insubordinate to me. He has not only visited Seebee and Dadur, and held communication with Brahooee Sirdars, but has sent Imam Buksh Mazari and others with letters to Khan of Khelat. He has also entered Bolan accompanied by Sirdars. The whole of this is directly contrary to instructions given him by me; most indiscreet and unbecoming; must make present relations with Khan and Khelat affairs more embarrassing, and make all parties doubt in reality Government policy and its good faith. You may be sure Sandeman will not be finally condemned by me unheard, but above speaks for itself, and I must beg his being kept to Dehra Ghazee Khan and his own legitimate duties.

No. 12.

Dated Jacobabad, 21st December 1875.

Khelat Diary, No. 48, for the week ending 19th December 1875.

The Sarawan and Jalawan Brahooees, assisted by Sirdar Azaad Khan, Nowsherwanee of Kharan, had all agreed to commence disturbances on the 25th of this month. Azaad Khan was to move on Khelat by the Sobrah route, Sirdar Noordeen Mingul and Sirdar Gohur Khan Zarukzai were to go by the Zehree route, and the Sarawan Brahooees, who are now in Kutchee, were first to possess themselves of Kutchee, and then on the 25th of this month also to move above the passes on Khelat, and if they proved successful, it was the intention of the Brahooee nobles to depose the present Khan, Khodadad Khan, and place his eldest son, Meer Muhammad Khan, a lad of about nine years old, on the throne: a certain number of the officers about his Highness' court (vide Khelat Diary, paragraph 1, No. 46 of 7th December 1875) had also privately promised the Brahooee Sirdars their assistance. With this intention Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee had collected all his family and his property on the 9th of the current month, and was going to leave Koorkh that evening and join the Sarawan Brahooees. But on that evening Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazee Khan, arrived in Seebee; he had come by the Guzee and Koorkh route with the under-mentioned following;—One troop of the 1st Punjab cavalry under Captain Wylie, 150 of the 4th regiment of Sikh infantry, and a European medical officer, by name Surgeon Thomson; Sirdar Imam Buksh Mazari, Sirdar Jumal Khan Laghari, Sirdar Ghulam Hyder Lund, Sirdar Sekunder Khan Rosah, Meer Ula Khan Murree, brother of Sirdar Guzzun Khan, and many other Murree Muccadums; Shabaz Khan, son of Gulam Murteza, Boogtee Sirdar, Sirdar Kadur Khan Khetran, and the son of Babul Khan, Khetran Sirdar, the headmen of Dreshuks and Bogdars. Captain Sandeman moved to Doka-ke-Koomb near Mull, and he desired the Sarawan Sirdars at once to desist from creating disturbance in Kutchee or Khelat. He sent an order to the Naib of Bagh, Abdul Aziz, that he was at once to dismiss all the Rhind and Mugzi horsemen he had collected in Bagh (vide paragraph 3 of Diary No. 47 of 14th December 1875), and in accordance with this order they all returned to their houses on the 11th instant. Captain Sandeman halted there the 11th, 12th, and 13th, and on the 14th he moved his camp to Pirak-ke-Tukree; on the 15th he moved to

Dadur, and halted there on the 16th. From here he sent two of his own sowars and two Sarawan sowars to Sirdar Noordeen Mingul and Gohur Khan Zarukzai with a letter to these two Sirdars, requesting them to refrain from making any disturbances in Khelat territory, as he was about to make a settlement of their differences and disputes with his Highness the Khan of Khelat. Captain Sandeman also sent two sowars to his Highness the Khan, and requested his Highness not to make any preparations to attack the Brahooees until he received another letter from him, and Captain Sandeman sent Sirdar Muhammad Khan, brother of Sher Zaman Khan, Barozai Sirdar, with six sowars to Candahar (but for what purpose is not known). Captain Sandeman presented Sirdar Sher Zaman Khan with a khillut or dress of honour, and the Sirdar then returned to Seebee. Captain Sandeman, taking with him Syud Aurung Shah, who lives at Dadur, and all the afore-mentioned Sirdars and troops and 200 Sarawan Brahooee Sowars, moved to Khoondeelanee. Captain Sandeman pays the Sarawan Sirdars and their 200 horsemen who are with him Rupees 150 per diem, with the exception of Sirdars Sumandar Khan and Dost Muhammad Lehris who are not with him. The following are the Sarawan Sirdars now with Captain Sandeman: Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, Sirdar Shadi Khan Bungulzi, Sirdar Syud Khan Muhammadshai, Sirdar Alla Dina Khoord, Sirdar Jhunda Khan Shawani, and their 200 followers. On the 18th Captain Sandeman and his followers moved to Bibinani, and on that day Sirdar Imam Buksh Mazari, Sirdar Jamul Khan Laghari, Russul Buksh, nephew of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Sirdar Dost Muhammad, son of Sirdar Alla Dina Khoord, with 140 sowars, were despatched to Khelat to his Highness the Khan. They were to march by the Rhodbar, Jumbaeri, and Nurmorkh route, and on the 19th Captain Sandeman moved to Kirta, where he intends to halt and await the return of his party from Khelat. The kossid, by name Khomi, who brought a letter for me, stated in my presence that he had seen Sirdar Imam Buksh and the others above-mentioned leave for Khelat.

2. The two messengers sent from here on the 14th instant with important letters for Captain Sandeman have not yet returned from Kutchee. On the 17th instant two other messengers were despatched to Captain Sandeman with copy of Commissioner in Sind's telegram dated Shikarpoor, 17th December 1875.

No. 1005, dated Camp Khanpoor, 22nd December 1875.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

2. The Commissioner cannot too strongly express his disapproval and condemnation of the proceeding of Captain Sandeman as herein detailed and as confirmed from other accounts. The manner in which Captain Sandeman has taken upon himself to assume direct political powers and enter into political relations, not merely with the Brahooee Sirdars, but even with the Khan of Khelat himself, is most unbecoming and improper.

3. The Government of India desired that a policy of strict non-interference should be followed. This was distinctly announced to the Sirdars and to the Khan, and has been carefully followed; yet a young officer, with only limited knowledge of what has previously passed, comes in and issues orders where he has no business to appear. This indiscreet (to say the least of it) meddling of Captain Sandeman will have a most pernicious effect by shaking the faith of the Sirdars and of the Khan in the real intentions of Government.

4. Instructions have again been sent to Captain Sandeman to return forthwith to his districts through the Murree Hills, submitting without delay such explanation of his conduct as he can offer, and that he should remain there pending further orders.

No. 13.

News from Shikarpoor.

Yesterday, Sunday, the 19th December 1875, it was rumoured in the town of Shikarpoor that an English force, consisting of four or five thousand men, arrived at Dadur in charge of Captain Sandeman of the Punjab. It was stated that he had been deputed to arrange to take the Murrees and Beloochees in Government employ, and that he is about to send for the subjects of Khelat to hold a conference with them.

No. 1010, dated Camp Lodra, 23rd December 1875.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

Forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

2. Such rumours are the natural results of Captain Sandeman's improper proceedings.

No. 14.

Translation of a letter from Meer Khan Gholam Bholak, to Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, dated 16th Zulkad 1292=15th December 1875.

The news I heard here is that in the year when the disturbances took place between his Highness the Khan, Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, and the other nobles, his Highness confiscated the Brahooee jaghir lands and cultivated them, sowing their lands with grain from his own granaries. After this the British Government mediated and made peace between his Highness and the Brahooees. The Brahooees in this settlement received back their own lands, and cut the produce of the grain which his Highness had sown. This year his Highness has demanded a return of this amount of grain from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and his friends, but they refused to give it, and his Highness has, by force, in exchange for this taken the sum of Rupees 1,200 from the zemindars and bunniahs who reside in Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's villages, and has also plundered the other Brahooees to a certain extent. Now all the Brahooees who had come into Kutchee intended to raise a rebellion. Sirdar Alla Dina Khoord's section were in Lukree, Sirdar Shadeo Khan Bungulzai in Bhadah, and the Shawanis in Hajee-ke-Shere; all having assembled together were of one determination, and all came together to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed to Kurkh. The following Murrees who are all Shabijas came to Kurkh to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, viz., Sheran Mulwani, Sobdhar and Sukoo Lingranis, Dhooroo Langari, the Brahooees were also present there, and the Sirdar made peace between them and the Murrees. The reason of this peace being made was, because should there be a rebellion and fighting between his Highness' troops and the Brahooees, in the event of the latter getting beaten, they would have an asylum in the Murree Hills to retire to; but up to the present no disturbance or rebellion has taken place; but a rebellion had been determined on and was being arranged when Futteh Khan, brother of Kurrum Khan Bijarani, brought the news that the Deputy Commissioner, Captain Sandeman, on the 8th Zulkad = 7th December, was then in Goozee, and would arrive in Thullee the following day. On hearing this, Sher Zaman Khan, Barozai Sirdar, with all the Pani Muccadums, Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, and all the Brahooee Sirdars and Muccadums went to Thullee to meet the Sahib and do istakbal; but the Sahib came by the Goozee and Khechusee road which debouches into the plain to the north of Doka-ke-Koomb, and he encamped where the Thullee and Mull rivers join. The above-mentioned Sirdars and Muccadums who had proceeded to Thullee not meeting the Sahib there, proceeded to the Sahib's camp as soon as they learned where he had pitched it. The Sahib, on the 9th instant, moved from Doka to the Naree River. Here the Panis, Brahooees, and others who had collected together, amounted to about 1,800 persons, but amongst these were 200 regular infantry and cavalry, the rest were all Belooch, viz., Sirdar Imam Buksh Mazari, the Lagharies, the Dushuks, the Gorchanis, the Lunds, the Kosahs, the Boogtees, the Khetrans, and Meer Ulla Khan, brother of the Murree Sirdar Kurrum Khan Bijaranee, and Sher Dil, Mazaranee Murrees. On the 10th instant, for the purpose of paying honour to Sirdar Sher Zaman Khan and Moolla Mahomed, the Sahib mounted his horse, visited Kurkh and old Seebee, and then returned to his camp, and he halted there for four days and nights. The Sahib made known the following to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee, that he (Captain Sandeman) had come for the purpose of making peace between the Brahooees and his Highness the Khan of Khelat; that he intended to make peace between his Highness and the Sirdars, and that he would open up the Bolan road in such a way that travellers and wayfarers might proceed by this route without any fear; and that he would make peace also with the Murrees in such a way that the Murrees would refrain from plundering in Kutchee and Seebee, which belong to his Highness the Ameer. The Sahib also stated that his first intention was to take every one with him and proceed straight to Khelat; but those who were with the Sahib represented that during the present season snow falls at Khelat, and the climate is intensely cold. Captain Sandeman then directed Sirdar Imam Buksh Mazari, with

100 horsemen, to prepare to proceed to Khelat to his Highness the Khan, and the Sahib said that he with the rest of his followers would await Sirdar Imam Buksh's return in Kula Bibinani or the Dusht Plain. The Sahib desired Sirdar Sher Zaman Khan Barozai to give him a Motabur to send to Candahar, and Sher Zaman got ready his brother, Mahomed Khan, with six sowars. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisanee and the other Brahooees joined Captain Sandeman's camp at Nari and stayed with it for four days. On the 14th Zulkad=13th December, the Sahib intended to move to Dadur, but on Moolla Mahomed representing that he would have to wait for one day to enable him to have his horses shod, the Sahib stayed one day longer there, and from there he started Sirdar Imam Buksh Mazari off to Khelat. On the 15th Zulkad=14th December, the Sahib gave Sher Zaman Khan, Barozai Sirdar, a khillut, consisting of one lungi, one choga, and a thân of velvet, and sent him back to his own town. Moolla Mahomed wrote a letter to Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, Gohur Khan Zurakzai, and Jam Ally, son of the Jam of Beylah at Nal, Wud, that they were not to create any disturbances, but to come to him. The force (Captain Sandeman's camp) will move from there (Dadur) on the 16th, but I do not know in what direction he will move, or where he will halt until Sirdar Imam Buksh Mazari returns. I formerly asked you to give me information as to when the Commissioner in Sind would come to Jacobabad, but you did not reply to this. Kindly let me know so that I may pay my respects to him and to you.

No. 1021, dated Camp Jacobabad, 27th December 1875.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

2. This account confirms what has already been reported concerning Captain Sandeman's unseemly interference with affairs in which he had no business to engage.

3. The Government of India had directed that the Khan and his nobles were to be left to settle their affairs by, and of, themselves, and certainly unless Government was prepared to compel the Khan to carry into effect the agreements entered into on his behalf at Jacobabad in 1872, and to make him abide strictly by the treaty engagements he was bound to, this was the only course which could be followed with justice or any show of proper dignity. The Khan and Sirdars were accordingly left to themselves, and the latter were about to adopt their own plan of obtaining redress, when a young officer without any authority from the person in whose hands these political matters are confided, suddenly shows himself and proclaims himself the settler of all differences. A more unseemly proceeding the Commissioner has never heard of, and a more embarrassing one there could not possibly be, when character for political consistency and faithful adherence to decision publicly conveyed are regarded. This account further mentions Captain Sandeman's intention of proceeding above the passes. This may or may not be true, but the Commissioner's letter recalling Captain Sandeman should have reached that officer before he could carry into effect a measure even more gravely reprehensible than what he has already so improperly entered upon.

No. 15.

Translation of a letter from Sher Zaman Khan, Barozai Sirdar, to Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, dated 30th Zulkad = 19th December 1875.

It must be known to you that your letter which you wrote and by which I was honoured reached me, the contents of which were as follows:—You Sher Zaman Khan should, in the same way your forefathers did, restrain your followers from joining in any disturbances or cabals against his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and you should prevent their taking any part in the spoliation of the country belonging to his Highness the Khan, and the British Government will approve of such conduct on your part. By the receipt of this letter I was made happy and much honoured. It has been my good fortune that until now none of my people have ever joined with the Brahooees in any disturbances, nor have they ever done any harm to his Highness the Khan's country, and for the future I will prevent any one doing so. For ages past my ancestors have been on most friendly relations with the rulers of Khelat, and in future this good feeling will be strengthened.

Your second letter, together with a letter to the address of Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan, which was sent to me, and the contents of the one to me were as follows: That wherever Captain Sandeman may have marched to this letter is to be sent by your sowars to the Sahib, for it is emergent, and you must send a reply. When I received these two letters I found out that the Sahib had reached Quettah (Shawlkot), I at once got two of my own sowars ready, because no one else, through fear of the Summalanis and Dhoomurs, would go there. I arranged with these two sowars that they were each to receive ten rupees and started them off, and I hope that the above-mentioned Sahib would get your letter on the 19th December. When I receive the reply to your letter I will at once forward it to you by my own sowar; keep your heart comforted. The news of the Sahib is, that on the 9th December he came by the Lehree and Ghazee Pass to Doka on the Thullee River; next day the Sahib moved the Nari River. At that place he called Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and all the other Sarawan Sirdars to him, and the afore-mentioned Sirdar and all the others went and paid their respects to him. The following Belooch Sirdars are with Captain Sandeman:— The Mazari Dushuk, Laghari Kosah, Lund, Kulalh Sirdars, Meer Ula Khan, brother of Guzzun Khan, Murree Sirdar, and the other Murree Muccadums who live above Kahun, also the Ghorabain and Boogtee Sirdars. The Sahib halted here four nights, and then, with all the Brahooee Sirdars, moved to Dadur. Next day he sent Sirdars Imam Buksh Mazari, Jamal Khan Laghari, Rasal Buksh, nephew of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, and 70 or 80 horsemen to Khelat, to wait on his Highness the Khan, and invite him to visit Captain Sandeman, and he arranged to move to Mustung. He then dismissed all the Brahooees, with the exception of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and the other Sarawan Sirdars. His first march was to be Kirta, and he intended reaching Quettah on the third march. It is well known that the Sahib intends going straight, viâ Mustung, to Khelat. Whatever I hear I will let you know. There is no other news of any description, otherwise I would have written it to you. I am entirely your dependent. I do not look in any other direction. I am always under your orders and in your service. I am your servant waiting at your door for orders. Consider me as amongst your servants, and look on me with the favours of a King, because I am always exalted by this. Keep comforted. I am hopeful that I will not go one footstep beyond the orders of Government.

No. 1036, dated Camp Jacobabad, 29th December 1875.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

2. The Commissioner's orders recalling Captain Sandeman must have reached him before he could proceed on to Khelat. The Commissioner will not at present comment further on these indecent and unbecoming proceedings of Captain Sandeman.

No. [illegible]

Telegram, dated 1[illegible] January 1876.

From Captain Sandeman, Camp Shaul Kote, through Rajanpoor, to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

On entering Khelat territory received a most enthusiastic welcome from the Khelat Government, Chiefs, and people. Khan's officials informed me that orders from his Highness directed them to treat me with the same respect as shown to his Highness when on tour. The Khan, in reply to the petition of the Murree and Brahooee Chiefs for a peaceful solution of present difficulties, has written me to say he fully consents and will arrange this with me in person, and for the protection of the Bolan traffic. Letter states his Highness deeply regrets misunderstanding with British Government. I am en route to meet his Highness, accompanied by Murree and Brahooee Sirdars. I telegraph this direct, as I yesterday received letter from Colonel Loch, written by order of Sind Commissioner received by telegram. Loch directs me to return to Ghazee forthwith and to report having done so. My engagements with Khan and Murree Brahooee Sirdars do not admit of my attending to order. Doing so would in all likelihood involve the peace of the country; it is, in my opinion, opposed to the instructions contained in

Government Resolution of 16th October, and conflicts with orders of Punjab Government about opening Thull Chotialee route. Please telegraph final instructions to Commissioner, Colonel Loch, and myself. Special messenger will await reply. Message ends.

No. 17.

No. 30, dated 3rd January 1876.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to the Government of Punjab, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am desired to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of letter dated Camp Dadur, 15th December, from Captain R. G. Sandeman, reporting progress of the expedition he is now conducting under the orders conveyed in Foreign Department Resolution, No. 2819P., dated 16th October 1875.

Enclosure 1 in No. 17.

Dated Camp Dadur, 15th December 1875.

From Captain R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to the Government of Punjab.

It is with very great pleasure I am able again to write you to assure you of the complete success up to date which has attended the expedition I am conducting into these hills.

I passed through the heart of the Murree Hills to the Seebee Plain, where I arrived on the 8th instant, in perfect safety and without a contretemps of any kind occurring. I took the old kafila route from Hurrand to this. The route is perfectly open and easy, with plenty of wood and water at the different halting places, sufficient for a large force. The distance from Kahan to Seebee is 81 miles, and from the Punjab frontier line to Dadur it is 155 miles.

In selecting our line of march I chose the old kafila route from Hurrand to this. The road is not only easy for camels, but the country is quite open. The only difficulty there ever apparently was on this route was caused by a deep ravine which crosses it. This has been filled up, and the Murree Chiefs told me that the tradition in existence regarding this is that this was done by the order of one of the Khorassan Emperors when marching through the country en route to the invasion of India.

There is another route from Kahan, viâ Mondai, in the Murree country, to Bibi Nani. It also enters the Seebee Plain at Tallie. It was described to me as rather more difficult than the route we took, but more direct. I trust some day to inspect it.

Before concluding my remarks about the kafila routes it is well to tell you that the merchants of Dadur paid me a visit yesterday. I had a long talk with them, and they not only say that trade between this and the Punjab is an easy matter were the routes safe, but they stated they and the Bagh merchants still possess their forefathers' books, which prove not only what they say to be true, but that the trade that then existed was at one time very extensive and flourishing.

On debouching from the Murree Hills I was at once joined by Sirdars Moolla Mahomed of Sarawan, Shadi Khan Bungalzai, Junda Khan Shawani, Alla Dina Koord, the Khan of Seebee, and the Khujjak Chiefs.

On the 9th and 10th I held a conference with the Sirdars of the Murree, Boogtee, and Brahooee tribes. I associated with me selected Sirdars of our own districts.

The result of our conference was, that immediate steps were to be taken to prevent further plundering in his Highness the Khan's territory. Some camels were carried off lately from near Jacobabad, but in the Khan's territory, by Dhoombkees and Murrees, but these I will recover. It was tacitly admitted by all present that the Brahooee Sirdars had used the Kahan and Mondai Murrees, whose quarrel with the Khan was of the same nature as their own, to injure his Highness' Government, while on the other hand his Highness had, through his Naibs, employed the Bijarani Murrees to coerce the Sarawan Sirdar Moolla Mahomed. The assembled Chiefs of the Murrees, Boogtees, and Brahooee tribes came to me on the last evening of the conference (after it was over) and asked me to help them to make peace with his Highness. This I agreed to do, saying I would send their petition by the hands of two of my own Sirdars to his Highness.

It was absolutely necessary to take some step of this kind. Civil war all admitted was imminent, and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed told me that his Highness the Khan's eldest son had been prevented visiting Kutchee by Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, who was prepared to attack him did he attempt to march in this direction. The Khan of Seebee told me the same thing. Finding affairs so critical I selected Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan to take the petition to his Highness, telling them to tell him the true position of affairs in the country as above described, and that I was en route to the Bolan Pass to arrange for the protection of trade, &c. The Sarawan Sirdars sent off horsemen to tell Sirdar Noordeen that they and the Murree Sirdars were under agreement to me to do no harm in the country for the present, and that he was not to create a disturbance.

On the 10th I, accompanied by Captain Wylie and Dr. Thomson, and all the Punjab Sirdars, paid a friendly visit to the Khan of Seebee at New Seebee. I told the assembled Chiefs very briefly with what object I was in the country. On leaving, as the Khan had been of much use to me in various ways, supplying the expedition with grain, &c., I presented him and his nephew with a khillut each, together in value about Rupees 320. I arranged that on my onward journey his nephew was to accompany me to take a letter to the Governor of Candahar, asking if his Highness the Ameer had notified his intention in accordance with the Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor's letter to him (a copy of which you gave me), asking him to send an official of some influence to meet me.

On the morning of the 13th I marched from my camp in the Seebee Plain en route to Bibi Nani by the direct road. Bibi Nani is three marches above Dadur, and the road goes by it into the Bolan Pass. There is no necessity for one coming from the Punjab en route to Shaul Kot or Candahar to come first to Dadur.

I had accomplished nearly one-half of my first march when I suddenly saw in the distance a small body of horsemen. They were clearly reconnoitring us, I therefore went off after them. On coming up to them all dismounted and presented their nuzzurs of a few rupees. They were in a great fright, but turned out to be the "Jahnasheen" of Dadur and the Khan's Commandant of cavalry stationed here. We entered into conversation. They very earnestly desired that I would come to Dadur, as they had supplies prepared for me, and had mended the bridges and got ready an encamping ground for my force. They said his Highness the Khan would be only too happy when he heard of my visit; in fact, they simply entreated me to come, saying the country people were in great fear of the Brahooee and Murrees, and that my arrival would restore confidence to all. They made no attempt to conceal the very great relief to their fears my arrival in the country had brought to them. The Naib of Bagh sent me a letter to much the same effect. I at once made up my mind to come here, and issued orders to divert the march of my people from Bibi Nani to Dadur.

On my arrival at Dadur the Khan's artillery fired a salute. During the day I received most of the principal inhabitants. In the evening I visited the town. One and all assured me that what the Khan's officials stated was quite true. They said that they and the Khan's Government would do anything in their power to meet the wishes of the British Government. I was greatly moved by an old grey-bearded headman of the Mingul Brahooees of the Bolan Pass, who, when shaking hands with me on taking his leave lifted my hand to his mouth before I could stop him, and kissed it, blessing me at the same time.

I do believe that in the long run all will come right. I do not pretend that the task I am on is an easy one, but I see nothing in the state of the country to lead me to believe it to be an impossible one, nor is the Khan of Khelat the only one to blame for the distracted state of the country. That Sorab Khan, the Chief of the Dhoombkees of Kutchee, and the Sarawan Sirdars have been aiding the Murrees to plunder in Kutchee, I am in a position fully to prove. Here the Khan of Khelat has commenced to build a fort, and done all he could to protect the country. His officials have been most attentive, and yesterday evening I presented the "Jahnasheen" and the Commandant of Cavalry each with a small khillut as a return for their kindness and attention.

I have a large party with me, and am anxious about my expedition. I have the hire of 350 camels to pay, and altogether my expenses are between 300 and 400 rupees per diem. This does not include such "khilluts" as those given to the Seebee Chiefs, but I am doing all I can to keep my expenditure as small as possible.

P.S.—I have written this under considerable difficulties as Chiefs and the followers are continually visiting me to pay their respects.

No. 18.

Telegram, dated 3rd January 1876.

From Commissioner in Sind, Jacobabad, to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Captain Sandeman is stated to have returned to Dadur, but has not as yet acknowledged receipt of my orders. It is added he has invited the Khan to meet him, and the Khan has said he will do so. Unless he leaves at once for his own duties and districts the worst results must follow. His proceedings are directly opposed to the avowed policy of Government, are creating grave doubts and suspicions amongst all classes, and leading to unfounded hopes, which can only be most embarrassing in the future. If his Excellency the Viceroy desires any change in the policy ordered by him, I trust I may be informed of it. This unseemly interference of Captain Sandeman is, I would state, most unjustifiable and injurious to our name for good faith. It began at a moment when affairs were righting themselves, and this his action has prevented.

No. 19.

Telegram, dated 4th January 1876.

From Lieutenant-Governor, Lahore, to Viceroy, Calcutta.

With reference to recent correspondence and telegrams I think it would strengthen Captain Sandeman's hands and facilitate his task if he were gazetted Political Agent, and placed in direct subordination to the Government of India *qua* the special duty entrusted to him.

No. 20.

Telegram, No. 39P., dated 7th January 1876.

From Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to Commissioner in Sind, Jacobabad.

Your diaries and telegrams received. On the information now before him, Viceroy compelled to conclude you have not properly understood or carried into effect instructions of 16th October relative to Sandeman. You have not submitted to Government your instructions to him, but, from remarks on Diary No. 47 for 12th December, you appear to have placed restrictions on Sandeman not in accordance with letter or spirit of Resolution of 16th October. Nothing in Sandeman's proceedings, as reported by you, inconsistent with Resolution or in excess of powers thereby vested in him, or which warrants strong expressions of blame used in regard to him. During present tour Sandeman will now be under direct orders of Government of India, to whom he will submit his reports under flying seal, through you when possible, and in other cases keeping you acquainted with proceedings. Instructions will go to him from Government of India, copy being sent to you.

No. 21.

Telegram, No. 50P., dated 7th January 1876.

From Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to Captain Sandeman, Khelat, viâ Rajanpoor.

Yours of 1st from Shalkot through Rajanpoor. Act upon the instructions of Government Resolution, No. 2819P., dated 16th October, but take care not to exceed them or to interfere with questions between British Government and Khan. Exercise your own discretion as to your return to Punjab, but do not protract your stay in Khelat territory. Submit your reports to Government of India under flying seal, through Commissioner in Sind when possible, and in other cases keep him fully acquainted with your proceedings. You will take your instructions during your present tour from the Government of India.

No. 22.

No. 53P., dated Fort William, 7th January 1876.

From C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Col. Sir William Merewether, K.C.S.I., C.B., Commissioner in Sind.

I am directed by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council to acknowledge receipt of your letters and telegrams noted in the margin, and to convey to you the following remarks and instructions.

Khelat Diaries, Nos. 47 and 48, for weeks ending 12th and 19th.
Dockets, Nos. 1010, 1021, and 1036, dated 23rd, 27th, and 29th December.
Telegrams of 17th and 22nd December and 3rd Jan.

2. His Excellency in Council, upon the information now before him, is compelled to arrive at the conclusion that you have not properly understood or carried into effect the instructions contained in the Resolution of the Government of India, No. 2819P., of the 16th of October last, relative to the mission of Captain Sandeman. No copy of the instructions given by you to Captain Sandeman in consequence of that Resolution has been submitted by you for the information of Government. It is evident, however, from your remarks of the 17th of December, attached to Diary No. 47, that your instructions to Captain Sandeman placed restrictions upon that officer's proceedings which were not in accordance with the letter or spirit of the Resolution of the 16th of October.

3. His Excellency in Council can see nothing in the proceedings of Captain Sandeman as reported by you, or in a telegram from that officer of the 1st instant, a copy of which is enclosed, inconsistent with his instructions contained in the Resolution of the 16th of October, or in excess of the powers expressly vested in him by the Governor-General in Council by that Resolution, while your orders to Captain Sandeman to return to his district appear to be opposed to the policy and directions of his Excellency in Council as set forth in that Resolution.

4. Captain Sandeman seems to have found the country on the verge of a civil war, and his presence appears from the diaries to have prevented bloodshed up to the present time. Nothing in his conduct as known to the Government of India appears to warrant the strong expressions of blame which you have used in regard to him, notwithstanding the caution which the Viceroy directed me to convey to you in my telegram of the 20th of December.

5. Under these circumstances his Excellency in Council is reluctantly compelled, for the purpose of preventing further complications, to place Captain Sandeman while on his present tour under the direct orders of the Government of India, to whom he will submit his reports under flying seal, through you when it is possible, and in other cases keeping you fully acquainted with his proceedings.

6. In like manner he will receive his instructions direct from the Government of India, and you will be furnished with copies of them.

No. 54P.

Copy to Punjab Government for information.

No. 55P.

Copy to Captain Sandeman direct for information and guidance.

No. 23.

Telegram, dated 9th January 1876.

From Commissioner in Sind, Jacobabad, to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Yours of 7th received. I certainly did not understand that the duties confided to me were to be entered upon independently by comparative stranger to the country and people; that while I was carefully following policy ordered of non-interference, a junior officer of less experience and knowledge of subject should come in without reference to me, actively interfere and upset arrangements. Sandeman knew well my strong objection to his engaging in Khelat affairs and why, and should have addressed me before doing so. I fear some wrong information, unknown to me, has given Government of India wrong impression of state of affairs in Khelat. To adjust matters quickly interference must have been exerted for or against Khan. Government rejected this. Decision to wait patiently was about to be rewarded when Sandeman's appearance spoils all. On 16th December policy non-interference was approved; Sandeman was then directly meddling and, as will be proved in end, most mischievously initiating double policy. If interference was intended, I would respectfully urge it should have been by me who could point out best time and mode. My instructions to Sandeman have gone to you. I cannot too deeply deplore and feel acutely apparent loss of Viceroy's confidence your telegram of 7th conveys; trust to result for rectification.

No. 24.

Telegram No. 102P., dated 10th January 1876.

From Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to Commissioner in Sind, Jacobabad.

Your telegram of 9th and previous papers exhibit views and policy in regard to Khelat quite irreconcileable with those of the Government of India. Governor-General in Council has no other course left than to relieve you of responsibility for Khelat affairs. Colonel Monro will be ordered from Punjab to Jacobabad to take political charge. Colonel Loch will be relieved of all responsibility for affairs in Khelat, except his military duties. Remain at Jacobabad till Colonel Monro arrives, and meantime take no steps to commit Government in any way regarding Khelat affairs without previous reference to and approval of Government of India. All requisitions as regards military or police on entire Sind and Khelat frontier which Colonel Monro may make on Colonel Loch or yourself should be promptly complied with.

No. 25.

Telegram, No. 104P., dated 10th January 1876.

From Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to Lieutenant-Governor, Punjab, Camp Delhi.

Please direct Colonel Monro, Commissioner, Derajat, to proceed immediately to Jacobabad and take over from Sir William Merewether charge of our entire relations with Khelat. Commissioner of Sind is relieved of all responsibility for Khelat affairs, Colonel Loch also so relieved, except in respect of military duties. Both are instructed to comply with all requisitions in respect both to military and police on entire Sind and Khelat frontier which Colonel Monro may make on them.

Place before Colonel Monro at once the letter No. 16P., dated 5th January 1875, and the Resolution No. 2819P., dated 16th October 1875, and any other papers necessary to give clear view of Government policy in Khelat. Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan will hold same relation of subordination to Colonel Monro as he formerly did to Commissioner in Sind, and will submit reports through Colonel Monro.

Change now made is urgently called for owing to difference of view and policy pursued by Commissioner in Sind from that held by Government of India. Presence of Colonel Monro at Jacobabad most urgently required, and he should proceed there at once. He will receive usual deputation allowance, and all travelling expenses paid.

No. 26.

Telegram dated 11th January 1876.

From Commissioner in Sind, Jacobabad, to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Yours of 10th. I bow respectfully to the decision of Governor-General in Council, but I would beg to be allowed to express the extreme distress that decision has caused me, and, in justice to myself as well as others, would beg deferentially to observe that I have only endeavoured to carry out the policy confided to me of non-interference, not my own views, and Colonel Loch, acting under my instructions, has been accurately following this under considerable difficulties. Until yours of 7th, especially after that of 16th December, I believed this to be policy still, and therefore objected to Captain Sandeman's proceedings, pointed out how embarrassing they were, while the course of non-interference supposed to be required was being maintained by me. I have always endeavoured faithfully and truly to carry out orders and views of Government, and I cannot too deeply deplore my efforts and mode of management, after so many years of labour, have failed to procure approbation. As the administrative change proposed is such an extreme one, I would respectfully suggest it may be deferred until result of Captain Sandeman's tour be seen, orders regarding him being exactly observed.

No. 27.

No. 150P., dated Fort William, 13th January 1876.

From C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to the Government of Punjab.

In continuation of my telegram of the 10th January 1876 to his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, I am directed by the Governor-General in Council to forward a copy of the correspondence marginally noted on the subject of the affairs of Khelat and of the Murree and Boogtee tribes. Copies of other portions of the correspondence have already been sent to you.

Letter from Commissioner in Sind, No. 816, dated 21st October 1875.
" " " dated 29th October 1875.
Endorsement from Commissioner in Sind, No. 950, dated 8th December 1875.
Endorsement from Commissioner in Sind, No. 966, dated 13th December 1875.
Telegram from Commissioner in Sind, dated 22nd December 1875.
Khelat Diary No. 47.
" " 48.
Endorsement from Commissioner in Sind, No. 1010, dated 23rd December 1875.
Endorsement from Commissioner in Sind, No. 1021, dated 27th December 1875.
Endorsement from Commissioner in Sind, No. 1036, dated 29th December 1875.
Telegram from Captain Sandeman, dated 1st January 1876.
" Commissioner in Sind, dated 3rd January 1876.
" to " " No. 39P., dated 7th January 1876.
" from " " dated 9th January 1876.

2. It is with much regret that, owing to the irreconcileable difference of opinion which has been found to exist between the Government of India and Sir William Merewether on important questions of Imperial policy, his Excellency in Council has been constrained to relieve the Commissioner in Sind of responsibility connected with the affairs of Khelat, and to entrust the conduct of those affairs to another officer. There appeared to be no other course open by which it would be possible to ensure unity of political action on this portion of the Indian frontier.

3. Accordingly the Governor-General in Council directs that Colonel Monro, the Commissioner of the Derajat Division, be desired to proceed at once to Jacobabad and take over charge from Sir W. Merewether of the entire relations of the British Government with Khelat. The Commissioner in Sind has been relieved of all responsibility for Khelat affairs, and Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier, has been similarly relieved of all responsibility for affairs in Khelat, except in so far as his military duties are concerned. Both Sir W. Merewether and Colonel Loch have received orders to comply with such requisitions, in respect both to military and police arrangements on the entire Sind and Khelat frontier, as Colonel Monro may make on them.

4. I am to request that the Government of the Punjab will furnish Colonel Monro with copies of the orders of his Excellency in Council, No. 16P.C., dated 5th January 1875,

and of the Resolution of the Government of India, No. 2819P., dated 16th October 1875, with any other papers which may be necessary to give a clear view of the policy adopted by the Governor-General in Council in regard to the affairs of Khelat. Colonel Monro's attention should be particularly directed to paragraphs 22-30 of the Resolution of 16th October 1875, as containing the views of his Excellency in Council regarding the responsibilities of the British Government, as well as the instructions which Captain Sandeman is endeavouring to carry into effect.

5. If the measures now in progress should prove successful, and his Highness the Khan of Khelat should evince a sincere desire to co-operate with the Government of India in promoting security and order in his Highness' dominions, it will, as stated in paragraph 29 of the Resolution of October 1875, afford the Governor-General great pleasure, on receiving an expression of regret for the past, to restore the former subsidy and to renew those relations of cordiality and friendship which previously subsisted between the two Governments.

6. Colonel Monro having been entrusted with the control of Khelat affairs, it will be necessary that the Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan should hold the same relation of subordination, in respect to the management of the Murrees and Boogtees and other similar matters, to Colonel Monro as he formerly held to the Commissioner in Sind, and that Captain Sandeman's reports on the subject of those tribes and of Khelat should be submitted to the Government of India through Colonel Monro.

7. I am to add that Colonel Monro, while employed on this special duty at Jacobabad, will receive the usual deputation allowance, and all actual travelling expenses incurred by him during the same period will be paid by Government. The Lieutenant-Governor may proceed to make temporary arrangements for the conduct of Colonel Monro's duties as Commissioner of the Derajat Division.

No. 152P.

Copy to the Government of Bombay for information.

No. 28.

Telegram No. 143P., dated 13th January 1876.

From Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to Commissioner in Sind, Jacobabad.

Your telegram of 11th. Governor-General in Council cannot modify the orders already given.

No. 29.

No. 6 of 1876.

Government of India. Foreign Department. Political.

To the Most Hon. the Marquis of Salisbury, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Marquis, Fort William, 14th January 1876.

With reference to the Despatch from your Lordship, No. 91, dated 8th July 1875, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of correspondence* on the subject of Khelat and the Murree and Boogtee tribes.

2. In October last, as the time approached when Captain Sandeman, the Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan, had to proceed into Khelat territory in pursuance of orders previously given him, it became necessary for us to review the affairs of that country, and once more to set forth clearly in the light of recent events the policy which we desired should be adopted in Khelat, and the objects which Captain Sandeman should keep in view in his proceedings.

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* Nos. 1 to 28.

3. We invite attention to Resolution No. 2819P., dated 16th October 1875, which contains a narrative of events and the instructions issued by us. It will be seen from paragraphs 20 to 22 of that Resolution that we deemed it necessary to modify in one respect the decision we had come to on 5th January 1875, by distinguishing more clearly our duties and obligations in respect to raids committed within or near the British frontier, and raids committed by the nominal subjects of the Khan within the territories of Khelat. The Resolution of 16th October fully explains both the modification we made and the reasons for it, and we need not enlarge on the subject in this Despatch.

4. Our policy may be summed up as follows :—

First. That we should afford complete protection to the lives and property of our own subjects, and suppress outrages within the Sind and Punjab frontiers by force if necessary.

Second. That while we may reasonably expect our troops stationed in the Sind outposts to afford some protection to life and property in Khelat territory immediately adjoining the Upper Sind frontier as far as their power can reach, we should not accept responsibility for the protection of life and property in the territories of the Khan of Khelat.

Third. That our frontier officers should use their influence and good offices for the promotion of peace and order, and for the settlement of disputes, whether among the tribes of Khelat or between the tribes and the people of Seebee or the Government of the Khan.

5. In pursuance of the above policy Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan, was directed to proceed into the Murree Hills, in order (1) to procure all the information he could respecting local feuds and quarrels among the Murree and Boogtee tribes, or between them and the Afghans, or between them and the Brahoees; (2) to endeavour to settle amicably such quarrels; (3) to report on such quarrels as he might not be able to settle; and (4) to report on the general relations between the Murree and Boogtee tribes and the Khan's Government. Captain Sandeman was also to inquire and report whether anything could be done for the protection of trade viâ the Bolan, and whether a system of fixed tolls could not be arranged for, the proceeds of which would go to the tribes interested in the protection of the route; and in respect to all or any of these objects he was invested with discretion to make any arrangements he thought proper within the total sum sanctioned at the Mittunkote conference, viz., Rs. 66,960 a year.

6. Shortly after the Resolution of 16th October 1875 had been recorded we received Sir W. Merewether's report, No. 816, dated 21st October, and accompanying papers, which contained an unfavourable account of affairs in Khelat and of the Khan's conduct.

7. In his letter, dated 29th October 1875, the Commissioner in Sind acknowledged receipt of Resolution No. 2819P., dated 16th October 1875. He renewed his complaints of the conduct of the Khan of Khelat, and he remonstrated at length against the policy which we had deliberately adopted in respect to the Murrees, contending that measures should be taken to check and punish the tribe for their forays upon the Khan's territory in Kutchee, and recommending that he should be authorised to protect that province by an armed force. We have not thought it necessary to issue any special orders on these communications, and we have not been induced by a consideration of them to deviate from the policy in respect to Khelat which we had already adopted, after mature deliberation, and after consideration of the views and arguments previously advanced by the Commissioner in Sind.

8. We next learned from the communications noted on the margin that a revolution was believed to be imminent in Khelat, the chief actors in the conspiracy being Noordeen, the Chief of the Minguls, in the south, and in the north Moolla Mahomed Raisani, the Sarawan Sirdar, who has for some time resided in exile at Seebee, and the object of the movement being to depose the Khan in favour of his son, Meer Muhammad Khan. By telegram, No. 3309P., dated 16th December 1875, the Commissioner in Sind was informed that his proposed policy of abstention from interference in the apprehended rebellion was approved.

Telegram from Commissioner in Sind, dated 13th December 1875.
Endorsement from Commissioner in Sind, No. 950, dated 8th December 1875.
Endorsement from Commissioner in Sind, No. 966, dated 13th December 1875.
Khelat Diary, No. 48, for the week ending 19th December 1875.

9. Meanwhile Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan, had penetrated into the Murree Hills, and thence to Seebee and Dadur. Captain Sandeman's

own account of his proceedings will be found in the enclosure of the letter from the Government of the Punjab, No. 30, dated 3rd January 1876, and in his telegram despatched from Rajanpoor on 1st January, with which may be compared the information received from Sind, and contained in the papers named on the margin. Captain Sandeman appears to have met with considerable success so far in his expedition. He took with him representatives of the Murree tribe, collected them and the Brahoee Sirdars together, prevailed upon them and Moolla Mahomed Raisani to uspend their quarrels and their threatened action against the Khan, and finally opened up communication with his Highness himself, in the hope of inducing the Khan to co-operate in the adjustment of those inter-tribal differences which are believed to lie at the root of the disturbances in his Highness' territory. In acting thus Captain Sandeman has proceeded, so far as we can judge, in conformity with the letter and spirit of our instructions as conveyed in the Resolution of 16th October 1875, and summarised in the 4th paragraph of this Despatch.

Khelat Diary, No. 47.
" " " 48.
Endorsement from Commissioner in Sind, No. 1010, dated 23rd December 1875.
Endorsement from Commissioner in Sind, No. 1021, dated 27th December 1875.
Endorsement from Commissioner in Sind, No. 1036, dated 29th December 1875.

10. Sir William Merewether, however, has adopted a different view. On the 17th December he telegraphed that Captain Sandeman was stated to have visited Seebee and Dadur and communicated with the Brahoee Sirdars, that such proceedings were directly contrary to the Commissioner's orders, objectionable, and embarrassing, and that Captain Sandeman had been ordered by express to return at once to his district. The orders on this communication were conveyed by the Foreign Secretary's telegram No. 3,343P. of 20th December 1875, in which Sir W. Merewether was requested, while directing Captain Sandeman to avoid interference in the troubles apparently impending between the Khan and his subjects, to be careful not to interfere with Captain Sandeman's execution of the orders he had received from the Government of India, and particularly not to be hasty in condemning Captain Sandeman's conduct before he had explained it. It was added that Captain Sandeman's movements among the Murrees should not be interfered with.

11. The rejoinder from the Commissioner in Sind to the orders quoted in the foregoing paragraph will be found in his telegram of 22nd December. He therein erroneously asserted that Captain Sandeman's action was directly contrary to the policy laid down by the Government of India, in having not only visited Seebee and Dadur and held communication with the Brahoee Sirdars, but also in having sent messengers and letters to the Khan of Khelat, and in having entered the Bolan Pass accompanied by the Sirdars. Sir William Merewether added that the whole of this action was directly contrary to the instructions given to Captain Sandeman by the Commissioner, with many other expressions of strong disapprobation; and the Government of India were finally exhorted to keep Captain Sandeman to Dehra Ghazee Khan and his own legitimate duties.

12. Similar sentiments, showing that the Commissioner in Sind persists in regarding Captain Sandeman's efforts to adjust the quarrels between the tribes, the Brahoee Sirdars, and the Khan as meddlesome and embarrassing interference in the political affairs of Khelat are recorded in the papers marginally noted. In his remarks on Khelat Diary, No. 47, the Commissioner charges Captain Sandeman with disregarding instructions by which the Commissioner had ordered him on no account to go beyond the hills into Seebee or Kutchee, or to have any communication direct with the Brahoee Sirdars. We have received no copy of the instructions referred to; but if they were to the effect stated by the Commissioner, they were not in accordance with the wishes and orders of the Government of India as explained in the Resolution of 16th October 1875, under which Captain Sandeman was deliberately invested by the Government of India with discretion to make any arrangements he considered advisable without the necessity of previous reference to the Commissioner in Sind. The other papers mentioned on the margin abound in strong expressions of dissatisfaction which it is unnecessary to detail, for they are in fact attributable to a radical difference of opinion between the Government of India and Sir William Merewether. We, on the one hand, are anxious that the Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan should use every effort with the Khan, the Brahoee Sirdars, and the Murrees, to settle existing disputes. The Commissioner,

Endorsement from Commissioner in Sind, No. 983, dated 17th December 1875.
Endorsement from Commissioner in Sind, No. 1,005, dated 22nd December 1875.
Endorsement from Commissioner in Sind, No. 1,021, dated 27th December 1875.
Telegram from Commissioner in Sind, dated 3rd January 1876.

on the other hand, would maintain peace in Kutchee by force of arms, and confine Captain Sandeman's action to the Murree and Boogtee Hills, and would debar him from that communication with the Government of Khelat, the people of Seebee, and the Brahoees which was contemplated by our instructions of 16th October 1875, and which we consider indispensable for the purpose in view.

13. Matters having reached this stage we found ourselves compelled to choose one of two courses, either to discountenance and recall the officer, who was acting in accordance with our policy and who appeared to be deserving of our support, and to uphold the Commissioner in Sind, from whose opinions on the subject of the action to be adopted in Khelat we have had frequent occasion to dissent, or to place Captain Sandeman while entrusted with the conduct of these special duties under our direct orders and control. It appeared useless to attempt further discussion of the question of policy with the Commissioner in Sind, who was already in full possession of our views. It would have been in expedient and even dangerous to have allowed the present complication to continue and to have endeavoured to work out a scheme of action by means of two agents at variance with one another, and one of whom had entirely misapprehended our intentions. In coming to a conclusion we were aided by the telegram from the Government of the Punjab of the 4th January, in which the Lieutenant-Governor suggested that it would strengthen Captain Sandeman's hands and facilitate his task if he were placed in direct subordination to the Government of India so far as the special duty entrusted to him was concerned.

14. Accordingly, on the 7th January 1876, we caused to be issued the orders noted on the margin. We pointed out to the Commissioner in Sind that he appeared to have not properly understood or carried into effect the instructions of the 16th October 1875, that the restrictions which he seemed to have placed on Captain Sandeman's movements were not in accordance with the letter or spirit of those instructions, that Captain Sandeman's proceedings as reported were not inconsistent with the instructions given him or in excess of his powers, that the Commissioner's orders directing Captain Sandeman to return to Dehra Ghazee Khan appeared to be opposed to our policy and directions, that there was nothing in Captain Sandeman's conduct as known to the Government of India which would seem to warrant the strong expressions of blame which had been used by the Commissioner in regard to him, and that with the view of preventing further complications we had been reluctantly compelled to place Captain Sandeman, while on his present tour, under the direct orders of the Government of India.

Telegram to Commissioner in Sind, No. 39P., dated 7th January 1876.
Telegram to Captain Sandeman, No. 50P., dated 7th January 1876.
Letter to Commissioner in Sind, No. 53P., dated 7th January 1876.

15. Captain Sandeman at the same time received orders to act upon the instructions of Resolution No. 2819P., dated 16th October 1875, but to be careful not to exceed them, or to interfere with questions between the British Government and the Khan of Khelat. He was directed to exercise his own discretion as to his return to the Punjab, but not to protract his stay in Khelat territory. It was further ordered that his reports should henceforth be addressed to the Government of India and sent under flying seal through the Commissioner in Sind, and he was told that he would receive instructions direct from us during his present tour, proper steps being taken to keep the Commissioner in Sind regularly informed.

16. After arrangements had been concluded as above described, we received a further telegram* from the Commissioner in Sind showing clearly that Sir W. Merewether was unable to accept our views, and that he persisted in disapproving of Captain Sandeman's proceedings, notwithstanding the intimation conveyed to him that those proceedings were not inconsistent with Captain Sandeman's instructions or in excess of the powers conferred upon him by us.

* Despatched on 9th January 1876.

17. In regard to the remonstrances of Sir W. Merewether, we need only remark that Captain Sandeman was not sent to Khelat territory without reference to the Commissioner in Sind; he was not made independent of the Commissioner until the Commissioner himself forced Government to the step; he has not been instructed to interfere in the revolution which was said to be impending, but, on the contrary, he has been instructed not to interfere; the instructions of the Government of India that good offices should be used by Captain Sandeman in the quarrels which he is now attempting to settle had been before the Commissioner in Sind since October last; and, generally, there is no justification, so far as we can see, for the terms in which Sir W. Merewether has telegraphed.

18. This telegram, however, afforded fresh evidence that there was no longer any hope of receiving from the Commissioner in Sind such full and hearty co-operation as we deemed to be indispensable for the furtherance of our efforts to bring about a better condition of things in Khelat. We were not prepared to abandon the policy which had been deliberately adopted after personal consultation with Sir William Merewether and full consideration of the arguments urged by him, and we were therefore constrained to take the only alternative remaining, to act upon the instructions conveyed at the close of paragraph 4 of your Lordship's Despatch No. 91, dated 8th July 1875, and to remove from the conduct of our affairs in Khelat the agent whose opinions have been found to be irreconcileable with our own.

19. The orders finally issued by us are contained in the telegrams to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and the Commissioner in Sind despatched on the 10th January 1876, and in our letter, No. 150P, dated 13th January 1876, to the Government of the Punjab. Sir William Merewether has been relieved of all responsibility for Khelat affairs, which will henceforth be conducted by Colonel Monro, Commissioner of the Derajat Division. Colonel Loch has also been relieved of all similar responsibility, except in so far as his military duties are concerned. Both Sir William Merewether and Colonel Loch are to comply with all requisitions in respect both to military and police arrangements on the entire Sind and Khelat frontier which Colonel Monro may make on them. Colonel Monro has been ordered urgently to proceed to Jacobabad, and Captain Sandeman will hold the same relation of subordination to Colonel Monro as he formerly did to the Commissioner in Sind, and will submit reports to us through Colonel Monro.

20. It is scarcely necessary for us to assure your Lordship that these measures have only been taken after anxious deliberation and in the full conviction that they were absolutely necessary for the purpose of ensuring unity of policy in the Government of this most important section of our frontier. Indeed it appears to us that the time has now come for taking into consideration the changes to which your Lordship referred in paragraph 6 of your Despatch No. 91, dated 8th July 1875, and on this subject we propose to take an early opportunity of expressing our views.

21. We trust that our action will be supported by the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

We have, &c.
(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
W. MUIR.
E. C. BAYLEY.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.

No. 30.

Translation of a news-letter received at Jacobabad, 28th December 1875.

You should know that the news here is as follows:—Captain Sandeman came by the Lehri and Gazie Pass into the plains, and he sent Fateh Khan, brother of Karam Khan Bijerani, on ahead to Sirdars Sher Zaman Khan and Moolla Mahomed on the 9th instant, to give them news of his coming, and the following day the Sahib himself arrived by the Thulli road at Doka. Both the Sirdars went and met him. The next day Captain Sandeman marched to Nari, and he called all the Sarawan Sirdars to visit him there. All of them, with their own followers, went there. The Sahib gave Sher Zaman a daily subsistence of 40 rupees for himself and his followers; to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed he allowed Rupees 200 per diem for himself, the other Sarawan Sirdars and their followers; and on the following day the Sahib called all the Sirdars and their followers to make their salaams to him, and he made a searching inquiry into the causes of the present differences and troubles between his Highness the Khan and the Sarawans and Jalawans. The afore-named Sirdar (Moolla Mahomed) explained all fully to the Sahib, who then directed Sirdar Moolla Mahomed to send his sowars to Noorden, Gohur Khan, and Jam Ali, son of Jam Mir Khan, with letters to them, telling them

that for the future they would not attempt to create a rebellion, that he, the Sahib, would make peace between his Highness the Khan and the Sirdars. The Sirdar Moolla Mahomed sent Ali Murad, son of Ittabar Girani, with three sowars to Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, Gohur Khan Zurukzai, Jam Ali, and Azaad Khan Nowsherwani, and wrote a letter to them, the contents of which were—" Give up all intention of now creating a " rebellion, lest reproach shall fall on us. Should his Highness create any disturbances " for which we might be rebuked, then they will be of his creating. After this the Sahib sent Nubbee Buksh and Izmut Khan Raisanis to Khelat with a letter to the address of his Highness to the following effect: " I have been " appointed by the British Government in England to " make a settlement of the disputes and disagreements " between your Highness and your nobles, and to make " proper arrangements for the protection of the Bolan " route, and I have arrived in Kutchi, having come march by march. I have assembled " Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and all the other Sirdars, and have ordered them to desist from " attempting to create any disturbances, and I am coming with these Sirdars to meet " your Highness to arrange for a termination of your quarrels on both sides. Your High- " ness should therefore desist from making any attacks on the Brahooees." The Sahib gave these sowars forty rupees for road expenses and started them off. The following day the Sahib told Sirdar Sher Zaman Khan that he wished to see the town of Kurk to-morrow, so next day the Sahib with Sher Zaman Khan and Moolla Mahomed visited Kurk, but previous to their arrival Sher Zaman Khan had sent orders to his people to have his reception-room properly arranged with carpets, &c. The Sahib rode through the town and then alighted at Sher Zaman's house and stayed there for about an hour. He gave Sher Zaman Khan a great deal of encouragement, and requested him to send for the son of Ikhtyar Khan (a child of about four years old) as he was anxious to see him. The boy was accordingly brought, and the Sahib presented him with 400 rupees, the Sahib then mounted his horse and returned to his own camp. The Sahib after this told Sher Zaman Khan that he wished to send his brother, Mir Muhammad Khan to Candahar, because the English Government have requested his Highness the Ameer to send certain trustworthy persons to meet him. When these (*wakils*) agents arrive, they will join the Sahib's camp, and remain with him to assist him in settling the disputes and differences between his Highness and his Sirdars. This the Sahib gave as his reason for wishing to send Sher Zaman Khan's brother to Candahar, because possibly the persons appointed to this duty may delay on the road. Sher Zaman replied that he would first consult with his people and then give a reply. Sher Zaman then assembled all his people and explained the matter fully to them, that the Sahib was very desirous of sending his brother to Candahar, but that he himself was opposed to it, because he considered himself a dependent and follower of Sir W. Merewether and Colonel Loch, and possibly these officers hearing about his brother going to Candahar might be annoyed; if he, Sher Zaman, objects to send his brother, the Sahib will not listen to it, as he says the duty to be performed is most important; now what advice do you give me? The people all replied without doubt it is as you represent, but our honour is involved in Moolla Mahomed's affairs (grievances) being settled; if you do not send your brother the Sirdar (Moolla Mahomed) will be angered, and the Sahib will be displeased. Place your faith in God, and the Sahibs will not be annoyed at your agreeing or disagreeing. After this Sirdar Sher Zaman desired his brother to get ready to go with two sowars to Candahar. The Sahib told Sher Zaman then to accompany him to Dadar. Four days the Sahib halted near here, and on the fifth day he moved to Dadar. When he reached Dadar he sent for Sher Zaman Khan to his tent and presented him with a choga, a loongee, and a roll of velvet, also Rupees 200 in ready cash, and then gave him his leave, and he promised to give Mir Muhammad Khan Rupees 500 for road expenses, and comforted Sher Zaman by telling him that he would take care of his brother; Sirdar Sher Zaman Khan then returned to his own country. The Sahib remained two days in Dadar, and before leaving he sent Sirdars Imam Buksh Mazari, Jamal Khan Laghari, Russool Buksh, nephew of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, and 70 or 80 horsemen, to Khelat for the purpose of inviting his Highness the Khan to meet him, and he made arrangements with the afore-mentioned Sirdars that they were to rejoin him at Mustung, where he hoped to meet his Highness. He then dismissed all the Brahooees with the exception of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and 200 sowars. The first march the Sahib made after this was to Kirta, and he gave out publicly that he was going, viâ Quettah and Mustung, direct to Khelat. It will be seen, with God's assistance, what will happen in the future.

The letter, if such has been written, to the Khan of Khelat by Captain Sandeman, has been called for from that officer, and will show whether the statement of the contents as here given is correct or not.—W. L. M.

The following Belooch are with the Sahibs:—The Mazaris, Lagharis, Dushucks, Kosahs, Lunds, Kolalhs, Ghorchanis; the son of Sirdar Ghulam Murteza Boogtee, Mirula Khan, the brother of Guzzun Khan Murree, Sirdar Karam Khan Bijarani, and other Murree Muccadams, residents of Kohan, Kadar Khan Khetran, and the son of Badal Khan. When the Sahib arrived at the Nari River he sent a sowar to call the Murrees who live low down (Kot Mandai)—these are Wuderah Sobdar, Sheran, Ali Muhammad Baktier Dhusu, but they all only arrived in Mishk after the Sahib had left for Dadar; they therefore returned each to his own home. To-day, the 22nd, two Murrees who came to Kurk from the Sahib's Camp at Kuruk, near Bibinani, on the Sahib's business, and put up at Sher Zaman Khan's, stated that when the Sahib reached Kuruk, the Naib of Mustung, Faiz Muhammad, with 300 sowars, arrived there, and at once came and salaamed to the Sahib. The Sahib questioned the Naib regarding his Highness, and asked when his Highness heard of the Sahib's arrival, whether his Highness would come to Mustung or not. The Naib replied: I have received orders to collect supplies in the town of Mastung. I am hopeful that his Highness will come. If you make any request, or give any directions to his Highness, he will not make any excuses to evade them. The Sahib then said: I intend first to go to Quettah; should his Highness come it will be well; if not, I must go to Khelat. The Sahib's baggage camels are very much done up, and he told Mirula Khan to take two of his own Murree sowars and two Mazari sowars and take the tired camels back to Dadar, and Mir Bola Khan ordered us two on this duty; we were then to come and remain with Sirdar Sher Zaman Khan. Mirula Khan said that when he reached Mustung he will write all that has occurred and send the letter to us, and that we will have to convey it to Sirdar Guzzun Khan. Naib Faiz Muhammad is to reach Dadar on the 23rd of this month.

Whatever I hear in the future I will write.

No. 5, dated Camp Jacobabad, 4th January 1876.
Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information, in continuation of correspondence ending with this Office endorsement No. 1036, dated the 29th December 1875.

2. This letter gives more details of Captain Sandeman's extraordinary conduct. The Barozai Sirdar of Kurk, Sher Zaman Khan, was naturally nonplussed at finding a new person entering the scene without any credentials from those authorities whom alone Sirdar Sher Zaman Khan and all others looked to.

No. 31.

No. 13, dated Camp Jacobabad, 7th January 1876.

From Colonel Sir W. Merewether, K.C.S.I. & C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Not having been favoured prior to my departure from Bombay on the 19th November with any further instructions on my letter of the 29th October last, I wrote on the 21st of November the following directions to Captain Sandeman for his guidance in carrying out the orders of Government as given in Government Resolution No. 2819P., dated 16th October. They were that in reference to the above Government Resolution—

"I have the honour to request that you will proceed into the Murree Hills and endeavour, "as far as you can there, to carry out the instructions conveyed in paragraphs 26 and 27 "of that Resolution, viz., that you will obtain all the information you can submitting it "to me respecting the local feuds and quarrels among the Murree and Boogtee tribes, or "between them and the Afghans, or between them and the Brahooes. You may possibly "be able to amicably adjust for a time some of the quarrels between the Murrees and "Boogtees, and perhaps with the Afghans; but any feuds that may be supposed or may "be stated to exist between the Murrees or Boogtees and Brahooee tribes should be first "fully and thoroughly reported to me before any action is attempted as regards the Brahooee "side of the question; and all reports on these subjects should be forwarded to me "through the Political Superintendent on the Frontier of Upper Sind, that I may be in "possession of his opinion on any points brought forward by you relating to the Brahooee "tribes or Belooch residents in Kutchi, those tribes belonging to his political charge."

"2. Your report on the general relations between the Murree and Boogtee tribes, and the Khan's Government as viewed from the Murree and Boogtee side, I shall be glad to receive through the same channel. I do not propose deputing an officer from Sind to be associated with you."

"3. The report called for in the 27th paragraph should also be submitted through the "Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind, but no arrangements should be entered "into with any of the tribes to the westward of the Murree and Boogtee countries, until I "have had an opportunity of judging on the nature of your proposals. I am now about "to proceed to the frontier, and shall be at Kashmore about the 20th December. By that "time you will, in all probability, be in possession of all the information you will be able "to obtain in the hills, and I should desire to confer with you personally on what further "course it will then seem advisable to me that I should recommend for the consideration "of Government. I should therefore wish that you could arrange to meet me there, either "on the 20th or at the end of December." The above was written at sea, but before its despatch from Kurrachee on the 25th instant intimation was received of Captain Sandeman's having started for the hills, and the following postscript was added: "Your telegram "announcing your departure for the hills was shown me on my return here. Your so "proceeding is approved, and you will be good enough to follow the instructions now "forwarded in this letter."

2. In drawing up these instructions I was guided by the state of affairs politically as existing between the Government of India and that of Khelat, which was that owing to the failure of the Khan to comply with certain demands made upon him by the British Government, and to his disregard of treaty engagements, no further communications were to be held with him until such time as he came to a better sense of what was required of him as a friendly ally of the British Government. He also having failed to act up to the engagements made in his behalf in 1872 for the purpose of effecting reconciliation between himself and his discontented barons, he was to be left alone to settle the differences with them as he could, and they were to follow their own plan of readjustment, without interference of any sort from this side of the border, provided that any disturbances that might take place between the contending parties should not interfere with the peace and safety of the British possession. In fact there was to be a total withdrawal of all connection with the political affairs of the State of Khelat.

3. I was the more particular also in enjoining on Captain Sandeman careful abstinence from all interference in the affairs of the Khelat State, because I was well aware of the existence for some time past of a most unbecoming desire on his part to mix himself up in them. I say unbecoming, because it was manifestly most unsuitable that an officer who held the position Captain Sandeman did should engage in matters having no connection with the charge he held, and in which he should have no concern. He was far removed from the locality and circumstances he essayed to enter upon; he had had no practical experience of what had taken place previously, and for any little he supposed he knew he had to take it on trust from hearsay and from the vague information given by people about him who were necessarily very little better informed than himself, as the political relations with Khelat were in the hands of the Sind authorities, and Captain Sandeman was serving under a different local Government—that of the Punjab—it was also almost undesirable that he should enter on the scene acting separately and differently, and so making it appear that the Government of India had two views and two modes of management. This is most dangerous and improper action under any circumstances, but more especially so with Asiatics, they being unfortunately too prone to follow such crooked courses and ever ready to take advantage of them. To uphold the good faith and consistency of Government therefore, it would not be fitting that an outsider, like Captain Sandeman, should intrude and engage in duties which belong especially to others. I regret exceedingly that, as I shall presently have to show, my anticipations have been only too truly borne out as to the probability of Captain Sandeman being led away by undue assumption to commit a grave breach of official decorum, as well as to seriously complicate affairs, just, too, as they were about to right themselves.

4. Captain Sandeman has been credited with the possession of much valuable influence over the wild tribes on the border, and certainly, as far as the Punjab frontier was concerned, he had been able to induce the Murree and Boogtee tribes to abstain from the predatory inroads they formerly so frequently indulged in. It was understood that he believed himself capable of extending that influence and of making the Murree tribe behave as well in the direction of the Khelat province of Kutchi as they had been doing towards the Punjab, provided certain means in the shape of money were placed

at his disposal. In accordance with the wishes of his Excellency the Viceroy, I accepted the services of Captain Sandeman for the above purpose, but for that purpose only, and the means were afforded him. Instead of confining himself to that task, or even fairly attempting to enter upon it, he has allowed the Murree to do very much what they liked towards Kutchi, and their conduct during the past year has in consequence been worse than I have ever known it in all my experience on this frontier, accompanied by an amount of insolent defiant bravado, which cannot but tell most injuriously against the reputation for power of a Government up to whose very gates they ride and plunder with impunity, and this when measures had been publicly sanctioned to prevent this very thing.

5. In place of attending to his legitimate duties Captain Sandeman has not ceased to endeavour to get beyond them, and engage in those with which he has no proper reason to deal. And now, without reference to me or the Political Officer in charge of Khelat relations, he has deliberately entered upon the political affairs of that State, matters quite beyond his sphere of duty. He has done this, too, in spite of his being perfectly well aware that such procedure was directly opposed to all I had repeatedly inculcated on him in regard to his avocations under me. He has acted therefore in direct opposition to my known orders, and a more grave breach of official decorum and deliberate insubordination could not possibly be.

6. To return to the letter of instructions, several copies were despatched by the Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind, through whom they were forwarded, to ensure their reaching Captain Sandeman. One sent to the Boogtee Sirdar was received by him, and passed on immediately to one of Captain Sandeman's postal chowkees in the hills on the 10th December, and should have been in Captain Sandeman's hands a day or two later, but there has as yet been no acknowledgment of its receipt.

7. I first heard on the 2nd December from the Political Superintendent of Captain Sandeman's intention to enter Kutchi, but hoped my letter of instructions would reach in time to prevent his taking such a step. At any time such an act on his part would have been highly reprehensible, but just then it was still more necessary it should not occur, for these well-founded rumours that the Brahooee Sirdars, stimulated by Noordeen Mingul, as well as smarting under recent impolitic acts of their ruler and his officials, had at last determined on combined action against the Khan of Khelat, and there was every expectation that the differences between the Khan and the Sirdars were about to be settled by themselves after their own fashion. Their proposed plan was to depose the present ruler, and put up his son in his stead, and as they had succeeded in gaining over a portion of the regular troops, the revolt would most likely have been a successful one, and would have been the most suitable solution of present difficulties. It was what was being quietly awaited, and was the only means left, direct interference having been disapproved by Government, of obtaining a likely opening for the restoration of peace and order in the Khelat State, and a satisfactory renewal of the friendly relations which it is so desirable to have with that State.

8. On the 13th December, two days after my arrival at Sukkur, I received the account forwarded to Government under my endorsement No. 966 of that date, giving details of the plot as furnished by Sher Zaman Khan, Barozai Sirdar, and written by him on the 2nd December. On receipt of this intelligence I sent information of it to Captain Sandeman, supposed then to be still in the Murree Hills, directing him to be careful to avoid all communication with the Sirdars, &c., and abstinence from interference was enjoined on all. The same was telegraphed to you, and the reply received was "policy of non-interference approved."

9. About this very time Captain Sandeman has since stated he left the hills on the 10th December. When the approved policy of non-interference was being strictly observed, Captain Sandeman comes unauthorizedly forward, accompanied by British troops and a host of Belooch of sorts, enters the plain of Kutchi, tells the Sirdars and everybody he has arrived to arrange all differences and set everything to rights. Despatches letters to Noordeen Mingul and other Sirdars in Jalawan, directing them to suspend their revolutionary projects, and finally sends to the Khan of Khelat proposing to have an interview with him. This last was especially improper, for he must have been well aware all relations with that Sovereign had been broken off, and the orders of Government were that until certain demands by them were complied with, no communications were to be held with him. It is stated in one of the reports received that Captain Sandeman had given out that he was acting under instructions from the great Government at home ("Wilayut"), but I can scarcely credit this, while it is an unlikely thing for any

one to invent. He is also reported to have taken men of the Sirdars' clans into service, if true a most impolitic measure at the present time.

10. All these strange proceedings on the part of Captain Sandeman have created extreme excitement amongst all classes, and will cause more. Expectations will be raised which will be most difficult, if not impossible, to meet. The Khan will think that all he has wrongly done during the past few years is about to be condoned, that he may go on defying our resentment and evading his obligations as much as he pleases, and that the intimation of the displeasure of the British Government, and withdrawal or continuance of its favourable countenance, are of no consequence, to be paid no attention to. That he may continue to ignore the rights of the Sirdars and subjects of his country, and to allow disorder and misrule to prevail throughout his dominions. The Sirdars will believe that their cause is to be taken up, their claims against the Khan enforced, their grievances righted, and a guarantee given that the Khan shall only act as they please in future. It is surely unnecessary to enlarge on this to show how extremely embarrassing such proceedings as those of Captain Sandeman are, how utterly impossible it is to carry out the views of Government, deliberately decided on, when such unauthorized and indiscreet interference takes place, and how undignified and inconsistent a position it places the Government in.

11. Immediately that I heard of Captain Sandeman having entered Kutchi, I instructed the Political Superintendent on the Frontier Upper Sind to convey my orders to the former as given in the following telegram : " Send express to Captain Sandeman, wherever " he may be, and direct him to at once return to his districts ; report his arrival there to " me, and explain why he has disobeyed my express orders not to visit Seebee or Kutchi, " or communicate with Brahooee Sirdars." This was despatched from Shikarpoor on the 17th December, and forwarded on the same day by Colonel Loch from Jacobabad, entrusted to special messengers. When these orders reached Captain Sandeman does not appear, but letters received here on the 3rd and 5th instant from that officer, acknowledging the receipt of my orders of the 13th and 17th December respectively, are dated 22nd and 25th idem from Shalkote, Quettah, copies annexed, Appendices A and A1. The tone of these letters I cannot too strongly condemn, especially the 2nd paragraph of that of the 22nd. The whole of both letters, however, are, I consider, highly unbecoming an officer filling the position Captain Sandeman does, and have an air of deliberate insubordination which is not only gravely improper, but quite incompatible with a decent regard for the public interests, showing plainly as they do that development of his personal views were the first consideration with him. There is nothing whatever in the Government Resolution he quotes which could justify the action he has taken, and when my invariable instructions to him to keep entirely aloof from connexion with Khelat State affairs are considered, his attempting to show that he believed he was doing what could be justified only makes his conduct appear in a worse light.

12. Until the receipt of further information it is difficult to say what mischief he has done, how far he has committed himself, or what measures had best be adopted to remedy what has occurred. But, with a view of saving as much ill as possible, I have again repeated to him my orders that he should return to his own districts in the Punjab, where I beg he may be kept strictly in future. This is not the first occasion on which I have had to notice Captain Sandeman's disregard of true subordination, and I must request to be relieved from the embarrassments caused by so impracticable an officer. He was placed under me solely to control the Murrees and Boogtees, and as he cannot do that I have no need whatever for his services. I have desired him, copy of letter attached, Appendix B, to submit such explanation as he has to offer for his late extraordinary conduct, and on receipt it will be duly submitted for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy.

13. In former correspondence I several times endeavoured to show that it was a grave mistake to depend too much on the personal influence it was stated Captain Sandeman had with the Hill tribes. I then pointed out the basis on which that influence, as far as it went, was formed, and that its continuance depended more on the pleasure and caprice of the Murrees than on any soundness of principle in the system itself. The Murrees, very readily and naturally, chimed in with the wishes of the Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan, and were his most obedient servants, ever anxious to please as long as they gained advantages from him, and no control over them was attempted in respect to other parts of the country. In fact, by keeping in with the authorities in the Punjab frontier, they had everything to gain and nothing to lose. It did not require much discrimination on their part to appreciate these benefits, and behave accordingly. But to believe that there are any germs of finality, or of even tolerable continuance, in such a

system is only to lay up material for future disappointment, if not grave disaster. I should not be doing my duty if I did not take this opportunity of placing on record my opinion in the strongest terms possible, that dependence in such a system is utterly fallacious, and the sooner it is abandoned for ever the better for our credit and renown, and for the peace of the whole frontier. I have no hesitation in saying that our name for justice and vigour has suffered, and is suffering greatly from the ill-proportioned petting the Murree tribe has had extended to it, and the impunity they have enjoyed for the outrageous acts they have committed, and which have been largely on the increase since they have been more favoured. The other wild tribes cannot understand this, and are rapidly beginning to look upon it, that disorder and violence are more paying things to follow than peace and propriety of demeanour.

14. The anomalous state of affairs of the Murrees being in high favour on the Punjab side, while they were harrying the territory of our ally the Khan of Khelat, brought about the conference at Mittunkote in 1870, and, in preference to the firm principle recommended from Sind, it was determined the subsidizing coaxing plan should be continued and tried on both frontiers. The persistent misconduct of the Murrees* towards Kutchi prevented their being taken into pay, but at the beginning of last year it was determined to place these tribes, as well as the Boogtees, in the sole charge of Captain Sandeman, that with the money sanctioned for the protection of Kutchi and his influence he might induce the Murrees to abstain from their habits of plunder; and from what he said, I was, and am, certainly under the impression he stated he could do so if allowed to manage them in the same way as he had hitherto done with respect to the Punjab border. Having had much longer and more extended experience of these tribes than Captain Sandeman, I was not sanguine of his success; indeed I felt confident that complete failure would be the result. But in deference to the desire of his Excellency the Viceroy and of the Government of India, I raised no further objections than I had originally submitted. These were that though it suited the Murrees to respect the Punjab frontier, they would not mildly submit to be checked in their illicit gains elsewhere. That even if the principal Chief, Guzzun Khan, desired to act honestly, the remainder of the tribe would not agree or obey him, and that his influence over the whole would diminish in proportion to his ceasing to be their successful leader and participator in the engrossing forays they so much delight in. Predatory tribes are the same everywhere, and the Murrees certainly do not differ—only, perhaps, in the fact that they from never having been for years brought under any control, or made to fear a stronger power than themselves, are less amenable to civilizing influences than others.

* This is believed now to have been preconcerted and done with an object in view.

15. The experience of last year has, I would venture to maintain, proved the correctness of my opinion. There has been no improvement in the behaviour of the tribe. On the contrary, their conduct has been worse, more outrageous and lawless than I have ever known it, and there are not wanting symptoms, as may be seen from the report and accompaniments from Colonel Loch, the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, that the influence over them hitherto exerted by Captain Sandeman is beginning to fade away. The objections raised by Guzzun to Captain Sandeman passing through the Murree Hills, the firing on his escort, and the contemptuous disregard for his approbation, when they coolly brought the plundered camels into his camp and disposed of them almost under his eyes, all show that there is very little real respect in their feelings or bearing towards him.

Appendices C. and D.

16. The fact is the Murrees have never yet been made to feel that there are certain tangible disadvantages when they do not regard our orders and wishes, and until they are made to understand this, there will be no sincere adhesion on their part. It was decided that Sirdar Guzzun Khan should come into Jacobabad to pay his respects to the Political Superintendent whose orders he had previously slighted. It is stated that he only did so as a personal favour to Captain Sandeman, and that after much pressure. This is not the form in which one would wish to see influence used, and it was rather adding to the defaulter's position, instead of making him understand he had to make amends for past misconduct. The compensation taken from the Murrees for the kafila plunder was no punishment to them. I accepted the award, wishing to do all I could to forward the wishes of his Excellency the Viceroy, but it was absurdly low, and being taken from the subsidy paid to the tribe they scarcely felt it, while they had enjoyed far more in the loot they had gained. The restitution for the Khuttun raid is still most incomplete, not one tenth of the property plundered has been restored, nor has an equivalent in money been paid to the owners as promised. Of the camels carried off from Seebee, twenty-five are yet in the hands of the Bijarani Murrees, so in reality little pressure has

been brought to bear on the tribe, and the effect has been that they have not hesitated to proclaim their utter disregard for the good opinions of the British power by their incessant acts of violence in Kutchi carried on throughout the year, though they well know that such are entirely against the wishes of the British Government.

17. As the Murrees will not conform to the peaceful proposals held out to them, and as these continued plundering so near the Sind borders will produce a demoralising effect on the other Belooch tribes residing thereon, I have the honour to request that I may be allowed to go my own way to work to keep them at a more suitable distance, and which I can easily do, provided I am not trammelled by connections with the Punjab frontier, and that the money sanctioned after the Mittunkote Conference, viz., Rupees 30,040 per annum, is again placed at the disposal of the Political Superintendent on the frontier of Sind. Captain Sandeman, or the officer who may be in charge of the Lower Derajat, can then manage the Murrees in regard to that frontier as he did before, and they will be treated on this side simply as they behave, without any reference to what passes elsewhere. I would beg, therefore, that the above money may be re-credited to the Bombay accounts for use here.

18. As regards the Khan of Khelat, Captain Sandeman's proceedings have been particularly infortuitous and inopportune. In accordance with the policy laid down by his Excellency the Viceroy, all communications with the Khan had been suspended after despatch of my letter in March last, and intercourse carefully avoided. The conduct of the Khan, as shown in my letters of the 21st and 29th October, has been very far from conciliatory, and has been in no way such as to lead to the supposition that he felt any regret for what had passed, or desire to make suitable amends by complying with the demands that had been made on him. Since the above letters were written by me, the Khan has addressed two letters to Colonel Loch, the Political Superintendent, both most objectionable in style, and not worded in the manner letters from the Khan to the chief official on the frontier should be. Copies of these letters* are forwarded herewith. No replies have been sent purposely, for had any been given grave notice must have been taken of the impropriety of their tone. It was also desirable to let the Khan understand, which he did not seem to do, or pretended so, that the abandonment of friendly communications was a reality and loss to him, and not a farce or a thing to be lightly estimated. Captain Sandeman, therefore, venturing to address the Khan and to propose a meeting was a most untimely act and gravely injudicious, as well as wholly unauthorised. It is another proof, however, of the mischief that must be caused by the meddling of officers in affairs that do not legitimately belong to them, and regarding which they must necessarily be but partially informed. I have now the honour to request that specific orders may be issued in this respect, that Captain Sandeman may keep strictly to his own duties, and not produce the embarrassment in important matters affecting the public interests in the way he has lately done. Also that such notice may be taken of his very unseemly behaviour as his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council may be pleased to direct.

* Appendices E. and F.

Enclosure 1 in No. 31.

Appendix A.

No. 171, dated Camp Shalkote (Quettah), 22nd December 1875.

From Captain R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, to Colonel F. Loch, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, without number, dated the 13th instant, informing me, by desire of the Commissioner in Sind, that a revolution in Khelat was so clearly imminent that the Commissioner directed you to tell me to avoid any communication whatever with the Brahooee Sirdars or their followers, and that I was on no account to go beyond the Murree Hills, towards the Bolan, Seebee, Mittree, or Kutchi.

2. In reply to the above I shall be obliged by your informing the Commissioner in Sind that I left the Murree Hills on the 10th instant, or three days before your letter under reply was written. It will, however, doubtless afford the Commissioner in Sind pleasure and relief to know that the State of Khelat is so far quite tranquil that the contending parties, notwithstanding their differences, express their earnest desire to maintain the present peaceful state of the country, which I trust may be maintained.

3. I am at present busily engaged in carrying out the instructions contained in the Government of India Resolution of the 16th October last. As soon as they are concluded I will submit, through the Commissioner in Sind, for the information of the Government, the report called for in the above-named Resolution of Government of India.

Enclosure 2 in No. 31.

Appendix A1.

No. 174, dated Camp Shalkote, 25th December 1875.

From Captain R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, to Colonel F. Loch, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

In reply to your No. 4419, dated 17th instant, I have the honour to refer you to my Office No. 171, dated Shalkote the 22nd December. In addition to the explanation given in that letter, I have the honour to state that I fully understand that I am on special duty, acting directly under the orders of Government of India conveyed to me in their proceedings of the 16th October last. As already stated in the letter above referred to, directly I have completed the duty I am now on, I shall submit a report through the Commissioner in Sind for the information of Government as directed.

Enclosure 3 in No. 31.

Appendix B.

No. 1031, dated Camp Jacobabad, 28th December 1875.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. & C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to Captain R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dehra Ghazee Khan.

I have the honour to desire you will, without delay, submit replies to the following questions.

2. On what date and at what place did you receive my letter of instructions, No. 918, dated 21st November last?

3. On what grounds you ventured to enter Seebee and Kutchi without first obtaining my permission, when you knew I had decided objections to your visiting either of those places?

4. Why, after the repeated injunctions I had given you not to communicate with the Brahooee Sirdars direct, you received and visited them? Whether it is true, as has been reported to me, that you took certain of these Sirdars and their followers, or the latter only, into Government employ without any previous reference either to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, in whose hands political relations with these Sirdars are, or to myself?

5. Whether it has been correctly reported that you took upon yourself to address his Highness the Khan direct by letter, and sent messengers to him? If so, what explanation have you to offer for so grave a breach of propriety and official decorum? Copy of any such letter should also be forwarded to me.

6. I have to desire also that you will submit to me notes of any conversations you held with the Brahooee Sirdars, and of what was the nature of the communication you made to them.

7. And further any explanation you may have to offer in reference to your late extraordinary proceedings in interfering with matters totally distinct from the official charge you hold.

8. You will, as already ordered by me, return to your own district of Dehra Ghazee Khan forthwith, and report the date of your arrival within them.

Forwarded through the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, with request that he will despatch this letter by the quickest and most direct route to wherever Captain Sandeman may be.

A duplicate copy is enclosed for despatch viâ Dehra Ghazee Khan.

Enclosure 4 in No. 31.

Appendix C.

Jacobabad news-letter, dated 1st December 1875.

Pullin Kungrani and Nohuk Guzeenee, Murree Maccadums, left Kahan on the 16th ultimo, and came straight to Kurk, and they state that a messenger sent by Captain Sandeman came to Sirdar Guzzun Khan when they were both present with a letter, in which Captain Sandeman stated that it was his intention to proceed direct to Kot Mundai viâ Kahan, to which place he wished to invite Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisani for the purpose of settling the present difficulties between his Highness the Khan and the Sirdars. Sirdar Guzzun Khan was to let him know if there was a road from Kahan to Kot Mundai by which guns and troops could travel; if there was not, Captain Sandeman wrote that he would proceed viâ Dhera Bibrok to Bagh, where he would invite the Raisani Sirdar for the same purpose. Sirdar Guzzun Khan sent the messenger back with a reply that there was no road viâ Kahan, that Captain Sandeman had better proceed viâ Dhera Bibrok. The messenger left in the presence of the two afore-mentioned Murree Maccadums. When the Brahooees heard this, they all became very much excited, and are anxiously expecting the British Government to interfere in their behalf with his Highness the Khan.

No. 4304, dated Jacobabad, 2nd December 1875.
Endorsed by Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.
Submitted to the Commissioner in Sind.

Enclosure 5 in No. 31.

Appendix D.

No. 16, dated Jacobadad, 4th January 1876.

From Colonel Francis Loch, C.B., Political Superintendent and Commandant, Upper Sind Frontier, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind.

I have the honour to submit for your information the letters noted in the margin.

1. Original and translation of a note received at Jacobabad from Bagh, dated 30th December 1875.
2. Original and translation of a letter from Salla Shah and Mahomed Wario Bagh, no date.
3. Original and translation of a letter received in Jacobabad from Kurk, dated 26th December.
4. Letter from Captain Sandeman, on special duty, to Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

2. From the date of Captain Sandeman's letter, which however was not despatched until he had reached "Guroo" on the 28th ultimo, owing to the sowars not having been able to travel sooner on account of the severity of the weather, it would appear at first sight that the information contained in letters Nos. 2 and 3 could not be correct; but from the statement made by the sowars who brought Captain Sandeman's letters, it would appear that Captain Sandeman intended to stay two days at Khelat, that on the 28th he was only two marches from Khelat; then they left, and that the following day he was to march to Mangachur, and next day to Khelat. These sowars also state that a Molatur Maccadum of the Dushuks, by name Hyder Khan, had to be sent back to Dadar, as he suffered greatly from the intense cold, and that Captain Sandeman informed him on his taking leave, that he, Captain Sandeman, would be back in Dadur in six days from that time. This, of course, would be impossible, as the marches between Khelat and Dadar are as follows, viz.:—

1.	Khelat to	Mangachur	26 miles.	6.	Khelat to	Abgoon	10 miles.
2.	„	Kud Mustung	18 „	7.	„	Bibinani	11 „
3.	„	Mustung	14 „	8.	„	Kietah	9 „
4.	„	Mobee	8 „	9.	„	Dadar	24 „
5.	„	Mach	10 „				

and as these stages are a good distance apart it would hardly be possible to march the whole distance in less than nine days. It is more than probable however that the Dushuk Maccadum had a tent with him which Munshi Khoda Buksh imagined to be Captain Sandeman's advance tent, and hence the mistake with regard to Captain Sandeman's sudden retrograde movements in Dadar.

3. It will be observed that the information given comes from three different quarters. That regarding Captain Sandeman being at Dadar is from Mustoee, about 16 miles to the north-east of Bagh in Kutchi; that regarding his Highness the Khan coming from Khelat direct to Bagh, from Bagh itself, and that regarding the supplies being laid in, from Gundava. This news has again been reported to me by one Illias Lyerani, resident of Lyerani-ke-Bustie, 24 miles to the south of Bagh, who states that one Alloo Meerdeh, or person who is sent to collect supplies, came to his village when he was there three days ago, and informed the Jansheen, Arraf Khan, brother of Samunder Khan Lehree, that he had been sent by Naib Abdool Azeez to inform the Jansheen that his Highness had written to say that after the Eed, which takes place on the 10th of this month, he, his Highness, intended coming by the Lakaree Pass to Bagh, and that supplies were to be laid in for him at once, and that the Jansheen, Arraf Khan, was to assist in collecting what he could, and thus each report, bearing on the other as it does, makes me think that there must be truth in them.

4. I am informed that in 1872, when his Highness the Khan's troops—*i.e.*, cavalry, infantry, and guns, Shukkur Khan, commanding, and Naib Mahomed Khan, Vakeel—marched from Khelat to Haji-ke-Sher in Kutchi and attacked the Brahooees, that they marched by the Lakaree Pass, so if his Highness has really determined on coming to Bagh as stated, he would have no difficulty in coming by this road, and that it would be the most direct route into Kutchi.

5. I have further to bring to your notice the following reports current in Jacobabad, as I consider it my duty to submit the same for the information of Government, for if the stories are correct, it shows that Captain Sandeman has not the power over the Murrees, and that he has not got them in hand as the Government have been led to believe. I make this report with no wish to detract from Captain Sandeman in any way, but I consider it right that such reports should be brought to the notice of Government, in order that investigation may be made regarding their truth or otherwise, and thus to prevent further complications hereafter.

6. I will give the reports seriatim, so that you may be able to follow each, and dovetail the one into the other. First, it is stated that when Captain Sandeman wrote to the Murree Sirdar to say he intended coming to Kahan, and from there proceeding to Mundai, and wishing to know if there was a road by which troops could march, Sirdar Guzzun Khan, his brother, Morula Khan, and Karam Khan Bijarani, with many of the Muccadums, were much annoyed at Captain Sandeman's wish to march troops through their country, and they determined not to allow him to go. Eventually a meeting of the headmen and Maccadums was held, at which Sher Mahomed, Guzeen Mari, who is a brother-in-law of Sirdar Imam Buksh Mazari, and some of the Muccadums, his adherents, said—if Captain Sandeman was not given a road through their country, they would leave the tribe and join the Boogtees or Mazaris, that on this a very animated discussion took place, at which it was decided Captain Sandeman should be allowed to travel by the route by which he eventually marched, but that he should first of all be requested to go by some other route, and a reply was sent to the effect that there was no road through the Murree country, if Captain Sandeman wished to go to Seebee and Dadar he had better go viâ Dhera Bibrok, the head-quarters of the Boogtees, then down the Sangsela Valley, and so to Poolaji and Lehri in Kutchi, and so on to Seebee. That when Captain Sandeman did arrive at Kahan, the Murree Sirdar requested Captain Sandeman not to bring his troops near his town, and he informed Captain Sandeman that he had better go viâ Nufoost and Surtaf, that there was no road through the Murree country for troops. Eventually Captain Sandeman was permitted to march by the road first agreed upon by the Murrees amongst themselves, viz., Ghuzzee, Goork, &c., and to Thulli, to the north of Kutchi, but not by the Mundai road. When Captain Sandeman's baggage left Kahan and was opposite the Lehri defile between Kahan and where the Lehri River rises in the hills opposite the halting place at Dakà, some 70 or 80 Murrees [Badanis], who were collected on the hills, drew their swords, and waved them over their heads and fired two shots. The baggage was then all stopped, and Karam Khan Bijarani was sent to pacify these on the hill side, and make them desist from showing any further warlike signs. One of Captain Sandeman's jutts passing through Jacobabad stated that this was really true. Karam Khan Bijarani pacified the Murrees, and the baggage marched on without further let or hindrance.

7. When Captain Sandeman was on the march between Ghuzzee and Goork, Nohuk Guzzini Murree with his followers driving 103 camels, which they had carried off from near Mamool in his Highness the Khan's territory, happened to be coming along the road, where they were met by Captain Sandeman, who enquired as to who they were, and where they had come from, and on being told, he enquired if Mamool was in his

Highness the Khan's or British territory, being informed it belonged to his Highness, he replied very good, I have nothing to do in the matter. Nohuk then went on with his camels, and having distributed them he returned to Captain Sandeman's camp, and marched with it to Dadar.

8. It will be observed from letter No. 1 attached to this that his Highness the Khan's troops attacked the Brahooees, all of whose Sirdars and Muccadums, excepting one or two of the latter of very small note, have gone with Captain Sandeman towards Khelat and killed eight of them, other six of them being wounded, as well as five on his Highness the Khan's side. It is stated that this attack was made in accordance with Captain Sandeman's written orders to Naib Abdool Aziz of Bagh, that in the event of the Brahooees looting, or in any way ill-treating the villagers, he was to send a force to punish them.

9. The letter which Captain Sandeman states contains his full explanations, dated the 22nd December, has not yet been received. It will be submitted as soon as it reaches me.

10. It is reported that Shabuz Khan, the Boogtee Sirdar's son, who was released from the Bakkar jail in November last, has become insane, and that he had to be sent back from Captain Sandeman's camp, and that he is now in confinement in Dera Bibrok.

P.S.—Attached is also Captain Sandeman's letter No. 171*, referred to in accompaniment No. 4, since received, and a telegram† from the Superintendent, Bakkar subsidiary jail; that Sirdar Shabuz Khan never showed the slightest sign of madness whilst in Bakkar.

Enclosure 6 in No. 31.

Translation of a Note from Said Lallu Shah and Muhamed Warrio, received at Jacobabad, dated Bagh, 30th December 1875.

Thanks be to God by His goodness I am well, and I trust that you are the same. There has been a fight between his Highness the Khan's troops and the Brahooees, eight of the latter have been killed and four wounded, five of the former have also been wounded. All the Brahooees have collected in Hajee-ke-Sher. On the 28th of Zulkad 1792, *i.e.*, 27th December 1875, his Highness the Khan intends leaving Khelat for Mustung.

Enclosure 7 in No. 31.

Translation of a letter from Lallu Shah and Muhamed Warrio to Munshi Russool Buksh, Bagh (no date).

Captain Sandeman who went to the Khelat country was at Dadar on the 1st January, *i.e.*, 3rd Zulkad, and he hoped to reach Bagh on 5th Zulkad, *i.e.*, 3rd January. His Highness the Khan will reach Bagh on the 10th Zulkad, *i.e.*, the 8th January. We heard this from Naib Abdool Azeez Naib of Bagh, and so we sent the news to you at once.

Enclosure 8 in No. 31.

Letters received in Jacobabad from Koork, dated 26th December 1875.

All the news from this place, from beginning to end, I have already sent you by the hand of a sowar; I trust that you have received and read the same. This is the latest news. Jullul Peerdada Mooree came from Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dhera Ghazi Khan's camp, to Sirdar Sher Zaman Khan's on the 23rd ultimo, and brings the following story, viz., when I reached Bibinani with the Sahib, Nubbee Buksh, and Izmut Khan Raisanis, the persons sent with the letter of invitation from Captain Sandeman to his Highness the Khan, returned from Khelat, and their sowars give the following verbal information, that his Highness said wherever the Sahib directs me to attend there will I present myself. His Highness also sent another reply to this effect—"By "your coming I am much more happy than I can explain, wherever you please to tell "me to meet you, at Mustung or Quetta, I will at once come, and I will in no way "whatever act in opposition to your directions, I will remain dependent on you." The receipt of this letter made the Sahib very happy.

2. The Murree force, which consisted of 200 sowars under Mir Ula Khan Murree, requested him to let them return, as they were suffering much from the excessive cold.

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* Enclosure No. 1. † Enclosure No. 9.

Mir Ula at once made their request known to the Sahib, and said if you wish to detain the Muccadums with you, you can do so, but allow the sowars to return to their homes. The Sahib kept Mir Ula Khan and the Motabur Muccadums with him, and gave all the rest their leave. I, Jullul, came back to Dadur with them. I came on to Seebee, and the others went straight to their several homes in the hills. The son of Hajee Ketran also asked to be allowed to return, and he came back.

Enclosure 9 in No. 31.

Telegram, dated 5th January 1876.

From Surgeon Leahy, Sukkur, to Political Superintendent, Frontier Upper Sind.

The Sirdar never showed the slightest sign of madness whilst in Bakkar.

Enclosure 10 in No. 31.

Appendix E.

Letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to Colonel F. Loch, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, dated Khelat, 2nd Rumzan = 21st October 1875.

Moolla Pir Buksh, Naib of Nusseerabad, has just informed me, my friend, that the Naib of that place had sent a few of my sowars to inquire into a dispute which had taken place amongst some of my camelmen who were residing within my border, and with whom one flock of my camels were, but these camelmen, through some villany on their part, went and made a report to the British outpost, the sowars of the Thanna made my sowars prisoners, and the camelmen with my camels have gone and settled within British border. Again, Syud Uchun Shah and Lall Shah, residents of Shahpur, killed three persons of the Bungur caste without any cause, and they have now, my friend, sent you a written request that they may be allowed to reside within British limits, now that they receive encouragement from you, they are inducing many people by threats and oppression to desert Shahpur and Chutter. Ever since I have been on friendly terms with the English, no officer residing in Jacobabad has ever interfered in the disputes of my people residing within the Khelat border before this. If any persons residing within my country left and entered British territory they were not permitted to settle there, but were sent back. Now, on the following account, I am entirely without hope of receiving any benefits. If I ever address you for any purpose, you my friend never send me a written reply, but you inform the bearers of my letters by word of mouth, that all the information they contain will be submitted to the Commissioner in Sind, and when the Commissioner in Sind's reply is received it will be forwarded. If ever I address a letter to the Commissioner in Sind at Kurrachee, the Commissioner replies that I write direct contrary to the general rule and custom. This matter puzzles me much. Formerly I made a representation to your Government regarding the allowance I received in lieu of the kafilla taxes and about certain other matters, but I have not received any reply to them. Until now I have been anxiously expecting a reply regarding the allowance formerly granted me. When I place hopes in you my friend and look on you as a friend, and I write to you for certain information and explanation regarding my own affairs, it is necessary that you should give me full explanatory replies, so that my heart may be satisfied, this is in no way opposed to friendship. I have much in my heart I should like to express, but as I have not received any replies to my former communications, I have not written about it to you. All is well here, keep your heart comforted my friend, and look on me as one who is always looking anxiously for your welfare, and make me happy by writing.

No. 4153, dated Jacobabad, 5th November 1875.

Endorsed by Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

True translation submitted to the Commissioner in Sind.

Enclosure 11 in No. 31.

Appendix F.

No. 37, dated Jacobabad, 5th January 1876.

From Colonel Francis Loch, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind.

In submitting the accompanying letter and translation of the same from his Highness the Khan of Khelat, forwarded to the address of the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, through Pir Jan, Naib of Nusseerabad, I have the honour to request your particular attention to the innuendoes used throughout the letter, as well as to the phraseology of the letter itself, which shows a marked disrespect to an officer of my standing, and more especially so to one in the position I now hold with respect to his Highness the Khan.

2. It may be remembered that in June 1874 his Highness requested me to arrest Dhur Muhammad Jamali, stating no specific charge against him, the matter was referred to you under my No. 1901, dated 20th June 1874, for decision, and in your No. 833, dated 27th June 1874, you directed me to inform his Highness that, unless specific charge was made against Dhur Muhammad, it was out of my power to arrest him. I presume his Highness refers to this when he says that Dhur Muhammad always goes to Jacobabad when his Highness' people go to collect the outstanding revenue, and that in the same manner his Highness' wishes to infer that, although Dhur Muhammad is an acknowledged subject of his Highness, that the authorities in Jacobabad assist him in defrauding his Highness of his just revenue. The use of the term "Huzur Humdost" is most improper on the part of his Highness, as it is lowering the representative of the British Government on the Sind Frontier, and shows anything but a desire to be more conciliatory to, or on better terms with, the representatives of the British Government than he was when all communication between the British Government and his Highness was ordered to cease, see paragraph 8, Government Resolution No. 16 P., dated 5th January 1875. "After "its despatch all communications with the Khan should, if possible, be avoided till such "time as he comes to a better mind." The annexed letter shows his Highness' present state of mind, which in my opinion is far from that expressed in paragraph 29 of Government Resolution No. 2819 of 16th October last. His Highness and his officials are well aware that the revenue derived from lands irrigated by water from Government canals are always collected by his Highness' officials, and the amount due paid by them to the Mukhtyarkars of the different talukas, so that his Highness requesting me to collect this revenue I look on as most disrespectful to me, and such as should not be passed over.

Enclosure 12 in No. 31.

Translation of a letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, dated Khelat, 20th Zulkad 1292=19th December 1875.

There are about two thousand rupees of last year's and this year's revenue due by Dhur Muhammad Jamali on the land in your friend's district. When my people go to his village to collect this revenue he (Dhur Muhammad) at once goes into the Jacobabad Districts, and when they leave his village he returns to it and gives a decided refusal to pay. When the above-mentioned person is an acknowledged subject of your friends, and justly owes this outstanding balance, then how does he refuse to pay this money? I write to you as a friend to ask that you will either kindly make this person a prisoner and hand him over to the Naib of Nusseerabad, or that you will collect the revenue due, and send it to (Huzur Humdost) your illustrious or noble friend, or that you turn him out of the town (meaning Jacobabad), so that my people may be able to admonish him in a proper manner. Keep your friendly heart comforted. All is well here, write of your welfare and make me happy.

No. 32.

No. 49, dated Jacobabad, 29th December 1875.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 27th December 1875.

On the 26th of the current month four Murrees, Guzini, Badanis, residents of Dahoe, plundered a buniah near the town of Lehri in Kutch of all his property and clothes;

the buniah, through fear, cried out for assistance, and two men, hearing his cries, ran to his assistance. The four Murrees at once attacked these two men, one of whom, Galu *wulud* Hukum Kuthar, resident of Lehri, was killed, and the other man escaped.

2. With the exception of the news contained in the letters received from Meer Ghulam Bolock, Sirdar Sher Zuman Khan, Barozai, and his cousin, Sar Bulund Khan, and a Jacobabad news-writer, translations of which, as well as the originals, or copies of all of which have been forwarded for the information of the Commissioner in Sind, there is no other news to report.

No. 12, dated Camp Jacobabad, 8th January 1876.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

No. 33.

Telegram, dated 14th January 1876.

From Colonel Sir W. Merewether, Jacobabad, to Viceroy, Calcutta.

Information has been received from several sources that grave disturbances occurred at Khelat on or about 8th instant. Notwithstanding Khan's oath to Noordeen Mingul the latter was attacked by Khan's troops outside the city and killed, with some thirty men. Darogah Attah Muhammad and his brother, Ali Muhammad, joined in with Noordeen. Attah Muhammad was badly wounded and likely to die, Ali Muhammad killed. This will exasperate the Sirdars more than ever against Khan, and probably cause immediate outbreak in Kutchi. Captain Sandeman stated to have left Khelat on return to Dadur on 5th; if, as I suppose, he is with Moolla Mahomed Raisani, I have no fear of any injury to him or his party.

No. 34.

No. 27, dated Camp Jacobabad, 14th January 1876.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies of the following papers, with original vernacular letter from Azim* Khan, Khyberi, are forwarded to C. U. Aitchson, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

* From Azim Khan.

2. Captain Sandeman will, fortunately, have been well away from Khelat when these disastrous events took place, and as he is probably with Moolla Mahomed Raisani, a staunch man, and the leader in Sarawan, there need be no fear of any injury happening to Captain Sandeman or his party.

3. The events that have occurred at Khelat (and having come from several sources they can scarcely be doubted) will exasperate the Sirdars more than ever against the Khan, but they will attempt nothing directly against him now on account of the inclemency of the weather above the passes. They are, however, almost certain to cause an outbreak in Kutchi, seize the Crown rain and stores, and eject the Khan's officials. If this were all, there would be no harm to others, but disorderly characters are sure also to break out and plunder the defenceless, which the Sirdars will not be able to prevent.

Enclosure 1 in No. 34.

Translation of a letter from Azim Khan, Khyberi Sirdar, to Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent (no place or date mentioned).

After taking leave of you I returned home. To-day, the 14th of this month (*i.e.*, 12th instant), a letter from Azim Jan, son of Naib Muhammad Khan (late Vakeel of Jacobabad and now at Khelat), bearing Azim Jam's seal, was brought from Bagh to the Janshin of this place (Chuttur), and in the above-mentioned letter the following news was given :—Sirdar Noordeen Mingul with his followers encamped outside the city (Khelat).

His Highness the Khan's troops attacked Noordeen's followers. Atta Mahomed Wuzeer and his brother, Ali Muhammad (properly Muhammad Ali), took part with Noordeen Mingul. In the fight Noordeen Mingul was slain amongst his own followers. Darogah Atta Mahomed Wuzeer was badly wounded and is dying, and his brother, Ali Muhammad, with 30 men were killed. It is not known how many of his Highness' troops were killed. This was the only news in the letter. The sowar who takes this saw and heard this news. I have sent it for your information. Besides what was written in the letter, the sowar, who brought the above letter to Chuttur, states verbally that Captain Sandeman could not arrange matters with his Highness, and that officer finding that his Highness would not be guided by the advice given him, determined on returning. The last news was not written in the letter, but was brought by the sowar who brought the letter regarding the fight. God knows if this is true or not.

Enclosure 2 in No. 34.

Translation of a letter from Meeah Sadeh Shah and Muhammad Wario, to Munshi Russool Buksh, dated Bagh, 14th Zulhaj 1292=12th January 1876.

The news from this place is, by God's blessing, good. I pray to God for your welfare. Noordeen and Abdul Guffur Sheikh and Ali Muhammad brother of Atta Mahomed Darogah, have been slain. Atta Mahomed himself is severely wounded and likely to die. Twenty-four men were killed in the Miri, and the Brahooees were killed outside; there is no list of those killed given.

This somewhat differs from the other account and somewhat mystifies it.—W. L. M.

On the 7th Zulhaj=5th January, Captain Sandeman left the city of Khelat and proceeded towards Dadur. Besides this I have no other news, when there is I will write to you. To-day a kossid from Khelat arrived in Bagh. When I heard this news from the kossid I at once wrote it to you.

No. 35.

No. 28, dated Camp Jacobabad, 15th January 1876.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies of the following papers, with original accompaniments, are forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, in continuation of former correspondence.

Enclosure 1 in No. 35.

Translation of a letter from Lall Buksh, to Munshi Russool Buksh.

You should know that "Sandeman Feringee" arrived in Khelat, and informed his Highness that he had brought all the Brahooee and Belooch Sirdars with him, and the more benefits his Highness bestowed on them, the more pleased he (Captain Sandeman) would be on hearing this; his Highness' assurances to the Brahooees were without bounds. The Sahib tried to pursuade the Khan to visit Kutchi, but his Highness replied, when a letter reaches me from the Governor I will then visit Kutchi. No lasting arrangement has been made. No one has ever thought of trying to make any settlements regarding us poor zemindars; no one has ever mentioned our names until now; no proper reconciliation has taken place. I place my hope in the Almighty. It is believed that Captain Sandeman will obtain a letter from the Governor asking his Highness to visit Kutchi, and send the same to his Highness; he will then visit Kutchi. His Highness the Khan's affairs are now entrusted to this Sahib, and he is to act as he considers best.

Enclosure 2 in No. 35.

Translation of a private letter from Khelat (no place, no date).

I have received all the news regarding you. Noordeen Mingul arrived here (Khelat); he is a man not to be depended upon, sometimes he sides with one party, sometimes with the other; he is not to be trusted. Captain Sandeman with all the Sarawan Sirdars and

Belooch has reached this. The arrangements made are as follows: Captain Sandeman has had long discussions regarding assurances being given to the Kohistan people (*i.e.*, the nobles), and on his representation and advice his Highness has assured the Brahooees. The Sahib endeavoured much to persuade his Highness to visit Kutchi, but his Highness replied, when a letter from the Governor (to this effect, I suppose) reaches me I will then visit Kutchi. The Sahib has sent Gohur Khan Zurukzai a letter of assurance (tusalee namah), and has directed him to proceed to the village of Ghut in Ziri, and has promised that he will settle matters for him.

No. 36.

Telegram, dated 15th January 1876.

From Colonel Sir W. Merewether, Jacobabad, to Viceroy, Calcutta.

Other information confirm to-day the news from Khelat of Noordeen and the others having been killed by the Khan's troops. Two Belooch Sowars, who had been sent to Captain Sandeman, returned to-day, having left that officer on the 11th instant safe at Mittree in Kutchi, fourteen miles south of Dadar. Captain Sandeman had come the direct route from Khelat into the Bolan, not viâ Mustung and the Dusht.

No. 37.

Translation of a letter from Sirdar Muhammad Khan, Bamuzai, dated Quetta, 3rd January 1876.

My servant Derwesh has returned to me, but he brought no note with him from you, my friend, nor letter from the Sahib; from what cause has this happened? If you do not choose to write and show kindness, it rests with you. You are well aware of the difficulties I have got into through my constantly writing to you on account of the great intimacy I had with your father and my friendship for you. I have always sent you information. Perhaps you imagine that your not sending me any note would be to my advantage. Derwesh told me that the Sahib had sent a verbal message requesting me to furnish him with any fresh news I might hear, and you reminded Derwesh regarding this, consequently I consider it proper that I should write and let you know that Captain Sandeman has arrived in this part of the country; he marched one evening to Siriab and next night to Quetta, and from there he sent back all the Sirdar's followers, keeping the Sirdars themselves only with him. He halted there one night, and in the morning I went and paid my respects to him. The Sahib asked me a great many questions about the hills and the passes, Thull (Chotiali) and Zoor, and said that he intended making proper arrangements for the safety of this route. The Sahib sent to the Governor of Candahar appointed by his Highness the Amir, Sirdar Muhammad Khan, Baruzai, with ten horsemen from the Dusht plain, and he sent Sirdar Imam Khan Mazari with 100 horsemen from the Bolan Pass to Khelat. The Sahib ordered me to come to him at Siriaq; I went there, and he again made a great many inquiries about the hills. Next morning he marched to Mustung. Whilst at Siriab a letter was received from Noordeen Mingul, saying that he had reached Khelat. I heard that when the Sahib arrived in Mustung, Fakir Muhammad Mustowfi (son of Abdul Aziz) came out and met Captain Sandeman, and that they all started for Khelat, where they must have arrived. There is no other news. All the Brahooee followers have returned to Dadur.

No. 32, dated Camp Jacobabad, 17th January 1876.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

No. 38.

Memo., No. 15, dated Camp Jhangar, 7th January 1876.

The undersigned has the honour to forward translation of report, dated the 27th ultimo, from Ali Muhammad, Sub-Inspector, Frontier Police, for perusal.

I have in a former report informed you that Sirdar Noordeen Mingul had left for Khelat and halted at Guazdar owing to the Mingul Brahooees having dissuaded him from proceeding. He remained there several days until his Highness the Khan sent Abdulla Jan and Mustowfi Vakeels to bring him, and also sent him his sealed oath on the Koran, saying that he was in no way his enemy. After this Noordeen proceeded with the two above-named Vakeels to Khelat, and has now reached "Sorab," which is 20 miles from that city.

2. Gohur Khan, Sirdar of the Ziri Brahooees, is living near to Khelat on the west side, and he has looted some merchandize from the Pathans on the Mula road. This Gohur Khan has quarrelled with his Highness the Khan about the Sirdarship of the Ziri Brahooees, and his Highness the Khan named another person to that position, but the Brahooees decided to have Gohur Khan, and it is said that he (Gohur Khan) has killed the person named by the Khan. Noordeen has been called to Khelat that he may bring Gohur Khan and the other Brahooees to reason, and he has not gone willingly, but because he could not help himself.

(Signed) F. J. Wise, Captain,
District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee.

No. 33, dated Camp Jacobabad, 17th January 1876.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copy forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

No. 39.

No. 148, dated Jacobabad, 15th January 1876.

From Colonel F. Loch, C.B., Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind.

I have the honour to report that two Rhind Sowars, whom I sent with a letter to Captain Sandeman, have just returned, and they inform me that they left that officer near Mittree on the 11th instant. They also state that when they were at Jumbara, one of Sirdar Noordeen Mingul's followers brought the intelligence to the Brahooee Sarawan Sirdars with Captain Sandeman that their Sirdar Noordeen with 60 of his followers, also Darogah Atta Mahomed and his brother, had been slain in the city of Khelat by his Highness the Khan's troops on the 8th of the present month.

No. 40, dated Camp Jacobabad, 18th January 1876.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copy forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information, in reference to correspondence ending with Commissioner's endorsement No. 28, dated the 15th instant. The sowars brought no letters from Captain Sandeman.

No. 40.

Dated Jacobabad, 10th January 1876.

Khelat Diary, No. 1, for the week ending 9th January 1876.

On the 24th ultimo Mir Baz Khan, commanding the Waziri Regiment, with 400 men, reached Bagh, having come by the Mula Pass. On the 26th of last month, two days after the arrival of the above troops, Haji Murad, resident of the Bagh District, made a complaint to Abdul Aziz, Naib of Bagh, that the Brahooees were doing great damage to his fields, and on receiving this complaint the Naib ordered Mir Baz Khan to take one gun and his 400 men to punish the Brahooees. The Brahooees belonged to various sections

of the Sarawan tribe, viz., Budozais, Shawanis, Dinazais, Sheranzais and others, and they were all then collected near Hasham-ke-Dusti at Gumbaz Shah Wali. They were totally ignorant of the approach of the troops, until Mir Baz Khan opened fire on them with the gun and the small arms. Eight of the Brahooees were killed, four wounded, and seven or eight taken prisoners, four flocks of goats belonging to them, as well as all their goods and chattels, were carried off, and five of the troops were wounded. No Sirdar or Muccadum of any influence was with the Brahooees at the time, all having accompanied Captain Sandeman to Khelat. The goats and all the property captured were taken to Bagh. The Brahooees have left Hasham-ke-Dusti, and are now collected between Haji-ke-Shere and Mittree; they at once sent two messengers to inform Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisani of what had taken place.

2. When Captain Sandeman was marching from Kirta to Bibinani, some Murrees (tribe not at present known) who were on the hills, taking his party for their enemies, drew their swords and whirled them round their heads and fired some shots. Captain Sandeman at once sent Sher Dil Mazarani Murree to them, and he, after some persuasion, managed to induce them to come to Captain Sandeman, who gave them some money as a present. Captain Sandeman had hardly left the hills, when these Murrees raided a flock of goats from the Seran Kakurs, who live with the Shawanis near Siriab. The owners of the raided property complained to Captain Sandeman at Siriab, who replied that he could make no arrangement about it then, but it would be investigated hereafter. Captain Sandeman halted two days at Quetta near where the old cantonments are. He has only the Sirdars, and the 200 infantry and 50 cavalry belonging to the Punjab force with him now; all the Brahooee Sirdars' followers have been allowed to return to Dadur. Captain Sandeman returned to Siriab, and then marched to Theri, and when there the above mentioned Murrees together with some others, looted the Yasurzai Kakurs near Alla Buksh's killa of three flocks of goats and sheep, in all about 1,200 animals. The owners complained to Captain Sandeman, who refused to interfere, saying it was the Naib of Quetta's business. On the 3rd of this month two sowars brought two letters from Captain Sandeman to the address of the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier. These men report that Fakir Muhammad, son of Abdul Aziz, Naib of Bagh, had been sent to meet Captain Sandeman at Mustung: that officer was at Ghuru on the 28th. All the Brahooees and Murrees, with the exception of the Sirdars, having returned to Dadur.

3. When Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's letter reached Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, he marched to Sorab and sent word to Sirdar Azaad Khan Nowsherwani to come to him; but Azaad Khan refused to do so,and sent a message to Noordeen to the effect that all the arrangements the Sirdars had made for a rebellion had been upset by him (Noordeen), and it would be a most difficult matter again to get all persons to be unanimous and to act in concert; and added, take care that we are not all disgraced. After the sowars, who took Noordeen Mingul's reply to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, had left, his Highness' sister, Bibi Fateh Khatun, who had him sent by the Khan, arrived, and she pursuaded Noordeen to accompany her to Khelat.

4. The Murrees living at Kot Mundai raided the Murkhiani Pathans and carried off 20 goats. On the 28th December Hyder Khan Mussur[illegible]oogtee attacked the Pathans (tribe not known), and carried off 20 head of cattle. On the 29th December Dilli Jan Notani Boogtee, with 14 men, carried off seven donkeys and one flock of goats from the Brahuis from near Shur Shori, close to Shahpur. The Brahooees followed them up and recovered the goats, but the Notanis carried off [illegible] donkeys. Fateh Khan, brother of Karam Khan Bijarani, with 40 sowars, attacked the Khetrans and carried of 30 bullocks and eight donkeys: the Khetrans assembled and raided the Bakranis near Ghiandari, killing 20 of them and carrying off a large number of their cattle, sheep and goats. On the 28th of last month the Khetrans again raided the Bakranis and carried off their cattle; the Bakranis collected and followed up, a fight ensued, in which 20 Bakranis were killed and the Khetrans carried off all the cattle.

No. 41, dated Camp Jacobabad, 18th January 1876.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

No. 41.

Telegram, dated 18th January 1876.

From Commissioner in Sind, Jacobabad, to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

The following news has to-day been received about late proceedings at Khelat. The news from here is as follows :—Captain Sandeman marched from here, Mustung, to Khelat, the first day his Highness the Khan's son came out to meet Captain Sandeman, and next morning Captain Sandeman without the Sirdars visited the Khan, but no conversation took place. The third day the Khan visited the Sahib, but the afore-mentioned Sirdars were not present. The Sahib and his Highness conversed together, but the conversation, I believe, ended in nothing. On Tuesday, the 4th January, the Sahib determined on leaving, but Khan Sahib, Mir Khodadad Khan, went to Captain Sandeman, reassured him, and prevented his leaving. On Wednesday, the 5th January, the news of the attack on the Brahooees by the Khan's troops which took place in Kutchi was received, but you will be well acquainted as to who was in fault regarding this fight which took place in Kutchi. The Brahooees, however, wrote to their Sirdars as follows : One of our sections have been attacked, some of our people have been killed, and our flocks carried off. At last, on Wednesday, the 5th January, Captain Sandeman with all the Belcooh Sirdars left to return by the Rhodbar route to Kutchi, this route by Rhodbar enters the Bolan Pass at Bibinani. Sirdar Noordeen was first in Khelat, meaning that he arrived before Captain Sandeman ; he came by means of Atta Mahomed, who was lately his Highness the Khan's Wuzeer. The day after Captain Sandeman left, Noordeen and Atta Mahomed visited his Highness the Khan, and they stayed all day in conference with his Highness. They then left and went together to Atta Mahomed's house. Noordeen's followers, mounted and foot, amounting to about 300, were outside the town. It was Thursday, the 6th January, when Noordeen and Atta Mahomed went to the latter's house together. His Highness ordered Masam, commanding the Nurwai Regiment, to take 400 Sepoys with him, and to proceed to Atta Mahomed's house to arrest these people or to kill them. By the will of God a fight began, in which Noordeen, Atta Mahomed's brother, Muhammad Ali, with thirty persons, were slain, also two young sons of Atta Mahomed. Atta Mahomed himself and Ali Jan the Shahgassee were also present in the fight, but it is not known if they have been slain or if they have been made prisoners. When I know about it I will let you know. Fakir Muhammad, commanding the Jangli Regiment, took his regiment and guns and attacked Noordeen's people outside the town, and a desperate fight took place, but I have heard no particulars of the fight. I wish to send this man with the letter off quickly, so I have written this letter.

No. 42.

Telegram, dated 19th January 1876.

From Captain Sandeman, Camp Bolan Pass, viâ Rajunpore, to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Am returning without having settled matters between Murree tribe and Khelat Government. Have fully discovered true causes which keep country in state of anarchy. At first Khan appeared most desirous for peace, but said he had heard day or two before my arrival I had not authority to arrange it. Told Khan objects of expedition. He then received Murree and Bolan Chiefs in public Durbar. Murree Chiefs made full submission. Khan publicly said they should have back service and Ghuzzun his jaghire, which Khan had confiscated. After this negotiations progressed well until day before I left. Khan that day sent word that his troops had attacked Brahooaes in Kutchi killing several. In evening Khan visited me, but could not get him to be reasonable, and end the war. Admitted he had not sufficient power to protect Kutchi and Bolan from Murree inroads. Khan said he was carrying out policy he was educated in, and could not alter until he had referred point to British Government. Khan pressed letters on me for Viceroy and Lieutenant-Governor. I accepted them, telling him I must inform Government true position of affairs. Tone of letter submissive, acknowledge subordination of Khelat Government to British. During visit Khan's object clearly was to show he had no quarrel with British Government. I telegraph direct, because since leaving news received that Khan had imprisoned or killed Sirdar Noerdeen and exaggerated accounts may reach Government. This Sirdar had separated from other Sirdars, was negotiating direct with Khan, and in no way connected with me. Quarrel very bitter between Khan

and Sirdars. Both sides fully admit their inability on account of its long standing to settle it without the powerful but friendly intervention of British Government, which they solicit. Message ends.

No. 43.

Telegram, dated 19th January 1876.

From Sir W. Merewether, Jacobabad, to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

It is reported that Gohur Khan Zehree, with others of the Sarawan tribes, are moving down the Moolla, and that he intends plundering Kotra, Gundava, and other places of Sarawan. Sirdar Moolla Muhammad talks of retiring into Murr Hills. Terms having been arranged between him and them by Captain Sandeman.

No. 44.

Dated Jacobabad, 19th January 1876.

Khelat Diary, No. 2, for the week ending 16th January 1876.

On the 1st of the current month Captain Sandeman arrived at Khelat, his Highness the Khan sent his son, Mir Muhammad Khan, as far as Zearut to meet Captain Sandeman according to the custom of the country, and Captain Sandeman went to Ghulam Muhammad Janeshin's house, which had been prepared for his reception by the orders of his Highness the Khan. Next day Captain Sandeman visited his Highness the Khan in the Miri, and the following day his Highness visited Captain Sandeman, when a long conversation and conference took place. On the 5th instant Captain Sandeman left Khelat by the Rhodbar road, his first march being to Johan. On the 6th of this month Sirdar Noordeen Mingul and Atta Mahomed Wuzeer, by whose influence Noordeen had come to Khelat prior to Captain Sandeman's arrival, paid his Highness a visit, and they afterwards both went to the latter's house. His Highness the Khan then ordered Moosum, commanding the Nurwai Regiment, to take 400 of his regiment and attack Atta Mahomed's house. The following people—Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, Darogah Atta Mahomed Wuzeer, Darogah Muhammad Ali, his brother, Naib of Khelat, Atta Mahomed's two young sons, Muhammad Ali's eldest son, Janeshin Shabun, who was formerly Janeshin of Gundava, and Abdul Guffur Muhammad with 30 men were killed. It is not yet quite certain whether Atta Mahomed is dead or not, but he was badly wounded. A few of his Highness' troops were also killed. One of his Highness the Khan's regiments also attacked the followers of Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, who were encamped outside of the town, and killed a great number of them, but it is not yet known for certain who the headmen, if any, were killed in this fight. It is, however, rumoured that Chakur Khan, Jatak Sirdar, was killed.

This puts the attack on, and death of, Sirdar Noordeen Mingul two days earlier than the first account.—W. L. M.

When Gohur Khan, Ziri Sirdar, heard this news he went with 20 of his followers and murdered Musty Khan Dewar, Darogah of Ziri, and brother of Metha Khan Chobdar. Gohur Khan is now collecting his people with the intention of plundering in Kutchi near Gundava and Kotra.

2. Captain Sandeman has returned to Kutchi and remained at Mittree and Mull for a few days, and it is reported that he has made peace between the Sarawan, Brahooee Sirdars, and the Murrees, and that he has given Sirdar Moolla Mohamed permission to reside with the Murrees in the Murree Hills. Captain Sandeman was at Lehree on the 17th instant.

3. Tonghan, Janeshin of Gulham-ke-Basti, not far from Mittree, went there to look after the crops, and he was murdered on the 10th of this month. His body was not found for six days after the murder was committed.

4. Three days after the murder of Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, his Highness the Khan ordered four hundred seepahis to be sent to Bagh in Kutchi to reinforce the troops stationed there.

No. 49, dated Camp Jacobabad, 20th January 1876.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

No. 45.

Translation of a letter from Sirdar Azim Khan, Khyberee, to Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, dated 19th Zulhaj, *i.e.*, 17th January 1876.

To-day, the 19th, *i.e.*, the 17th January, Captain Sandeman reached Mull, and he will move to Lehri to-morrow. Sohrab Khan, Dhoombkee Sirdar at Lehri, went to meet Captain Sandeman at Mull. The following is the account of what has taken place: — The above-mentioned Sahib ordered Sirdar Moolla Mohamed Raisani to go and live in the Murree Hills, and he gave an order to Mir Oola Khan, Murree, brother of Sirdar Guzzan Khan, Murree Sirdar, that he and the Belooch Murrees were to give Sirdar Moolla Mahomed every assistance for one month; that he, Captain Sandeman, was going to see the Government; and that he would inform them of what arrangements had been made for them. It is now Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's intention to go into Murree Hills.

A person has come from the Mula Pass or river, who says that Sirdar Gohur Khan, Zurukzai, with 28 followers, has killed Chobdar Metha Khan, Naib of Nurgarrah in the Ziri District. Gohur Khan is now near Pir Chuttur, and is collecting a force, and it is his intention to plunder Gundava (about 80 miles west from Jacobabad) and Kotri, about seven miles still further to the west. God knows whether this is true or not. I hear from people that Captain Sandeman is very dispirited and out of wits.

No. 53, dated Camp Jacobabad, 21st January 1876.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies, with original accompaniment, forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

No. 46.

Translation of a letter from Syud Achan Shah and Yar Shah, residents of Shahpur, dated Shahpur, 18th January 1876.

After taking my leave of you I arrived here in safety. When I reached Shahpur I at once learnt from Gulzar Mazari that Captain Sandeman had returned from Khelat with the Brahooee, Sarawan, and Belooch people, and was encamped at Mull in the Seebee District, that he had made peace between Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and Mir Ula Khan, Murree, brother of Guzzun Khan, Murree Sirdar, and made them take oath on the Koran. All the Brahooee Sarawans are leaving Seebee and Mull and are going to the Murree Hills, besides this I have heard that Captain Sandeman intends stationing a (thanna) post in the Sangsila valley (Boogtee country) and in Kahan (head-quarters of the Murrees). Mir Gohur Khan, Ziri Sirdar, with his people, attacked some of his Highness the Khan's people, and killed 20 of them, including one Naib, and one or two men were killed on Gohur Khan's side.

2. Gohur Khan, Ziri Sirdar, together with other Jalawan Sirdars, are leaving Khorasan and coming into Kutchi by the Mula Pass.

I write this for your information.

No. 54, dated Camp Jacobabad, 21st January 1876.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies, with original accompaniment, forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

No. 47.

Intelligence received from Shikarpur.

This morning (17th January) Ali Murad, Belooch Sinjani, stated that he left Khelat 10 days ago. Noordeen Mingul, brother-in-law of the Ex-Jam of Beyla, came to Khelat about 20 or 25 days ago; he paid his respects to the Khan and took up his abode with

him. On the 4th January a Sahib accompanied by the Sirdar, Murrees and Boogtees, and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisani, arrived at Khelat, having travelled viâ Shalkote and Mustung. He stayed four days, after which he departed, returning by the same route he had come, and accompanied by all the Sirdars. Two days after the Eed (Huj) festival the Khan, through the agency of Darogah Atta Mahomed Khan, invited Noordeen Mingul to the residence of the Darogah, where Noordeen took up his abode with 60 or 70 men. The Khan then directed his infantry, artillery, and cavalry to kill them both. A fight ensued, in which Noordeen with 62 men fell, the Darogah's brother, Muhammad Ali, and his son, were also slain; Atta Mahomed received two gunshot wounds, but three men escaped on horseback. When the wife of Muhammad Ali, Darogah's sister-in-law, beheld her son fall, she threw herself from an upper storey window and broke her legs.

No. 110, dated Camp Jacobabad, 26th January 1876.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copy forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

No. 48.

Translation of a letter from Sirdar Sher Zaman Khan, Barozai, to Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, dated 16th Zulhaj, *i.e.*, 14th January 1876.

You must be acquainted with the news from here regarding which I formerly wrote to you. The most recent news is as follows: Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan, with Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and the other Sirdars went march by march to Khelat. The first day his Highness visited Captain Sandeman, and Captain Sandeman strongly urged his Highness to make peace. His Highness replied, by your coming I am made excessively happy. I will give you a written receipt. If you get a written order addressed to me from the Governor, in whatever manner you may be pleased to order, I will abide by it and obey the order. Captain Sandeman replied, I am going back to Kutchi and I will get an order from the Sahib; you write a receipt. His Highness wrote a receipt and gave it to Captain Sandeman, and he has it now. On the day this conversation took place, a report from Abdul Aziz, Naib of Bagh was received by his Highness, in which it was stated, I took a force and attacked the Brahooees, killed six of them, and a few of their leading men were made prisoners, and I carried off large numbers of their flocks. On hearing this, Captain Sandeman became very much enraged with his Highness, and said the Brahooees had, at his desire, delayed taking any steps, and now your Highness' troops have attacked the Brahooees and have carried off by force their flocks. Now act just as you please and carry on your affairs after your own fashion. It was then evening, and the Sahib ordered his troops to get ready to march at once. His Highness entreated him with tears to delay his departure, but Captain Sandeman refused to listen to his entreaties and said he would leave at once. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed then represented to Captain Sandeman that it was not the hour to begin a march, that he should wait till the morning; the Sahib took the Sirdar's advice and remained there that night. The next morning he marched to Johan and then came by regular marches to the other side (north) of Mittree and halted there. The story regarding Noordeen is that some time ago his Highness sent Darogah Atta Mahomed to Sirdar Noordeen and gave him a Koran with his seal on it to take to Noordeen with a message from his Highness that for the future he intended no harm to him, and that he would get the British Government to release the Jam of Beyla, Mir Khan, from confinement. The above-mentioned Atta Mahomed went to Noordeen and took his oath to him and brought him before his Highness the Khan. The day after the Sahib left, his Highness sent a man to Noordeen to say that the Darogah had called him, the Sirdar came with his friends to the Darogah's house. His Highness then ordered the infantry and other troops to kill Noordeen and his friends, also Atta Mahomed. The infantry went there and commenced firing, a fight took place, in which 36 of his Highness' infantry were killed. Noordeen and his friends, Atta Mahomed and his brother Muhammad Ali were also slain, and Ali Jan, son of Rahimdad, fled and took refuge in the Khan's sister's house, and the Juttuk Sirdar managed to escape and reached his friends in safety.

Owing to this and the fight which took place in Kutchi the Sarawans are all united and the Murrees have become friendly with them, and it is their intention to create a rebellion. It will be seen what will be done. Whatever takes place hereafter I will send you a full report.

My brother, Nur Muhammad Khan, was sent by the Sahib to Candahar. To-day, the 16th Zulhaj, *i.e.*, 14th January, I received a letter from him in which he writes:—

I arrived in Candahar on the 25th Zulkad = 24th December, and the letters I brought were at once forwarded to his Highness the Amir, but up to the present no reply has been received to them; when I get the replies I will return to you. Up to the present I have not been fully acquainted on what duty my brother has been sent to Candahar; when he returns in safety I will write and let you know. It will be seen if the Sahib, intends returning to his own country or not, or what he will do. I am very much pleased to hear Sir W. Merewether has arrived at Jacobabad. I am very anxious to pay my respects to him. I now ask that you will kindly invite me that I may pay my respects both to him and you, by which my dignity and my reputation in this world will become as bright as the sun. You yourself said that when Colonel Sir W. Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, came to Jacobabad that I was to come there to pay my respects to him without being invited, I was ready to do so. If, however, you will kindly send me a letter, either from the Commissioner in Sind or from yourself, it will greatly increase my reputation and good name. Be quite confident that I am a dependent on the British Government. In whatever way you please to order, I will act on. Your letter which you sent for the Sahib, I sent with my sowars; they have returned, but the Sahib (Captain Sandeman) gave them no answer to bring.

No. 107, dated Camp Jacobabad, 26th January 1876.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies, with original vernacular letter, forwarded for the information of the Government of India.

Colonel Loch has been requested to inform Sirdar Sher Zaman Khan that Sir W. Merewether is unable to receive the Sirdar.

No. 49.

Translation of a letter from Sher Zaman Khan, Barozai, to the Commissioner in Sind, dated 26th Zulhaj 1292.

Previously I gave you full news. What has since occurred I now beg to report:—Captain Sandeman, with Moolla Mahomed Raisani and others, Sarawans, on return from Khelat, passed two nights at Mittree, the third night having marched therefrom, arrived near the city of Mull, where also he stayed two nights. On the 3rd he marched and proceeded to his country. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, with all the Sarawan Sirdars, *i.e.*, Wudera Mir Shadi Khan Bangulzai, Sirdar Alladina Koord, Sirdar Said Khan Muhammad Shai, and Jundo Khan Shawani and others, conferred together and started for the Tuli River along the skirts of the hills, where they are still staying. The Ooloos (clansmen) of all the Sirdars are assembling, they will get together in two or three days. The Murrees have also joined the Sarawans, and they all intend to create disturbances. There will be a great fight in two or three days. The Murree force is also collecting. When the Sarawan people get together they will make a combined fight. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed has taken away his family from my city to his own toman. You may be aware that Naib Faiz Muhammad, with 200 cavalry and infantry, has come to Dadur, and there are about 500 or 600 cavalry and infantry with Naib Abdul Aziz at Bagh under the command of Fakir Muhammad. It remains to be seen what may happen. The Dumars and Sumalanis are also collecting in the Bolan to join the Sarawans and Murrees. The two former tribes will create disturbance from their part of the country; while the Murrees and Sarawans begin their action from here (this side). It is apprehended that the country will be so set on fire, that God's creation will be seriously distressed. The Brahooees that were in my town previously and those who now came I have sent away to prevent reflection upon me, and they have all gone to their own tomans. My respect depends upon your generosity, for I am an adherent and subordinate of yours. I am exceedingly desirous of paying you respects. If I am kindly called, I will present myself, and have my honour raised thereby. I will write in detail what may occur hereafter.

No. 112, dated Camp Jacobabad, 26th January 1876.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copy, with original vernacular letter, forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

2. On Colonel Munro's arrival at Jacobabad, Sirdar Sher Zaman Khan will be informed that in future he should address all communications relating to affairs beyond the Sind frontier to that officer.

No. 50.

Translation of a letter from Sir Bullund Khan, Barozai Sirdar, to Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, dated 16th Zulhaj, *i.e.*, 14th January 1876.

I have received your letter and the one from the Commissioner in Sind on the 15th of this month (yesterday), and by the receipt of the same I have been a thousand times exalted. May God keep you Sahibs in safety. The accounts from here are that Captain Sandeman with the Sarawan Sirdars went by the usual marches to Khelat, and urged his Highness the Khan to make an agreement with the Brahooees. His Highness replied to the Sahib, the treaty between myself and the Brahooees is that formerly made by the Commissioner in Sind. After that treaty was made the Brahooees never came to salaam to me, and no other treaty can now be made. After this Captain Sandeman left that place and came by stages to Mitree, where he arrived on the 14th of this month (12th January). Captain Sandeman informed every one that his purpose had failed, now do whatever you like. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed sent to the different places to give the Brahooees this news, and told them that whoever were his friends should come to Thuclee, and live at the foot of the hills, and that a rebellion would take place, and he requested the Sahib to remain at Mitree for two or three days until his people, the Brahooees, may be able to leave Kutchi. The Murrees are of one mind with the Sarawans, it will be seen, if the Sahib remains here or not.

Sirdar Noordeen, Atta Mahomed, and Ali Jan, determined together that they would murder his Highness the Khan on the day of the Eed. His Highness, however, had them killed beforehand, on Thursday, the 9th of this month (7th January). I write this for your information. I will write again whatever there is to report.

No. 208, dated Jacobabad, 22nd January 1876.

Endorsed by Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

True copy of translation, with original accompaniment, submitted to the Commissioner in Sind.

No. 113, dated Camp Jacobabad, 26th January 1876.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies, with original vernacular letter, forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

No. 51.

No. 85, dated Camp Duhar, 22nd January 1876.

From R. H. Vincent, Esq., Acting District Superintendent of Police, Shikarpoor, to Commissioner of Police in Sind, on Circuit.

I have the honour to inform you that the town inspector of Shikarpoor reports that a caravan, consisting of about 250 Pathans, which left Shikarpoor some 20 days ago, and was destined for Candahar, is rumoured to have been plundered by Gohur Khan, Brahooee Sirdar, in the Mulla Pass.

2. During the encounter some 200 Pathans are said to have been murdered, and their merchandise, consisting chiefly of indigo and cloth, valued at about $1\frac{1}{4}$ lakhs of rupees, plundered.

No. 109, dated Camp Jacobabad, 26th January 1876.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copy forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

No. 52.

Translation of a letter received at Jacobabad, dated 23rd Zulhaj, *i.e.*, 21st January 1876.

You should know that Ghoram Khan, Brahooee, has come from Mittree, and he reports that when Captain Sandeman returned from Khelat to Mittree the following Brahooees were with him :—Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisani, Alla Dina Khoord's son, Shadi Khan, Bungulzai. The Sahib told them I will make peace between you and the Murrees; after this you go and remain in the Murree Hills and create a rebellion, and make war with his Highness the Khan. To this the Brahooees agreed, but Captain Sandeman told them when I go to Dehra, having made a proper treaty with Ghuzzan Khan, I will let you know of it, and you must act on it.

No. 111, dated Camp Jacobabad, 26th January 1876.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies, with original accompaniment, forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

No. 53.

No. 3, dated Camp near Seebee, 13th January 1876.

From Captain R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind.

I have the honour to acknowledge your No. 1007, dated Camp Khanpur, the 22nd December 1875, and forwarded under cover of Colonel Loch's No. 4477, dated Jacobabad, the 23rd December 1875. You have also with the same letter forwarded, for my perusal and reply, copy of Khelat Diary, No. 48, for the week ending 19th December 1875. These papers I only received four days ago in the Robdar Pass. Before replying to the contents of the diary I will reply to your endorsement acknowledged above.

2. Your letter directing me to meet you at Kashmor between the 20th and 30th of December did not reach me until after I had entered the Bolan Pass, which I did on the 15th December, and long after I had been joined by the Sarawan Brahooee Sirdars, while a telegram from Colonel Loch, which told me you could not reach Kashmor until the 15th January (or two days hence), I only received a few days ago, on my return journey from Khelat. It was therefore out of my power to have acted on the instructions then sent. But putting these facts altogether aside, as already explained in this Office Nos. 171 and 174, dated 22nd and 25th December respectively, to the address of Colonel Loch, I have since starting on this expedition believed I was acting directly under the orders of the Government of India conveyed in their Proceedings of the 16th of October last, No. 2819P., and forwarded for my information and guidance under cover of your endorsement, No. 862, dated Kurrachee, 3rd November 1875.

3. I will now reply to the contents of the diary referred to above. It first states that a conspiracy on a large scale headed by Sirdar Azaad Khan of Karan had been organised against the Khelat Government, but that my arrival in the country had entirely prevented its execution.

I believe that a conspiracy had been entered into between Sirdar Noordeen Mingul and several of the Khan's officials, and bitterly, as the issue has shown (of which I only heard particulars a day or two ago), the conspirators have suffered for their temerity. But the Sarawan Sirdars, who joined me of their own free will on entering Seebee, declare they did not know of any such scheme.

4. I believe this statement to be true from the fact that on my arrival at Kahan the Murree Sirdar, Ghuzzan Khan, showed me a letter (a copy of which I have) which he had received a day or two before from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, in which the Sirdar asked the Murree Chief for aid, with men to enable him to oppose the Khan's army shortly expected in Kutchi. This letter Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan placed in my hands and asked me to advise him how he should act. In reply I asked him whether he desired peace or war with the Khan's Government. On his emphatically declaring he anxiously desired peace, and would send his brother and headmen with me with the object of obtaining it, after requesting him to record this in writing, which he did, I promised to see the Sarawan Sirdars and inquire of them what their views on the subject were. They joined my camp directly it arrived in Seebee territory, and they also in writing petitioned me to obtain for them, if possible, a peaceful solution of their present difficulty with the Khelat Government. We then all together marched for the Bolan Pass to inquire into Brahooee and Murree quarrels regarding the Bolan Pass traffic, which the Proceedings of the Government of India, No. 2819P., dated 16th October 1875, authorised me to inquire into and, if possible, settle. What action I took on the joint request of the Murree and Brahooee petition for peace with the Khelat Government will be recorded in my general report directed to be submitted to the Government of India through you directly the expedition is concluded.

5. I may further mention here another fact in support of my belief that the Sarawan Sirdars did not know of the conspiracy named in the diary against the Khelat Government, viz., that Sirdar Noordeen had been called into Khelat by the Khan himself, and had actually proceeded there with the Wuzeer, who went for him previous to my arrival in the country having become known. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed heard of this from Faiz Muhammad, Naib of Dadur, soon after we entered the Bolan Pass, whom we met in it, but would not at first believe the news. After our arrival in Khelat we found what the Naib had said was true, and the Sarawan Sirdars came and told me of it, saying in strong language, which I need not here repeat, that Noordeen was "a scoundrel and had "betrayed their (the Sirdar's) cause."

6. In regard to the statement in the diary that after my arrival I had directed the Sirdars and the Khan's officials to cease from making war on each other, I have the honour to reply that it is wholly devoid of truth. The only document I wrote to the Naib of Bagh was in acknowledgment of a civil letter I received from him saying that he desired to come and visit me, in which I thanked him for his courteous desire, but would not give him the trouble as I was leaving that afternoon for Kirta, 30 miles within the Bolan Pass. No other communication of any kind passed between us.

7. Regarding the statement in diary that I sent sowars to Sirdars Noordeen and Gohur Khan Zarukzai, that also is wholly untrue. The only statements in the diary, as far as it concerns me, that are true (for even my movements are incorrectly stated, as well as the size of the escort accompanying me, which is greatly exaggerated) are the ones regarding the giving of a small khillut to Sher Zaman Shah of Seebee and sending a party to Khelat and Kandahar. I presented the khillut to the Seebee Chief in return for the valuable aid he had afforded the expedition in providing it with grain and other supplies of which I had run short.

8. Regarding the deputation of a party to Khelat and Kandahar, I will fully explain this act, and the necessity for it, when I submit my report to the Government of India as directed in their proceedings already above referred to.

9. The despatch of kossids with instructions for me, noted in the concluding portion of the diary as having set out from Jacobabad on the 14th and 17th December as already reported, did not join me until I arrived at Shawlkot. I left Dadur on the 15th or the day after the first kossid was despatched from Jacobabad. That day I marched to Kirta, as already stated, distant from Dadur about 25 to 30 miles, it was therefore impossible your instructions could have reached me in time to prevent my acting in the way explained in this letter.

10. On account of the season of the year and the severe weather I experienced above the passes I have not delayed my movements, since I started on my return journey in order officially to report them. I am now en route to Dera Ghazi Khan, and have halted here a day amongst other things to afford time for this letter and for the dismissal to

their homes of the Murree and other Chiefs. The results of the expedition I will report directly I reach Dera Ghazi Khan. I may here, however, briefly state them to be as follows:—I have inquired into the Murree, Boogtee, Afghan, and Brahooee quarrels, and some of these I have been able to amicably settle. I have not been able to effect a settlement of the quarrel between the Khelat Government and the Murree tribe, but I have discovered the real causes which have led to this and other quarrels. I believe also I am in a position to report on what can be safely done for the protection of the Bolan trade.

No. 120, dated Camp Jacobabad, 27th January 1876.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, in continuation of previous correspondence.

2. This letter was only received by me here to-day.

3. In the 2nd paragraph Captain Sandeman states my letter, despatched from Kurrachee on the 25th November, did not reach him till after the 15th December, when he had entered the Bolan Pass. The cause of this delay has yet to be explained. Captain Sandeman merely speaks of my desire that he should meet me at Kashmor; he does not acknowledge the important part of the instructions sent to him, excepting in so far as to say, "I have since starting on this expedition believed I was acting directly under the "orders of the Government of India, conveyed in their Proceedings of the 16th October "last, No. 2819P., and forwarded, for my information and guidance, under cover of "your endorsement, No. 862, dated Kurrachee, 3rd November 1875." But Captain Sandeman forgot, and appears to forget still, that the Government Resolution he quotes merely ordered him to proceed into the Murree Hills, that it in no way relieved him from subordination to me, and that, having been before repeatedly enjoined by me, both verbally and by letter, to confine his operations to the Murree and Boogtee hills and on no account to communicate with the Sirdars or any of the people in Katchi, he was bound in all duty to refer to me before he adopted such a course, or ventured on leaving those hills to enter the plains of Kutchi. As an officer also serving under me, as the above Government Resolution showed him to be, he should have kept me regularly informed of his proceedings, and before entering on any new line of conduct, which he knew to be contrary to the orders I had given him, he should have applied to me for consent to his proposed action. All this he entirely neglected to do, and with the exception of his two letters from Shawlkote, dated respectively 22nd and 25th December, addressed to Colonel Loch, and forwarded by that officer to me, I received no report from him of what he was doing from the time he announced his departure for the Murree Hills until now. I am still without any reply to my letter, No. 1031, of the 28th December 1875.

4. With regard to Khelat Diary, No. 48, ending 19th December 1875, it was therein stated that in the rebellion projected by the Brahooee Sirdars, Sirdar Azaad Khan of Kharan was to assist, not head it. It was also shown in letter from Sirdar Sher Zaman Khan of Kurkh to Colonel Loch, dated the 2nd December 1875 (forwarded to Government under my endorsement, No. 966, of the 13th December), that on the 26th November "Afzul Khan Mingul brought a letter to Sirdar "Moolla Mahomed* from Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, and "the messenger gave the following information, that Sirdar Noordeen Mingul was with a "Jalawan force in Baghwana, and that he had presented Sirdar Gohur Khan Zehri with "the Sirdar's khillut or dress of honour. The latter Sirdar is at Hurtoshah with 300 "men. The sowar said that when he left it was Noordeen Mingul's intention to proceed "to Zehri. Ali Jan, son of Rahimdad, had been sent by his Highness the Khan to "Noordeen, who had falsely agreed to go to Khelat, but from what people say, he intends "going there to create a disturbance." The son of the Jam of Beyla was said to be joining in the conspiracy, also some of the Khan's regular troops at Khelat, and further on, "on the 28th Shaval, *i.e.*, 28th November, all the Sarawan Sirdars came to Sirdar "Moolla Mahomed Raisani, and the sowar who had come from Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, "as well as a sowar from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, were sent to Sirdar Noordeen, and all "the Sirdars remained with Sirdar Moolla Mahomed two nights, and are all unanimous. "They returned on the 30th November to their several stations, and their intention is "to create a disturbance." This intelligence was written by a man who has always sent good information, and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed was at the time living in his village, to which the Sarawan Sirdars all came. Captain Sandeman joined these Sirdars only a few

* Living at Kuruk with Sirdar Sher Zaman Khan.

days after the above events were said to have taken place, and how they could declare to him "they did not know of any such scheme" is certainly very incomprehensible. Captain Sandeman says, "I believe that a conspiracy had been entered into between "Sirdar Noordeen Mingul and several of the Khan's officials;" he should have had no difficulty in feeling certain the scheme had been communicated to the Sarawan Chiefs, and that had he not come to take up their cause they would have joined in it, as Sirdar Sher Zaman Khan had reported it was their intention to do. The Sarawan Chiefs naturally went to him, and of their own freewill, because they would believe, even if they were not told, that he was coming to arrange matters for them. I cannot concur in any way in Captain Sandeman's expressed view of the events which took place at Khelat the day after his departure, when he says, "and bitterly, as the issue has shown, the con- "spirators have suffered for their temerity." Sirdar Noordeen had then abandoned his plan of rebellion, having entered Khelat under sworn safe conduct from the Khan, and he paid his respects to his Sovereign, confident in security. A few days afterwards the Khan, unmindful of his pledged word, has Noordeen attacked and killed. I should consider no expression of disapproval too strong for such unjustifiable treachery.

5. The plan of petition for peaceful solution of present difficulties would very naturally be adopted by the Brahooee Sirdars in place of fighting, and a Sahib having come amongst them would at once raise such hopes in their minds. It was this very sequence I have all along pointed out would occur, and further from my knowledge of the real state of affairs between the Khan and the Sirdars, that such hopes must meet with disappointment, when matters would be far worse than before.

6. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed may have heard in the Bolan of proposals that Noordeen should go to Khelat under promise of safety, conducted by the Wuzeer; but I can hardly conceive he could have then received intimation of Noordeen's actually having gone there, for all accounts agree now in saying that Noordeen entered Khelat only a few days before Captain Sandeman himself. This point will be cleared up when kossids return from Khelat, who were present at the time of Noordeen's arrival and death.

7. As the informant who supplied the news for the diary was not at Dadur, he may, if the Sarawan Sirdars sent sowars to Noordeen from there, have been misled and misinformed as to Captain Sandeman having sent himself. Captain Sandeman also distinctly denies the truth of the statement that after his arrival he had directed the Sirdars and the Khan's officials to cease from making war on each other, as well as what he was reported to have written to the Naib of Bagh.

8. I am not aware, of course, what quarrels Captain Sandeman has been able to settle, but if he refers to animosity between Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and the Murrees, I would call attention to the postscript to my letter, No. 816, of the 21st October, in which it is shown that any difference that may have existed between the Murrees and that Sirdar had been forgotten and foregone, when the Muccadums sent the message they did to the Sirdar. The letter Captain Sandeman was shown by Ghuzzan Khan at Kahan, in which aid was asked of the Murrees by the Sirdars, proves that no animosity then existed between them. I trust I may be allowed to peruse the reports Captain Sandeman alludes to in his 8th and 9th paragraphs, as his proceedings cannot but be regarded as affecting most materially my reputation for political judgment and fidelity to the interests of Government in the management of the affairs which I have had the honour of conducting for so long.

No. 54.

Translation of a letter from Muhammad Khan Kajjak, to Commissioner in Sind, no date

Captain Sandeman and all the Chiefs, including Moolla Mahomed Raisani, had gone to his Highness the Khan of Khelat. There they conferred, and then his Highness the Khan observed that you should go to Dadar. I will also come there. Captain Sandeman borrowed Rupees 6,000 from the Khan, and distributed the amount in Rupees 200 to each of the Chiefs. About this time his Highness the Khan received a letter from the Naib of Bagh to the effect that he had killed numerous Brahooees and had seized a considerable amount of property. Captain Sandeman on hearing this was enraged with the Khan, and told him what sort of a ruler are you that you kill people. I do not know of what caste you are. You are Ooroosee or Gajai and yet have a human form. You have no sense. Those who are human beings command people by conciliation and leniency; while you do so by murder. We take country somewhere by war and somewhere by leniency; having said this, he (Captain Sandeman) returned by the Bolan

route. After Captain Sandeman was five or six koss away from Khelat, the Khan sent for Noordeen Mingul and Darogah Atta Mahomed; when these men had arrived at the bazar with 60 followers the Khan got them killed. A sowar came to inform Captain Sandeman and Moolla Mahomed of what had occurred. This intelligence so much angered Captain Sandeman that he would not ever receive Moolla Mahomed whenever the latter went to him, and that he put out the lamps that his servants lighted in the tents. When Captain Sandeman received at Mittree instructions from "Willayat," he called the Sirdars and Moolla Mahomed Raisani and told them—"You should be at "rest. Major Harrison was removed, because he had taken to Jacobabad Shahgassi "Wullee Muhammad, a servant of his Highness the Khan." Captain Sandeman also said, "That we Sahibs had a meeting at which the Commissioner said the people should be "commanded by a military action, while I said it should be done by leniency; but the "Commissioner in Sind spoke the truth; he was correct in his statement, and what he "said has been realized, these people are false speakers and bad." Moolla Mahomed invited the Sahib to stop two or three days, so that he (Moolla Mahomed) might remove his people and be settled in one place. Mittree has been devastated. Captain Sandeman then came to Mull and told the Murree Sirdars not to harm the Brahooees. Guzzun Khan's brother is gone to Kahan. Karam Khan is with Brahooees at Khumb Doka. Moolla Mahomed has left a wife and two sons at Kurk and taken two wives with him. Samandar Khan Lehri has broken off friendly relation with Moolla Mahomed and Futteh Khan Raisani, and the Shawanis have also disconnected themselves from Moolla Mahomed. Orders from his Highness the Khan have reached the Naib of Bagh and Dadar not to fight until Brahooees do not create disturbances. Naib Abdool Aziz has sent an order to the Brahooees, telling them that those who belong to Moolla Mahomed should leave and go to him, and those who are not evil-designers should go and live with Samandar Khan. The Barozais of Kurk have also been fighting among themselves. The Murgzhai tribe is on the side of Misri Khan's sons. The people of Kurk side with Sher Zaman. This difference has arisen on the right of pagri (Sirdarship).

The Brahuis say that Captain Sandeman's proceedings have been such as if one sets fire to two pieces of fire-wood together. Colonel Loch has written to us that the Governor Sahib and the Commissioner Sahib were coming so you should be prepared to come, but I excused myself on account of sickness. As now I apprehend that this might have displeased the British Government, I entreat that I may be forgiven. I have been penitent that I shall never again fail in this respect. Consider me and my brother, Ali Muhammad, your faithful and obedient servants. There is no art that Lukman Hakim did not command, and likewise there is nothing that has not been arranged by the Commissioner. Let there be Brahooee or some other tribes concerned; you can best adjust it.

No. 125, dated Camp Jacobabad, 27th January 1876.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True translation, with original accompaniment, forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

No. 55.

Translation of a letter written on the 15th of Zulhaj 1292, *i.e.*, 13th January 1876.

The news from here is—Captain Sandeman with Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and the other Sarawan Sirdars went from here by regular stages to Khelat. The first day his Highness went and visited Captain Sandeman, Captain Sandeman urged the Khan to make a treaty with the Brahooees. His Highness replied, I am excessively pleased at your coming, but if you will get an order from the Governor to my address I will attend at whatever place you may appoint. I will carry out whatever orders you may be pleased to give me and I will in no way break through them. The Sahib replied to his Highness, if you will write an agreement in accordance with these terms I will obtain an order addressed to your Highness. The Khan then and there wrote a paper in accordance with the terms, which Captain Sandeman now has. His Highness the Khan said to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, whatever I have done or you have done has been through fear of our lives; now you must wait and I will wait. The Sirdar answered that if your Highness will remain quiet, we will remain quiet, if not, it rests with you. His Highness said to Karam Khan, Murree, you are an inveterate enemy of mine, my troops were defeated, and my guns taken by you. Karam Khan replied, your Highness had better

make peace with your people, no peace can be made with us. The day on which this conversation took place, the report from Abdul Aziz, Naib of Bagh, reached Khelat, in which it was stated that he had attacked the Brahooes with some troops, had killed six of them, had made some of their headmen prisoners, and had carried off a great many of their flocks of goats and sheep. When the Sahib heard this he became very much enraged, and said that at my request the Brahooees had desisted from creating further disturbances, and your troops have attacked them and carried off their flocks; do as you think proper and act as you please (meaning, I have nothing further to say to you). The Sahib at once ordered his troops to get ready to march; the Khan entreated him with tears to stay, but the Sahib would not listen to his entreaties. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed then represented that it was near evening, and that Captain Sandeman had better wait until the morning. The Sahib at the request of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed stayed for one night, and in the morning marched to Johan, and from there he came stage by stage to the north of Mittree.

The news regarding Noordeen is as follows:—Some time ago his Highness the Khan sent Darogah Atta Mahomed to him, and sent with him a Koran with his Highness' seal on it, and he took an oath that for the future he would not harm Noordeen. After this the Darogah went, gave the oath and brought Noordeen back with him to his Highness the Khan. The day after Captain Sandeman left Khelat his Highness sent some one to Noordeen to tell him that the Darogah had sent for him. Noordeen with his friends went to Atta Mahomed's house, and his Highness then sent some infantry to Atta Mahomed's house to murder him and Noordeen. The infantry went and opened fire, and a fight ensued, in which 36 of the infantry of his Highness the Khan were slain, and Noordeen and his friends and Atta Mahomed and his brother Darogah Mohamed Ali were also killed. Ali Jan, son of Rahimdad, escaped and took refuge in the house of the Khan's sister; the Juttuk Sirdar also managed to escape, and he joined his friends and people. When the Brahooees heard of this and the attack on their tribe near Nori, they were all of one determination, and the Murrees are united with them. In one or two days six thousand Brahooees will be collected between Haji and Mittree.

It remains to be seen what will happen, and whether the Sahib returns to his own country. Whatever other news I hear I will write to you. The Sarawan Brahooees and the Murrees are on really friendly terms now. I believe that they will create a rebellion.

This they have been for some time, as far as the Chiefs on either side go. It will be recollected when the Khan took the Bands away from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisani, the Murree Sirdars opposed their support to Moolla Mahomed, saying he was their Sirdar.—W. L. M.

No. 114, dated Camp Jacobabad, 27th January 1876.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies, with original accompaniment, forwarded to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

No. 56.

Telegram dated 9th February 1876.

From Colonel Munro, Jacobabad, to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Brahooee Sirdars (Sarawans) write his Highness' breach of solemn oath to Noordeen has dissipated confidence in the Khan. Sarawans and Jalawans communicating object apparently general rebellion. Sarawans aided by Murrees occupy Thulli and Bolan. Khan's troops said to be cooped up in Bagh and Dadar. Sirdars following obliged to maintain themselves by plunder. Anarchy generally prevalent.

No. 57.

No. 6A., dated Gwadar, 29th January 1876.

From Captain E. Mockler, Assistant Political Agent, Mekran Coast, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind.

I have the honour to forward herewith translate from a letter received by me from Sirdar Fakir Muhammad, Naib of Kedj, informing me that his Highness the Khan had

put to death Sirdar Noordeen Mingul and Darogah Atta Mahomed; you will perceive than an attempt is apparently being made to throw the onus of this deed on the British Government.

Enclosure 1 in No. 57.

Translation of a letter from Naib Fakir Muhammad, of Kedj, to Captain E. Mockler, Assistant Political Agent, Mekran Coast.

A letter has come from Nâl, and news has also come from Kolwah. It is written that a Sahib from Bengal came to Khelat and had an interview with the Khan, after which he went back. After the Sahib's departure the Khan killed Sirdar Noordeen Mingul and Darogah Atta Mahomed.

No. 175, dated Camp Hussain Beylo, 11th February 1876.

Endorsed by Commissioner in Sind.

True copies forwarded to the Acting Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

No. 58.

Telegram dated 12th February 1876.

From Colonel Munro, Jacobabad, to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Apparent lull in Khelat affairs. Brahooees and Murrees communicating with Sandeman may be restrained from combined action in Kutchi pending Government resolve. Reports finished, to be posted to-morrow.

No. 59.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 14th February 1876.

On the 9th February letters were received from the Sarawan Brahooee Sirdars to the address of the Commissioner, Colonel Munro, and the Deputy Commissioner, Major Sandeman. The contents of the letters were to the effect that the confederate Sirdars saw no other course open to them than to put their quarrel with his Highness the Khan to the issue of a battle. The reason for this was the conduct of his Highness the Khan in having caused the destruction of Sirdar Noordeen, his Shahgassee, and Wuzeer Atta Mahomed.

The letters stated that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisani had sent his eldest son, Hasad Khan, to Kahan, to Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan to obtain the support and active aid of the Murri clan; that Ghuzzan Khan had agreed to give these, and had sent Sher Muhammad, his cousin, to Mondai, where Sirdar Moolla Mahomed had proceeded and had held an interview with Sher Muhammad. The result was that the Brahooee and Murree clans were to be friends and to act in concert.

The letters further stated that the Brahooees are collected in two places. The Sarawan Sirdars are at Tulli and the Sumalani Minguls hold the Bolan Pass.

A few days prior to the writing of these letters the Brahooees had caused some loss to a village situated near Bagh in Jallal Khan's country. The Brahooees plunder where such is possible, and this the Sirdars cannot now prevent.

On the 4th of February a sowar arrived at Tulli with a letter from Jam Ali, son of Mir Khan, Ex-Jam of Lus Beyla, to the address of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed. The purport of the letter is that Jam Ali is very anxious that all the Sirdars, Sarawan and Jalawan, should remain in rebellion against the Khan, who cannot now be trusted. Jam Ali now considers Sirdar Mulla Mahomed in the light of a father, and that he ought (there being no other course open) to join heartily in opposing and fighting with his Highness the Khan.

Jam Ali's letter also stated that Mir Brahim Khan, brother of the late Sirdar Noordeen, and Mir Gohur Khan Zarakzai were already in arms and held the Mulla Pass. The

Jalawans were also collecting at Wud with the object of raiding Khozdar and Baghwana. If possible, Mir Gohur Khan intended to attack the village of Kotra in the Mulla Pass.

It was also believed that two kafillas en route to Candahar had been plundered in the Mulla Pass.

The Sirdar's letter concluded by saying that the Brahooees, who were taken prisoners by the Khan's troops in the early part of January, were released, a fine of Rupees 40 being imposed on each.

The reply sent to the above communications was as follows :—

" I have received your letter of the 6th February, also the one for the Commissioner, Colonel Munro. The latter I have delivered.

" Colonel Munro is greatly concerned to hear of the disturbed state of Kutchi.

" It is proper for you to send me once a week an account of your doings and of all that takes place in the country.

" I regret extremely to hear that there is now, in the opinion of your Sirdars, no cure for your troubles, but war with his Highness the Khan. At any time should you change your minds, and should you desire it, I will gladly write to his Highness on your behalf, and do my best still to bring about a peaceful solution of your present difficulties. Do not forget this. With the consent of the Commissioner I am ready at any time to do my best for you with his Highness the Khan. Tell this to the Murree Chiefs also, and be careful all of you not to cause injury to poor people. I note what you say about the death of Sirdar Noordeen at the hands of his Highness the Khan. I have seen Naib Pir Jan on this subject, and he tells me that Sirdar Noordeen and Wuzeer Atta Mahomed and others had conspired together to kill the Khan on the day of the Eed. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed will also remember what passed between him and me on the subject of this conspiracy against the Khan's throne and life. He will remember that Noordeen's agent, when he arrived at Mustung with news of Noordeen's arrival at Khelat, told us all that Noordeen was not doing well, and was acting a double part. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed himself at Khelat said to me that Sirdar Noordeen was a treacherous man and a scoundrel (loocha) both to you (Sirdars) and his Highness the Khan.

" Now in acting at the present time as you Sirdars in your letters describe you are doing, it is right you should recall these things to your memory and not forget what was Sirdar Noordeen's character, and whether it is advisable for the sake of such a man to widen the breach between yourselves and his Highness the Khan.

" I hear that Gohur Khan attempted to attack Kotri, but that the Naib stationed there was joined by the Magassie Belooch and their Chiefs, who declared they were ready to fight for his Highness the Khan. On hearing this Gohur Khan and his people had to retire into the hills."

The following news has been received from the Murree head-quarters of Kahan :—

The southern Murrees (they reside in the hills about Tulli, Dadar, and as far as Kirta in the Bolan Pass) lately made a raid on Tall, carrying off 200 sheep and 12 cows.

On the 4th of February Hassad Khan, eldest son of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, visited Kahan. He was well received, and went with Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan's cousin, Sher Muhammad, to Mondai to meet Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisani.

On the 5th instant Colonel Loch sent one Roshan to the Commissioner to complain that two bullocks of his had been carried off into the Boogtee Hills. Commissioner directed Major Sandeman to take up the case. The complainant was sent with some Boogtee sowars into the hills to try and trace the plundered animals. Every effort is being made to try and trace the cattle which had apparently strayed, it being only conjecture that they had been plundered by Boogtees.

10th February.—Intimation was sent to the Murree and Brahooee Chiefs that did any plundering parties belonging to their respective tribes come near any of the Sind military posts they would be attacked.

11th February.—The Commissioner in Sind's docket No. 131, dated 4th instant (enclosing a letter from District Superintendent of Police, Shikarpoor), to Commissioner Colonel Munro, on special duty, gives the following news :—

That a report, dated 27th January 1876, received from the Thannadar of Shadadpoor, states, " That the Bunnias (shop-keepers) of that place have received letters from the " Nari District to the effect that Moolla Mahomed has collected a number of Sarawans " and Murrees at Tulli. Great plundering prevails in the Nari District, and many people " are preparing themselves to leave the country.

" Sett Utman Chand, resident of Gundava, and his brother have left the Nari, together with their families, and are now in the village of Mohil on their way to Shikarpoor.

"Khan Muhammad, mounted constable, of Panj, reports that 200 Magassie sowars have put up in Gundava, and other foot and mounted regiments in Jhal.

"Gohur Khan together with 500 or 600 sowars stop the Mulla Pass, and have taken possession of Baghwana, and have also plundered two caravans of Pathans, one of which was proceeding from here to Candahar, and the other coming from thence to this district; consequently proceeding to and from Candadar viâ the Mulla is stopped.

"Ibrahim Khan, brother of Noordeen Mingul, is collecting forces in Wud, and it is not known where he intends to go: Brahooees are plundering everywhere."

The following report has been received from his Highness the Khan of Khelat's Naib stationed at Nasirabad in Kutchi:—

"Since the Brahooees raided Bar Shori they have not attacked any other village. All the people in Kutchi residing in hamlets have moved from these and gone into the larger villages. I have heard of no one leaving Kutchi on account of Brahooee depredations. No raid has been made in the Gundava direction.

"Mir Gohur Khan Zarakzai did collect a force of 500 or 600 men with the intention of occupying the Mulla Pass; but the Sirdar of the Magassie Belooch, Kaisar Khan, came to the aid of the Naib of Gundava with 1,000 men. On hearing this Gohur Khan fled.

"His Highness the Khan has since sent Naibs Abdul Latif and Pir Baksh with a body of troops under the command of Fakir Muhammad, commandant, to attack and punish Gohur Khan and re-open the Mulla Pass.

"Two hundred infantry and Naib Itbar Khan are stationed at Khozdar.

"Noordeen's brother Ibrahim collected some men in Wud, but as yet has not been able to do any damage to the people or country.

"Regarding the report of the plunder of kafillas in the Mulla Pass, nothing authentic is yet known. I heard a small party of Pathans en route from Shikarpoor to Khelat viâ the Mulla were attacked, and some loss caused to their property. I have sent to get full information regarding this, and will send it when received. I have heard of no kafila plundered en route to Kurrachee from Candahar."

Syud Aurang Shah of Dadar has sent the following news:—

After the return of the Sarawan Sirdars from Khelat they settled at Tulli at the foot of the Mondai Murree Hills.

The Sumalani, Pashani, Bodozai, and Lahri Brahooees are at Kundlani and Abigoom, in the Bolan Pass.

Generally the Brahooees seem to be of opinion that the way out of their present difficulties is to fight with his Highness the Khan.

The Naibs of Kutchi wrote to his Highness the Khan that the Brahooees of K uthi were again in rebellion and intended to attack his Highness' troops.

The Khan, in reply, sent orders that the troops were to remain passive, and were not to take the initiative against the Sirdars, but to let the Brahooees first attack them. The Naibs were directed not to cause any injury to the Brahooees.

On the first Moharram his Highness sent Naib Abdul Latif of Quetta and Fakir Muhammad, commandant, with the troops under his command, to attack Gohur Khan Zarakzai, Chakar Jatak, and other Jalawans.

A letter was received on the 12th from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed to say that since he last wrote no further plundering had been done by the Brahooees in Kutchi.

No. 26P.C., dated 14th February 1876.

From Lieut.-Col. A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division (on special duty), to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Submits Khelat diary for the week ending 14th February 1876.

No. 60.

Telegram dated 16th February 1876.

From Colonel Munro, Jacobabad, to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Brahooees and Murrees repeating raids in Kutchi; Cassimshok near Bagh plundered 14th.

No. 61.

No. 34P.C., dated Camp Jacobabad, 18th February 1876.

From Lieut.-Col. A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division (on special duty), to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary; to Government of India, Foreign Department.

With reference to your telegram of the 16th instant, I have the honour herewith to submit copy of my own, transmitting letter of the 12th instant, enclosing Major Sandeman's report of his mission to the hilly tracts of Beloochistan (Khelat) to the address of the Secretary to Government, Punjab, in whose hands the complete reports, with their enclosures and appendices, now are.

2. In my telegram of yesterday, acknowledging yours, I explained the difficulty of sending copies of all the papers from this station; but, for the future, all communications relating to Sind border or Khelat affairs shall be sent to you direct, copies being furnished to the Government of the Punjab, as required by your telegraphic message under acknowledgment.

Enclosure 1 in No. 61.

No. 20, dated Jacobabad, 12th February 1876.

From Lieut.-Col. A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner, Derajat (on special duty, Jacobabad), to C. M. Rivaz, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Punjab.

Reference to Government orders of 12th ultimo.

On receipt of your telegram of the 12th ultimo, with orders from the Government of India, directing me to proceed to Jacobabad to assume charge from Sir W. Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, of entire relations with Khelat, I at once made preparations for compliance, being at Dera Ghazi Khan en route to Lahore, to attend the reception to be there given to His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales.

Departure from Dera Ghazi Khan. And arrival in Sind.

2. Leaving Dera Ghazi Khan on the 16th January by boat on the Indus, with such office establishment as I had with me on circuit, I reached Kusmore in Sind on the 22nd, and reported my arrival there to you.

Orders communicated to Captain Sandeman.

3. Before my departure from Dera Ghazi Khan, I transmitted a copy of your telegram to Captain Sandeman, who was then believed to be on his return march from the Bolan Pass and Khelat through the Murree and Boogtee Hills. Soon after my arrival at Kusmore, I was gratified by

Letter from that officer.

receiving a note from that officer, written the previous day at Boogtee Dera, intimating his readiness to join me at any convenient point between Kusmore and Jacobabad, if apprized of my being on that line of route. I at once communicated with Captain Sandeman, who made a forced march,

Who joins Commissioner at Toj.

outstripping his escort, and joined me at Toj on the night of the 23rd January. The troops composing the escort and the baggage cattle being fatigued with long marches in a hilly country, we proceeded to Jacobabad by easy stages, arriving there on the

Arrival at Jacobabad.

28th January.

Commissioner in Sind and Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, at Jacobabad.

4. I found the Commissioner in Sind encamped at Jacobabad, and I waited upon him and upon Colonel Loch, the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, with copy of the instructions which I had received. The records of the Political Superintendent's

Records received.

Office treating of Khelat affairs and the management of the entire Sind border from Jacobabad to the sea were placed at my disposal, and I requested Captain Sandeman to expedite submission of a full

Captain Sandeman's report called for.

report of his proceedings during his tour of two months' duration in the Murree, Boogtee, and Khelat territories, arrangements being made for the return of the detachments from the Punjab frontier

Punjab escort permitted to return.

force, which had formed the escort of the mission, to their respective regiments.

Official papers received from Punjab Secretariat.

5. During my progress to Jacobabad I received the documents from your office, with which I was to be furnished in accordance with the instructions from the Government of India, and carefully acquainted myself with their contents. Whilst Captain Sandeman's report was in pre-

Commissioner how employed whilst awaiting Captain Sandeman's report.

paration I was occupied with such of the current duties of my office as could be carried on at this distance; in

making local inquiries as to the more recent doings in the Khelat State; in organizing a small Intelligence Department through the Belooch Sirdars accompanying Captain Sandeman, and in familiarising myself as much as possible with the later correspondence and orders of authority in regard to Sind border management generally, and to our relations with Khelat in particular.

Submits that report with comments.

6. With this preliminary notice of my own proceedings, I now beg to submit Captain Sandeman's full report, dated the 5th instant, with a running commentary, concluding this transmitting letter with such remarks on the actual position of affairs as I may deem myself to be justified in offering for consideration, on a necessarily short acquaintance with and study of the subject.

Captain Sandeman crosses frontier line at Harrand.

7. After noting the requirements of the Resolution of the Government of India, authorising his visit to the Murree and Boogtee Hills, and to Khelat territory, Captain Sandeman reports that he crossed the frontier from Harrand on the 22nd November 1875, escorted by small detachments of infantry and cavalry from the Punjab frontier force, detailed as an escort under orders of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor. Captain Wylie and Dr. Thomson were respectively in command and medical charge of the escort.

His regular escort.

His large irregular escort.

8. In addition to that escort, Captain Sandeman was accompanied by a very large body of Beloochis of the Dera Ghazi Khan District and border, headed by their Tomandars or Chiefs; the only absentee being the Kasrani Chief, the locality of whose tribe was deemed too distant from the scene of operations to render their presence or absence of any moment. The numbers of Beloochis, chiefly horsemen, in the Deputy Commissioner's train, may be estimated at from 1,000 to 1,200, consisting mainly of picked men in attendance upon their Chiefs. This irregular, but very dependable following, was sufficient to obviate or bear down any semblance of opposition which might anywhere appear, though none was anticipated from the first.

Its numbers, consistence, and object.

Punjab system requires no description.

9. His Honour is well aware of the system pursued for nearly ten years past on the Dera Ghazi Khan border in controlling the border tribes and maintaining security and peace; it is therefore quite unnecessary here to describe it. The assemblage referred to in the last paragraph was an illustration of it on a large scale. The Deputy Commissioner has found it ever profitable to enlist the sympathies and aid of the Belooch Chiefs, and of the better disposed headmen and members of their Tomans, in favour of good border administration. They had repeatedly responded to his call on former occasions, securing results which could not otherwise have been obtained without a display of military force, at great expense. In this last friendly expedition the moral effect of such a gathering of clans, assembled publicly in the interests of peace and good government, to traverse regions the inhabitants of which have long been strangers to either, must have been great, apart entirely from the respect which the strength and numbers of the invading body must secure. Without a justifiable faith in such a combination of moral and tribal influences, the Deputy Commissioner admits that he could never expect success in his endeavours to extend a system which has been found to produce salutary effects on the Punjab border, to the Murree, Boogtee, and other tribes occupying the remoter hills of Beloochistan, forming the frontier of Sind.

The palpable demonstration of it.

Its good effects.

Moral effect of assemblage to be also borne in mind.

Success of Deputy Commissioner's measures dependent upon proper application of this moral force.

Joining of independent tribes.

10. On the 25th November the Loharani section of the Murree tribe appeared, and, on being informed of the objects of the mission, joined, and were soon after followed by the Bijarani Murrees, under their notorious sectional leader Karam Khan. The Khetran and Boogtee Chiefs, with a considerable retinue, also presented themselves, and the mission, thus swollen in proportions by the adhesion of so many Beloochis, entered Kahan, the Murree head-quarters, on the 2nd December, receiving a cordial welcome from the Chief, Ghuzzan Khan, and his immediate dependents, who had advanced to meet it.

Arrival at Murree head-quarters, and reception.

Conference at Kahan. Disclosures.

11. A conference at Kahan disclosed the facts that the Murree Chief had already been in friendly communication with Moolla Mahomed Raisani, the acknowledged leader of the Sarawan Brahooee

faction, opposed to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and that a general rising of the disaffected throughout the Khelat State was imminent. Friendly discussion elicited an assurance on the part of the Murrees that they would be amenable to any reasonable requirements consequent upon a reconciliation between the Khan of Khelat and his rebellious Brahooee Sirdars. Reviewing their own position as a poor, wild, and predatory tribe, to whom robbery and spoliation had descended as an inheritance, they admitted that they had been made the tools of designing men, of both the contending factions, in plundering the Kutchi subjects of his Highness, who had, moreover, been ever exposed to Murree raids from their geographical position. Such arrangements as had once existed, when the late Nusseer Khan ruled in Khelat, would not be disagreeable to them; but their acceptance must be contingent upon his Highness' reconciliation with all the Sarawans.

General rising contemplated.

Effects of friendly discussion.

Exposed state of Kutchi to Murree raids.

Professed amenability of Murrees.

12. Captain Sandeman undertook to mediate, and Ghuzzan Khan delivered to him the letter received by the Murree Chief from the Sarawan leader, in furtherance of the proposed mediation, deputing his brother, cousin, and leading mukkaddams to accompany the mission, and granting the first two relations written powers to act for him in his own unavoidable absence owing to weak health.

Captain Sandeman's mediation accepted.

Murree Chief's personal inability to accompany.

13. On the 8th December Captain Sandeman reached Seebee (in the territories of his Highness the Ameer of Cabul), the temporary asylum of the refugee Moolla Mahomed Raisani, who had called to his councils several other leading Brahooee Chiefs. These leaders, with the Afghan chiefs of Seebee and Khajjak, joined the camp in a friendly manner, soliciting a written declaration by Captain Sandeman of the objects for which he had been deputed by Government to their country. This was given for important reasons detailed in the 14th paragraph of this report; and, after full discussion of the position in all its bearings, the Sarawan Chiefs expressed their readiness, as the Murree Chief had already done, to suspend warlike operations, and to accept Captain Sandeman's mediation between themselves and his Highness the Khan of Khelat. They further expressed their willingness to accompany the mission through the Bolan Pass to Shalkot, or Quettah, the opening of which pass for traffic was a principal object of Captain Sandeman's deputation. It had been resolved that two leading Belooch Sirdars of the Dera Ghazi Khan District should be deputed to his Highness the Khan, bearing the joint petitions of the Murree and Brahooee Sirdars, and a written intimation to his Highness of the objects and authority with which Captain Sandeman had visited the country. Until assured of his Highness the Khan's satisfaction at the visit, Captain Sandeman preferred entering the Bolan by Bibinani, thus avoiding contact with the Khan's officials at Dadar. On his way, however, the Khan's principal officials met him with a welcome to Dadar, to which place he was specially invited. The mission accordingly turned off to that place, where it was very cordially received, both by officials and residents generally.

Mission reaches Seebee.

Meeting with Brahooee and Afghan Chiefs.

Sarawan leaders also accept Captain Sandeman's mediation.

And join the mission in its progress through Bolan.

Proposed deputation to his Highness the Khan.

Diversion to Dadar.

Reception.

14. Starting for Kirta in the Bolan, on the 15th December, Captain Sandeman received certain prohibitory orders from the Sind authorities, compliance with which he deemed to be impossible in the circumstances, especially with reference to subsidiary orders received by him, before leaving his district, from the Government of the Punjab. These appeared to him to require an exploration of the Bolan Pass, and part of the country beyond up to Quettah. From Kirta the Lagari and Mazari Tomandars were deputed on a visit to his Highness the Khan as bearers of the joint petitions of Brahooees and Murrees, a letter from Captain Sandeman having preceded them. To this communication a very favourable reply was received, referring to his Highness' adherence to former treaties and stipulations which had been broken, he alleged, by his Sirdars. Allusion is made to the arrival at Khelat (on 13th December) of Noordeen Mingul, Jalawan Sirdar, who had been specially summoned by the Khan, without reference to Captain Sandeman's mission at all.

March to Kirta.

Despatch from Sind authorities.

Deputation of Sirdars to Khelat.

Correspondence with his Highness the Khan.

Sirdar Noordeen's arrival.

15. The mission proceeded through the Bolan to the Dasht-i-bedaulat, and thence onwards to Shalkot or Quettah. During the march further prohibitory orders, which are quoted at length, were received from Jacobabad and replied to. The Dumar Kakar (Pathans) Chiefs presented themselves, expressing a desire to join in any arrangement by which the Bolan Pass route might be again opened for traffic, as they were considerable losers by the closure. The reception of the mission at Shalkot was as cordial as elsewhere in his Highness the Khan's territories. A letter from his Highness, in reply to that sent by the Belooch Sirdars, was received on arrival, couched in the most favourable and encouraging terms, and intimating the appointment of a high official to wait upon the mission and attend to all its wants. The written report of the Belooch delegates was equally encouraging, and, up to this point, matters appeared to prosper beyond expectation.

Shalkot or Quettah.

Express from Jacobabad and reply.

Dumar Pathans.

Cordial reception at Quettah.

Reply to letter sent by Belooch deputation.

Favourable prognostications.

16. Ominous interruptions continued to arrive, however, by express, from Jacobabad. Captain Sandeman received orders from the Commissioner in Sind to return forthwith to his district, and replied that compliance was then impossible, without sacrificing the objects for which he had been sent under orders of the Government of India to visit the hills. The prejudicial effect of these communications is noted by Captain Sandeman, who reports that the contents of the letters appeared to have been generally made known to the natives by the kossids, causing doubts in the minds of chiefs and others as to the validity of authorisation by which the mission was supported. Endeavouring to assure the Chiefs and dissipate their increasing doubts, Captain Sandeman proceeded to Mustung en route to Khelat. Traders from Candahar had solicited his aid at Quettah in securing a passage through the Bolan Pass for a kafila, but nothing could be done in contravention of his Highness' orders on that subject. The occupation of Shalkot by his Highness the Khan's troops covers the kafila route at this point, and it was clear that nothing effectual for the permanent opening of the Bolan could be secured without his Highness' assistance, however anxious other Chiefs and tribes might be to re-open an ancient traffic route by which they had largely benefited.

Captain Sandeman's recall by Commissioner in Sind.

Reasons for non-compliance.

Contents of letters known and promulgated by the kossids.

Injurious effects of this.

Solicitations of a Kafilabashi.

Reasons against interference.

17. At Mustung the Khan's delegate joined the mission, accompanied by the Lagari and Mazari Chiefs, bearing messages of cordial welcome from his Highness, between whom and Captain Sandeman friendly written communications passed. The mission arrived at Khelat on the 31st December, apparently under the most favourable auspices; for the details of the receptions and subsequent attentions of the Khan and his officials give every indication of cordiality.

Arrival at Mustung.
Return of Chiefs deputed to Khelat.
Friendly communications.
Arrival at Khelat.

18. That intelligence adverse to the objects of Captain Sandeman's visit to the hills was sedulously spread throughout the country is proved by the doubting interrogatories of Chiefs and others immediately after the arrival of each messenger from Jacobabad. Apart entirely from the vexed question in regard to Captain Sandeman's discretion to visit Khelat under the instructions he had received, it soon became clear that the reports thus circulated by persons, officials and otherwise, apparently interested in the results, were producing the worst possible effect. This did not prevent the members of the mission from being well received by his Highness, who at first gave unmistakeable signs of his appreciation of the visit.

Evidences of injurious effects caused by reports from Jacobabad.

His Highness the Khan's earlier encouragement notwithstanding.

19. The description of Captain Sandeman's interviews with the Khan of Khelat conveys the impression that his Highness was at first most favourably inclined to all the overtures made to him, whether in the interests of good government and peace throughout his territory, or specially in reference to the hostility of his Sirdars, and the predatory raids of the Murrees. His allusions to the attempted mediation of 1872 were contemptuous, demonstrating his belief in the impracticability of compliance with its stipulations, even by his enemies. He described his difficulties in regard to the opening of the Bolan Pass for traffic, which, he averred, had been closed by order of the British authorities, necessitating withdrawal of his protective police posts. Whilst admitting his inability

Interview with the Khan.

Khan's reference to mediation of 1872.

and to traffic through Bolan.

to be solely responsible for the security of traders passing through, he still pointed to his rights to a share of transit fees were the Pass to be re-opened. Symptoms of hesitation on the Khan's part, in regard to the various proposals made by Captain Sandeman, gradually became apparent. Evasive replies, contradictory of those implied in his earlier communications, were given, and it became evident that some sinister influences were at work.

Symptoms of vacillation and insincerity on his Highness' part.

Sinister influences.

20. During the various public receptions it was observed that Sirdar Noordeen Mingul who had been summoned, under peculiar circumstances, by the Khan to his presence from Lus Beyla, the government of which south-western portion of the Khan's territory had recently been entrusted to this leading Chief of the Jalawan faction, kept aloof from the Sarawan confederacy, notwithstanding previous friendly overtures on the part of the latter. Sirdar Noordeen appeared to deal directly with his Highness; but the Sarawans believed him to be playing a double part, opposed to the interests of the Sirdars of the Khelat State generally. Captain Sandeman judiciously (as the sequel proved) declined to interfere between this Chief and the Khan at the request of the Sarawans.

Sirdar Noordeen Mingul's position at Khelat.

Captain Sandeman declines to deal with that Sirdar.

21. That the change of tone and manner on the Khan's part was partly, if not entirely attributable to the conflicting disclosure by messengers from Jacobabad, may be inferred from the discoveries made by the Mazari and Lagari Sirdars (paragraph 51), and the scene described in paragraph 53. Captain Sandeman felt under the necessity of reassuring his Highness; who, however, adduced very pertinent reasons (vide paragraphs 55 and 57) for the doubts and hesitation more recently exhibited by him. What is set forth in the paragraphs last referred to appears to me to be important, demanding serious consideration, as evidencing a pre-existing state of affairs which was utterly irreconcilable with the success of what has been termed, in connection with Beloochistan affairs, "the Punjab policy," now tentatively approved by the Government of India in contradistinction to the "Sind system," to which his Highness the Khan's remarkable expression of opinion and obligation refers.

Probable causes of Khan's change of tone and demeanour.

Pertinence of reasons adduced by him.

What they point to.

22. The Khan's expressed inability to coerce his Sirdars is alleged by him as the incentive to his compliance with a system in itself disagreeable to him, and, moreover, alleged by him to be the cause of the commotions by which his Principality has, for so many years, been distracted. Captain Sandeman's description of his interview with the Khan, in paragraphs 53 to 60 of his report, seems to me specially worthy of the consideration and orders of Government. His Highness' earnest request that Captain Sandeman would be the bearer of letters to his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor and to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General was acceded to, and both khureetas form enclosures to this report.

Khan's sense of inability to coerce.

Causing adherence to a system really obnoxious to him.

Khureetas of his Highness the Khan to Viceroy and Lieutenant-Governor.

23. The account of the public Durbar held by the Khan, the day following the more private discussion just referred to, is interesting. The causes of the temporary suspension of the public ceremonial reception are set forth in paragraphs 64 to 66, and are moreover separately described in a letter from Captain Wylie, which forms one of the appendices to this voluminous report. The reference to Sirdar Noordeen's position and bearing during the Durbar points to the segregation of him and his party from the Sarawan confederacy. His Highness reply in Durbar to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's address on the part of the Sarawans evinces intelligence and determination of character. It also discloses the fact above noticed that his Highness is really anxious to communicate more freely with the highest British authorities than it has hitherto been in his power to do for reasons given by himself. The Khan's address to the Murree representatives is noticeable as showing his own estimate of that most turbulent and unruly Belooch clan after long experience. Their past history certainly gives little good augury for the future though their abstinence for so many years from plundering the Punjab border (under circumstances which it must always be remembered have been very favourable to themselves and their objects), and also their professed amenability to Captain Sandeman's demands on the late, as on

Public Durbar at Khelat.

Temporary interruption.

Sirdar Noordeen's appearance there.

His Highness' reply to the Sarawans,

and to the Murrees.

Their past history should induce caution.

many former occasions, must be borne in mind when dealing with them and their position in regard to surrounding complications.

Interviews with Khan satisfactory up to this point.

24. Thus far Captain Sandeman's public and private interviews with the Khan of Khelat promised well: as if, however, to illustrate the constant liability to miscarriage of the motives and objects of truthful agents negociating with Asiatics—always fickle and suspicious, and often viciously bent upon pursuing crooked and mischievous courses—a report arrived

News from Bagh.

next day of an attack, near Bagh, in Kutchi, by his Highness' deputy there, upon some Brahooees (who were alleged to have disobeyed orders previously issued), with the result that several Brahooees were killed, more imprisoned, and some herds of cattle appropriated. Captain Sandeman

Disappointment.

at once expressed his disappointment at this occurrence. Whether preconcerted, as is not improbable, or whether accidental, merely in furtherance of previous instructions, having no special reference to Captain Sandeman's mission, the event supervened very inopportunely. The Sarawan Chief at that time did not appear to view the matter so keenly as did the English officer. Moolla Mahomed was still professedly anxious for such arrangements as might

Khan's change of demeanour.

ultimately lead to a permanent cessation of hostilities between the Khan and the Sarawan Sirdars. His Highness sought another interview with Captain Sandeman, which was granted. He expressed his want of confidence in the Brahooee Sirdars as a body, declaring he had but one faithful Sirdar left, and he wished Captain Sandeman to view the affair at Bagh as of no great

Causes of this.

moment. Whether the Khan's inconsistencies are to be ascribed to studied dissimulation from the first—to sinister influences, brought to bear upon him from any quarter during the progress of the mission or its sojourn at Khelat—to a naturally fickle and vacillating disposition—to the effect upon his mind of greater immediate danger to his person and throne from the hatching conspiracy of Noordeen, or to a combination of some or all of these causes

Khan sends khureetas to Viceroy and Lieutenant-Governor.

together, does not yet clearly appear. Delivering the promised khureetas into Captain Sandeman's hands, notwithstanding a noticeable but ineffectual attempt on the part of one of his officials, formerly his confidential agent at Jacobabad, to prevent the sending of the letters, his Highness at last took leave with as good a grace as the occasion would permit. The

Mission leaves Khelat.

mission left Khelat next morning, every mark of respect being shown, as on its entry.

Moolla Mahomed intercedes for Nurdin.

25. When leaving Khelat Captain Sandeman was again accosted by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, interceding, voluntarily, as it would seem, for Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, whose early destruction appeared to the Raisani Sirdar to be imminent. With the intimation that if Noordeen

Who does not appear.

choose of his own accord to join the camp he might do so, Captain Sandeman declined, as on the previous occasion, to encourage him otherwise. The Jalawan Sirdar did not join the camp.

Correspondence induced by traders.

26. A correspondence took place with his Highness the Khan, at the solicitation of some traders, as described in paragraphs 83 and 84, with little result. In his reply the Khan of Khelat volunteers details of his dealings with Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, alleging arrogance

Khan's account of Noordeen's affair.

and disobedience of orders against him, in the first instance, culminating thereafter in a conspiracy, secretly abetted by Khan's Wuzeer, Atta Mahomed, to assassinate his Highness, who, anticipating their action, sent troops against them. Noordeen and some 60 of his followers, including a brother of the Wuzeer, who was himself wounded, were killed. It would appear, from reference to documents referred to in paragraph 85 of the report, and from others to which

Noordeen's intentions no secret.

I have had access, that Sirdar Noordeen's machinations and intentions were no secret, though his visit to Khelat on the particular occasion, in obedience to the Khan's summons, had not been assented to

Proofs of uncertainty.

by the Sirdar, until the most solemn protestations or oaths from the Khan, as to the Sirdar's personal safety, had been previously obtained. The event is illustrative of the uncertainty attaching to any action on the part of the Government of Khelat in the existing state of affairs.

Shahghassee Wallee Mahomed quondam Wuzeer.

27. The reference made by his Highness to the retention at Jacobabad of his Ex-Wuzeer Shahghassee Wallee Mahomed, now a pensioner of Government on Rupees 600 per mensem, is probably not

without its special significance. The quondam official of the Khelat State is well reported of in all the correspondence from Sind perused by me. He has been introduced to me here by Sir W. Merewether and Colonel Loch, but beyond one short interview in their presence, I have had no opportunity of making his acquaintance. His presence here, as a pensioner merely, can be productive of no good to the Government interests, and probably his former influence in Khelat affairs, whether for good or evil, causes him to be made the rallying point of the factions at present opposed to his former master, both within and without the British border. His removal to some locality—such as Dera Ghazi Khan—where suspicion would not attach to his conduct, might be solicited by the Khan in the event of a reopening of friendly communications with his Highness, or it may prove to be advisable in every sense.

His antecedents.

Residence at Jacobabad probably injurious.

As a pensioner of Government might be moved further off.

28. That active rebellion was impending throughout the Khelat territories, whether of the Sarawans or Jalawans, previously to Captain Sandeman's appearance on the scene, and without any reference whatever to the objects of his mission, which were not then known to the Khan or his Sirdars, is proved by subsequent local inquiries, confirmatory of the more authentic intelligence previously received on the subject. It seems unnecessary now to speculate upon what might or might not have happened had Noordeen Mingul not been cut off at a time when his faithlessness had very nearly reached its climax.

Revolution in Khelat apparently imminent when Captain Sandeman appeared on scene.

Sarawan action suspended.

Jalawans counteracted by Noordeen's fate.

29. On his return march Captain Sandeman endeavoured to heal differences between Dumars, Sumalani Minguls, and Murrees, with some apparent success. At Kirta, in the Bolan Pass, he received a letter from the Sind authorities, severely censuring his conduct throughout, and he points to it in evidence of the other difficulties which he had to contend with in acting up to the instructions conveyed to him by the Governments of India and the Punjab. I do not consider myself called upon in this preliminary and transmitting report to enter upon the disputed subject of difference of views or misapprehension of orders, as these are matters for disposal between the higher authorities and the Sind officials more particularly concerned.

Proceedings on return march.

Censures conveyed from Sind.

Reasons for avoiding comment on this part of the subject.

30. Bearing in mind the innate love of plunder of the Murrees, their antecedents as a tribe, and the tempting facilities offered by the neighbouring plains of Kutchi, under a weak Government like that of Khelat, for the prosecution of their hereditary profession as "spoliators-in-general," I must be permitted to doubt whether the mere discontinuance of service and confiscation by the Khan of a jaghire given, in the first instance, for specific service, and re-appropriated in consequence of continued persistence in marauding by the Murrees, can be deemed the sole cause of Murree depredations in Kutchi. These seem to be the only causes that can be alleged in so-called justification of a series of the most unjustifiable acts; but it may be questioned whether his Highness the Khan's own forbearance towards the Murrees in 1858–59, when he had the power of inflicting a severe castigation upon them, as recommended by the late General Jacob and Sir Henry Green, may not have tended more than any other cause to induce a repetition of marauding expeditions into Kutchi, his Highness himself would appear now to be fully conscious of this, and there is undoubtedly a large consensus of opinion in favour of the view. Having in a preceding paragraph (No. 23) noted what is advanced on the other side in favour of the Murrees, resting upon our experience of their doings, for some years past, on the Punjab border, the policy thereupon founded being that which has, for the present, been accepted by authority, I need not enter here into any lengthened disquisition on the subject. Beyond a trifling exhibition of bravado on the part of a few Murrees, acting independently during the march of the mission from Kahan, the account of which in Sind Diaries (Captain Sandeman states) is greatly exaggerated, the general behaviour of the tribe during the expedition has been unusually good. I conceive, therefore, that we should accept such conduct, on the part even of Murrees, as encouraging so far. The Deputy Commissioner records in paragraph 92 of his report that the Murrees professed an eager desire to protect trade on

Murree character and antecedents.

Doubts as to alleged cause of their depredations in Kutchi.

Khan's former forbearance probably misplaced.

Opinions of General Jacob, Sir H. Green, and others.

Action of Murrees in regard to objects of mission favourably viewed.

Professed eagerness of Murrees to enter into engagement.

reasonable terms, and their Sirdar had written to accept responsibility for Murree raids into Kutchi, on the condition that the Khan of Khelat and his Sirdars should be reconciled to each other. Considering the relations that have subsisted between the Khan and Sirdars for the last 15 years or more, it must be admitted that the condition fixed by Ghuzzan Khan is a very problematical one, and that the opportunity for acting up to it may be far distant, judging especially from the attitude which those Sirdars and the Murrees have assumed since their return from Khelat. Still it would be obviously impolitic to expect too much from the Murrees, who have responded with a reasonable amount of readiness, to our requirements.

To be taken for what it is worth.

31. Captain Sandeman refers to the varying principles upon which our relations with the Khan of Khelat have hitherto been maintained, and contrasts the quotations from Sind correspondence given in paragraphs 92 to 95 of his report with others of a contrary tendency, which are to be found largely spread over the Sind reports of the last two years, especially since the withdrawal of our Political Agent from Khelat. He points out that the earlier descriptions confirm his Highness the Khan's verbal statements to himself, during their interviews, as to the rules and principles by which he was guided. Captain Sandeman considers that the Khan may possibly, even now, be brought to a sense of his duty to Khelat and its people, if an opportunity be afforded him, in reply to his letters to Government, of making a full and frank disclosure of all his wants and circumstances, in view to a better understanding, and to his regulating his management of affairs henceforward more in accord with the welfare of his Sirdars and people, and in such manner as may secure the attainment of those objects for which this mission into the hills was sanctioned.

Contrarity of our dealings with his Highness the Khan hitherto.

Contrasts.

Earlier dealings referred to by the Khan.

A further opportunity solicited for coming to an understanding.

32. It is for the Government to decide whether the circumstances disclosed in the accompanying report and appendices justify a renewed attempt, with a fair prospect of success. It must be admitted that the mission was well received by all parties, from the Khan downwards. Untoward events with which, in so far as can as yet be discovered, the deputation of a British officer to the Beluchistan hills had nothing whatever to do, certainly occurred, during that officer's sojourn in Khelat territory; but such occurrences have not been unusual for many years in that disturbed State. In the very peculiar circumstances of the visit, it would, in my opinion, have been a matter for surprise if sinister influences had not been strongly exerted to thwart the objects of a peaceful deputation, such as that headed by Captain Sandeman. It requires but a very cursory perusal of the later documents concerning our relations with Khelat to be convinced that factious intrigues have, for a long period, largely promoted the unsettled state of the country. These intrigues have not been confined to Kutchi or to Khelat. Their ramifications are doubtless widely spread and deeply laid, requiring time, energy, and perseverance on the part of officers specially appointed to search them out. The political affairs of Khelat, in their connexion with Sind, have evidently afforded a large field for scheming factions, undeterred by the fear of a determined or energetic ruler at Khelat. Wuzeers, Shahghassees, and other State officials have followed each other, especially of late, in somewhat quick succession, the rapidity of changes being proportioned to the fitful caprice of the ruler, or the successful influence of intriguers. The results of a long continuance of such a state of things are but too apparent, and they reflect largely upon the decision and capacity of those directing the Khelat Government at the head-quarters of the State.

Government orders requisite.

Untoward events not unusual in Khelat.

To be expected in the circumstances.

Prevalence of intrigues.

How to obviate them.

Frequent changes of Khelat officials.

Causes and results.

33. The present aspect of affairs, in so far as I can apprehend it, from recent contact and short acquaintance, appears briefly to be this:—His Highness Mir Khodadad Khan, notwithstanding his past difficulties and trials, stills holds his position in a measure, though nearly all the leading men of the old régime maintain an attitude of chronic rebellion against him. From time to time conflicts have occurred with varying results. The military force at his Highness the Khan's disposal is estimated as under 3,000

Present state of affairs generally.

How the Khan holds his position.

Military force at his disposal.

men. Of this force the main portion supports the Khan at Khelat, and detachments occupy such outposts as Shalkot, Dadar, Bagh, &c., where the Khan's Naibs and Janishins uphold a semblance of authority in his name, and oppress the people. Some of the surviving so-called nobles of the State are wandering exiles, whose patrimonial estates are either held by the Khan himself or are lying waste. Periodically, the Sirdars of either, or both, the Sarawan and Jalawan factions combine to act in concert against the head of the State, whose unoffending subjects are but too often plundered and victimized by the assembled Brahooees. Occasional greater successes have been attained; but the Khan, with his little standing army, aided by the passive attitude of the Belooch population, obtained palpable local ascendancy, and his enemies are scattered for the time, to re-assemble when a good opportunity offers, by a junction with marauding Murrees or others. Security to life and property, or to traders between Candahar and India, through the Bolan or Mulla Passes, in such a state of affairs is out of the question, exposed as these Passes are to the incursions of various predatory tribes. Progress and prosperity succumb to the general confusion; and communications between the ruler and the representatives of a great and firmly-constituted neighbouring Government like ours become the fertile source of interested schemings of every kind. Separated off from the leading Khans of the principality, with whom he is at chronic hostility, his Highness selects temporary favourites as his officials from amongst the inferior classes by whom he is surrounded, necessarily maintaining intimate relations also with the commandants of his troops, upon whom the stability of his throne alone depends. Excepting the plains of Kutchi, his possessions are chiefly within the mountain ranges, extending from the Murree and Boogtee Hills to the sea, the lower tracts of Lus Beyla and Mekran, but nominally owing his sovereignty.

How distributed and used.

Some Sirdars in exile.

Their estates.

Occasional combinations.

Results.

Security to trade impossible.

Khan separated off from natural leaders of the country.

His favourites and interested advisers.

Tracts acknowledging his authority.

34. There seems to be no reason at present to apprehend marauding incursions or violations of British territory from beyond the border line at any point. Murree raids in Kutchi may possibly continue, and a few unimportant offences may be committed along the lower border between Lus Beyla and Kurrachee, which is protected by a special police. The force at Jacobabad is indeed ample for all requirements. No impediment, therefore, presents itself to a fair trial of Captain Sandeman's renewed proposals, viz., to re-open communications with his Highness the Khan of Khelat, as *de facto* as well as *de jure* Ruler of the State; to endeavour by firm yet conciliatory and encouraging treatment, rendered all the more easy by recently acquired personal intercourse with most of the dissatisfied Brahooee Sirdars to bring them to a reconciliation with the Khan; to withstand firmly the plottings of interested schemers; fearlessly to stamp out factious opposition, with his Highness' sanction and assistance, beyond the frontier line; and to re-establish our relations generally with the Khelat State on a firmer footing than circumstances have admitted of for several years past. A general want of confidence now prevails, his Highness the Khan is believed to possess some of the qualities of a ruler, as evinced by his retention of his position so long, under very adverse conditions. Doubts may well be entertained of his good faith, until his later protestations of fidelity to British interests are again fairly tested. Our maintenance of an entirely passive attitude would naturally be construed into an abandonment of all interest in Khelat affairs. Kutchi would be devastated by the Murrees; the trade routes permanently closed; and the Khan probably driven, in desperation, to seek aid from other quarters (as mentioned in his own Durbar speech); a consummation which, in the present state of Central Asian politics, should be jealously guarded against by us.

Violations of British border not to be feared.

Strong military force at Jacobabad.

Opportuuity favourable for renewing our relations with the Khan.

Reasons for this and means of accomplishment.

The Khan's capacity.

Doubts of his good faith required to be dissipated.

35. The issues are important. At present we have practically lost our hold over the Khelat Government. Unity of action and treatment can now be secured, and one policy pursued for the whole Beloochistan frontier, from the Pass of Vehoa to the sea, comprising all the tribes with whom we have to come in contact. The Murrees and Boogtees have, in so far as I am aware, at no previous period been better "in hand" than at present, and it is essential that a hold acquired by years of anxious exertion and

Issues at stake.

Circumstances favourable to uniformity of action.

And why.

labour shall not be relaxed. Never before were the representatives of these tribes, and a large proportion of the Brahooee Chiefs, so recently in rebellion against their Khan, brought to his feet in Durbar by a British officer to sue for reconciliation. Granting that evil influences and contrarieties in our mode of treatment may have tended to throw the Khan for advice and counsel, less or more, into the hands of ill-disposed persons of an inferior stamp, it appears to me, on a review of all the circumstances, and especially with reference to the requirements of paragraphs 26, 27, and 28 of the Government of India Resolution of 16th October last, that on no former occasion have we had a more favourable opportunity for accepting the invitation—made by himself, with apparent honesty and frankness—for a renewal of friendly relations with his Highness the Khan of Khelat, who clearly needs our countenance and aid, in so far as he may show himself to be deserving of them.

His Highness the Khan's apparent anxiety for a re-opening of communications.

His necessities.

36. Captain Sandeman's efforts of nine or ten years have been unflinchingly directed to secure uniformity in our dealings with the Belooch tribes, and much of the success attained would be lost if any less experienced and personally uninfluential hand attempted to cement the disjointed elements. His personal influence over the tribes, and great interest in the work, point him out as the officer most fitted to carry it out to such an issue as may in the future, after consolidation of the system, render its maintenance comparatively easy to selected officers coming after him. I have ever considered the dependence, and success in working, of such a system upon the influence or presence of any one particular officer as its greatest defect, from a Government point of view; and I have often looked forward to the probable collapse of all we had gained by it, as contingent upon a change of officers. This should not be, if we are to aim at permanent benefit and success in our frontier arrangements. Personal idiosyncracies are often valuable doubtless; but in a matter of extensive concernment like the carrying out of an enlightened and generous yet firm policy towards our poor and predatory neighbours of the whole Belooch border, our object must be so to simplify and consolidate that those who succeed the executive inaugurators of the policy may have no difficulty in following suit. Without this the best individual efforts may become exposed to ultimate failure.

Captain Sandeman's successes.

What they point to.

System requires consolidation in view to permanency.

Its defects.

What we should aim at.

37. Having received no special instructions for guidance other than those contained in your telegram of the 12th ultimo, and the order of the Government of India in regard to Captain Sandeman's expedition into the hills, I am somewhat in doubt whether my suggestions may not be deemed premature or out of place, pending the decision of Government regarding the results of the mission.

Commissioner's doubts as to offering suggestions.

Pending decision of Government as to results of mission.

38. Having regard, however, to the advancing season, to my own continued absence from my regular charge, and to the necessity for very early specific instructions as to the future conduct of our relations with Khelat, since the Sind authorities have been relieved of all responsibility in the matter I assume that my recommendations may not be considered to be uncalled for. It appears to me advisable that Captain (now Major) Sandeman should be put in immediate charge of all duties connected with the independent Belooch tribes beyond Sind and the Lower Punjab border throughout, from the Dera Ghazi District to the sea; and that the conduct of renewed relations with his Highness the Khan of Khelat, if Government sanctions such renewal, should also be entrusted to Major Sandeman, who would discharge all duties hitherto performed by the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, relative to our communications with Belooch or other tribes within or without the frontier line in so far as these concern border administration and political management.

Reasons for making suggestions.

That Major Sandeman be put in charge of Political Superintendency on Sind and Lower Punjab borders.

All political and executive frontier control hitherto held by Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to merge in Major Sandeman's duties.

39. One European officer as Assistant would be requisite, and he should be an officer selected with reference to his special qualifications for the duties to be expected of him. A knowledge of the Belooch language, and previous experience in dealing with Beloochis, are essentials, if any officer possessing such qualifications be available.

A European Assistant necessary.

His special qualifications.

40. I have every reason to believe that Mr. Bruce, Assistant Commissioner, lately of Kulu, and formerly in charge of the Rajanpur subdivision for several years under Major Sandeman, is an officer pos-

Qualifications of Mr. Bruce, formerly Assistant Commissioner of Rajanpur.

sessing the necessary qualifications, and that he is fitted, in most respects, from antecedents and experience, to be an efficient coadjutor to Major Sandeman in the difficult task before him of establishing his system, carrying out the policy, now accepted by the Government of India, along the whole Belooch line, and of placing our now suspended relations with the Khelat State and its ruler on an intelligible and firm footing.

41. The supervision and control of these officers might advantageously rest with the Commissioner of the Derajat, to whom they would be subordinate in all respects, reporting through him, for information of the Government of India, to the Punjab Government, which would thus have the undivided immediate direction and superintendence of our frontier management, from Peshawur to Kurrachee, and of our political relations with Khelat, as with Cabul. Such an arrangement would doubtless facilitate the proper regulation of traffic through the great trade routes to and from Central Asia, of which that through the Bolan Pass has been practically closed for several years.

Both officers to be controlled by Commissioner of the Derajat.

Advantages of these proposals.

42. It will be obvious, from a perusal of the enclosed report, that the objects desiderated in paragraph 27 of the Government of India Resolution of 16th October last cannot be satisfactorily attained until some such changes as are herein proposed receive the sanction of Government. The re-opening and secure use of the Bolan Pass for traffic are shown to be contingent upon the success of arrangements to be primarily effected with his Highness the Khan of Khelat, but in combination with the heads of neighbouring tribes, as the Dumar (Kakar) Pathans, Murrees, and others.

Reference to paragraph 27 of Government Resolution.

How the Bolan can be re-opened for trade.

43. Major Sandeman informs me that the sum placed at his disposal in the paragraph just referred to would be amply sufficient, if granted annually, to effect all the objects contemplated in the Government Resolution, in so far as these concern the Belooch or other tribes along the whole line.

Sum hitherto placed at disposal ample for all requirements in the hills.

44. Advantage might be taken in conveying the replies of Government to his letters now forwarded to re-open communication with the Khelat ruler and with the Sirdars. Should an encouraging amount of success attend Major Sandeman's efforts in both directions, as he himself fully expects, when he would be untrammelled by many of the difficulties which he believes mainly contributed to his want of full success on the late occasion, it might be possible thereafter to fulfil the intention expressed in paragraph 29 of the Government of India Resolution.

Resumption of Government intercourse with the Khan.

Major Sandeman's expectation.

45. In the event of our re-opening the communications herein recommended with his Highness, in furtherance of the policy enunciated by the Government of India, it seems to me, on a review of past proceedings on both sides, and also looking at the state of disorganization and want of general confidence prevailing in Khelat, that something more determined than a mere conciliatory attitude on the part of the deputed officer is demanded under the *imprimatur* of Government to give a reasonable prospect of success in our future dealings with this disturbed border principality.

Suggestions with reference to existing state of affairs.

46. The state of confusion, amounting nearly to anarchy, now existing throughout Khelat territory, appears to require that any renewal of communications should be accompanied, not indeed by threats of armed intervention, opposed to the principles laid down in paragraph 7 of the Government of India letter No. 2214P. of 9th October 1874, and in subsequent orders, but with such unmistakeable evidence of full moral support accorded by the Government to the officers now specially required to deal with these complications as would obviate the possibility of any recurrence of past misconstruction as to motives, objects, and authority.

Suggestions continued.

47. It is to be borne in mind that even in the Treaty of 1854, entered into between the British Government and Mir Nusseer Khan, then ruler of Khelat, special provision was made in Article IV. (at a time, too, when the affairs of Khelat presented an aspect more favourable than now) for the occupation by British troops of any position or station in the territories of Khelat which the British authorities might at any time consider advisable to hold. This fact can, without any departure from the hitherto accepted policy of Government, be brought prominently to the recollection of his Highness the Khan. Entertaining, as I do, much confidence in the influence and authority which Major Sandeman has personally acquired over the wilder trans-border Belooch tribes, and also in the good effects which his recent intercourse with the majority of the

Reference to Article in Treaty of 1854.

His Highness the Khan to be authoritatively reminded of it.

Special remarks contingent upon Major Sandeman's further deputation.

Brahooee Sirdars has produced, in demonstrating to them the real interest which the British Government takes in the restoration of tranquillity to their country, I think that, to ensure to that officer a good prospect of success, in the undoubtedly difficult task before him, there should be no opportunity left, in our communications either with Khan or Sirdars, for doubt as to the prospective objects of this final effort towards peaceful mediation. The limit of one year might be fixed within which to judge of progress and results.

48. At present I do not wish to anticipate a result opposed to the expectations of the officer whose recent personal visit to the localities, and whose interviews with his Highness the Khan of Khelat and most of the Chiefs and tribes concerned, have led him to form these expectations. It is obviously unnecessary here to speculate as to the ulterior measures to be resorted to in the event of failure. An assurance that all possible pacificatory measures had been tried would be confidently arrived at, and until such a position is attained I conceive that the object set forth in the despatch of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 91 of 8th July last, will not be gained.

The opposite views.

Speculation as to ulterior measures necessary here.

Views of Her Majesty's Secretary of State.

49. Two statements, showing the strength of the Frontier Police in Sind, are appended. The European officers under whom they serve should be directly subordinate to the Political Superintendent at Jacobabad *quoad* all frontier matters, along the whole Sind and Khelat border, and responsible for the speedy conveyance to him of all border intelligence of importance.

Frontier Police in Sind.

Subordination of police officers as to border matters.

50. In paragraphs 2 and 3 of letter No. 4P.C. of 29th ultimo to your address I briefly adverted to the smallness of office establishments available to any officer deputed, as Major Sandeman and myself have been, to discharge important duties in another Province and Presidency, the system of administration in which appears to differ in many respects from that of the Punjab. With reference to the remarks then made, I beg to append copies of detailed lists obtained from the office of the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, which include officials of all kinds, some of whom only, as Colonel Loch, C.B., Captain Reynolds, and several subordinate clerks and others, have been, and are still, in the receipt of pay and allowances for the discharge of duties in the Political Department. The discharge hitherto of so many duties of a varying nature in the Political, Military, Revenue, and Judicial Departments, devolving upon particular officers of another Presidency will necessitate an early change in the distribution of these allowances, and the issue of specific orders exactly defining the positions, emoluments, and relative duties of such officers as may be retained from the Punjab in Sind under the recent orders of the Supreme Government. As regards my own establishments I have not been as yet inconvenienced, because my express deputation necessitated my taking with me such establishments as usually accompanied me on circuit; but if the suggestions offered in this letter are acceded to, specific orders on the point under notice will be called for. Had I not brought my own establishments, I should have received but little aid from the inferior English Clerk and Jemadar of peons alone made over to me. The Head Moonshi in the Political Department, a native of Khelat, and a declared enemy of his country's Sovereign, significantly resigned his office rather than present himself to me.

Political Office Establishments in Sind.

Differences of system.

Lists furnished.

Combination of duties.

Changes demanded in making new appointments.

Commissioner accompanied by his ordinary Camp establishment.

51. If Major Sandeman be required to remain at Jacobabad, as recommended above, his presence there with an Assistant Commissioner or Assistant Political Agent, available at all times for deputation to any part of the frontier between Jacobabad and the sea, would appear to be amply sufficient, under present circumstances, which do not furnish sufficient occupation for an officer in my position, unless duties of a more onerous nature, in their every day aspect, than the orders of the Government of India appear to comtemplate, in connexion with the affairs of the Khelat State, are detailed for performance. In so far as can be judged, no danger to the peace of the Sind British border need at present be apprehended, and I would therefore solicit early telegraphic orders, if possible, as to my movements. The current miscellaneous work of my division has, as yet, not suffered from my absence, and an early return would enable me speedily to bring up all arrears of judicial work.

Presence of Major Sandeman and an Assistant sufficient at Jacobabad.

Present state of things does not demand permanent residence of a Commissioner at Jacobabad.

No actual disturbance on British border anticipated.

Early orders solicited.

52. I am given to understand that a considerable body of mounted police, consisting of certain members of reclaimed predatory tribes, some of whom were subjects of his Highness the Khan of Khelat as Dhoombkees, Jakranis, Khasas, and Boogtees, is maintained in the districts, under the designation of "Belooch Guides." In so far as the duties of any of these may be connected with frontier administration not strictly military, and separate from those of internal district police, I consider that they should be freely at the disposal, or entirely under the orders of the Political Superintendent. They must be valuable aids in maintaining communications with the trans-border tribes.

Irregular Belooch Police Horsemen.

On frontier duties strictly military to be subordinated to Political Superintendent.

Reasons.

53. Having observed various statements in the later political diaries regarding Major Sandeman's proceedings in the hills, to which I deemed it right that he should be afforded an opportunity of replying, I requested him, after I had received his report, to reply to those. He has accordingly furnished the necessary replies in a Postscript, dated the 11th instant, which is attached to his Report. These sufficiently attest the danger which might sometimes attach to action upon unverified information conveyed through interested channels.

Postscript to Major Sandeman's Report.

Why written.

54. In conclusion, it behoves me to notice with commendation Major Sandeman's enterprising exertions in conducting this mission, to and from Khelat, in safety, through an inhospitable region rarely visited by Europeans, except on military expeditions which have not been always successful. His earnest endeavours, under difficulties of no ordinary nature, to effect the objects contemplated by the Government of India, and the amount of success which attended those endeavours, cannot fail, I trust, to receive their due meed of appreciation.

Major Sandeman's own services.

55. Captain Wylie and Dr. Thomson, who accompanied Major Sandeman, have earned his warm acknowledgments, which I believe to be fully merited. The map of the countries visited, prepared by the former officer, and the record of meteorological and other observations kept by Dr. Thomson, will be submitted hereafter.

Captain Wylie and Surgeon Thomson.

56. I have alluded, at some length, in paragraph 9 of this letter to the services of the Belooch Chief, of the Dera Ghazi Khan border, who, with detachments of their clansmen, accompanied Major Sandeman. No more favourable exemplification of the beneficial effects of carrying these Chiefs and their tribesmen heartily with us in our efforts to repress crime and to reclaim their less favoured brethren of the remoter hills could have been given than their cheerful and effective co-operation on this, as on many former occasions. The services of Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan Mazari and Jamal Khan Lagari were prominently conspicuous. The native detachments of cavalry and infantry conducted themselves creditably throughout, and the Subadar of the 4th Sikhs, Wali Mahomed, is specially noticed by Major Sandeman.

Services of the Belooch (voluntary) contingent.

What they demonstrate.

Mazari and Lagari Chiefs conspicuously useful.

No. 62.

No. 1C., dated Camp, 19th February 1876.

From Lepel Griffin, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Punjab, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am desired to forward a khureeta received to-day addressed to his Excellency the Viceroy from his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

Enclosure 1 in No. 62.

Translation of a letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat, to his Excellency the Governor-General of India.

Captain Sandeman has paid me a visit and informed me of the kindly desires of the British Government towards me. I feel greatly indebted to your Excellency for the same.

I have ever considered myself as the subject of the British Government, I do so now, and desire to remain under the protection of the British.

I urgently desire to explain to the British Government much that is in my heart, and trust that the opportunity of doing so may be afforded me. I desire this in order to prevent the chance of the old friendly relations that have existed between Khelat and the British being in any degree severed. With the object of obtaining this request I send you these few lines. By your kindness, should you so desire it, I will write your Excellency from first to last through Captain Sandeman a full statement of my affairs. I have told Captain Sandeman a few particulars of my affairs, who will doubtless tell you of them. Instead of writing should you prefer to see me in person to hear what I have to say, on being informed of your desire I will at once present myself before you.

I consider myself bound by former treaties with the British Government, and do not desire in the least to alter these.

Consider me as your Excellency's loyal well-wisher and servant, and treat me with continued kindness.

No. 63.

No. 42P.C., dated Jacobabad, 22nd February 1876.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 21st February 1876.

16th February 1876.—The Naib of Nasirabad sent information to the effect that the Brahooees raided Jhok Kasim Shah near Nari, carrying off 250 cows. They plundered the village and set fire to a few houses.

The raiders were opposed by a party of irregular horse in the pay of the Khan, numbering about 100. These consisted of Rinds, Kumbranis, and Jatois, and were commanded by Jemadars Nusrat, Boogtee, and Shah Muhammad, Jatoi. On the Brahooees nearing the village the irregular horse attacked the raiders, but were repulsed, losing 40 of their number killed and one Jemadar. The remainder fled. The Brahooees are said to have had six men killed and a number wounded.

On hearing of this fight the Naib, Abdul Aziz, marched with the troops stationed at Bagh to attack the Brahooees. He was accompanied by Wudera Dost Muhammad, Rind. On reaching Mall, it being then near sunset, the Naib decided to return with the troops to Bagh, which he did. The troops did not come up with the Brahooees.

2. Sirdar Jamal Khan, Legari, reports that the Bozdars attacked the Khetrans and killed Sher Muhammad and 14 of his followers. This was done in retaliation for the raid made in December last viâ the Mahoi Pass by the Khetrans on the Bozdars. In that raid Sher Muhammad, Khetran, was one of the leaders. The Khetrans on the occasion referred to violated British territory on the way to the Mahoi Pass. The tribe was fined for this by order of the Commissioner of the Derajat.

Subsequent news states that the Khetrans, after the death of Sher Muhammad, collected to the number of 12,000 and raided the Bozdars, but were repulsed with the loss of 18 men killed. Several of the chief headmen of the Khetrans were taken prisoners, and are now in the hands of the Bozdars. The two sides, it is reported, have agreed to terms of peace very favourable to the Bozdars.

3. 18th February 1876.—Syud Aurang Shah has written from Dadar to say that the Brahooees made a raid on a village called Kunda, but were opposed by the Khan's Janashin Alliyar. In the encounter which ensued the Janashin lost one man killed and had six men wounded. The Brahooees had several men wounded. They carried off one flock of sheep.

The Jalawans made an attack on Kotri, but without success. The Khan's Naib, Abdul Latif, with a regiment of infantry under command of Kakir Muhammad occupy Zehri. It is reported that Gohur Khan, Zarukzai, is in communication with Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and the other Sarawan Sirdars with the object of the Jalawan and Sarawan Brahooees joining their forces and making a combined attack on the Khan's troops in Bagh. This proposal is said to have emanated from the Jalawans, but what reply the Sarawans sent is not known.

A letter from the Sarawan Brahooee Sirdars states they are still anxious to make peace with his Highness the Khan. They state that they are in rebellion from necessity and not from choice, and will now do what they can to prevent their followers from further devastating Kutchi. They ask Major Sandeman to visit Kutchi and to settle their quarrel with the Khan. They explain their object in fighting the Khan is to obtain from him by force fair terms of peace.

Muhammad Khan, nephew of the Barozai Sirdar of Seebee, who was sent to Candaha by Major Sandeman, has arrived at Jacobabad with a letter to Major Sandeman from Sirdar Futteh Khan, Governor of Candahar. The letter simply states that his Highness the Amir of Cabul has replied to his honour the Lieutenant-Governor direct about the opening of the Tal Chotiali route, which reply has doubtless been communicated to Major Sandeman.

20th February 1876.—The report that lately appeared in the "Pioneer" and other newspapers about the plundering of a large Pathan kafila in the Mulla Pass at the commencement of this month, during which over 200 Pathans were killed, is greatly exaggerated. A few camels were plundered en route from Khelat to Gundava in the Mulla Pass, but none of the kafila people, as far as is yet known, were killed, and the loss to the kafila people was not great. Particulars of what actually occurred to the kafila have been sent for, and will be given in next week's diary.

21st February 1876.—Sirdar Moolla Mahomed has written himself to urge Government to mediate between the Brahooees and the Khan, stating that all the Sirdars, Jalawan and Sarawan, will attend to the wishes of the British Government. He says, if Major Sandeman will only come into Kutchi all disorders and disturbances will cease, and that all will obey him. He can explain how the Jalawan quarrel with the Khan can be arranged.

The District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee, reports that up to the 18th of the month the frontier under his charge was perfectly quiet.

It is, however, feared that "the death of Sirdar Noordeen will give rise to much disturbance and trouble in Khelat."

The report further states that "certain Jamote prisoners who were concerned in the attack and 'loot' of the kafilas in 1872 and 1873, and who were captured and taken to Khelat by Wuzeer Atta Mahomed when he was down here with a force in April last, have lately returned to their homes. These men were released about the time that Sirdar Noordeen was murdered, or a little before, and have spread reports that they have been told by the Khan and his ministers to return to their old work of looting kafilas, committing robbery, and creating disturbances of all kinds on the frontier, and that the more they do in this line the better. They also stated that his Highness the Khan was about to send a force against Jam Ali Khan at Lus Beyla, and they had orders to collect together the Jamotes to assist.

"On hearing this, one tribe of Jamotes, who are at enmity with Jam Ali, and who were concerned in the kafila loots before and have always been our most troublesome neighbours, assembled in the hills near the frontier and gave out that they intended to loot as they liked. I (Captain Wise) was on the frontier at the time, and at once sent word to their headmen that I heard they had gone out to loot, and I had therefore given orders to the frontier police that none of them were to be allowed to cross into our territory to obtain supplies, and that such order would remain in force until one of them brought me word that the gang had dispersed.

"Up to date I have heard nothing further, but as they obtain all their supplies from our territory they will probably be dispersed."

The District Superintendent states he has "every confidence in the different Sirdars "residing near his frontier, viz., in Jam Ali Khan of Lus Beyla, Sahib Khan Choota and "Jullah Khan, Brahooee. He believes these Sirdars will succeed in keeping order "should they not be interfered with in any way by his Highness the Khan of Khelat."

The District Superintendent, police, Shikarpur, reports as follows:—

1st. Gohur Khan, Brahooee, made an attack on Kotri in the Mulla Pass, but was repulsed by Sirdar Kaisar Khan, Magussie, and by the Khan's troops.

This information corroborates what appeared in last week's diary regarding this.

2nd. Sirdar Ibrahim, brother of the late Sirdar Noordeen, attempted to intercept the Khelat troops proceeding viâ the Mulla to reinforce the garrison of Bagh. He was aided by Azaad Khan of Kharan, but with what result is not known. The troops, it has since been reported by the Naib of Nasirabad, have arrived at Bagh.

No. 42P.C., dated Jacobabad, 22nd February 1876.

Endorsed by Officiating Commissioner in Sind.

Forwarded for information to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Calcutta. The District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee, has been directed, with reference to his report quoted in the diary, to confine his action strictly to the main-

tenance of good order, and security to life and property, along his western border, and to take no measures likely to be misconstrued as showing a leaning to one or the other side of the contending parties in Khelat territory.

No. 64.

No. 3C., dated Camp Bagha Purana, 24th February 1876.

From L. H. Griffin, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 1C., dated 19th current, enclosing khureeta from his Highness the Khan of Khelat, I am desired now to forward, in original, Major Sandeman's report, No. 8 of the 5th February, on the result of his mission, the Commissioner having forwarded copy of his own report direct to the Government of India. Should the papers be printed, I am to request that this Government may be furnished with a few spare copies.

Enclosure 1 in No. 64.

No. 8, dated Camp Jacobabad, 5th February 1876.

From Captain R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, to Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat, on special duty.

I have the honour to refer you to the Proceedings of the Government of India No. 2819, dated 16th October 1875, and to request the favour of your soliciting the Government to instruct me regarding my further proceedings in connexion with them, for I find I am unable without such instructions to complete the duty I am now on.

Reference to Government of India Resolution.

2. The proceedings of Government of India referred to above directed me to proceed into the hills beyond our frontier: (1), to procure all the information I could respecting local feuds and quarrels among the Murree and Boogtee tribes, or between them and the Afghans, or between them and the Brahooees; (2), to endeavour, as far as I could, to bring about an amicable settlement of these quarrels; (3), to report for the information of Government my views on such quarrels as I could not settle; (4), to report on the general relations between the Murree and Boogtee tribes and the Khan of Khelat's Government. I was also to inquire and report whether anything, and if so what, could be done for the protection of trade viâ the Bolan Pass, and whether a system of fixed tolls on caravans could not be arranged, for the proceeds of which would go to the tribes interested in the protection of the route. In respect to all or any of these arrangements discretionary power was given me in regard to the expenditure of the total sum of Rupees 66,960, sanctioned at the Mittunkote Conference.

Its requirements.

3. But in addition to issuing the orders recorded above the proceedings of Government reviewed the recent correspondence on Khelat affairs, and they set forth clearly the policy the Government desired should be followed, and the objects in connexion with it that I should keep in view during my mission into the hills. Moreover, it was distinctly stated that should the measures then authorised prove successful in affording reasonable security to trade through Khelat territory, and should his Highness the Khan show an earnest desire to co-operate for that end and to return to a proper sense of his duties, it would afford his Excellency the Governor-General in Council great pleasure, on receiving an expression of regret for what had occurred, to restore the former subsidy and to re-establish the old friendly footing with his Highness' Government.

Enunciation of Government policy in regard to Khelat affairs.

Conditional restoration of subsidy.

4. In pursuance of these instructions I left Dera Ghazi Khan for the Murree Hills on the 18th of November last. I was accompanied by the Belooch Chiefs and their followers, as per margin. The Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor was pleased to furnish me with a personal escort of regular troops, consisting of a company of the 4th Sikh

Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan, Mazari, and his nephew, Sher Muhammad Khan, with 250 horsemen; Sirdar Jamal Khan, Lagari, with 290 horsemen; Golam Haider Khan, Lund Chief, with 160 horsemen; Haider Khan, Gurchani Chief, with 150 horsemen; Mazar Khan, Tomandar, Tibbi Lundan, with 18 horsemen; Sekunder Khan, Khosa Chief, with 140 horsemen; Miran Khan Drishak Chief, with 130 horsemen; Muhammad Massu Khan, Nutkani, with 8 horsemen.

infantry and 20 sabres of the 1st Punjab Cavalry. Captain Wylie, 1st Punjab Cavalry, accompanied me in command of the troops and to map the country. Dr. Thomson, of the same regiment, was in medical charge of the mission.

Captain Sandeman's departure on 18th November and escort.

5. On the 22nd of November 1875 I marched from Hurrand and reached the Shum Plain on the 25th, and was at once joined by the Loharani Murree Chiefs, to whom I sent notice of my approach. I briefly explained to them the duty I was on, and the object with which I had entered the hills. I asked them to join me, and this they heartily agreed to do. I was also joined a few days afterwards by Karam Khan, Chief of the Bijarani Murrees, and by the Boogtee and Khetran Chiefs and their followers as noted in the margin.

Reaches Shum Plain on 22nd November.
Is joined by Hill chiefs.

Sirdar Mirulla Khan with 250 horsemen; Nehal Khan, Loharani, Murree Chief, with 80 horsemen; Karam Khan, Bijarani Murree Chief, with 18 horsemen; Sher Dil and Kechi Khan, Muzerani Murree Chiefs, with 12 horsemen; Gohur Khan, son of Sirdar Golam Murteza, Boogtee, with 72 followers; Babal Khan, Khetran Chief, and his son, Beluch Khan, with 60 horsemen; Kadir Baksh, nephew of the Khetran Chief, with 44 horsemen; Din Muhammad, cousin of the Bozdor Chief, and Shikari Khan, Bozdar Headman, with 7 horsemen.

6. The mission entered Kahan, the Murree head-quarters, on the 2nd of December, and on its arrival met with a cordial welcome from Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan and the Kahan Murrees. The Sirdar himself, with a considerable following, on hearing of my nearing Kahan, came out to meet me, and on coming up to me dismounted, and presented his "nuzzur" of a few rupees.

Enters Kahan on 2nd December.

7. The day after my arrival at Kahan I held a meeting of the Murree Chiefs. At it the existing state of affairs in connexion with Khelat was fully discussed. I found Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan to be then in close correspondence with Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Chief of the Sarawan Brahooees. This Sirdar had lately written a letter to the Murree Chief, intimating that a rising was about to take place against the authority of his Highness the Khan, and Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan was invited, for the reasons given in the letter (Appendix A.), to join the Brahooee Sirdars.

Consultation with Murree headman.

Murree communications with Sirdars of Khelat State.

Contemplated rebellion in Khelat.

8. I fully discussed with Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan the contents of the letter. The causes which had induced the Murree Chiefs to take part with the Brahooee Sirdars against the Khan's Government were fully entered into. The Murree Chiefs declared that were the Khan desirous for peace, which they said they believed him to be, they would most willingly agree to any fair terms that I could arrange between his Government and them. They, however, said that no lasting peace could take place unless the Khan made it with all the Brahooee Sirdars. They explained how this was so in the following words.

Discussion with Murree Chiefs.

Their professed desire for peace.

Only foundation of a lasting peace.

9. They said that the fact of the Murree clan living in the hills as a wild people was known to all. That the present unprotected state of Kutchi was a great temptation to the clan. That designing men used the Murrees to injure the Khan by employing them on plundering expeditions, but were a general peace once made, and the same arrangements come to with all, as existed during the late Nusseer Khan's reign, the Murree Sirdar would then undertake to prevent plundering in Kutchi, and would be responsible for it; but this peace, to last, must be made with all the Sarawan-Brahooee clans.

Exposed state of Kutchi a temptation to Murree raids.

How that could be obviated.

10. In reply, I agreed to do my best to bring about the understanding required. With this object Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's letter was made over to me for disposal, and it was arranged that as Ghuzzan Khan was himself in a weakly state of health, and would, in consequence in all probability, succumb to the cold did he visit Khelat, that his brother, Mirulla, and cousin, Mir Hazar, should accompany me on my onward march. The Murree headmen Karam Khan, Bijarani, Nehal Khan, Loharani, Sher Dil, Muzerani, and other Chiefs of less note, were also to go with me. Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan agreed to give Mirulla and Mir Hazar in writing power to act for him, which was done (Appendix B.).

Captain Sandeman's proposals.

Mirulla and Mir Hazar, Murrees, to accompany as representatives of the Chief Ghuzzan Khan.

Murri Mukaddums also to join.

11. It was then settled that the next day I was to march for Seebee, where Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and the other Brahooee Sirdars were said to be. There a conference was to be held, and were the Brahooee Sirdars, like the Murree Chiefs, anxious that peace should be maintained with

Proposed march to Seebee to confer with refugee Sarawan Sirdars.

the Government of the Khan, it was arranged that I should use my influence to obtain it.

12. With this object in view the mission left Kahan on the 4th December and reached the plains of Seebee on the 8th December, where I was joined by the Sarawan Sirdars Moolla Mahomed, Raisani, Shadi Khan, Bungulzai, Alla Dina Khoord, Junda Khan Shahwani, and other minor Brahooee Chiefs. The Khan of Seebee and the Khujjuk Chiefs also joined my camp.

Mission leaves Khan on 4th reaches Seebee Plain on 8th December.

Is joined by Brahooee Sirdars and local Chiefs.

13. The following day I held a conference of the Brahooee and Murree Chiefs, associating with them Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan, Mazari, and Jamal Khan, Lagari. We fully discussed the position of affairs. It was admitted, for reasons that were stated, but which it is unnecessary to enter upon here, that the country was in a state of anarchy, and that the Brahooee clans intended to again rise in rebellion against the Khelat Government. No attempt was made to deny the statement that had been made to me by Sirdar Ghazan Khan that both the Sirdars and the Khan's Government had used parties of Murrees to coerce each other, and that on this account great injury had resulted to the people of Kutchi.

Conference with assembled Chiefs.

Anarchical state of affairs in Khelat admitted.

Intending rising of the clans.

Murrees used by both contending parties to effect contrary objects.

14. Our deliberations resulted in its being arranged that the Brahooee Sirdars should take time to consider whether, under the circumstances, it was desirable that they should join the Murrees in asking the Khan's Government for peace. Did they decide to do so I on my part agreed to send their request along with that of the Murree Chiefs to his Highness the Khan by the hands of two of my own Sirdars. The Brahooee and Murree Chiefs, however, desired that I should give them in writing a statement of the objects with which I had come amongst them. This was considered necessary because the Murree Chiefs at Kahan and the Brahooee Chiefs now had explained to me that however desirous they might be to protect the trade routes and secure the safety of the Bolan Pass, without the co-operation of the Khelat Government doing so was out of their power. Before, therefore, attempting to arrange this it was necessary as a preliminary step, first to settle matters between them and the Khelat Government and get his Highness to agree to co-operate in opening out the route. I directed the Sirdars to enter this statement in their petition for peace, did they agree to make one to the Khan, which I required should be in writing.

Sirdars solicit written statement of objects of the mission.

Reasons adduced.

Settlement of difference absolutely necessary before trade routes can be opened.

15. Late that evening Sirdar Alla Dina Khoord was sent to me with the Sirdar's joint decision. He said they (the Sirdars) were quite unanimous in their earnest desire for peace, and he gave me a written request that I should apply to their Khan for it (Appendix C.) In my answer (Appendix D.) I agree to write to the Khan on the subject, and to despatch two of my own trusted Sirdars to his Highness with that object. They would be directed to explain to his Highness fully the true position of affairs, and the objects I had in view in visiting the country. It was then decided that the Brahooee Sirdars should join the expedition, and that I should proceed to Shalkot (Quettah) escorted by them and 250 of their men, and by the Murree Chiefs, and that we should remain there until the Khan's reply to their petition came. It was further agreed that we were together to inquire into the causes which had led to the closing of the Bolan Pass to traffic. The opportunity would, moreover, be afforded them of demonstrating the impracticability of keeping open the Bolan to trade without the Khan's Government aiding and co-operating with them in doing so. They said a visit to the Bolan would show the impossibility of either side separately and independently of the other keeping open the Pass.

Alla Dina Khoord presents written solicitation of Brahooee Sirdars.

Captain Sandeman undertakes to convey it to his Highness the Khan.

Brahooee Sirdars join the expedition to Shalkot (Quettah).

Advantages of a visit to the Bolan Pass.

16. My mission having so far been successfully accomplished, I decided to march the next day for the Bolan Pass, entering it at Bibinani. By taking this route I avoided coming in contact with his Highness the Khan's officials at Dadar. I decided to adopt this course until I knew that it would afford his Highness the Khan satisfaction to know of my being in the country.

Mission to enter the Pass at Bibinani.

17. On the 13th of December 1875 I left my encamping ground near Seebee en route for Bibinani. I had proceeded some distance when suddenly a party of horsemen appeared on the plain some distance off. They were apparently reconnoitring us. I at once, with a body of men, rode up to them. On reaching them they all dismounted and the chief men presented

Cause of alteration of route.

their "nuzzurs" of a few rupees. They proved to be the "Janishin" of Dadar and the Khan's commandant of cavalry stationed there. They said they had come out to meet us to entreat us to come to Dadar, and that they knew well his Highness the Khan would be delighted to hear of our arrival there. They further explained that they had collected supplies and bridged the streams we would have to cross before entering Dadar to enable us to do so in comfort. Altogether they seemed so thoroughly in earnest that I decided to visit Dadar, and in consequence at once directed my line of march to be altered with a view to visiting that place.

Meeting with Janishin of Dadar and Commandant of Khelat Cavalry.

18. On my arrival at Dadar, the Khan's artillery stationed there fired a salute of 11 guns, and not only his Highness' officials but the Chiefs and people generally appeared intensely gratified with my visit. In the evening the merchants of the town visited me, and told me of the great injury trade had sustained by the closing, during the last few years, of the Bolan Pass to traffic.

Arrival and reception at Dadar.

19. The following day, the 13th December, I halted, and here the Mingul (Sumalani) Brahooee and other headmen of the Bolan Pass joined me. One old headman was so glad to meet me that after shaking hands he lifted my hand to his mouth and kissed it before I could prevent his doing so.

Mission joined by other Chiefs.

20. On the 15th December I marched for Kirta. Just as I was starting I received a letter from the Commissioner in Sind containing subsidiary orders regarding the mission. I must here remark that previous to their arrival I had received the Government Proceedings No. 2819P: from Sir William Merewether, with an endorsement dated Commissioner's Office, Kurrachee, the 3rd November, stating that they were forwarded to me for "information and guidance."

March to Kirta in Bolan.
Letter from Commissioner in Sind.

21. The orders now received were of a nature that rendered it impossible I could comply with them, for they arrived after I had completed the preliminary negotiations with the Brahooee clans, which they were apparently issued to prevent my entering upon. Moreover, they required me to meet the Commissioner in Sind and Colonel Loch at Kusmore in Sind any date from the 20th of December to the end of that month. I may note here that the Punjab Government orders issued subsidiary to the proceedings of the Government of India required my proceeding to the Dusht-be-Daulat (a plain beyond the Bolan Pass), or some place in its neighbourhood, where the Ameer of Cabul had been requested to send an agent to meet me to confer with me regarding the opening of the Tull Chotiali route. After considering the position to prevent further complications, I referred the point demi-officially to the Foreign Secretary, forwarding to him the letter in original of the Commissioner in Sind, to which I asked him to send a reply. I explained that I was proceeding onward in obedience to the instructions received from the Punjab Government referred to above.

Impossibility of compliance with orders received.
Reasons for this.
Subsidiary orders of Punjab Government.
Reference to Foreign Secretary to Government of India.

22. On the 15th I marched to Kirta about 30 miles within the Bolan Pass. On the 16th I dispatched the Mazari and Lagari Chiefs, Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan, viâ the Robdar Pass, to Khelat to confer with his Highness the Khan about the petition for peace presented by the Murree and Brahooee Sirdars. I sent ahead of them a letter (Appendix E.) to the Khan, telling him of the deputation of these two Sirdars and the object I had in view in directing them to visit his Court.

Deputation of two Sirdars to Khelat.
Letter to his Highness the Khan.

23. The Khan of Khelat to this letter at once replied, and as what he says is very important, I here record it at length: — "I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter informing me of your arrival at Seebee, and that the object of your visiting the country is to settle the quarrels and feuds between the Murrees and Brahooees. Also that you had deputed Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan, Mazari, and Jamal Khan, Lagari, to visit me. I have made myself fully acquainted with the contents of your letter, and in reply have to state that since the British Government through Sir W. L. Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, settled the differences between the Brahooees and my Government I have maintained peace with the Brahooees and caused them no injury. Notwithstanding this, they (the Brahooee) have broken faith with me, have attacked my people, plundered their property, and destroyed their crops. When the above-named British officer settled our differences, the Brahooees bound themselves to return the plundered

His Highness' reply.

property taken from my people and from kafilas during the rebellion of 1872, but as yet they have not done this.

"The other day when the Brahooees left Khorassan for Kutchi they caused great violence to my people and again became rebels. On account of their depredations on my people I ordered my troops to attack them and punish them. But on receipt of your letter under reply, I prohibited my troops from causing any violence to the Brahooees.

"You have stated in your letter that the Brahooees have prevented Sirdar Noordeen Mingul (Brahooee) from raiding in my country, who was going to do so. But this statement of the Brahooee is quite untrue. I deputed Sirdar Noordeen to Lus Beyla to protect the country and to arrange revenue matters there. To discuss these I called him into Khelat, and he arrived here on the 14th Zelkad (13th December 1875).

"On the arrival of Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan I will let them know my desires, which they will explain to you. All is well. Consider me always as your friend and continue corresponding with me."

24. This letter, which I have had carefully translated, is important because it shows that Sirdar Noordeen (Mingul) arrived at Khelat on the 13th December, or on the very day I had concluded my preliminary negotiations with the Sirdars of Sarawan. Moreover on that very date I marched into Dadar; it was quite impossible, therefore, that on the date of Noordeen's reaching Khelat either he or the Khan could have known of my arrival in the country, or of the intention of the Murree and Sarawan Sirdars to petition to Khelat Government through me for peace. This letter also bears clear testimony to the fact of his Highness being quite alive to the state of affairs between him and the Sarawan Sirdars, for he particularly notices that if they are prepared to hold by the former agreement made between him and them by S. W. L. Merewether, on their fulfilling its conditions he will also gladly abide by it. What these conditions were, and how impossible it was for the Brahooee Sirdars to fulfil them, will be noticed hereafter.

Simultaneous arrival of Sirdar Noordeen Mingul at Khelat and of mission at Dadar, viz., on 13th December.

Why this is noted.

25. But to return to my narrative of events. As noted above, on the 16th December Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan left my camp, viâ the Robdar Pass, for Khelat. I continued my march on the 17th for Shalkot (Quettah). On the following day on nearing the Sir-i-Bolan we heard of the arrival there of the Naib of Dadar, Faiz Muhammad, and a party of Khan's troops en route for Dadar. They had left Mustung that morning. In the evening Faiz Muhammad and the principal officers with the troops paid me a visit. They were very polite, and here we heard for the first time of Sirdar Noordeen's arrival in Khelat. The news was told to the Sarawan Sirdars by the Khan's Naib in rather a triumphant manner, but they would not believe what was said, saying that the Naib was not to be depended on.

Mission reaches Sir-i-Bolan.

Meeting with the Naib of Dadar,

26. On the 18th we continued our march, and, on the following day, just after leaving the Dusht Plain, I was joined by Abdul Latif, the Naib of Shalkot, who informed me that he had received orders from his Highness the Khan to pay me every attention possible, and to treat me in exactly the same way as he (the Naib) would act towards his Highness the Khan himself when on tour.

and with Naib of Shalkot.

27. Shortly after the Naib's arrival an express sowar came from Jacobabad from Colonel Loch bearing a letter to my address. The following is a transcription of its contents. It is dated the 13th December:—"The Commissioner in Sind has "desired me to inform you that a revolution in Khelat is "clearly imminent, and he directs you to be most careful to avoid any communication "whatever with the Brahooee Sirdars or their followers, and that you are on no account "to go beyond the Murree Hills towards the Bolan, Seebee, Mittree, or Kutchi."

Express received from Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

Contents of letter.

28. To this I sent the following reply, dated Camp Shalkot (Quettah), the 22nd December 1875:—"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, without number, dated the 13th instant, informing me, by desire of the Commissioner in Sind, that a revolution in Khelat was so clearly imminent that the Commissioner directed you to tell me to avoid any communication whatever with the Brahooee Sirdars or their followers, and that I was on no account to go beyond the Murree Hills towards the Bolan, Seebee, Mittree, or Kutchi.

Captain Sandeman's reply.

"2. In reply to the above, I shall be obliged by your informing the Commissioner in Sind that I left the Murree Hills on the 10th instant, or three days before your letter

under reply was written. It will, however, doubtless afford the Commissioner in Sind pleasure and relief to know that the state of Khelat is so far quite tranquil that the contending factions, notwithstanding their differences, express their earnest desire to preserve the present peaceful state of the country, which I trust may be maintained.

"3. I am at present busily engaged in carrying out the instructions contained in the Government of India Resolution of the 16th of October last. As soon as they are concluded I will submit, through the Commissioner in Sind, for the information of the Government, the report called for in the above-named Resolution of the Government of India."

29. After despatching the reply recorded above, I received the Dumar Chiefs of the Kakar Pathan tribe, who inhabit the hills to the right of Shalkot (Quettah). They stated their wishes were those of the Brahooee Sirdars, and that they would, like them, gladly join in any arrangements I could make for the protection of trade. They told me that prior to the closing of the Bolan Pass to trade they had been in the receipt of an allowance from his Highness the Khan, which has since been discontinued. They seem well disposed, and stated as they were very poor they would be greatly pleased if I could arrange their quarrel with his Highness' Government and get back for them their allowance.

Meeting with Dumar Kakar Pathan Chiefs.

Results of interview.

30. On the 24th of December I arrived at Shalkot (Quettah) under a salute of 11 guns. In the evening I visited the town, and was received with every possible mark of honour by the Khan's officials. Here I received a letter from his Highness the Khan. It is dated the 24th Zelkad 1292 (23rd December 1875), and runs as follows: "I have to acknowledge receipt of your letter sent by the hands of Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan, Mazari, and Jamal Khan, Lagari. I have made myself fully acquainted with its contents. The above-named Sirdars have given me your message, and informed me of the kind intentions of the British Government towards me and of your own kind wishes.

Arrival and reception at Shalkot (Quettah).

Letter from his Highness the Khan.

Its purport.

"I consider myself as subject to the British Government and believe you are my friend. I am ever ready to attend to the wishes of your Government, and to be bound by my old engagements with it. I have verbally informed your Sirdars of my own views and desires, and they will explain these to you. Should you so desire it I will come myself to visit you at any place you like to name. In the meantime I send my Mustowfi, Mulla Fakir Muhammad, who will accompany Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan, to attend on you and see to your wants. All is well. Continue to correspond with me."

31. In addition to this I received a letter (Appendix F.) from my two Sirdars, then with the Khan, to say that his Highness was highly pleased to see them, and would agree to all the proposals I had desired them verbally to explain to the Khan, who had approved of them and of my arrival in the country. Altogether, up to the date of my arrival at Shalkot, viz., the 23rd December, my mission had prospered beyond my expectations, and there was every reason possible for believing that the result the Government had in view in sending it into the country would be fully attained.*

Report of Sirdars deputed to his Highness.

Favourable aspect of affairs up to this point.

* See also postscript to this letter, which contains Colonel Loch's views, which strongly support mine here given.—R. SANDEMAN.

32. But I reckoned without my host. On the 24th December I received another express from Jacobabad. It was also from Colonel Loch, C.B., and was dated the 17th December 1875. Its contents were as follows: "Under instructions conveyed to me by telegram from the "Commissioner in Sind, I have the honour to direct that "on receipt of this letter you will at once return to "your own district, Dera Ghazi Khan, and that you will report your arrival there to "the Commissioner in Sind, and explain to him why you "have disobeyed his express orders not to visit Seebee or "Kutchi, or to communicate with the Brahooee Sirdars."

Symptoms of interruption.

Letter from Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

Orders therein conveyed.

33. To this I sent the following reply, dated Shalkot (Quettah), 25th December 1875: "In reply to your No. 4419, dated 17th instant, I have "the honour to refer you to my Office No. 171, dated "Shalkot, the 22nd instant. In addition to the explanation in that letter, I have the "honour to state that I fully understand that I am on special duty, acting directly under

Captain Sandeman's reply.

" the orders of the Government of India conveyed to me in their proceedings of the " 16th of October last. As already stated in the letter above referred to, after I have " completed the duty I am now on, I shall submit a report through the Commissioner in " Sind for the information of Government as directed. At the same time I despatched a

Telegram to Foreign Secretary to Government of India.

" telegram by special messenger to Rajanpur informing the " Foreign Secretary of what had happened. I pointed out " that the orders of the Commissioner in Sind directing me at once to return to my district " clashed with those I had received from the Punjab Government, and I requested that " further instructions might be issued to the Commissioner, Colonel Loch, and myself " conveying to us the final orders of Government for guidance." This was done, but they reached too late to be of value.

34. But it is my duty here to record that the arrival of these messengers from Jacobabad was calculated to counteract the objects of my mission and to injuriously affect the minds of all the Chiefs in camp. I was continually asked by the Brahooee Chiefs if it was true that I was in the country merely for pleasure. Similar questions were asked of Captain Wylie regarding my mission, and shortly after I resumed my march en route for Mustung to meet the Khan's Mustowfi, I began to feel that even our own Chiefs were doubtful as to what my powers from Government really were. I put, however, a bold face on matters, and unchanged proceeded on my course. It had, however, been brought to my notice by Syud Aurang Shah of Dadar, who was with me, that Naib Abdul Aziz had sent off to the Khan an express sowar to tell him of all that had occurred.

Injurious effects of the orders received.

Objects of mission misconstrued,

and doubts as to its authority.

His Highness the Khan informed of counter orders received.

35. When encamped at Shalkot a large kafila arrived from Candahar. The Kafilabashi came to me and said that he had left Candahar en route to India, because he had heard from two Jacobabad kossids who had passed me in the Bolan of my arrival in the country, and he asked me to give him a Brahooee and Murree escort through the Pass. I enquired of the Naib, Abdul Latif, regarding this. He said I could of course do as I liked, but the Khan had directed that kafilas were not to go through the Bolan Pass, but were to proceed to India viâ Khelat and the Mulla. The kafila people grumbled greatly at this order, saying, its issue entailed great danger from the severe cold to the safety of the caravans. That the route viâ Khelat was a very long one compared with the Bolan Pass route, and that on the way no fodder was to be obtained for their luggage animals, &c. After considering the position, I decided I could not interfere with his Highness' orders. It was clear to me, however, that the object of the Brahooee and Murree Chiefs in bringing me to Shalkot (Quettah) was obtained, for it was perfectly obvious that without the co-operation of his Highness the Khan, as the Fort of Shalkot covered the kafila route, the Bolan Pass could not be again open to traffic.

Kafila at Shalkot.

Prohibition as to use of Bolan Pass.

Dissatisfaction of traders.

Captain Sandeman does not interfere.

What the incident illustrates.

36. I marched into Mustung on the 26th December under a salute of 11 guns, and the following day Mustowfi Fakir Muhammad, accompanied by Sirdars Jamal Khan and Imam Buksh Khan, arrived on the part of his Highness the Khan. Mustowfi Mulla Fakir Muhammad conveyed to me the most respectful messages from his Highness, and told me the Khan was most desirous of peace, and deeply regretted the misunderstanding which had arisen between him and the British Government, assuring me the Khan would come to Mustung himself, did I desire it, to say so.

March to Mustung.

Return of deputed Sirdars with his Highness' Mustowfi.

37. I sent through the Mustowfi the following reply, dated Mustung, 26th December, to the Khan's letter received at Shalkot (Quettah) recorded above:—" I have received your letter and " perused its contents. I am much pleased with what you say; I also appreciate your " Highness' kindness in sending your Mustowfi, Fakir Muhammad, to meet me.

" I have consulted with him and my Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan as to where we should meet, and I have decided in visiting you at once to consult with you regarding the duty on which the Government of India has sent me, I will therefore proceed towards Khelat directly the weather permits."

Reply to his Highness' previous letter.

38. The Khan at once replied as follows:—" I have to acknowledge the receipt of " your letter informing me of your health, also that you " were en route to visit me at Khelat. I have made

His Highness' acknowledgment.

" myself fully acquainted with its contents. I am highly pleased we are to meet, as I " am very anxious to see you. All is well, &c."

39. I may here note that the Jacobabad messenger, whom I had despatched to Jacobabad with my reply to Colonel Loch's letter recorded above, returned to my camp, saying the weather prevented his crossing the Dusht Plain. The Mustowfi, Fakir Muhammad, that day paid me a visit, and during it asked me by what authority I had come into the country, and whether I had permission from the Commissioner in Sind to arrange matters between his master and the tribes. I reassured the Mustowfi, telling him exactly what the orders of Government were. Even then, although I felt very anxious on the subject of the extent of the injury the arrival of these messengers was doing the cause I was on, I still hoped to be able to tide it over and maintained an unaltered aspect. I was, however, to know shortly the effect their arrival and news of a similar nature to that conveyed to my people by them, but received from other sources, was producing on the minds of his Highness the Khan and his advisers.

Return of a messenger.

Mustowfi's interrogations.

Effect of injurious reports.

40. I left Mustung under a salute of 11 guns, and arrived at Khelat on the 31st of December. The Khan sent out his son, Mir Mahmud Khan, a boy of 12 years of age, escorted by a regiment of cavalry, to bring me in. They met me several miles from Khelat. A salute of 11 guns announced our arrival. After seeing me to my Camp, Mir Mahmud Khan took his leave, but left with me Nawab Muhammad Khan, late Vakeel at Jacobabad, to see to my comfort. The very first question the Ex-Vakeel put to me was as to whether I had lately received letters from Jacobabad. On my replying in the affirmative, he asked in a very significant manner as to their purport. I told him, in reply, that when I visited his Highness the Khan I would give him every particular as to the objects the Government had in view in sending my mission into the country.

Mission leaves Mustung.

Deputation of his Highness' son to meet and welcome the mission to Khelat.

Questions continued as to communications from Sind.

41. The next day was devoted to visits of ceremony. I went in the morning, about noon, accompanied by Captain Wylie and Doctor Thomson and an escort of Punjab cavalry, to visit the Khan. We were all in uniform, and were received with considerable ceremony. The approach to the Durbar room was lined with troops, and everything possible done to receive us with honour. The Khan of Khelat, Mir Khodadad Khan, met us at the door of the Durbar room, and with considerable ceremony conducted us to our seats. He was surrounded by his courtiers, but with the exception of Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, whose presence in consequence was conspicuous, no Brahooee or other Chief of note was present. After sitting a little talking on ordinary subjects we took our leave.

Ceremonial visits.

Noordeen Mingul sole Sirdar of note at his Highness' Durbar.

42. In the afternoon of the same day his Highness, Mir Khodadad Khan, accompanied by his three sons, returned my visit. He arrived in Camp about 4 p.m. My escort of regular troops lined the approach to my tents and saluted him as he dismounted. On alighting from his horse he was received by Captain Wylie, I myself meeting him at the door of my tent. The Khan sat for some hours talking. He asked permission to inspect the Punjab troops, which was granted. After doing so he took his leave seemingly very much gratified with his visit.

Return visit of his Highness.

43. The next day, 2nd of January, was to be devoted to business. On the morning of that day, accompanied by Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan, I went to the Durbar room. After talking a little the courtiers were all dismissed, and the Khan and myself were left alone, our confidential attendants merely being present. The Khan retained with him Nawab Muhammad Khan Sheikh, late Vakeel at Jacobabad, and a Pathan adviser of the name of Abdulla Khan. I retained Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan.

Visit on business.

44. On our being left with the attendants named in the last paragraph, the Khan turned round towards me and asked me to be good enough to explain my desires and the objects I had in view in visiting Khelat. In reply, I told him they were those my two Sirdars, now present, had stated to him when they visited him to present to him the Murree and Brahooee request for peace. He asked me to personally inform him of my wishes. I did so, saying that I trusted he would see the necessity of making a permanent peace with the Murrees and Brahooees, and arranging with me for the protection of the Bolan Pass traffic

Khan's inquiry as to objects and means.

which I had been authorised by Government to do my best to secure. I pointed out that the Murrees had always to me maintained that their cause of quarrel with his Government was the same as the Sirdars, viz., the depriving them of service granted by his late brother, Mir Nusseer Khan, and the confiscation of their jaghire lands. On my mentioning the conditions of peace granted to the Sirdars, his Highness gave a most disagreeable smile, and said at once that the conditions of peace given to the Sarawan Sirdars were of such a nature that "neither the present Sirdars nor their children's children could fulfil them." He alluded to the conditions of peace made in 1872, which required that the Sirdars should make good the property plundered from the kafilas, and that all the property seized during the rebellion of that year by the Sirdars and their followers "from the ryots of "Beloochistan, whether in Khorassan or Kutchi, had to be restored." A reference to the record of that year will show that the rebellion had been a very successful one. Shalkot, Mustung, Bagh, Dadar, and other places having been captured by the rebels, the property in consequence which was destroyed amounted to a large sum. The money due to the Khan by the Sirdars for the kafilas plundered under the conditions of peace was of itself nearly a lakh, for his Highness said that the lakh of rupees given him that year by the Government to meet necessary expenses had been used, all but Rupees 10,000, by the Sind authorities to reimburse the merchants' losses.

Explanation of objects.

Contemptuous reference of Khan to previous conditions of peace with Sirdars in 1872.

Reasons for deeming them impracticable.

45. In reply to this explanation of his Highness, I said that all I desired him to grant the Murree clan was a peace with his Government the conditions of which they could fulfil, and I trusted after what he had said that he would take pity on the distracted state of the country, and also give the Brahooee Sirdars such terms of peace that they also could fulfil them. I pointed out that the Murree and Sarawan cause was one, and that unless a comprehensive agreement was made with all, including the Dumar-Kakar Pathan Chiefs and the Murrees and Minguls of the Bolan Pass, no satisfactory arrangements for the peace of Kutchi and the protection of the Bolan Pass for traffic could be effected.

Captain Sandeman's reply.

46. In answer to these remarks his Highness said that he could not agree to be responsible for the Bolan Pass traffic. That the original order closing the Pass was issued by Major Harrison, who sent notice to the Candahar merchants that the Pass was closed. In consequence of this order he had removed his police post of Kirta in the Pass. He said, however, he would co-operate with me in opening the Pass by directing his Naibs of Shalkot (Quettah) and Dadar to help me by every means in their power, but the responsibility for the safety of kafilas could no longer be accepted by him. Although he would accept no responsibility, he would however expect the fair share of the kafila fees which had always been the right of the Khans of Khelat.

Reasons adduced by his Highness for non-interference as to Bolan Pass.

47. I did not attempt to argue with him on the want of fairness in what he said, but in my reply endeavoured to show how greatly he and his people lost by the present state of anarchy in the country, and I endeavoured to move him to a fair sense of his duty as ruler of the country and successor of the great Nusseer Khan, by pointing to the fact that I, a British officer, after great trouble and expense, had brought to his feet the Brahooee, Murree, Dumar, and other Bolan Chiefs, and was entreating him in the name of his ancestors to have mercy on his people and country, and to make peace with the Chiefs in accordance with old Brahooee and Belooch custom. I said I was in a position to state that all the Chiefs would gladly accept the terms of peace formerly granted by his late brother, Mir Nusseer Khan.

Captain Sandeman's rejoinder.

48. For a time my earnest tone and manner did seem to move him, and I could see I had impressed him to some extent for he hesitated a little. At this stage of the conference Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan said to the Khan, he hoped his Highness would answer him plainly as to the causes which had led him to go back from the promise he had given himself and Sirdar Jamal Khan during their late visit to make peace with all in accordance with the terms granted by his brother, the late Mir Nusseer Khan. The Sirdar appealed to the Khan, asking if it was not true that he (the Khan) had not only agreed to the proposals I had sent him and Jamal Khan to make, but had deputed his Mustowfi, Fakir Muhammad, to visit me to say so and to bring me to Khelat.

Its visible effects.

Endeavour to explain inconsistencies.

49. To this his Highness gave an evasive reply, admitting however that what the Sirdar said about his having promised to make peace with the Murrees and Sirdars being quite true. Seeing distinctly

His Highness the Khan's evasive reply.

that for the present prolonging the interview would do no good, I proposed to adjourn the conference. His Highness at once signified his approval, but said he would reflect well on all I had explained to him, and would next day again visit me in camp and give a final reply. I then took my leave.

Conference adjourned.

50. On my return to Camp Sirdar Moolla Mahomed paid me a visit to tell me that the rumours about Sirdar Noordeen having of his own accord joined the Khan were quite true, and that he was playing a double part in Khelat politics, and one quite opposed to the interests of the Sirdars. The Sirdar asked me to send for Noordeen and to admonish him. This I declined to do. I said that as Noordeen had gone to the Khan of his own accord, it would do infinite harm did I interfere between the two. I may mention here that during our stay in Khelat, Sirdar Noordeen did not visit in accordance with Belooch custom our own Sirdars, but held entirely aloof from them.

Sirdar Moolla Mohamed's visit.

Declares Noordeen to be playing a double part.

Captain Sandeman declines to send for that Sirdar,

who had kept aloof from other Sirdars.

51. The next day, an hour or more before I expected his Highness the Khan's visit, Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan asked for a private interview with me, I at once granted it. On coming into my tent they said they were sure they knew the reasons that had led to the Khan going back from his promise to them. I said, "tell them." They at once replied, "The letters from Jaco- "babad have done it all. The Khan has been told that you have no authority from the "Government to make peace, and this has been told to him since we left with his "Mustowfi to bring you to Khelat." I was then informed that Ex-Vakeel Muhammad Khan had a son living at Nurpur, near Jacobabad, who had been writing news to his father about my mission into the hills, who had told it to the Khan. Our two Sirdars were strongly of opinion that the Khan himself when they first met him had really wanted peace, and that the story of my want of power from Government to treat with him alone had changed him.

Formerly deputed Sirdars seek an interview with Captain Sandeman.

Their explanation of his Highness the Khan's change of demeanour.

52. After hearing all the Sirdars had to urge, I decided, when the Khan paid his visit, to be perfectly open with him, and explain to him what my Sirdars had told me. I determined to tell him plainly with what object the Government of India had sent my mission into the country.

Captain Sandeman's resolve in consequence.

53. The Khan arrived in camp about 4 p.m. I received him as usual, and after we were seated I asked him to dismiss all but his confidential advisers, as I had something particular to say to him. This he did at once, and I told him before Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan what they had just said to me. On hearing it he opened his eyes, gave a hearty laugh, and at once turned to the Ex-Vakeel, Muhammad Khan, who was some distance away from him, and said, "Ah "Muhammad Khan, you are found out. Don't fear. I will be responsible; the Sahib "is not angry with you. It is not right for a father to fear his son," alluding evidently to the Ex-Vakeel's son who had sent the news, &c. His Highness the Khan then desired to give me full particulars of his quarrel with the Sind authorities, saying they were already very angry with him, and did he treat with me, excepting by order of the British Government, he knew, from experience, that he would give still deeper offence, &c.

His Highness the Khan's second visit.

References to news from Sind.

His Highness' fears and scruples.

54. In reply I explained to him fully my position, and I read to him from the Government of India proceedings of the 16th October last, the objects the Government desired to accomplish in sending my mission into the country. In polite language I told his Highness that it would not be becoming in me to listen, under the circumstances, to his complaints against the Sind officers.

Objects of mission fully explained to him.

55. After hearing all I had to advance, the Khan then said, "But no power has been "given you to dispose of my quarrel with Sirdar Moolla "Mahomed and the other Brahooee Sirdars. Their quarrel "with my Government has been settled by the Sind officers, and I cannot alter without "the authority of the British Government, or I may fall between two stools. Did I listen "to you and enter upon new agreements with Murrees and Brahooees, and afterwards did I "find the Sind officers had to put these in force, I would get no help from them, and my "Sirdars would in consequence get their help and support to my great loss." He said the peace arranged at Jacobabad is not a possible one (in reference to its conditions he

His Highness' reasons for not accepting proposals.

used the word *na moomkin*, meaning impossible). During this interview he spoke in a most reasonable way, and concluded with words to the effect that he could not rule his country without the aid of the British.

Further discussions and explanations.

56. In answer I again placed before him the true position of affairs. I admitted that it was true I had not the power to settle between him and the Brahooee Sirdars, but I was directed by Government to do all I could to arrange a peace between his Government and the Murrees (the Bolan Murrees included), and as the Bolan Pass could not be opened to traffic until the Murree and Brahooee quarrel about the kafila fees was arranged, he must see plainly that their dispute regarding this was really a part of it, and inseparable from the quarrel between him and his Sirdars, and to arrange it properly it was necessary to treat the matter as a whole and deal with it as such.

His Highness' expression of inability to act differently from what was required from Sind.

The cost to him and hatred between him and his Sirdars.

57. The Khan then told me plainly that he knew to do as I recommended would require him to alter his entire policy. Truth necessitates my adding that he said, "Sahib, had I met you years "ago and heard what you have now said matters would "be different from what they now are between me and my Chiefs. I have an office "filled with papers advising me to pursue the policy I am now engaged on, but if your "Government direct me to alter and send positive orders, I must obey these, but I "won't otherwise do so, as I am entitled to Government "help, having spent many lakhs of rupees in fighting and "coercing my Sirdars, whom I hate, and who hate me."

The Khan's admission of weakness.

His expectations,

and reference to policy hitherto pursued.

58. To this I replied that I understood him to say that he had not the power to reduce the country to obedience by force of arms. He admitted this most openly, saying he had no such power, and that it was this knowledge that made him feel that he must do as the British Government directed, but before complying with my wishes in regard to restoring peace on the terms given by his brother, Nusseer Khan, he claimed the right to be heard by our Government. He seemed to think our Government was bound to give him money and arms to enable him to carry out the policy he had been educated in by Government officers towards his Sirdars, saying that to that alone was due the fact of a civil war now existing in his country, with which he was unable single-handed to cope.

59. I informed his Highness in reply that so very important a point as the one he had now advanced was, of course, one I could not deal with, and also that I was quite certain our Government would never deny him a fair hearing, and, in my opinion, he ought to tell the Government what he had just said to me. He then asked me to be the bearer from him of a letter to his Excellency the Viceroy. I explained to him the custom on such occasions, and that if he wrote a letter to his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor asking him to forward his letter to his Excellency the Viceroy, I would accept it and forward the two letters.

His Highness asks Captain Sandeman to be the bearer of letters to the Viceroy and Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

60. The result of our conversation, as given above, seemed highly to please his Highness. He had come at 4 in the afternoon, and it was now nearly 9 at night. On his rising to go away I proposed that as a preliminary step to changing his policy towards his Sirdars and their tribes, I trusted he would receive the Sirdars and Chiefs now in Khelat, who were all desirous of making their submission and being received by him. He at once heartily agreed, saying he would receive all in the morning, and would hold a Durbar for the purpose.

His Highness agrees to give the Sirdars an interview.

61. Next day, at noon precisely, I went accompanied by all the Sirdars and Chiefs then in Khelat to the Durbar room. Captain Wylie, 1st Punjab Cavalry, also accompanied me.

Proceedings of next day.

The British Chiefs present were Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan, Mazari, Jamal Khan, Lagari, Sekunder Khan, Khosa, Miran Khan, Drishak, Gholam Haider, Lund, Muhammad Massu Khan, Nutkani, Mazar Khan, and Ahmad Khan, son of the Lund Chief.

Chiefs present.

Brahooee Sirdars.

Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisa-ni, his eldest son Hassad Khan, Sirdar Alla Dina Khoord, Shadi Khan, Bungulzai, Muhammad Said Khan, Junda Khan, Shahwani, Yar Muhammad Khan.

The Murree Chiefs present were—

Sirdar Mirulla Khan, Mir Hazar Khan, cousin of the Murree Sirdar, Gul Muhammad, nephew of the Murree Sirdar, Karam Khan, Chief of the Bijarani Murrees, Nehal Khan, Chief of the Loharani Murrees, Sher Dil and Kenchi Khan, Chiefs of the Mazerani Murrees (Bolan Pass Murrees), and the Bolan Pass Dumar (Pathan) Kakar Chiefs Rahim Dad and Khodadad, Mingul Brahooees Rasool Baksh, Rahu Khan, and Khair Muhammad.

The Boogtee and Khetran Chiefs present were—

Gohur Khan, son of Sirdar Golam Murteza, Boogtee, Haibat Khan, Chief of the Massuri Boogtees, Fatteh Khan, Chief of the Nathani Boogtees, Rugga Khan, Chief of the Khalpur Boogtees, Beluch Khan and Kadir Baksh, eldest son and nephew of the Chief of the Khetrans.

62. Before the Brahooee Sirdars were admitted to the Khan's presence considerable ceremony was observed. A message was sent to the Khan's Shahghassee to say that the Sirdars asked an audience of the Khan, and that they inquired after his Highness' health. A suitable reply was sent by the Khan, and they and their headmen were then admitted. On their entering the Durbar room his Highness the Khan rose and remained standing until Sirdar Moolla Mahomed saluted him. This was done by the Sirdar kissing the Khan's extended right hand and touched both his eyes with it. Both then sat down, and all the other Chiefs and their followers advanced and kissed his Highness' hand in the way Sirdar Moolla Mahomed had done. After all were seated I asked the Khan's permission to address the assembly, which was at once granted, and I did so to the following effect.

Ceremonies observed.

63. I said that the day was a very auspicious one that had brought so many Khelat Chiefs and Sirdars to the feet of the ruler of the country, Mir Khodadad Khan. I explained the object with which I had visited the country, and the great pleasure it had given me to obtain the consent of his Highness the Khan to make peace with his Sirdars and Chiefs who were also anxious for peace. That the Khan, at my request, had agreed to receive all his Sirdars in Durbar and to accept their submission, but could not arrange with them the exact terms of peace until a point we were in doubt about had been referred to the British Government. I then told the assembled Chiefs that I had one or two points to talk over privately with his Highness the Khan before he himself addressed them, and I asked the Khan to close the Durbar for a short time to give me the opportunity of doing this.

Captain Sandeman's address in Durbar.

64. My object in asking this was to enable me to make sure of the terms the Khan had agreed the previous evening to give the Sirdars and the Murrees should the reply from the Government be of such a nature as to make it advisable for his Highness to come to terms in the way I proposed with the Chiefs and clans. The Durbar was at once closed, and Captain Wylie, the Khan's eldest son, Mir Muhammad Khan, and myself were left alone with his Highness.

Durbar temporarily closed and why.

65. Addressing myself to the Khan I then went carefully over all that occurred from first to last since I entered the Kohistan by order of the Government of India, and I concluded my address by asking the Khan if he truly desired peace, and would grant it in the way proposed by me, did the Government require him to make it with his Chiefs and people. I said I particularly desired to know if he would do this willingly, and would give the old terms granted by his brother, the late Nusseer Khan.

Captain Sandeman's address to the Khan in private.

66. The Khan heartily responded to my request, saying he was quite in earnest during the previous evening in what he had said. I asked Captain Wylie to record for my information what he recollected of this and a subsequent interview with his Highness, regarding which I will presently enter upon, and this Captain Wylie has done. His letter is marked Appendix G.

His Highness the Khan's acquiescence.

67. In this way having come, as far as was possible, to a thorough understanding with his Highness, the Durbar was again opened, and the Chiefs and Sirdars took their seats. Some little time afterwards Sirdar Noordeen entered, bowed to his Highness, and took his place away from the Brahooee Sirdars, sitting down amongst the attendants belonging to his Highness' Court.

Re-opening of the Durbar.

Entry of Sirdar Noordeen.

68. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed then addressed the Khan in the following words:—

Address of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed to his Highness the Khan.

"Your Highness, we the tribes of Sarawan are your "subjects; you are our King and master. We have come "to your door to ask forgiveness for past offences, and trust your Highness will pardon "our evil deeds. Great troubles have been experienced by us all, for which we are sorry. "Look upon what has occurred as due to misfortune, and have mercy upon us. We are "your subjects."

69. To this his Highness the Khan replied, turning round to me and saying with apparent truth—"I am going to speak kindly. I will "make peace if the British Government order me to do "so after I have told it all that is in my heart." He then said—

His Highness' reply.

"Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and other Brahooee Sirdars, I (Khodadad Khan) am the subject of the British Government. My country and all that I have belongs to the British, and it is my duty to make these over to that Government on being called on to do so. The kingdom of Khelat, since my ancestors possessed it, has always been subordinate to a superior Government, and has never been a kingdom wholly independent.

"Since the British Government took Sind and came into this part of the world, Khelat has been a dependency of the British Government. But, notwithstanding this, of late years the British Government has separated itself from Khelat, and left me to rule alone. I do not know the real cause of this, for I cannot say I have neglected the advice given me by the British.

"Such being my position, and feeling helpless, I looked about for another King. I thought of asking the help of the Ameer of Cabul, or of the Shah of Persia, but I did not do so, saying to myself I am truly the old subject of the British, and one day they will surely remember the fact, and call upon me personally to explain the state of my affairs from first to last. You (turning to me) Sahib have come into this country by order of your Government, and if you tell me I must do such and such a thing, I must obey, because I am subject to the British, but you do not order me to act contrary to my wishes, therefore, before settling with the Brahooees, I must from beginning to end lay my affairs before your Government."

Turning to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed the Khan said—

"Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, once you were my subject. It is 17 years since differences first commenced between you and me. You should remember that although you have caused me loss by your acts, doing so has not benefited yourself. I am Khan of Khelat and you are my Sirdars (turning and facing all), I liken myself to a man who has the proper complement of arms and legs—I am the body, you, Sirdars, are the arms and legs. No living man desires to injure the arms and legs of his own body by his own acts, but if a limb gets diseased, and likely by remaining on the trunk to injure the entire body, he cuts it off, and casts it from him." The Khan then turned to me and said "Sahib, is it "not so? Don't the English Hakeems do this when necessity arises for it." He then resumed his speech.

"If you, Sirdars, act honestly for the future I will make peace with you. Necessity alone has caused me to injure you. Remember this, and do no more harm to my people. All that has passed between us I forgive. It is four years now since Sir W. L. Merewether settled our differences. I have held by the peace then made, but you, Sirdars, cannot say you have fulfilled the conditions you agreed to. You have not paid the value of the kafilas you plundered, nor paid for the losses caused to my people by your misconduct, although you agreed to do so. But now that Captain Sandeman has brought you here, I am willing to forgive even these matters, but first I must write to the British Government on the subject. As soon as the British Government sends me a reply I will then join Captain Sandeman, and we will together do what is ordered. Until such reply is received do not injure my people, and I will not allow my troops to injure you."

70. To this Sirdar Moolla Mahomed in the most humble tone replied—"Your "Highness, you are our King, and we are your subjects. "We have been very unfortunate and have suffered much, "do have mercy on us. We have been deprived of your favours for long. Forget our "past bad acts. We are at your feet."

Mulla Mahomod's rejoinder.

71. His Highness the Khan then addressed the Murree Chiefs as follows; but it was clearly with difficulty he could reconcile himself to the Murree alliance, for, before speaking to them, he whispered to me—"Nothing but the sword will ever cure the Murrees."

His Highness' address to the Murris.

He then said:—

"Murree Chiefs, since former times you are my subjects, and you were at one time loyal and true to the Khelat Government. Since you commenced your depredations I have looked upon you merely as a set of thieves and scoundrels, but lately you attacked my troops, killed them, and captured my guns. Since then I have looked upon you as a disloyal people. But now you have come to me with Captain Sandeman, I accept your submission, and will forgive your past conduct on condition that you abstain for the future from evil acts. If you do not do so, then Captain Sandeman will join me, and we will together punish you. Do not think we cannot do this. If the Sahib helps, we can together destroy you." His Highness then asked me to confirm his words.

72. I, at the Khan's request, addressed a few words to the Murrees. I said I felt sure they would hold to their promises, and if his Highness forgave the past it would be necessary for them to behave well. I said I had Ghuzzan Khan's written promise saying he would be responsible for Kutchi, as far as their tribe was concerned, once peace was established between the Khan's Government and them, see Appendix H. That what the Khan said was quite true, that if they broke faith after a permanent arrangement had been come to it would certainly be to their great loss.

Captain Sandeman's special reference to the Murrees.

Mirulla and Mir Nazar replied in proper terms, saying the Murrees would keep faith with the Khan. Sirdar Karam Khan said that he hoped the Khan would restore their service in taking them again into favour and give Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan back the Murree jaghire. To this request of Karam Khan's I drew the attention of his Highness the Khan.

Reply of Murree representatives.

73. The Khan then said:—"It is quite true. When Shah Nawaz Khan opposed my "father, Mir Mehrab Khan, the Murree Sirdar, Din Mu- "hammad, joined him and did good service, and on this "account my father, Mir Mehrab Khan, gave the jaghire of Tunia to the Murree "Sirdar. For misconduct I afterwards confiscated this "jaghire; but if you Murrees will give up your evil ways "and will for the future act honestly, the jaghire of "Tunia shall be restored to you."

His Highness' reference to past history of Murrees.

Why their jaghire was confiscated.

Conditional restoration.

74. Some further conversation ensued between the Murree Chiefs and the Khan, but it was of no importance, and it is unnecessary to record it. The Durbar then was brought to a close. His Highness remarking to me as I was leaving him that he would come and say good-bye the following evening, and would bring letters with him for his Excellency the Viceroy and the honourable the Lieutenant-Governor. I had arranged to leave Khelat the next day but one, as there was nothing to detain me longer in Khelat.

Durbar dissolved.

75. From what is recorded above it will be seen, as far as circumstances admitted of their doing so, my negotiations with the Khelat Government had apparently prospered well, and I felt very hopeful that ultimately peace between the contending factions, so very necessary in the interests of all concerned, would by the intervention of our Government be secured.

Apparent success of negotiations up to this point.

76. Next morning, however, I was surprised and grieved at receiving copy of a report direct from his Highness to say that the Naib of Bagh had attacked the Brahooees in Kutchi, killing several and carrying off a number of sheep and goats. On getting the news I at once sent word to the Khan to say that my delaying till the next day was quite useless, as under circumstances such as those described in the Naib's letter peace in Kutchi was quite hopeless.

Causes of disturbances.

Conflict near Bagh.

Captain Sandeman and Murrees to depart.

77. To this message his Highness sent to say that he was coming himself to my camp, and to await his arrival. On hearing this I sent for Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, and asked him what his hopes of peace under the circumstances were, and if he could account for the Khan's troops acting as they had done.

His Highness announces his desire for another interview.

The Sirdar said probably the Brahooees had committed some offence, that he and the other Sirdars were very anxious for peace, and if his Highness would agree not to cause further injury to the Brahooees, and would restore the plunder for what had happened, they did not desire to break the conditional peace agreed upon the day before.

Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's views of the untoward occurrence.

78. On getting this reply, I sent word to his Highness that I would await his arrival in camp. He came accompanied by his son, but his looks had altered very much. He said that he could not trust the Brahooee Sirdars; that they were all rebels, and, at heart, hated him and he hated them; that what had occurred was the result of their people plundering in Kutchi. To exemplify this he then said that in the Khelat State there was only one loyal Sirdar left, Fakir Muhammad, who any day might become disloyal, and he would then have to kill or hang him. He asked me not to be angry of what had occurred in Kutchi, which was merely an every day event.

Captain Sandeman accedes to another meeting.

His Highness the Khan's altered demeanour and explanations.

79. To this I replied that I was not angry, only very sorry, and greatly disappointed, as it was clear that under such circumstances no permanent reconciliation between him and his Sirdars could be arrived at. I pointed out that what he had said about Sirdar Fakir Muhammad was not apposite to the present position of affairs; that we were all his guests, and no Government, be it Christian, Mahomedan, or Hindoo, broke a truce of the nature granted by him to the Brahooee Sirdars during the time negotiations were going on. I could not, however, get him to see this. His one idea seemed to be that as the Brahooees had been misbehaving, only punishment would bring them to a proper sense of their allegiance to himself.

Captain Sandeman's reply.

His Highness' apparently fixed impression.

80. After a good deal of talk I agreed to delay leaving Khelat until the next day, the date on which I originally had decided to march, but I said I did this to show I was not angry, as I was only very deeply grieved. The Khan replied by asking me to take and deliver the letters referred to above for his Excellency the Viceroy and the Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor, remarking that he held to all that he promised in Durbar the day before.

Captain Sandeman postpones departure for a day.

His Highness' letters to the Viceroy and Lieutenant-Governor received.

81. I agreed to be the bearer of the letters which the Khan told an attendant to produce, but in taking them I informed his Highness I would in delivering them, give the Government a true account of all that had occurred, to which he assented. Just as he was giving me the letters Ex-Vakeel Muhammad Khan tried with great and marked eagerness to prevent the Khan's handing them to me, kneeling at his feet and trying to get him to change his mind. The Khan, however, was quite determined and urged the letters on me. I have the honour to enclose them, and shall be obliged by your forwarding them to the Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor for whatever notice the Government may consider it desirable and proper to take of their contents. I may here add that before receiving them, I took care that they were couched in proper terms. But I found this precaution was unnecessary. Inquiry proved their contents to be entirely the Khan's own sentiments, and when the rough copies were submitted to me for approval, the writer who brought them said his Highness had himself carefully studied the meaning of each word contained in the letters. Shortly after I had accepted the letters his Highness took his leave and his good-bye. For translation of letter see Appendix I.

Captain Sandeman's remarks in taking charge of them.

Obstructive efforts of Ex-Vakeel Muhammad Khan.

Disregard by his Highness.

Letters herewith submitted for transmission.

Believed to have been dictated word for word by his Highness himself.

82. The next morning at sunrise the mission marched from Khelat. A salute of 11 guns being fired on our departure. Just as I was mounting my horse Sirdar Moolla Mahomed again came to me about Sirdar Noordeen, urging that I should send for him and tell him to come away with me. He said if I did not do this Sirdar Noordeen would certainly be destroyed by the Khan. Under the circumstances I said I could send no such message to Noordeen, more especially as I had reason for believing that the Sirdar was playing a double part. Moolla Mahomed frankly admitted this, saying that Noordeen was a scoundrel, but notwithstanding this he urged that I should send for him. I said I could not do so. He then said: "If Noordeen joins you of his own free-will will "you let him do so." I said, certainly, and you may tell him so; however, he never came. I will notice this fact and the reasons for it a little further on.

Mission leaves Khelat.

Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's urgent solicitation regarding Sirdar Noordeen.

Reason assigned for it.

Captain Sandeman declines to interfere regarding Noordeen.

Noordeen never came of himself.

83. Just as I was leaving Khelat, another circumstance occurred worthy of note. A large kafila had arrived in Khelat that morning, the Kafilabashi ran after me and asked me to allow his kafila

Solicitation by a Kafilabashi.

to come with me. I said I had no objection to his coming with me, and would write to the Khan on the subject directly I reached my encamping ground. This I did as follows:—"Be it known to your Highness that yesterday when leaving Khelat, the Kafilabashi of a kafila ran after me and entreated me to allow him and his kafila my protection through the Robdar Pass. He stated that the other kafila routes were unsafe, and said he had a very large kafila with him.

Letter to his Highness the Khan.

"At Shalkot the Kafilabashi of a very large kafila, on account of the unsafe state of the Bolan Pass, asked me for a Murree and Brahooee escort through it. The Murree and Brahooee Sirdars with me were ready to grant such an escort, but hearing that it was by your Highness' order that the Bolan route was closed, I refused it.

"I did not allow the kafila to come with me yesterday, as I understood your Highness to say that you only desired to keep open the Mulla Pass route, but as your Highness mentioned to me, just as you were saying good-bye, that the Mulla Pass was unsafe, I write this letter to inform you of the request of the Kafilabashi and my reply, so that you can send the kafila after me if you so desire it.

"You will remember that I told your Highness in Khelat that one of the principal objects of the Government of India in sending me into the country was to inquire and report whether anything, and if so what, could be done for the protection of the Bolan Pass route, hence the present position of affairs regarding it and the kafila traffic generally is very grave."

84. The above letter I despatched to the Khan on arrival in camp, and I received a few days afterwards the following reply to it from his Highness:—"I have to acknowledge the "receipt of your letter written from Jouhan informing me of your good health; "also of the request of the merchants to afford protection to their kafilas through "the Robdar and the Bolan Pass on your return journey. I "have made myself "fully acquainted with its contents. All I had to say with regard to the merchants "and the opening of the trade routes I informed you "verbally of when you were in Khelat. I have nothing "further to add. After your departure the following event occurred:—

His Highness' reply.

Unfavourable to Kafilabashis.

"On Wednesday, the 7th instant, I sent for Sirdar Noordeen Mingul. He came, and I directed him to bring to me by force Gohur Khan Zarukzai, as he was oppressing the merchants passing through the Mulla Pass. Sirdar Noordeen replied that he would neither go for Gohur Khan, or bring him to me in any other way, and used many other arrogant words.

Announces destruction of Sirdar Nroodeen Mingul.

"As I considered Noordeen as one of my Amirs I allowed the matter to pass, but I discovered that when he returned to his abode he consulted with my Wuzeer Atta Mahomed, and the two together entered into a conspiracy against me.

Reasons for it.

"The next day, Thursday, my Wuzeer, Atta Mahomed, had a private interview with me in the Durbar-room. It is a rule from ancient times that our Kutcherry is closed on Thursday, and that I perform my ablutions. I was then alone, and the Wuzeer on leaving me sent a man to inform Noordeen, telling him of the fact, and that they should together come at once to the 'Miri' and attack me.

Particulars.

"On getting this information Noordeen collected his followers and joined Atta Mahomed, and they were both ready to attack me in the 'Miri.' But I got intimation of the conspiracy, and ordered out my troops who, instead, attacked them. A fight ensued, Sirdar Noordeen and his followers, as well as Mahomed Ali, brother of Atta Mahomed, have been killed in the encounter. Atta Mahomed himself is wounded. I write for your information. Continue to correspond with me."

Noordeen's alleged proceedings and conspiracy.

Troops ordered to attack conspirators.

Result.

85. The fate of Sirdar Noordeen, as stated by the Khan, from what I have already reported in this letter, will, I feel sure, cause no surprise. If you refer to the Khelat Diary for the week ending 19th December 1875, and my reply No. 3, dated 13th January, in answer to it, also to the Candahar news-letter recently received, you will find that for a long time it was well known that certain of the Khan's officials were conspiring against his Highness with the object of deposing him and putting his son, Mir Muhammad Khan, on the throne. How far the conspiracy extended it is not for me to say, but it was believed that not only the Wuzeer, Atta

Noordeen's conduct for a long time suspicious.

References in illustration.

Mahomed, and Sirdar Noordeen, as stated by his Highness in his letter, were concerned in it, but it was believed that on the conspiracy breaking out a Commandant of one of the regiments and some of the troops would join the conspirators. The Khan himself, I felt certain, knew of it when I was at Kelat, for he very pointedly and bitterly complained to me that his Ex-Wuzeer, Wullee Muhammad, was allowed an asylum at Jacobabad, from whence he engaged in intrigues against him. I avoided having anything to do with Noordeen for the reason I have given in this letter. I was aware also that the Commissioner in Sind, when mediating between the Khan and his Sirdars in 1872, had excluded Sirdar Noordeen from the terms of peace, recording his reasons in the following words:—"The attitude assumed by Sirdar Noordeen Mingul has placed him "beyond the pale of mediation. The Sirdars here wrote to him that, as he had not "ceased to cause disorders, they had no longer anything to do with him. I also informed "him he had lost my mediation, and his Highness the Khan was at liberty to act against "him as he pleased. Correspondence on the subject is appended."

His Highness the Khan's probable knowledge of conspiracy from the first.

His complaint about Ex-Shahghassee Wullee Muhammad.

Commissioner in Sind had previously excluded Noordeen from negociations of 1872.

86. From what transpired at Khelat it appeared that the fact of the Sarawan Sirdars having cast off Noordeen on the occasion named above had angered him; therefore when it was given out, in consequence of the information received from the Ex-Vakeel's son from Jacobabad, as related in this report, that I was not acting under orders of Government, Sirdar Noordeen held aloof from the other Sirdars, and thus paid them out in their own coin, by not joining them at Khelat in trying to obtain terms from the Khan. Doubtless he had other reasons for doing so, such as the conspiracy against the Khan in which he was engaged, but this I believe to have been one of them.

Probable causes of Noordeen's declining to join Sarawan Sirdars.

87. My own Sirdars, Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan, are of opinion that the Khan was acting quite honestly when they first met him in Khelat, and that it was the news from Sind and the knowledge which came to him later on of my being in the country in opposition to the wishes of the Sind authorities (which fact became widely known through the arrival of the messengers who brought the expresses to me from Jacobabad ordering me back to my district) that caused his Highness the Khan to go back so determinedly from what he had at first to them so willingly and heartily agreed to. Doubtless another cause was that he knew of the conspiracy against him and felt he had Sirdar Noordeen in his power; but for all that, I concur with our own Sirdars in thinking that, had no such decided action been taken from the direction of Sind, an honourable peace might have been obtained for all, the Khan himself of his own action including Sirdar Noordeen in it.

Opinions of Mazari and Lagari Chiefs.

Wide dissemination of contents of prohibitory letters from Sind.

Another probable cause.

Captain Sandeman's concurrence with Tomandars as to evil effects of.

Interference from Sind.

88. Before disposing of this matter I desire to remark on another point connected with it, viz., that Sirdar Noordeen's destruction ensued two days after I left Khelat. In considering this it has to be remembered that the late diaries received from Jacobabad, as well as the information I received when in Khelat itself, testify to the fact that a conspiracy of no ordinary kind had been organized against the Khan which, had it succeeded, would in all probability have resulted in the destruction of his Highness himself, probably at the very time Sirdar Noordeen met his death. That Noordeen and the others concerned were playing a game of this kind the whole country knew, and I think, considering the circumstances as they existed when I entered the country, matters have ended very fortunately. The position would have been to all appearances a much more difficult and serious one had the Khan and not Noordeen been destroyed, and I think, therefore, the Khan can hardly be blamed for attacking Sirdar Noordeen in the way he did on a favourable opportunity offering.

Sirdar Noordeen despatched two days after departure of mission from Khelat.

Previous intelligence as to inimical revolution.

Results therefore not so untoward as they might have been.

89. On my return journey I took the opportunity of doing my best to bring about a fair understanding between the Dumar Kakar Chiefs, the Sumalani Mingul Headmen, and the Murree Chiefs. Peace was agreed to, and on entering the Bolan Pass from the Robdar Pass, I dismissed them to their homes. All expressed their satisfaction at their sojourn with me, and their readiness at any time to join me on being sent for.

Apparent amenability of Chiefs and Headmen to Captain Sandeman's visit.

90. On arriving at Kirta in the Bolan Pass another express from Jacobabad reached me. The letter brought by it was from Colonel Loch, was addressed to me, and ran as follows :—"I have the "honour to acknowledge the receipt of your two letters, "Nos. 171 and 174 of the 22nd and 25th ultimo, and by "the direction of the Commissioner in Sind to inform you in reply to them that he "views with extreme displeasure your highly improper "and indecorous behaviour in acting as you have done, "interfering with matters in which you had no business to engage, and I am desired to "repeat his orders that you at once return to your dis- "tricts in the Punjab, where your legitimate duties lie, "reporting your arrival there for his information."

Mission arrives at Kirta in the Bolan on return journey.

Express from Jacobabad.

Captain Sandeman severely censured by Sind authorities; and

ordered to return to his district.

91. I have recorded this letter here at length, because it strongly illustrates the difficulties the mission had to contend against. From first to last not only had the support I was fairly entitled to from Sind when putting in force the orders of the Government of India as contained in their Proceedings of the 16th October last been withheld, but every means possible had been taken, by the despatch of this and similar letters, to publicly discredit and disavow the duty I was on, nor is the statement contained in this letter that I was interfering with matters I had no business to inquire into in any degree correct. The very reverse of this was the case, for not only do the Proceedings of the Government of India direct me to inquire into the general relations between the Murree and Boogtee tribes and the Khan's Government (paragraph 26), but Sir W. L. Merewether in a letter dated 25th November 1875, No. A-917, to my address, animadverts very strongly upon the recent conduct of the Murrees in Kutchi, recording his opinion to the effect that "it had been worse than he had ever known it during the last "30 years and more." There was, therefore, the strongest reason for my taking up the matter, and thoroughly getting at the true causes which have led to Murree raids in Kutchi. It is not too much to say that the mission the Government of India deputed me on has, without any doubt whatever, demonstrated that the acts of the Khan of Khelat himself in regard to confiscation of the Murree jaghire, &c., render him solely responsible in the matter, which responsibility he fully admitted.

Letter quoted at length as illustrative of Captain Sandeman's difficulties.

Orders deemed obstructive of compliance with Government of India orders.

Recent reference by Commissioner in Sind to the Murrees.

And necessity for inquiring into causes of raids in Kutchi.

His Highness the Khan's action in the matter points to this responsibility.

92. On the 9th of January I arrived at the foot of the Bolan Pass, and at once telegraphed to Government the results of my mission. I considered these to be that although his Highness the Khan would not make peace with the tribes, until I had referred to Government as to the policy he was to pursue towards his Sirdars and their clans for the future, still he had sent most submissive letters to his Excellency the Viceroy and the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor, asking for permission to submit his case from first to last to Government for consideration. In regard to my negotiations and dealings with the Murree and Brahooee Sirdars, I have been perfectly successful. They accompanied me to Khelat and made their humble submission in public Durbar to his Highness the Khan. They professed their eager desire to protect trade on most reasonable terms, while Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan has himself written to say that after peace was arranged between the Chiefs and the Khan he would hold himself responsible for Murree inroads into Kutchi. With such results before me I may with confidence assert that the cause of disturbances in Kutchi and in Khelat itself are due primarily to the conduct of the Khan himself and to the policy he had been recommended, according to his own statement, to pursue towards his Chiefs and people. I quote here from a letter of the Commissioner in Sind, No. 266, dated 1st May 1869, to the address of the Political Superintendent, as it denotes conclusively what that policy really was. "It "will be manifest to you from what is above written that the policy I would wish you "to follow is that of friendly counsel to his Highness the Khan as the sole person in "Beloochistan with whom we have any right or reason to communicate; that we are in "no way entitled to interfere directly between him and his nobles and subjects, and to

Exit from Bolan Pass.

His Highness the Khan's reluctance temporary.

His desire for free communication with Government.

Successful dealings with Murree and Brahooee Sirdars.

Ghazan Khan's professions.

His Highness the Khan himself primarily responsible for state of affairs.

Quotation from former correspondence.

" carry out this policy fairly and justly, it is above all things most important that it " should in no way be shown that we are meddling in the affairs of the country by " identifying ourselves openly with the cause of those who are acting in opposition to " him."

93. I arrived at the town of Mull on the 14th January, and here I dismissed the Murree and Brahooee Chiefs. Before permitting them to depart I recorded their views as to the causes which had led Mir Khodadad Khan to act towards them in the way described in this report. Their deposition attributes their present position and the state of anarchy prevailing in the country to the policy adopted by their Khan in his dealings with them. They say they date their present troubles from the day guns and arms were supplied to the Khan by our Government. In dealing with the present state of affairs, it should be borne in mind that they have existed for 15 or 16 years, and are now very serious.

Brahooee and Murree Chiefs permitted to depart.

Written statement of their views.

94. In considering this I do not think it is fair or right to hold his Highness the Khan personally responsible for them. He himself most emphatically said to me that in doing as he had done he was merely acting up to the advice which had often been given him. I notice too that Sir William Merewether in his letter No. 367, dated Kurrachee, 11th April 1872, paragraph 7, to his Excellency the Governor of Bombay in regard to this, writes: " I had a long " conversation with the Wuzeer Shahghassee Wullee Muhammad, and he assured me that it was his master's most earnest desire to act only in conformity with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, and appealed to me to confirm him, from my own knowledge of all that has passed, in the statement, that from the time his Highness has ascended the throne he had never once failed to act strictly up to that desire. I can most fully do so, and confidently assert that whatever faults his Highness may have, want of loyal friendship to the British Government is certainly not one of them.

His Highness the Khan's policy advised by Sind authorities.

Quotations.

95. Again, Sir W. L. Merewether in the 33rd paragraph of his letter No. 340, dated Camp Jacobabad, 5th April 1872, writes on the same subject in the following words: " I would now proceed " to offer a few remarks on the future. There cannot, in my opinion, be the least doubt " what course should be followed with regard to Khelat, or Beloochistan as it should be " correctly termed. His Highness the Khan is *de facto* and *de jure* ruler of that " country. We have treaty engagements with him, under which he is bound to keep his " subjects from injuring British territory or people, to protect trade, &c. But the treaty " is with him as ruler only, and under none of the engagements are we called upon to " interfere directly in the manner in which he carries on his government. It is, however, " an object to us that there should be a strong and well regulated Government in his " country, and it has been the custom hitherto to give him freely, through the Political " Agent at his Court, the best advice on occasions of difficulty. I must say I know of no " occasion when such advice has been rejected, and I can confidently state that the Khan " has invariably done his best to act as would be approved by the British Government. " But he has had great difficulties to contend against in the ambitious practices of certain " of his nobles. They are not many, they can easily be numbered and named, but they " have been sufficient by their restless intrigues to keep the country in a perpetual state " of ferment, destructive of all advance in prosperity. It is the state of our own country " under the Plantagenets over again."

Further questions.

96. I have quoted freely from the Commissioner in Sind's letters as given above, because what he says supports fully what Mir Khodadad Khan himself stated to me at Khelat. A consideration of the entire state of affairs leads me still to hope that his Highness, even at this late date, may be brought to a proper sense of his duty to his country and people. The Khan's letters forwarded with this report to his Excellency the Viceroy and the Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor afford the opportunity to the Government to enunciate direct to the Khan himself the views of the British Government regarding his policy and conduct, and the principles that should for the future guide him in conducting these. The opportunity is also afforded the Government of hearing the Khan in his own defence.

Above quotations corroborative of his Highness the Khan's statements to Captain Sandeman.

His Highness the Khan's solicitations by letter afford the opportunity of hearing all he has to say.

97. Should the Government adopt this view of the matter and bring Mir Khodadad Khan to a proper sense of his position, I see no cause whatever to prevent my again visiting his Court, on no doubtful mission, but on the almost certainty that he

Captain Sandeman hopeful of the effects of a further mission untrammelled as this has been.

would agree to put in force the arrangements contemplated in the Government Proceedings of the 16th October last, and to which he has already conditionally agreed. It is true that since I was in Khelat the Khan has destroyed Sirdar Noordeen ; but I do not see that his Highness can be greatly blamed for this ; for it appears, as already stated from all I can learn, that Sirdar Noordeen's destruction by his Highness was incidental to the position, and could hardly, under the known circumstances, have been avoided.

Sirdar Noordeen's destruction forced upon the Khan by circumstances.

98. But whatever decision the Government may arrive at on a perusal of this report, I would earnestly urge that delay should not be permitted to take place in taking whatever further action may be determined on, and in replying to his Highness the Khan's letters, and to the petition of the Chiefs. Delay will only make the state of affairs, already very complicated, much worse. In considering this, I trust the fact of the Murree Sirdar having agreed to be responsible for the safety of Kutchi directly peace is made between the Khan and his Sirdars may not be overlooked, and that the Murree Chiefs and the Chiefs of the Bolan Pass, without exception, have visited his Highness' Court during the most severe season of the year and publicly made their submission, craving his Highness' forgiveness, and agreeing to protect the Bolan Pass traffic on the terms granted them by his brother, the late Nusseer Khan.

An early decision solicited.

Overtures of the Murree Sirdars not to be overlooked.

99. In concluding this report, it is with pleasure I bring to notice the excellent service performed by Captain Wylie, who has been indefatigable in mapping the country, and otherwise has rendered me during the mission much valuable assistance. Doctor Thomson's services on the present occasion I also desire to bring to favourable notice. These officers are to submit reports of the duties performed by them during the tour which will be forwarded when received.

Services of officers commended.

100. The services of Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan Mazari and Jamal Khan were very valuable. They spared no trouble in their endeavour to bring my negotiations with his Highness to a favourable conclusion. The other British Belooch Chiefs and their followers behaved well, and although considerable hardship had to be endured in Khorassan from the extreme cold, not a grumble of any kind reached me. It was remarkable that during the tour no mishap or contretemps of any kind occurred. The escort of regular troops under command of Subadar Wulli Mahomed behaved on all occasions in a most soldierly like way. I felt much indebted to the Subadar for the way he performed his duties, which I will bring to the notice of his commanding officer. The escort marched from this en route to Rajanpur and Dera Ghazi Khan to rejoin their regiments on the 6th instant, Captain Wylie and Doctor Thomson accompanying it.

And of Belooch Sirdars.

Enclosure 2 in No. 64.

Appendix A.

Translation of a letter from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisani, to Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan, Murree.

I sent you Alum Kungrani lately with a message to say that his Highness the Khan has taken possession of my lands on the plea that I am your (Ghuzzan Khan's) friend, and that I had in consequence returned to you the captured (stolen) Murree mares. That it was I who had caused the Khan's territory to be raided by the Murrees. Since then the Khan has taken a fine of Rupees 1,500 from my people (Hindoos and zemindars), saying that I, their Sirdar, am his Highness the Khan's enemy, and have in consequence become the friend of the Murree Sirdar, and that it is through me the Khan's country is plundered.

The Khan has also told the clans of Sarawan that I induced the Murrees to make the raid on Dadar. That in consequence of this he is sending his son with his troops to Kutchi, and that they (the clans) should join his son and help him to attack the Murrees, because they are his and their enemies, their Sirdar having joined the Murrees.

The Sarawan headmen have come to me here, and the southern Murree headmen have sent me a letter to say that I ought to come to some arrangement about them and the Brahooees. In reply I have again sent for the Murree headmen. On their arrival I will settle matters between the Murrees and Brahooees.

Lately the Khan sent orders to his officials, directing them to give money secretly to the Brahooees, and having thus caused them to join the Juttoees, the two together would attack the Murrees. This matter was arranged, and it only lately came to my knowledge.

Directly I heard of what was about to happen I sent a man secretly to prevent the Brahooees joining the Juttoees. The Brahooees obeyed my orders, and the Juttoees were obliged to return to their homes.

I now send Muhammad Sadik and Bukhtiar Khan, Ghazni Murrees, to you to say that the Murrees do not discern between an enemy and a friend at the time of fighting. On receipt of this letter please send Mirulla Khan or Sher Muhammad to Mondai, because I expect matters will be brought to the issue between the Khan and myself. Should the result of this be a truce, I will be able at the same time to make your peace with the Khan. Should the Khan direct his troops to make an attack on the Murrees, then I will send the Brahooees to join you to aid you in opposing the troops.

Should the Khan's troops attack me, then Mirulla Khan or Sher Muhammad with the Murrees should come to my aid. It seems advisable that we should afford each other mutual aid against the Khan's troops.

Do not delay sending either Mirulla or Sher Muhammad. It is necessary that we should consult in order that whatever happens we may act in concert and prevent the Brahooees from being induced to join the Khan. Before the arrival of the Khan's son the Brahooees and Murrees should join together and arrange for the future what to do. If you act at once and send Sher Muhammad or Mirulla, the Brahooees will remain within my power. If you delay sending Mirulla or Sher Muhammad, I will induce the Brahooees to join you and send my son along with them. Be comforted regarding this, once we have joined together we cannot afford to separate our interests. This is a time of difficulty, but if we act together with one mind, by the grace of God we will achieve our objects.

Prior to this I wrote you to send the mare carried off by Sher Dil, Sherani Murree, but as yet have received no reply. Please send her to me by the bearer of this letter, and keep me aware of your health and prosperity.

Enclosure 3 in No. 64.

Appendix B.

Translation of a Mukhtiarnama of Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan, Murree, dated 4th December 1875.

Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan, having come into the country to arrange to open the Bolan Pass and to settle the feuds between the Murrees and Brahooees and other matters connected with the trade routes, I am ready to accompany Captain Sandeman with that object, but my feeble state of health does not permit of my doing so. Instead, I send with Captain Sandeman my brother Mirulla Khan and my cousin Mir Hazar Khan and some other relatives, as well as the Murree headmen, and I authorise my brother Mirulla Khan to act for me in concert with the Murree headmen during the coming negotiations. Whatever arrangement he and the headmen make there I will abide by. In virtue of this, I, Ghuzzan Khan, set my seal.

Enclosure 4 in No. 64.

Appendix C.

Translation of a petition, dated 11th Zelkad 1292 (10th December 1875), from the Brahooee Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisani, Wudera Shadi Khan, Bungulzai, Alla Dina Khoord, Junda Khan, Shahwani, and Mirulla Khan, brother of Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan, Murree, to Captain R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan, on special duty.

As your Honour has come into the country to inquire into the causes which have led to the closing of the Bolan Pass to trade, and to procure all the information you can respecting feuds and quarrels among us and the Government of the Khan of Khelat, we beg to inform you that these feuds and quarrels are of a very long standing, and have led to the closing of the Bolan Pass to trade and to the bad state of affairs in Kutchi. We were going to raid on Kutchi, but hearing of your Honour's expedition into the country, we have presented ourselves to you, and hope that your Honour will interfere and settle these disputes. If your Honour will be good enough to do this, we beg to assure you that we will hold ourselves responsible to protect trade through the Bolan Pass and prevent raiding into Kutchi. We are willing to be guided by the wishes of the British Government, and have abstained from causing further violence in Kutchi. We hope that your Honour will consult with his Highness on the subject, and let him know how earnestly we desire peace. We also beg your Honour to state to us in writing what the British Government desire to accomplish by sending your expedition amongst us.

Enclosure 5 in No. 64.

Appendix D.

Translation of a letter, dated 12th December 1875, from Captain R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan, on special duty, to the Brahooee Chiefs, Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisani, Wudera Shadi Khan, Bungulzai, Alla Dina Khoord and Mirulla Khan, brother of Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan, Murree.

In reply to your petition dated 11th Zelkad 1292, I have to inform you that I was greatly pleased to receive your request desiring me to forward your express desire for peace to his Highness the Khan of Khelat. This I have done by the hands of two of my own Sirdars, who will explain to his Highness your wishes. Should his Highness favour me with his own desires on the subject I will at once communicate these to you.

It is with much satisfaction that I observe you have voluntarily come forward to promise that for the present all acts of violence by your people will cease in Kutchi and in the neighbourhood of your country. His Highness the Khan cannot fail to appreciate your having thus acted in this way of your own free will.

In your petition under reply you, Sirdars and headmen, desire me to place on record for your information the views and wishes of the British Government, and the object with which I have visited your country. In reply, I have to inform you that my chief desire is to aid you by my influence and advice in restoring peace to the country. The British Government has ordered me to tell you that although my Government does not accept any direct responsibility for the protection of life and property beyond the British frontier, it desires to influence you, Sirdars and all concerned, in maintaining the peace of the country, and protection to trade. My instructions are to procure all the information I can respecting the local feuds and quarrels among the Boogtee and Murree tribes, or between them and the Afghans, or between them and the Brahooees; to endeavour as far as I can to bring about an amicable settlement of these; to report for the information of Government my views regarding such quarrels and feuds as I cannot settle; to report on the general relations between the Murree and Boogtee tribes and his Highness' Government.

I congratulate you all in having so heartily come forward to proclaim to the whole country your earnest desire for peace and protection to trade. The British Government will receive this your assurance with the most lively satisfaction. On my own part, in answer to your request for my aid in obtaining for you the blessing now sought for, I can most truly reply that my aid in obtaining a successful issue to your petition to his Highness is given as freely and cheerfully as you have heartily asked for it.

Enclosure 6 in No. 64.

Appendix E.

Translation of a letter, dated 12th December 1875, from Captain R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan, on special duty, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

In accordance with order received from the Government of India I have visited Kohistan to inquire into the causes which have lead to the feuds and quarrels between the Murree, Boogtee, and Brahooee tribes, and closing of the Bolan Pass to trade.

Having visited the Murree country, I arrived here at Seebee a day or two ago.

The Murree and Sarawan (Brahooee) Sirdars are with me.

All these Sirdars are most anxious for peace and for a fair settlement of their quarrels. At their request I write to tell you this.

The Murree and Brahooee Sirdars have promised me to abstain from all acts of further violence in the country, and anxiously hope their petition for peace will be listened to.

I send the Sirdars' petition to you by the hands of two of my own trusted Sirdars, who will explain the true state of affairs to you and the objects of my expedition into this part of the country.

Enclosure 7 in No. 64.

Appendix F.

Translation of a letter dated Khelat, 20th December 1875, from Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan, to Captain R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Having left your Honour's camp we arrived at Khelat yesterday. Before entering the city we sent messengers to his Highness to inform him of our arrival. The Khan sent

Atta Mahomed Khan, brother of Abdul Latif Khan, Naib of Shalkot, to meet us with 10 sowars. They met us at a short distance from the city. On arrival in Khelat they took us to a house allotted by the Khan for our accommodation. This house is a very good building and contains many rooms. The Khan also gave us four tents for our people. He entertains us in a very hospitable way. A short time after our arrival we went to pay our respects to the Khan, who received us very kindly and asked after our welfare. After a short time we took our leave. The next day his Highness sent for us again and we explained to him fully the objects of your expedition, in the way you instructed us to do. The Khan was very much pleased to hear what we told him. On being asked by his Highness regarding certain matters, we gave proper replies to the best of our ability. In short, the Khan was highly delighted, and said that to-morrow, the 21st, he would give us a letter to your address informing you of his desires. As soon as we receive the letter we will send it to you at Mustung, or wherever your Honour is encamped. The Khan has issued orders to his officials at Mustung and Shal to attend to you and to receive you at the Dusht. We expect that the order must have reached them by this time.

Enclosure 8 in No. 64.

Appendix G.

Dated Camp near Bibinani, Bolan Pass, 9th January 1876.

From Captain H. Wylie, 1st Punjab Cavalry, to Captain R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

In accordance with your desire, I have the honour to report to you the substance of what I heard and saw at the two interviews which took place on the 3rd and 4th instant between you and his Highness the Khan of Khelat, at which interviews I was, by your order, present.

The interview of the 3rd took place in the Miri of Khelat. You were attended by the whole of our Belooch Sirdars, and by the Brahooee Sirdars, and Murree Chiefs.

The Khan was in state, with his officers around him, and received us with marked cordiality.

After the usual formalities, his Highness addressed Moolla Mahomed and the Brahooees to somewhat the following effect:—

That there had been war and bloodshed between them for many years, but that now, by the Grace of God, Captain Sandeman had managed to bring the Chiefs of the Brahooees before him, and had told him they were anxious for peace, which he (the Khan) was also, he would therefore forgive past offences, and he hoped that for the future there might be peace in the country. They should, however, remember this, that when a limb of a man's body was in a diseased state he naturally tried every means to cure it, till, if all failed, he at last had it cut off. They were like a diseased limb to him, he would try and cure them without amputation, but, if all means were ineffectual, off they must come. He further said that when definite orders were received from the British Government sanctioning Captain Sandeman's mediation between the Brahooees and himself, he would come down to Kutchi and there settle all matters in dispute.

He then addressed the Murrees. (He called them a regular lot of thieves,) and said that without a good lesson he feared they would never be anything else, but that as the Sahib had brought them before him, and as they promised to behave better, he would forgive their past offences, and he hoped that their conduct would be better for the future.

On this Sirdar Kurrum Khan, Murree, got up and asked for the Tunia Jaghire to be restored to them. This and other matters the Khan promised to arrange with them and Captain Sandeman at the proposed conference in Kutchi.

Notwithstanding that the interview had had such and apparently satisfactory ending, I could not but be struck by the grave faces and downcast looks of the Brahooees and Murrees, but particularly of the former. The fact was they knew the Khan's character better than we did, and distrusted his word.

After this the Durbar was cleared, and we had a private audience. The people present being the Khan, his eldest son, Mir Mahmud Khan, and our two selves.

You first addressed his Highness and explained to him all that had occurred since our entry into Beloochistan in about the following terms:—

That the Khan was aware of your orders from Government, as you had read them to him, that on your way through the Murree country you had had an interview with Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan, who had shown you a letter he had recently received from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Brahooee, informing him of a concerted rising which was about to take place

against the Khan of Khelat's Government, and urging on Ghuzzan Khan to raise his clan and join the insurgents; that Ghuzzan had however promised to be guided by you, and that he had left the letter in your hands; that he had stated that he was not well enough to accompany you himself, but that he would send his brother Mirulla and the headmen of the various sections of Murrees with you. He also put his seal to a document authorising Mirulla to treat with the Khan, and binding himself to any settlement which you and Mirulla should make with the Khan. The headmen of the Murrees, with a sufficient number from each section, had accordingly come with you, and you had brought them into the Khan's presence.

That on the 9th December you reached the Nari River, and encamped near Seebee; the previous evening Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and the representatives of the Brahooees had joined you. The objects of your expedition were explained to them, and they were given time to think of their reply, which was to the following effect:—That, undoubtedly, a rising on a large scale was intended, and would have taken place very soon, but that as they were anxious for peace, they would like to accompany you to the Khan, and through your mediation make up their quarrel.

On the 13th December you recommenced your march, intending to go up the flank of the Bolan to Bibinani viâ Muskaff. You were met, however, by the Janashin of Dadar, who pressed you so earnestly to go to Dadar that you consented. You were received by a salute of 11 guns, and everything that the Janashin could do to make you comfortable and show you honour was done, he stating that the Khan would never forgive him if he neglected you in any way.

As at that time you did not know what the wish of his Highness might be about treating with the Murrees, &c., you despatched to him, from Dadar, our two Sirdars, Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan, with the following orders:—"That the Murrees and Brahooees were very anxious for peace; that the Government of India was also anxious that the disturbances in the country should cease; that it was quite impossible to separate the Murree and Brahooee quarrel with his Highness' Government; but that if he, the Khan, would agree to peace, there would be no difficulty about it; that you were authorised to tell him that if he would co-operate heartily with you in arranging and affording protection to the Bolan trade, and express his regret for what had passed, the Indian Government would with pleasure enter into their old relations with him."

After despatching the above message to Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan, you had proceeded up the Bolan Pass to Shalkot to meet, if possible, the Candahar Agent, and make arrangements about trade routes.

During the passage of the Bolan you had passed a body of the Khan's troops en route from Mustung to Dadar. The Naib of Dadar was with them. He came and paid his respects, and said that the Khan had ordered him to conduct you to the Dusht-Be-daulat if you wished. This offer you had declined.

At Shalkot, Naib Abdul Latif, of that place, had shown you every attention, and stated that his Highness' orders were that you should be treated in every way as he, the Khan himself, would be were he on tour. That as his Highness had shown such a kindly spirit towards you, you had determined to go to Mustung so as to be near him for correspondence, and that you had accordingly arrived at Mustung on the 25th December.

That evening Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan had returned to you from Khelat, accompanied by Mustowfi Fakir Muhammad, who was bearer of a letter from the Khan to you.

In the letter the Khan had expressed himself as willing and anxious for peace, and glad of your arrival and of the chance of your mediation; indeed so anxious was he that he would come to you wherever you wished; he had further said that he felt himself as holding his kingdom only under the British Government, and that he would go anywhere and do anything he was ordered if only the Government would inquire into his case.

You had, however, considered it best that we should go to his Highness, and we accordingly had arrived at Khelat on the 30th December, and that you were now willing and ready to try and help him in making arrangements for peace in his country, and for opening the Bolan Pass to traffic.

His Highness replied to the following effect:—

He said he was most anxious for a settlement of his case with the British Government; that though he was a King in his own country, still he looked on the British Government as his King, and that he held his land as under the English. That he was ready and willing to obey any orders sent him by our Government, but that before settling with you for the future management of his country, he wished to be told distinctly whether he was to receive orders and work with you, or with the Sind authorities; he said that

on three several occasions had he met the chief representatives of our Government, and from all he had returned "hopeless."

That when he met the Viceroy at Sukkur in 1872 he was allowed no private interview, or (as he could not speak English) any means of fully laying his case before him. He said that the last treaty drawn up by Sir William Merewether between himself and the Brahooees was of such a nature that he knew at the time that not only the Brahooees then living but their children's children could not fulfil the conditions laid down therein. He further stated that he knew he could not rule his country properly without aid; that being cut off from all communication with us, he was thinking of looking for help elsewhere, such as to Persia, or Afghanistan, but that he would gladly seize this opportunity of forwarding a letter through you to the Viceroy, and that, if the Government permitted him, he would send them an account of his case, entering fully into all his disagreements with the Sind authorities; that also, if permitted, he would gladly proceed to Calcutta, or London, or anywhere he was ordered, and meet the heads of the Government, and in person lay his case before them, but that he earnestly entreated that he might be told definitely whether he was to deal with Sind or the Punjab, for that at present he felt he was in danger of falling between two stools, and of having no settlement of his case and no proper understanding with the British Government.

He said that in now tendering his submission he begged to be allowed to say that though he was heartily sorry for the disagreements which had arisen between the British Government and himself, he felt that he could not say he was sorry for any act of his own, as on all occasions, according to the best of his ability, he had endeavoured to carry out the wishes and instructions sent him, and that he had not succeeded in this he attributed in great measure to the demands made and to the misunderstandings which had taken place between himself and the officials with whom he had to deal.

You here asked his Highness how it was that his words now were different from those he wrote to you to Mustung, and also to what he had said to Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan.

To this he replied, that his chief adviser, Nawab Muhammad Khan, had a son at Shahpoor near Jacobabad, and that this son had been told that you were up here without proper authority; in fact, that you were wandering about the country for your own pleasure, and not by orders of Government. This the son had written to his father, who had warned the Khan not to treat with you, and that he naturally felt that until he received positive orders from the Supreme Government he could not bring himself to look on you as a properly authorised ambassador.

The Durbar was then again opened and the trusted Native officials on both sides admitted.

The Khan entered pleasantly into conversation with all, and joked Nawab Muhammad Khan as to his feelings with regard to Sind. The form of letter which the Khan was to address to Government was then arranged, and we took our departure much pleased with our interview. I myself was much struck by the Khan's manner, with the clearness and force with which he spoke, and with the pleasant way in which he addressed the Sirdars, always seeming to have some happy remarks or joke to make with each. I came away with the impression that if he had always had fair treatment from us, much of the evil which now reigns supreme in the country might have been averted. It will be understood from what I have written that it was with surprise and pain that on the 4th instant we received the information that the Khan's troops at Bagh had attacked the Brahooees near there, killed five of them, and taken several prisoners and some cattle.

You sent to the Khan to say that after the information received you felt obliged to march. He replied that he hoped you would stay, and that he would come and see you in the afternoon. The Brahooee Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and the Nawab Muhammad Khan having also requested you to do so you consented.

In accordance with this arrangement the Khan arrived in camp about 4 p.m. By your order I was with you during the interview, and the few really trusted Native gentlemen on both sides were also present. I was at once struck by the complete change of his Highness' tone of voice and manner.

He asked why you were leaving him, and for what reason you were angry?

You then told him you were not angry but sorry; and that the surprise and pain which the news received from Kutchi had given you was great; that you had brought the Murree and Brahooee Sirdars to his feet, and that in open Durbar he had forgiven them; that it was not the custom of any people, whether Christian, Mahomedan, or Hindoo, to attack their enemies while treaties of peace were under consideration; that you could not look on this breach of faith with any feelings but those of sorrow, and that you were

sure the British Government would do the same; that his Sirdars and people were most anxious for peace, but that by this action he had destroyed all hope of it for the present.

To this he replied that he could not see much harm in his conduct; that we must clearly understand that the attack on Brahooees had been made by his orders, and that it was in no way the fault of his servants. That there had been long years of warfare between himself and the Brahooees, and that the quarrel could not be patched up in a day. That he was ruler in his own country, and that he meant to keep that country in order by force of arms; that the Amir of Cabul did so, and why should not he, the Khan. That he would, if you requested it, give up the prisoners, but that he would not restore the cattle or make any other restitution. He further stated that he considered the best way to get his country into order was for the British Government to give him aid with troops and money. The Khan added that notwithstanding that he considered it necessary to treat his subjects in this way, and that he could not repent of the action of his officials in the matter, still he hoped that you would convey his letter to the Viceroy, and assure the British Government of his earnest desire for a settlement of his affairs with it. He then repeated his words of the previous day, saying he would go anywhere to meet a properly authorised Envoy, or even to the seat of Government, if that was the wish of the Governor-General. You replied that you would forward his letter, and he then prepared to hand it to you. This Nawab Muhammad Khan tried to prevent, and in his eagerness got up and knelt before him, holding the letter in his hands, but the Khan was determined, and himself placed the letter in your hands.

He then said, Sahib, if you and I are permitted to work together, see if we don't get the country all right, but after this, don't let me fall out of your hands again, it will be to my great loss.

The interview then closed, and the Khan took his departure.

The next morning, as originally intended, we commenced our return march towards the Punjab. A salute of 11 guns being fired by the Khan's artillery on our setting out.

Enclosure 9 in No. 64.

Appendix H.

Translation of a letter, dated 22nd December 1875, from Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan, Murree, to Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 14th December 1875, and, in reply, I beg to state that prior to its receipt in obedience to your order, I made the Murrees to return the plundered property taken last year from Kutchi. It is the Dhoombkees, Brahooees, and Khujjuks in reality who induced the Murrees to raid in Kutchi. The Murrees themselves do not do so. Moreover, no arrangements for the protection of Kutchi have as yet been entered on.

The camels recently plundered from Kutchi, the restitution of which you now ask in the above-named letter, were carried off by the Murrees before your arrival in Kutchi. After you have come to an understanding with the Murrees for the protection of the Khan's country, I will act as you may order, and will be responsible for Murree raids into Kutchi. To settle about this, I have sent my brother, Mirulla Khan, Mir Hazar Khan, Gul Muhammad Khan, and the Murree headmen with you.

Enclosure 10 in No. 64.

Appendix I.

Translation of a letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, Punjab.

Captain Sandeman has paid me a visit, and from him I have heard of the kind desires of the Governor-General of India towards me. He also told me that your Honour wished me well.

I am the subject of the British Government, and have always considered myself in that light.

I have told Captain Sandeman the state of my affairs. He will explain it to your Honour.

I have taken the opportunity of sending a letter for his Excellency the Governor-General. Be good enough to forward it, and obtain a favourable reply to the request it contains.

Treat me with kindness, and consider me as your well-wisher and friend.

Enclosure 11 in No. 64.

Appendix K.

Translation of a petition from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisani, Wudera Shadi Khan Bungulzai, Said Khan, Muhammadshahi, Alla Dina Khoord, and the Murree Chiefs, Mirulla Khan and Mir Hazar, to Captain Sandeman, dated Camp near Mittree, 13th January 1876.

It is about 12 years now since we first went to war with his Highness the Khan of Khelat. Four years ago a kind of settlement was arranged between the Khan and ourselves, but it was not a satisfactory one. The Khan himself did not hold to the agreement, but took possession of our lands. He also, from our tenants, levied money contrary to our laws. Prior to your arrival the other day in the country the Brahooees and Murrees in despair were about to collect, join their forces together, and attack the Khan's troops. It was with great pleasure we heard of your arrival in the country, as we were very anxious for a settlement of the feud without resorting to arms, and we gave you a petition asking you to arrange our dispute with the Khan. You took our petition and said you would send it by trustworthy messengers to his Highness the Khan. You informed us that you were going towards the Bolan, and you wanted us to accompany you; we agreed, and we decided not to commence war with his Highness the Khan. You sent off your confidential agents to his Highness with our request for peace. Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan visited the Khan with the object of discovering his views on the subject, and whether he would agree to settle with us and prevent his troops doing our people further injury. In pursuance of our desire for peace directly we had decided to ask his Highness for it, as Noordeen Mingul had acted hitherto with us, we sent off sowars to tell him what we had decided to do. But before our sowars reached Noordeen it appears he put faith in promises of the Wuzeer, Atta Mahomed Khan, and has of his own accord gone into Khelat.

On your (Captain Sandeman's) arrival at Shalkot a reply came to you from the Khan agreeing to our request for peace. In that letter (which you read to us) the Khan said he had directed his troops and servants to cease from causing our people further injury. After this you marched towards Mustung. On your arrival there, your Sirdars, Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan, accompanied by Fakir Muhammad Mustowfi, arrived bringing a letter from his Highness the Khan. In that letter (which you also read to us) the Khan expressed a desire to meet you at any place you might appoint. You, having regard for the position of the Khan as ruler of Khelat, said you would go and visit him. We, the Sirdars of Sarawan, and the Murree and Boogtee and Dumar (Kakar) Chiefs all agreed to go with you, and did so. We presented ourselves before the Khan in Durbar at Khelat. According to the ancient custom of the Khelat State we humbled ourselves before the Khan, making our submission to him, and asked for peace and forgiveness. You yourself were present and saw and heard all that passed. You also heard the Khan accept our submission, and his agreeing to forgive past offences. In open Durbar you heard the Khan himself say that the condition on which the former peace was made, viz., that we were to give compensation for plunder taken in the former rebellion, was not only impossible for us to fulfil, but his Highness declared openly that our children's children could not do so. The Khan then told us to take comfort; that he had some matters to refer to the British Government, and after getting a reply he would arrange a fair settlement of our case according to the ancient State laws, and would in the meantime prevent his troops injuring us and our people. He asked us to promise not to injure his people, and this we agreed to.

This matter being settled we were indulging the hope that all was well, when suddenly, when you were still in Khelat, news was received by you from the Khan that Abdul Aziz, Naib of Bagh, had with the Khan's troops attacked our people, killed five, and carried off some property and flocks. On hearing this, after holding an interview with his Highness the Khan, and finding that peace was not then possible, you the following day left Khelat. The Khan fully admitted to you that by his orders his troops had injured our people.

On our arrival with you in the Bolan Pass, after leaving Khelat, news reached us of the death of Noordeen Mingul and several of his followers at the hands of the Khan. The Wuzeer, Atta Mahomed, is also said to be killed, and Ali Jan Shahgassee put in prison.

It is clear to us that the Khan's object is to gradually destroy his Sirdars and take possession of their lands. He desires to rule the country by means of his slaves and servants, and to resume all jaghires and revenue free grants. For instance, having murdered Taj Mahomed, he possessed himself of his lands. What the Khan is

doing is quite contrary to the laws of Khelat. When his ancestors took possession of the country, ours aided them, and the rule and custom of the country is for the Khans of Khelat to hold power through their Sirdars and Chiefs, and their tribes. In return for aiding the Khans of Khelat to rule, the Sirdars were allotted lands and revenue free grants. Now the Khan has again waged war on us to achieve the objects named in this petition, we must meet him in the field or else fly the country. The English Government rules the country, and is in the light of a king to us, we therefore submit this statement in order that a just view by Government may be taken of our position, and steps taken to restore peace and order to our distracted country. Since the British Government gave our Khan arms and guns he has used them with the objects of destroying us, and from that day the ruin of the country commenced. For the present we are all going to retire to the Murree Hills. We, Murrees, Brahooees, Dumars, and Sarawan Minguls, are ready and willing to protect trade passing through the Bolan Pass. We have the power to protect trade when in the pass, but the Khan himself does not desire to open the Bolan Pass to traffic. He, the Khan himself, told you (Captain Sandeman) this. The reason for this is that in accordance with old custom, and also in accordance with Sir William Merewether's settlement of our case, the seventh part of the kafila fees is the right of the Sarawan Sirdar, Moolla Mahomed. This of itself is of great value. There are also other shares, badrakhie fees, that go to the tribes in the pass who protect the kafilas. The Khan desires to prevent our getting our fair share of the fees, and wishes to send all the kafilas via Khelat and the Mulla, to enable him to levy for himself all the custom dues, &c. Going by the Mulla is most detrimental to the caravans, but the Khan does not care for this, or what trouble they are subjected to. The Khan himself told you he would not protect the Bolan; but the British Government might open the pass; that he would not be responsible. Why should the Khan get the customs and other fees if he does not aid in keeping open the pass? Without the Khan's aid we cannot open the pass, because his Highness has troops at Dadar and Shalkot, and we could not undertake the responsibility on that account. What is given above is our case, which we represent to the Government for consideration.

No. 65.

Telegram, dated 11th March 1876.

From Colonel Munro, Jacobabad, to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Khan's troops and Sarawan Sirdars have fought on Murree border, result reported unfavourable to Khan, whose loss is stated at 20 to 30. Brahooee Sirdars concerting combined movement against Khan, expressing disappointment at our inaction.

No. 66.

Telegram, dated 13th March 1876.

From Colonel Munro, Jacobabad, to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Candahar caravans returned from Hindoostan, numbering 2,000 to 3,000 camels, arrived at Shikarpoor. Merchants clamouring for help through the passes. Major Sandeman believes it feasible on orders issuing. Experience acquired here demonstrates absolute necessity of Political Superintendent, recommended in paragraph 38 of my report, having charge also of Upper Sind District.

No. 67.

Telegram No. 671P., dated Fort William, 14th March 1876.

From Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to Colonel Munro, Jacobabad.

Your letter, No. 20 of 12th February, transmitting Major Sandeman's report of his mission, and your subsequent telegrams, and the letter of the Khan of Khelat, have been considered by the Governor-General in Council; your conclusions are generally concurred in, and suggestions approved. If, though you are satisfied that Khan and

principal Chiefs of all parties, including Jalawan and Sarawan, are ready to accept Major Sandeman's arbitration, you are authorised, should you deem it desirable under present circumstances, to depute him to meet Khan and Sirdars in Kutchi or elsewhere, as may be convenient, and make a renewed attempt to carry out objects set forth in Government Resolution of 16th October, that is, a general settlement of differences between the tribes themselves, and between them and Khan, and also, if Khan shows a proper spirit, the re-establishment of friendly relations between him and British Government. Major Sandeman should be accompanied by military escort of such strength as you consider amply sufficient for his protection and dignity, the troops being taken from Punjab or Sind, or both Punjab and Sind, as you may think fit; military authorities of Punjab and Sind will be instructed accordingly. Major Sandeman may also have the services of any available officers, civil or military, whose assistance he requires and you consider necessary; and you may advance to him from the treasury such funds as he may need. In short, the Government of India, having confidence in yourself and Major Sandeman, desire that the latter be allowed, under your orders, a full opportunity of effecting, under the most favourable circumstances, a settlement of Khelat affairs.

A letter from his Excellency to the Khan of Khelat, in reply to his communication, will be transmitted to you in due course. Pending further orders you will continue at Jacobabad in charge of political relations of the British Government with Khelat and frontier tribes from Dera Ghazee Khan to the sea under the immediate orders of the Government of India. Bombay Government will be requested to place at your disposal the service of Belooch guides. Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed should be desired to leave Jacobabad forthwith, and reside at Dera Ghazee Khan, as suggested. Order on subject of transfer of internal administration of Sind Frontier District from Sind to Punjab will issue hereafter.

No. 68.

No. 671(*a*)P., dated Fort William, 14th March 1876.

Extract from the Proceedings of the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Read again—

Resolution No. 2819P., dated 16th October 1875, conveying instructions to Major Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazee Khan, in reference to his proceeding to the Murree Hills, and setting forth the policy of the Government in regard to Khelat affairs.

Correspondence ending with this office, telegram No. 102P., dated 20th January 1876, relieving the Commissioner of Sind from all responsibility for Khelat affairs, and entrusting the political charge of those affairs to Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, Commissioner of the Derajat Division of the Punjab.

Read—

Letter from Major Sandeman, No. 8, dated 5th February, to Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, submitting report of his proceedings under the above Resolution.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, dated 12th February, transmitting above, and making suggestions for future conduct of our relations with Khelat.

Letter from Khan of Khelat forwarded with Punjab Government's letter, No. 1C., dated 19th February.

Telegram from Punjab Government, dated 20th February, containing Lieutenant-Governor's opinion as to action to be taken on above.

Telegrams from Colonel Munro reporting events in Khelat since the return of Major Sandeman.

Khelat diaries.

Observations.—In reference to these papers two questions of importance have to be considered:—

First.—What action shall be taken by the Government in view of the state of affairs in Khelat reported by Major Sandeman, and subsequent events?

Secondly.—Are any further measures immediately necessary for efficiently conducting British relations with Khelat now that the Commissioner in Sind has been relieved from responsibility in reference to them?

2. With regard to the first question, viz., what action shall be taken by the Government in view of the state of affairs in Khelat reported by Major Sandeman, and subse-

quent events, his Excellency in Council observes that the policy of the Government in regard to Khelat affairs is thus set forth in paragraph 25 of the Resolution of 16th October 1875: "So far as the influence and good offices of Frontier Officers can be "used to promote peace and good order and settle disputes, whether among the tribes or "between the tribes and the people of Seebee or the Government of the Khan, his "Excellency in Council desires that they shall be freely exercised, but the responsibility "for the government of the country and the maintenance of order does not devolve on "the British Government."

3. In pursuance of this policy, Major Sandeman was deputed to the Murree Hills with the following instructions:—

"At present the real causes of the quarrels and disturbances which prevail are but imperfectly known. Without fuller and more explicit information there is little prospect of the influence of the British Government being successfully applied to their settlement. His Excellency in Council therefore desires that Captain Sandeman shall proceed into the Murree Hills as early in the cold season as practicable, in order (1) to procure all the information he can respecting local feuds and quarrels among the Murree and Boogtee tribes, or between them and the Afghans, or between them and the Brahooees; (2) to endeavour as far as he can to bring about an amicable settlement of these quarrels; (3) to report for the information of Government, through the Commissioner in Sind, his views on such as he cannot settle; and (4) to report on the general relations between Murree and Boogtee tribes and the Khan's Government. Sir William Merewether may, if he thinks fit, depute an officer from Sind to be associated with Captain Sandeman, but in subordination to him.

"Captain Sandeman will also inquire and report whether anything, and if so what, can be done for the protection of trade viâ the Bolan, and whether a system of fixed tolls on caravans could not be arranged for, the proceeds of which would go to the tribes interested in the protection of the route. In respect to all or any of these objects Captain Sandeman will have discretion to make any arrangements he considers to be advisable, within the total sum sanctioned after the Mittunkote Conference, viz., Rs. 66,960 per annum."

It was added—

"Should the measures now authorised be successful in affording reasonable security to trade through Khelat territory, and should his Highness the Khan show an earnest desire to co-operate for this end, and to return to a proper sense of his duties, it will afford the Governor-General in Council great pleasure, on receiving an expression of regret for what has occurred, to restore the former subsidy and re-establish the old friendly footing with his Highness' Government."

4. Major Sandeman duly carried out the above instructions. Proceeding from Hurrund, on the Dera Ghazee Khan frontier, on the 22nd November he entered the Murree Hills, and in the course of a long tour through Kahan, Seebee, the Bolan Pass, Quetta, Mustung, and Khelat, had friendly conferences with the Chiefs of the Murree and Boogtee tribes, the Brahooee (Sarawan) Sirdars, the Afghan Chiefs of Seebee and Shujjak, and ultimately with the Khan himself.

5. From his interesting report it appears that his mission was in one respect a failure; he did not succeed in settling the disputes between the Murrees and Boogtees and the Brahooees, or between them and the Khan; but, nevertheless, in the opinion of the Government of India, it was by no means wholly unsuccessful; it proved, if it did nothing more, that the advent of a British officer as mediator was most welcome to the Chiefs of Khelat. By all parties with whom he came in contact, by Murrees and Boogtees, by the Afghans of Seebee, by the Brahooee Sirdars, by the Dumar Kakar Patan Chiefs, by the Minguls of the Bolan Pass, and by the Khan himself, Major Sandeman was received in a spirit of marked friendliness and respect; indeed all seemed tending to a successful issue when a change appears to have taken place in the disposition of the Khan, which change Major Sandeman attributes to some doubts which arose as to his position and authority; but, even after this, he was still treated with consideration. The Khan himself, though he drew back from the promises of a reconciliation, "on the "basis of Nusseer Khan's settlement," made to the Belooch Sirdars who proceeded in advance, still professed his readiness to comply with the directions of the British Government; at Major Sandeman's request he received the Brahooee Sirdars in Durbar; expressed his willingness to forgive the past, and to abstain from hostilities against his Sirdars, pending the orders of the British Government, and eventually made Major Sandeman the bearer of a letter to his Excellency the Viceroy, couched in submissive terms, asking permission to offer an explanation of his conduct through Major Sandeman, or to attend at any place required to offer it in person.

6. If the history of the mission had ended here there would indeed have been little doubt as to the course to be pursued; for as the British Government had, by the deputation of Major Sandeman, expressed its willingness that the influence and good offices of its frontier officers should be used for promoting good order and for the settlement of disputes in Khelat, and as the officer deputed had been received in a most friendly manner by all parties interested, it would have been only in accordance with past orders to allow Major Sandeman to complete the work which had been commenced with promise of success but had been interrupted by circumstances; but, unfortunately, during the stay of the mission in Khelat territory two events occurred which seemed likely to place difficulty in the way of effective mediation.

7. In the first place, on the very day after the Durbar in which the Khan had declared for a suspension of hostilities pending the decision of the British Government, his Naib in Kutchi (acting, as the Khan afterwards admitted, under his own orders) opened fire upon some Brahooee followers of the Sirdars, killed several, and carried off some head of sheep and goats. The occurrence was announced by the Khan himself, who explained that it was in punishment for an attempt to plunder. Major Sandeman was justly aggrieved at the Khan's conduct; but as the leading Brahooee Chief did not attach, apparently, much importance to what had taken place, it need not probably be regarded as a serious obstacle to reconciliation.

8. The second and most serious occurrence was that Noordeen, the Mingul Chief, was killed by the Khan's troops a few days after Major Sandeman had left Khelat. The Chief had arrived at Khelat some time before Major Sandeman, and his advent was in no way connected with that officer's visit; his death, therefore, was not in violation of the pledge of safety given by the Khan to the Chiefs accompanying Major Sandeman, and the honour of the British Government is not concerned in the matter. The Khan, indeed, who was the first to inform Major Sandeman of the event, explained that in causing the death of the Sirdar he simply anticipated an attempt to be made on his own life; as the Chief is said to have been an unscrupulous intriguer, and as Sir William Merewether has reported that he was at the time engaged in a conspiracy to dethrone the Khan, it is possible, indeed not improbable, that the Khan's story is correct.

9. However this may be, the occurrence had an unfortunate effect, and made it necessary for the Government of India to pause for a time and watch the progress of events before deciding upon the continuance of a policy of mediation. From Colonel Munro's telegram of the 9th of February, it appeared that the Brahooee Sirdars (Sarawans) having lost all confidence in the Khan in consequence of the death of Noordeen, were in communication with the Jalawans in view to a general rebellion; that plunder and anarchy were generally prevailing, and the Khan's troops cooped up in Bagh and Dadur; and on the 16th it was reported that raiding by Murrees and Sarawans was going on in Kutchi. A telegram of the 29th announced a temporary lull in hostilities, both sides clearly awaiting indication of further action by the British Government; it stated further that a satisfactory communication had reached Colonel Munro from the Khan, while the Brahooee Sirdars wrote similarly, suspending hostilities against the Khan; and in the Khelat diary of the 21st February it was reported that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, the Sarawan Chief, had written to urge the Government to mediate between the Brahoocs and the Khan, stating that all the Sirdars, Jalawan and Sarawan, would attend to the wishes of the British Government, and that he could explain how the Jalawan quarrel with the Khan could be arranged. But on the 11th of March a collision was reported between the Sarawan Sirdars and the Khan's troops upon the Murree border, and the Brahooee Sirdars were said to be concerting a combined movement against the Khan, expressing disappointment at the inaction of the British Government. Lastly, from a telegram of the 13th, it appeared that Candahar coravans returned from Hindoostan, numbering from 2,000 to 3,000 camels, had arrived at Shikarpore, and that merchants were clamouring for assistance through the pass, which might, in the opinion of Major Sandeman, be easily arranged on orders issuing.

10. Such being the state of affairs in Khelat territory, the time has now arrived when it is necessary for the Government definitely to decide what course is to be pursued; whether they will abandon the task of mediation or instruct Major Sandeman to proceed with his endeavours to effect a settlement.

11. Major Sandeman remarks, "I am not without hope that the Khan, even at this "late date, may be brought to a proper sense of his duty to his country and his people," and "I see no cause whatever to prevent my again visiting the Khan's Court on no "doubtful mission, but on the almost certainty that he would again put in force the "arrangements contemplated in the Government Proceedings of the 16th October "last."

Colonel Munro, an officer of long frontier experience and sound judgment, observes that "no impediment presents itself to a fair trial of Major Sandeman's renewed pro- "posals," and he recommends accordingly that "advantage be taken in conveying the "replies of Government to the Khan's letters to reopen communication with Khelat "and the Sirdars," with the proviso that "renewal of communications be accompanied "not indeed by threats of armed intervention, opposed to the principles laid down in "paragraph 7 of the Government of India letter No. 2214P., of the 9th October 1874, "and in subsequent orders, but with such unmistakable evidence of full moral support "accorded by the Government to the officers deputed, as will obviate the possibility "of any recurrence of past misconstruction as to motives, objects, and authority."

The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab in his telegram of 20th recommends that "in the first place the Khan be permitted to submit a statement of his case to the "Government of India;" and that Major Sandeman "be instructed to persevere in "endeavouring to obtain objects laid down in Government of India's letter of 15th "October."

12. After full consideration of all the circumstances of the case, the Government of India are of opinion that the course proposed by Colonel Munro and supported by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab is the best that can be adopted under the circumstances, viz., that Major Sandeman should be allowed to endeavour to carry out, under more favourable circumstances, the objects for which he was deputed to the Murree Hills; it is clear that he has not as yet had a fair chance of achieving success; present circumstances are not such as to render success hopeless; on the contrary there is, so far as can be judged, a desire on the part of all for the intervention of the British Government; until therefore a renewed attempt at mediation shall have been made and failed, the Government of India is not prepared to abandon the line of action taken in October last. Intervention under these circumstances will be widely different from that proposed by Sir William Merewether and rejected by the Government of India in this Office letter No. 16P., dated 5th January 1875.

13. Accordingly orders will at once issue that if Colonel Munro is satisfied that the Khan and principal Chiefs of all parties, including Jalawans and Sarawans, are ready to accept Major Sandeman's arbitration, he is authorised, should he deem such a course desirable under present circumstances, to arrange for a meeting between Major Sandeman, the Khan, and his Sirdars in Kutchi, or elsewhere as may be convenient, and make a renewed attempt to carry out the objects set forth in the Government Resolution of the 16th October last, that is, a general settlement of differences between the tribes themselves and between them and the Khan; and further, in extension of those orders, if the Khan should show a proper spirit, the re-establishment of friendly relations between him and the British Government. Major Sandeman should be accompanied by a military escort of such strength as the Commissioner may consider amply sufficient for his protection and dignity, the troops being taken from the frontier forces of the Punjab or Sind, or both the Punjab and Sind, as the Commissioner may think fit. Major Sandeman may also be allowed the services of any available officers, civil or military, whose assistance he requires and the Commissioner considers necessary; and the Commissioner is empowered to advance to him from the treasury such funds as he may need. In short, the Government of India having confidence in Colonel Munro and Major Sandeman desire that the latter be allowed, under the Commissioner's orders, full opportunity of effecting under the most favourable circumstances a settlement of Khelat affairs. A letter from his Excellency the Viceroy to the Khan of Khelat, in reply to the latter's communication, will be transmitted to the Commissioner in due course. Some minor points referred to in the reports under consideration will be disposed of by separate letter.

14. His Excellency in Council proceeds to consider whether any and what further measures are required to secure the effective political management of the Khelat border.

15. Under orders contained in the telegram to the Commissioner of Sind, No. 102P., dated 20th January 1876, the Commissioner of Sind was relieved of all responsibility for Khelat affairs, and the political charge of those affairs was entrusted to the Commissioner of the Derajat Division of the Punjab. His Excellency in Council now desires that it be clearly understood that the political jurisdiction of the Commissioner of the Derajat Division extends through the whole length of the Khelat frontier from Hurrund to the sea, and that all information, reports, or political information of any kind received by the Sind Police stationed at or near the Khelat frontier, be furnished direct to Colonel Munro, as heretofore to the Political Superintendent of the Sind Frontier District.

16. His Excellency in Council further desires, with reference to paragraph 52 of Colonel Munro's report, that the services of the mounted police maintained in Sind

Districts under the designation of Belooch Guides be made available to, or placed under the orders of, the officer in charge of our political relations with Khelat.

17. Lastly, his Excellency in Council has arrived at the conclusion that it will be necessary, for the effective political management of the Khelat border, that the portion of Upper Sind known as the Frontier District should be placed under the administrative control of the Punjab Government, and an application for sanction of Her Majesty to this transfer will be made to the Secretary of State in Council in order that a Proclamation to that effect may be issued under the provisions of 28 Vict. c. 17.

Nos. 671(*b*)P, 671(*c*)P.

Ordered that a copy of the foregoing Resolution be forwarded to Colonel Munro and to the Government of the Punjab and Commissioner in Sind for information and guidance.

No. 671(*d*)P.

Ordered also, that a copy of the foregoing Resolution be forwarded to the Government of Bombay for information and guidance, special attention being called to paragraph 15.

No. 69.

Government of India. Foreign Department. Political.

To the most Hon. the Marquis of Salisbury, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Marquis, Fort William, the 17th March 1876.

With reference to our Despatch No. 6, dated 14th January 1876, on the subject of Khelat affairs, we have the honour to transmit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government the accompanying papers :—*

2. These papers include the official Report of Captain (now Major) Sandeman's proceedings which were briefly noticed in paragraph 9 of the above Despatch; the recommendations of Colonel Munro, the officer now in charge of our political relations with Khelat, and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab as to the course to be pursued, and telegrams and diaries concerning events in Khelat up to the 13th March.

3. The Report and the papers connected therewith have received our most careful consideration; and the conclusions we have formed and the orders we have issued are fully set forth in our Resolution No. 671 (*a*) P. of the 14th March; from that Resolution your Lordship will perceive that we have authorised a renewed attempt being made by Major Sandeman to carry out the objects of the Resolution of the 16th October 1875, and also, under certain conditions, to re-establish friendly relations between the Khan and the British Government.

We have, &c.
NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
W. MUIR.
A. CLARKE.

No. 70.

No. 55, dated Camp Jacobabad, 21st January 1876.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to request that you will submit to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council that it was with the most extreme regret, and, I trust I

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* Nos. 30 to 68.

may be allowed to add, surprise that I received your cypher telegram of the 7th instant, and still more the subsequent one of the 10th, copies appended, as well as of my replies.

2. I have now had the honour of serving Government for close on to 35 years, 31 of which have been spent in India in the endeavour to do my duty and to act strictly in accord with the orders of Government in every position I have held, and never before this has there been any question that any other motive actuated me than the faithful performance of my duty, and the careful observance of instructions communicated for my guidance.

3. I trust that I may be allowed to say, with all due deference and respect, that in this one solitary instance the imputation on me is not really deserved, and that it has arisen from mistakes and omissions with which I have had nothing to do, and which I will now try briefly to show.

4. The hill tribes of Belcooch, the Murrees and Boogtees, both face the ends of the Sind and Punjab border. The latter, from having been taught some severe lessons and being nearer to us, had become more amenable to management, and gave little trouble. The Murrees, on the contrary, while respecting the Punjab Frontier, and receiving favourable treatment there accordingly, behave most obnoxiously towards the plains of Kutchi, territory belonging to our then ally, his Highness the Khan of Khelat. The Sind border was quite safe from both tribes. But the successful forays by the Murrees in the Khelat district of Kutchi disordered the country generally, interfered with the chief trade route through the Bolan and plains below, and tended to upset the mind of the Belochs located within our border, who had only lately been reclaimed from a similar wild life. The Murree proceedings were therefore objected to by the Sind authorities, in which charge the political relations with Khelat were entrusted.

5. As far back as December 1868 I pointed out the dangers that must follow from allowing these Murrees unrestricted license in one direction, though they behaved well in the other, and urged a blockade being established until they came to behave better. It was, I consider, very unfortunate the plan was not then followed, as had it been the Murrees would have been completely in hand by this time instead of, as they are, more insolent and defiant than they have ever been. The Punjab officers argued it would be hard on their part to bring force to bear on the Murrees, who had behaved perfectly well as regards them, while restrictive measures such as proposed would probably lead to disturbance of the peace on their frontier.

6. The correspondence that took place led to the assembly of the Muttunkote Conference, at which it was endeavoured to get rid of the dual system of management, which was found to work so roughly, and for this purpose it was ordered that the officer in charge of the Punjab Frontier, Southern Derajat, should be *qua* Murrees and Boogtees under the Commandant and Political Superintendent on the Frontier of Sind. This scheme did not answer any better. The Murrees deliberately ignored the chief authority, the Commandant on the Sind Frontier, and their conduct continued so bad that the intention of taking some of them into pay for the maintenance of the peace had to be abandoned. They would neither obey the Sind Frontier Commandant's orders nor those of their legitimate ruler, the Khan of Khelat, and when summoned through the Khan of Khelat in February 1873 to meet the Commissioner in Sind they ignominiously held aloof. But they kept even with the authorities on the Punjab border all the time.

7. During 1874 the conduct of the tribe and their continued raids in Kutchi were so glaringly objectionable, and their fomenting discord amongst the Boogtees was doing so much harm to that tribe, that the plan of blockade was again revived in my letter, No. 1146 of the 5th November, with the further recommendation that should the blockade prove insufficient, the troops, which in the same letter it was proposed should be sent to Khelat, might on their return pass through the Murree Hills, and, if necessary, administer direct and lasting punishment to that tribe. I would respectfully ask perusal of the above quoted letter of the 5th November, particularly paragraphs 6 to 9 inclusive, as it bears on the whole question now at issue, and puts the relative position in a clear and simple light.

8. The result of the papers submitted in 1874 was, that I was summoned to Calcutta to attend his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General. The measures I had ventured to urge to put affairs in Beloochistan and the Government relations with her ruler of that State on a more satisfactory footing, as well as to secure the Murrees into more obedient and peaceful behaviour, could not be entertained and others had to be substituted.

9. In Government letter No. 16P. of the 5th January 1875 it was ruled in reference to the objectionable proceedings of the Khelat ruler and his subjects on the western border of Sind, as well as the general state of misrule that pervaded that State, that—

Vide paragraph 7.—W. L. M.

Represented by me in previous correspondence.—W. L. M.

" *His Excellency in Council considers that as the Khan of* " *Khelat has failed to prevent those crimes, or to give* " *satisfaction for them, and there is no reasonable expec-* " tation at present that the attitude of the Khan will be " changed for the better, it has now become incumbent on the British Government " to take its own measures for the prevention of such offences in future, and the " exaction of a reparation for such as may hereafter occur. I am therefore to request " that the Khan may be addressed by you in a letter setting forth the cases in which " he has failed to grant redress for outrages committed within British territory or upon " British subjects. He should be informed that until such time as he manifests both a " willingness and an ability to perform the duties of a good neighbour, we should take " our own measures, without reference to him, to protect our territories and the lives and " property of our subjects; that any of his subjects who may commit offences in British " territory and be apprehended there will receive the utmost penalty of the law; and " if they succeed in escaping back into Khelat territory they will, whenever this may " be practicable, be followed and punished, and satisfaction will be exacted from those " who may shelter and aid them.

8. " A draft of the letter to be sent to the Khan of Khelat should be submitted for " the approval of the Governor-General in Council. After its despatch *all further com-* " *munication with the Khan should, if possible, be avoided* " *till such time as he comes to a better mind.*" The above instructions are most clear, and point to an absolute avoidance of all interference with affairs connected with the Khelat Government or its ruler. The letter to the Khan was despatched in the month of March 1875.

The italics are mine.—W. L. M.

10. With regard to the other question of the procedure of the Murree tribe, it was considered that the reason for their " line of conduct has been to a considerable extent " the dual system of management. While the Murrees have been comparatively tractable " on the Punjab side, owing to the advantages they derive from the British Govern- " ment, they have rendered themselves justly obnoxious to the Sind authorities by dis- " regarding the policy of Government and raiding in the Kutchi plains, His Excellency " in Council considers it necessary that this double management should absolutely " cease. It is essential to any proper dealings with these tribes that the question as it " affects the Punjab and Sind should be treated as one. If their behaviour is such as " to justify their punishment on the Sind side, they cannot continue to receive favour " from the side of the Punjab.

" For this reason his Excellency in Council considers that the Deputy Commis- " sioner of Dera Ghazi Khan should be the medium of all intercourse and communica- " tions with the Murree and Boogtee tribes in all their branches, but that he should be

These italics are mine.—W. L. M.

" *under the orders of the Commissioner of Sind, to whom* " *he should report through the Political Superintendent all* " *matters affecting those tribes, and from whom he should receive his instructions,* " *copies of all such reports and instructions being sent to the Punjab Government for* " *information.*

" *With reference to other tribes than the Murrees and Boogtees, that is to say, tribes* " *whose proceedings mainly affect Sind, and who have no direct intercourse with the* " *Punjab, the Deputy Commissioner should take no action without reference to the Com-* " *missioner in Sind, and such action as may be ordered in respect to them should be* " *undertaken jointly by the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan and the Political* " *Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier. Unity of policy and action is absolutely* " *necessary, and no deviation from the policy prescribed should be permitted by the* " *officers on either side without previous instructions from the Government of India.*" These instructions are perfectly plain, and I will venture respectfully, but confidently, to assert that the records will prove they have been absolutely and solely carried out by the authorities on the Sind side. How far this has been the case on the Dera Ghazi side I am unable to say, as recent events lead to the conclusion that communications from that side have been submitted to Government, which I have never seen, and which did not pass through me. I may be wrong, but the inference is, I think, justifiable. Government will be able to judge whether it is correct or not.

11. It was thought that the management, which had been partially tried with some success on the Punjab side, might produce good results on the Murrees and Boogtees, and Captain Sandeman was instructed to use his influence in the settlement of existing

intertribal quarrels, and to subsidize those tribes with the view of inducing them to behave in an equally exemplary manner towards Kutchi as they did towards the Punjab border, accepting the responsibilities and dispensing the benefits under the orders of the Commissioner in Sind.

12. Certain preliminary arrangements, however, had to be made in consequence of the disobedient attitude that had been assumed towards the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, by the Murree Chief, and the neglect of the latter to make, as he had been called on to do, restitution of property plundered from the kafilas in 1872. Also restitution of cattle belonging to British subjects carried off by Murrees and Boogtees in August 1874 from outside the Sind outposts. When these conditions were fulfilled Captain Sandeman was at once to proceed to arrange the details of the measures resolved upon.

13. The Murree Chief, Guzzun Khan, paid his respects to Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, at Jacobabad, in February 1875. But it is now stated that he did so only as a personal favour to Captain Sandeman, which I consider should not have been the manner of the submission. An award made by Captain Sandeman as to the amount to be made good by the Murree tribe for the plunder they gained from the kafilas was accepted by me, though very far below the value of what they had possessed themselves of. In the same way with restitution for the Khutton raid in August 1874, the decision arrived at by Captain Sandeman was, I considered, very much below what ought to have been enforced, but it was frankly and readily accepted by me in the hope that this leniency would have a salutary effect on the hill tribes, and would strengthen Captain Sandeman's hands in his endeavours to bring those tribes, the Murrees especially, under the control desired. I regret to have here to remark that the Khutton award has not yet been fully enforced. I must also add that neither of these demands on the Murrees have had the effect which they were intended to produce, viz., that they should make the Chiefs and members of the tribe generally feel they were punishments awarded for their misdeeds. The amount for the kafilas, Rs. 4,000, was simply deducted from the subsidy paid to the Chief, while he and his tribe retained possession of, and had benefited by, goods to the value of a very much larger sum than that, and the delay in enforcing, as well as the comparative smallness of the demand for the Khutton loot, has made it no infliction at all.

14. After the despatch of the letter to the Khan of Khelat in March last year, the policy of absolute non-interference in the affairs of the Khelat State was rigidly adhered to throughout the year by me, and, under my instructions, by Colonel Loch, the Political Superintendent on the frontier. It was several times brought to my notice that communications were passing between the Dera Ghazi Khan District and Khelat. Having in view the orders of Government that nothing of the sort should occur from British territory, I addressed the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan, and asked him if such was the case. He stated distinctly no, and forwarded a letter from his assistant, the Assistant Commissioner of Rajanpur, to the same effect. I rested quite satisfied with this. Government will be best able to decide whether I was right in doing so.

15. The proceedings of the Murrees, instead of becoming better after the leniency with which they had been treated, increased in insolence and defiance of the avowed policy of the British Government with regard to Kutchi, and with which they could not fail to have been acquainted, Captain Sandeman having been instructed in letter No. 16P of the 5th January 1875 to explain it carefully to the Chief, Guzzun Khan. It was, moreover, notorious throughout the country. I drew Captain Sandeman's attention to their repeated acts of outrage, and inquired of him whether the late orders for more extended subsidising had been carried into effect. I also particularly pointed out to him that these acts of the Murrees were for the most part not prompted by feelings of revenge or intertribal quarrels, but were dictated by their inveterate love of plunder and outrage, and mainly directed against unoffending people who were unable to protect themselves. His replies were not satisfactory, as will be shown from the correspondence; indeed, in October he fairly acknowledged he had been unable to keep the Murrees out of Kutchi. He stated by telegram, in reply to a question from me, he had not given a rupee of the new subsidy to any of the tribe.

16. The state of affairs in Khelat may with advantage be here briefly referred to. Discussions between the Khan and his Sirdars had commencement with the earliest period of his reign, 1857. He was thought to be a weak youth, and that once in their hands they might wield power as they pleased. In this they were then defeated by the old Darogah, Gool Mahomed, who, whatever his other faults may have been, was a staunch upholder of the Ahmadzai dynasty. The breach continued to widen as years

went on. Several rebellions took place against the authority of the Khan, and for a time he was deposed, but was reinstated by the Sirdars on the murder of the cousin put up in his stead. He has managed to hold his own ever since. In the autumn of 1871 one of the most serious outbreaks of all took place, and became the more serious from the Sirdars conceiving themselves supported in their action by the then chief official on the British border. To put an end to the disorders which were becoming serious in Kutchi, the Government of India ruled that the Sirdars should be allowed to come into Jacobabad to detail their grievances, and the Khan of Khelat gave full power to the Commissioner in Sind to act and decide on his behalf. The complaints of the Sirdars were most fully inquired into, and the award was that while they were to make restitution of the plunder taken from the kafilas by their followers in the Bolan, and agree to act loyally in future towards their Sovereign, he in his turn was to allow and confirm them in their hereditary lands, and treat them as the custom of the country required they should be recognised. The Sirdars looked for this award to be abided by by the Khan, but they state it has not been, and they further urge that many acts of tyranny have since been inflicted on various clans by the Khan, as well as that they can in no way trust to him or his promise. His Excellency the Viceroy received the Khan at Sukkur in November 1872, and it was hoped this would have a good effect. In the February following I proceeded to Shahpur in Kutchi to have a meeting with the Khan. All the Brahooee Sirdars were present. Every possible endeavour was made by me to induce the Khan to abide by the award of 1872, to act towards his Sirdars in a more generous, conciliatory spirit, and to make arrangements for the better government and maintenance of peace and order in his country. But it was all of no avail; under the influence of bad advisers he would take interest in nothing useful, and only kept repeating applications for the release of three questionable favourites, who had been removed into Sind. I saw all the Sirdars, both in the presence of the Khan, and afterwards at his desire by themselves, the Wuzeer being present on each occasion. They were very reasonable and respectful, with the exception of Noordeen Mingul, who openly defied the Khan in his camp, and did not attend any of the latter Durbars. I could only advise the Sirdars to do their best to be on good terms and work with their Sovereign, it being the wish of the British Government to see a firm government and united people in Khelat, and impress upon them that no good could accrue to anybody from disturbances such as had been promoted by them in 1871–72; neither would they be tolerated; that these only injured unoffending people. They should, therefore, abstain from that mode of obtaining redress, and I particularly warned them if perpetrators of such disorders approached the British border they would be treated like common thieves, and punished accordingly.

Vide Report No. 400 from Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to Government, dated 3rd May 1873.—W. L. M.

See paragraph 27, page 14 of letter No. 400 of 3rd May 1873.—W. L. M.

I must state that they have hitherto most loyally held to the promises they then made to follow this advice.—W. L. M.

17. Finding no good results could be gained by further interviews with the Khan, I broke up my camp, and from the next halting place, Manuti, wrote my views fully to him, and pointed out how I thought matters might be improved. The Khan did not accept of them. In April 1873 his manifest disinclination to act in accord with the wishes of the Government of India, and his conduct towards the Political Agent at his Court, was such as to make the latter's recall absolutely necessary. The excellent Wuzeer, Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed, against whom the Khan had lately been deliberately working, found it advisable to leave too, and come into British territory for protection. The Khan retired to Khelat, and the Sirdars went to their homes above the passes, with the exception of Moolla Mahomed Raisani, who distrusting the Khan preferred returning to his old place of voluntary exile in Seebee.

18. During 1873–74 relations were not entirely broken off with the Khan of Khelat, but he showed no signs of any endeavour on his part to improve the state of affairs in his country. Various acts of outrage were committed by his people on British subjects, and when redress was required of him reply was given that arrangements were about to be made to restore order in the places complained of, but nothing was ever done. In February 1874 a gross outrage was committed on the western frontier of Sind. The arrest and delivery of the perpetrators was demanded, but, though promises were freely made by the Khan, nothing was, or has been up to the present time, done by him in this respect. I then ventured to recommend force should be employed to compel the Khan to act up to his engagements. On the departure of Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed from the Government of Khelat no Wuzeer was at first appointed. It was several times offered by the Khan to Atta Mahomed, son of the Darogah Gool Mahomed, but refused until about November 1874 when it was at last accepted, and Atta Mahomed was

installed. In the spring of last year the new Wuzeer proceeded into the southern districts of Khelat to restore order there and in Lus Beyla, and to seize the perpetrators of outrages whose extradition had been demanded, especially Pahar Khan Sassuli, the Chief, in the grave outrage of February. All this the new Wuzeer did excellently well, and took the defaulters back with him to Khelat last April, but the Khan did not cause them to be delivered up as required, nor has he to this day.

19. As stated in the previous part of this letter, I proceeded to Calcutta in December 1874, according to summons by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, and after my return to the frontier, the letter ordered to be addressed to the Khan of Khelat was despatched. It was delayed a little, because there seemed a hope of improvement in the Khan's demeanour, but this proved illusory. A letter was also forwarded to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisani, repeating the advice and injunctions given to him and the other Sirdars by me at Shapur in 1873.

20. On the 21st of October last, as the year was drawing to a close, I submitted the report quoted in the margin, showing the state of affairs in Khelat, and what had occurred up to that time. There has been no change for the better on the the part of the Khan. Indeed, he had shown himself even more pointedly indifferent as to how he stood with the British Government by disgracing the new Wuzeer, Atta Mahomed, when he returned to Khelat after admirably arranging with Captain Wise for order and quiet on the western frontier of Sind. The Khan's answer to my letter of March was most objectionable in tone, and as it gave no opening for recommendation of renewal of old relations no steps were taken on it. A very full and interesting report by Colonel Loch was forwarded, at the same time showing that the Khan's conduct towards the Sirdars had been persistently irritable, and that complaints were loudly made by them.

No. 846, dated 21st October.

21. The Resolution of the Government of India No. 2819, dated 16th October, was received by me on the day of my departure from Sind for Bombay to attend at the coming of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales. As Government was not then in possession of my report of the 21st idem, and as there were points in the Resolution which I thought would have been differently viewed had his Excellency the Viceroy perused that report, I ventured in a further letter, dated 29th October, to submit some further observations relating to affairs on the Sind and Punjab Frontiers and in Khelat, and to ask instructions.

22. These points may briefly be said to have been—

That the expectation of the Khan of Khelat having somewhat realized the gravity of the situation had not been realized.

That the Murree tribe, though the Sirdars had paid the required visit to Jacobabad, and arrangements had been made for the restitution of plundered property or its equivalent, had shown no improvement in their behaviour towards the unoffending people of Kutchi, indeed had shown more daring rapacity than I had ever known them display before. That these outrages did not proceed from any particular quarrels with other tribes, but from the insatiate love of plunder possessing the Murrees, and the assurance they feel that they can carry it on with impunity. The leniency system I felt would never bring them to order, that nothing but severe measures and telling punishment will induce them to withhold from deeds of violence.

That there was no immediate dispute between the Murrees and the Khan of Khelat, further than that they always disobeyed his orders and harried his country when it pleased them, and that if the Khan or his officials had prompted the Murrees to molest any people, that was nothing to us; our dealings were now direct with the Murrees, and they should elect once for all who they would serve, us or the Khan. They could not have engagement with both now; that the object of the Mittunkote Conference was to put an end to a system under which a tribe of robbers were favourably received and treated well on one side, and there was reason for this, but they were guilty of deliberate misbehaviour on the other, harrying unoffending people and interfering with trade; that it was absolutely necessary this state of affairs, which still continued, should be put a stop to, as if it was not, the district of Kutchi immediately adjacent to Sind would become desolate, and traders not dare to cross it.

That if kafilas were deterred from coming through Kutchi, they would be driven to adopt the routes by Khelat, which would be advantageous to the Khan, but injurious to Sirdars who had been in the habit of sharing in the transit dues of the Bolan.

That the Thull Chotiali route might possibly be re-opened, but it would be of little practical use, as it was only a side route to Delhi in former years. Now the trade must find its way to the sea by the shortest and best road, which unquestionably is that through Kutchi, and which ought therefore to be solely thought of.

That the position of the Sind outposts was not exactly that given in the Government Resolution, and that they were of no value for maintenance of order in Kutchi, being far removed therefrom.

Finally, that there was positively nothing to be learned as to the real state of affairs either in the Murree Hills or in Khelat. Previous reports during the past years had explained everything, and my letter of the 21st October, with its accompaniments, had detailed all up to date, while the supplementary letter of the 29th had cleared points which seemed to be considered obscure. The position was simply this, the Khan of Khelat was at open variance with his Sirdars, and hope of reconciliation did not exist unless some third party intervened, stronger than either, who would insist on pledges being observed on both sides; or that they should measure strength until one overpowered the other. The other matter was that a tribe of lawless plunderers were disturbing the country and injuring trade, and they must be either forced or tempted into obedience and respect for the property of others. In both instances it had been ruled that the latter courses were to be followed. The Khan and his Barons were to be allowed to settle their differences after their own fashion, interference from our side being strictly avoided, beyond precautions for the safety of life and property within British territory, and better behaviour was to be secured from the Murrees by friendly offices and subsidising. The former, viz., position of Khelat parties, remained as it was, and had yet to develope itself. The latter had been found impracticable from the experience of the past year, owing to the continuous and even increased outrageous acts of the Murrees. In conclusion, I recommended a new plan by which Kutchi might be kept clear of the Murrees and trade be protected.

23. Up to the time of my return to Kurrachee in November, I had received no further orders on my letters of the 21st and 29th October. I therefore drew up instructions for Captain Sandeman, how he was to act in carrying out the orders of Government conveyed in Government of India Resolution No. 2819 of the 16th October last. Copy of these already have been submitted. In preparing them I was guided by the orders I had received to avoid all interference in the internal affairs of the Khelat State, which I had been closely adhering to, and which I understood to be still in force. I was the more sure of this, because on my arrival at Kurrachee I found awaiting me there Government of India letter No. 2872P., dated 21st October, acknowledging receipt of my letter No. 471, dated 4th idem, regarding affairs in Khelat, and the desire of certain subjects of his Highness the Khan to emigrate from Kutchi and seek an asylum in Sind. The wish of these people had been reported to me by Colonel Loch, Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, as also the disordered condition of Kutchi. In reply, he had been told that the state of affairs was much to be regretted, but no interference could take place. If people desired to come into Sind they could be permitted to do so, at the same time Colonel Loch was told he had acted quite right in exerting his influence in inducing them to stay in Kutchi. In the above quoted letter from the Government of India, Mr. Secretary Aitchison writes:—

"His Honour in Council observes that you have instructed the Political Superintendent, "Upper Sind Frontier, that *no interference on the part of* "*the British authorities* can take place in these disputes "between the Khan and his subjects. In this opinion the Government of India fully "concurs. *There is no need for any active interposition on the part of the British* "*Government*, and if the people who have reason to complain of misrule in Khelat choose "to emigrate and settle in British territory, an asylum "should not be refused to them as long as they abstain "from using that asylum as a point from which to excite "disturbances in Khelat." I would draw attention to the date of this letter, it is five days subsequent to that of Resolution No. 2819P., and certainly conveys the view that the policy of non-interference by British authorities in the affairs of the Khan of Khelat and his subjects are still to be strictly adhered to.

The italics are mine.—W. L. M.

This was the course recommended by me before when Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisani asked for an asylum in Sind.—W. L. M.

24. Government Resolution No. 2819P. of the 16th October abandoned the idea of preventing Murree depredations in Kutchi. As the discontinuance of those outrages was the main cause of the Mittunkote Conference and subsequent arrangements under which Captain Sandeman was made immediately subordinate to me, that he might exert his influence for good over that tribe, naturally his functions in that respect would be supposed to cease, but it was considered that "at present the real causes of the quarrels and "disturbances which prevail are but imperfectly known, without fuller and more explicit "information there is little prospect of the influence of the British Government being "successfully applied to their settlement," I ventured in my letter of the 29th October to point out how these doubts might be removed, but hearing no further on the subject

I accepted the instructions laid down in the 26th and 27th paragraphs of the Government Resolution, and directed Captain Sandeman accordingly, at the same time keeping in view the policy and necessity enjoined on me of abstaining from any direct interference between the Khan of Khelat, his Sirdars, and his subjects.

25. These instructions were as follows :—"His Excellency in Council therefore desires "that Captain Sandeman shall proceed into the Murree Hills as early in the cold season as "practicable, in order (1) to procure all the information he can respecting local feuds "and quarrels among the Murree and Boogtee tribes, or between them and the Afghans, or "between them and the Brahooees; (2) to endeavour, as far as he can, to bring about an "amicable settlement of these quarrels; (3) to report, for the information of Government "through the Commissioner in Sind, his views on such as he cannot settle; (4) to "report on the general relations between the Murree and Boogtee tribes and the Khan's "Government. Sir William Merewether may, if he thinks fit, depute an officer from "Sind to be associated with Captain Sandeman, but in subordination to him." These orders I construed to confine Captain Sandeman's proceedings entirely to the Murree Hills, that being his especial field of action at the time, and believing such, I did not consider it necessary to depute an officer from Sind to be associated with him.

26. Paragraph 27 directed—"Captain Sandeman will also inquire and report whether "anything, and if so what, can be done for the protection of trade viâ Bolan, and whether "a system of fixed tolls on caravans could not be arranged for, the proceeds of which "would go to the tribes entrusted in the protection of the route. In respect to all or any "of these objects Captain Sandeman will have discretion to make any arrangements he "considers to be advisable within the total sum sanctioned after the Mittunkote Con-"ference, viz., Rupees 66,960 per annum." After my interview with his Highness the Khan at Shahpur in 1873, it was proposed by me to him that an arrangement similar to this should be made, and allowance passed to the Sarawan Sirdars, who are most concerned with transit, through the Khan. The latter rejected the proposal, and as without his assent it could not possibly be carried out as long as he held the supreme power, it was dropped. No matter what arrangements the Sirdars made for passage down the Bolan, the Khan could at once defeat them by directing his Naib at Quetta to make all kafilas diverge there, and go viâ Khelat and the Mulla or other roads. This much, if Captain Sandeman had not already learned it from the records, he would have been told by any one in the country, and could have reported on accordingly.

27. Paragraph 28 refers to the practicability of re-opening the Thull Chotiallee route, with which I have nothing to do, though I have repeatedly endeavoured to show that the difficulties attending it are very great, and it would be of little use when re-opened.

28. Paragraph 29 reviews the whole, as it were, and suggests that should the measures authorised prove successful in affording reasonable security to trade, and should his Highness the Khan show desire to co-operate for this end and make proper amends, the old friendly footing with his Highness' Government might be re-established. But this I understood to be more for the information of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and myself, who were to have the direct carrying out of the orders of Government.

29. The last paragraph would seem to refer to some impatient and inconsiderate dealing with the tribes, as well as harsh and precipitate action on my part, regarding which I am at a loss to conceive in what respect I was found to have acted so. I certainly complained repeatedly about the gross outrages committed by the Murrees, but I think there was good reason for this, at the same time I sure am the correspondence will show that on the points submitted to me for decision in regard to what should be required of that tribe for its misdeeds, my action was most lenient, more so than their subsequent proceedings have shown they deserved. I am always most ready to treat these wild people with every consideration and kindness, when they show themselves worthy of it, and are amenable to proper control. The rule with these tribes should always be *parcere subjectis sed debellare superbos*, and this is what I have ever tried to follow.

30. In the orders contained in the latter part of the Government Resolution, I would beg, then, most respectfully and deferentially to observe, there is nothing whatever to show that the policy directing strict non-interference between the Khan and his Sirdars or subjects had been abandoned. Indeed, in a letter dated five days later, such non-interference is fully approved and enjoined. I could not therefore for a moment suppose it was the wish of his Excellency in Council that Captain Sandeman should enter in between them, and while placed in subordination to me, take up a most important subject I had been directed to withhold from.

31. My instructions to that officer were based therefore on that view. I must also add, that I was prompted to be very precise and explicit in them, because I had noticed for some time past he had shown a strong, and I considered unreasonable, desire to engage in the internal affairs of the Khelat State. He had also on a former occasion exhibited a tendency to act independently of me, which it may be recollected I had to bring to official notice, knowing well the inadvisability of disunited and discontented people conceiving there could be two different executives on the part of Government; the difficulties that must follow from the vague hopes that would be excited in the Sirdars' minds by their cause being apparently taken up again, and the danger of fresh complications with the Khan of Khelat arising from a new official coming in, so soon after he had been told all communication with him had been withdrawn until he made amends for his disregard of friendly obligations and treaty engagements. I placed what I thought very necessary restrictions on Captain Sandeman, and desired him to absolutely confine his action to within the Murree Hills.

32. Captain Sandeman had been placed under me in January 1875, and was directed to report to me, and to me only, on all subjects relating to the Murrees and Boogtees, and tribes in any way connected with them, sending copies to the Government of the Punjab. It would seem now that he could not have abided by this rule, or I should have been better acquainted with his proposed actions. I append a list of all the documents received from him during the past year, from which Government will learn how far he complied with the instructions given him. If all reports on these subjects prepared by him have not been submitted to me I think I have just reason to complain of such action on his part.

33. Had I had the slightest idea it was the wish of his Excellency in Council that Captain Sandeman should actively engage in Khelat affairs, and personally visit the Sirdars and Khan, I should have felt it my duty to point out officially the difficulties and evils that would arise from such a course being followed, and to recommend its being abandoned. If after the arguments I should have adduced his Excellency still wished that Captain Sandeman should be deputed on this extra service, it would have then been my duty to see his Excellency's wishes carried out, and do all I could to see them effectually performed. One of the first requisites was that he, Captain Sandeman, should have been provided with credentials from me, that is, letters of introduction to the Sirdars and Khan, from the authority with whom they had hitherto only communicated officially. Not having these papers, the Sirdars and Khan would naturally think there must be something strange in his coming to them, certainly something very unusual, and any object there was in view would have all the less chance of success, if it ever possessed any at all. I was not called on to supply such documents and beyond a telegraphic announcement of Captain Sandeman having left for the Murree Hills, which reached me on the 25th November, I received no intimation from that officer of what he proposed doing, where he intended going, or any reports of progress as should certainly have been furnished to me.

34. Two days after my arrival at Sukkur, or on the 13th of December, I received information that a skilfully organised revolution was about to break out in Khelat territory, and telegraphed to you as follows:—"Revolution in Khelat imminent. Noordeen "Mingul working a likely conspiracy in conjunction with Fakir Muhammad, commanding regiment at Khelat, and others. Object to depose Khan, and set up eldest son. "Sarawan Sirdars in communication with Noordeen, but principal ones being in Kutchi "will probably only create disturbance there for diversion. Am proceeding to frontier "to watch events, avoiding all interference. Sandeman in Murree Hills, by last accounts. "Have told him of above, and instructed him to be most careful to avoid any communication with Brahooee Sirdars or people, and on no account to go beyond Murree Hills "towards Bolan, Seebee, or Kutchi." This revolution was what I had expected must occur sooner or later, and what I understood should be allowed to run its course, if the Sirdars chose to enter upon it. The only part that concerned us being the protection of the British border from disorder or injury. Your reply to that telegram, dated 16th December, was—"Policy of non-interference approved;" but there was no remark on the orders I had sent to Captain Sandeman. On the same day as the telegram, the letters giving the intelligence of the projected rebellion were forwarded to you under my endorsement, No. 966.

35. On the 17th December I heard that Captain Sandeman had left the Murree Hills and entered Kutchi. I telegraphed to you—"Captain Sandeman is stated to have visited "Seebee and Dadur, and communicated with Brahooee Sirdars. This is directly contrary "to my orders; would be highly objectionable at any time, but at the present moment most "improper and embarrassing. Any appearance even of separate political action from

" that I have been ordered to carry out cannot be too carefully avoided. Have sent " express to Captain Sandeman to return at once to his districts, and I would beg he " may be kept there. Papers by post." Believing strict non-interference in Khelat affairs was still the policy of Government, I considered Captain Sandeman's entry on the scene particularly unsuitable. He must either appear to be siding with the rebellious Sirdars, or check them in the course they had adopted of their own free will, and which they had been left to follow; whichever of these happened, his presence amongst them must raise expectations, which, judging from the orders I was working under, I conceived Government did not wish to acknowledge or support; it would more seriously complicate matters and cause the tangled web of Khelat affairs to become more and more confused, and more difficult of readjustment hereafter. From what has since been learned, Captain Sandeman would appear to have adopted the second plan, viz., stopped the outbreak, and letters were sent by the Sarawan Sirdars to Sirdar Noordeen Mingul and the Jalawans to hold their hands too. Captain Sandeman, in letters from Quetta (Shalkote), dated 23rd and 25th December, acknowledged to Colonel Loch receipt of my orders to return to his districts; but stated he could not comply with them, as he was acting under the orders of the Government of India. This was the first intimation I had received from him that he considered himself under orders independent of mine. Up to this day I have not been furnished by him with any acknowledgment of my instructions of the 25th November having reached him. To insure their doing so they were forwarded to him by several routes from Jacobabad, and some time previous to the orders which he did acknowledge from Quetta.

36. Your telegram of the 20th, in reply to mine of the 17th, was—" While directing " Captain Sandeman not to interfere in the troubles apparently impending between " Khan and his subjects, you should take care not to interfere with Sandeman's execu- " tion of orders he has received from Government of India, and particularly not to be " too hasty in condemning his conduct before he has explained it. Sandeman's move- " ments amongst Murrees should not be interfered with." I had not in the least attempted to interfere with Captain Sandeman's movements among the Murrees, on the contrary, I had impressed on him he should confine himself entirely to their hills; and as regards the orders of the Government of India, I felt clear he must be going beyond them altogether. I replied therefore on the 22nd: —" I do not understand, and cannot sup- " pose Sandeman has orders for what he is doing, as it is directly contrary to policy " laid down by Government of India, and gravely insubordinate to me. He has not " only visited Seebee and Dadur and held communications with Brahooee Sirdars, but has " sent Imam Buksh Mazari and others with letters to Khan of Khelat. He has also " entered Bolan accompanied by Sirdars. The whole of this is directly contrary to " instructions given him by me—most indiscreet and unbecoming. Must make present " relations with Khan and Khelat affairs more embarrassing, and make all parties doubt " in reality of Government policy and its good faith. You may be sure Sandeman will " not be finally condemned by me unheard; but above speaks for itself, and I must beg " his being kept at Dera Ghazi Khan and his own legitimate duties."

37. The above telegrams and the different memoranda at the same time added by me in submitting letters detailing Captain Sandeman's proceedings will, I trust, be considered certain proof that I never for a moment imagined Captain Sandeman either was or could be regarded as carrying out orders of Government in the way he was acting, and that in all I did I was honestly and bonâ fide endeavouring to carry into effect what I believed to be the wishes of his Excellency the Viceroy. These, inculcating non-interference in Khelat affairs had been communicated to me, but nothing since to show they had been abrogated. Non-interference was not the policy I had ventured to recommend; I had urged that the Khan should be forced to act up to his obligations. The course I followed then was not my own, but what I was told was desired by the Government of India, until such time as the Khan showed a willingness and ability to perform the duties of a good neighbour, and I steadily adhered to it.

38. Finally, I would respectfully ask, has not my forecasts of events been exactly fulfilled? Captain Sandeman has all along been misled by the belief that he had only to get within the circle of Khelat politics to be able to arrive at once at the centre, and set all things to rights. But, as I have repeatedly pointed out, he really knew little of the character of the Khan of Khelat, or of the true merits of the case between the Khan and his Barons, therefore he was not able to judge how it could best be adjusted. His arrival in Kutchi stopped a revolution which promised to bring about the adjustment of affairs which Government was waiting for. These proceedings of Noordeen Mingul showed more judgment and careful combination than he had ever

displayed before, and had for their object immediate movement against the Khan himself. The communications sent from Seebee, or Dadur, after Captain Sandeman had joined the Sarawan Sirdars, induced Noordeen to suspend his measures against the Khan, and he afterwards paid his respects at Khelat when guaranteed safety by the Khan pledging his oath on the Koran, and induced to do so by the persuasion of Atta Mahomed Wuzeer and the Khan's sister, the Bibi Futteh Khatun. The Sarawan Sirdars went readily with Captain Sandeman to Khelat, but as I knew must be the case, nothing came of it. They would not be satisfied without guarantee from us that the Khan should keep his promises better than he has done, and the Khan, judging from the letters received from divers sources, does not appear to have satisfied Captain Sandeman. The most unfortunate event of all, however, has been the treacherous behaviour of the Khan so immediately after the visit of Captain Sandeman, in having Noordeen Mingul attacked and killed in spite of the safe guarantee. If the breach between the Khan and Sirdars was wide before, it is infinitely so now, and quite uncloseable, while grave disturbances must follow. They have already been begun by Gohur Khan, head of the Jalawans. The people give a variety of reasons for the Khan's reckless behaviour. But the latest report is, I think, the correct one, that one of his bad advisers told him Noordeen and Atta Mahomed were plotting to kill him (an absurd thing as they were then situated), but he determined to anticipate their action by killing them. The above is briefly what has occurred lately, and I leave it for the consideration of Government.

39. I have endeavoured to give, step by step, the principle that has guided me throughout, and the reasons for all I did, and I confidently hope that what is now laid before his Excellency in Council will lead to my being absolved from the grave imputation which before this explanation has appeared to his Excellency to lie at my door, and that the supposition may no longer be entertained that I ever contemplated for a moment deviating in the least from a sincere desire to carry out the views of his Excellency and Government. I would also most respectfully trust that the severe condemnation which has been passed may be removed, so that it may not remain on the records of Government as reflecting so seriously on the reputation of a public officer who has always endeavoured to show that obedience to orders, faithful discharge of duties entrusted to him, and cheerful devotion to the public service were the guiding motives that have always actuated him.

40. Before bringing this letter to a close, and as consequent on the late decision of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council directing me to be relieved of the political duties on this frontier, I would beg to be allowed to submit for his consideration the following observations on the causes which have led to the present state of affairs, and what my experience of many years in connexion with the locality and people would prompt me to recommend for the future.

41. I think I may safely and justly state that a careful review of the events of the past 10 years will go to prove that the difficulties experienced in maintaining peace and good order in the country lying to the north of Sind have been largely increased by the view held that it was inadvisable to alter arrangements made on the adjacent portion of the southern frontier of the Punjab with the hill tribes of Belooch, whose lawless acts were complained of from Sind in respect to the first mentioned locality, but who showed more orderly demeanour towards, and who abstained from committing outrages in British territory in the Punjab. The two tribes principally concerned are the Murrees and Boogtees, the former in a pre-eminent degree and for the whole time, the latter much less so, and only in recent years.

42. It has been repeatedly represented that while the good behaviour of these tribes towards the Punjab was in a measure owing to the personal influence exerted over them by the district officers, at the same time the satisfactory result was greatly due to the fact that it was to the interest of the tribes (the Murrees especially) to keep on good terms with the officials in the Punjab, because they derived regular and palpable benefits therefrom, while no restrictions were imposed on their lawlessness and disorderly practices elsewhere. Restrictive measures were advocated from Sind, but as it was considered these might cause the Murrees to break with the Punjab, and recommence outrages there, the point was not pressed; but, instead, it was endeavoured to extend the friendly managing system which had been so far successful in the Punjab, and try its effect in producing similar control on the other side. By this means it was hoped that the two systems which had hitherto prevailed might be avoided. The above was decided on in 1871, the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan for these purposes being placed under the Political Superintendent and Commandant on the frontier of Upper Sind. I venture confidently to assert that every possible facility

and assistance was afforded by the officers on the Sind side to make this plan successful, but it did not answer. The Murrees still showed themselves unruly, continued their aggressions on the inhabitants of Kutchi, and wilfully disobeyed the orders of the Political Superintendent. Their conduct all this time towards the Punjab was shown to be most subservient, and all that could be desired. This was easy enough for them, for they were in receipt of regular pay, and treated with high favour there, while they could indulge their liking for plunder and deeds of violence elsewhere without any restraint being imposed on them. The insolence of the Chief was so marked in 1873, and the plunderings of the tribe so frequent that year and the following, that I again urged punitive measures should be adopted and these Murrees brought under proper control once for all. It was shown there would be no difficulty in doing this. The country had become well known to our officers, and there was no escape for the tribe. Their hands had been so continuously against every one else, no one would give them refuge, and from long success they had become so powerful and arrogant, all other tribes desired to see them humbled and brought back to their old position.

43. Advisable though it appeared that these wild freebooters should be made to respect other people's lives and property, still, in the hope that they might yet be restrained by other than forcible measures, and military movements beyond the frontier being disapproved by his Excellency the Viceroy in Council, it was determined by his Excellency that one more effort should be made to win the tribe over by leniency and liberal treatment. The Murree and Boogtee tribes were placed solely under the control of Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan, who was to deal with them direct, irrespective entirely of their real ruler the Khan of Khelat, and to leave the promise of reward and punishment in his hands for the conduct of these tribes towards their neighbours, Kutchi being specially included. The policy and object of Government was to be fully explained to the Murree Chief, so that he might know exactly what was required of him. To leave the executive more untrammelled he was separated from the Political Superintendent on the Sind Frontier, and placed directly under the Commissioner in Sind. This plan succeeded no better than the other. The behaviour of the Murrees has been far worse during the last year than it has ever been known to be before. The avowed policy of Government was openly disregarded by them, and the outrages committed in Kutchi were more frequent and more bold than ever; altogether their conduct was most defiant, yet no check was imposed upon them. In October last his Excellency the Viceroy in Council was pleased to rule that interference in protecting Kutchi was not called for from the Government of India, as it was territory belonging to the Khan of Khelat, with whom relations had been broken off. The last plan then has succeeded no better than the first, and I would respectfully draw attention to the repeated opinions I have expressed for years past, that with such characters as the wild Belooch measures which depend for success on coaxing, petting, and pecuniary adjustments can never answer. These people must be taught and made to obey implicitly. Then treat them with every kindness, but it must still be conjoined with just firmness. Captain Sandeman will have informed Government of the demeanour of the Murrees during his late visit to and passage through their hills. If the reports that have been received here, and are current throughout the country, are true, it was anything but proper or such as his long kind treatment should have commanded.

44. Neither the dual nor the quasi-dual, nor the supposed direct and single management of these tribes has succeeded, and it has become necessary that a different course should be adopted. I would therefore beg to lay before Government what has long appeared to me to be the real and only practical remedy for existing difficulties. I mentioned it in discussion with Sir Henry Davies at Mittunkote in 1871, but did not press it then or since, because the desire appeared so strong to give the officers of the Dera Ghazi Khan district full opportunity of testing their plan, and to prevent any sign of hostilities on the southern portion of the Punjab Frontier.

45. Where interests and people are assimilated, or nearly so, the management in connexion with them should unquestionably be only in one person's hands. To have proper administration on the border the question should be viewed territorially, ethnologically, and philologically also. In this respect the frontier line from Peshawur to the sea is naturally, and happily divided into two distinct sections. The northern one, where Pathan tribes almost exclusively face our border. The southern, where Belooch and Brahooee, with certain Mahomedanised Rajpoots, called Sindees, are the only people we have to deal with. The first extends south as far as a little below the latitudes of Dera Ghazi Khan. The second from that point to the sea. The entire length from Peshawur to the sea would be large for the control of one man, unless he had special

powers and was placed in much the same position as the Warden of the Western Marches used to hold in England, and for this a person with very special qualifications would be required. But the charge may be most safely and advantageously taken by two people in the divisions nature has given.

The first division I may leave to others better informed as to its details, so will confine myself to the second, with which I have been so long connected.

The Belooch element may be said to commence at Hurrund, some 60 miles south-west of Dera Ghazi Khan and 90 miles north-east of the Sind border near Kashmor. The Khetrans and Bozdars run north of that line it is true, but neither of these belong to the Belooch confederacy, are independent, and come within the Pathan circle. The first are really Pathan, and having a rich country are peaceably disposed, and would readily remain quiet if left alone. The latter are an offshoot of the Rhind Belooch, but have been long quite apart from the others. From Hurrund down to the sea west of Kurrachee, 490 miles, Belooch or Brahooees live on either side of the border. It has, I know, been much the habit to regard the Sind border as the small portions along the northern part from Kashmor to Khyra Ghari, but this is only an insignificant piece. The whole to the sea, over 400 miles, must be considered, and its well-being will always be matter of the first importance.

On the three grounds then mentioned by me, the bit of frontier of 90 miles from Hurrund to the present Sind boundary near Kashmor should be confined to Sind and form part of the lower division of a frontier administration.

The Belooch and Brahooee clans would then be under one management. All the important passes into the Murree and Boogtee (the real refractory tribes now) Hills would be under one and the same system of guarding, while those tribes having only one authority to look to would be more careful how they risked his displeasure, and when they misbehaved would be promptly and firmly dealt with.

The general management and control of the lower division of the frontier must, I would respectfully urge, rest in the hands of the Commissioner in Sind, or chief authority there, whoever he may be, all that passes beyond or on that frontier must materially affect matters within, and the administration of the province could not be safely conducted by two different people. It would be two men trying to drive the same team in a coach, there must be an upset sooner or later. The troops now on the frontier of Sind would be sufficient to take up the extra outposts, Khelat affairs being settled. The affairs of Beloochistan (Khelat,) &c. should also be under the same authority as they have hitherto been, and no one else should be allowed to interfere. Asiatics readily detect the existence of two systems, and quickly take advantage of them. Had I still the honour of the confidence of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General and Government, as I formerly believed I had, I would guarantee with my life the perfect success of this system, and that the line of route from Kurrachee to Quetta should become safe and regularly frequented as from Calcutta to Allahabad, and I have never yet promised a thing that I have not done.

The northern frontier from Hurrund to Khyra Ghari should be under a Political Superintendent and Commandant, as now, with sole command over the troops throughout, seeing to and being responsible for their proper disposal. The tract of country below Hurrund between the hills and the river would be transferred to Sind, and for this purpose a line drawn from Hurrund to Mittunkote, or thereabouts, would perhaps make the best territorial divisions, but that could be settled at any time, being merely a detail; if the principle was once allowed, communication with all people beyond the frontier, Belooch, Brahooee, or what, should be conducted solely through the Political Superintendent, whose position should be maintained and his influence supported as much as possible on all occasions.

Government have now on the frontier a most distinguished and most excellent officer, a man of high honourable feeling, cool courage proved in much service, and while firm in right and when duty compels him to be so, most patient and conciliatory when suitable to those brought in contact with him, while in zealous devotion to his duty and careful attention to orders given him he has always been conspicuous. It will be matter of most extreme regret to me if this frontier should lose his services just now, and that it should be because he faithfully carried out the orders he had received from me. I trust that this may not be the case, and that he may yet remain where no one could be better trusted.

No. 71.

No. 91, dated Camp Jacobabad, 22nd January 1876.

From Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 53P. of the 7th instant, and in reply to state, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, that I trust my letter of the 21st instant will have proved to his Excellency that I have only endeavoured in all true faith to carry out his Excellency's orders and instructions as given both before and in Government Resolution No. 2819 P. of the 16th October last. Reading that Resolution by the light of the orders I was carrying out, and simply according to the letter thereof, I venture respectfully to say there was nothing to lead me to believe it was the wish of his Excellency that Captain Sandeman's mission should extend beyond the Murree Hills into which he was directed to proceed, and which were a part of his recognised charge. If there was another spirit intended apart from that which such reading would convey, I confess it was quite unnoticed by me, and I can only offer the expression of my extreme regret that, not being favoured with the exact nature of his Excellency's wishes, I failed to perceive that entirely new views were entertained as is now shown to me. Had I been so favoured this unfortunate misunderstanding on my part would certainly never have occurred.

2. My instructions to Captain Sandeman were despatched to him on the 25th November, and copy of them was forwarded to you with my first report on the subject. I did not think certainly of sending copy to you at once, because they were based on the orders I had received in regard to Khelat affairs, and I never dreamed they could be other than would be in accord with the wishes of his Excellency in Council..

3. As before stated by me, the restrictions I imposed on Captain Sandeman's movements were grounded on the orders of Government, that all communications should, as far as possible, cease between British officers and the Khan of Khelat, his Sirdars, or people, and that Khelat affairs should be left strictly to themselves. I laid these restrictions the more particularly on Captain Sandeman, because I had observed a very untoward tendency on his part to engage in affairs connected with the Khelat State which were not in his charge, with which he could have no just concern, and which I knew well would be very gravely complicated if he had anything to do with them, by reason of the double action which such engagement on his part would lead the Khelat people to believe was intended. This tendency has, I regret to say, been in existence for some time and has proved very embarrassing. As far back as the autumn of 1872 endeavours were made from the Rojan division of the Rajanpur district to open direct communication between Captain Sandeman and his Highness the Khan. To what extent and in what form they have since been conducted that officer will be best able to inform Government. I only know that during the time Captain Sandeman has been under my orders, or was under those of the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, no official reports were made by him to either as to his connexion in any way with the ruler or people of that State, or of his having had any communication with them. If he had, no comment I am sure is necessary from me on the indelicacy and impropriety of such a proceeding. It was, moreover, contrary to orders repeatedly given him by me. If he had not, recent events require yet a new light to be let in on them.

4. My orders to Captain Sandeman to return to his district were sent because I thought he was exceeding the powers vested in him, and I can only again express my regret that the reading of the Government Resolution of the 16th October did not convey to me that extra powers had been entrusted to him. The only communication made to me by that officer was that he was leaving for the Murree Hills; no reports of progress or diaries were ever sent by him to me, so that I was completely in the dark as to his procedure until I heard from others of his having descended into Kutchi.

5. With regard to the caution alluded to in your telegram of the 20th December, I would respectfully observe it does not tell me of Captain Sandeman having any special orders for what he was doing; and your previous telegram of the 16th December saying "policy of non-interference approved" the more assured me Captain Sandeman was overstepping bounds.

6. The country was on the verge of a civil war when Captain Sandeman appeared. It was, however, a revolution the people had been purposely left to, if they chose to enter on it; and, as I reported at the time, offered the most likely solution of existing difficulties that had yet occurred, and it certainly promised to cause the least disorder

in the country. Had Nordeen Mingul's proposed movement on Khelat succeeded, which seemed very probable, and the Sarawan Sirdars managed to keep their people in Kutchi tolerably in hand, as they have done so well hitherto, a change of ruler would have been effected with a comparatively small amount of bloodshed and disturbance. The outbreak Captain Sandeman checked then would have been trifling to what will follow now (unless the British Government interferes with the strong hand, sees justice done, and order restored); and the results which have so unhappily followed his visit to Khelat cannot, I think, be too greatly deplored.

7. The enthusiastic reception described in Captain Sandeman's telegram of 1st January was merely the exhibition of hopes that he must have come with power to adjust the grievances of all. The Sirdars thought they would be righted, and the Khan, who was then in a most desperate position, caught a gleam of hope that there might be safety for him yet, and that he might get his desire over his enemies. The reaction now following the results of Captain Sandeman's visit cannot fail to be very injurious to our prestige and most damaging to the cause of order.

8. Captain Sandeman acknowledged receipt of orders to return, in letters from him dated Shalkote, 23rd and 25th December, so he had received them in good time, and it would, I cannot help saying, have been better for the peace of Beloochistan, and our future connexion with that country, had he then retraced his steps.

9. In conclusion, I can only repeat that I cannot too deeply deplore not merely having misunderstood what it seems now were the real wishes of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, but that I should have lost that trust and confidence which I had hoped I possessed, and which, had it been continued to me, placed where I was, might have led to the averting of much of what has so unfortunately occurred.

No. 72.

No. 824P., dated Fort William, 30th March 1876.

Observations.—The Governor-General in Council deems it desirable to place on record the circumstances under which it has been found necessary to relieve Sir William Merewether, the Commissioner of Sind, of the political management of the Sind and Khelat frontiers and to place the same in charge of the Commissioner of the Derajat Division of the Punjab.

2. At the time when the Resolution No. 2819P., dated 16th October 1875, was issued, it had been found necessary to distinguish more clearly than had previously been done the duties and obligations of the British Government in respect to raids committed within the British frontier, and raids committed by the nominal subjects of the Khan within the territories of Khelat. The principles then laid down and the instructions issued for the guidance of the Commissioner in Sind and of the other frontier officers of the Government, may be summed up as follows:—

First.—That we should afford complete protection to the lives and property of our own subjects and suppress outrages within the Sind and Punjab frontiers by force if necessary.

Second.—That while we may reasonably expect our troops stationed in the Sind outposts to afford some protection to life and property in Khelat territory immediately adjoining the Upper Sind Frontier as far as their power can reach, we should not accept responsibility for the protection of life and property in the territories of the Khan of Khelat.

Third.—That the frontier officers of the British Government should use their influence and good offices for the promotion of peace and order and for the settlement of disputes, whether among the tribes of Khelat, or between the tribes and the people of Seebee or the Government of Khelat.

3. In pursuance of the policy thus explained, Captain (now Major) Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan, was directed to proceed into the Murree Hills in order (1) to procure all the information he could respecting local feuds and quarrels among the Murree and Boogtee tribes, or between them and the Afghans, or between them and the Brahooees; (2) to endeavour to settle amicably such quarrels; (3) to report on such quarrels as he might not be able to settle; and (4) to report on the general relations between the Murree and Boogtee tribes and the Khan's Government. Captain Sandeman was also to inquire and report whether anything could be done for the protection of trade viâ the Bolan, and whether a system of fixed tolls could be arranged, the proceeds of which would go to the tribes interested in the protection of the route; and in respect to all or any of these objects Captain Sandeman was invested

by the Governor-General in Council with discretion to make any arrangements he might think advisable within the total sum sanctioned at the Mittunkote Conference, viz., Rupees 66,960 a year. It was added, in paragraph 29 of the Resolution, that should the measures now authorised be successful in affording reasonable security to trade through Khelat territory, and should his Highness the Khan show an earnest desire to co-operate towards this end and to return to a proper sense of his duties, it would afford the Governor-General in Council great pleasure in receiving an expression of regret for what has occurred to restore the former subsidy and re-establish the old friendly footing between his Highness' Government.

4. Under these instructions Captain Sandeman was competent to take such steps as he might consider necessary for adjusting the quarrels between the Murrees and Boogtees, the Afghans, the Brahooees, and the Government of Khelat, and for collecting information on the subject of the general relations between the tribes and the Khan's Government, and even for opening the way for the re-establishment of friendly relations between the British Government and the Khan. The scope of Captain Sandeman's action was intentionally made wide enough to admit of the full and free exercise of his good offices and influence for the purposes above-mentioned.

5. After the Resolution of 16th October 1875 had been issued, the Governor-General in Council received a report from the Commissioner in Sind, No. 816, dated 21st October 1875, and subsequently a letter from the same officer, dated 29th October. In the former the Commissioner commented unfavourably on recent proceedings of the Khan of Khelat and severely condemned the conduct of the Murrees. In the latter he remonstrated against the policy adopted by the Government of India in respect to the Murrees, renewed his complaints of their misconduct in raiding upon Kutchee, pointed out the importance of Kutchee from a commercial aspect, and recommended that in the ensuing cold weather he should be authorised to protect Kutchee against the inroads of the Murrees. This recommendation was inconsistent with the instructions that already had been issued by the Government of India. It was received when the Governor-General was on tour, and his Excellency saw no ground for modifying those instructions.

6. The next news of importance received from the Khelat frontier was the telegram from the Commissioner in Sind, dated 13th December 1875, informing the Governor-General in Council that a revolution in Khelat was imminent, that Noordeen Mingul was the leading conspirator, and that the Sarawan Sirdars were in communication with him. The Commissioner stated his intention to avoid interference, adding that he had instructed Captain Sandeman to be most careful to avoid communication with the Brahooee Sirdars or their people, and on no account to go beyond the Murree Hills towards the Bolan, Seebee, or Kutchee. On the supposition that a revolution was about to take place the Government of India had no wish that the British officers in Sind should interfere in the crisis or interpose actively between the parties, and therefore the Commissioner was acquainted by telegram No. 3309P., dated 16th December 1875, that a policy of non-interference was approved. Nothing, however, was said to justify the supposition that his Excellency in Council had altered his views as to the action which Captain Sandeman had been authorised by the Resolution of 16th October 1875 to take.

7. The intention of the Government of India in this respect was made clear by the Foreign Secretary's telegram No. 3343P., dated 20th December 1875. The Commissioner in Sind had reported in his telegram of the 17th December that Captain Sandeman was stated to have visited Seebee and Dadur, that this was contrary to the Commissioner's orders, objectionable, and embarrassing, and that he had been ordered to return at once to his district, where the Commissioner begged he might be kept. The Commissioner was thereupon instructed, while directing Captain Sandeman not to interfere in the troubles apparently impending between the Khan and his subjects, to be careful not to interfere with Captain Sandeman's execution of the orders he had received from Government, and particularly not to be hasty in condemning his conduct before he had explained it. It was added that Captain Sandeman's movements among the Murrees should not be interfered with.

8. The Governor-General in Council had not then been made acquainted by the Commissioner in Sind with the instructions he had issued for the guidance of Captain Sandeman in consequence of the Resolution of 16th October 1875. The fact that such instructions had been issued was first reported in the endorsement from the Commissioner, No. 983, dated 17th December 1875, accompanying the Khelat Diary, No. 47, for the week ending 12th December 1875. The precise nature of the instructions has now been ascertained from the Commissioner's letter No. 13, dated 7th January 1876. From this it appears that they were dated the 21st of November 1875, and that after

directing Captain Sandeman to proceed into the Murree Hills for the purposes contemplated by the Resolution, the Commissioner added—"You may possibly be able to "amicably adjust for a time some of the quarrels between the Murrees and Boogtees, "and perhaps with the Afghans, but any feuds that may be supposed, or may be stated, "to exist between the Murrees or Boogtees and Brahooee tribes should be first fully "and thoroughly reported to me before any action is attempted as regards the Brahooee "side of the question." And again—"No arrangements should be entered into with "any of the tribes to the westward of the Murree and Boogtee countries, until I have "had an opportunity of judging on the nature of your proposals." It further appears from the Commissioner's letter to Captain Sandeman, No. 917A., dated 25th November 1875, that, whereas the Government of India had directed Captain Sandeman to report upon the general relations between the Murree and Boogtee tribes and the Khan's Government, the Commissioner directed that "the idea of any terms being discussed or "come to between the Khan and those tribes should not be entertained."

9. These instructions to Major Sandeman, both in their particulars, and in their whole tenor, are in the opinion of his Excellency in Council opposed both to the letter and to the spirit of the orders which were contained in the Resolution of the Government of India of the 16th of October 1875.

10. By Sir W. Merewether's telegram of 22nd December 1875, his Excellency in Council was informed that the Commissioner considered Captain Sandeman's action to be directly contrary to the policy laid down by Government and gravely insubordinate; that Captain Sandeman had not only visited Seebee and Dadur and held communication with the Brahooee Sirdars, but had sent Imam Buksh Mazaree and others with letters to the Khan; that he had entered the Bolan accompanied by the Sirdars, and that the whole of this was "most indiscreet and unbecoming, must make present relations with "Khan and Khelat affairs more embarrassing, and make all parties doubt in reality (of) "Government policy and its good faith."

11. The endorsement from the Commissioner in Sind No. 1,005, dated 22nd December 1875, on Khelat Diary No. 48, contained further expressions of strong disapproval and condemnation in reference to Captain Sandeman. His efforts to carry out the instructions of the Governor-General in Council were denounced as a direct assumption of political power which was "most unbecoming and improper." The desire of the Government of India that a policy of non-interference should be followed in a particular crisis, viz., the revolution supposed to be impending, was appealed to by the Commissioner as a ground for severe disapproval of proceedings taken by Captain Sandeman under general instructions from the Governor-General in Council. Finally, though the Commissioner had been warned by the Foreign Secretary's telegram No. 3343P., dated 20th December 1875, not to interfere with Captain Sandeman's execution of the orders he had received from Government, or with his movements among the Murrees, the Commissioner informed his Excellency in Council that instructions had been sent to Captain Sandeman to return forthwith to his own district, that is to Dehra Ghazee Khan. These orders recalling Captain Sanderman were again referred to in endorsements from the Commissioner, No. 1021, dated 27th December 1875, and No. 1036, dated 29th idem, with further remarks conveying severe animadversion on Captain Sandeman's proceedings.

12. The endeavour being made by Captain Sandeman to settle the disputes which he found to exist in Khelat seemed to be so completely in accord with the views of the Governor-General in Council that his Excellency in Council could only account for the Commissioner's reports and proceedings by supposing that he had not properly understood the instructions contained in the Resolution of the Government of India No. 2819P., dated 16th October. He was accordingly informed by the Foreign Secretary's telegram No. 39P., dated 7th January 1876, and letter No. 53P., of the same date, that the restrictions placed by him on Captain Sandeman's proceedings were not in accordance with the letter or spirit of the Resolution of 16th October; that the Governor-General in Council could see nothing in those proceedings inconsistent with Captain Sandeman's instructions, or in excess of the powers expressly vested in him by his Excellency in Council, while the Commissioner's orders to Captain Sandeman to return to his district appeared opposed to the policy and directions of his Excellency in Council as set forth in the Resolution of 16th October. It was added that under the circumstances the Governor-General in Council was reluctantly compelled, for the purpose of preventing further complications, to place Captain Sandeman while on his tour under the direct orders of the Government of India.

13. At the same time Captain Sandeman received orders by telegram No. 50P., dated 7th January 1876, to act upon the instructions of Government Resolution

No. 2819P., dated 16th October, but to be careful not to exceed them, or to interfere with questions between the British Government and the Khan of Khelat. He was told to exercise his own discretion as to his return to the Punjab, but not to protract his stay in Khelat territory. And it was arranged that his reports should be submitted to the Government of India under flying seal through the Commissioner in Sind when possible, the Commissioner in other cases being kept fully acquainted with Captain Sandeman's proceedings. Captain Sandeman during his tour was to receive instructions from the Government of India.

14. These arrangements having been completed, the Governor-General in Council received a telegram from the Commissioner in Sind, dated 9th January 1876. In this telegram the Commissioner stated that he did not understand that the duties confided to him were to be entered upon independently by a comparative stranger to the country and people; that while he (Commissioner) was carefully following a policy of non-interference, a junior officer of less experience and knowledge of the subject should come in without reference to him, actively interfere, and upset arrangements; that Captain Sandeman knew well the Commissioner's strong objection to his engaging in Khelat affairs, and should have addressed the Commissioner before doing so; that to adjust matters quickly interference must have been exerted for or against the Khan; that Government declined to interfere, and the decision to wait patiently was about to be rewarded, when Captain Sandeman's appearance spoilt all; that when the policy of non-interference was approved Captain Sandeman was then directly meddling, and, as would be approved in the end, most mischievously initiating a double policy; that if interference was intended it should have been exerted through him (Commissioner), who could point out the best time and mode, and that he (Commissioner) trusted to the result for rectification.

15. The telegram summarised in the foregoing paragraph left the Governor-General in Council no alternative but to take immediate action for securing unity of policy in the conduct of the relations of the British Government with Khelat. If the Commissioner had read rightly the orders conveyed in the Resolution of 16th October 1875, and supported Captain Sandeman, there would have been no risk of a misapprehension of the views of the Government of India, and for any misapprehension that has arisen, as indicated in the Commissioner's letter No. 13, dated 7th January 1876, and the telegram quoted in the preceding paragraph, the responsibility rests entirely with him. If the Commissioner had felt doubts regarding the proper interpretation of the orders of the 16th October, he should have asked by telegraph for instructions from the Governor-General in Council before taking upon himself to order Captain Sandeman to abandon the work entrusted to him and return to his district. Instead of the course which he actually followed he should have made known the contents of the orders of 16th October 1875 to those of the tribes with whom the Political Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier was in communication, and so paved the way for Captain Sandeman's negotiations.

16. As it seemed impossible to expect that the control of affairs could be satisfactorily carried on through the Commissioner in Sind, whose opinions and conduct had been found to be irreconcilable with the views expressed and the policy enjoined by the Government of India, the Governor-General in Council was compelled, with great regret and reluctance, to relieve the Commissioner in Sind from all responsibility for Khelat affairs, and to entrust the political charge of Khelat to Colonel Munro, Commissioner of the Derajat Division of the Punjab. This measure was carried into effect by the orders noted on the margin.

17. In his letters, No. 55, dated 21st January, and No. 91, dated 22nd January, the Commissioner seeks to vindicate the action taken by him, and prays to be absolved from "the grave imputation that he ever contemplated for a moment deviating in the least "from a sincere desire to carry out the orders of his Excellency or Government." The Governor-General in Council gladly accepts Sir William Merewether's disclaimer of any intention to act in deliberate opposition to the instructions of Government, but both his letters are principally directed to a recapitulation of the opinions which he had previously expressed upon Khelat affairs, and upon the mode of dealing with the Murrees. Those views had already been considered by the Government of India with all the attention Sir William Merewether's character and position entitled them to receive, but they were not approved. Nothing has now been advanced by Sir William Merewether to lead the Government of India to modify the opinion they have expressed that his manner of dealing with Major Sandeman was at variance with the instructions of the 16th of October. The difficulty of the attempt to manage the affairs of Beloochistan, partly from the Punjab and partly from Sind, has long been felt. Recent events have com-

pelled the Government of India to transfer the responsibility for frontier affairs to Colonel Munro, an officer serving under the Punjab Government, and Sir William Merewether's duties will be confined to the civil administration of Sind.

No. 825P.

Ordered, that copy of the above Resolution be forwarded to the Government of Bombay, in continuation of letter No. 152P., dated 13th January 1876.

No. 826P.

Ordered, that copy of the above Resolution be forwarded to the Government of the Punjab, in continuation of letter No. 150P., dated 13th January 1876.

No. 827P.

Ordered, that copy of the above Resolution be forwarded to the Commissioner in Sind, in continuation of telegram No. 143P., dated 13th January 1876.

No. 73.

No. 78 of 1876.

Government of India. Foreign Department. Political. (Extract.)

To the Most Hon. the Marquis of Salisbury, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Marquis, Fort William, 31st March 1876.

In continuation of our Despatch No. 6, dated the 14th January, we transmit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the accompanying correspondence.*

2. On receipt of Sir William Merewether's letters, No. 55, dated 21st January, and No. 91, dated 22nd January 1876, we again reviewed the circumstances under which we were constrained to relieve that officer of all responsibility for Khelat affairs and place them in charge of Colonel Munro, Commissioner of the Derajat. We have embodied our conclusions in a Resolution, copy of which accompanies this Despatch.

3. While we readily accept Sir William Merewether's disclaimer of any desire to act in deliberate opposition to the orders of the Government, we are of opinion that he failed to carry out the instructions contained in our Resolution of the 16th of October, and that the correspondence shows that it was impossible to expect that the duty of carrying into effect the policy which we had deliberately adopted, but which was not in accord with his opinions, could with advantage be replaced in his hands.

* * * * * * * * * *

We have, &c.

(Signed) Northbrook.
Napier of Magdala.
H. W. Norman.
Arthur Hobhouse.
E. C. Bayley.
W. Muir.
A. J. Arbuthnot.
A. Clarke.

No. 74.

No. 80, dated 17th March 1876.

Memorandum from Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., *D.C.L.*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Has the honour herewith to submit for information copy of a murasila, despatched to his Highness the Khan of Khelat on receipt of Foreign Secretary's telegram of the 14th instant.

* Nos. 70 to 72.

2. This is the first opportunity the undersigned has had of communicating direct with the Khan, who is stated to be in anxious expectation of a reply to his letter from the Viceroy and Governor-General.

3. The announcement that a reply is to be sent in due course will tend probably to assure the Khan of the earnest nature of the attempt which is again about to be made, and it will also apprise him of Major Sandeman's second visit to the Bolan for the purpose of passing through all the caravans detained at Shikarpur. The opportunity afforded thus for fairly discovering to what extent all the contending parties are desirous of accepting our renewed offers of mediation is a good one, and Major Sandeman is sanguine of success.

Enclosure 1 in No. 74.

Translation of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty, to the address of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, dated 15th March 1876 (corresponding with 18th Saffar 1293 A. H.)

I beg to inform your Highness that owing to the disagreement of the Sirdars in the ilaqa of Khelat and consequent absence of peace in that country, I am appointed, under orders of the supreme and liberal Government of India, to witness and ascertain the state of the affairs relative to the boundaries from Derajat to Kurrachee, and have accordingly arrived at Jacobabad in order that both those boundaries may be supervised by one officer, and that Government may possess an accurate knowledge of what may occur.

I did not before this address you separately on the ground that your correspondence (with Government) was carried on through the highly exalted Major Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan, to whom your Highness delivered, on the occasion of his interview with you at Khelat, two letters, one addressed to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and the other to his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. The above-named gentleman laid those letters before me, and I sent them directly to the addresses. I have been waiting for replies to those letters, being anxious to know what answer may be issued by Government. I received intelligence yesterday that a reply to your letter had been issued by the Government of India, so that it will shortly arrive here. On its arrival I will lose no time in sending it to your Highness, and you will learn from it all particulars.

I beg to add that on the occurrence of disputes between the Brahooee Sirdars, Jalawan and Sarawan, the British Government always looks to your Highness for the adoption of measures for the suppression of the disturbances and restoration of peace, and the said Government is anxiously considering whether all events which have occurred have been previously disclosed to it, truly and accurately, according to the actual facts of the case.

I beg to inform your Highness that in consequence of these disturbances and the insecurity of roads in the country of Khelat, the caravans cannot travel to and from Candahar, and a great number of merchants, whose return to their native country is absolutely necessary, have become restless, being obliged to stay here longer; and that Major Sandeman being informed of all these circumstances, and relying on the words which your Highness was pleased to express to him on the occasion of his meeting with you at Khelat, is taking along with him the caravans, accompanied by a sufficient force in order to escort them through the Bolan Pass, that they may safely reach their respective places of residence. It is very probable that the above-named gentleman will, in a courteous and friendly spirit, directly make an intimation to your Highness about his arrival in your territories, either soon after or previous to it.

I trust that your Highness will consider me as your well-wisher, and gratify me from time to time with friendly letters.

May welfare constantly attend your Highness.

No. 75.

No. 705P., dated Fort William, 20th March 1876.

From F. Henvey, Esq., for Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty.

My telegram of the 14th March conveyed to you the orders of the Government of India regarding the action to be taken in reference to Major Sandeman's report of his

proceedings in Khelat, forwarded with your letter No. 20, dated 12th February, and the events reported in subsequent diaries and telegrams.

2. I have now the honour, by direction of his Excellency in Council, to forward, for your information and guidance, copy of a Resolution in this Department, No. 671A.-P., dated 14th March 1876, setting forth in further detail the views and orders of the Government. The letter from his Excellency the Viceroy to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, referred to in paragraph 12 of the Resolution, is sent herewith, together with a Persian translation.

3. In transmitting the above, I am to request that you will convey to Major Sandeman an expression of the satisfaction of the Government of India at the manner in which he carried out the instructions contained in this office Resolution No. 2819P. of the 16th October 1875. The acknowledgments of the Government are also due to Captain H. Wyllie and Dr. G. Thomson, who accompanied Major Sandeman.

4. The conduct of the Belooch Chiefs of the Dera Ghazi Khan District who attended with their followers is highly appreciated by his Excellency in Council, and you are authorised, in recognition of their services, to confer upon them, on his Excellency's behalf, khilluts of the value noted in the margin.

	Rs.
Chief of the Mazaris -	800
„ Lugharis -	800
„ Drishaks -	500
„ Gurchanis -	500
„ Khosas -	500
„ Lund -	500

5. The services of Wali Muhammad, Subadar, and the native detachments of cavalry and infantry will be acknowledged in the Military Department.

6. With reference to paragraph 50 of your letter on the subject of office establishment, I am to request that specific proposals be submitted for the consideration of the Government of India. Meanwhile you are authorised, as a provisional arrangement, to entertain such additional office establishment as may be absolutely necessary.

No. 76.

Dated Fort William, 20th March 1876.

From his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, to his Highness Begular Begee Mir Khodadad Khan, Wali of Khelat.

I have received your Highness' letter in which you communicate your wish to remain under the protection of the British Government, and your urgent desire to offer explanations in order to prevent a severance of the friendly relations which long existed between Khelat and the British Government.

My friend! the British Government has always desired the maintenance of friendly relations with the Khelat State, and I would remind your Highness that the suspension of those relations, which has unhappily continued for nearly three years past, is the result of your Highness' own conduct.

Nevertheless, I am willing to accept your Highness' communication as evidence of regret for the past and a desire for reconciliation. I have accordingly determined to authorise Colonel Munro, the officer now in charge of Khelat affairs, to depute Major Sandeman, an officer who possesses my full confidence and with whom your Highness is already personally acquainted, for the purpose of conferring with your Highness upon the affairs of Khelat, and if possible effecting a settlement of all disputes.

I take this step in the expectation that your Highness will not fail to co-operate sincerely and heartily with Major Sandeman in the adjustment of all existing differences, whether in respect to your relations with my Government or in respect to the Chieftains and tribes of Beloochistan.

By hearkening to Major Sandeman's counsels, and acting in conformity with his advice, your Highness will afford the best proof of the sincerity of your professions, and relieve me from the necessity of taking further measures to secure the tranquillity of the British frontier and the protection of trade.

No. 77.

No. 706P., dated Fort William, 20th March 1876.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Lepel Griffin, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

With reference to the correspondence ending with the telegram from this office No. 679P., dated 14th of March 1876, I am directed by the Governor-General in Council to forward, for the information of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, copy of a Resolution No. 671A.-P. of the same date, setting forth the views of his Excellency in Council as to the policy which should now be followed in respect to the affairs of Khelat.

2. Copies of a letter No. 705P. of this day's date, issuing subsidiary instructions for the guidance of Colonel Munro, and of the letter from the Viceroy to the Khan of Khelat are also enclosed.

3. I am to request that the substance of the orders passed by the Governor-General in Council in reference to Khelat, and a brief statement of the object which the Government has in view, namely, the pacification of the country, may be communicated to the British Agent at Cabul, in order that he may be in a position to acquaint the Amir with the particulars of the case in the event of his Highness seeking for information.

4. A printed copy of the correspondence quoted in Resolution No. 671A.-P., dated 14th instant, is forwarded confidentially for submission to his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor.

No. 78.

No. 707P., dated Fort William, 20th March 1876. Extract.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

In transmitting, for the information and guidance of his Excellency the Governor in Council, copy of Government of India's Resolution in this Department No. 671A.-P., dated 14th March 1876, on the subject of Khelat affairs, I have the honour, by direction of the Governor-General in Council, to call the attention of the Government of Bombay to the marginally noted extract from paragraph 52 of Colonel Munro's letter of the 12th February, and to request that, with the permission of his Excellency in Council, instructions may be issued to the Commissioner of Sind to give effect, without delay, to that officer's recommendation.

"I am given to understand that a considerable body of mounted police, consisting of certain members of reclaimed predatory tribes, some of whom were subjects of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, as Dhoombkees, Jakranis, Khosas, and Boogtees, is maintained in the districts under the designation of 'Belooch Guides.' In so far as the duties of any of these may be connected with frontier administration not strictly military, and separate from those of internal district police, I consider that they should be freely at the disposal, or entirely under the orders of, the Political Superintendent. They must be valuable aids in maintaining communications with the trans-border tribes."

2. I am further to state, with reference to paragraph 14 of the Resolution, that the Government of India will be glad if his Excellency the Governor in Council will instruct the Commissioner of Sind to arrange that the European officers of the Sind Frontier Police be made directly subordinate to the Political Superintendent at Jacobabad (*i.e.*, to Colonel Munro) quoad all communications with the tribes beyond the British Frontier along the whole Sind and Khelat border, and responsible for the speedy conveyance to him of all border intelligence of importance.

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No. 79.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 21st March 1876.

16th March.—A letter was received from Shikarpur dated the 15th instant, bringing to notice "that the caravan people here are very anxious to return to their country." It further states that some of the merchants "had been put to such straits that they "had actually sold their goods to support themselves, and that their entreaties had

" compelled " the writer to again address the Political Officers on the subject. It was ascertained that the caravans detained at Shikarpur and Jacobabad numbered 3,000 to 4,000 camels.

2. 20th March.—News from Seebee is to the effect that his Highness the Khan's troops were preparing to march. It was expected that they were to go to Khorassan, as it was currently stated that the Khan had ordered them there to oppose the Jalawans.

3. From the Boogtee Hills news was received that the Massuri Boogtee leader, Hyder Khan, with his son and 26 followers, had been killed in an encounter with the Zarkhan Pathans. It would appear that the Pathans attacked the Boogtees when cooking, and had thus the advantage from the first. The Boogtees were at the time on their way back from a raid into the Zarkhan Pathan country.

4. In diary for the week ending 21st February 1876 notice was taken of a letter from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed of Sarawan in which he stated that he could arrange that the Jalawans should join the Sarawans in the event of the British Government permitting an officer to mediate between the Brahooees and his Highness the Khan. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed was requested to write further regarding this. A letter in reply from the Sirdar to Major Sandeman has been received. In it the Sirdar sends an original letter from Sirdar Azaad Khan of Kharan to the address of the Sarawan Sirdars. The contents of this letter are as follows: That it was now necessary that there should be no division amongst the Sirdars. Both factions should become of one mind and act together. It was not possible that the Jalawans could come to Kutchi to the Sarawans, but the latter should join the former in Khorassan. They could then arrange to make a combined attack on Khelat. The writer said that if Sirdar Moolla Mahomed was in communication with the British authorities, and were it possible to arrange through them for the settlement of the dispute between his Highness the Khan and Mir Khan, Jam of Lus Beyla, and other similar cases, it was right and proper for all the Sirdars, Jalawan and Sarawan, to accept the mediation of the British authorities. Should there appear no hope of this, then the only resource left was for the combined Brahooee Sirdars to settle their affairs by fighting with his Highness the Khan.

5. 21st March.—News from Khelat is to the effect that his Highness the Khan had released the ex-Wuzeer, Atta Mahomed Khan, from prison, and had fixed for his maintenance and that of his family Rupees 60 a month and 32 maunds of atta. The ex-Wuzeer's wound was progressing favourably, and he had been allowed to go and live with his family. The story of the death of the Wuzeer's wives as given in a former diary was untrue.

6. Naib Pir Jan of Nasirabad reports that matters are perfectly quiet in Kutchi. The Brahooee Sirdars had forbidden their followers from plundering and thieving in Kutchi. His idea is that this has resulted from the fact that the news had spread everywhere of the intention of the British Government to send Major Sandeman to open the Bolan Pass to traffic. The news had created rejoicing in every household, and all now hoped that peace and quiet would be restored to Khelat. The Naib was sure that no one would more truly rejoice at getting the news than his Highness the Khan himself.

No. 59, dated Jacobabad, 22nd March 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty, Jacobabad.

No. 80.

No. 7C., dated Camp, 28th March 1876.

From Lepel Griffin, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am desired to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy, with translation of a murasila from the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor to the Khan of

Khelat, in reply to the letter from his Highness which accompanied Major Sandeman's report, forwarded to your address with my letter No. 3C. of the 24th February last.

Enclosure 1 in No. 80.

Translated copy of a murasila from the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

I have received your Highness' letter in which you express your good wishes towards the British Government and myself. Your letter which accompanied it to the address of his Excellency the Governor-General of India was duly forwarded, and a reply has been despatched to you by his Excellency.

I have been gratified to hear from Major Sandeman, an officer serving under the Punjab Government, of the kind and courteous manner with which your Highness received him when he visited Khelat in November and December last. And I sincerely trust that on the occasion of the visit which he is now about to undertake to your territory in accordance with the instructions of the Government of India, he will be able to lend such support to your Highness' endeavours to give satisfaction to the Sirdars and people of your territories as may render them successful in establishing peace and prosperity, and may renew friendly relations between the British Government and your Highness.

Be assured that I am always your sincere well-wisher, and desire nothing more than the prosperity of your Highness and the Khelat State.

No. 81.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 28th March 1876.

During the past week no event of any importance has occurred either beyond the frontier, in Khelat, or on it.

2. 24th March.—The Brahooee Sirdars of Sarawan sent a letter to Major Sandeman expressing their sincere pleasure at hearing he was about to proceed to the Bolan Pass, accompanied by the return caravans, with a view to sending them in safety through the Pass. The Sirdars express their earnest desire to co-operate in this work, and will meet Major Sandeman at Dadar, or any other place he may name, on being informed of the probable date of his arrival at the place he may appoint for the meeting. They state they will bring with them the Chiefs of the Minguls, Kakars, and Murrees, but it is desirable that a meeting between Major Sandeman, the Sirdars, and Chiefs should take place before the kafilas enter the pass.

3. With regard to the Jalawan affairs, Sirdar Moolla Mahomed is of opinion that Mir Ibrahim Khan, Mir Gohur Khan, and Jam Ali will gladly join in any satisfactory arrangement for the peace of the country that Major Sandeman may propose. He (Sirdar Moolla Mahomed) since the traitorous conduct of the late Noordeen Mingul became known has avoided close contact with the Jalawan Chiefs; but, for all that, he is in a position to state that he believes they will follow his advice. He further states directly he (Sirdar Moolla Mahomed) meets Major Sandeman he will place fully before him the true position of Sarawan and Jalawan affairs. For the future the Sarawans will carefully abstain from causing further injury to the country; but their difficulties are great, as on account of their disputes with his Highness the Khan, they and their followers are debarred from entering the towns to get supplies.

4. 26th March.—Captain Wise, District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee, reports as follows:—

"The frontier continues quiet, and the only report during the week is one from Sub-Inspector Sirdar Jubbal Khan, dated 19th March, stating that Jan Muhammad Choota was trying to raise the Jamalis and others against his brother, and another from Sub-Inspector Ali Muhammad reporting that a Pathan kafila from Kurrachee with 1,000 camels and 500 men had passed safely along our frontier and through Saheb Khan Choota and Jubbal Brahooee's raj (jurisdiction). The former had given them a letter to Noordeen's brother asking a safe passage for them, but that on arrival further up country a body of Mingul Brahooees had collected to plunder them, and were following them for that purpose. The Pathans are strong in number, and are armed, and I think will be able to hold their own; but the passes are all reported to be closed, and they are likely to have to fight their way through.

" The Sirdars on the frontier in our service are still anxious regarding the course his Highness the Khan will take regarding them, as they consider he is displeased with them for keeping the frontier quiet and kafila roads open, and they look to us to speak in their behalf."

5. 27th March.—A letter was received from the Officer Commanding at Jacobabad, proposing that on account of the improved aspect of affairs on the Sind frontier, the outposts of Rojhan, Khyra-Ghurri and Digri, which had been established last year in Aprion account of " the turbulent state of the frontier," should be withdrawn.

6. 28th March.—News from Sibi is to the effect that the Sarawan Sirdar Moolla Mahomed is in the Murree Hills. It was proposed by turbulent people to raid in Kutchi. This the Sarawan Sirdars refused to permit, it having become known that Major Sandeman was soon to proceed to Dadar to endeavour to re-open the Bolan Pass to traffic. The Brahooees and Murrees are at peace together, and have remained so since it was established between the two by Major Sandeman in January last.

7. A report had been received in Seebee that his Highness the Khan's troops were preparing to march for Khorassan. It had been arranged by the Brahooees to attack them in the Bolan Pass, but this intention had now been abandoned. The Naibs had also decided to cause no further injury to the Brahooees.

8. Another account from Seebee is to the effect that the Sarawans have been reduced to great straits; that it was with much difficulty the Sirdars prevented their followers, on account of their impoverished state, from committing excesses in the country. Many of the Brahooees had returned to Khorassan for the hot months. Muhammad Said Khan, Agent to the Governor of Candahar, was still at Seebee. He had experienced much difficulty in collecting arrears of revenue from the Khajjaks.

9. 28th March.—Letters were received from the Naibs of Nasirabad, Bagh and Dadur expressing in his Highness the Khan's name their great pleasure at hearing of Major Sandeman's intended visit to the Bolan Pass with the object of re-opening it to trade. They profess their anxiety to aid in every way, and ask permission to come and meet Major Sandeman with the object of giving it.

No. 69, dated Jacobabad, 29th March 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Forwarded to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty, Jacobabad.

No. 82.

No. 116, dated 1st April 1876.

From Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty, Jacobabad, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my No. 80 of 17th ultimo, I have the honour herewith to forward a letter in original (with English translation) from his Highness the Khan of Khelat in reply to my communication of which a copy was sent to you under cover of the docket above referred to.

2. It will be observed that his Highness the Khan does not appear much to appreciate Major Sandeman's opening of the Bolan Pass route to the outgoing caravans, but would prefer, if possible, their going by the much more circuitous and difficult route of the Mulla Pass, which has, until lately, to some extent been under his control.

3. The Khan's objects doubtless are that this last-named Pass, which has recently been the scene of disturbances and of the plundering of caravans, should be securely re-opened through Major Sandeman's intervention, and that his own exclusive receipt of fees should be maintained.

Enclosure 1 in No. 82.

Translation of a letter from his Highness Mir Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, on special duty, Jacobabad, dated Khelat, 2nd Safar 1293 (=23rd March 1876).

I have to acknowledge receipt of your letter informing me of your arrival in Sind, and that you were placed by Government in charge of the Sind and Khelat frontiers. You also stated your reasons for not having written me sooner, which were that replies have not come to my letters addressed to his Excellency the Viceroy and the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor, Punjab; but as these were then on their way to me, you wrote to announce the fact.

For a long period it has been the custom, when a change of British officer took place on the frontier, for the newly appointed officer to announce the event to me. I was on the look-out, therefore, for a letter from you, and am much pleased that one has come.

I consider myself as the subject of the British Government, and believe you are my friend. Your appointment to the charge of this frontier will greatly benefit myself and the public.

I note what you say about Major Sandeman's escorting the kafilas through the Bolan Pass. Major Sandeman knows my views on this point, as I personally explained them to him.

I tried to keep open the Mulla Pass, and to punish the evil-designed persons infesting it. With this object I occupied the Pass with my troops, but on account of the Brahooee (Sarawans) insurrection in Kutchi, I had to move them to Bagh. I do not think Major Sandeman should trouble himself about opening the Bolan, and escorting kafilas through that Pass. Please instruct the kafila people to proceed to Gundava and Kotri. On their arrival there I will send orders to my troops and officials to escort them through the Mulla Pass. Should the kafilas have started with their escort, I will help to ensure their safety through Khelat by aiding with my troops, and will send these to meet them.

No. 83.

No. 125, dated Jacobabad, 4th April 1876.

From Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat, on special duty, Jacobabad, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to report that Major Sandeman marched from Jacobabad this morning in progress to the Bolan Pass; in the first place, to afford a safe passage through that defile to the numerous caravans which have lately been detained here and at Shikarpur; and, secondly, to ascertain, without further possibility of doubt, whether the Khan of Khelat and the principal Chiefs of all parties, Jalawans and Sarawans, are ready to accept his arbitration for the purposes set forth in the Government Resolution of the 16th October last.

2. I enclose copy of a letter of instructions addressed by me to Major Sandeman when handing over to him the letters from his Excellency the Viceroy and from his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to the Khan of Khelat, with a copy of the Resolution above referred to, for his information and general guidance, and I trust that these instructions may be approved.

3. In exercise of the discretion allowed to me, I have deemed it to be advisable that the troops composing Major Sandeman's escort should be taken from both the frontier forces of the Punjab and Sind, as per marginal detail in my letter of instructions to Major Sandeman, who has also been granted the services of Captain Wylie and the surveying party which accompanied him on his last mission to Khelat.

4. Funds to the amount of Rupees 25,000 for the general purposes of the mission have been advanced to him by me, as drawn from the Shikarpur Treasury, under the sanction of the Government of India duly conveyed through the Government of Bombay.

5. For some little time past there has been a comparative cessation of hostilities in Khelat territory. Ever since the announcement that Major Sandeman would effect a safe passage through the Bolan to the caravans returning from Hindustan, the contending parties appear to have suspended hostile operations, in anxious expectation of some effective interference, and the Sarawan leaders have been in direct communication with

Major Sandeman, earnestly professing their desire for a final settlement. The Khan's sentiments regarding the opening of the Bolan to the returning merchants may be judged of from his late letter to me, a copy and translation of which were forwarded to you under cover of No. 116 of 1st instant.

6. The first object, viz., the passing through the Bolan Pass of the caravans, effected, it is probable that Major Sandeman will take up a favourable position at or near Mustung for opening direct communications with the Khan of Khelat and all the Chiefs, whether Jalawan or Sarawan, with the intention of assuring himself of their readiness to accept his arbitration, and of promoting the desire of the Government of India in re-accrediting him to Khelat territory with unmistakable signs of support.

7. The selection of a favourable locality above the passes in a climate much more conducive to the health of the troops forming the escort, and all the officers attached to the mission, than any that could be fixed upon in Kutchi during the hot season now set in, cannot fail, in my opinion, to place Major Sandeman in the best possible position for thoroughly ascertaining the objects and wishes of the various contending parties in the disorganized State of Khelat.

8. Should an encouraging amount of success be secured, and his Highness the Khan of Khelat be found to exhibit that proper spirit which is contemplated by the Government of India in according to him another opportunity for re-establishing friendly relations with the British Government, matters might be put in training for a meeting in Gundava or elsewhere on the plains of Kutchi in October or November next between the Khan of Khelat and the British Commissioner. The information which will be amassed meanwhile regarding the real state of affairs throughout Khelat territory cannot fail to be most valuable. We should be able to deal with the Khan and his Sirdars on such a groundwork of accumulated facts, compared with the fictions of the past, as will effectually obviate misconception on either side, and lead to definite conclusions.

9. The hot season having already set in, an interview with the Khan of Khelat elsewhere than above the passes is precluded. The interval can be turned to very profitable account, however, in collecting information from all sides, and in dissipating long established prejudices, traceable to a vicious system, whereby interested Natives were permitted to have the leading share in complicating our past relations with Khelat, as some recent correspondence as well as certain reports now under submission, regarding the connexion between the late Political Munshi Rassul Buksh and Shahgassee Wallee Mahomed will sufficiently demonstrate.

10. Major Sandeman's further proceedings will be watched with interest. Relieved of the clogs and trammels which impeded him on his first visit to Khelat, he will be free to act within the limits prescribed for him by the Government of India, and I therefore look forward with confidence our obtaining such results, whether favourable or otherwise, from this second deputation as shall leave no room whatever for doubt as to the course to be ultimately pursued.

Enclosure 1 in No. 83.

No. 117, dated Jacobabad, 3rd April 1876.

From Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat, on special duty, Jacobabad, to Major R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

In continuation of this Office No. 94 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour herewith to make over to you, for your special information and guidance, as in charge of the mission now about to depart towards the Bolan Pass and Khelat territory, a copy of the printed Resolution No. 671(a)P. of the Government of India, dated the 14th ultimo, which was passed with reference to the reports, as per margin, concerning your former mission to Khelat.

Major Sandeman's No. 8 of 5th February to the Commissioner.
Colonel Munro's No. 20 of 12th February to the Secretary to Government, Punjab.

2. Your particular attention is drawn to paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Resolution, and you will be specially guided by what is laid down in paragraph 12 in your further communications with his Highness the Khan of Khelat and the Sirdars of that State, whether of the Jalawan or Sarawan factions.

3. I am aware that circumstances have hitherto prevented you from forming so confident an estimate of the motives and objects of the Jalawans as your personal intercourse with the Sarawan leaders has induced. It will be all the more necessary, therefore, that you embrace the earliest and best opportunities available for making yourself acquainted with and ascertaining the real tendencies and desires of the Jalawan leaders,

so that no doubt may be permitted to remain regarding those when you are submitting to me such proofs as are demanded by the Government of India of the readiness of the Khan and principal Chiefs of all parties, including Jalawans and Sarawans, to accept your arbitration in view to a settlement of the disputes which have so long rent the distracted State of Khelat, and to the re-establishment of friendly relations between his Highness the Khan of Khelat and the British Government.

4. It is unnecessary for me to impress upon you the great importance of the duties now entrusted to you. None of the impediments which clogged your progress on the first occasion will, on this your second mission, be permitted to interfere with your freedom of action.

5. You will be accompanied by a military escort of the strength noted in the margin, which has been considered by me to be sufficient both for your protection and dignity, in regard to which the Government of India are solicitous. The escort is composed of troops partly taken from the Punjab Frontier Force and partly from the Sind Frontier Garrison at Jacobabad. You have also sought for and obtained the services of Captain Wylie and his surveying party, who accompanied you on the former occasion, and his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab has consented to place the services of Captain Anderson of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry at your disposal. You have, moreover, been supplied with necessary funds, under authority of the Supreme Government, and been inspirited by what must be deemed the strongest incentive to an officer placed in your position, viz., an expression of confidence in yourself by the Government of India, zealously, yet discreetly and judiciously, to discharge the important political functions which are now entrusted to you.

Two mountain guns.
Wing—Regiment of Sind Horse, and two companies of Jacob's Rifles, from the Garrison at Jacobabad.
100 Sabres of 4th Punjab Cavalry.
Three companies of 4th Sikhs, from Punjab Frontier Force.

6. You will also have with you, under command of their tribal leaders or native officers, 150 of the Belooch Guides, maintained hitherto for police and other purposes in the Upper Sind Frontier District, and lately made over for employment in the Political Department. Some of these, Jakranis, Dhoombkees, and others who are themselves natives of Kutchi, will doubtless be of much use to you as messengers and purveyors of intelligence.

7. You will be the bearer to his Highness the Khan of Khelat of the letter from his Excellency the Viceroy, received with the Resolution of the Government of India, as also of a letter from his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab (copies and translations of which are forwarded for your information), in reply to the communications which his Highness addressed through you to these high authorities.

8. Should an opportunity offer itself to you for presenting the letters in person, you will doubtless do so in the most appropriate manner, paying due respect to these communications by such ceremonious display as the means at your disposal will admit of.

9. Should circumstances necessitate your transmitting the letters referred to by the hands of another person, you will be particular in the selection of the bearer, and cause the presentation to be made with such outward signs of ceremony and respect as the occasion will demand.

10. With these preliminary instructions as to the conduct of your proceedings, I make over to you the letters for his Highness the Khan. Your first concern will be to effect a safe passage to the congregated caravans proceeding in the wake of your party, through the Bolan Pass, and you will be good enough to report how this has been effected. That duty accomplished, you will possibly take up a suitable position above the passes for prosecuting the main objects of your deputation on this important service, bearing in mind, when doing so, the necessities and wants of the troops composing your escort in all respects, whilst the protection of the people of the Khelat State from even the smallest exactions or oppressive acts of any kind at the hands of your escort or camp followers, must be with you a paramount duty.

11. I have arranged that the officer commanding the escort shall not be senior to you in military rank; and although it is not intended that you should in any way interfere with the strictly military duties of officers commanding the whole or portions of the escort, you will understand that the precaution which I have taken in this matter is intended to leave you unfettered as the officer at the head of the expedition, and primarily responsible, should any cause for exceptional action on your part arise.

No. 84.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 4th April 1876.

1st April.—Nothing of great importance has occurred during the week. The Brahooee Sirdars are watching events and are encamped with their followers in the Murree Hills, to the right of the Bolan Pass.

2. A news-letter from Dadar states as follows:—The true number of men killed in the late fight on the side of the Khan, as well as on the side of the Brahooee Sirdars, has not been correctly reported. The writer hears that Major Sandeman is shortly to be at Dadar, and will on his arrival give him a correct account of the affair. This he prefers to do to writing it. News has reached Dadar from Khelat that his Highness the Khan and the Commandant of the Khelat Garrison have had a bitter quarrel. The Khan told Sirdar Mosun to give up the plunder taken from the ex-Wuzeer Atta Mahomed's house. The Commandant, in reply, said that it was quite impossible to recover it from the sepoys; moreover, such an order if issued by the Khan would be very unpopular, and consequently it was impolitic to give it. The result of this dispute is that there is no confidence now between the Khan and his troops. The Commandant has removed his family from Khelat to Mustung.

3. The Khan is greatly disappointed at the result of the late fight with the Brahooees. He has written very severely to his Naibs of Dadar and Bagh, saying they allow the Brahooees to plunder the country, and do not use the troops for its protection. He has severely taken the Naibs to task, and directed them to at once attack the Brahooees, and punish them for the Barshori and Kasim Shah-ki-jok affairs. It appears that the Naibs reported that in the late fight the Khan's troops were victorious; but his Highness having received a true account of the affair from another source is greatly angered against Naib Faiz Muhammad of Dadar for not having fought better, as the attack on the Sirdars had been directed by him and by his advice.

4. It is rumoured that there has been a fight in Lus Beyla between Jam Ali and the Jamotes, in which the latter were victorious. The Jalawans are at present in the Palari Hills, and state they intend, as the season advances, to again commence plundering in Khorassan.

5. 3rd April.—The Barozai Chief of Seebee, Sirdar Sher Zaman, has written to say that the Khan's Naibs of Dadar and Bagh threaten to attack him with the Khan's troops and guns if he does not turn out of Seebee Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's family, who are residing there. This Sher Zaman says he has no power to do, as Sirdar Moolla Mahomed resides in Seebee by permission of the Amir. This statement is true, for Sirdar Moolla Mahomed showed Major Sandeman when lately at Seebee an order of the Amir allowing him to reside in Seebee. Very lately letters were accidentally brought to Major Sandeman addressed to Sirdar Moolla Mohamed from the Amir of Cabul and Syud Nur Muhammad Shah.* The statement of Sirdar Sher Zaman, as given above, is declared by the Khan's Naib Pir Jan not to be true. He says the Khan's order to the troops was to attack the Sirdars in the Murree Hills, but no order was given to attaek Sher Zaman in Seebee.

* Sirdar Moolla Mahomed told Major Sandeman that the Amir said he w uld authoritatively settle the Sirdar's dispute with that kingdom were it not for fear of the British.

6. A letter from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed states that he and his confederates are most anxious to preserve the peace of the country. That after much trouble they have entirely put a stop to plundering. The Sirdar states that he will join Major Sandeman with the Bolan and Murree Chiefs, including the Mingul and Dumar-Kakar Pathan Sirdars, directly he arrives at Dadar. He states that the Brahooees are badly off for supplies; hence it has been with great difficulty that plundering has been entirely put a stop to.

7. 4th April.—Major Sandeman and escort, composed of one wing 3rd Sind Horse, 100 sabres 4th Punjab Cavalry, two companies Jacob's Rifles, three companies 4th Sikh Infantry, and two mountain guns, arrived on the 4th instant at Rojhan, 10 miles from Jacobabad, in Khelat territory. The Khan's Naib, of Nasirabad, by his Highness the Khan's orders, accompanies Major Sandeman. The Naibs of Bagh and Dadar and Naib Abdul Latif, of Shawlkot (Quetta), have written to ask permission to visit Major Sandeman in camp to pay their respects.

8. At Rojhan a caravan, composed of 1,500† camels and donkeys, is encamped. Many respectable merchants are with it, and their numerous tents are pitched alongside their merchandise. They came directly from Kurrachee. The *kafila-bashis* were loud in their expressions of gratitude at permission having been given them to follow with their caravan one march in rear of the escort. They said that the benefit to all merchants on account of

† Besides this large kafila, there are two others en route from Shikarpur. It is estimated that 4,000 to 5,000 baggage animals and 6,000 to 7,000 persons are waiting a passage through the Bolan Pass. —R. G. S.

the re-opening the Bolan Pass to traffic is very great. They expressed this in the strongest language and most demonstrative way, their happy and expressive faces and gestures testifying to the truth of what they said and evidently felt.

Major Sandeman halted at Rojhan to enable the baggage camels of the escort to be thoroughly examined, as many of them were reported unfit for a long march. This was absolutely necessary, as the next march is across the desert, a distance of 32 miles. The escort marches this evening at 6 p.m. The nights are still pleasantly cool; days rather warm.

No. 84, dated Camp Rojhan, 5th April 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty, Jacobabad.

No. 85.

No. 683, dated 10th April 1876.

From Lepel Griffin, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am desired to forward copy of a letter addressed to the Commissioner of Peshawur, No. 5, dated 25th ultimo, communicating the substance of the orders passed by the Governor-General in Council with reference to the affairs of the Khelat State, together with copy of letter (and English translation thereof) addressed by the Commissioner of Peshawur to the Native Agent at Cabul.

Enclosure 1 in No. 85.

No. 5, dated 25th March 1876.

From Lepel Griffin, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to Colonel Sir F. R. Pollock, K.C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

I am directed by the Lieutenant-Governor, in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Government, to forward to you a statement of the substance of the orders passed by the Governor-General in Council with reference to the affairs of the Khelat State, together with a brief statement of the object which the Government has in view in the action now taken by them with a view to your communicating the same to the British Agent at Cabul, in order that he may be in a position to acquaint the Amir with the particulars of the case, in the event of his Highness seeking information.

2. The policy of the Government of India with reference to the Khelat State as laid down by them in the month of October last, and in accordance with which Major Sandeman was deputed to the Murree Hills, was to use the influence and good offices of frontier officers to promote peace and good order, and to settle disputes, whether among the tribes or between the tribes and the people of Seebee or the Government of the Khan, although the responsibility for the good government of the country and the maintenance of order was not held to devolve upon the British Government.

3. Major Sandeman's mission into the Murree Hills in November 1875 was with the object of obtaining all the information in his power regarding local feuds and quarrels among the Murree and Boogtee tribes, between them and the Afghans, or between them and the Brahooees; to endeavour as far as possible to bring about an amicable settlement of these quarrels; to report for the information of Government his views of such as he was unable to settle, and to furnish Government with a further report on the relations between the Murree and Boogtee tribes with his Highness the Khan. Major Sandeman was further to inquire and report regarding the measures which might with the greatest advantage be adopted for the protection of the Bolan trade route and the safety of caravans.

4. Major Sandeman was unsuccessful in settling the disputes between the Murrees and Boogtees and the Brahooees, but the result of his mission showed that all parties in Khelat were desirous of availing themselves of the mediation of the British Government. By all parties the British officer was received with the greatest friendliness and respect; and although since Major Sandeman's departure from Khelat occurrences have taken place, and notably the death of Noordeen, the Chief of the Minguls, to disturb any new feeling of confidence between the Khan and his Chiefs, still his Excellency the Governor-General in Council has not considered that these occurrences are of such a nature as to forbid the hope that Major Sandeman may be able under more favourable conditions to bring to a successful termination the disputes which have reduced Khelat to a state of anarchy.

5. The Viceroy has accordingly, placing the political charge of Khelat affairs under Colonel Munro, the Commissioner of the Derajat Division of the Punjab, authorised Major Sandeman, with an escort sufficient for his protection and dignity, to meet his Highness the Khan and his Sirdars at Kutchi or elsewhere, as may be convenient, and make a renewed attempt to carry out the objects of the Government as before stated in this letter; that is to say, to make a general settlement of the differences of the tribes between themselves and between them and the Khan; and further, should his Highness show a desire to act sincerely in furthering the policy which the Government of India have approved, to re-establish friendly relations between him and the British Government.

Enclosure 2 in No. 85.

Extract from Translated Copy of a Letter, dated 29th March 1876, from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to the British Agent at Cabul.

I have to inform you that I have received to-day a letter, dated 25th March 1876, addressed to me by the Secretary to the Punjab Government by direction of the Government of India, containing the substance of the previous orders passed by the Governor-General of India with reference to the affairs of the Khelat State, together with a brief statement of the object which the Government has in view on the action now taken by them, in order that you may be in a position to acquaint the Amir with the particulars of the case in the event of his Highness seeking for information. The object of the Government of India with reference to the Khelat affairs as explained by them in the month of October last, and in accordance with which Major Sandeman was deputed to the Murree Hills, was to use the influence and good offices of frontier officers to promote peace and good order, and to settle disputes, whether among the tribes or between the tribes and the people of Seebee or the Khan of Khelat, although the responsibility for the good government of the country and the maintenance of peace and order did not lie on the British Government. Major Sandeman was sent to the Murri Hills in November 1875 with the object of obtaining all possible information as regards local feuds and quarrels among the Murree and Boogtee tribes, between them and the Afghans, or between them and the Brahooees; to endeavour as far as possible to settle these quarrels himself; to report for the information of Government his views of such as he was unable to settle, and to furnish Government with a further report on the relations between the Murree and Boogtee tribes, and between them and the Khan. Major Sandeman was further requested to report regarding the best measures which might be adopted for the protection of the Bolan trade route and the safety of caravans. Major Sandeman did not succeed in settling the disputes between the Murris and Bugtis and the Brahooees, but the result of his mission showed that all parties in Khelat were desirous of availing themselves of the mediation of the British Government, and by all parties the British officer was received with friendly feelings and the greatest respect; and although since Major Sandeman's departure from Khelat there have been occurrences, especially the death of Noordeen Mingul, which affects the new feeling of confidence between the Khan and his Sirdars, still his Excellency the Governor-General in Council has not considered these occurrences of such a nature as to forbid the hope that Major Sandeman may be able, under more favourable circumstances, to bring to a successful termination the disputes which have reduced Khelat to a state of anarchy. The Viceroy has accordingly placed the political charge of Khelat affairs under Colonel Munro, the Commissioner of Derajat Division of the Punjab, and authorised Major Sandeman, with an escort sufficient for his protection and dignity, to meet his Highness the Khan and his officials at Kutchi or elsewhere, as may be convenient, and make a renewed attempt

to carry out the objects of the Government as detailed above; that is to say, to make a general settlement of the differences of the tribes between themselves and between them and the Khan; and further, should his Highness show a desire to act sincerely in furthering the policy which the Government of India have approved, to re-establish friendly relations between him and the British Government.

With the above-mentioned view I have written these accounts for your information.

No. 86.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 14th April 1876.

7th April.—Major Sandeman and escort marched into Makhan Beyla, and here the Khan of Khelat's Naibs of Shawlkot and Bagh met Major Sandeman. The Naibs stated they had orders from his Highness the Khan to attend on the mission, and to render willing aid in the escort of the kafilas. Fifty Pathan sowars of his Highness the Khan were placed by his order in attendance on Naib Pir Jan.

The line of march from Kunda to Makhan Beyla passed by the villages of Manju, Kushal, Waji, and Marorpur. The lands of these villages were said to be very rich, and to be highly cultivated. The zemindar had merely to irrigate the land and throw the seed on the surface and a good crop was certain. Ploughing was unnecessary. Near to Makhan Beyla is Jhok Kasim Shah which had recently been plundered by the Brahooees.

In the evening a Durbar was held by Major Sandeman, at which the Naibs of Bagh and Shawlkot were present. The orders of his Highness the Khan to these Naibs and to the Wakil Pir Jan to render the mission every assistance were read out by Pir Jan. The Brahooee Chief, Samandar Khan Lehri, attended the Durbar.

2. 8th April.—Marched to Bagh, distant 20 miles. About 5 miles from Bagh Major Sandeman, in accordance with previous arrangements, was met by the Commandant Fakir Muhammad of his Highness the Khan's troops. The Commandant informed Major Sandeman that his Highness the Khan's troops, numbering 800 horse and foot, were drawn up outside Bagh, and were prepared to receive Major Sandeman, who at once rode and inspected the troops.

The escort, on approaching his Highness' troops, was brought to attention, and the latter, who were accompanied by two bands of music, saluted it in passing. In the afternoon a Durbar was held, and at it the state of affairs in the country was fully discussed.

The town of Bagh is the capital of Kutch Gundava, and was at one time considered a place of considerable importance. It now contains 300 shops, managed by Hindus, and 1,200 families. During the reign of the great Nusseer Khan the Naib of Bagh was Governor of the country as far as Harrand in the Punjab. The Harrand Dajil ilaqua was then included in his Naibship. Free intercourse and considerable commerce then existed between the people of Bagh and that portion of the Punjab known as "Harrand Dajil." The books of the Bagh and Dadar merchants still in existence prove this. Major Sandeman recently traversed the road from Lehri viâ Boogtee Dera to Harrand Dajil, and it is perfectly open and easy. Lehri from Bagh is distant about 15 miles, the road being open and straight, and directly across the plain of Kutchi. In Bagh itself his Highness the Khan of Khelat has generally a garrison of his regular troops. Were peace established in Kutchi, the prosperity of this place is capable of great development. It is situated on the Nari River; the lands are first class, and here and in its neighbourhood the famous "Bagh-Nari" bullocks are bred.

3. 10th April.—The mission marched for Haji-ka-Shahr, distant about 15 miles. The previous evening a water-carrier had been taken ill with what appeared to be cholera, and died this morning. Inquiries were at once instituted as to whether the disease was in the neighbourhood or not; but, even on the spot, so apathetic are the Natives regarding affairs of this kind, that it was difficult to get reliable information. A late Munshi of the Political Superintendent's Office, Jacobabad, paid his respects to Major Sandeman, and on that officer asking him if there had been cholera lately in Bagh, he said did not know for certain, but that a good deal of sickness had existed some weeks previously. On arrival at Haji-ka-Shahr the fact of cholera having broken out amongst the troops was placed beyond a question. A special report regarding this has been submitted.

No further cases of cholera have occurred in camp. The disease is believed to be over. The sick are doing fairly well. Already many are convalescent.—R. G. S. 16.4.76.

4. 11th April.—Mission marched to Pir, a village situated at the entrance to the Bolan Pass. Here the Khan of Khelat's Naib of Mustung met Major Sandeman, informing him that he had orders from his Highness the Khan to render every aid. A party of Brahooee horsemen from the Brahooee Sirdars also joined Major Sandeman's camp.

5. 12th April.—Mission marched 22 miles to Kirta, inside the Bolan Pass. Kirta is a deserted village, which was lately destroyed by the Murrees. The reason for their so acting is connected with the quarrel between his Highness the Khan and his Sirdars. A detailed account of this would take up too much space to admit of its being recorded here. Kirta occupies a very important position in the Pass. It commands the entrances to the Murree country from the Bolan, and covers Bibi Nani. To protect this portion of the Pass from Murree inroads his Highness the Khan used to garrison Kirta with 500 regular troops. This day was devoted to arranging for the escort of the kafilas through the Pass, as cholera had rendered it quite impossible for the troops to do this, excepting at great risk. It had been ascertained that cholera had broken out amongst the kafila people, rendering it doubly desirable that the troops should be separated from them as much as possible. The task was, however, no easy one, as a panic seemed to have seized our own Belooch and Chiefs. Several of the former at once started for their homes.

6. 13th April.—The Brahooee Sirdars of Sarawan (accompanied by messengers from the Jalawans), Moolla Mahomed, Raisani, Alladina Koord, Shadi Khan, Bungulzai, Said Khan, Shawani, with 500 sowars, to-day joined Major Sandeman. They were at once associated with Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan, Mazari, and Jamal Khan, Lughari, in the protection of the kafilas. The Jakrani guides and Murree and Boogtee sowars also aided in escorting the kafilas. These arrangements having been completed, the caravans numbering 4,000 camels more or less, and an innumerable number of donkeys and animals of all sorts, were allowed to move to Bibi Nani. Major Sandeman went to Bibi Nani from Kirta to meet the Chiefs and superintend matters. The only apparent danger to be met with was what might result from a quarrel breaking out between the Belooch and Afghan merchants. The former numbered about 1,000; the latter about 6,000. The merchants made the appearance of the cholera an excuse for not paying their transit dues, saying it would take a fortnight to do this according to custom, as the property they had with them amounted to a very large sum. It was finally arranged that the amount due should be settled by estimate and the proper sum taken by the Naib of Shawlkot (Quetta) on the caravans arriving there.

7. 14th April.—Major Sandeman, escorted by the Sind Horse and Punjab Cavalry, went again this day to Babi Nani. The Cavalry were taken as much for change of air as to show the merchants that Major Sandeman was determined they were to behave and pay the transit dues to the officials appointed to receive them. It may be here noted that never before were such large caravans collected together. The merchants alone numbered, as said above, over 6,000 souls, and the kafilas, according to the estimate given by the merchants themselves, valued from 6 to 7 lakhs of rupees. It has, in considering this, to be remembered that the Bolan Pass has been closed to traffic for the last three years. All passed off well. The merchants to-day were perfectly reasonable, and paid up at once. The caravans started about 3 in the afternoon for the head of the Pass, the Brahooee and Belooch Sirdars with their followers alone escorting them.

A consultation was held by Major Sandeman with the Belooch and Brahooee Sirdars, with the object of arranging for the future protection of the Bolan Pass from inroads by robbers; also, to prevent the Murree clan from raiding during this hot weather into Kutchi, or until permanent arrangements can be come to in concert and communication with his Highness the Khan for the protection of the Pass and Kutchi. The result of the deliberations then come to will be communicated in next week's diary.

A letter from Major Sandeman to his Highness the Khan was despatched to-day.

No. 91, dated Camp Kirta, Bolan Pass, 16th April 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty, Jacobabad.

No. 87.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 21st April 1876.

In last week's diary intimation was given that on account of cholera having appeared amongst the kafila people, the transit dues would be levied by estimate. In pursuance of this, a uniform rate of Rupees 3 per camel-load and Rupee 1-8 per donkey-load was levied. The kafilas were then allowed to start up the Pass, escorted by the Brahooee and Belooch Sirdars and their followers. The merchandise of which the caravan was composed consisted of cloth, metals, sugar, and indigo. Sirdars Imam Baksh Khan and Jamal Khan, with the Belooch guides, were directed not to return to the camp after the arrival of the caravans at Quetta, but to go to Mustung and remain there until further orders. This order was given as a precautionary measure on account of the outbreak of cholera.

2. 16th April.—Dr. Duke rejoined the camp from Pir. Cholera had nearly disappeared, and the account given of the cases left at Pir was very hopeful. Asad Khan, eldest son of Sirdar Mulla Muhammad, and Sirdar Alladina Kurd arrived in camp, with 50 sowars, to remain in attendance on the mission. Jemadar Mannu Khan Brahui, with 10 sowars, was this day despatched to Kahan, to aid the Murree Chief in preventing inroads on Kutchi during the hot months.

Intimation of this arrangement was sent through Pir Jan, the Khan of Khelat's Wakil in attendance on the mission, to the Naibs of the Khan stationed in Kutchi. A report was received that the late Wazeer Atta Mahomed Khan with his two sons had fled from Khelat to Kharan. His wives and the rest of his family had remained in Khelat. The flight of the ex-Wuzeer was believed to be the result of treachery.

3. 17th April. No fresh case of cholera reported. Kenchi Khan, Chief of the Mazarani or Bolan Pass Murrees, arrived in camp; reported Sherdil, the other Chief of this section of the Murrees, to be ill, and unable in consequence to come to camp. The Mazarani Murrees are at present residing on the Dusht plain with the Brahooee Koords. A letter was received from Muhammad Hussein from Bagh that the Khan of Khelat's troops stationed there were on the point of starting for Khelat when an order came from his Highness the Khan directing them to stand fast. The weather was hot, and the Commandant of the infantry and Ressaldar of the cavalry had gone into the town to live. There was no sickness at Bagh either amongst the troops or people.

4. 18th April.—No fresh case of cholera reported to-day. In the afternoon his Highness the Khan's Wakil Pir Jan waited on Major Sandeman and asked permission to read two letters he had just received from his Highness. He said it was his Highness' wish that the contents of the letters should be made known to Major Sandeman, who at once gave Pir Jan permission to read them. Their contents were as follows:—His Highness wrote that he was most anxious for the friendship of the British, whose greatness he fully respected and admitted. He earnestly desired a meeting with Major Sandeman, who ought to come to Khelat for the purpose. The Commissioner, Colonel Munro, had informed his Highness of Major Sandeman's mission to Khelat territory. The Commissioner had written to his Highness to say that Major Sandeman, on his arrival in Khelat territory would write to him, but up to date no letter had been received by his Highness from Major Sandeman. It was his Highness' intention on hearing from Major Sandeman to invite him to come to Khelat.

Pir Jan was directed in the letter to inform his Highness of all that went on in Major Sandeman's camp, who the Sirdars and Chiefs were who joined the camp, &c. He was also to inform Major Sandeman that his Highness had directed his troops to cease from injuring the Brahooee Sirdars or their people. His Highness had directed his Naibs and Jah-Nashins to render Major Sandeman every assistance and to obey his orders. Wakil Pir Jan then read a letter from his father stating that the flight of the ex-Wuzeer was true. He had gone off with his two sons, and he (the writer) at the time was security to the Khan that this should not occur. Pir Jan's father expressed great anxiety at what had occurred.

5. 19th April.—No fresh case of cholera. The disease has clearly left the troops. The convalescents from Pir and Haji-ka-Shahr had all arrived, with the exception of six, who were still at Pir, for want of carriage to bring them on. A Jemadar was sent with camels and kajawahs to bring them into camp. The doctors reported the convalescents generally to be in a highly satisfactory state. On account of the heat (thermometer in tents in the daytime 114°), and with the object of obtaining a change of air for the escort, it was decided that the main body should march for Abigam, 20 miles higher up the Pass, at an elevation of 3,500 feet above the level of the sea. The convalescents

were to be escorted by Captain Scott, who was left for the present with a first class Native doctor at Kirta and three companies of Punjab infantry, 25 Mazarani (Bolan) Murree footmen, and Sirdar Alladina Koord, with some Brahooees. Captain Scott received orders to rejoin the camp with all the convalescents on the 23rd. The Murree Chief of Kott-Mundai was sent for to camp with a view to settling his quarrel with the people of the village of Kirta, now deserted on account of it. They entreated Major Sandeman to do this, saying it only required some one to get in the Murree Chief, who was quite willing to settle with them, when they would be able to return to their village and to the cultivation of their lands. The Brahooee Sirdars, it is believed, will be able to arrange amicably this quarrel.

6. 20th April.—The escort, with the exception of the troops named above, marched to-day to Abigam, 20 miles. On arrival a report was received from the Brahooee and Belooch Sirdars intimating the safe arrival of the caravans at Quetta. The weather is much cooler than at Kirta. It is believed that the health of the troops composing the escort will greatly benefit by the change.

7. 21st April.—The mission halted to-day. Reports were received from Dadar and Bagh from the Naibs stationed there that they had received notice of the arrangements made for the protection of Kutchi during the hot months from Murree inroads, and that they would actively co-operate in putting them in force. All notices of intended raids by Murrees received from Jemadar Mannu Khan would be at once attended to, and every precaution taken to be prepared for them.

No. 95, dated Camp Abigam, Bolan Pass, 22nd April 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty, Jacobabad.

No. 88.

No. 173P., dated 3rd May 1876.

From Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to submit copy of a letter (No. 92 of 21st ultimo) from Major Sandeman, giving details of his measures for securing a safe passage through the Bolan Pass to the caravans which accompanied him from Sind, and announcing the result as entirely successful.

2. The hearty co-operation of the Brahooee and Belooch Chiefs at a time when cholera had shown itself both amongst the troops composing Major Sandeman's escort and the numerous body of caravan people is a gratifying feature, and it is satisfactory to find that the epidemic had disappeared from both camps some days before the report was written.

3. Major Sandeman's arrangements for keeping the Bolan Pass open, and maintaining his own communications with Upper Sind undisturbed, are confessedly temporary, but they appear to be well calculated to secure the object in view.

P.S.—A letter to your address from Ressaldar Daud Khan, the Candahar news-writer, received with Major Sandeman's letter, is enclosed.

Enclosure 1 in No. 88.

No. 92, dated Camp Abigam, Bolan Pass, 21st April 1876.

From Major R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty.

I have the satisfaction to report that the large caravans numbering 4,318 camels, 520 donkeys, and valued, when taking transit dues, at Rs. 5,66,000, arrived safely at Shawlkot (Quetta) on the 17th instant, escorted by the Sarawan and Belooch Sirdars and their followers as per margin. From thence they started on the 19th instant for Candahar. As already reported, I was obliged, on account of the severe visitation of cholera, which very unexpectedly attacked my escort, to entrust the entire duty of escorting these very large and valuable caravans through the Pass to the Belooch and Brahooee Sirdars named above.

Sirdars Moolla Mahomed, Raisani, Shadi Khan, Bungulzai, Yar Muhammad, son of Alladina Koord, Junda Khan, Shawani, and Said Khan, Muhammadshahi, with 300 horsemen. Sirdar Imam Buksh, Mazari, with 30 horsemen. Sirdar Jamal Khan, Lughari, with 30 horsemen. Jakrani guides, numbering 120 horsemen. Shadi Khan, Boogtee Duffadar, with 8 Boogtee sowars. Duffadar Jalla Khan, with 8 Murree horsemen.

2. The willing way in which the Brahooee and Bolan Chiefs agreed to aid our own Belooch Sirdars in securing the safety of the route through the Pass was very marked. When undertaking the duty they showed a most excellent spirit, which was all the more conspicuous because of its having been accepted during a time of difficulty and danger; for the Chiefs themselves were more or less greatly depressed at the outbreak of cholera, it having also appeared amongst the kafila people. It was not, however, so severe with them as amongst the troops. I am informed by those in charge of the caravans that out of the large numbers of people, numbering in all about 6,000 souls, only from 45 to 50 fatal cases occurred. Amongst the troops and camp followers, numbering from 1,800* to 2,000 souls, about 67 fatal cases occurred out of 137 seizures. These figures are given approximately.

* Fighting men of all arms	-	908
Camp-followers with escort	-	584
Police with stores -	-	21
Belooch	-	290
Total	-	1,803

3. I have taken advantage of the excellent spirit exhibited on this occasion by the Bolan and Brahooee Chiefs to arrange to put in force tentatively the provisions of section 27 of the Government of India Resolution No. 2819P. of the 16th October last, and hope soon to have settled with the Chiefs and Sirdars of the Bolan Pass to re-open the Pass to traffic under their protection. I am also arranging, in as far as is at present possible, to secure the plains of Kutch Gundava from Murree inroads.

4. The Murree clan, as you are aware, are Sarawans, and in some degree they acknowledge the Raisani Sirdar, Moolla Mahomed, as their feudal Chief. I have placed him for the present in charge of the Pass arrangements, and he and the other Brahooee Sirdars have written a joint letter to Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan, warning him for the future not to raid on Kutchi, and a Jemadar and 10 Brahooee sowars, with Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan's consent, have been placed on duty at Kahan, the Murree head-quarters. These are, in addition to the Murree sowars, in my employ there. Their duty will be to aid Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan, should he show a willingness to join in the protection of Kutchi, to start off horsemen to warn the Khan of Khelat's Naib's stationed there of any collection of the Murree clan made with a view of committing a raid into Kutchi. This is only a temporary arrangement entered into until I can find the opportunity of settling the Murree clan's affairs in concert and communication with his Highness the Khan of Khelat. The Sarawan Sirdars coming forward in so marked a way, however, and speaking so plainly to the Murree clan, is politically at the present time of great value. It not only tests the sincerity of their desire for peace, but it actually places them on the side of order, for the Brahooee tribes combined, were they at peace with the Khelat Government, have the power to protect Kutchi and the trade routes from Murree inroads. This fact the Murree clan themselves fully admit. When his Highness the Khan of Khelat coerced the Murree clan in 1858, his army almost entirely consisted of the Brahooee clan and a few Belooch.

5. In order to keep open the Bolan Pass in the way described above, I am arranging through the Sirdars and Chiefs to place at the deserted village of Kirta (in the Bolan Pass) 5 Brahooee sowars and 15 Murree footmen. At the Sari Bolan (head of the Pass) the Bolan Chiefs are to place on duty there 15 Mazarani Murree, 15 Mingul (Brahooee), 15 Koord, and 15 Dumar-Kakar Pathan footmen. These arrangements when completed will be, as said, merely tentative. Permanent arrangements will be made hereafter, and I see every reason to hope that I shall be able to induce his Highness the Khan to cordially aid me in making them.

6. A reference to this Office No. 8 of the 5th February last will show that when I was lately in Khelat his Highness was perfectly agreeable to my making, of my own accord, arrangements for the safety of the Pass. The action now taken in the present position of affairs was necessary to enable me to keep open my communications with Jacobabad. I may point here to one excellent result of my intercourse direct with the Bolan Chiefs and tribes, viz., that I have already been able to settle the disputes between the Minguls (Brahooee) and Murree tribe, through their Chiefs, to which disputes the unsafe state of the Pass was of late years to some extent due.

7. During our stay in the Pass, so safe has its transit been, that in marching to this from Kirta I was able to send on ahead the tents and heavy baggage of the escort, to the great convenience of the troops composing it. I may add that I have now been eight days in the Bolan under circumstances which rendered the co-operation and friendship of the tribes in securing a passage through it of the greatest importance. I have felt perfect confidence in their friendship, and have allowed in consequence the baggage animals to graze undisturbed all over the hills, and not an animal has been reported to me as missing. Our postal communications have been kept open and entirely uninterrupted.

8. These circumstances will of themselves demonstrate the excellent spirit with which the Brahooee Sirdars and tribes have hailed my advent amongst them. Verbally all have assured me of their desire to be guided by me in arranging their present differences with his Highness the Khan of Khelat's Government.

9. I have halted here for the present to allow of arrangements to be made to bring the cholera convalescents, of whom there are a good number, to this from Kirta. To-day's accounts state they are all doing very well. On account of the want of carriage we could not all march together. In a very few days they will have joined us, when we march for Siriab in the valley of Shawl. I may notice here that subsequent inquiries have proved the report of cholera being at Shawlkot to be unfounded.

Directly I receive Dr. Duke's report of the cholera outbreak, as promised by him, I will submit a letter in continuation of this Office No. 88, dated 12th instant, showing the progress of the disease, its termination and results to those it attacked. I am, however, very happy to be in a position to state that our forced marches on "Kirta" had the desired effect, cholera having entirely disappeared four days after our arrival there. The diminished severity of the few cases admitted into hospital during the four days after our arrival showed that the entire change from the plains of Kutchi to the hill air of the Bolan Pass was attended with the result hoped for by me when I, in consultation with Captain Newberry and the medical officers, decided on, if possible, gaining it before halting to battle with the disease.

No. 89.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 28th April 1876.

2nd April.—The mission halted at Abigam in the Bolan Pass. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisani, after having seen the returning caravans in safety to Quetta, rejoined the camp. The Sirdar brought news of the flight of the ex-Wazir Atta Mahomed Khan from Khelat.

2. 23rd April.—The Mingul headmen, Haibat Khan, Kotub Khan, Rawat Khan, Russel Khan, and Malik Rahim, with 26 horsemen and 276 footmen, arrived in camp to pay their respects to Major Sandeman. The Dumar-Kakar Chiefs Bahawal and Dinan, with 65 footmen, also arrived in camp with the same object.

Major Sandeman was anxious for the mission to-day to continue its march through the Pass, but this was found not to be feasible, as some of the cholera patients were too weak to bear moving from Kirta. The mission therefore halted.

3. 24th April. To-day a Durbar was held, at which the representatives of all the Bolan tribes were present. All expressed their desire to keep open the Pass to trade and their ability to do so, were the quarrel between the Sirdars and his Highness the Khan once arranged.

The Dumar-Kakars occupy the hills to the right of Shawlkot (Quetta), and number about 400 fighting men. They are intermarried with the Koord Brahooees, who live on the Dasht-ba-Daulat and the Maro plain. The Mingul Brahooees number about 2,000 fighting men, and are entirely subordinate to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed. The result of the conference left no room for doubt as to the anxiety of the tribes to keep open the Pass. But on account of the positions held by the Khan's troops at Shawlkot and

Dadar, this cannot be done without his Highness' co-operation. It was clear also that without the aid of the Chiefs and Sirdars, his Highness could not, single-handed, secure the safety of kafilas. The Khan's Wakil, who was present, fully admitted this. All agreed that were the old arrangements which were made in the time of Mir Nusser Khan again approved of by his Highness, the Pass would be perfectly safe. The tribes, on service being bestowed on them, would agree to maintain parties of footmen at the dangerous parts of the Pass, to protect trade and travellers when en route through it.

To-day a letter was received by Major Sandeman from his Highness the Khan. It was in reply to Major Sandeman's letter to his Highness sent from Kirta. The contents of the letter were satisfactory. The Khan agreed to permit the Brahooees to cut their crops undisturbed. His Highness expressed an earnest desire to meet Major Sandeman, and asked that the letters from his Excellency the Viceroy and the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor might be sent to him as soon as possible. As the mission was still delayed in the Pass on account of the cholera outbreak, it seemed desirable to comply with his Highness' request, and to send the letters by the hands of Captain Wylie. However, the letters have not yet been forwarded, as in reply Major Sandeman considered it desirable first to suggest to his Highness that he should come to Mustung to meet him there and to receive the letters in person. The matter is still under consideration.

To-day Naib Pir Jan waited on Major Sandeman with a letter from his Highness the Khan to the Naib's address. Pir Jan said it was the desire of his Highness that the contents of the letter should be read by Pir Jan to Major Sandeman. Permission being granted, the letter was read. It was to the following effect:—That his Highness wished for peace, and invited Major Sandeman to address the Jalawans, who were supposed to be inclined to create a disturbance. His Highness further wrote that he was quite prepared to send an army into Jalawan, did Major Sandeman desire it. The Khan also requested Pir Jan to arrange with Major Sandeman to send some Khelat kafilas, now blocked at Gundava, in safety through the Bolan to Khelat.

To the first part of the letter Major Sandeman replied that he quite concurred with his Highness that were it possible, peace should be made with the Jalawans as well as the Sarawans. The flight of the ex-Wuzeer was then discussed, and Major Sandeman informed Pir Jan that Atta Mahomed had written him on the subject of his misfortunes and recent flight from Khelat. The result of the interview was that Major Sandeman agreed to comply with his Highness' request to address the Jalawan Sirdars, offering in his Highness' name terms of peace. It was also arranged that the Khelat caravans should be escorted by the Brahooees through the Bolan Pass, did his Highness so desire it.

It was clear that the flight of the ex-Wuzeer Atta Mahomed Khan, and the belief that he had the power to create fresh difficulties about the terms of peace to be arranged between the Khelat Government and the Jalawans, has caused his Highness to ask Major Sandeman to write himself to the Jalawans.

To-day a written agreement was presented to Major Sandeman by the Sarawan Sirdars, the contents of which were to the effect that these Sirdars unreservedly placed themselves in his hands when endeavouring to arrange their quarrel with the Khelat Government. They stated that, with the Khan's approval, they would do service in the Bolan Pass for the protection of the route.

The escort of the 4th Sikh Infantry arrived to-day in camp with cholera convalescents from Kirta. The sick were doing well, and no fresh case of cholera since the 18th, the date on which the disease ceased, had occurred.

Sirdars Imam Buksh, Mazari, and Jamal Khan, Lughari, sent Major Sandeman a letter, in original, from his Highness the Khan to their address. The letter stated his Highness' anxiety to meet Major Sandeman at Khelat, and that he hoped they (the Sirdars) would induce that officer to come there. His Highness would be glad were the Bolan re-opened to trade, did the arrangements come to redound to his honour.

4. 25th April.—The mission marched to-day for Dozan, distant about 13 miles. The place takes its name from a stream running through this small valley. The Mazarani Murrees and Mingul Brahooees reside in the neighbourhood of this place and on the Dusht, which is only six miles off. During the day their flocks and herds in great numbers were brought to water at the spring, which affords a sufficient supply for a force twice the size or more of the escort.

Sirdars Imam Baksh Khan and Jamal Khan, with their Belooch followers, and the Jacobabad Belooch Guides rejoined the mission. They reported that one of the Belooch guide jemadars and three horsemen had died from cholera; that in their opinion the caravan people had not lost from cholera nearly the numbers stated by them. They supposed from 25 to 30 of them had died of the disease.

Arrangements were here made with the Khan of Khelat's Naib Pir Jan to place 100 of the Belooch Guides in Haji-ka-Shahr in Kutchi under a Ressaldar who would co-operate with the Naibs in Kutchi, and particularly with the Haji-ka-Shahr Naib, to keep open the road and forward supplies, &c. to Major Sandeman's camp viâ the Bolan Pass. The three Jacobabad Guide Ressaldars, as per margin, for the good service performed by them in aiding in the escorting of the large caravans to Quetta during the cholera, when it was considered undesirable on account of the disease to employ the military escort on the duty, received, in recognition of their services, an honorary parwana and a khillat from Major Sandeman before starting for Haji-ka-Shahr on the new and important duty entrusted to them.

Malguzar Khan.
Itbar Khan.
Yar Muhammad Khan.

5. 26th April.—The mission halted to-day. It was arranged that the next march should be to Mustung, and not by the Siriab route, which goes in the direction of the Afghan border and Quetta. The distance to Mustung being from 26 to 30 miles over a difficult road, and there being little water en route, Major Sandeman, in consultation with Captain Humfrey, arranged that the infantry should march in the evening 15 miles for the foot of a pass called Surk-Bajo, which had to be crossed, and that they should bivouac there for the night, carrying water with them. A large number of camels were supplied to the infantry on which to carry water. The measure was carried out, and the troops arrived at Mustung without much difficulty. The march was considered not a very severe one. The medical officers report the health of the troops to be on the whole satisfactory.

6. 28th April.—The mission will halt at Mustung for the present, or until the medical officers state that a meeting between his Highness the Khan and Major Sandeman can take place without danger of infection from the recent cholera epidemic which attacked the escort.

To-day Naib Pir Jan waited on Major Sandeman with a letter from his Highness to the Naib's address. As it was his Highness' desire that the contents should be read to Major Sandeman, this was done. They were as follows: That his Highness would fully consent to re-open the Bolan Pass in concert and communication with Major Sandeman. All his Highness desired was that the arrangements, whatever they were, should not be derogatory in any way to the honour of the Khan of Khelat. That he was anxious to meet Major Sandeman, and had directed his Naibs to in no way injure the Brahooees, or interfere with their lands.

To-day Sirdars Moolla Mahomed and Alladina Koord waited on Major Sandeman with a letter from some kafila merchants stating that a caravan of 650 camels had arrived at Dadar. They asked for a Brahooee escort through the Pass. An escort of 200 Brahooees and some Belooch (Mazarani Murrees) were at once despatched to Kirta to bring on the caravan and escort it as far as Shawlkot (Quetta).

No. 97, dated Camp Mustung, 30th April 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty.

No. 90.

Translation of a letter, dated 10th May 1876, from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's kind letter informing me of your welfare. It reached me at a very happy moment, and I have made myself fully acquainted with its contents. I cannot express in sufficiently strong terms how greatly I am indebted to your Excellency for your kind intentions towards me.

In reference to what your Excellency writes, viz., that the breach of friendly relations between the Khelat and British Governments, which has now unfortunately existed during the past three years, is entirely my own fault; in reply, I beg to assure your Excellency that I am your subject, and have ever attended to all orders issued, and have ever remained in subjection to the British Government. Believe me that the unfortunate breach of friendly relations which has taken place is not due to me but to the following cause.

Formerly, officers of the Bombay Presidency conducted my relations with the British Government, who felt kindly towards me and treated me with consideration. My affairs consequently prospered until the date of Captain Harrison's arrival as British Agent at my Court. He was high in favour with Sir William Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, who was entirely led by Captain Harrison.

After Captain Harrison's arrival at Khelat, Wullee Mahomed (who is an hereditary slave) was my Wuzeer. He became at enmity with me, and in consequence, through telling evil and false statements to Captain Harrison, turned that officer's mind against me. He believed in the disloyal Wullee Mahomed's statements about me, and in consequence lost all faith in me and considered me to be unreliable.

Since the days of my ancestors the evil-disposed Brahooee clans have continued their bad acts. In my father's time they rebelled and did evil, and at last through their bad conduct he was killed. After his death, the kindly-disposed British Government appointed my brother Mir Muhammad Nusseer Khan as the Ruler of Khelat, but even during his time the Brahooees did not cease from doing evil. From the date that I (aided by the British Government) ascended the Throne of Khelat, the acts of disloyalty and enmity committed by the Brahooee clans against my Government from first to last must be well known to your Excellency.

These tribes, aided by Wullee Mahomed, gained the confidence of Captain Harrison, and tried all they could to injure me. In consequence of this, and out of fear of losing by their evil acts the friendship of the British Government, which is of long standing with my Government, I left Khelat and journeyed to Sukkur to explain to your Excellency the state of my affairs. This I did, and then returned home.

On a second occasion, I went to Shahpore (in Kutchi) to meet Sir William Merewether, and in person I explained to him my desires; but as Captain Harrison was high in his favour and possessed his confidence, what I had to advance in support of my views was never listened to or considered.

After this, Captain Harrison, at the request of my disloyal Wulzeer Wullee Mahomed, took him with him to British territory. The Wulzeer had in his possession my accounts, which he took away with him, and these he has kept in his possession up to date.

The Brahooee after the departure of Captain Harrison up to the present day have never ceased to do evil in the country and to commit raids on my people, to the great loss of myself and them. They have also plundered kafilas, and everywhere created disturbances.

But now that Major Sandeman has come into the country I have been made very happy, as all our affairs will be settled in a way consistent with my honour.

My hope is that the British Government will treat me in a way similar to the one adopted by it with regard to the Amir Shere Ali Khan and the other Frontier Rajas whose authority over their own affairs and subjects is upheld. With regard to myself, I hope the British Government will place the Brahooee clans under me and give me authority over them, and thus maintain my power and dignity.

To Major Sandeman I have written a full statement of my desires, and by the blessing of God I will not fail to settle, in concert and communication with him, all my affairs and those of the country. I will do this in accordance with advice, and know that doing so will redound to my honour and welfare.

In the treaty made by the British Government through General Jacob with my late brother, the sum of Rupees 50,000 was agreed to be given on account of reduction of kafila fees then arranged. This sum I yearly received up to the date of Captain Harrison's departure, although it was not a fair equivalent for the loss sustained by me in the reduction of the fees. I, however, agreed to the proposal, as it was the wish of the British Government that I should do so. Notwithstanding this, and that I still hoped for an increase of the subsidy, although I have committed no fault, what has hitherto been given me for four years has been withheld. I am in hopes that what is due may now be paid to me.

Wullee Mahomed, my ex-Wuzeer, through the influence of Captain Harrison, obtained the imprisonment of Shukur Khan, my Commandant of Troops, Mulla Saleh Muhammad and Gul Muhammad, my Munshis. These men were my faithful servants and had committed no fault. At my interview at Sukker with your Excellency I asked for the release of these men, and your Excellency was pleased to say you would consider my request after the lapse of some time. I have, therefore, hoped for their being set at liberty, but up to date they are still in confinement. Be good enough to release them and permit of their returning to me. My honour is concerned in a compliance with this request.

All is well here. Consider me as your servant, and continue to favour me with your kind letters, &c.

No. 91.

No. 200, dated 22nd May 1876.

From Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty, Jacobabad, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In forwarding the enclosed Khelat Diary for the week ending 5th instant, I have the honour to state, with reference to the last entry under date 29th April, that Mr. Bruce, Assistant Commissioner at Jacobabad, received instructions from me by telegraph immediately I became aware of the circumstances to arrange, in concert with the district authorities and the Agent of the Khan of Khelat in attendance upon the Assistant Commissioner, for the safe progress of the caravans arriving thus unexpectedly across the plain of Kutchi to the mouth of the Bolan Pass, communicating by express with Major Sandeman, who would secure them a passage through the Bolan.

2. These instructions were at once complied with, and no mishap occurred. Those additional caravans appear to have given no warning of their late approach, and to have avoided Jacobabad in their route towards the Bolan viâ Khaira-Ghurri (in the lower part of the Upper Sind Frontier District) and Bagh to Dadur.

3. I would beg to draw special attention to the entry under date 4th May, showing how stores in transit to Major Sandeman's camp, through the Bolan, have been escorted by parties of Murrees and Boogtees, once deemed so formidable and untrustworthy.

Enclosure 1 in No. 91.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 5th May 1876.

1. 29th April.—The principal zemindars of Mustung, headed by Mulla Dad Karem, paid Major Sandeman a visit and expressed their great satisfaction at his and the escort's arrival in the country. In fact the demeanour generally of all the zemindars and country people since the arrival of the mission has been very marked and expressive of the highest satisfaction. Up to the present time supplies of all sorts have been easily obtainable. In conversation, the zemindars explained the tenure on which they hold their lands. They are the proprietary body, but pay the Government share (estimated at one fourth) of the produce to the Khan of Khelat, partly in kind and partly in cash. The township of Mustung pays 3,300 maunds of wheat and jowar, and a cash payment besides of Rupees 1,700. The payment made in cash is really a water rate levied on the karezes, which irrigate the valley. These were dug by the zemindars, and are kept in repair at their cost. The entire country round the town is one waving sheet of wheat and barley crop; it is estimated that the valley of Mustung is 18 miles long and 6 miles broad, and of this 6,000 acres of land are under cultivation. The Khan of Khelat possesses some lands in the valley, which are entirely cultivated by his own zemindars. He has also a small stud here. This valley is very favourable to horse-breeding, which is practised to a considerable extent. There is plenty of grain, and lucern crops are extensively raised. After they are cut, large quantities of the grass is dried in the sun and stored for winter use. The orchards and gardens about Mustung are very fine. It is estimated that they number 900 in all, and produce in large quantities grapes, almonds, peaches, mulberries, &c. The townspeople desert their homes in the city during the summer months, and reside in the orchards and gardens. On entering Mustung, it looked deserted; but I found the cause for this was due to what I have just stated.

The climate is perfection. The days not too hot, and the evenings and nights delightfully cool.

To-day a letter was despatched to Mr. Bruce at Jacobabad, requesting him to ask the district authorities to co-operate in preventing caravans leaving Jacobabad for Kandahar without due notice having been sent to Major Sandeman of the probable date of their setting out. Several large kafilas have been allowed to enter the Bolan Pass without any tribal escort, simply because Major Sandeman did not know of their approach until he heard of it from the kafila merchants on their arrival at the mouth of the Pass. Allowing caravans to travel in this way is placing strong temptation in the way of the Murrees, and is too great a risk to run in the present state of affairs. Doubtless the Jacobabad district authorities will heartily aid in preventing its again occurring. On due notice being given, there is now no difficulty in arranging for the safety of the caravans traversing Kutchi and the Bolan Pass.

2. 2nd May.—Naib Pir Jan placed in the Deputy Commissioner's treasure chest Rupees 2,478, the amount of the transit dues realised on the last kafila passing through the Bolan Pass. The departure of this kafila from Quetta to Kandahar was announced. It has been arranged that until the affairs of the Khan and his Sirdars have been amicably settled, the kafila fees will remain in deposit. The tribes are entitled to the "budrakki," or the fees paid for an escort through the pass. The Khan is entitled to the amount due for customs duty.

3. 3rd May.—The Jalawan Sirdars have sent a letter to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, who has made it over to Major Sandeman, saying they will heartily co-operate with him and Major Sandeman in arranging fair terms of peace with his Highness the Khan. Previous to this, letters stating the Jalawan Sirdars' case in full were received by Major Sandeman from them, who has submitted copies to Colonel Munro.

Copies forwarded to Government.—A. A. M.

The Jalawan Sirdars, like their compatriots of Sarawan, are perfectly reasonable in what they ask, viz., honourable terms of peace, and the restoration of lands confiscated by his Highness. Mir Jam Ali, Governor of Lus Beyla, is prepared to be responsible for the safety of trade and good conduct of the other Sirdars of his faction, if the reasonable terms of peace applied for are given by the Khan.

From indirect sources news has reached Major Sandeman that the Belooch Chiefs of Kutchi and the Commandants of his Highness the Khan's regiments have told his Highness plainly that he ought to make peace; that if he does not do so, and his Highness is held responsible for the state of the country by the British Government, he (the Khan) can expect no support from them. It is reported that the Belooch Sirdars said that, in the event of this occurring, they would aid the British and join the Brahooee Sirdars against his Highness. From every direction and from every source information has been received that the Khan's cause is very unpopular with all classes.

4. 4th May.—To-day a report came from the Naib of Dadur, intimating that camels bringing stores for the escort had arrived at Dadur. A tribal Belooch escort, consisting of eight Murri sowars under command of Duffadar Jullu Khan, and eight Boogtee sowars under command of Duffadar Shadi Khan, were at once despatched to escort them through the Bolan Pass to Mustung.

5. 5th May.—Sirdar Sher Zaman Khan, Barozai, of Seebee, reports that a few Murree sowars made a raid into Seebee territory on the village known as Golam Bolaks. Two men of the village were killed, but only two cows were captured, as the people had received notice of the raiders' approach, and in consequence had placed their flocks and herds in safety.

No. 103, dated Camp Mustung, 7th May 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Jacobabad.

No. 92.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 12th May 1876.

1. 6th May 1876.—His Highness the Khan's Naib Mulla Pir Jan in attendance on Major Sandeman sent that officer a letter from the Naib of Quetta for orders. The contents of the letter were to the effect that the merchants of Quetta and its neighbourhood were anxious to send a kafila to Kutchi conditional on Major Sandeman providing it with a Brahooee escort through the Bolan Pass to Dadur. Major Sandeman, on hearing the contents of the letter, promised the required escort, and directed that the merchants should get ready the caravan.

2. 8th May.—Sirdar Moolla Mahomed sent a letter to Major Sandeman from the Maro Plain, where he is encamped, to ask for an advance of Rupees 1,000 to be paid to the Brahooees on duty in the Bolan Pass. Major Sandeman agreed to make the advance, but it was to be understood that when the division of the kafila's fees took place the sum would be deducted from the "budrakki" due to the Brahooees. The whole of the fees which have been taken from caravans are in deposit, and will be divided hereafter.

Captain Humfrey applied for an escort through the Pass for some camels brought from Jacobabad, which he is sending back there, having engaged camels belonging to this part of the country in their stead. A man of his regiment convicted of theft had also to be sent back to Jacobabad. A Brahooee escort was placed at Captain Humfrey's disposal.

3. 9th May.—Ressaldar Mal Guzar, commanding the 100 Guide sowars of Jakranis and Dumkis stationed at Haji-ka-Shahar in Kutchi, reports the arrival of another large kafila at Bagh. Orders were issued for its escort through the Bolan. Fifty Guides were to accompany it as far as Pir at the foot of the Pass, where a large Brahooee escort would meet it.

Twenty-three camels conveying mess and other stores arrived to-day with their Murree and Bugtee escort at Mustung.

A letter arrived from Jacobabad for Mulla Pir Jan, giving information that cholera had appeared in the village of Jallal Khan and Sini in Kutchi.

4. 11th May.—To-day messengers arrived from Lus Beyla and Wudd from Mir Jam Ali and the other Jalawan Sirdars. They brought letters for Major Sandeman from the Sirdars. The letters stated that the Jalawan Chiefs earnestly desired peace. That they would be guided by Major Sandeman's advice, to whom they had already submitted a full statement of their case. They desired the kind consideration of the Government to their petition for the release of Mir Khan, Jam of Lus Beyla, who is still detained by the British Government in prison.

5. 12th May.—Captain Wylie returned from Khelat after having delivered the Viceroy's and the Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor's letters to his Highness the Khan. He also brought letters from the Khan for his Excellency the Viceroy, the Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor, and for Major Sandeman. Major Sandeman decided that the contents of these letters and the negotiations in connexion with them, which have gone on between him and his Highness the Khan, should be reported to Government in a separate communication, and not recorded in the Diary.

Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan, Mazari, and Jamal Khan, Lughari, returned from Khelat. They at once sought a private interview with Major Sandeman, and reported that just before leaving Khelat his Highness the Khan had sent for them for the purpose of discussing his proposed visit to Major Sandeman at Mustung with the object of settling there with the Brahooees according to the desire of that officer. His Highness said " he " was fully prepared to meet Major Sandeman and to settle the Brahooee case, but before " doing so his Highness wanted Major Sandeman to guarantee him one or two conditions " of peace prior to the meeting." What those one or two conditions are will be reported separately, and are not entered in this Diary. It may be stated here that his Highness' letters and messages were couched in the most respectful terms.

Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisani, of Sarawan, sent Major Sandeman a letter from Sirdar Azaad Khan of Kharan to his (the Sirdar's) address. The contents of the letter asked the news about Major Sandeman's advent into the country, and whether in his (Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's) opinion there was a likelihood of Major Sandeman doing justice between the Sirdars and his Highness the Khan. Sirdar Azaad Khan wrote that if the Raisani Sirdar was satisfied that justice would be done, he would himself, on being sent for, at once come and make his submission to his Highness the Khan and to Major Sandeman.

A letter was sent for Major Sandeman's perusal, addressed by Rahim Khan, Chief of the Minguls, to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, stating he would come in and make his submission on being sent for.

The Khan of Khelat's ex-Wuzeer, Atta Mahomed Khan, addressed a letter to Major Sandeman, asking that officer to intercede for him with his Highness the Khan. The ex-Wuzeer wrote that he was exerting himself in the interests of peace, and would do all he could to preserve it, and trusted his Highness might be induced not to injure his (the Wuzeer's) family, now in prison in Khelat.

The general health of the escort is good. The people of the country are most friendly, and daily show this by their conduct. Supplies are plentiful, and the harvest prospects excellent.

No. 110, dated Camp Mustung, 14th May 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty.

No. 93.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 19th May 1876.

13th May.—Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisani, reports that he and the other Sarawan Sirdars were about to visit Major Sandeman, but just as they were on the point of starting, a letter reached them from Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan, advising them to remain where they were: "that his Highness the Khan did intend to visit Mustung, and "make peace." The Sirdars wrote that they were anxious on this point, as his Highness' troops were expected shortly from Kutchi, and they were not certain whether there was to be peace or war. They sent therefore on their behalf Alladad, Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's brother-in-law, to Mustung, to make inquiries as to the true state of affairs. The Sirdars were advised to remain quietly where they were, and to send Alladad to Mustung. They should adopt proper precautions for their individual safety, and to prevent any accident happening, as anything approaching a disturbance would be unfortunate at present.

News from Jalawan states that all is quiet there at present. Jam Ali was ruling in Lus Beyla, and had added to the number of his regular troops. The ex-Wuzeer Atta Mahomed was said to be at Zehri. Sirdar Gohur Khan had been recognised as the successor of Taj Mahomed.

2. 14th May.—Ressaldar Malguzar, commanding the Guides at Haji-ka-Shahr in Kutchi, reports that he had sent one Jemadar and 40 Guides to escort a kafila en route to Candahar. The sowars had orders to see the caravan as far as the Dusht and Maro Plain, where the Sarawan tribes were encamped. They had got some distance on their way in charge of the kafila, when they were met by a party of Koord Brahooees, sent to relieve them. The Brahooees were under Dost Muhammad's son and Kadir Buksh, the brother of Alladina, the Sirdar of the Koords. The Guide Jemadar made over charge of the kafila to the Koords after taking a receipt. Alladad Khan, brother-in-law of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, reports that a caravan consisting of 1,300 camels had left the Dusht for Quetta.

3. 15th May.—Sirdar Sorab Khan Dhoombkee, resident of Lehri in Kutchi, reports that he sent spies into the Murree Hills to see what the clan Murree were going to do in the present state of affairs in Khelat. They returned and stated that the Murree headmen had collected and held a long consultation. They had decided to do as requested by Major Sandeman and the Raisani Sirdar, and would not allow any of the tribe to plunder for two months. By that time they hoped that the Khan and Major Sandeman would have come to an arrangement for the protection of Kutchi and a settlement of their tribal affairs with the Khelat Government. They were a large tribe, and it was necessary that a settlement should be come to; otherwise they could not of themselves protect the country.

A Notani Boogtee went to plunder in the Murree country, was met, and killed.

About 200 Hadianis made a raid on the Mundani Murrees, killing a man called Bura and 12 others, and plundering some cattle.

A Hindu, by name Gurdit Singh, arrived in camp, and reported himself to Major Sandeman as a spy of the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, who had sent him to obtain news from Herat. His story was to the effect that after traversing Cabul he arrived at Candahar, and from thence proceeded to Herat. He tried to return to British India viâ the Bolan and Mulla Passes, but found both closed on account of the civil war, and had remained three months in Khelat. Regarding what had gone on there, he said he arrived in Khelat a fortnight after Sirdar Noordeen was killed. He had mixed freely with the people of the place, and it was well known that the Wuzeer Atta Mahomed and Sirdar Noordeen had conspired against the Khan, who was made aware of the conspiracy in time to prevent its execution by himself directing Noordeen's destruction. At the time this event took place Atta Mahomed, the Wuzeer, was wounded and all his property plundered by the troops under Commandant Mosun. After this event the Khan directed Mosun to restore the plunder taken from the Wuzeer's house. This the Commandant would not do and threatened to kill the Wuzeer. To save his life the Khan put a heavy fine on the Wuzeer, and said until the sum was paid his life must not be taken. This was only a trick of the Khan to save the Wuzeer. His Highness is very much afraid of his troops, and therefore did not press the Commandant much to return the plunder.

The troops under Mosun number from 600 to 700 fighting men, but one half of these are at Bagh in Kutchi. Most of them are Pathans from the Peshin valley and Candahar, Mosun himself is a resident of Peshin, and it is said he has lost confidence in the Khan

since the attack on Sirdar Noordeen and the plunder of the Wuzeer, and believes that some day the Khan, on opportunity offering, will be revenged on him for the plunder of the Wuzeer's house. The Peshin soldiers are all on the side of the Commandant, and will do exactly as he tells them. His power over the others is not so certain. This Gurdit Singh heard from other soldiers in Khelat, several of whom are residents of Peshawur and Hazaar.

A careful examination of Gurdit Singh raised doubts as to whether he was stating the truth or not regarding his being a spy of the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat. He was carefully examined about Herat, and his answers were not satisfactory, so much so indeed that it was believed he had never been there. His story about Khelat was spoken freely and without hesitation, and had the appearance of truth. A telegram was despatched to Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, inquiring as to whether or not Gurdit Singh was in his employ. Pending reply he was detained in camp.

4. 16th May.—Duffadar Mannu Khan Girani-Brahooee, who was sent to Kahan, the Murree head-quarters, with letters from Major Sandeman, the Brahooee Sirdars, and Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan Mazari to the Murree Chiefs, returned to camp with a letter from Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan, Murree Tomandar. The Sirdar wrote that he would do his best to prevent raids by the Murree clan into Kutchi-Gundava, and he stated, on service being restored to him for the protection of Kutchi, he was prepared to be responsible to prevent for the future Murree raids in the Bolan Pass and Kutchi.

Duffadar Mannu Khan brought with him the diary of the news-writer stationed at Kahan, the Murree head-quarters. The following is the abstract of the intelligence it contained :

On the 11th April 400 Boogtees, led by Fatteh Khan Notani, made a raid on Kolu on the Zerkhan Pathans. Intimation had been given of the approach of the raiders, who returned empty-handed, but after losing four of their number killed. This raid was made in revenge for the death of the Mussuri Boogtee leader Hyder Khan, who was killed by the Zerkhan Pathans some months ago.

On the 25th of April 14 camel-loads of wool were sent by the Hindu merchants of Kahan to Rojhan, the Mazari head-quarters, for sale. The wool was valued at Rupees 1,200.

5. 17th May.—A letter was received to-day from his Highness the Khan of Khelat intimating that his Highness agreed to Major Sandeman's request that he should come to Mustung. His Highness wrote that in his letters to his Excellency the Viceroy and the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor he had stated his views and wishes; but as it was Major Sandeman's desire that he should at once come to Mustung to talk over matters, he would do so, and would leave Khelat on the 25th May, that day being the first day of the new moon.

The Inspector of Police, Nawab Khan, reported his return from Shawlkot. The kafila referred to above had arrived there, but only consisted of 168 laden camels and 24 donkeys. Sirdar Alladina had realised Rupees 55 on account of Budraki fees in the Bolan, and the Naib of Shawlkot had collected Rupees 621-1-6 as customs duty. The money was placed in deposit pending orders, or until after a settlement of the dispute regarding the division of the fees had been come to.

Letters were received from Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan Mazari and Jamal Khan Lughari from Khelat. They wrote that his Highness the Khan was to leave Khelat on the 25th for Mustung, and that they would remain in attendance on him until then, accompanying him to camp.

No. 112, dated Camp Mustung, 21st May 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty.

No. 94.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 26th May 1876. (Extract.)

20th May.—Letters were submitted by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed from Sirdar Gohur Khan of Zehri and the other Jalawan Chiefs, who wrote that they forwarded for perusal letters from his Highness the Khan to one Mussa Khan and Mussamut Naz Bibi, in which

the Khan said that it was his intention to send his troops against Sirdar Gohur Khan and the Jalawans on their arrival at Khelat. The Jalawan Sirdars desired the Khan to keep his troops in Kutchi until a truce had been properly arranged. They did not consider it safe under present circumstances to permit the troops to march through the Mulla Pass without a guarantee that they would not on reaching Khorassan attack the Jalawans They said they had lost confidence in the Khan since the death of Sirdar Noordeen.

The letters forwarded addressed to Mussa Khan and Naz Bibi stated that an expedition would be organised against Zehri on the arrival of the troops at Khelat. Inquiry proved that the Khan, after the death of Sirdar Taj Mahomed of Zehri, had been in the habit of levying the Sirdar's share of the produce of his (Taj Mahomed's) lands, but that since the destruction of Sirdar Noordeen the Jalawans had positively refused to give it for the future.

On rece ipt of the above news, a letter was sent to Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan Mazari and Jamal Khan Lughari, now with his Highness the Khan in Khelat, telling them to inquire of his Highness regarding this matter, and to report without delay.

2. 22nd May.—The Sirdars above named replied to the letter referred to, and stated that they had at an interview talked the matter over with his Highness, who said that since Major Sandeman's arrival in Bagh he had made peace with the Brahooees; that his troops had not yet left Gundava; that there was no chance of their reaching for two weeks, and that his Highness was to leave Khelat for Mustung on the 28th May, reaching Mungucher on the 29th and Amanala on the 30th.

The Sirdars wrote that they were anxious for Captain Wylie and Dr. Duke to meet his Highness at Mungucher, and that Major Sandeman should come himself to Amanala.

A reply was sent to the Sirdars to say that Captain Wylie was with a survey party in the district, but that Dr. Duke and Captain Shepherd, with an escort of cavalry, would meet his Highness as requested at Mungucher. Major Sandeman and Captain Humfrey, commanding the escort, would proceed on the 31st to a distance of three miles from Mustung, and there meet his Highness and escort him to the Palace (Miri) of the Khans of Khelat in the town of Mustung. The Sirdars were directed to assure his Highness that every care would be taken to maintain his honour and dignity during his Highness' stay with Major Sandeman.

A reply was sent to the Jalawan Sirdars advising them to do their utmost to prevent further disturbances in the country; that on the arrival of his Highness the Khan at Mustung, where he was shortly expected, the passing of the troops through the Mulla Pass would be discussed, and that Major Sandeman had advised the Khan not to march his troops at present, until he had come to a permanent arrangement with the Sirdars of Jalawan and Sarawan.

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4. 25th May.—Sirdar Sher Zaman Shah Barozai, Chief of Seebee, wrote offering his services on any duty the British Government would employ him. He stated that the Kakar Afghans had raided the Murree clan and the Wanichi Pathans, killing three Murrees and one Wanichi, and that they had carried off some cattle. In retaliation the Murrees and Wanichis had made a combined raid on the Kakars, who were defeated, losing 30 of their people killed. The Murrees recovered the plunder that had been taken from them by the Kakars. The Seebee Sirdar also stated that a Murree named Jullah had arrived in his village from the Murree Hills, and stated that their Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan had sent to all the Murree Chiefs to tell them to prevent Murrees from raiding in Kutchi; that if any one did so at present, he would be made over a prisoner to the British Government.

5. 26th May.—Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and the other Sarawan Chiefs sent Alladad, the former's brother-in-law, to Mustung, with a letter for Major Sandeman. Its contents showed that they were all anxious about the proposed movement of the Khan's troops through the Passes, and did not see how, under present circumstances, they could permit it, as the Khan threatened to attack the Jalawans; and the cause of all the Sirdars being one and the same, if the Khan did this, they (the Sarawans) would, in accordance with agreement, join the Jalawans and oppose the troops. A reply was sent to the effect that the Khan's troops were still at Gundava, and his Highness himself was soon to be at Mustung, when the matter of the march of the troops would be discussed. It was very desirable at present that no disturbance of any kind should take place, and the Sirdars should do their best to keep the peace.

Sirdar Moolla Mahomed reports that Naib Faiz Muhammad of Dadar, with a company of the Khan's infantry, had asked a safe passage through the Bolan Pass, as he was en route to Mustung by the Khan's order. The Sirdar said he did not like the idea of

allowing troops to come through the Pass at present. Major Sandeman, in reply, wrote that one company of infantry could do no harm, and that Naib Faiz Muhammad and the troops with him should be allowed to come to Mustung unmolested, as ordered by his Highness the Khan.

News was received to-day of the departure of a caravan numbering 650 camels, and carrying merchandise valued at several lakhs of rupees from Jacobabad en route for the Bolan Pass and Candahar. Arrangements were at once made for its safe transit through the Pass to Quetta.

No. 113, dated Camp Mustung, 27th May 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty.

No. 95.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 2nd June 1876.

27th May.—His Highness the Khan's Naib Pir Jan reported that the Brahooees living in the neighbourhood of Mustung had refused to send in grass and fuel for the use of the Khan and his followers, who were shortly expected at Mustung. The headmen of the Shahwani and Muhammadshahi Brahooees, who reside near Mustung, were called in through the Agent, Mir Jungi, of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed. After discussing the matter with the headmen and the Khan's Naib, Duffadar Mannu Khan Brahooee was sent with the Janishin of Mustung to see that the arrangements for supplies being sent into Mustung for the use of his Highness were carried out. The Brahooees did not object to give the usual supplies. All they said they could not agree to give was more than they were according to sunnud obliged to furnish. It was found, however, that certain Brahooees had purchased lands, and they wanted to be exempt from the amount these would have been obliged to give had the original zemindar-proprietor still possessed the land. The dispute was amicably arranged.

2. Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan wrote from Khelat to say that at his Highness' request they had sent messengers to Sirdar Gohur Khan and ex-Wuzeer Atta Mahomed Khan to ask them to allow the Khan's troops to pass up the Mulla to Khelat without opposition. They reported that his Highness' heavy baggage had left Khelat for Mustung, and that the Khan himself would leave on the 28th.

Ressaldar Daud Khan, the Government news-writer, to-day arrived in camp from Candahar. He stated that matters were going on very well in Candahar, and that he had written to the Amir of Cabul to say he was asked to visit Major Sandeman at Mustung, and had received a letter from his Highness telling him to do so. He had been supplied by the Governor of Candahar with two sowars as an escort. Daud Khan described the country as perfectly quiet between this and Candahar; that the arrival of the kafilas from Shikarpur and Kurrachee had given great satisfaction to all the Candaharis, and especially to the Governor, who was glad to get the customs fees, &c.; that large caravans, consisting of wool, &c., were still blocked at Candahar, but would start for Kurrachee directly the weather was cold enough to enable them to travel. The news-writer gave much interesting information about Sirdar Yakub Khan's imprisonment, but as it is not in any way connected with Khelat affairs, it is omitted from the diary.

3. Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan forwarded letters from Khelat which were sent by the Jalawan Sirdar Gohur Khan and ex-Wuzeer Atta Mahomed in reply to the letters mentioned in paragraph 2 of this diary. The contents of these letters were to the effect that the Jalawans would not allow the Khan's troops to come through the Mulla Pass; that they had certain information that the Khan would send his troops against Zehri directly they arrived in Khelat, and to this, under present circumstances, they would not submit; therefore the troops, if they came through the Mulla Pass, would have to force a passage. They trusted that Major Sandeman would request the Khan to direct the troops to stand fast until the terms of peace had been settled and agreed to by both sides. That they desired peace was quite evident, for since the arrival of Major Sandeman's mission in Khelat territory they had ceased to cause injury to the country, and were anxious for a permanent peace to be arranged, which it was in the Khan's power to agree to if he also desired it. Major Sandeman had

reason to believe that the Khan did intend to send the troops on arrival in Khelat to Zehri to enable his officers to collect the Sirdari share of Taj Mohomed's lands, which since the death of that Sirdar the Khan had appropriated. He therefore wrote to his Sirdars in Khelat on the subject, asking them to obtain particulars as to his Highness' intentions regarding this, and report for Major Sandeman's information.

4. 28th May.—Ressaldar Malguzar Khan of the Jacobabad Guides, commanding the Haji-ka-Shahr post in Kutchi, wrote to say that a large kafila had arrived there. He at once sent notice of this occurrence to the Brahooee Sirdars, who despatched Alladina's son, Dost Muhammad, with a Brahooee and Murree escort, to see the kafila in safety through the Bolan Pass. That day Dost Muhammad had reported his arrival with the escort half-way between Pir and Haji. The kafila would therefore be at once started en route to Candahar, accompanied by 50 Jakrani and Dhoombkee Guides. Nawab Khan, Ressaldar of Police, was directed to proceed at once to Shawlkot (Quetta) to aid the Naib there to realise the kafila fees on its arrival.

5. Malguzar Khan, commanding the Guides at Haji-ka-Shahr, to-day reports that information had been received by him to the effect that the Murrees were preparing for a raid, but where or on whom was not known; that he had sent word to Sorab Khan Dhoombkee and others of the intention of the Murrees. A letter was sent in reply to the Ressaldar directing him to first send some of his men to Dadar and elsewhere to ascertain the truth or otherwise regarding report of this nature before he spread and acted on them. This he ought to experience no difficulty in doing, as he and his men were all natives of that part of Kutchi where he is now stationed.

6. 29th May.—A letter arrived from Sirdars Jamal Khan and Imam Buksh Khan intimating that his Highness the Khan had that day left Khelat en route for Mustung, was encamped at Girani, and would be at Mungocher on the 29th, Amanwala on the 30th, and Mustung on the 31st.

7. 30th May.—A letter was received from Mungocher from Dr. Duke telling of his Highness the Khan's arrival there, and that matters, as far as he could judge, seemed to promise well for a satisfactory solution of the Khelat difficulty. The Murree Duffadar Jullu Khan reported his return from escorting the kafila named in No. 4 through the Bolan Pass to the Dusht Plain, where it had arrived in safety. Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan had deputed his brother Mirula to Kot Mundai to keep the peace and prevent Murrees raiding in Kutchi or in the Bolan Pass, but the Duffadar stated that the Murree Chiefs were all very anxious that a permanent arrangement should be come to between them and his Highness the Khan for the protection of the Bolan Pass and Kutchi.

Mir Alla Dad and Mir Zangi, the Agents of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, reported that a quarrel had taken place between the Brahooees and the sepoys with the Ja Nashin. They thought the sepoys were to blame. The Naib Pir Jan said the fault lay with the Brahooees, one of whom had seized a sword and wounded a sepoy. Investigation proved that the Naib's statement was quite correct. The Khan's officials were not to blame; the offending Brahooees were therefore placed in arrest until his Highness the Khan and the Sirdar's arrival at Mustung, when the case will be disposed of according to the law of the Khelat State.

8. 31st May.—His Highness the Khan arrived at Mustung and was received with all the honours due to his rank and position. In the afternoon Major Sandeman and Captains Humfrey, Reynolds, Scott, and Shepherd paid him a visit of ceremony at the Miri.

9. 1st June.—To-day his Highness the Khan was received in full Durbar. A description of his reception is given in this office letter No. 114, dated 2nd June 1876, to the address of the Commissioner, Colonel Munro.

No. 115, dated Camp Mustung, 5th June 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

No. 96.

Dated Kurrachee, 9th June 1876.

From Messrs. R. W. Cox and Esan Khan to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

We, the duly accredited agents of the Chiefs and people of Lus Beyla, beg most respectfully to solicit the favour of being informed of the result of a memorial they submitted to the Bombay Government through us on the 17th March last, and which memorial was submitted for final disposal to the Government of India.

The memorial is in behalf of the Ex-Jam of Lus Beyla, now a State prisoner in Poona, in the Deccan, for whose restoration the Chiefs and people pray.

The Jam has been detained in captivity for six years. The causes which led to his deportation from Sind are fully detailed in the memorial.

We shall be obliged by being favoured with some information as to the fate of the memorial.

No. 97.

No. 10K., dated Simla, 10th June 1876 (confidential).

From L. H. Griffin, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to T. H. Thornton Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am directed by the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor to submit the following observations on the state of affairs in Khelat for the consideration of his Excellency the Governor-General in Council.

2. The intelligence which has been received within the last few days from Major Sandeman, in charge of the expedition, to endeavour to arrange matters between his Highness the Khan and his Chiefs, seems to the Lieutenant-Governor to be satisfactory and re-assuring. From the time that Major Sandeman entered Khelat territory the Chiefs of the several tribes expressed their willingness to await the result of his negotiations and to abide by his advice, and the Khan has now himself left his capital, undertaking the long journey to Mustung where Major Sandeman is encamped, and has there had interviews with him, which, from the telegraphic reports received yesterday, seem to show that he, together with his Chiefs, is willing to accept the mediation of a British officer, and to follow the line of conduct approved by the British Government.

3. Such being the situation of affairs, Sir Henry Davies considers it his clear duty to urge most respectfully upon the Government of India the necessity which, in his opinion, exists for giving to Major Sandeman, who has been deputed on this special mission by the Government of India itself, such prompt and complete support as may strengthen his position in the presence of the conflicting parties in Khelat, and may unmistakeably demonstrate to them that he is supported by the full power of the British Government. In asking that this action may be taken by the Government of India without delay, the Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor does not consider that he is in any way over-stepping those limits of political action which, with reference to Khelat affairs, have been prescribed for the Punjab Government. Colonel Munro, Commissioner of the Derajat Division, now in charge of the political relations of Upper Sind, and Major Sandeman, the officer employed on the special mission to Khelat, are both Punjab officers, and the Lieutenant-Governor considers that he would be failing in his manifest duty, were he to refrain from pressing their claims to the full and generous support of the Government of India, when their action seems to him to have deserved such encouragement, when they have acted in every particular in accordance with the instructions of the Government of India itself, and when, without such encouragement, the negotiations so long in progress, and carried on with so much difficulty, must probably break down.

4. The whole circumstances of the Khelat case, the policy which has been followed, and the measures which have been taken by the Government of India to arrange matters in this distracted State, are so intimately known to the Government of India that it is only in this letter necessary to refer to a few points in the arrangements of the last few years to show how specially interested the Punjab Government are in the settlement of the question; how constantly and freely their opinion has been invited and finally adopted; and this is only recalled to the recollection of the Government of India in order to justify the urgent representation which his Honour feels himself now compelled to submit.

5. Immediately on his assumption of the office of Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir Henry Davies was called upon to meet the Commissioner in Sind and other frontier

officers at Mittunkote in February 1871, to endeavour to secure more unanimity of action in the treatment of the Murree and Boogtee tribes on the Sind and Punjab Frontiers. This conference was characterised by great friendliness of spirit between the Sind and Punjab officials. Many concessions were made to the Sind view of the frontier and Khelat question, and the arrangements finally adopted were to place the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan under the Political Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier, who should alone control the relations of the British Government with the Murree and Boogtee tribes. In addition to a subsidy of half a lakh of rupees paid to his Highness the Khan under the Treaty of 1854, a further grant of Rupees 32,040 was proposed to be annually paid for the entertainment of horsemen belonging to the tribes in question, with the object of maintaining tranquility on the border, and the security of trade routes.

6. The arrangements then made, controlled thenceforth solely by the Commissioner in Sind, were unsuccessful in securing the results desired, and the course of events during the years 1871, 1872, and 1873, have been briefly epitomised in the Resolution of the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, dated 15th October 1875, and need not be recapitulated here.

7. The conduct of the Khan of Khelat was so unsatisfactory that, although his Excellency the Viceroy declined to agree to the recommendations of Sir William Merewether to settle the disturbances of Khelat by means of armed intervention, yet the 7th Article in the Treaty of 1854 was enforced, and the annual subsidy of Rupees 50,000 withheld. The policy of endeavouring to deal with the frontier tribes entirely through the Khan, and of giving them to understand that they were regarded merely as subjects of his Highness, was declared in letter No. 2214 of the 9th October 1874, from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Commissioner in Sind, to have failed after long and patient trial; and the Governor-General in Council was of opinion that the time had arrived to have recourse to the alternative measure of making arrangements direct with the frontier tribes, and without reference to the Khan.

8. In accordance with the suggestion of Sir Henry Davies, the Government of India directed that the country should be visited by a party of Sind and Punjab officials, and an endeavour made to bring about an amicable settlement with the Murree tribe to carry out the details for the enlistment of tribal levies, and for the general security of the frontier and the safe transit of caravans. The dual system of management on the Sind and Punjab Frontier, in the opinion of his Excellency the Governor-General in Council, was one of the causes of the attitude adopted by the Murree tribe, and it being considered essential that this double management should cease, and the control of the tribes on both frontiers should be uniform, the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan was appointed to manage the affairs of the Murree and Boogtee tribes in all their branches, but subordinate to the Commissioner in Sind, to whom he was to report through the Political Superintendent all matters affecting those tribes, and through whom he would receive his instructions; copies of such reports and instructions being sent to the Punjab Government for information. Major Sandeman was directed to proceed into the hills as soon as possible to explain to the Murree tribe the policy and resolution of the Government, and to arrange for the restitution of plundered property. This mission was generally successful. Ghuzzan Khan, the Chief of the Murrees, and his minor Chiefs made their submission to Colonel Loch, the Political Superintendent at Jacobabad, and a great portion of the plundered property was restored, or compensation paid for it.

9. The action subsequently adopted, the declared policy of the Government of India, the instructions which Major Sandeman was to follow, and the objects which he was to endeavour to obtain, have been recorded in the Resolutions of the Government of India of the 15th October 1875, and the 14th and 30th March 1876. In the Resolution of the 14th March the Government of India expressed their opinion that after full consideration of the circumstances of the case, the course proposed by Colonel Munro, and supported by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, was the best that could be adopted under the circumstances, viz., that Major Sandeman should be allowed to carry out, under more favourable circumstances, the object for which he was deputed to the Murree Hills. It was clear that he had not as yet had a fair chance of achieving success; present circumstances were not such as to render success hopeless, but on the contrary there was, so far as could be judged, a desire on the part of all for the intervention of the British Government; that therefore until a renewed attempt at mediation should have been made and failed, the Government of India were not prepared to abandon the line of action taken in October 1875.

Owing to irreconcilable difference of opinion which existed between the Government of India and Sir William Merewether, the Commissioner in Sind, the conduct of the affairs of Khelat had, from the commencement of January, been taken from that officer

and placed in the hands of Colonel Munro, Commissioner of the Derajat; while his Excellency in Council decided that the portion of Upper Sind known as the Frontier District should be placed under the administrative control of the Punjab Government. The circumstances under which the Governor-General in Council considered it necessary to make these important changes were recorded in the Resolution of the 30th March.

10. Such being the circumstances of the case, the action taken by the Government of India having been that which the Lieutenant-Governor had in a great measure suggested, and which he had systematically maintained; Punjab officers aided by influential Punjab border Chiefs having been selected for the execution of the duty; and notice having been given that the Frontier District of Sind was to be placed under the administrative control of the Punjab Government; Sir Henry Davies trusts that, having received from the Government of India no intimation that the policy thus accepted by his Excellency the late Viceroy has been in any material point changed, or indeed that it was proposed to change it; his Excellency the Governor-General in Council will hold him excused for pressing with some degree of urgency the necessity, as it appears to him, of taking very prompt and decided action to ensure that the negotiations which have been thus far successfully carried on by Major Sandeman, both with the Khelat Chiefs and his Highness the Khan, shall not fail for want of the declared support of the Government.

11. With reference to the kind or the amount of support to be given to Major Sandeman, the Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor would only observe that these are of less importance than that the support should be given without delay; and he is further of opinion that the proposals made by Colonel Loch, in his letter No. 4170 of 7th November last, to the address of the Commissioner in Sind, are, at this juncture, well worthy of the consideration of the Government of India. He would strongly recommend that Major Sandeman be empowered to restore to his Highness the Khan, on the ratification of an agreement to observe the prescribed conditions and to follow the policy laid down in the Resolution of the Government of the 15th October 1875, the annual subsidy of Rupees 50,000 which has been for some time withheld from him, and for the restoration of which the re-opening of the Bolan Pass for traffic is a sufficient reason. Sir Henry Davies is also of opinion that it will be necessary to adopt the suggestions of Colonel Loch in the 5th paragraph of the letter above referred to, and to allow a certain annual subsidy to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisani and the Murrees for the protection of the caravans coming down the Bolan Pass, or to allow the Brahooee Sirdars a fixed tax levied on all caravans. On this point, however, much must be left to the discretion of Major Sandeman himself, who on the spot can best judge what concessions to the various tribes and Chiefs interested will be required to ensure the due protection of the trade routes.

12. The Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor would respectfully urge on the Government of India that Major Sandeman, so far as he has already conducted the negotiations with which he was charged by his Excellency the Viceroy, has acted with great patience and discretion, and that the success which he has already achieved is eminently creditable to him and to Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan Mazari and Jamal Khan Lugari, and that there is reasonable hope for such arrangements being made for the future as may bring to an end the state of anarchy in which Beloochistan has so long been plunged, and revive friendly relations between his Highness the Khan and the subordinate Chiefs. That the task still to be accomplished is an exceedingly difficult one Sir Henry Davies has no occasion to state. The character of the Khan himself, his conduct in the past, and the extreme suspicion with which most of the Chiefs regard him, are well known to the Government of India; and although it is only fair that his Highness' explanations should be fully heard and considered, yet it is quite certain that the present negotiations can only be brought to a successful issue by making it indisputably clear to all interested, that the entire confidence of the Government of India is with the officer employed on this difficult and delicate mission, and that behind him is the strength of the British Government, resolved to support him in enforcing the policy upon which the Government of India has, after long deliberation, determined.

No. 98.

Telegram, dated 12th June 1876.

From Colonel A. A. Munro, Dera Ismail Khan, to Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Major Sandeman telegraphs that he has had a long interview with Khan of Khelat, who agrees to be guided by his advice in coming to terms with the Sirdars. The Khan

will appoint two confidential Agents to be associated with Mazari and Lugari Chiefs in arranging terms of reconciliation. Khan's troops to remain in Cutchi until conclusion of negotiations. Major Sandeman expresses satisfaction at progress of his measures, and is hopeful as to result.

No. 99.

Telegram, No. 1426P., dated 13th June 1876.

From Foreign Secretary, Simla, to Colonel A. A. Munro, Dera Ismail Khan.

Your telegram of 12th received.

You are to convey to Major Sandeman the Viceroy's congratulations on his having obtained the assent of the Khan as well as the Sirdars to the mediation of the British Government. You will also inform him that the Khan's letter has been received; and that the answer to it will be forwarded, together with further instructions, to Major Sandeman, on receipt of the report referred to by Major Sandeman in his letter of the 24th of May.

But you are at the same time to instruct Major Sandeman that he must, in the meanwhile, be scrupulously careful not to commit the Government of India to any line of policy towards either the Khan or the Sirdars.

The Viceroy desires to draw your attention to the fact that Major Sandeman has not yet furnished his Excellency with the details necessary for the formation of an opinion as to the true character of the complaints addressed by the Sirdars in general terms to that officer; and that many of those complaints are founded on statements apparently incompatible with recorded facts which were carefully examined into at the time of their occurrence.

The Viceroy also expects that Major Sandeman will now afford the Khan adequate opportunity to learn and answer the accusations brought against his Highness by his Sirdars, and to lay his own case fully and fairly before the Government of India.

Major Sandeman will doubtless collect with impartiality, and report with fidelity, the statements made to him on both sides; but he will be careful not to commit himself or the Government to any opinion, or to do or say anything which can have the effect of weakening the Khan's authority in the eyes of his disaffected vassals.

On receipt of the complete information which it is now awaiting, the Government of India will form its own judgment, and thereupon take such steps as it may deem expedient in reference thereto.

No. 100.

No. 232, dated 14th June 1876.

From Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty, Jacobabad, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to submit a letter, No. 114 of the 2nd instant, from Major Sandeman descriptive of the arrival in his camp at Mustung, on the 31st ultimo, of his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

2. The details show that nothing was left undone by Major Sandeman to give éclat to the Khan's arrival, or to make his reception appear to be as cordial as possible.

Enclosure 1 in No. 100.

No. 114, dated Camp Mustung, 2nd June 1876.

From Major R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, to Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty Jacobabad.

I have the honour to report that his Highness the Khan of Khelat, in accordance with agreement, arrived at Mustung on the 31st of May, and was received by me with all the honours due to his rank, a salute of 19 guns from the two mountain guns being fired on his approaching camp. I, accompanied by Captain Humfrey, met his Highness three miles from Mustung, escorted by a troop of the 3rd Sind Horse, and after seeing his Highness to

his palace (Miri) situated in the town of Mustung, I took my leave. Two days before the Khan of Khelat's arrival at Mustung, his Highness was met at Mungocher, two marches off, by Dr. Duke and Captain Shepherd and an escort of the 4th Punjab Cavalry.

2. On the afternoon of the day of his arrival, I, accompanied by the officer commanding my escort and the officers commanding detachments of regiments named in the margin, paid his Highness a visit of ceremony. The following day, at half-past four in the afternoon, I received his Highness in Durbar, the whole of the European and native officers of the escort being present to meet his Highness. On his arrival a guard of honour of the 4th Sikh Infantry, numbering 100 rank and file, saluted him. They were drawn up in two rows to the right and left of the Durbar tent, facing inwards, thus forming a lane for his Highness to pass through on entering the Durbar. As he dismounted, he was received by Dr. Duke who conducted his Highness to the door of the tent, where I myself met him and led him to his seat.

Captain Humfrey, 30th Bengal Native Infantry.
Captain Scott, 4th Sikh Infantry.
Captain Reynolds, 3rd Sind Horse.
Captain Young, Artillery.
Captain Shepherd, 4th Punjab Cavalry.

3. His Highness' loyal Mirs, other native gentlemen, and the native officers of his household troops, were then presented to me by the Khan's Wuzeer. After this I introduced to his Highness the European officers of the escort. The officers commanding detachments then presented to his Highness the native officers under their immediate command.

4. Before his Highness took his departure I addressed him to the following effect: I said, "that an impression had gone abroad on account of the delay that had occurred in his Highness coming to Mustung that he had shown an unwillingness to accept my invitation to come here. Nay more, that it had been actually stated as a fact that his Highness had declined to come at all. That the real fact was that the delay in his coming here was quite unavoidable under the circumstances, but as such a report had gone abroad, I thought it well in his Highness' presence to contradict it, thus affording his Highness an opportunity of confirming what I said. I myself could assure all present that, although my intercourse with his Highness had not been one of very long standing still I already knew enough of him to be certain that he was fully aware of the duties of a Ruler of a large State like the Khelat one. That I felt sure his Highness most thoroughly appreciated the motives which guided the British Government in ruling the great Empire of Hindustan, viz., that much is to be gained by conciliation, compromise, influence, and by the recognition of the rights of others coupled with the assertion of one's own. That, as a rule, in most cases a great deal is obtainable from explanation and inquiry conducted in the belief that it is for the interest of all contending parties to settle their quarrels and differences in a satisfactory and peaceful manner. That settling them by force of arms was of course often a very grave necessity, but was only resorted to by Kings and Rulers, who had truly the welfare of their people and country at heart, when every other measure had failed, &c., &c.

5. His Highness, to the above address, most cordially and heartily responded, saying the sentiments I had given expression to were perfectly true ones. That his country and all he possessed belonged to the British Government. That the report that had been spread abroad to which I had referred had been got up by his enemies with the object of injuring him in the eyes of the British Government, whose loyal and obedient servant he was, ever had been, and desired to remain.

6. Shortly after this his Highness took his departure, the same ceremonies being observed as those which were attended to on his arrival.

No. 101.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 9th June 1876.

1. 4th June.—To-day a report was received from Kutchi to the effect that his Highness the Khan's troops had marched and intended to reach Khelat viâ the Mulla Pass, and that the Jalawans and Salawans were collecting in great numbers to oppose the troops. His Highness was at once communicated with on the subject, and orders were issued to the Commandant of the troops to stand fast wherever the order might reach him. It was conveyed to him by the hands of two sowars of the Khan, two Sarawan-Brahooee sowars, and two of Major Sandeman's sowars. The fact of the issue of this order by the Khan was made known to the Sarawans, and arrangements were also made to let the Jalawans know of it to prevent their attacking the troops.

2. 5th June.—Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan, on the part of the Sirdars, and the Khan's agents Nawab Muhammad Khan, Abdulla Jan, and Mustaufi Fakir Muhammad, assembled at Major Sandeman's tent to discuss the terms of peace to be arranged between his Highness and the Sirdars. These were recorded in writing and forwarded to his Highness for approval. On receiving the paper containing them, his Highness expressed his satisfaction, stating he would himself visit Major Sandeman and present the paper to him after having affixed his seal to it.

Sher Zaman Shah, the Barozai Chief of Seebee, reports that a dispute broke out between some of his people and some Girani-Brahooees. He went to try and settle it, and during the discussion was accidentally shot through the arm. The wound was not a severe one. All was going on well in Seebee.

The Jalawan Chiefs, Jam Ali Khan, Mir Gohur Khan, Mir Ibrahim Khan, and Mir Chakar Khan, wrote to say that they would be prepared to visit Major Sandeman on being sent for. They were a little anxious on account of the distance and the cost of doing so, but hoped to be able to come directly they were called in.

3. 6th June.—At 4 o'clock in the afternoon his Highness visited Major Sandeman. He presented that officer with the written terms of peace, saying he accepted them with very great pleasure. He said he had never expected matters to end so well, and truly believed that a good settlement would now be come to between himself and his Sirdars. He said he had never felt so happy since he ascended the "guddee." He would do all he could to bring matters to a proper understanding between himself and his Sirdars, and with the aid of the British authorities now present, he believed the negociations now going on would end successfully and to the great benefit of himself and his State. His Highness really seemed to speak as he felt, and to be in earnest. He said a great deal about his desire some day to visit Hindustan, and explained how much he would have enjoyed it had circumstances admitted of his visiting India during the stay of his His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales there.

Nawab Khan, Ressaldar of Police, who went to Quetta (see Diary for last week) to aid the Naib there to realise the kafila fees returned. He brought with him Rupees 1,658–12–3, which sum was placed in deposit with the other accumulated custom dues. A sum of Rupees 280 had been paid to the tribes in the Pass as budrakki. Nawab Khan reported that on his way back from Quetta he halted at Farringabad, near Teri. That the Khan of Khelat's sister, Bibi Alla Dini, wife of the Jam Mir Khan, had arrived there, the village being in her jagir. That this lady sent her agent to him to ask him to tell Major Sandeman how greatly delighted she and all the other Khelat ladies were at the prospect of the quarrel between the Khan and the Sirdars being arranged, &c. She had insisted on entertaining him, and during his stay of one day in the village he remained her guest.

With the consent of his Highness the Khan, Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and the other Sarawan Sirdars were summoned from Dusht and Maro plains to Mustung.

4. 7th June.—To-day the Sarawan Sirdars arrived at Mustung.

A report was received stating that a skirmish had taken place in the Mulla Pass between the Khan's troops and the Jalawans, led by Ex-Wuzeer Atta Mahomed and Sirdar Gohur Khan. A few on both sides were said to have been killed. The order for the troops to stand fast had arrived.

5. 8th June.—At 4 o'clock in the afternoon Major Sandeman took Sirdar Moolla Mahomed to pay his respects at the "Miri" to his Highness the Khan. The Khan rose on the Sirdar entering, and they embraced. The interview passed off very well.

6. 9th June.—To-day it was decided that on account of the fight in the Mulla Pass it was desirable to send Mirulla, son of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, and Wudera Shadi Khan Bungulzai, with a party of sowars and a letter from his Highness the Khan, to invite the Jalawan Sirdars not to delay coming here. The letter from his Highness conveyed strict orders to the troops to on no account cause injury to any one, but to stand fast until peace was declared.

Sirdar Moolla Mahomed reported the receipt of a letter from Sirdar Azaad Khan of Kharan, asking permission to come to Mustung. Major Sandeman was of opinion that as his case was not connected with the quarrel between the Sirdars of Sarawan and Jalawan and his Highness, perhaps it would be as well for him to delay visiting Major Sandeman.

Ressaldar Mal Guzar Khan Jakrani, commanding the guide post of Haji-ka-Shahr in Kutchi, reports that cholera is prevalent in Jhal. About 100 Magassie Beelooch had died of it. It had disappeared from other parts of Kutchi.

No. 123, dated Camp Mustung, 16th June 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

No. 102.

Khelat Diary for the week ending the 16th June 1876.

1. 10th June.—To-day the Sarawan Sirdars were received by his Highness the Khan of Khelat in Durbar. They were admitted with considerable ceremony, and a long conversation took place. Both sides seemed pleased at meeting. Major Sandeman was present.

2. 11th June.—The Sarawan Sirdars went of their own accord to-day to pay a friendly visit to his Highness the Khan. It was reported that his Highness was greatly pleased at this event taking place, and pointed out how pleasant it was to find the Ruler of the Khelat State's Durbar filled with the nobles of the country according to old usage and custom. The Sirdars made a suitable reply and took their leave.

3. 12th June.—A message was received to-day from his Highness the Khan by Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan to the effect that the Khan was anxious for a day to be fixed on which he could entertain the Sarawan Sirdars at dinner.

4. 13th June.—Dhani Baksh, Ghazni Murree, brought letters from Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan to the address of Major Sandeman. The Murree Chief merely wrote for news, and to ask when arrangements were to be come to about Kutchi. A reply was sent to say that as soon as possible arrangements would be come to for the protection of Kutchi. That for the present Major Sandeman trusted Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan would keep his brother Mirulla at Kott Mundai, and would prevent raids taking place. That up to the present the conduct of the Murrees had been good, and it was to be hoped that such would be continued.

To-day the postal sowars in the Bolan Pass were fired at on reaching the Siri Bolan when in the act of watering their horses, and the mail bags carried off. In the scuffle that ensued a Raisani, who was travelling in company with the postal sowars, was killed. A party of Koords in charge of Kadir Dina, the brother of Sirdar Alla Dina, went off in pursuit of the robbers, who were believed to be Dumar Kakar, the only strange part of the business being that their headmen were then in Major Sandeman's camp at Mustung. The headmen of the Minguls residing in the Bolan Pass were summoned to Mustung to pay their respects to his Highness the Khan.

5. 14th June.—This morning the Sarawan Sirdars, with the exception of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, dined with his Highness the Khan. Sirdar Jamal Khan, Lugari, was also present. Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan, Mazari, was too ill to attend. Rahim Khan, the Zagar Chief of Noshki, and father to the Khan's senior wife (the mother of Mir Mahmud Khan), arrived at Mustung, and was present at the dinner party and took part in it. The party is reported to have gone off well, and that the Khan and the Sirdars entered freely with each other into conversation. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed sent word to his Highness to say he would dine some other day with his Highness after Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan got well and was able to go with him to the Miri and be present at the dinner.

A letter was received to-day from the Ex-Wazir Atta Mahomed telling of the skirmish in the Mulla Pass. He said the Jalawans lost about 10 killed and wounded. He considered that the Khan's troops suffered much more than the Brahooees, but what their loss was he could not tell.

Alladad Khan, sowar (who took the Khan's order to the commander of the troops telling them to stand fast and not to fight, also the letter to the Jalawan Sirdars telling them of his Highness' order), reports that there is no necessity for further anxiety as the Brahooees were returning to their homes and all was quiet.

Mr. Bruce reported that the details of kafilas encamped at Khyra Ghurree and the stores for the officers of the escort had that day started for Haji-ki-Shahr.

A Brahooee escort was at once sent to meet them.

6. 15th June.—Captain Humfrey, commanding escort, and Captain Shepherd, 4th Punjab Cavalry, applied to Major Sandeman to cash for them drafts (pay of troops) on

the Shikarpur treasury to the value of Rupees 18,000. This was done by his Highness the Khan, who took the drafts and paid the money in cash. Some other arrangements will for the future have to be come to for the cashing of draft sent for the pay of the escort.

His Highness sent a letter for Major Sandeman's perusal. It was from the Commandant of troops, Fakir Muhammad, who stated that he was encamped at Nukrama near Zehri, and would stand fast and carefully attend to his Highness' orders. Care would be taken to cause injury to no one, and efforts would be made to induce the Brahooees to keep quiet and settle in peace.

Nawab Khan, Inspector of Police, wrote to say that he had joined his Highness' troops and had delivered the Khan's written order to the Commandant, Fakir Muhammad, who said he would carefully attend to orders and not touch a blade of grass belonging to the Brahooees. He (Nawab Khan) would shortly proceed and join the Jalawan Sirdars, and would present to them in person the letters that had been entrusted to him for them.

7. 16th June.—Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, accompanied by Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan, went to visit his Highness the Khan. On entering the Durbar-room he made his obeisance according to old rule and formality before the Khan. The Khan rose and then the two embraced. After this the Sirdar took off his sword, which he placed at the Khan's feet, and falling there himself made full submission to the Khan, saying as follows: "Your Highness is the ruler of the country, and I am your subject. "I have come to your Highness for pardon and to place myself in your hands. You "can either kill or pardon me, whichever you please, I am quite at your mercy. I have "been long unfortunate and have remained separate from your Highness, and I have "waged war. Now my sword is at your feet; do with it what you will. Take my "head off with it, or restore it to me."

After the Sirdar had ceased speaking, the Khan seemed greatly moved, and at the same time much pleased, at what the Sirdar had said and done. His Highness took up the Sirdar's sword and returned it to him, saying he trusted yet to live to see the Sirdar use it against his (the Khan's) enemies. The Khan again embraced the Sirdar, saying he was his old Mir, and he trusted that for the future they would remain good friends. A long conversation then took place between the Khan and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, after which the Durbar broke up.

The Inspector of Police, Nawab Khan, and Ex-Wuzeer, Atta Mahomed, write to say that the letters asking the Jalawan Sirdars to Mustung had been received. They accepted the invitation with great pleasure. Mir Ibrahim Khan had been sent for, and they were all busy preparing to start for Major Sandeman's camp at Mustung, where they might shortly be expected.

No. 127, dated Camp Mustung, 20th June 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

No. 103.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 23rd June 1876.

1. 17th June.—Major Sandeman having been suffering from fever, his Highness the Khan came to his camp with a few of his officials to ask after that officer's health. His Highness was accompanied by Sirdar Asad Khan (the eldest son of Sirdar Moolla Muhammad of Sarawan) and the other Brahooee Sirdars. The interview lasted for half an hour. The Khan during it expressed his great satisfaction at Sirdar Mulla Mahomed having visited him in private and at his having made full submission. Major Sandeman took the opportunity of mentioning to the Khan that he was desirous of making some changes for the better protection of the Bolan Pass, and that it was proposed to make Sirdar Alla Dina Koord responsible. His Highness in reply said he thought the proposed arrangements very suitable, and was glad that Sirdar Alla Dina was to have a fair trial. His Highness had evidently taken Sirdar Alla Dina into favour, who had gone several times to visit his Highness and make his submission to him. After the interview was over his Highness directed his Mustaufi, Fakir Muhammad, and Wakil, Nawab Muhammad Khan to arrange to give the usual daily allowance to the Sarawan Sirdars.

In consultation with Sirdars Jamal Khan and Moolla Mahomed a list was prepared showing the daily allowance each Chief should receive. It was then sent for submission and approval to his Highness the Khan.

2. 18th June.—Nawab Muhammad Khan, the Khan's Wakil, and Naib Faiz Muhammad of Mustung, were sent by his Highness the Khan to ask Major Sandeman to arrange the dispute between his Highness and the Sarawan Brahooees regarding the share of the rich lucern grass, which is here cultivated like regular crops, that the Khan ought to receive from the Brahooees. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed was sent for in order that the matter might be discussed before him. The Naib of Mustung said that the old lands which the Brahooee Sirdars possessed about Mustung were exempt from the tax, but that the newly purchased lands were not so exempt, and ought to pay exactly as if they were in possession of the old zemindari proprietors. The tax was levied according to a measure called a *trangar*, and each *karez* was bound to give one *trangar* every fourth day. In addition the zemindars were bound to supply gratis lucern daily sufficient for the Khan's horses and troops during his stay at Mustung. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed was of opinion that the zemindars should divide amongst them the quantity of lucern daily required for the Khan and his troops, and should give it, although it was a heavy tax on them to do so, on account of the Khan having of late years so largely increased the number of his troops which had necessitated a large number of baggage animals being daily provided for. Regarding the other tax of a *trangar* of lucern from every *karez* every fourth day, the Sirdar said this was an entirely new tax, and was imposed to provide for his Highness' troops, during the winter months. That its imposition was one of the chief causes which had led to the long civil war between the Khan and his Sirdars. It was finally arranged that the matter should be fully discussed between the Khan's advisers, Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan, and then referred to his Highness for decision.

3. 19th June.—The arrangement for the better protection of the Bolan Pass was to-day discussed at Major Sandeman's tent between Sirdars Moolla Mahomed, Alla Dina Koord, Imam Buksh Khan, and Jamal Khan. It was arranged that, for the present, Sirdar Alla Dina Koord should accept the responsibility of the protection of the Pass, as he and his tribe reside on the Dusht and in the Pass, and are intermarried with the Dumar Kakars. That it was necessary to keep men always on duty at Kirta and the Siri Bolan, as previously arranged by Major Sandeman. That the Sirdar responsible for the protection of trade must also be responsible for the safety of the mail bags, &c. Sirdar Alla Dina agreed to take over entire charge of the Pass arrangements. The following men are always to be on duty in the Pass:—

Kirta village.

Dost Muhammad, son of Sirdar Alla Dina.
Nubbee Buksh, Headman of Kirta.
Tail Khan, „ „
1 Headman, Bingu Murrees.
1 „ of the Kott Mundai Murrees.
1 „ „ Mazerani Murrees.
60 Murree and Koord footmen.

Siri Bolan.

Yar Muhammad, son of Sirdar Alla Dina.
4 Headmen belonging to the Dumar Kakar and Sumalani Minguls.
40 Mingul footmen.

It was further arranged that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, although not in immediate charge of the Pass, should superintend all that went on, and report whether the Koords and others under Sirdar Alla Dina acted up to their agreement. These arrangements were in continuance of those already made under the provisions of section 27 of the Government of India Resolution No. 2891, dated 16th October 1875. The Khan sent a parwanna addressed to the headmen of Kirta in the Pass, telling them that they had permission to re-occupy the village and cultivate its lands.

His Highness the Khan sent a paper to Major Sandeman by the hands of his Mustauti Fakir Muhammad, with a view to demonstrate that since the treaty of 1854 the Khans of Khelat have lost in custom dues a lakh of rupees yearly on account of having reduced the custom dues from 1 rupee per maund to 8 annas. As this is a very old grievance of his Highness, and has frequently been represented to Government, now that it has been again brought forward, Major Sandeman decided to thoroughly investigate the matter,

and make it the subject of a separate reference to Government, with a view to its final disposal.

Sirdar Asad Khan and the other Sarawan Sirdars to-day visited his Highness in Durbar according to old State usage.

4. 20th June.—Wakil Muhammad Khan, Naib Faiz Muhammad, Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan, Jamal Khan, and Moolla Mahomed, assembled to discuss the lucern tax. It was decided that lucern should, at once, be supplied for the daily use of his Highness and troops; but that the tax of the trangar supply for winter use should be referred by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed in person to his Highness the Khan for decision.

The Jalawan Chiefs, Mirs Jam Ali and Ibrahim Khan, wrote to say that they had arrived at Saikran, two marches from Zehri, and would shortly join Major Sandeman's camp, but were anxious that the Khan should call his troops into Khelat, as they desired to avoid the chance of a collision with any of them. A reply was sent to say that his Highness the Khan had ordered his troops, as requested by them, to march at once for Khelat, and that they might proceed to Mustung with every confidence, as the troops had received strict orders that they were to molest no one.

5. 21st June.—Sirdar Moolla Mahomed to-day went alone to pay a visit to his Highness the Khan. They entered freely into conversation with each other, the Khan telling the Sirdar that he would cause him no further injury. In reply the Sirdar said that if his Highness would act up to his promises, he (the Sirdar) would serve and obey him. The conversation about the lucern was not very satisfactory. The Khan agreed to let off the trangar tax for this year, but would say nothing about future years. The Sirdar did not think it advisable to press the matter, and asked Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan to go with him the next day to his Highness with a view to the question being discussed with them by his Highness.

6. 22nd June.—Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan, Jamal Khan, Moolla Mahomed, Nawab Muhammad Khan, Wakil, Naibs Faiz Muhammad and Pir Jan, again assembled to discuss the question of the lucern trangar tax. The discussion demonstrated that during the reign of the late Khan, Nusseer Khan, no difficulty about the lucern tax existed, as no regular army was kept up in those days by the Khans of Khelat. But since the reign of the present Khan, he had raised an army, and had in consequence many horses and camels, and had taxed the zemindars and Brahooees to maintain these. This led to the last rebellion of the Brahooees, as the Khan had levied the trangar tax by force; moreover the trangar measure was not a fixed one, and might mean a camel load of two maunds or four maunds according to the fancy of the collector, who used this fact as a means of oppression and to extort money from the poorer class of zemindars and Brahooees. After a great deal of discussion the Mazari Sirdar, Imam Buksh Khan, was of opinion that a compromise should be made. That the Khan should reduce the present tax by one half, and fix the trangar measure at a certain number of maunds. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed reluctantly agreed to the proposal, but was very desirous that the tax should be levied in cash and not in kind, and would agree to pay any fair sum to be fixed by arbitration in lieu of the trangar lucern tax. The Khan's officials were of opinion that his Highness would never agree not to take in kind, but they hoped that he would be induced to reduce the amount of lucern to be realised, and that he would fix the size of the measure called the trangar at a certain number of maunds. It was finally arranged that the question should be again referred to his Highness the Khan, who could alone arrive at a final decision in his capacity of ruler of the country, and Sirdars Moolla Mahomed of Sarawan, Imam Buksh Khan, and Jamal Khan should wait upon him with a view to obtaining his Highness' decision, which, it was hoped, would be of such a nature as to prevent future trouble regarding the levy of this tax. The Sirdars then visited his Highness, who gave much the same reply as on the former occasion to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, saying that this year he would remit the tax altogether.

7. 23rd June.—Nawab Muhammad Khan, Wakil of his Highness the Khan, waited on Major Sandeman by his Highness' orders, and asked that officer to decide regarding the amount of lucern the Brahooees should pay his Highness yearly. In reply, Major Sandeman said that the question was one that could only be properly decided by his Highness himself, and that he hoped that the Khan would do so in consultation with the Sirdars, and that a fair decision, after considering the necessities and requirements of both sides, would be arrived at. The Wakil took his reply to his Highness, who, it is believed, will, in consultation with the Sirdars, settle the question in a way satisfactory to both sides.

Letters were received, dated the 20th June, from the Inspector of Police, Nawab Khan, who is now with the Jalawans. He forwarded letters from Mir Gohur Khan and the Ex-Wuzeer Atta Mahomed Khan, who wrote to say that Mirs Jam Ali and Ibrahim

Khan had arrived at Anjira, four or five miles from Zehri. That all were anxious about the position of the Khan's troops, and were desirous for his Highness to direct them to march to Khelat. The Wakil of his Highness was informed of the contents of these letters, and after a little delay he reported that in consequence of the request contained in them, his Highness had issued orders to the Commandant of the troops to march for Khelat. That his Highness would also write to the Jalawan Chiefs to come to Mustung. His Highness accordingly wrote a letter addressed to Mir Jam Ali, and another addressed to Mir Ibrahim Khan and the other Jalawan Sirdars, telling them to march at once for Mustung, and that they could do so without the least fear. These letters were forwarded by Major Sandeman with his own letters addressed to the Jalawan Sirdars sent in reply to those referred to above.

No. 129, dated Camp Mustung, 25th June 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

No. 104.

No. 1,518P., dated Simla, 26th June 1876.

Office Memorandum from F. C. Daukes, Esq., Officiating Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Messrs. R. W. Cox and Esan Khan, Kurrachee.

Read a letter from Messrs. R. W. Cox and Esan Khan of Kurrachee, dated the 9th of June 1876, requesting to be informed of result of a memorial submitted by certain Sirdars and inhabitants of Lus Beyla, praying for the release and restoration to his country of the Ex-Jam, Mir Khan.

Order.—Ordered, that Messrs. R. W. Cox and Esan Khan be informed that the memorial is under consideration.

No. 105.

No. 244, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 30th June 1876.

From Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to submit a report, No. 122 of the 14th instant, with Appendices A. to J., from Major Sandeman, now on special duty in Khelat territory, giving details of his proceedings to date, and also enclosing a kharita from his Highness the Khan of Khelat, in acknowledgment of the letter from the late Viceroy and Governor-General of India, which was received as per paragraph 12 of the Government of India Resolution No. 671 (*a*) P. of the 4th March last, and duly forwarded.

2. I have from time to time conveyed to you by telegraph intelligence of Major Sandeman's progress and proceedings as received from him in the same manner through Jacobabad.

3. The appendices to the report consist chiefly of translations of letters which passed between the Khan of Khelat and Major Sandeman anteriorly to the Khan's arrival at Mustung in the end of May. The Khan had evinced considerable reluctance to leave Khelat for the purpose of meeting Major Sandeman and discussing the objects of that officer's second deputation to Khelat territory. Various influences appear to have operated to induce the Khan's first displayed hesitation to leave his capital and to visit the British officer at the place which the latter had selected for sojourn, in pursuance of the instructions which he had received; considerations of personal dignity and a disinclination to meet the disaffected Sarawan Sirdars, under the protection as it were of a British officer, being the most powerful incentives to that hesitation.

4. Major Sandeman in these circumstances deemed it advisable to forward the letters of which he was the bearer to the Khan through Captain Wylie, one of the officers attached to the mission, who was accordingly deputed to Khelat with a proper escort to deliver to the Khan in person the letters from his Excellency the Viceroy and his Honour

the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. A report from Captain Wylie, descriptive of his reception at Khelat, and of his performance of the duties entrusted to him, forms one of the appendices (F.) to Major Sandeman's.

5. The prevalence of various rumours throughout the country, of a nature unfavourable to the objects of Major Sandeman's mission, had induced that officer to send two Belooch Sirdars in his confidence—Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan, Mazari, and Jamal Khan, Lugari—with Captain Wylie, for the purpose of more thoroughly testing the popular feeling and bringing authentic intelligence of the state of affairs at Khelat. On their return these Sirdars communicated privately to Major Sandeman the information given in paragraph 8 of his report, on which I do not feel called upon to comment. Major Sandeman very properly would make no promise or would enter into no engagement; but he sent the Khan a general reply, which had the effect of causing the Khan's joining the camp at Mustung on the 31st May, as already reported.

6. In paragraphs 10 to 14 inclusive, Major Sandeman relates the course of proceeding immediately after the arrival of the Khan of Khelat at Mustung. A paper embodying certain terms and conditions (Appendix J) was drawn up by five delegates, three of whom were nominated by the Khan and two by Major Sandeman, these latter being the Sirdars already named. The Khan expressed a readiness to abide by the terms agreed upon by the delegates, and it was resolved thereupon to summon all the principal leaders of the two disaffected factions, Sarawan and Jalawan, to Mustung to discuss those terms. The Sarawan leaders, being in the neighbourhood, arrived the following day; but the Jalawan Sirdars, who were at a distance, had not joined up to date of the report, though they were then expected to arrive at an early date. They had not reached Mustung at time of despatch of Major Sandeman's last telegram to my address, but their arrival was then daily looked for.

7. The reference in paragraph 15 of the report to a balance of compensation said to be still due to certain caravan merchants who were plundered in the Mulla Pass in 1872 concerns a matter which has already been the subject of correspondence and inquiry through the Punjab Government, and I can see no objection to Major Sandeman being authorised to make the further inquiries desiderated by him.

8. In regard to what is advanced in paragraphs 16 to 21 of Major Sandeman's report, I have to observe that previously to my return from Jacobabad in April, I received instructions from your office covering a memorial which had been submitted to the Bombay Government concerning the exiled and imprisoned Jam of Lus Beyla, to report upon that Chief's case. I was unable at the time to do so, because the correspondence in the Jacobabad office was incomplete, and that which had been ordered to be placed at my disposal by the Commissioner in Sind was not received until some time afterwards, when I directed a careful and confidential abstract of the correspondence regarding the Jam of Beyla from first to last to be prepared by the Assistant Commissioner placed at my disposal by the Punjab Government for special duty. The abstract is announced to be nearly completed, and on its receipt I shall be in a position to report fully on the Jam's case.

9. The incidents related in the concluding paragraph were unfortunate: the plunder of the post-bags in the Bolan Pass by a party of marauders, supposed to be of the Dumar-Kakar Pathan tribe, and the untoward results of the pursuit, are to be regretted. Such occurrences are perhaps unavoidable in an unsettled country like Khelat, but Major Sandeman expects to recover the stolen bags and to obtain punishment of the thieves.

10. The instructions contained in your telegram of the 14th instant for Major Sandeman's guidance have been duly conveyed to and acknowledged by him.

11. The second enclosure to Major Sandeman's report, viz., the Khan of Khelat's reply to the letter addressed to him by his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, has been transmitted through the Secretary to the Punjab Government.

Enclosure 1 in No. 105.

No. 122, Camp Mustung, dated 14th June 1876.

From Major R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

I am now in a position to place before you a detailed account of my proceedings up to date. I did not feel able to do so sooner, as I wished first to satisfy myself that his Highness the Khan of Khelat, whose arrival here I reported in this office No. 114, dated

2nd instant, was really and truly anxious to act up to his professions. What I have to relate will, I trust, demonstrate this to be the case.

2. On the 14th April 1876, from Kirta in the Bolan Pass, I addressed a letter to his Highness telling him of my arrival there and the progress of the mission. A copy of my letter and his Highness' reply is annexed (Appendices A. and B.)

3. These letters do not require much comment from me, as they show exactly what his Highness and I were aiming it. I desired the Khan to come to me at Mustung. He, on the other hand, anxiously requested that I should go to Khelat. As I was determined not to do this, I sent him a letter decidedly saying so, and again I urged him in it to come here. This letter is marked Appendix C.

4. To this letter his Highness sent a reply (Appendix D.); and although he by no means refused to come, still he asked me to appoint a place nearer Khelat for our meeting; I, therefore, for considerations I will now enter upon, decided to forward at once to the Khan his Excellency the Viceroy's and the Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor's letters. I was induced to do this because I was given to understand that all manner of rumours were afloat as to the objects of this mission. The Khan was said, did he come here, to dread being made on arrival a state prisoner, &c. There was also a party amongst his confidential advisers who told him that the greater the difficulty he made about complying with what I wanted, the greater consideration would be shown him by me hereafter. My own idea was, that the Khan, knowing the Brahooees were in large bodies round and about Mustung and its neighbourhood, which is their own country, did really fear to come here without some decided assurance from me. There were, however, more substantial causes for his not at once yielding to my request, which I shall notice further on in this letter.

5. Having made up my mind to send his Excellency's letter to his Highness, I decided, as directed by you in your No. 117, dated 3rd April 1876, paragraph 9, to do so with every outward form and dignity. I entrusted it to Captain Wylie, 1st Punjab Cavalry (on special duty, surveying the country), and Dr. Duke, and I sent with them Captain Shepherd and 90 sabres, 4th Punjab Cavalry, as an escort. I also sent another letter (Appendix E.) from myself to the Khan, pointing out again why I could not under any circumstances come to Khelat. My instructions to Captain Wylie were simply to deliver the letter and to refer his Highness to my letters already alluded to for any information he desired to know.

6. Captain Wylie proceeded to Khelat, and his report of what passed there (Appendix F.) is attached. He performed the duty on which he was employed in every way to my satisfaction. The Khan received him with all honour, and he forwarded through him replies to the letters he took to him from his Excellency the Viceroy and the Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor. These letters I have now the honour to submit for whatever notice they may be considered worthy. Captain Wylie also brought another letter to my address from his Highness (Appendix G.) It is not necessary to notice it here at length on account of what I shall presently relate. Suffice it to say, the Khan agreed to do anything required of him, saying an order conveyed by an ordinary messenger from the British Government to him was sufficient to ensure his compliance with it. But the contents of the letter had much more of true reasonable complaint than I was at first inclined to believe. How this came to light I will now explain.

7. When sending off Captain Wylie with his Excellency the Viceroy and the Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor's letters, I directed Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan, Mazari, and Jamal Khan, Lugari, to accompany him. My instructions to them were merely to watch events, and to give me a true and reliable account of the state of affairs in Khelat.

8. These to Sirdars on their return asked me for a private interview. To this I at once admitted them. They said that the Khan's state was as follows: That his Highness had called them into his Durbar and had held a private interview with them; that his mind was distracted by doubts and fears; that his Highness (they asked to be excused for repeating this, as perhaps it showed disrespect) said that from the commencement of his reign he had ever taken advice, that it was through taking the advice of the British officers that his affairs with the Sirdars were now so complicated; that at Sir William Merewether's request he had occupied Beyla, and in fact that officer had made him a present of the province of Lus; that he had gone to great expense to secure the safety of the province and had put the traiterous Noordeen there as Naib; that at first he got real help from the Commissioner, who had imprisoned his enemy Mir Khan and his son Jam Ali; that shortly after this his Shahgassee, Wullee Mahomed (a nominee of our own), had picked a quarrel with him (the details are too long to tell); that this quarrel

had been taken up by Major Harrison and Sir William Merewether, who supported the Shahgassee, who was taken away from his Court by Major Harrison; that prior to this, a greater indignity had been put on him by the imprisonment, at the Shahgassee's request, of his senior military commandant, Shukur Khan, and two trusted Munshis, Gul Muhammad and Saleh Muhammad; that he had gone to Sukkur to meet the Governor-General, but as he could not talk English he could not explain all he had to say, and had returned to Khelat hopeless; that he met the Commissioner in Kutchi, but he would not listen to any request he had to make. After this the Political Agent had left him, and Jam Ali and Mir Ibrahim Khan had escaped from Hyderabad at a time when his affairs were very desperate; that Sirdar Noordeen (the brother of Ibrahim and uncle of Jam Ali) had at once rejoined them; that they had bribed over the Beyla troops and seized the revenue, and were thieving goats and sheep up to the walls of Khelat; that he could prove, if necessary, that the occupation of Lus in the first instance was the result of the advice he received. Another point was that in the settlement made by the Commissioner in 1872 it had been decreed that the Brahooee Sirdars were to pay for the plunder of the kafilas in the Bolan, and had also to reimburse the ryots for their losses accruing from the rebellion of that year; that neither of the conditions had been fulfilled, and he had to pay for the kafilas Rupees 90,000 out of his own treasury; that his treasury was empty, and he felt very hopeless, but that if I would guarantee him fair treatment and terms based on the peace of 1872, he would come to Mustung at once. The Sirdars, in conclusion, said they had agreed to take him back my answer.

9. In reply to the Sirdars I said that I had already heard a good deal of what the Khan had asked them to convey to me when in Khelat in the cold weather; that they were perfectly at liberty to say to his Highness that I would submit to the Government any reasonable views and requests he had to advance, but that I could make no promise of any kind. I told the Sirdars to tell his Highness what the Jalawan Sirdars said in their petitions, copies of which were sent you under cover of this office No. 112, dated 24th ultimo. The Sirdars started for Khelat next day, and two days afterwards I received a letter (Appendix H.) from his Highness stating that he would leave Khelat for Mustung at an early date. He did so on the 29th of May, arriving here on the 31st of that month, as reported in this office No. 114, dated 2nd instant.

10. After the reception of his Highness, as described in the letter above referred to, I paid him a private visit at the Miri (palace); my two Sirdars were with me—Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan. With the Khan were his confidential advisers—Nawab Muhammad Khan, Mustoufi Fakir Muhammad, and Abdulla Jan. The latter is a merchant and a friend of the Khan's; he seemed to me a quiet, pleasant, sensible man.

11. We had a great deal of conversation about the past. His Highness was very strong in his remarks about Lus Beyla, saying over and over again he had been directed to occupy the country; that from the commencement of his rule to the present day he had never neglected our advice and did not intend to do so now. It would not be profitable to record all that passed. I will merely add that the interview ended satisfactorily by his appointing Nawab Muhammad Khan, Mustoufi Fakir Muhammad, and Abdulla Jan to discuss with my two Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan the terms of peace to be offered to the Brahooee Sirdars. This was to be done next day in my camp, and they were all to assemble there for the purpose.

12. The next day the native gentlemen named in the margin assembled at my camp and drew up a paper in which very fair terms of peace were entered, and such as I thought all parties ought very willingly to agree to. This paper was then taken to his Highness the Khan for approval.

Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan, Jamal Khan; Nawab Muhammad Khan, Mustoufi Fakir Muhammad, Abdulla Jan.

13. The Khan took some time to consider the contents of the paper. During the following day he sent to say that in the afternoon he would pay me a visit and present it to me himself.

14. That afternoon his Highness came to my camp, and at our interview presented the paper marked Appendix J. He said he agreed to the terms very willingly, and once they were arranged between him and his Sirdars he would use his utmost endeavours to prevent their being broken. That evening the Sarawan and Jalawan Sirdars were summoned to Mustung. The Sarawans, being quite near, they joined next day, and on the terms being read to them, they accepted them. I will now remark on the contents of the paper containing the terms of peace.

15. Proposition No. 1 asks the Government to settle about the plunder taken from the kafilas in the Mulla Pass. There are papers with me ending with your No. 144, dated

11th April 1876, showing that Government has already agreed to pay a portion of the money due. This portion is due for the kafilas of 1872. The whole sum, I believe, is not a large one. I would therefore solicit permission to inquire carefully into the total amount due to the merchants, and this done, the bills should be audited by you and paid to the merchants. My reasons for holding this opinion are as follows:

16. If the correspondence of 1872 is examined, there is clear and substantial proof to show that the mediation then effected did not, for the reasons then given, include the Jalawan Sirdars. In fact, the Commissioner's report, No. 340, dated 5th April 1872, shows that they were purposely excluded from it. At that time Mir Khan, Jam of Beyla, his son Jam Ali, and Mir Ibrahim Khan were in confinement by our order. The Government of India approved of the exclusion of Sirdar Noordeen from the mediation, provided the Commissioner was assured that his Highness the Khan had the power to coerce him.

17. But how did it all end? The Khan was not able to keep order in Lus Beyla or along that frontier. For these and other reasons he fell under the displeasure of the British and our relations with him ceased, and our authorities recommended an army should be sent to depose him. In 1874 his enemies Jam Ali and Mir Ibrahim Khan escaped from Hyderabad, and were at once joined by Noordeen (uncle of the former and brother of the latter), who had been appointed by the Khan Naib of the province of Lus. At one stroke, therefore, so to speak, the Khan lost his dearly-acquired new acquisition. Moreover, I am of opinion that a perusal of the correspondence detailing these events will leave no manner of doubt on the mind that the Khan was acting throughout according to instructions he received from the British authorities. I do not intend to quote from the old records in support of this, as it would lengthen this letter very much to do so; but a perusal of these and his Highness' own letters written to the British authorities at the time show that he is entitled, in my opinion, to the fullest and most careful consideration being given to all that then occurred to enable a just view to be taken of his Highness' position and the true state of his affairs at the present time. I may, however, here again add that I believe the kafila money claimed in addition to what the Government has already agreed to give is only a few thousand rupees. The money might be taken from any sum the Government felt inclined to present to his Highness under the provisions of Foreign Secretary's letter, No. 8 C. P., dated Delhi, 11th January 1872, para. 4, should these still be considered applicable to the present position of affairs. That they are so I feel there ought to be no doubt, as the settlement come to in 1872, to use the Khan's own words, was one "that could not stand, nor could the Sirdars, or their children's "children" have fulfilled its conditions.

18. That this was truly so will be found from a reference to the Commissioner's decree given in paragraph 23 of his report, No. 340, dated 5th April 1872, to the address of the Hon. the Governor of Bombay. Therein it was directed that the Brahooees should give up the property plundered from the kafilas, and "that all property seized during "the late rebellion by the Sirdars and their followers from the ryots of Beloochistan, "whether in Khorassan or Kutchi, be restored."

19. This last condition was a most important one. In fact, both conditions were so. Regarding putting in force the first condition, the Khan says, in order to do so, he (not the Sirdars) was mulcted in Rupees 90,000. Regarding the second, putting it in force was a physical impossibility, as the whole of the chief towns fell for the time being into the hands of the rebels and their hungry followers, and were plundered and their contents scattered to the four winds of heaven. Shawl Kot (Quetta), Mustung, Dadar, Bagh, Gundava, and Kozdar, all fell into the hands of the rebels. When they were called upon to pay up, they were found to be so poor, they could only pay for a portion of the injury done to kafilas, and nothing for that done to the ryots, leading to his Highness the Khan's remarks given above.

20. These conditions might have been considered necessary ones, but the Khan's complaint is, that although he was guided by our authorities in all he did, not only were the conditions imposed on the rebellious Sirdars ignored by these very authorities, but he states he himself was partly held responsible for them by the officer who decreed them.

21. In reference to the Khan's remarks in paragraph 2 of his memorandum about the cost of the war with the Jam and what led to it, I have already to some extent gone into the latter question, and now leave the matter with you, as I am fully aware the whole case of the Jam from first to last is under your consideration. I will only add that the Khan seems to have no very ill feeling towards the Jam, and would, as said in his memorandum, willingly see him released on his guaranteeing to keep the peace. Of course,

he should be required not to wage war on the Khan or the Khan on him, and any attempt by either side to do so should be discountenanced by us. That this was the old policy maintained in the days of Mr. Mansfield, Commissioner in Sind, will, I think, be gathered from a perusal of his No. 617, dated 26th June 1865, to the address of the Political Superintendent. The other requests contained in the Khan's memorandum, on which the basis of a permanent peace as proposed by him should be made, do not seem to require further comment by me.

22. The Khan since his arrival here has been receiving daily all the elder sons—in fact, all the Sarawan Sirdars but Sirdar Moolla Mahomed—in Durbar. They are to-day dining with him. Pride keeps Sirdar Moolla Mahomed a little aloof for the present. I do not doubt, however, that this will after a few days be easily arranged. Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan, like myself, has suffered much from fever during these transactions, and I have felt the temporary loss of his services very much. To-day he is reported better.

23. In conclusion, I desire to state that the only contretemps of any kind, as far as I am aware, that have occurred since this mission started on the 4th of April last for the Bolan Pass are—(1.) the skirmish in the Mulla Pass reported in this office telegram of the 10th instant, but which turns out to have been an affair of no importance; (2.) the plunder in the Bolan Pass by some Dumar Pathan thieves of my dâk, which they carried off. The plunderers were followed by my people in the Bolan, who came up with four men. A fight took place and three out of the four were killed, and on their bodies being examined, they proved to be Murrees. This is unfortunate, but it is just one of those things incidental to the position and must be remedied, which I shall at once set about doing. The plunder of the dâk is quite unaccountable, as the two Dumar-Kakar headmen were with me here in camp at the very time it occurred. It is evidently due to some local quarrel, and will, I doubt not, be easily remedied. I have every reason to believe I shall recover the missing dâk and be able to punish the thieves. I am taking greater precautions for the safety of the mail-bags for the future. So safe have things hitherto been, that the mails went from *chauki* to *chauki* accompanied by only two horsemen.

Enclosure 2 in No. 105.

Appendix A.

Translation of a letter, dated Camp Kirta, 14th April 1876, from Major R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

The Commissioner, Colonel Munro, informed your Highness that I was about to proceed to the Bolan Pass to re-open it to the kafilas returning from India to Khorassan. I arrived here with the caravans two days ago, and your Highness will be glad to hear that they are being escorted in safety through the pass by the tribes themselves. I should have informed you of this fact before, but I have been much occupied on account of cholera having appeared amongst the troops. I am very happy to be able to tell you that the disease has almost disappeared, and there is every reason to believe it will do so entirely within the next few days.

Your Highness' Naib, Pir Jan, has been with me during my march, and has given me great satisfaction by the way he has executed your Highness' commands in at once attending to all requisitions for assistance made upon him by me since I entered your Highness' territory.

I forward this letter through Naib Pir Jan, and it is with the highest satisfaction I have to inform your Highness that I am the bearer of letters from his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and the Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor, Punjab, to your Highness' address in reply to your letters sent through me to these exalted personages. Be good enough to inform me whether it is your Highness' wish and pleasure that these letters should be sent to you direct, or whether I will retain them until I can present them in person when we meet in pursuance of the terms arranged between us when I visited your Highness in Khelat in the cold weather.

I will be delighted to meet your Highness either at Quetta, Siriab, Mustung, or any other place most convenient for your Highness. I myself am most anxious that our meeting should take place at Mustung, and trust that your Highness will be able to arrange to meet me there.

In consultation with Naib Pir Jan I have asked the Naib of Dadar not to interfere with the Brahooees cutting their crops, telling him I would be responsible to your Highness did he comply with my request.

Receive the expression of my high consideration for your Highness, and believe me to be your Highness' sincere friend.

Enclosure 3 in No. 105.

Appendix B.

Translation of a letter, dated 21st April 1876, from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to Major R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter informing me of your arrival at Kirta with the caravans, and that you could not write me before as you were much occupied on account of cholera having appeared amongst the troops, but that the disease had now almost disappeared.

I have perused your letter, and am highly pleased with its contents. I was expecting its arrival for some time, as Colonel Munro in a letter he sent me told me you would write. Now you have written from Kirta, and I am heartily glad to hear of your arrival there. I hope, by God's blessing, you will soon get free of the cholera, and that He will in His mercy grant this. It is a great pleasure to me to hear of the good conduct of my servant Naib Pir Jan. I placed him in attendance on you to comply with your wants and orders. It is very gratifying to me that he has done so well, and hearing of it has delighted me and made me happy.

With reference to what you write telling me that you are the bearer of letters from his Excellency the Viceroy of India and the Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor to my address, and to your asking whether you should send them to me direct or present them yourself when we meet, in reply I beg to state that the news has made me very happy. Be good enough to send the letters direct to me at your earliest convenience.

With reference to your query as to where we should meet, at Siriab, Mustung, or elsewhere, in reply I beg to say that I am very anxious to meet you, but on account of the appearance of cholera in your camp, it is only right and proper to delay our meeting until the danger of infection is passed. Khelat territory is your own property. Please encamp at Mustung, Quetta, or elsewhere for a short time, or until all danger from the cholera is passed, and if you will then proceed to Khelat I shall be very glad, as it is a very convenient place for us to meet.

I notice what you say about the caravans having been escorted to Shawl Kot (Quetta) by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisani, and the other Brahooee Sirdars. I would have preferred had troops escorted the caravans, as it is due to the folly of the Brahooees that the Bolan Pass has ever been closed to trade.

In reference to what you say about the produce of the Brahooee lands, and that you and Pir Jan discussed the point, and that you agreed to be responsible to me if the Brahooee lands were not interfered with, I have attended to your wishes in the matter and confirmed them, and have directed my Naibs not to interfere with the Brahooee lands in any way, although I should have preferred waiting before giving the order until after we had met, because you are aware of the bad conduct of the Brahooees and the injury they have done to Kutchi.

All is well here. Consider me always as your friend, and continue to correspond with me.

Enclosure 4 in No. 105.

Appendix C.

Translation of a letter, dated 26th April 1876, from Major R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

I have received your Highness' letter and have taken time to consider its contents before replying, as I am greatly disappointed to find that your Highness hesitates coming to meet me according to our agreement made when I was in Khelat. I was in hopes that your Highness would be so highly gratified at hearing of my mission and of the high consideration of the British Government for your Highness in sending it into the

country, that on being made aware of its approach your Highness would have shown your great appreciation of its objects by readily appointing Mustung, as proposed by me, for our place of meeting.

Your Highness must be aware that your coming to meet me as proposed is quite in accordance with precedent, and was the course adopted by your predecessors on the occasion of officers of my rank being deputed by the Supreme authority to confer with the Khans of Khelat on weighty matters connected with the interests of the two Governments. Your Highness must be perfectly aware that the object of the mission I am conducting is pregnant with results connected with the welfare of the Khelat State, and that before rejecting my proposal naming the place where we should meet, you should give the subject your Highness' most complete and careful consideration.

The letters to your Highness' address from his Excellency the Viceroy and the Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor cannot, your Highness must be aware, be sent by the hand of an ordinary messenger. I did think of deputing Captain Wylie, with a suitable escort, to take them to your Highness and deliver them with proper respect, and, after doing so, to return with your Highness to my camp; but now there is some doubt as to where we are to meet, I will retain them until I hear from you again.

Enclosure 5 in No. 105.

Appendix D.

Translation of a letter, dated 29th April 1876, from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to Major R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

I desire to acknowledge the receipt of your letter informing me of your good health and that we should meet at Mustung. I have made myself fully acquainted with its contents.

On hearing of your appointment by the Supreme Government on your present duty I felt very happy, and issued orders to my Naibs and officials to pay you every respect and attention and to provide you with supplies.

But I am sorry to find that since your arrival in the country you have allowed the disloyal Brahooees, who do not wish my Government well, to join you, and that you have treated them with every consideration.

When such is the case and these disloyal men are with you, how can I with any degree of happiness come to Mustung to meet you? But notwithstanding what I say I am still happy to do as you desire. I know you are my friend, and my hopes are all centred in you. The whole of Khelat, Mustung, and Shawl Kot belongs to you. There is no difference between these places; I hope therefore you will march from Mustung for Khelat, and permit me to meet you at the place called the Zearut or at Kurk. These places are one march from Khelat.

As we are to meet, the best plan is for you to present to me yourself the letters from his Excellency the Viceroy and the Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor.

All is well here. Be comforted from my side. Consider me your friend, and continue to correspond with me.

Enclosure 6 in No. 105.

Appendix E.

Translation of a letter, dated 1st May 1876, from Major R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

I have received your Highness' letter of the 29th April, and am grieved to find that your Highness still hesitates to come and meet me. My instructions from the Government of India direct me to name a suitable place for us to meet and to invite your Highness to join me there to confer with you regarding the important objects of my mission, which, as your Highness knows, are deeply connected with your own interests and Government and those of the British Government.

In pursuance of these instructions I have invited your Highness to meet me at Mustung, where my camp now is. I must leave it to your Highness to say whether you will join me here or not. The responsibility of your not doing so must rest entirely on your Highness. Mustung is the place where your brother, the late Nusseer Khan, on an occasion similar to the present one, met General Jacob. It is only three marches from Khelat, and in every way suitable as a place of meeting.

My friend, what you say about the Brahooee Sirdars' conduct causes me great sorrow. You must know well that until your quarrel with the Sirdars is arranged there can be no peace in Khelat, and that consequently British and Khelat interests must continue to receive the greatest possible injury. Is this well? Is it to your own personal interests to refuse the reconciliation offered by all your Sirdars and Chiefs? If your Highness continues to refuse it, the responsibility must, as in the case of your refusal to meet me, rest solely with your Highness.

Your Highness states I have conferred high favours on the Brahooees. My friend, what I have done is to receive their profound submission and to listen to their desire to submit to your Highness on fair and reasonable terms. Their co-operation with me in sending the returning kafilas through the Bolan Pass, and in helping to keep it open was necessary to the safety of the caravans, and could not be dispensed with.

The truth of this, I am certain, if your Highness will consider the matter from a proper point of view and in a fair spirit, must be apparent to your Highness.

Your Highness may rely that in all these matters I have not forgotten your Highness' interests, or that your Highness holds the high position of Ruler of the Khelat State. But at the same time I do not forget, for it is daily forcibly through passing events brought to my notice, that throughout the length and breadth of the land the Chiefs and Sirdars are in a state of rebellion, and that for 15 years your Highness has found yourself wholly unable to suppress it, or unaided to settle the quarrel which has led to it. Only three days ago, at the request of your Highness, I wrote to the Jalawan Sirdars telling them you desired them not to continue in opposition to you. I also told them the object of my visiting Khelat under the orders of the Supreme Government, and that I hoped your Highness was prepared to give them fair terms of peace. Both Jalawans and Sarawans are prepared to submit to your Highness on fair and reasonable terms, and I trust your Highness will not refuse their request, but will arrange these in accordance with the wish of the British Government in concert and communication with me.

My friend, whoever told you that the Brahooee Sirdars were with me in camp could not be your Highness' well-wisher. No Sirdar is with me. Directly they had completed the duty on which I had summoned them I sent them back to their homes. I gave them this order purely out of consideration for your Highness, and in the hope that your Highness would in consequence feel ease and confidence in joining my camp at Mustung.

What your Highness says about your Naibs having orders to help and attend on me is perfectly true, and I desire your Highness to accept my sincere acknowledgments for your so kindly considering all my wants and requirements. All your servants have shown their loyalty to your Government by attending to your orders. Only Faiz Muhammad, the Naib of Dadar, is careless and neglectful. In order to enable me to arrange for the safety of kafilas going through the Bolan, I directed him to intimate the arrival of any kafila at Dadar. This he does not do but sends them through the pass without arranging himself, or through me, for an escort for their protection. I trust your Highness will be pleased to warn Faiz Muhammad of the responsibility he incurs by so acting, and that your Highness will take steps to prevent his so doing for the future.

In order that your Highness may be no longer in doubt as to the authorization under which I am now in Khelat territory, I have decided that the time has come to transmit to your Highness the letters of his Excellency the Viceroy and the Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. These letters will be conveyed to you by the hands of Captain Wylie and Dr. Duke, who are accompanied by a suitable escort of cavalry. I commend to your Highness' serious consideration the contents of his Excellency the Viceroy's letter. His Excellency desires you to take my advice, which simply is, as recorded above, to join my camp at the earliest date possible, and in concert with me to arrange the quarrel on fair and just terms now existing between yourself and the Jalawan and Sarawan Sirdars.

Enclosure 7 in No. 105.

Appendix F.

Dated Camp Mustung, 15th May 1876.

From Captain H. Wylie, 1st Punjab Cavalry, on special duty, to Major R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty. (Extract.)

I have the honour to report that in accordance with your orders I marched from this place on the 2nd instant for Khelat to present to his Highness the Khan letters from his

Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, from his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and from you.

My orders were to bring back a reply, or, in the event of his Highness wishing to come to Mustung, to place myself and the detachment of troops with me at his disposal as escort.

I was accompanied by Surgeon O. T. Duke, by a squadron of the 4th Punjab Cavalry under Captain T. Shepherd, and by our Beelooch Sirdars, Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan. On the 4th May we reached Khelat, and about 4 miles from that place were met by Gour Khan, a nephew of the Khan's, and by his Highness' Vakeel, Muhammad Khan, who were escorted by about 50 sowars. On arriving in camp a salute of 7 guns was fired from the Miri.

The same afternoon, accompanied by Captain Shepherd, Dr. Duke, and Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan, I proceeded to the Miri to pay my respects to the Khan.

We were received at the door of the Durbar-room by his Highness and by his eldest son Mir Mahmoud Khan, and after introducing to him the officers above named, we took our seats at the Khan's right hand.

During the conversation which ensued, the Khan asked questions as to your rank and that of Colonel Munro. How many British officers were at Mustung, and what our losses had been during the recent attack of cholera, to all of which I replied. I imagined (perhaps more from his manner than words) that he was still somewhat uncertain as to your exact position and that of Colonel Munro. He also inquired of Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan, the extent of his powers as Magistrate, and asked me the strength of the Punjab Frontier Force, and if I was in civil or military employ, &c. For the rest our conversation was purely an exchange of civilities, and we shortly took our leave.

His Highness the Khan returned our visit at 5 p.m. the following day (5th May). He was received with a general salute; the whole of the squadron off duty being under arms. He stayed a considerable time and seemed pleased with his reception. The conversation was principally about troops and horses, and before leaving he carefully inspected the detachment, and had the horses filed past him.

I took an opportunity of saying that I had brought letters for his Highness from the Viceroy and from the Lieutenant-Governor, and also one from you, which I would with his leave present to him in Durbar the next day. To this he agreed, and the hour was fixed for 11 a.m.

About 10 a.m. the following day (6th May) Vakeel Muhammad Khan came to our camp, and at 11 I proceeded to the Miri, accompanied by Captain Shepherd, Dr. Duke, Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan, and the native officers of the 4th Punjab Cavalry detachment, and by a small guard.

We were received with the usual ceremonies, and after sitting a short time the Durbar-room was cleared by order of the Khan, only about a dozen of his own people remaining, and on our side a still smaller number.

I then presented to his Highness, with all respect, the letters sent to him by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and by you. I assured him in a few words that you had been sent into Beloochistan by the orders of the Supreme Government, and that remembering the respect due both to the Khan himself and to the letters of such high personages as the Viceroy and the Lieutenant-Governor, you had sent us three British officers to be the bearers of them to his Highness, and you had ordered me to await his reply, or, if it was his pleasure to return with us to Mustung, to place myself and the squadron at his service as escort; that you would receive him there and gladly enter on arrangements for the settlement of his affairs. I added there was no use my saying anything more, as he would himself see all that the Government wanted in the letters which I had just presented to him.

To this his Highness replied that there was not now much to say, but that there would be a great deal to talk about afterwards; that he would carefully read and consider the letters with his advisers, and that to-morrow evening he would let me know his decision. He finished up by saying that he was obliged to consider his "Izut;" that he was a Ruler over a country as large as that held by five Indian Rajas, and some more words to the same effect. After this we took our leave and returned to our camp.

The Khan did not bring me his reply the next day, but on the afternoon of the 8th he came to our camp, and was received with proper ceremony.

On entering the tent he dismissed all his attendants but some six men, and I on my part sent all our people away except Captain Shepherd, Dr. Duke, and Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan. The Khan's Munshi then produced a letter which is in

answer to yours, and read it aloud. The Khan then, of his own free will, excused himself for not having answers to the Viceroy's and Lieutenant-Governor's letters ready, but said they would be sent to me the following day, if I would kindly wait for them.

Before leaving he had some conversation with us on the state of affairs in Sind.

He asked Colonel Munro's exact position, and was told he had charges of the whole Belooch frontier from the sea upwards. He then asked what Sir W. Merewether's powers still were, and was told he was still Commissioner in Sind and possessed the same powers as formerly, except along the frontier and at Jacobabad, but that the whole of the political work of Beloochistan had been handed over to Colonel Munro. He asked several questions about the Bombay Presidency, and if Sir W. Merewether was likely to be made its Governor; he further remarked that if Sind were annexed to the Punjab, Bombay would become such a small Presidency as scarcely to require a Governor, as he said he had been told that Baroda had already been taken from it. He talked intelligently of the great benefit we should derive from the completion of the Sind, Punjab, and Delhi Railway between Multan and Kurrachee.

* * * * * * * *

On the evening of the 9th the Khan's letters for the Viceroy and Lieutenant-Governor were brought to me, and on the morning of the 10th we commenced our return march, reaching this on the 12th May.

Enclosure 8 in No. 105.

Appendix G.

Translation of a letter, dated 9th May 1876, from his Highness the Khan of Khelat, to Major R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

I desire to acknowledge the receipt of your letter informing me of your good health, and sending me letters from his Excellency the Viceroy and the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor by the hands of British officers and by Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan, Mazari, and Jamal Khan, Lugari.

Your letter which accompanied reached me at a very happy moment. I have perused it and fully understood its contents. The receipt of the letters from the Governors has made me very happy. There is no doubt as to the kind desires of the British Government towards me.

In reference to your invitation to me to come to Mustung to meet you, I beg to state that I am subject to the British Government and under its authority. Should orders have come to me by a peon even I should at once attend to them and do as directed, how much more readily then would I not do as required by you, who are my friend, in whom all my hopes are centred. Mustung is my own country; but had you directed me to go to any place in foreign territory I would have at once gone there to join your camp.

But my reason for not joining you at Mustung is that your desire for me to meet you there is caused on account of your wish to settle the quarrel between my Government and the Brahooees. Now the Brahooees are a disloyal people and have raided my country and caused injury to my people, and I do not feel it would be to my honour and dignity to settle my affairs with such disloyal men. If therefore I came to Mustung and did not settle with them, you would feel greatly disheartened.

But were I sure that you would take compensation from the Brahooees for the injury they have caused me and my country, and for the losses caused to kafilas, I would at once join you at Mustung in order that this might be done.

In regard to what you say that Mustung is the place where the late General Jacob was met by my brother Nusseer Khan, this is true enough, but the circumstances were different. My brother went first to Jacobabad, then General Jacob came to Mustung, where my brother met him, and all arrangements with the Brahooees were made by the British authorities through my brother.

In reference to what you say that until my quarrel with the Brahooees is settled there can be no peace in Khelat, and that the present unsettled state of the country has now endured for 15 years; that the Brahooees are quite prepared to come to terms, and that should I refuse them such terms the responsibility of doing so must rest with me; in reply, I beg to point out that Sir William Merewether settled my affairs with the Brahooees; therefore the present dispute is not 15 years old.

When the Brahooees were dealt with by the British authorities solely through me, I was able to coerce them by force of arms, and made them flee the country. Some went to

Afghanistan and elsewhere, and the country thus remained in peace, and the Bolan Pass became safe for traffic, and there was no one to injure traffic or the people of the country.

But that very year Sir William Merewether, Colonel Phayre, and Captain Harrison interfered in my affairs and settled these with the Brahooees, who were ordered to pay compensation for kafilas plundered. This the Brahooees could not pay, and quarrels again broke out, which were due to the interference of the British officers already referred to.

In regard to what you say about your receiving the Brahooees out of consideration for me and to obtain their submission, all I have to say in reply is, that I do not think such treatment redounds to my honour. Truly I am the subject of the British Government, but I want the British Government in such matters to treat me as it has treated the Amir of Cabul, Shere Ali Khan. The Government has made his enemies prisoners, making over some of them to him, and putting others in jail. I desire that my enemies should be treated in this way. This was what was done during the reign of my brother. Such should be the treatment shown to me now, and no direct communication should be held with the Brahooees.

I notice what you say about the Jalawan Chiefs, and that you had written to ask them to abstain from raiding the country. In reply, I beg to say that no Jalawan Chief is left to whom you could write. There are only some bad characters collected in Jalawan with the object of causing injury to me and my people. They are persuaded to act in this way by the Sarawan Sirdars, who send them secretly word to create disturbances, and then assure you it is the Jalawan Sirdars who are so acting.

In reply to what you say that whoever told me that the Brahooees are in your camp could not have been my well-wisher, all that I have to say is, that I know all that has gone on: how the Brahooees joined you at Kirta in the Bolan, and remained with you until a few days ago, when you dismissed them to their homes.

I notice what you say particularly about the conduct of Naib Faiz Muhammad and the kafilas. Regarding these (the kafilas) some contradictory orders were issued and brought to my notice by Naib Pir Jan; therefore I wrote to Naib Faiz Muhammad not to allow the kafilas to pass, but the merchants would not be detained and pressed on, and the Naib was powerless to detain them; therefore the fault was not his but the merchants', as had he detained them he feared their making false complaints to you.

Please on receipt of my letters sent for his Excellency the Viceroy and the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor receive and forward them, and yourself obtain a reply and communicate it to me.

All is well. Consider me your friend, and continue to correspond with me.

Enclosure 9 in No. 105.

Appendix H.

Translation of a letter, dated 17th May 1876, from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to Major R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

I desire to acknowledge the receipt of your letter informing me of your welfare and inviting me to meet you, and that I should without any hesitation write you as to whether or not I am prepared to come to meet you at Mustung, and that you had sent to me Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan. This letter of yours reached me at a very happy moment.

The Sirdars have arrived here and informed me of your kind desires towards me. I believe you to be my friend and my hopes are centred in you.

What my own wishes are I have already written in the letters I have addressed to his Excellency the Viceroy and the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor. But as it is also your desire that I should come to meet you at Mustung, I am very glad to do so. I will at once prepare for my journey to your camp, and trust to leave this on the 1st Jamadi-ul-awul 1293 (25th May 1876).

All is well. Continue to correspond with me.

Enclosure 10 in No. 105.

Appendix J.

Translation of a memorandum drawn up by his Highness the Khan of Khelat regarding the settlement of his quarrel with his Sirdars, and presented by him to Major R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, in Durbar, on the 6th June 1876.

Arrangements should be made by the British Government to compensate the Candahar merchants whose kafilas were plundered in the Mulla, Takari, and Kazak Passes by the

There is a correspondence with me regarding this. Government has agreed to pay at least a portion of this money under the agreement of 1872.—R. Sandeman Deputy Commissioner.

*This order cannot be found, but Sir William Merewether's report No. , para. , shows that some such order was issued.—R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner.

Jalawans, who also realized transit dues from some of these kafilas. The merchants are with me and are clamorous for a settlement.

2. In accordance with the written order of Sir William Merewether annexed * to this, I took possession of the province of Lus Beyla, and incurred great expense in doing so. This country should be made over to me or annexed to British India, or I should receive from the British the expenses incurred in the war against the Jam. If none of these proposals are adopted, then the next best thing to do is to release Jam Mir Khan, now in confinement in British territory, but this should be conditional on his ceasing to wage war on me and causing injury to my country. He should be required to render the same allegiance to my Government as he did to the Governments of former Khans of Khelat, and I on my part will engage not to encroach on his rights and privileges.

3. The Brahooee Sirdars should be required to expel from the country my ex-Wuzeer Atta Mahomed, who treacherously escaped from Khelat notwithstanding my servant Nawab Mahomed Khan was security for him. The ex-Wuzeer is doing all he can to keep up disturbances throughout the length and breadth of the land. After a permanent peace has been arranged on the condition that the ex-Wuzeer leaves the Khelat State, I will allow his family (who are in Khelat) to go with him.

4. By the settlement come to in 1872 by Sir William Merewether it was decreed that the Sarawan Brahooees should pay compensation for the kafila they plundered in the Bolan Pass. This compensation they could not pay. I had to give Rs. 35,000 to the merchants. I had also to pay Rs. 55,000 to the merchants that were plundered by the Murrees. I had thus a total sum of Rs. 90,000 to pay merchants on account of kafilas plundered by the Brahooees. It was decreed that they should pay, but as they had not the means I had to do so. I received, after the settlement, a lakh of rupees from the Government for my own use, but by this means I only received Rs. 10,000. This was not what the British Government intended; I therefore desire that the money should be refunded to me.

5. The annual subsidy of Rs. 50,000 which I used to receive has now for three years ceased, but I do not feel I have committed any fault to have caused this. Formerly the Khelat Government used to levy transit fees at one rupee per maund. The British Government reduced this to 8 annas per maund, and the Rs. 50,000 was given as compensation.

6. My Commandant Shukur Khan and my Munshis Mulla Saleh Muhammad and Gul Muhammad were taken from me and put in prison by the British Government without their having committed any fault. I shall feel obliged by the British Government releasing them and allowing them to depart in peace.

7. I desire to appoint Nawab Muhammad Khan, who is a well-wisher of my Government, to attend on Major Sandeman as my agent.

8. I desire that the share of the transit fees to which the Brahooees are entitled by ancient usage shall be continued to them as decreed by Sir William Merewether.

9. Whatever terms of peace the British Government desire to give the Brahooees on the part of my Government that I will agree to. I will not violate terms. Let the past be forgotten. I will restore to the Sarawan and Jalawan Sirdars their ancestral lands; and should they at any future time violate the conditions of peace, before punishing them I will report what has occurred to the British Government through the Political Agent at Khelat, and after receiving sanction (from British) I will then punish the offenders. On the other hand, should my Naibs and officers cause them injury contrary to custom and ancient usage, and should I not on being referred to do justice, then I am willing that my case should be appealed through the Political Officer at Khelat to the British Government for orders.

10. The Brahooees should, according to precedent and old rule, serve me and obey my orders, and I on my part will confer favours on them, as my ancestors did.

11. Should the British Government approve of these desires of mine as recorded herein, then my Government will hold itself responsible for the safety of the Bolan, Mulla, Raj, Kedj, Mekran, and all other Khorassan Passes, and I will do my best to keep these Passes open, as desired by the British Government.

No. 106.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 30th June 1876.

24th June.—His Highness the Khan sent for perusal letters to his address from the Commandant of his troops and Naib Abdul Latif informing his Highness of the arrival of the troops at Khelat. The letters stated that some of the baggage had been plundered en route to Khelat, and that one camel and one horse were missing. The depredations complained of were supposed by the Naib to have been the act of some Jattak Brahooee thieves.

The mail bag, reported to have been carried off by thieves in diary for the week ending 16th June, was recovered on the 17th of that month by Kadirdina, brother of Sirdar Alladina Koord. This fact was omitted to be reported in last week's diary.

2. 25th June.—Sirdar Rahman Khan Zagar Mingul, Chief of Nushki, brought a charge of oppression against the Naib of Nushki. He was directed to lay his complaint before his Highness the Khan. It was arranged that Sirdar Asad Khan should accompany him.

3. 26th June.—Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan Mazari and Jamal Khan Lughari visited Major Sandeman to-day. They stated that Sirdar Asad Khan had taken the Chief of Nushki to his Highness, who had in Durbar heard the complaint of oppression he had to make against the Naib of that place; that the Khan had carefully examined the sunnuds Rahman Khan had to produce in proof of his statement that the Naib had contrary to their provisions taken possession of a portion of the produce of his lands. His Highness after inquiry admitted the justice of the Sirdar's complaint, and issued orders to the Naib of Nushki to at once release the Sirdar's lands. His Highness spoke very kindly to Asad Khan, and was much pleased that Rahman Khan's case had been brought to his notice. Rahman Khan is a Chief of some importance, and his daughter is betrothed to the eldest son of his Highness the Khan, Mir Mahmud Khan.

4. 27th June.—Letters were received to-day from Mirs Jam Ali Khan, Ibrahim Khan, Gohur Khan, also from ex-Wuzeer Atta Mahomed Khan. They were written from Zehri, and stated that the Sirdars intended to halt there for two days and would then march to join Major Sandeman at Mustung.

Wakil Muhammad Khan, by his Highness' order, visited Major Sandeman and asked permission to discuss with that officer privately the lucern tax. Permission being at once given, the Wakil asked Major Sandeman to settle the matter by passing orders himself regarding it. In reply, Major Sandeman pointed out the impossibility of his issuing, as requested, such an order, as doing so would be direct interference on his part with the administration of the Khelat State. He told the Wakil that his advice to his Highness was that he should, as before recommended, send for the Sarawan Sirdars and discuss with them the tax in all its bearings; and that if the Khan desired it, Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan would be directed to attend the meeting and aid the two sides in arriving at a fair decision regarding it. Another matter the Wakil said his Highness the Khan wished to ask Major Sandeman about was regarding a Pathan who had been placed by his Highness' order in confinement on account of showing disrespect to Major Harrison when he was Political Agent at Khelat. The man had now been in confinement for nearly four years, and his Highness wished to set him free, unless doing so was contrary to Major Sandeman's wishes. In reply, Major Sandeman said he thought the matter rested entirely with his Highness. The prisoner apparently had suffered a long confinement, which was probably a greater punishment than the offence merited, and he certainly thought that did his Highness desire to release the man he should do so.

5. 28th June.—To-day Sirdar Asad Khan took the Shoranzai Brahooee to his Highness the Khan and presented them to him in Durbar. They complained to his Highness that the Naib of Mustung Faiz Muhammad had levied from them certain portions of the produce of their lands contrary to their sunnuds, which they produced, and they asked his Highness to inquire into their case and do justice. His Highness sent for Naib Faiz Muhammad and inquired from him regarding the complaint of the Brahooees. After this his Highness fixed a day for hearing the case and promised to do justice regarding it.

6. 29th June.—Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan paid their respects to his Highness the Khan, and had a long conversation with him on the subject of keeping open the trade routes.

7. 30th June.—To-day his Highness the Khan visited Major Sandeman at his camp, and they had a long consultation on the subject of permanently keeping open the Bolan Pass to traffic. The result of their joint deliberations was submitted to the Commissioner

in the form of a memorandum signed by his Highness and Major Sandeman under cover of this office letter No. 131, dated 1st July 1876.

In diary No. 417, dated 31st ultimo, by District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee, sent for perusal by the Commissioner, amongst other reports it is stated that "the Commander of the Khan's forces, by name * Mosun Khan, "who killed Noordeen Mingul and seized all the property "of Wuzeer Atta Mahomed, which amounted to 1½ lakhs "of rupees, and refused to give it up, has escaped with "50 mounted horsemen to Candahar." Inquiry has been made regarding this report, and it has been found to be quite incorrect.

* Commander Mosun Khan is at the present time commanding in the Khan's absence the Khelat troops in the Fort of Khelat.—R. G. S.

The report contained in diary No. 437, for the week ending 17th June 1876, by District Superintendent Police, Kurrachee, "that cash amounting to 1½ lakhs of rupees, being the "amount of revenue realised by his Highness the Khan from Kutchi Mekran, and 500 "camels belonging to him were looted on their way to Khelat by Gohur Khan, Sirdar "of Zehris, and Jutkie, Sirdar of Brahooee," is without any foundation whatever.

No. 140, dated Camp Mustung, 2nd July 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty.

No. 107.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 7th July 1876.

1st July 1876.—Ressaldar Malguzar Khan, commanding the Belooch Guides stationed in the town of Haji-ka-Shahr in Kutchi, reported that two Murrees came for purposes of their own to Seebee; they were met by some of the Kurk villagers, who killed one of them.

Sirdar Alladina Koord, in charge of the Bolan Pass arrangements, reported that he had sent men to Haji-ka-Shahr to meet the kafila and mess stores shortly expected to arrive there from Jacobabad. They were directed to take charge of the kafila and stores, and to escort the former to Quetta and the latter to Mustung.

2. 2nd July.—Letters arrived at Mustung from Mirs Jam Ali, Gohur Khan, Ibrahim Khan, and other Jalawan Chiefs. These reported the arrival of the Sirdars at Iskalku en route for Major Sandeman's camp.

His Highness the Khan sent his Wakil, Muhammad Khan, to Major Sandeman with a message, to the effect that his Highness could no longer afford to give the Sarawan Sirdars and their followers daily allowance, and his Highness trusted that he might be relieved of the burden, as it was uncertain how long they might be detained at Mustung. Major Sandeman agreed to pay Rupees 50 a day towards feeding the Sarawan Sirdars and their followers.

Inquiry was instituted into the complaints of the Sarawan Sirdars about the confiscation of certain of their lands by Naib Faiz Muhammad of Mustung. The matter was brought to the notice of his Highness the Khan by Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan Mazari. His Highness, in reply, said he did not desire to oppress any one, and if his Naib had seized lands not belonging to the Khelat Government they would be released. His Highness appointed a Committee to investigate the matter.

Major Sandeman, with his Highness the Khan's permission, had a long conversation with Naib Faiz Muhammad of Mustung in presence of Wakil Nawab Muhammad Khan. He pointed out to the Naib the impolicy of certain oppressive acts of his regarding which the Brahooees and ryots had bitterly complained, and counselled him in his master's interests to discontinue them for the future; that his Highness the Khan, when they were told to him, had stated that they had been committed without his Highness' authorisation, and that he (the Naib) was responsible for them, as his Highness had told him that although he was to rigidly maintain the rights of the Khelat Government, he was on no account to usurp those of others, &c. The Naib did not seem much to relish the conversation, and complained that although Major Sandeman and his Highness had together arranged that during the stay of the Khan at Mustung the Brahooees were to supply the

troops with lucern, several of them had not done so. The Naib, however, could not name the parties he complained of, and it was clear that the statement was not true. The Wakil, when taking his leave, said he would report the matter fully to his Highness the Khan, who would for the future prevent Naib Faiz Muhammad from doing illegal acts.

3. 3rd July.—Letters were received to-day from Mirs Jam Ali, Gohur Khan, and Ibrahim Khan, stating that on account of the long march from Lus Beyla the baggage camels had suffered severely; that the change of fodder and climate had acted injuriously on the animals, and they had lost 80 camels and 20 horses on the road. They had, therefore, come lately by easy marches. They would, however, arrive at Mustung on the morning of the 5th.

A letter was received intimating that the Guide Belooch sowars were for the present, by order of the Government of India, to remain primarily under the Jacobabad military authorities. This news caused Major Sandeman much anxiety, as he has 100 of the Guides on duty in Kutchi in connexion with the Bolan Pass arrangements, and this order, he feared, would injuriously affect these. He decided to consider the matter well before again referring the question to the Commissioner with a view to its being represented to the Government of India for reconsideration, as it is one of grave political importance. These Guides were subjects of his Highness the Khan, and resided at Lehri in Kutchi, and were translated from thence to Jacobabad for purely political reasons. They were then taken into Government service. As at present constituted there can be no doubt as to the necessity that exists for these men being permanently placed under the political officers. They have never done regular military duty and are not suited for it, while as now employed in Kutchi and in attendance on Major Sandeman at Mustung their services are very valuable. A party of them are Boogtees, and their Chief is a man of some position and influence. He and his men are at present on duty with Major Sandeman. The news of the transfer of his services from the Political to the Military Department had the effect of making him at once apply for permission to return to Jacobabad. Leave was granted him to do so, as under the circumstances it was considered undesirable longer to employ him on political work. He is the son of the late Alam Khan, Chief of the Kulpar Boogtees, who was the person, it is believed, who betrayed the movements of the Boogtees to the Sind authorities on the occasion of their defeat many years ago, when some 400 of them were destroyed.

The authority conveying this intimation by letter is not mentioned. — A. A. Munro.

The Chief of the Mazarani Murrees (Bolan Pass Murrees), by name Kechi Khan, waited on Major Sandeman, and asked to be employed under the Koord Sirdar in escorting kafilas. He was informed in reply that prior to his making the request Sirdar Alladina had been directed to employ him in the way requested.

4. 4th July.—To-day Takki Khan, the Mir Munshi of Sirdar Jam Ali, arrived in camp, and paid his respects to Major Sandeman. He said his master and the Jalawan Sirdars had arrived at Amanala and would be at Mustung the following morning. He stated that his master had 300 regular infantry, 200 cavalry, and 500 camel sowars with him, and he was anxious that the Jam Saheb should be received with a salute of guns, as he was the son of an independent prince, Mir Khan, the Jam of Lus Beyla. After a full consideration of all the circumstances connected with Sirdar Mir Khan's case, now a prisoner in Bombay, Major Sandeman decided that a salute of guns should not be fired on the arrival of Mir Jam Ali. The Mir Munshi was, however, assured that his master on arrival would be received with every attention and with the honour due to the son of the Prince of Lus Beyla, which country is now held by him in his father's name. A long conversation took place between the Mir Munshi and Major Sandeman regarding Jam Mir Khan's affairs, and the imprisonment and flight of Mirs Jam Ali and Ibrahim Khan Mingul from Hyderabad in Sind.

The Khan of Khelat's two Naibs Pir Jan and Faiz Muhammad waited on Major Sandeman by their master's order, and said they had been directed to ask for the aid of Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan when examining the sunnuds of the Brahooee who complained that their lands had been unjustly confiscated. The request was at once complied with; the Sirdars at the same time being told to report the result of the investigation direct to his Highness the Khan.

5. 5th July.—Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan to-day paid their respects to his Highness the Khan, and reported the result of the examination of the sunnuds by the Naibs and themselves on the previous day. They said many of the sunnuds had been given by the Khan himself to the complainants, and there was no doubt whatever as to the fact of Naib Faiz Muhammad having in many instances seized lands on the most

frivolous grounds; that when asked the reasons for so acting he had no sound ones to offer; that it was clear to them that he was a man of evil disposition, who greatly oppressed the people, whether Brahooce or zemindars; that he was a Dewar and of low birth, and that the appointment of such a man brought discredit on the Khelat Government. His Highness on hearing this opinion of the Sirdars regarding the Naib's character was much concerned, and directed Faiz Muhammad to cease from committing such acts as those named by the Sirdars. His Highness said he was much obliged to them for bringing these matters to his notice; that when such occurrences became known, it was only right and friendly to inform him (the Khan) regarding them, &c. His Highness then asked them to become members of the Committee appointed to investigate each case. Sirdar Moolla Muhomed of Sarawan was also to take part in investigating the matter, and they consented to join, did Major Sandeman give them permission to do so.

Permission having been obtained from the military authorities, Ressaldar Muhammad Amir Khan, 4th Punjab Cavalry, with an escort of 10 cavalry, was sent a few miles along the Mustung road to meet Mir Jam Ali and conduct him to his camp. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed having first obtained his Highness the Khan's permission, also went to meet Jam Ali. At 10 a.m. the Jam and Jalawan Sirdars arrived in camp. Altogether they were accompanied by a tribal force of between 2,000 and 3,000 men, 300 regular infantry, and 200 cavalry. Shortly after the Jam's arrival in camp Major Sandeman paid him a visit of ceremony to inquire after his and the Jalawan Sirdars' health, and to offer any assistance they might stand in need of. The young Jam was greatly pleased with the attention, saying that he had hurried as speedily as he could from Lus Beyla to Mustung, but on account of his father's absence he had many arrangements to make before he could leave his country. Jam Ali is about 25 years of age, and has a pleasant manner and pleasing face. He was eager in his endeavours to impress on Major Sandeman that he and his father were the loyal servants of the British Government and had never intentionally disregarded its wishes. His father at the time of his flight to Kurrachee was in receipt of an allowance of Rupees 15,000 a year paid him by the British Government on account of services rendered to the Telegraph Department. This allowance since the imprisonment of Jam Mir Khan had been discontinued. The young Jam was eager in his inquiries as to the object the Government had in view in detaining his father in prison now that he (Jam Ali) had possession of Lus Beyla, and he wished to know whether his father was considered a prisoner of the British Government or of his Highness the Khan. He said that to aid in obtaining his father's release, was it considered necessary, he would go to Simla or anywhere else, and do anything required of him by the British Government; that his mother had died at Hyderabad, and he was an only son, and his father and he had been separated for seven years. He entreated that his father should be released and restored with honour to his country, and was at first greatly cast down when in reply Major Sandeman said that the memorial asking for the release of Jam Mir Khan by himself and Chiefs was now before the Government, but that some time must elapse before orders could be passed on it. He seemed greatly relieved, however, to hear that everything possible had been done to place the particulars of his father's quarrel with the Khan, which had indirectly led to his present misfortunes, as clearly as possible before the Government, and that the Khan himself was not opposed, after fair conditions had been arranged, to his father's release.

6. 6th July.—Mirs Jam Ali, Gohur Khan, Ibrahim Khan, Shakar Khan, and Saleh Muhammad Jattaks, Mahim Khan Gurgnari, and other Jalawan Chiefs paid their respects to Major Sandeman, who explained to them in full Durbar the object the Government had in view in sending the mission into the country. He further explained to them fully what he knew regarding the conduct of the late Sirdar Noordeen, which had resulted in his untimely death. In reply, they one and all agreed to be guided by Major Sandeman in settling their quarrel with his Highness the Khan. The terms of peace were then fully discussed, and the basis on which a fair settlement was to be arranged was unanimously agreed to. Mir Jam Ali had a private interview with Major Sandeman, and explained at length the quarrel of the Jalawan Sirdars with the Khelat Government.

7. 7th July.—Mir Ibrahim Khan waited on Major Sandeman, and requested that in the terms of peace to be agreed upon by the Brahooee Sirdars and the Khelat Government, his Highness the Khan should, according to ancient State custom, agree to compensate him for the death of his brother, the late Sirdar Noordeen. After a long argument, in which Major Sandeman showed the Sirdar that his brother's death was entirely due to his own evil way of acting, he withdrew the claim for compensation. The next request the Sirdar advanced was that his Highness the Khan should visit him at his

camp and condole with him, according to the custom of the Muhammadan religion, on account of his brother's death. Second, that the Khan should recognise the son of Sirdar Noordeen as Chief of the Minguls. In reply, Major Sandeman said he would refer the two last requests to his Highness the Khan, and endeavour to get his Highness to agree to them.

Major Sandeman, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, accompanied by the whole of the Jalawan Sirdars, attended his Highness the Khan's Durbar. Each Sirdar was introduced separately, and made full submission to his Highness the Khan. Mir Jam Ali, on the part of his father, acknowledged the supremacy of the Khan of Khelat, and said if his Highness was agreeable to abide by the ancient law of the Khelat State, so was he and his father. He spoke very feelingly and humbly, and the Khan treated him with marked respect, getting up on Jam Ali's entering the Durbar and remaining standing until he sat down. Jam Ali did not make obeisance to the Khan like the other Sirdars of the Khelat State. All he was required by custom to say on entering the Khan's presence was (*Salaam alaikum.*) The Khan at once replying (*Alaikum salaam.*) His Highness then asked after the Jam's health, &c. The Durbar on the whole passed off very well. Major Sandeman explained to his Highness the Khan what each Sirdar hoped from his Highness. His Highness replied that they might rely on his (in consultation with that officer) doing what was right and proper in regard to settling their claims and requests. Mir Sirdar Ibrahim Khan seemed to feel his position keenly, but spoke out openly, saying his brother was his Highness the Khan's Mir, and if it suited him to kill him he was king. The Khan did not reply to the Sirdar's remarks, but remained silent. His Highness, however, was very attentive to him, and on Mir Ibrahim's taking his leave, rose up and remained standing until the Sirdar had left the Durbar-room. At the close of the Durbar his Highness remarked to Major Sandeman that Jam Mir Ali, whose mother was Noordeen's sister, was a "dark likeness" of Sirdar Noordeen; that he was very glad to see him, and would show kindness to him and Mir Ibrahim Khan.

Sirdar Alladina Koord reported that some Shawani Murris left their own village and settled near the Mingul (Bolan) Brahooees; that four of them had since been killed by the Dumar-Kakars. Major Sandeman on hearing this sent orders to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed to arrange if possible the matter, and prevent further bloodshed.

A memorandum by the Civil Surgeon was received and attached to the diary showing the work performed by him since his arrival at Mustung.

No. 145, dated Camp Mustung, 10th July 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, special duty.

No. 108.

No. 162C., dated Simla, 12th July 1876.

From Lepel Griffin, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 7C. of the 28th March last, enclosing copy of the Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor's letter to the address of the Khan of Khelat, I am now directed to forward, for information, translation of his Highness' reply, dated the 10th May, which has just been received through Major Sandeman.

Enclosure 1 in No. 108.

Translation of a letter, dated 10th May 1876, from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, Punjab.

Your Honour's kind letter, informing me of your good health, reached me at a very happy moment. I learnt from it your Honour's kind intentions towards me. I also desire to acknowledge receipt of a letter from his Excellency the Viceroy of India. The perusal of every word and every line of these letters made me very happy. There can be no doubt of the kindly feeling of his Excellency the Viceroy and of your Honour

towards me. I am the subject of the British Government, and have never neglected to comply with its orders, or to make my submission to it, and from this line of conduct I will never depart.

I beg to forward herewith a letter for his Excellency the Viceroy of India, which kindly deliver, and, after having obtained a reply, kindly send to me. In reference to what you say about Major Sandeman's visiting my country, in reply I beg to say that Major Sandeman has arrived in my territory. His arrival has rejoiced me greatly. To him I have written the state of my affairs and my desires regarding them.

By the grace of God I will settle my affairs and those of my country in concert and communication with Major Sandeman, and in whatever way that officer may advise. Doing so will redound to my honour.

All is well here. Be comforted from my side, and consider me your Honour's well-wisher, and continue to favour me with your kind letters.

No. 109.

No. 257, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 14th July 1876.

From Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to submit a letter, No. 139 of the 1st instant (with its enclosed memorandum of proceedings), from Major Sandeman, now on special duty in Khelat.

2. The letter and memorandum exhibit Major Sandeman's recent proceedings in furtherance of the instructions conveyed in paragraph 27 of the Government of India Resolution in the Foreign Department No. 2819P. of the 16th October last.

3. By those instructions he was ordered to inquire and report what could be done for the protection of trade through the Bolan Pass, and whether a system of fixed tolls on caravans could be arranged for, the proceeds of which would be distributed to the tribes in the neighbourhood who are interested in the protection of the Bolan route; and a discretion was allowed him to make such arrangements as he might deem advisable within a certain limit of expenditure.

4. The memorandum accompanying Major Sandeman's letter is a record of joint proceedings between himself and his Highness the Khan of Khelat, of proposals made, and of conclusions arrived at, in regard to keeping the Bolan Pass permanently and securely open for traffic. Major Sandeman shows that several tribes—as the Koord and Mingul Brahooees, the Mazarani and Mundai Murrees, and the Dumar-Kakar Pathans—are specially interested in the Bolan Pass; that the escort fees, which should be distributed to those tribes in proportion to the strength of escorts with the amount of security furnished to caravans passing through, have hitherto been arbitrarily given, or withheld, according to the will or caprice of the Khan of Khelat; and that the proceeds of customs dues levied at Shawl-Kot (Quetta) and Dadar have ever been considered as belonging to the Khan exclusively, subject only to a deduction of one seventh of the amount collected at Dadar, payable as a long-established perquisite to the Chief of the Sarawans.

5. The Sarawan Sirdar has, of course, been deprived of that perquisite ever since his rebellion against the Khan of Khelat, but his right to it, according to prescriptive usage, has now been fully admitted by the Khan of Khelat himself.

6. The Chief to whom Major Sandeman, with the Khan's sanction, proposes to give the immediate control of Bolan Pass arrangements is Maladina, Sirdar of the Koord Brahooees, two of whose sons are to be continuously on duty in the pass in command of escort parties of mixed Brahooee, Murree, and Pathan tribes, to be stationed at Kirta, the Dusht and Abgum, respectively, for the protection of travellers and caravans. As an additional precaution against possible misappropriation of escort fees and failure of [redacted] arrangements, the Sarawan Chief, Moolla Mahomed, Raisani, is to maintain a [redacted] supervision. The annual cost of these arrangements is estimated at Rupees [redacted] which may be reasonably realised from tolls.

7. His Highness the Khan of Khelat has, under advice, accorded a some[redacted] assent to these proposals, representing that he has been a considerable [redacted] owing to his treaty engagements with the British Government, which [redacted] levy of 8 annas only, instead of one Rupee per maund as forme[redacted] merchandise passing through. The details given in the 6th [redacted]

Sandeman's letter have been supplied by the Khan's officials, and they may, or may not, be capable of verification.

8. There can be no doubt that the Khan of Khelat considers it to be more conducive to his personal interest and benefit that caravans should be compelled to travel by the Raj and Mulla routes, and thus to come directly within the arbitrary power of exaction which would be possessed by himself and his officials, than that they should continue to use the ancient and preferable Bolan route, which possesses such palpable advantages over the others that few caravan traders would resort to those were the Bolan Pass kept open and the passage through it in safety to and fro duly maintained. Major Sandeman in the 8th paragraph of his letter clearly shows the greater advantages of the Bolan route in every way.

9. It seems unnecessary at this stage to offer an opinion in regard to what is set forth in the concluding paragraph of the letter now transmitted, as the matter will doubtless be duly considered in connexion with the affairs of Khelat generally, and our relations thereto on the issue of orders by the Government of India when the complete information called for from Major Sandeman has been received.

Enclosure 1 in No. 109.

No. 139, dated Camp Mustung, 1st July 1876.

From Major R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

I have the honour to draw your attention to paragraph 27 of the Government of India Resolution No. 2819P., dated the 16th October last. I am directed therein to "inquire and "report whether anything, and if so what, can be done for the protection of trade viâ "the Bolan Pass, and whether a system of fixed tolls on caravans could not be arranged "for, the proceeds of which would go to the tribes interested in the protection of the "route."

2. In consultation with his Highness the Khan of Khelat I have made full inquiry into this matter, and now submit with this letter for your consideration, a joint-memorandum by his Highness the Khan of Khelat and myself of our proceedings regarding it. These show the discussion that took place between his Highness and myself, and the conclusions we arrived at. They were recorded by me in English and then carefully translated into the vernacular and read out to his Highness the Khan, who affixed his seal to them. I then signed them, and a copy was sent to his Highness at his own request for record. I will now offer a few brief remarks regarding them.

3. The Chiefs and tribes interested in the Bolan Pass are the Koord Brahooees, the Mazarani, and the Mundai Murrees, the Mingul Brahooees and the Dumar-Kakar Pathans. The fees taken from the caravans are of two kinds, viz., the sung or customs dues which are levied at Shawl-Kot (Quetta) and Dadar, and the fees for buddruki or escort fees. The first-named go entirely to his Highness the Khan, after one seventh of those collected at Dadar have been deducted for the chief Sirdar of the Sarawans. His right to this share was not disputed by the Khan. The escort fees used to be given in a very arbitrary way to any tribe which, for the time being, was in his Highness the Khan's favour. From the enclosed memorandum you will observe that his Highness has agreed that the escort fees shall go to those actually escorting the kafilas, and that Sirdar Alladina Koord shall be responsible for their fair distribution. An arrangement of this kind was necessary, as there was reason to believe that formerly when the pass was open his Highness used to give a certain portion only of these fees to the Mazarani Murrees, who undertook the duty at reduced rates. This caused discontent amongst the tribes, and did not work well. The present plan (as the entire escort fees are given to [illegible]se protecting the kafilas through the pass, who are entitled to them by prescriptive [illegible] will, I trust, work better.

[illegible] further reference to the proceedings enclosed will also show you that for the present Sirdar Alladina Koord is in sole charge of the pass. This Sirdar has agreed to keep men* to the number of 60 always on duty at the village of Kirta in the heart of [illegible] also agreed to keep 40 men* at the Dusht plain in the hot weather, and at Abgum in the pass in the cold weather, always present for escort duty and to protect travellers passing to and fro. His Highness the Khan has granted to Mullik Til Khan, of

[illegible]ill belong to the Murree [illegible]nd will be in charge of Dost Mahomed.

[illegible] the Mingul [illegible] tribes, in [illegible]homed.

the village of Kirta, a written order permitting him to return to his village and to resume the cultivation of his lands situated in the pass. These arrangements for the protection of the pass will be supervised by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed of Sarawan, who will bring to notice any shortcomings on the part of Sirdar Alladina should any (for instance, in the distribution of the escort fees) ever occur. Their total cost will come to Rupees 18,000 yearly, which will be defrayed out of the money sanctioned for the purpose. [See paragraph 27 of the Government Resolution above referred to, empowering me to make suitable arrangements for the protection of trade passing through the Bolan Pass.]

5. I now come to a point in dealing with this subject that his Highness the Khan is most anxious the British Government should fairly consider. His Highness states that according to treaty he is obliged to take as customs fees from caravans 8 annas per maund instead of 1 rupee, and that this has reduced the State revenues by nearly a lakh of rupees yearly. He has sent me the following table of fees showing the sums actually levied on kafilas passing through Khelat territory in the year 1840–41, and his Highness has selected the collections made during that year to verify his statement as it was the last year during which 1 rupee per maund was levied from caravans:—

Table of Fees.

	Rs.	A.	P.
Khelat	89,325	13	2
Sorab	9,624	2	10
Kozdar and Baghwana	11,265	6	9
Mushki and Kolwa	3,135	9	3
Nimkar	2,593	11	2
Kedj and Makran	3,707	13	4
Mustung and Tiri	9,066	3	4
Shawl-Kot	21,434	2	8
Zehri	2,299	13	2
Noshki	1,191	14	8
Dadar	11,869	11	4
Bagh and Shori Pass	14,169	12	4
Lehri	4,887	3	2
Gunjaba and Kotra	8,633	8	4
Samechi Pass	7,371	7	2
Total	2,00,576	4	8

6. But I must here remark his Highness the Khan, although quite aware that by treaty he is bound to levy only 8 annas per maund, nevertheless desires to bring to the special notice of the British Government the fact that by imposing this condition the State revenues are reduced in a way he can ill afford.

7. There are, however, other strong reasons why his Highness prefers to keep open the Mulla and Raj routes to that of the Bolan Pass. By diverting kafilas arriving from Candahar at Shawl-Kot to Khelat, and thus preventing them going through the Bolan Pass, he collects himself the escort fees as well as the customs fees. His Highness also thus avoids having to pay the Sarawan Sirdar a share of the customs fees. He is, moreover, himself able to superintend at Khelat the collection of all fees.

8. The objection to kafilas being prevented by the Khan from going through the Bolan Pass, which, by ancient custom, he has no right to do, is of the very strongest description. The route viâ Khelat is not only a very much longer one (150 miles) than that viâ the Bolan Pass, but it is exposed during the winter to the extreme cold of Khorassan. Moreover, there is no fodder for baggage animals to be found along it. The consequence is that caravans in taking it suffer the greatest privations, and generally lose many animals, and thus run the risk of having to leave part of the merchandise they are carrying to India on the road. On the other hand, the route viâ the Bolan, as stated, is not only a much shorter one, but after making two or three marches from Shawl-Kot (Quetta) caravans get out of the cold altogether, and reach a country where there is abundance of forage, with a plentiful supply of water, and a mild climate.

9. Taking the entire state of the case into consideration, I am inclined to think that the Government in the end would not be losers were they to look upon this grievance of the Khan (which he has, I believe, from the first urged on our authorities) as one requiring a remedy. I believe, if the real truth were known, that since British relations with his Government have been broken off, by diverting the kafilas from Shawl-Kot to Khelat, and increasing the customs fees to the old rates, his Highness has not suffered in

revenue by the subsidy of Rupees 50,000 being withheld by our Government. It seems to me therefore that the subject is one requiring very serious consideration, and that in the interests of the Candahar trade it might be well worth the money to increase the subsidy of his Highness by Rupees 20,000 or 25,000 thousand yearly. By doing this the Government would assuredly bind the Khan more strongly to British interests, and would afford a substantial inducement to his Highness to exert himself to co-operate in keeping open the pass. In granting the extra money conditions might also be imposed, such as withholding the extra grant were the pass at any time closed and trade injured by Murree inroads into the Bolan or Kutchi, or for any other cause whatever. His Highness might also be required, which he would do very willingly, to direct his Naibs stationed in Kutchi, Shawl-Kot, and Dadar to render the Political Officers hearty aid should special measures at any time become necessary to secure the safe transit of trade through Kutchi and the Bolan Pass.

Enclosure 2 in No. 109.

Memorandum of proceedings of his Highness Mir Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat, and Major R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, at Mustung, on the 30th June 1876, regarding keeping open the Bolan Pass, and affording protection to trade passing through Khelat territory.

His Highness Mir Khodadad Khan and Major Sandeman met at Mustung on the 30th June 1876 to take into their joint consideration what steps could be taken by them to put in force the orders of the Government of India, as contained in their proceedings No. 2819P. of the 16th October last, for the permanent protection of trade passing through the Bolan Pass and Kutchi in Khelat territory.

The Government of India in the 23rd paragraph of the proceedings state: "It remains "then to consider what means shall be taken to restore peace in Kutchi, and to protect the "transit of trade within the territories of his Highness the Khan of Khelat." Further, in the 24th paragraph they record that "irrespective of the general interest which the Govern- "ment of India have in promoting the peace and prosperity of neighbouring countries, "they have a special interest in Kutchi. The boundary between Kutchi and Sind runs "through an open country, so that any serious disturbances in Kutchi may affect British "territory very closely. The raids, however, which have actually occurred in Kutchi "have not as yet been of a kind to endanger the general peace of the British districts "in Sind; and as the posts of the Sind Frontier Force are in advanced positions beyond "the frontier, there seems no reason to anticipate that outrages will be attempted to "their rear. Should such outrages be attempted, they should be promptly and "vigorously dealt with. The advanced outposts on the Sind border then may reason- "ably be expected to secure a fair degree of order in the southern portions of Kutchi, "over which their power of prompt action extends. Any armed aggression within "Kutchi territory thus commanded by the outposts may be forcibly suppressed by "them."

The points, therefore, that his Highness the Khan of Khelat and Major Sandeman had to consider were, (1) the protection of caravans through the Bolan Pass itself from Shawl-Kot to Dadar, and (2) thence through Kutchi to within reach of the British outposts stationed in Khelat territory.

Regarding the first point, the Government of India, in the 27th paragraph of their proceedings, directed Major Sandeman to "inquire and report whether anything, and if "so what, can be done for the protection of trade viâ the Bolan Pass, and whether a "system of fixed tolls on caravans could not be arranged for, the proceeds of which "would go to the tribes interested in the protection of the route."

Finally, the Government of India in their 29th paragraph invited his Highness Mir Khodadad Khan to co-operate in putting their proposals in force in the following words: "Should the measures now authorised be successful in affording reasonable security to "trade through Khelat territory, and should his Highness the Khan show an earnest "desire to co-operate for this end and to return to a proper sense of his duties, it will "afford the Governor-General in Council great pleasure, on receiving an expression of "regret for what has occurred, to restore the former subsidy and re-establish the old "friendly footing with his Highness' Government."

Major Sandeman then briefly pointed out to his Highness the Khan how the action of the Khelat Government up to the date of his entering the country in April last had left the trade routes without protection. He said that on his entering Kutchi in the cold

weather he found a rebellion on the point of breaking out; at his invitation the Brahooee tribes had joined him; that he had proceeded up the Bolan Pass, which was closed. The kafila-bashis in charge of caravans blocked at Candahar on hearing of Major Sandeman's arrival had flocked to Shawl-Kot, but were directed by the Naib there to proceed to Khelat, and to go viâ the Mulla or Raj route to India; that the merchants had appealed to Major Sandeman, who himself wrote to the Khan of Khelat asking him to allow them to proceed under his protection to Sind. The Khan, however, did not consent to this proposal, and one of those very kafilas afterwards had been partly plundered in the Mulla Pass, and the merchants were clamorous for compensation. The question of compensation to be paid to these merchants at the Khan's request had been referred by Major Sandeman to the Government of India in his No. 122, dated 14th June 1876, to the address of the Commissioner, Colonel Munro.

The fact of the entire stoppage of trade until Major Sandeman's advent into the country could not be disputed. Caravans, consisting of thousands of camels, had been blocked at Shikarpore on account of the known unsafe state of the kafila routes. Colonel Munro, the Commissioner, and Major Sandeman, had together visited the merchants at Shikarpore, and were jointly of opinion that such a state of things could be no longer permitted. It was decided by the Government of India, to whom Colonel Munro referred the state of affairs, that Major Sandeman, with a suitable escort of troops, should proceed to the Bolan Pass and open it to the returning kafilas, and that a full opportunity should be afforded Mir Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat, of joining Major Sandeman in so arranging the affairs of the Khelat State that protection to caravans should for the future be undoubted and permanent.

Mir Khodadad Khan here gave it as his opinion that the unprotected state of the trade routes was due to the fact that the Brahooees, who had plundered kafilas to gain their own ends, had not been held responsible by the British Government, and had not been made to pay the value of all the plunder they took from the kafilas of 1872, although ordered by the British Government to do so; that if the Government of India would place all the Brahooee Chiefs by force of arms under him, and aid him by making prisoners of those amongst them who were his enemies, then he would undertake to keep open all the trade routes and be responsible for the safety of kafilas.

Major Sandeman, in reply, said that he felt certain the British Government would not aid him to coerce his Sirdars by force of arms, and thus enable him to keep open the trade routes; that possibly the Government of India, on hearing the reasons for the Sirdars refusing protection to the trade routes, might consider them under the circumstances justifiable and entirely due to the Khan's own conduct. In fact, that the Governor-General of India in his letter to his Highness recently delivered had told his Highness that it was owing to his own conduct that friendly relations between his Government and the British Government had been broken off, and his Excellency had exhorted his Highness to hearken to Major Sandeman's counsels and to act on his advice, and thus afford the best proofs of the sincerity of his professions, and relieve the Governor-General from the necessity of taking further means to secure the tranquility of the British frontier and the protection of trade.

Major Sandeman then discussed with his Highness the Khan the three plans that existed for the protection of trade and Kutchi.

These were—

(1st.) For his Highness the Khan to take on himself the entire duty of protecting the passes and trade routes:

(2nd.) For the British Government to do so, and relieve the Khan of all responsibility:

(3rd.) Or the Khan to avail himself of Major Sandeman's influence with the tribes when arranging with them for the safety of trade through the Bolan Pass and Kutchi, and that his Highness should do this in concert and communication with that officer, as proposed by the Government of India in their proceedings above referred to.

Major Sandeman pointed out to his Highness that the first two measures were not suitable to the present position of his Highness' affairs; that it was an undoubted fact that from the date of his Highness' ascending the *guddee* to the present day Kutchi and the Bolan Pass had been hitherto unsafe for traffic. Moreover, did they adopt Plan No. 2, the loss in all likelihood in income to his Highness would be considerable. It was evident that if the British Government became responsible for the safety of the pass, and for keeping it open as suggested, they would also, as proposed in the 27th paragraph of their proceedings above referred to, take over the fees also and distribute them to the tribes guarding the pass.

Major Sandeman told the Khan that in his opinion his Highness ought thankfully and gratefully to accept the proposals for the protection of the trade routes of the Government of India as contained in Plan No. 3, and that his Highness ought at once to give proof of his wish to re-establish the old friendly relations between his Government and that of the British Government by showing an earnest desire to cordially co-operate with Major Sandeman in arranging with the tribes for the protection of the trade routes, which would of itself when accomplished restore peace to the distracted Khelat State. This could only, however, be done by his Highness treating the tribes in a fair and just spirit, and by his securing to them their ancient rights and privileges.

The Khan of Khelat at once heartily agreed to the last-named proposal, saying it was his anxious desire to comply with every expressed wish of the British Government, and if Major Sandeman would accept half the burden of settling his affairs with the tribes, he would gladly accept the other half.

With regard to the protection of the Bolan Pass traffic, he most heartily and gladly agreed to Plan No. 3. He was of opinion that the means already adopted by Major Sandeman made through the Sirdar of the Koords for the safety of the Pass were very suitable; that at the time he had agreed to these and confirmed them, telling Sirdar Alladina, in Major Sandeman's presence, that he sanctioned his taking over charge of the Bolan. It was true that the *buddruki* fees would by the arrangement go to the Bolan tribes, and would no longer be in his gift to dispose of as he liked; but he quite saw the necessity for these fees being given to the tribes who escorted the kafilas through the pass. His Highness remarked that the transit fees would be collected as usual at Dadar and Shawl-Kot, according to custom; and should hereafter any necessity arise for altering present arrangements now entered upon for the safety of the Bolan Pass traffic, he would make them in accordance with Plan No. 3 in concert and communication with Major Sandeman.

(Seal) of MIR KHODADAD KHAN,
Khan of Khelat.
(Signed) R. G. SANDEMAN.

Signed and sealed by the Khan of Khelat and
Major Sandeman, in presence of Sirdars
Imam Buksh Khan, Jamal Khan, Wakeel
Mahomed Khan, Mustoufi Fakir Mahomed
and Naib Peer Jan.
R. G. Sandeman, Major,
Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

No. 110.

Khelat diary for the week ending 14th July 1876.

1. 8th July.—To-day the statement of Rahmatulla, a sepoy of the 1st Belooch Regiment, now stationed at Kurrachee, received from Colonel Munro along with Commissioner in Sind's No. 389, dated 30th May 1876, was inquired into. Mir Jam Ali declared that he knew nothing of the sepoy or his story; neither did any of his people.

A letter was received from Sirdar Muhammad Khan, brother of the Seebee Chief, Sirdar Sher Zaman Khan; it reported the death of the latter the result of an accident. A reply was sent to Sirdar Muhammad Khan condoling with him on the death of his brother, and expressing a hope that he would succeed to the Chieftainship without trouble.

To-day 15 camels carrying supplies for the escort, and a kafila of 40 camels arrived from Jacobabad. Another kafila from Quetta and Mustung started to go viâ the Bolan Pass to Jacobabad.

In compliance with Commissioner and Superintendent's No. 248, dated 28th ultimo, and its enclosures, a letter was sent to his Highness the Khan conveying to him the acknowledgments of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council for the aid rendered by his servants during the late outbreak of cholera.

The Sarawan Sirdars visited his Highness the Khan and complained that Naib Faiz Muhammad of Mustung had taken possession during the late disturbances of lands the property of the Brahooees, and they asked his Highness to restore them. The Khan in reply said that if the Naib had appropriated lands in the way complained of they should

certainly be returned. His Highness appointed a Committee composed of the following members to inquire into these complaints :—

On the part of the Khelat Government	Wakil Nawab Muhammad Khan. Mustaufi Fakir Muhammad. Mulla Abdulla Jan.
On the part of the Sirdars	Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan, and Moolla Mahomed of Sarawan.

2. 9th July.—The Committee named above assembled at Major Sandeman's camp and sat all day inquiring into the various disputes brought before it. It was arranged that the proceedings should be recorded in the vernacular by the Superintendent of the Deputy Commissioner's Office, Munshi Hittu Ram.

3. 10th July.—To-day the Committee again assembled and recorded an opinion in each case. A large number of disputes were settled. The records of the different cases were at the close of the day's proceedings submitted to his Highness the Khan for approval and confirmation.

His Highness the Khan returned the vernacular proceedings submitted to him yesterday. He had approved and confirmed them, and had affixed his seal to each recorded decision of the Committee.

Mir Jam Ali and the Jalawan Sirdars waited on the Khan and asked his Highness to recognise Sirdar Gohar Khan as Sirdar of Zehri in room of the late Sirdar Taj Mahomed. His Highness agreed to the request, and said he also approved of the election of Sirdar Shakar Khan in room of his father, the late Noordeen, and would recognise these two Sirdars publicly in Durbar according to State custom, bestowing on them the usual khillut and dress of honour given on such occasions to newly elected Sirdars by the Khans of Khelat.

To the request of Mir Ibrahim Khan, referred to in last week's diary, that his Highness would visit him at his camp and condole with him on account of the death of Sirdar Noordeen, the Khan replied that on the present occasion and under present circumstances he could not visit Sirdar Ibrahim Khan in camp, but would during the cold weather, when the Sirdars would be in Kutchi, take a fitting opportunity of complying with the Sirdar's request.

His Highness then directed the Jalawan Sirdars to bring any complaints they had against his Government before the Committee who had disposed of the Sarawan complaints, and on their doing so he promised them redress if their grievances were well founded.

His Highness requested the Committee to re-assemble next day at Major Sandeman's camp.

4. 11th July.—The Committee assembled this morning at an early hour, and Mir Jam Ali and the Jalawan Sirdars brought forward the grievances and complaints they had to make against the Khelat Government. These were 34 in number, and the Committee most carefully and patiently inquired into them, recording an opinion on each case. Out of the 34 cases his Highness the Khan, on the list being submitted to him, confirmed and approved of the opinion of the Committee as recorded on 31 of them. He dismissed two complaints altogether, and one brought by Mir Jam Ali about the Kamal Khan estate he desired should be allowed to stand over until orders were received about Jam Mir Khan, who could on his release from confinement, if he so desired it, refer the dispute to the British Government for decision.

To-day in accordance with agreement, his Highness the Khan issued orders for the release of the ex-Wuzeer Atta Mahomed Khan's family, including the brother of the Wuzree, the late Shahgassee Ali Jan. The female slaves of the ex-Wuzeer were also allowed by the Khan to accompany his family from Khelat. His Highness requested Major Sandeman to permit the ex-Wuzeer to go into British territory. To this Major Sandeman agreed, conditionally on the Khan providing for the subsistence of the ex-Wuzeer and his family. The Khan agreed to do so for the present.

To-day his Highness the Khan released several Samalani Mingul prisoners who had been put in prison by him at Dadar and Khelat for taking part in the late attacks on kafilas in the Bolan Pass.

5. 12th July.—Major Sandeman visited his Highness the Khan to consult with him about the reception of his Highness and all his Sirdars at a final Durbar, at which the terms of peace arranged between them were to be declared. The 13th July was fixed by his Highness, and it was arranged that the Durbar should take place in Major

Sandeman's camp. The Durbar programme to be observed during the proceedings was then drawn up. A copy is attached to this diary.

6. 13th July.—To-day at 5 in the afternoon Major Sandeman held a Durbar for the reception of his Highness the Khan and the Sirdars of Sarawan and Jalawan. The European officers of the escort were invited to attend. Those who attended were Captains Humfrey, Reynolds, Gordon, Scott, and Shepherd, Lieutenants Harrison and Alexander, and Surgeon MacRury.

His Highness arrived at the appointed hour, and was received as he dismounted from his horse by Captain Wylie; the guard of honour of 100 men of the 30th Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles) saluted him. On his arrival at the entrance to the Durbar tent Major Sandeman met him and conducted his Highness to his seat. On his Highness' right sat Captain Wylie, Dr. Duke, and Captain Shepherd. On his left sat Major Sandeman, Captains Humfrey and Reynolds, Dr. MacRury and the other European officers present. The Native Durbaris were arranged in two lines and sat on the carpet. To the right of his Highness sat Mirs Karam Khan and Gohar Khan, his Highness' nephews, Mulla Abdul Rahman, Mustaufi Fakir Muhammad, and others in attendance at his Highness' Court. On the left of the line were seated Mir Jam Ali, Mir Asad Khan, Mir Gohar Khan, Mir Ibrahim Khan, Wuderas Shadi Khan, and Muhammad Said Khan, Sirdars Alladina Koord, Chakar Khan, Mohiem Khan, Imam Buksh Khan, Jamal Khan, Moolla Mahomed Khan, and many others. When all were seated the Durbar was opened by Major Sandeman reading in English, after permission had been obtained from his Highness the Khan, the Durbar programme. He then addressed his Highness and the Durbar in Hindustani, explaining the programme and the procedure that his Highness the Khan had observed in arranging his differences with the assembled Sirdars of Jalawan and Sarawan. Major Sandeman told the Durbar that directly after his Highness arrived at Mustung he had summoned his Sirdars and had appointed a Committee to inquire into their grievances, the result being that he (Major Sandeman) had been able most successfully to mediate between the two factions whose differences had for years distracted the Khelat State. He complimented his Highness the Khan on the way he had acted during the negotiations, and for having restored to his Sirdars and Chiefs their lands, ancient rights, and privileges. His Highness in reply said that he himself, his country, and people were the property of the British Government; that he was greatly indebted to the Government for sending Major Sandeman to advise with him regarding the settlement of the Khelat State; that he felt greatly indebted for all that had been done for him, and that he would use his utmost endeavours for the future to preserve the peace of the country now established. He hoped the Sirdars would continue to deserve his kindness and favour; and did they do so, they might rely on his maintaining them in their ancient rights and privileges.

Mir Jam Ali Khan and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed on behalf of the Sirdars replied to his Highness. They assured him they would be loyal and true to him; that they trusted to deserve his favour and kindness, and would in every way attend to the rules and precedents necessary to be observed by all the Sirdars of the Khelat State in their dealings with their Khan.

The settlement papers, containing the decision of his Highness on each dispute, were then introduced and placed before him on a chair in the Durbar. The Koran was placed with them.

Lala Hittu Ram, the Superintendent of the Deputy Commissioner's Office, then read the following papers, which are written in Persian.

First, the paper containing the terms on which peace had been agreed to and to which his Highness the Khan and the Sirdars of Sarawan and Jalawan had affixed their seals.

The petition of the Sirdars of Jalawan and Sarawan asking his Highness the Khan to obtain the release of the Jam of Lus Beyla, Jam Mir Khan.

The Khan's letter to Major Sandeman asking that officer to submit the petition to the [illegible]rnment of India for favourable consideration.

[illegible] this the contents of the other papers were notified to the Durbar.

[illegible]andeman, after pointing to the Koran and remarking on the solemnity of the [illegible]ed his Highness the Khan if he agreed to the contents of the papers on the [illegible], and whether he was willing to be bound in his dealings with his Sirdars [illegible]. His Highness cordially replied that he was quite willing to be bound [illegible]d that by the grace of God he would fulfil their conditions.

[illegible]ked a similar question and they all responded in the affirmative, [illegible]ily and in a loud tone, a few not quite so heartily. A salute of 19

guns was then fired from a hill, a short distance off, overlooking the Durbar tent, on which the two mountain guns had been stationed for the purpose.

The Khan of Khelat's band, which was in attendance, afterwards played a lively tune, during which the khilluts were introduced into the Durbar tent. To Mir Jam Ali his Highness the Khan presented 1 handsome lungi, 1 thân kinkab, 1 thân of white cloth, 1 horse, and Rs. 100 in cash.

Khilluts were also presented by his Highness, of nearly the same value, to Mir Asad Khan, Sirdar Gohar Khan, Zehri, and to Mir Ibrahim Khan for his nephew, the son of the late Noordeen.

On presenting the khilluts his Highness placed the lungi around the person of each Sirdar, who on accepting it kissed his hand and touched his feet. They made very submissive speeches, telling his Highness in a loud voice that they were his subjects and slaves and he could rely on their loyalty. His Highness throughout the Durbar seemed highly delighted, and expressed great satisfaction with the conduct of the Sirdars in the way they addressed him. A little sensation was caused by Mir Ibrahim Khan, the brother of the late Noordeen, who on being told to receive the khillut set aside for him said he could not do so, as he was not the Sirdar of the Minguls but merely the representative of his young nephew, Sirdar Shakar Khan, but he would take it in trust for him.

His Highness having signified his assent to this, the khillut was made over to the Sirdar for his nephew. The Sirdars present then congratulated those who had received khilluts and who had been recognized by his Highness as the Sirdars of their tribes. His Highness also did so.

After this Major Sandeman presented khilluts (in the name of the British Government for services rendered to him on the present occasion) to the following Mirs and officials of the Khelat State.

To the Khan's two nephews, Mirs Karam Khan and Gohur Khan, each 1 choga, 1 handsome lungi, and 2 thâns of white cloth.

Wakil Nawab Muhammad Khan, Mustaufi Fakir Muhammad, Mulla Abdulla Jan, and Naib Pir Jan, each received 1 choga, 1 lungi, and 1 thân of white cloth.

This closed the proceedings. The Khan of Khelat and all the Sirdars then raised their hands in prayer to God and said the "Fatia," which is considered equivalent to the most solemn oath a Muhamadan can take, and which is said on all such occasions and ceremonies as the one they had just taken part in.

Before the Durbar broke up Mir Jam Ali Khan rose, and on the part of all the Sirdars of Sarawan and Jalawan presented Major Sandeman with a paper containing an address thanking him for the manner in which he had mediated between them and his Highness the Khan. A translation of this address is attached to this diary. The Durbar broke up by his Highness the Khan taking his leave.

7. 14th July.—Mirs Jam Ali, Gohar Khan, Ibrahim Khan, and the other Jalawan Sirdars visited Major Sandeman on their way to pay their respects to his Highness the Khan. The conduct of Mir Ibrahim Khan at the Durbar in regard to (his?) khillut was discussed. All said that Mir Ibrahim Khan acted according to custom, and as they were then on their way to his Highness' Durbar, they would tell him of the present conversation regarding it, and were certain his Highness would agree that under the circumstances Mir Ibrahim Khan had acted perfectly right.

(Signed.) R. G. SANDEMAN, Major,
Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

No. 149, dated Camp Mustung, 16th July 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

Enclosure No. 1 in 110.

Durbar Programme.

To be observed on the 13th July 1876 at the reception of His Highness the Khan of Khelat, Mir Jam Ali of Lus Beyla, and the Sarawan and Jalawan Sirdars on the occasion of the terms of peace agreed to being publicly proclaimed.

1. Major Sandeman will address the Durbar and announce the manner in which the mediation between the contending sides was effected by him.

His Highness the Khan of Khelat will reply and announce that he has acknowledged the election of Sirdar Gohar Khan by the tribe as Sirdar of Zehri in room of the late Sirdar Taj Mahomed.

2. That he recognises Mir Shakar Khan, son of the late Sirdar Noordeen, as the Sirdar of the Minguls. Mir Ibrahim Khan to act for him until he is of age.

3. That at the request of Mir Jam Ali and the Sarawan and Jalawan Sirdars as contained in their petition to his Highness, he has written a letter to Major Sandeman asking that officer to forward it and the afore-mentioned petition to Government, with a view to obtaining the release from confinement of Mir Khan, Jam of Lus Beyla.

4. That the Sirdars will meet with every consideration and kindness from his Highness as the ruler of the country, provided they hold to the terms of their agreement as entered in the settlement papers to which he as well as they themselves have affixed their seals.

Mir Jam Ali and Sirdar Moolla Mahomed of Sarawan on behalf of the Sirdars will reply to his Highness the Khan's address and announce that they accept the terms of peace, and will for the future respect the laws and customs of the Khelat State and be bound by the conditions entered in the settlement papers named above.

The Superintendent of the Deputy Commissioner's Office, Hittu Ram, will then produce the papers containing the terms agreed upon by the two sides. Major Sandeman will ask his Highness the Khan if he agrees to the terms contained in the papers now laid before him and to which he has affixed his seal. The papers are—

1st. The paper containing the conditions on which his Highness agreed to make peace with Mir Khan of Lus Beyla and the Sirdars of Jalawan and Sarawan;

2nd. The Agreement for the protection of the Bolan Pass;

3rd. The settlement papers prepared by Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan, Jamal Khan, Wakil Muhammad Khan, Mustaufi Fakir Muhammad, and Mulla Abdulla Jan, containing their decision, approved and confirmed by the Khan and accepted by the Sirdars of Sarawan and Jalawan, regarding the complaints and grievances brought by the Sirdars and their tribes against the Khelat Government.

On receiving his Highness' reply in the affirmative, a similar question will be asked the Sirdars. On their also answering in the affirmative, a salute of 19 guns will be fired to announce that peace has taken place between the Khelat Government and Mir Jam Ali and the Sarawan and Jalawan Sirdars.

His Highness the Khan will then present, in accordance with ancient custom, a khillut and dresses of honour to the following Sirdars :—

Mir Jam Ali of Lus Beyla.

Sirdar Asad Khan, eldest son of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed of Sarawan; since 1872 he has held the position of Sirdar of the Sarawans.

Sirdar Gohar Khan of Zehri.

Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, Chief of the Minguls.

Major Sandeman, in the name of the British Government, will present the following officials of the Khelat Government with suitable khilluts in recognition of their services on the present occasion :—

Wakil Muhammad Khan.
Mustaufi Fakir Muhammad.
Naib Per Jan.
Mulla Abdulla Jan.

[redacted]ss will then take his leave and the Durbar will be closed.

(Signed) R. G. SANDEMAN, Major,
Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Enclosure 2 in No. 110.

Translation of a letter from Sirdars of Beloochistan to Major R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, dated 13th July 1876.

We, the Sirdars of Beloochistan, Sarawans and Jalawans, now present in Durbar at Mustung by order of Major Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan, desire to express our thanks to the British Government. Our reasons for thankfulness are these: Our country was in a distracted state; peace seemed impossible, and in consequence the Sirdars and Chiefs left the plain country and took to the hills. One result of such a state of things is that the Jam of Lus Beyla has now been in confinement in British Territory for eight years. But by the good management and sound judgment of Major Sandeman we trust that the release of the Jam from confinement may be obtained. We are all greatly indebted to the British Government for having given their kind attention to the state of this country and by their deputing Major Sandeman, who is an officer of wisdom, good temper, and sound judgment, to arrange our affairs and to restore peace to us. The said officer has by good management characteristic of him settled our differences with the Khelat Government in a most satisfactory way, and this is testified to by the Khan, ourselves, and Major Sandeman, being all present together to-day in this Durbar.

His Highness the Khan has also been kind to us, and has shown favour to us by restoring our ancient privileges and rights. His Highness has also on our joint petition to him been good enough to recommend the British Government to release Jam Mir Khan, and this act of his Highness has caused us to feel gratitude to him. One thing we regret, and that is that Jam Mir Khan could not be in to-day's Durbar, but we feel certain that through the recommendation of Major Sandeman and the kindness of the Government Jam Mir Khan will soon be able to attend similar Durbars. Finally, we trust that through the good management of Major Sandeman the peace now established may be a lasting one, and thus enable cultivation and the prosperity of the people to increase daily.

(Seals of) Mir Jam Ali of Lus Beyla and of the Sirdars Gohar Khan Zehri, Ibrahim Khan Mingul, Moolla Mahomed of Sarawan, Asad Khan, son of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Said Khan, Junda Khan Shahwani, Chakar Khan Jattak, Mohiem Khan Gurgnari, Kadir Buksh, Rahman Khan of Noshki, Alladina Koord, Alam Khan Rashkani, Shadi Khan Bungulzai, Sohrab Khan Lehri, Saleh Muhammad Musiani, and Fateh Khan Lotiani.

No. 111.

No. 1700P., dated Simla, 24th July 1876.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, on special duty, Dera Ismail Khan.

I have received and laid before the Governor-General in Council your letter No. 244, dated 30th June 1876, with enclosed reports from Major Sandeman.

2. The Governor-General in Council will defer passing orders on the various points mentioned in this correspondence pending submission by Major Sandeman of a final report on the results of his mission.

3. His Excellency in Council, however, observes that in the memorandum presented by the Khan of Khelat to Major Sandeman on 6th June 1876, his Highness demands that the British Government should compensate the Candahar merchants plundered by the Jalawans in the Mulla and other Passes. And it appears from Major Sandeman's marginal note on the memorandum, as also from paragraph 15 of his letter to you, No. 122, dated 14th June 1876, that he is disposed to view this demand in a favourable light.

4. The Governor-General in Council desires to receive from Major Sandeman at an early date more precise information showing—

(1.) The caravans on account of which compensation is claimed;
(2.) The time and place at which the caravans were plundered;
(3.) The persons by whom the caravans were plundered;
(4.) The loss estimated by the owners;
(5.) The compensation, if any, paid up to date, and by whom paid;
(6.) The balance fairly due;

(7.) A brief statement of the grounds on which the Khan claims compensation from the British Government.

5. In submitting the above particulars Major Sandeman should confine himself to a statement of ascertained facts, and should avoid an expression of his own views as to the course which the Governor-General in Council ought to adopt in this matter.

No. 112.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 21st July 1876.

1. 15th July.—The Sirdars of Sarawan and Jalawan, including Mir Jam Ali, petitioned the Khan to the effect that as his Highness had confirmed the opinions of the Committee in the different cases brought before it by them and had affixed his seal to these, he would be good enough to grant them fresh sunnuds and issue orders to the Naibs and other officials of the khanate telling them of the decision of his Highness, and that for the future the lands granted under the new sunnuds were on no account to be interfered with. His Highness gave a most favourable reply, and issued orders to his officials in accordance with the request of the Sirdars. His Highness also directed that a fresh sunnud was to be granted for each plot of land which had been restored according to his own order. This was done, and sunnuds were drawn up and sealed by his Highness as quickly as the writer could prepare them.

The Sirdars of Jalawan and Sarawan submitted another request to the Khan, viz., that as his Highness had recognized Mir Gohur Khan as the Zehri Sirdar in room of the late Sirdar Taj Mahomed, and the family lands had been restored to him, the whole of the Sirdars in consultation had decided that Mir Gohur Khan should yearly pay to the family of the deceased Sirdar Rupees 1,200 in cash and 24 kharwars of grain. His Highness, in reply, expressed his entire satisfaction with the arrangement, and sent the petition of the Sirdars, with his reply to this effect, to Major Sandeman for information. These papers were placed with the vernacular file for record.

To-day his Highness issued orders to the Officer Commanding at Khelat to aid Mir Jam Ali with supplies, &c., during his return journey to Lus Beyla.

Mir Jam Ali asked his Highness the Khan to release certain Jamote prisoners, his subjects, who were surrendered to the late Wuzeer Atta Mahomed Khan on account of it being believed that they were concerned in the plunder of kafilas. Mir Jam Ali had surrendered them at the Wuzeer's request, but when doing so had protested, as he did not believe in their guilt. His Highness, in reply, agreed to release them, provided that Mir Jam Ali held himself personally responsible for them, and would again surrender them at any future time should it appear they were actually concerned in the plunder of the afore-mentioned kafilas. Mir Jam Ali consented to this, and wrote a security bond agreeing to be responsible for the future acts of these men, and that he would deliver them up if called upon to do so. His Highness then issued orders for the release of the foliowing Jamotis, and they were at once made over to Mir Jam Ali, Jaman, Wali Muhammad, Mehu Wasaya, Mehu Wasaya Sani, Alladad, Nathu, Balich and Tib.

The District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee, in paragraph 3 of his No. 141, dated 18th February 1876, received from Colonel Munro, reported that "certain Jamote "prisoners who were concerned in the attack and the loot of the kafilas near our "frontier in 1872–73, and who were captured and taken to Khelat by Wuzeer Atta "Mahomed when he was down here with a force in April last, have lately returned "to their homes. These men were released about the time Noordeen was murdered or "a little before, and have spread reports that they have been told by the Khan and his "Ministers to return to their old work of looting kafilas, committing robberies, and "creating disturbances of all kinds on the frontier; and that the more they do in this "line, the better," &c.; Major Sandeman inquired of Mir Jam Ali regarding this. In reply, the Jam said that a few men had been released by his Highness, but they were sent to see if they could recover any part of the plunder taken from the kafilas. The others had now been released at his (Jam Ali's) request, as reported above. He did not believe they were guilty, and he had originally surrendered these men as pressure had been brought to bear on him, and he could not refuse to do so. He had held himself reponsible for their future good conduct, &c.

Inquiry was made by Major Sandeman into the report of the District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee, forwarding that of the Kotwal of Khuslan Thana, Yara Khan, regarding

the conduct of Saheb Khan Choota and Jan Muhammad, his brother, sent by Colonel Munro for Major Sandeman's information. His Highness the Khan and Mir Jam Ali were quite agreed as to the reasons which had led to the quarrel between the two brothers causing the present distracted state of the Kurrachee Police frontier.

His Highness the Khan stated that Saheb Khan is the Sirdar of the Chootas, but that he had deposed him, and placed his younger brother Jan Muhammad as Chief of the tribe; that Saheb Khan was an Inspector of Police on the Kurrachee frontier, and had fought with his younger brother for years; that he would not be guided by his Highness the Khan's advice, and that it was unfortunate his employment in the Kurrachee Police, as he was in opposition to his Highness; that if he took service with the British, it was only right he should permit his brother Jan Muhammad to manage the tribe. Mir Jam Ali agreed to this explanation, saying that one reason the Khan was angry with Saheb Khan was because he was a friend of his (Jam Ali's), but that now his quarrel with the Khan was settled, the proper plan was to send for Saheb Khan and Jan Muhammad to Khelat, and for his Highness to arrange the dispute. Major Sandeman decided to make a special reference regarding this quarrel to the Commissioner, Colonel Munro, as his Highness and Jam Ali were both of opinion that this portion of the Lus Beyla, Khelat, and Kurrachee frontiers could not be at peace until the quarrel between these two brothers was settled. The Jamotis, who are subjects of Lus Beyla, sided with Saheb Khan against his brother Jan Muhammad, and both his Highness and Mir Jam Ali expressed a strong desire that Major Sandeman should take up the case in concert with the Khan and dispose of it.

This matter will receive attention.—A. A. MUNRO.

To-day the escort of Punjab and Sind troops paraded for the inspection of his Highness the Khan. Punctually at 5 a.m. the Khan of Khelat, attended by Major Sandeman and the Sirdars of Jalawan and Sarawan and by Mir Jam Ali and his Chiefs, arrived on the ground.

The escort was drawn up in line, and received his Highness the Khan with a general salute. Afterwards the troops marched past in quick time. The infantry then returned to their quarters. The cavalry, after trotting and galloping past, wheeled into line, and concluded the parade by a general charge in the direction of his Highness the Khan.

Major Sandeman after the parade escorted his Highness back to the "Miri" or Palace, and received the Khan's repeated thanks for the pleasure the parade had afforded him.

In the afternoon the European and Native officers of the Sind and Punjab Cavalry forming part of the escort entertained his Highness with 'nezabazi,' cutting the orange, and other cavalry sports. The preparations for the entertainment were under the direction of Captain Reynolds, Commanding 3rd Sind Horse, and the Native officers of his regiment. His Highness arrived about 5 in the afternoon and was received with proper ceremony. His Highness and his courtiers were conducted to a tent prepared for their reception, and the games were at once commenced. During them the Native officers of the 3rd Sind Horse served his Highness and the Native gentlemen of his Court with refreshments. His Highness was greatly delighted with the entertainment, which reflected the greatest credit on Captain Reynolds and his officers for the excellence of the arrangements. It was a perfect success throughout, and his Highness, when taking his leave, asked permission to present the Cavalry sowars who competed before him with Rupees 100. Permission having been given, his Highness took his leave and was escorted to his Palace by Major Sandeman.

2. 16th July.—Mir Jam Ali and the Jalawan Sirdars left Mustung to-day to return to their homes. His Highness finished signing the new sunnuds and issued a parwana directing the Naib of Dadar to pay for the future Sirdar Moolla Mohamed of Sarawan one seventh of the kafila fees levied on caravans passing through the Bolan Pass. This order was issued in accordance with the decision of the Committee already referred to.

3. 17th July.—To-day Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan waited on his Highness the Khan to take their leave of him, as they had permission from Major Sandeman to return to the Punjab. They informed his Highness that Major Sandeman had directed them to discuss with him the settlement of the quarrel of the Murree clan with his Highness' Government. This was done, and finally it was arranged that his Highness should make peace with the Murris. In pursuance of this decision, his Highness wrote a letter to Sirdar Ghuran Khan, the Murree Tomandar, which he made over to Sirdar Imam Buksh for delivery, offering terms of peace to the Murrees, and asking the Sirdar and his headmen to meet him (the Khan) in Kutchi in the cold weather. The two Sirdars named above on taking their leave asked his Highness the Khan to

grant them a favour. On being told to name it, they asked his Highness to remit Rupees 3,000 revenue due by Dur Muhammad Jamali Lughari, residing at Rojhan in Kutchi. They asked this favour as the Jamalis were hard pressed for money, and the inundation had entirely destroyed their crops. It appeared that the Revenue authorities of Jacobabad had for similar reasons remitted the revenue on neighbouring lands in British territory. After consideration his Highness was pleased to grant the request of the Sirdars, and then and there issued orders to the Naib of Nasirabad to make the remission of revenue applied for.

His Highness the Khan proposed to leave Mustung for Khelat on the 18th instant, and sent his Wakil Nawab Muhammad Khan to Major Sandeman to ask that officer to accompany him. The latter agreed to accompany his Highness to Khelat, and arranged to take with him—

100 Sabres, 3rd Sind Horse.
100 Sabres, 4th Punjab Cavalry.
Detachment, 4th Sikh Infantry.

The remainder of the escort was to march for Khelat on the 20th instant under command of Captain Humfrey.

4. 18th July.—Sirdar Alladina Koord, accompanied by Til Khan and Nubbee Buksh, the headmen of Kirta, a ruined village in the Bolan Pass, who were summoned by his Highness the Khan (see diary for the week ending 19th June 1876) arrived in camp. In the morning they paid their respects to his Highness the Khan, who received them very kindly. His Highness told Til Khan and Nubbee Buksh that they had his full permission to re-occupy Kirta. It was arranged that Sirdar Alladina should also for the present remove with his tribe to Kirta. They asked help to rebuild their village. It was arranged that Major Sandeman should be consulted on the subject, and that his Highness and that officer in consultation on their arrival at Khelat should make some suitable arrangement regarding this.

In the afternoon Sirdar Alladina visited Major Sandeman, and submitted to him a list of the men who were to occupy Kirta and Abigam. It was placed with the vernacular file. The Sirdar urged on Major Sandeman that help should be given to rebuild the village of Kirta, as his sons-in-law Til Khan and Nubbee Buksh were very poor. Major Sandeman, in reply, promised on arrival in Khelat to consult the Khan on the subject, and assured the Sirdar that suitable help would be given.

To-day the Brahooee Sirdars assembled at Major Sandeman's camp to settle a dispute that existed between the Bungulzai Brahooees and the Koords. It was settled without much difficulty, and the terms recorded in the vernacular and placed with the vernacular file.

Under the provisions of Government of India Resolution No. 2812, dated 16th October 1875, the balance of Rupees 66,960, sanctioned in accordance with the recommendation of the Mittunkote Conference in 1869, was placed at Major Sandeman's disposal for the pay of the tribes residing in and near the Bolan Pass, and for employing them in the protection of that pass and of Kutchi.

The balance referred to at Major Sandeman's disposal amounted annually to Rupees 26,520. It has been arranged that of this sum, the Koords, Dumars, and Minguls under Sirdars Moolla Mohamed and Alladina receive Rupees 18,000 yearly, keeping at Kirta and Abigam 120 men under their Mokuddums always on duty; Rupees 8,400 will yearly be paid to the Southern Murrees, who havesince the mission entered the country kept 30 sowars on duty at Mundai. For nine months Sirdar Ghuzzan Khan has faithfully kept to his promise to prevent, in as far as he had the power, raiding in Kutchi or the Bolan Pass. The Khan of Khelat admits that he has done well, and in consequence his Highness has agreed to make peace with the tribe. His Highness has deputed Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan, as already stated, to try and arrange it, and Major Sandeman has directed them to endeavour to consolidate the present arrangements.

18th July.—This afternoon his Highness the Khan of Khelat under a salute of 19 guns left Mustung for Amanala, a distance of nine miles, en route for Khelat. He was accompanied by Major Sandeman and escort. His Highness had with him about 700 of his own troops. The European officers with the troops which accompanied Major Sandeman are Captain Gordon and Lieutenant Alexander, 3rd Sind Horse; Captain Shepherd, 4th Punjab Cavalry; Captain Scott, 4th Sikh Infantry; and Captain Wylie and Dr. Duke, the two latter on special duty with Major Sandeman.

5. 19th July.—To-day his Highness and *cortége*, accompanied by Major Sandeman and escort, arrived at Mungucher, distant 24 miles from Amanala. The village and

lands here are the property of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed of Sarawan. It is a rent-free village, although a few of the lands pay in kind to his Highness the Khan. The people inhabiting the valley are mostly Langaws, and are the agriculturalists. A few Lehris (Brahooees) keep camels, and live by breeding them and hiring them to traders, &c. The ravages caused by civil war were very apparent here. Many of the small hamlets were in ruins, and the karezes (water-courses) had been allowed to fall out of repair.

6. 20th July.—Arrived at Zearut, a distance of 19 miles from Mungucher and 10 from Khelat. Here it was arranged, on account of a sharp fall of rain, that the Khan should halt till the afternoon of the following day, when his Highness would march for Khelat, making the entry into his capital in state.

7. 21st July.—In the afternoon, at 3 p.m., Major Sandeman proceeded to his Highness' camp, and was received by his Highness, who at once mounted and joined Major Sandeman. It had been previously settled that the following arrangements should be observed on the occasion of his Highness' entering Khelat. On his Highness leaving his camp, accompanied by Major Sandeman, the escort of British troops on his Highness' arrival on the ground would receive him in line with a general salute. They would then form column, and his Highness and Major Sandeman would place themselves at their head and march for Khelat. His Highness' troops were directed to join the column by placing themselves in the rear of it.

On arrival about half a mile from Khelat the Khan's troops in garrison there, consisting of cavalry, artillery, and infantry to the number of 1,200 men and two bands, received the Khan's *cortége* with salvoes of artillery. A salute was first fired in honour of the British troops accompanying his Highness, a second was fired in honour of Major Sandeman, and a third in honour of his Highness the Khan.

The Khan's son, Mir Muhammad Khan, a youth of 13 years of age, handsomely dressed, was on horseback in command of the Khelat troops.

On the Khan's approach Mir Muhammad Khan dismounted, and so did all the principal officers, and received his Highness with a general salute, the two bands striking up a lively air. Mir Muhammad Khan conducted his duties with perfect gravity and coolness, but at the close of the salute, before returning his sword to its scabbard, he with a very happy look rushed to salute his father. The Khan at once pointed out to him that his sword was in his hand unsheathed. Mir Muhammad Khan quickly recognised his mistake, returned to his place, sheathed his sword, and then proceeded to embrace his father and pay his respects to Major Sandeman. Three other sons of the Khan, Mirs Shah Newaz Khan, Brahim Khan, and Azam Khan, all pretty interesting children, were then brought to visit his Highness, one or two riding before their attendants on horseback, and the others on riding camels. On arrival near to where the Khan was, they saluted him and welcomed him back to Khelat. The sight was both impressive and interesting. After the reception of the young Khelat Mirs, his Highness proceeded towards his palace, his two bands playing in front of him. Major Sandeman accompanied him as far as the road leading to the main entrance to Khelat, and then took leave of his Highness.

No. 164, dated Camp Khelat, 24th July 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty.

No. 113.

No. 267, dated 25th July 1876.

From Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In forwarding the enclosed letter, No. 146 of the 13th instant, from Major Sandeman, representing how he proposes to utilise the services of a portion of the Belooch guide horsemen (placed at his disposal in accordance with paragraph 15 of the Government of

India Resolution quoted by him) in connexion with the arrangements for keeping the Bolan Pass open for traffic as lately reported, I have the honour to state that I have received no official intimation that the orders contained in the paragraph quoted by Major Sandeman, by which the services of these Belooch Guides were made available for purposes connected with his deputation to Khelat, have been recently altered or withdrawn.

2. Major Sandeman's references, which are not very precise, seem to point to the issue of orders through some other department placing the services of the mounted Belooch Guides primarily at disposal of the military authorities on the Northern Sind Frontier. I therefore submit his representations on the subject for consideration and orders.

Enclosure 1 in No. 113.

No. 146, dated Camp Mustung, 13th July 1876.

From Major R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty.

I have the honour to draw your attention to the remarks contained in the Khelat diary for the week ending 7th July on the subject of the transfer of the Belooch Guides primarily from the Political to the Military Department. The employment of these men, for reasons I shall set forth in this letter, is a matter of great importance, and on it in a measure the success of my arrangements for the protection of Kutchi and the kafila route viâ the Bolan depends.

2. In pursuance of Government of India Resolution No. 671 A.P., dated Fort William, the 14th March 1876, paragraph 15, which states: "His Excellency in Council further "desires, with reference to paragraph 52 of Colonel Munro's report, that the services of "the mounted police maintained in Sind districts under the designation of Belooch Guides "be made available, or placed under the orders of the officer in charge of our political "relations with Khelat," 150 of these men were placed at my disposal, and I have since employed them on political duty. I stationed 100 of them in Kutchi at the town of Haji-ka-Shahr.

3. But the constitution of this body of men is peculiar. They are chiefly Jakranis and Dhoombkees, a few being Kosaks and Boogtees. They were originally subjects of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and the Jakranis and Dhoombkees resided at Lehri in Kutchi, but were translated from thence to Sind after Sir Charles Napier's hill campaign, and taken into Government service. In Sind a few were employed as guides to the military posts, but their chief duty was in carrying the letter post, and accompanying officers when on tour in the district. They were, moreover, taken into our service for purely political reasons.

4. The translation of this large body of men from Kutchi to our own territory, although doubtless it had the desired effect of preventing their committing their depretions on our territory, weakened the defence of Kutchi in no ordinary degree. It permitted the Murrees to make determined raids on the Dhoombkees left in their ancestral village of Lehri, situated at the foot of the Murree Hills. Sirdar Sorab Khan, Chief of the tribe, only the other day complained to me bitterly of this, and asked my aid to enable him to protect his village and ancestral lands from Murree inroads.

5. My plan is this. I propose to station 150 instead of 100 of these men at the village of Haji-ka Shahr in Kutchi, to afford escorts to kafilas as far as Bagh. I will place with them a certain number of Murrees, and as the Belooch Guides have a large complement of native officers of rank and standing, one of them can take charge of the Murrees, in addition to his other duties, and see that they behave properly. This I can easily arrange. By doing so I will not only afford protection to kafilas passing through Kutchi, but at the same time I will to a great extent check Murree raids. It will also enable me in a great degree to protect the village of Lehri, and thus restore to that part of the country the protection the translation of these men from Khelat to British territory originally deprived it of.

6. Another party of these guides are stationed in the police thana of Gundui in the Boogtee Hills, situated from 30 to 40 miles beyond the British frontier. From every point of view it is desirable that these men should be under the officer in political charge of the Boogtee tribe. In short, after considering the matter fully to prevent a dual system of management of the tribes being again introduced, I am of opinion that as many of these

guides as can be spared should be permanently placed under the officer in political executive charge of Khelat affairs. The placing of the Jakranis and Dhoombkees in Kutchi in the way proposed in this letter I have discussed with his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and he considered the plan an excellent one, and one that would tend in no small degree to protect the Bolan trade route.

No. 114.

No. 269, dated 28th July 1876.

From Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L,, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 267 of the 25th instant, and its enclosure, to your address, I have the honour to intimate my having been advised since despatch of that letter that Major Sandeman's anticipations in regard to a probable deprivation of the services of Belooch Mounted Guides have been caused by an apparent misconstruction of the orders conveyed in your letter No. 1285 of the 30th May last.

2. Although it has been ruled that these guides shall be deemed to be primarily under the orders of the military authorities (through whom their pay is still drawn as before) until the issue of final orders by the Government of India regarding our future political relations with Khelat and the prospective management of the northern frontier of Sind, I am not aware that there is any present intention on the part of these authorities to deprive Major Sandeman of the services of those Biluch Guides who were placed at his disposal when leaving Jacobabad for Khelat.

No. 115.

No. 194C., dated Simla, 31st July 1876.

From Lepel Griffin, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my No. 162 C., dated 12th instant, forwarding a letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to the Lieutenant-Governor, I am directed to request that his Honour may be informed, when the matter has been considered by his Excellency the Governor-General, in what terms it is desired by the Government of India that he should reply to the Khan.

No. 116.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 31st July 1876.

23rd July.—A letter written by Wakil Nawab Muhammad Khan by order of his Highness was received giving an account of the murder of Raza Muhammad Rind at the hands of Golab Khan (son of Itbar Khan Rind, Guide Ressaldar), Mannu Pahle and Golam Bolak. Full particulars of this case were reported to Colonel Munro in this office No. 163 of 23rd July 1876.

A translation of District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee's letter, No. 445, dated 24th June, to the address of Colonel Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, submitting the reports of the Kurrachee Frontier Police, describing the conduct of Inspector Saheb Khan Choota was read out to his Highness the Khan during a visit he paid Major Sandeman. The reports stated that Saheb Khan had crossed the frontier with a party of his own police to fight his brother Jan Muhammad. The Khan stated that it was perfectly true what the reports described as having occurred; that Saheb Khan and Jan Muhammad were at feud; that he (the Khan) supported the latter, as Saheb Khan had openly defied the Khan's authority, but that his Highness would make peace between the brothers if Saheb Khan could be induced to visit Khelat. His Highness said that if Major Sandeman would summon him (Saheb Khan), he (the Khan) would give him

The District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee, has been requested to cause Saheb Khan's attendance at Khelat.—A. A. MUNRO.

a safe conduct, and would bring his brother to Khelat to meet him. This plan was arranged, and Major Sandeman sent a telegram to Colonel Munro, asking that officer to direct the attendance of Saheb Khan at Khelat. The Khan's safe conduct was sent to Mr. Bruce at Jacobabad for delivery to Saheb Khan.

Ressaldar Malguzar Khan commanding Guides at Haji-ka-Shahr, reported the arrival there of a caravan of 22 camels en route for Khorassan. Yar Muhammad, son of Alladina Koord, was ready to escort it through the Bolan Pass.

A petition was received from Mir Jam Ali, of Lus Beyla, reminding Major Sandeman that the British Government used to pay his father Mir Khan the sum of Rupees 15,000 annually on account of the telegraph line passing through his father's country. Of this sum, Rupees 7,320 was paid to the telegraph establishment, and the balance of Rupees 7,680 his father received. Since the apprehension of his father the Jam the personal allowance had been stopped. Jam Ali requested Major Sandeman to obtain the restoration of the allowance. In reply Major Sandeman wrote to Mir Jam Ali that his petition would be sent to the Commissioner, Colonel Munro, for favourable consideration, who will doubtless submit it to Government.

This forms the subject of a special reference to Government of India in the Foreign Department.—A. A. MUNRO.

2. 24th July.—Sirdar Gohur Khan, the Chief of Jalawan, sent a letter to Sirdar Asad Khan of Sarawan, now here in Khelat in attendance on his Highness the Khan, asking the Sirdar to obtain the release of Muhammad Mulla and Rahmat Brahooees, also of Dad Muhammad Kumbrani, now in confinement in Khelat. The Jalawan Sirdar wrote that his Highness the Khan had agreed at Mustung to release these men. Sirdar Asad Khan brought the letter of the Jalawan Sirdar to Major Sandeman, and asked him to advise him what to do. Major Sandeman advised the Sirdar to wait upon the Khan in Durbar, and respectfully remind his Highness of his promise, and ask for the release of the prisoners named in Sirdar Gohur Khan's letter. This advice Sirdar Asad Khan followed, and his Highness the Khan, on being asked, at once released the prisoners, who were sent to Sirdar Gohur Khan.

3. 26th July.—His Highness the Khan and Major Sandeman in consultation arranged to erect accommodation at Abigam and Kirta for the Koords, Minguls, and Murrees stationed there for the protection of the pass. Alladad, the brother-in-law of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, was appointed on Rupees 50 a month to aid Sirdar Moolla Mahomed in superintending the Bolan Pass arrangements and to register the trade passing to and fro. The appointment is a suitable one, as Alladad Khan is a man of influence and can read and write. It was made under the provisions of the Government of India Resolution No. 2819P., dated 16th October last, paragraph 27.

Jemadar Denar Khan of the Guides arrived in camp. His statement regarding the murder of Raza Muhammad by his brother Golab and five others was recorded. The Jemadar admitted that he had been to his home on leave in Sharan, where his elder brother resided. He was there for two months and returned to Haji-ka-Shahr on the 12th July. The murder of Raza Muhammad by his brother must have occurred soon after he left, as he got news of it on the 14th. His brother Golab Khan wrote him the news, saying he had killed Raza Muhammad out of revenge for the murder by him of Waidad Khan, &c. Major Sandeman on hearing Jemadar Denar's story of what had occurred was satisfied that there was a strong primâ facie case against him and suspended him from duty, pending further orders.

4. 28th July.—His Highness the Khan paid Major Sandeman his usual friendly visit. His Highness was accompanied by his three sons, Mirs Mahmud Khan, Shah Newaz Khan, and Azam Khan, and his usual retinue. Much conversation took place about the country known as the Shum plain, Watakri, Nussau, and Marunj, which extends for 100 miles along the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier, many acres of which are known to be of excellent quality, but which are lying uncultivated. Major Sandeman mentioned his proposals to his Highness for settling that part of the khanate, and of bringing it under cultivation, particularly stating that the help of one of his Highness' Commandants and a party of Khelat troops would be needed to hold the Shum plain. This remark was made purposely, as Major Sandeman was aware that the Commandants were both anxious as to their future prospects, and Major Sandeman wished them to know that although it was to be hoped there would be no longer service for them against the Brahooees and their followers, there was other important work before them. The Khan and his officials seemed much pleased and interested in Major Sandeman's proposals, and it was decided that the scheme in all its bearings should be discussed with the Murree Chiefs

when they and the Khan visited Kutchi in the cold weather. The Shum plain is connected with British territory by the Cachar Pass, through which an excellent road has been made. The distance from Harrand is about 45 miles. Were the Shum plain occupied from Khelat, the whole of that portion of the British and Khelat frontiers would be brought under cultivation, and real and lasting progress made in the settlement of the two borders. Major Sandeman has explored every portion of that part of the country, and knows that his proposals for its permanent settlement are simple and easy of execution. It would moreover make the Bolan Pass easily accessible, through an open country, from Harrand in the Punjab. The routes leading respectively from Harrand and Shikarpur join at Bagh in Kutchi, and the distances from the two places are about the same. Both routes have been traversed by Major Sandeman. The former has advantages the latter does not possess, but they would be of at least equal value were it ever necessary to send troops viâ the Bolan Pass to Shawlkot (Quetta), or to any other part of Khorassan.

5. 29th July.—Mussamut Hur Bibi, the mother-in-law of his Highness the Khan and mother of the late Sirdar Taj Muhammad, sent an agent to Major Sandeman to say she desired to have an interview with him. Her request was at once complied with, and she visited Major Sandeman, accompanied by her female attendants and one or two male followers. When all were seated she said she had two requests to make: 1st, she had since the death of her son Sirdar Taj Mahomed got into debt, and she desired the Sirdars to arrange her affairs in accordance with the custom of the country; 2nd, that Rupees 1,200 a year besides 24 kharwars of grain, which her son's successor Sirdar Gohur Khan had fixed in consultation with the other Sirdars at Mustung as her yearly allowance, was not sufficient for her support. After a great deal of conversation it was arranged that the question of the settlement of her debts should be brought before the Sirdars when they assembled in Kutchi in the cold weather. With reference to the yearly allowance being increased, as what is now given had been fixed by her own friends and relatives, Major Sandeman told Mussamut Hur Bibi that this matter could not be taken up by him, but that on suitable opportunity offering he would speak to Sirdar Gohur Khan regarding it.

6. 31st July.—To-day the Khan's Commanders Fakir Muhammad and Mosun Khan and Naibs Abdul Latif and Faiz Muhammad, by order of his Highness, paid their respects to Major Sandeman. A great deal of conversation regarding the nature of the peace recently established took place. It was of a satisfactory nature. Major Sandeman showed the party the map of Beloochistan and the large tracts of valuable country (especially on the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier, which skirted Khelat territory for 100 miles) that were lying empty and uncultivated. All present took an apparently great interest in what Major Sandeman explained to them. The two Naibs asked some questions as to their future dealings with the Sirdars and their tribes, and it was arranged that Major Sandeman should consult with the Khan and Sirdar Asad Khan of Sarawan on the point, and if possible draw up a few simple rules for guidance, which both sides would agree to abide by. Naib Abdul Latif of Quetta then requested that Sirdar Alladina, who was responsible for the Bolan Pass and the trade routes between Shawlkot and Dadar, should also arrange that the Dumar-Kakars should not attack kafilas after they left Shawlkot. He said the Dumars used to get an allowance of Rupees 30 yearly in cash and 10 kharwars of grain, and if Sirdar Alladina would arrange for the entire safety of the kafilas to the Afghan border, this allowance would be restored. Major Sandeman, in reply to the Naib, said it would be necessary, before agreeing to the proposal, for him to consult his Highness on the subject, but that some suitable arrangement would be come to. The Naib then said that if the Amir of Cabul would direct the Naib stationed at Peshin to work in concert with him (the Shawlkot Naib), great benefit would accrue. Major Sandeman said he would also consult with his Highness regarding this, and see what could be done to meet his (the Naib's) wishes. Major Sandeman when giving the two commanders and the Naibs leave presented them with suitable khillats.

Wakil Nawab Muhammad Khan brought for perusal a letter from Arbab Wali Muhammad, Rais Kasim, Rais Kushal, Faiz Muhammad, and Rais Mitha to the address of his Highness the Khan, congratulating him on the recent settlement of the affairs of the country, and on the peace established between his Highness and the Sirdars, and informing him that the zemindars of Kunda, Palall, and Bar-Shori in Kutchi had returned to their land and villages. Many other zemindars of Lehri, Chator, and Shahpur who had left their lands and villages on account of the civil war, and had settled on the Shahiwah Canal in the Sind Frontier District, had all returned to their lands, and were greatly rejoiced on account of the peace recently established.

His Highness the Khan sent Major Sandeman the following reply to his letter, referred to in diary for the week ending 14th July 1876, it is dated the 29th July and runs as follows :

"I have received your letter of the 12th Jamadi-ul-Sani 1293 (5th July 1876) informing me on the subject of the services of Naib Pir Jan and my other servants rendered to you in the Bolan Pass, and that you had brought the same to the notice of Colonel Munro, Commissioner, Derajat, who was greatly pleased at hearing of the same, and reported it to the Government of India. Your letter I have fully perused, and in reply have to say that all my servants, wherever they are stationed, have my instructions to render every aid to the British officers, and are ever on the alert to attend to their wishes and orders. I am very much pleased with Mulla Pir Jan and that he has done you good service. All is well."

No. 169, Camp Khelat, dated 6th August 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty.

Note.—The preparation of my final report delayed despatch of this diary.

(Signed) R. G. SANDEMAN.

No. 117.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 7th August 1876.

1. 1st August.—A report was received from the Officer Commanding Guides at Hajike-Shahur in Kutchi, intimating that the Naib of Bagh had sent a party of infantry stationed there under Captain Mir Baz Khan to demand the surrender of Golab, Mannu, and others by the Rhinds on account of the murder of Raza Muhammad Rind. The Khan on being shown the report sent orders to Abdul Aziz, the Naib, telling him he was not to fight until every other means had been tried to obtain the surrender of Golab and the others. That Ressaldar Itbar Khan, the father of Golab, was expected at Khelat shortly, when efforts would be made to get him and his son Jemadar Denar to settle the case according to custom of the country. If this could not be accomplished, then other and more serious steps would be taken to obtain the desired end, and the whole affair would be reported for the orders of the British Government.

Rules were drawn up for the guidance of the Sirdars and Naibs in the way stated in diary for the week ending 31st July. The Khan's Wakil Muhammad Khan and Sirdar Asad Khan of Sarawan approved of them. Afterwards they were submitted to his Highness the Khan, who was pleased to give his assent to them, and directed his Mustaufi Fakir Muhammad to send a copy to each Naib for information and guidance. Major Sandeman arranged to send a copy of the rules to each of the Sirdars. A translation of them is annexed to this diary.*

2. 2nd August.—It being an old State custom for the Khan to present a newly elected Chief with a new standard of the tribe of which he had become the Sirdar, and as Sirdars Asad Khan of Sarawan and Gohur Khan of Zehri were newly elected, they petitioned the Khan at Mustung to present them each with a new standard. This the Khan had promised to do and said they should have them on his arrival at Khelat. In fulfilment of this promise Wakil Muhammad Khan to-day presented Sirdar Asad Khan with a new standard. He also sent one to Sirdar Gohur Khan. The two standards were made respectively of red and yellow silk.

3. 3rd August.—Sirdar Asad Khan of Sarawan (whose mother is the sister of the senior widow of the late Taj Mahomed, and whose brother Mirula is betrothed to a daughter of the deceased Sirdar, another daughter having married his Highness the Khan,) had an interview with Mussamut Hur Bibi, the mother of the late Sirdar Taj Mahomed, with the object of helping her to settle her dispute with Sirdar Gohur Khan. It was hoped that in the event of her doing so she would return to Zehri and live with the Sirdar, who would be a son to her, and then all disorder in Jalawan would cease. At

*. NOTE.—In accordance with request contained in Colonel Munro's No. 301, dated 4th September 1876, the rules have been made Appendix A. 4 of Major Sandeman's Report No. 167, dated 31st July 1876.

the interview Mussamut Hur Bibi agreed to Sirdar Asad Khan taking her affairs in hand, and to his writing to Sirdar Gohur Khan on her behalf, and this the young Sirdar of Sarawan did. The result will be reported in a future diary.

His Highness the Khan to-day received a letter from Sirdar Gohur Khan reporting a dispute between the Hotmanzais and Zehris, and asking his Highness' aid to settle it. In reply his Highness directed Sirdar Gohur Khan himself to try and settle the quarrel. In the event of his not succeeding his Highness promised the Sirdar his aid in doing so.

4. 4th August.—Major Sandeman received a letter from his Highness, the contents of which were to the effect that as Sirdar Alla Dina had been placed in charge of the Bolan Pass arrangements, the Naib of Quetta had received orders to restore to the Dumar Kakars their annual allowance of Rs. 30 in cash and 5 kharwars of wheat and 5 kharwars of jowar, and to make over the cash and grain to Sirdar Alla Dina for payment to the Dumars. His Highness was of opinion that Sirdar Alla Dina should be responsible for the safety of all kafilas up to the Afghan border, and his Highness asked Major Sandeman to communicate with the Amir of Cabul with the object of getting his Highness to issue orders for the protection of his portion of the kafila route before it reaches Peshin. In reply Major Sandeman wrote to his Highness to say that Alla Dina would be directed to do as the Khan wished; at the same time it was to be understood that on this account the Naib of Quetta was not relieved of any responsibility regarding the safety of kafilas after they leave Shaul (Quetta). His Highness' request that the Amir of Cabul should be written to on the subject of the protection of kafilas would be submitted to the Commissioner for orders, his Highness' letter in original being sent to him with that object

In the afternoon his Highness the Khan paid Major Sandeman his usual weekly visit. A great deal of conversation took place regarding the state of affairs in the Khanate. A letter was read to his Highness that Major Sandeman had received from Sirdar Azaad Khan, Nowsherwani of Kharan, asking that officer to intercede with his Highness for the restoration of his estate of Punjgur and the settlement of his quarrel with the Khelat Government. His Highness after hearing the contents of the letter said that the estate referred to had been confiscated by his brother, the late Mir Nusseer Khan. That Sirdar Azaad Khan's daughter had been the wife of his brother, but at his death she had left Khelat with her father contrary to his (the Khan's) wish, and in defiance of custom and precedent. That until she returned and the family quarrel was arranged he (the Khan) did not desire to have anything to say to Sirdar Azaad Khan or his family. A reply to this effect was sent to Sirdar Azaad Khan. Major Sandeman added to it that he hoped a favourable opportunity would still offer of settling the quarrel, and did it do so, he (Major Sandeman) would keep the Sirdar's desire for a settlement of his quarrel with the Khan in memory, and would do his best to bring it about.

In conversation his Highness the Khan mentioned the arrival at Khelat from Kedj of Sirdar Khera Khan. This Sirdar's father, Sirdar Fakir Muhammad, is the Naib of that part of the Khanate. After a great deal of conversation it was decided that as the affairs of the Mekran coast were very unsettled, the Chiefs should all be summoned to a conference at Khelat. Sirdar Khera had come for help in the shape of troops. On consideration, however, it was decided to try first what effect summoning the Mekran Chiefs to a conference would have. It was hoped that by doing this the affairs of Mekran might be settled in same way as those of Jalawan and Sarawan had been arranged.

5. 5th August.—A letter was received from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed to say that some of his tribe had fought over the produce of their lands, and 4 had been killed and several wounded. The Sirdar said he was on the point of starting to escort the treasure through the Bolan Pass, and that on his return he would settle the case. A similar letter was sent by this Sirdar direct to his Highness the Khan. In reply his Highness wrote the Sirdar that as the treasure was coming viâ the Mulla to Khelat, and not viâ the Bolan Pass as was first intended, the Sirdar need not escort it, but to remain at home and settle the quarrel in his tribe. If he could not succeed he was to report particulars to his Highness, who would aid him to do so. Major Sandeman also wrote to the Sirdar strongly urging on him the necessity of settling the quarrel and preventing further bloodshed.

6. 6th August.—Sirdar Môhiem Khan Gurgnari wrote a letter to Sirdar Asad Khan complaining that the Khan's Naib when taking batai from him had taken more than was the Khan's share. Sirdar Asad Khan took the letter to his Highness, who after some conversation issued orders which, when put in force, will remove the grievance. Sirdar Rahman Khan Zagar of Noshki sent a petition to his Highness to the effect

that the Government Daroga had refused him his allowance as Naib of Noshki and had deprived him of two nights' water for his crops. The Khan wrote an order to the Daroga telling him to pay the Sirdar's allowance and to restore the water.

7. 7th August.—A petition from Golab, Pahli, Munnu, and Hasil Khan was sent by them to Major Sandeman, saying they were in the right in destroying Raza Muhammad, as he had killed one Waidad Khan. They asked Major Sandeman to intercede with the Khan for them. After consultation with his Highness a reply was sent telling these men that whatever causes of complaint they had against Raza Muhammad, as the whole of the Sirdars were at Mustung in consultation with his Highness the Khan (at the very time they committed the murders), with a view to the settlement of such cases, they ought to have come there and made a proper representation of the cause of quarrel with Raza Muhammad, and not, instead, have taken the law into their own hands. Now the only course open to them was to surrender unconditionally and trust to his Highness' mercy and justice, who, if they did so, would settle the case according to custom. Should they not adopt this course they would have to take the consequence of their misconduct.

A letter was received from Captain Humfrey, who is encamped, for convenience sake, with half the troops of the escort, about 8 miles off, asking Major Sandeman to allow the squadron of the Sind Horse with him to rejoin, as the military authorities had called attention to the severe night work the Sind Horse had to perform, and getting them all together would enable easier duty to be given them.

In reply Major Sandeman wrote that Captain Humfrey was heartily welcome to the services of the squadron of Sind Horse asked for, but that Major Sandeman could not understand why the Sind Horse were worked harder than the other troops of the escort, and had more night work to do. That he (Major Sandeman) was encamped with Dr. Duke and Captain Wylie in the open and for their entire camp he had no sentry during the day on duty, and only one during the night. That in Major Sandeman's opinion Captain Humfrey should consider well before reporting as to the necessity for working the men of the Sind Horse so hard during the night. In considering the matter he should remember they were not encamped in an enemy's country, but in that of a friendly ally, and Major Sandeman saw no necessity whatever for giving the Sind Horse the severe night work to which Captain Humfrey's attention had been called by the military authorities.

No. 172, dated Khelat, 11th August 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

No. 118.

No. 1844P., dated Simla, 14th August 1876.

From F. Henvey, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Lepel Griffin, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

With reference to your letter No. 194C., dated the 31st of July 1876, inquiring in what terms his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor should reply to the letter from the Khan of Khelat to his Honour's address of 10th May last, I am directed by the Governor-General in Council to state that the communication in question should be acknowledged in general terms of satisfaction at the loyal and friendly sentiments which the Khan has expressed.

No. 119.

No. 1849P., dated Simla, 14th August 1876.

From F. Henvey, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Lieutenant-Colonel. A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty.

I am directed to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 257, dated 14th July 1876, and to acquaint you in reply that before passing orders on the arrangements recommended

for the security of trade through the Bolan Pass, the Governor-General in Council will await Major Sandeman's final report, which is anxiously expected by His Excellency in Council.

2. Meanwhile you are requested to explain the following apparent discrepancy. In paragraph 6 of your letter under reply you anticipate that the cost of the arrangements proposed by Major Sandeman, estimated at Rupees 18,000, may be reasonably realised from tolls. The Governor-General in Council, however, understands Major Sandeman to recommend that the tolls should be paid in the Khan's name through Alladina Koord for distribution among the tribes interested in the traffic, and that the cost of the pass guards should be defrayed, not from tolls, but from the funds placed at Major Sandeman's disposal by the Resolution No. 2819, dated 16th October 1875.

No. 120.

Telegram, dated 17th August 1876.

From Colonel Munro, Dera Ismail Khan, to Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Major Sandeman, in a message of the 6th August from Khelat, intimates that the Khan has summoned to Khelat all Chiefs of Mekran who are subjects of the Khelat State, and has solicited Major Sandeman's aid in settling Mekran's disputes also; the atter appears willing to assist. Is he authorised to do so?

No. 121.

Telegram No. 1893P., dated 18th August 1876.

From Foreign Secretary, Simla, to Colonel Munro, Dera Ismail Khan.

Your telegram of 17th. Viceroy authorises Major Sandeman to assist the Khan in settling disputes between his Highness and the Mekran Chiefs on the following conditions:—

1st. Major Sandeman must negotiate with the Chiefs through the Khan on terms first settled in concert with his Highness.

2nd. The object kept in view by Major Sandeman in conducting or supporting the negotiations must be to extend and consolidate the authority of Khan, and through it the power of the British Government, over Western Beloochistan, without crippling either the Khan or the British Government by inconvenient concessions or obligations.

Viceroy further desires that during the remainder of his sojourn in Khelat Major Sandeman's personal influence be exerted to the utmost in support of the Khan's dignity and authority, and that the greatest care be taken to prevent his Highness' position being in any way lowered in the eyes of his Sirdars.

No. 122.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 15th August 1876.

8th August.—Paid my usual weekly visit to his Highness at the Miri (palace). A good deal of conversation took place with the Khan and his advisers regarding the dispute between the Necharas and the Baranzais. It was decided to call the headmen of the two tribes into Khelat, as well as Sirdar Gohur Khan, and settle the case here.

2. 9th August.—Musti Khan, the Naib of Zehri, reported that his Highness had decided to leave the settlement of the question raised at Mustung as to whether or not the Zehri bunniahs should pay the Government transit dues on merchandise until the arrival of his Highness at Gundava. It was arranged that Sirdar Gohur Khan should be informed of this decision.

3. 11th August.—His Highness summoned Sirdars Gaji Khan, Gichki, Naib of Punjgur, Kouda Muhammad Khan, Kouda, Alla Dad, Kissani, Mir Murad, Mulla Faiz Muhammad, Haji Habtan, Dad Muhammad, Mulla Mehrab, Mulla Gool Dad, Sari Korani, Dad Muhammad, Gichki, Yar Muhammad, Nawab Khan, and others of Punjgur, to come to Khelat, and have their affairs settled in the same way as the affairs of the Jalawan and Sarawan Sirdars had been arranged. At the request of his Highness Major Sandeman also wrote to these Sirdars and headmen to the same effect. His

Highness visited Major Sandeman at his camp. The sowars who were sent to bring the parties belonging to the Nechara and Baranzai tribes who had fought about the produce of their lands arrived, bringing the parties concerned. It appeared that a quarrel and fight had taken place, and 10 on both sides were wounded slightly, but none were killed. After the arrival of the sowars Mir Pasand Khan, the brother of Sirdar Gohur Khan, also arrived and aided in sending the culprits into Khelat. He at the same time wrote to his Highness to say that as the case was a tribal quarrel it ought to come first before the Sirdar. It was arranged that as Sirdar Gohur Khan was coming to Khelat, the case would then be brought forward and disposed of under the provisions of the rules lately sanctioned by his Highness for the settlement of such cases. His Highness wrote Sirdar Gohur Khan to this effect.

4. 13th August.—The long standing dispute between Sirdar Ibrahim Khan and his brother-in-law, Mir Muhammad Khan, was to day finally disposed of, and it was arranged that the latter should leave Khelat and return to Wudd, taking his family with him. His Highness' sanction to this arrangement was obtained.

His Highness the Khan's chobdars were sent to warn owners of camels that a certain number would be required for his Highness' approaching march to Kutchi. Sirdar Asad Khan was of opinion that by the Mustung settlement the Brahooees were exempt from providing camels for his Highness. On the settlement papers being referred to it was found that certain villages, both in Jalawan and Sarawan, were bound to provide his Highness with camels. It was finally arranged that the chief owners of camels should be called into Khelat, and a suitable arrangement come to in concert and communication with them for providing his Highness with the required number of camels for the march. The Wakil, Nawab Muhammad Khan, admitted that the Khan had to pay Rupees 5-4 for the hire of each camel from Khelat to Kutchi.

5. 14th August.—To-day his Highness invited Major Sandeman to visit him at the palace or Miri, to be present at a distribution of khilluts which he intended to bestow on several of his most deserving civil and military officers. Major Sandeman accepted the invitation, and proceeded to the Miri at four in the afternoon. His Highness presented khillats to the following officers :—

Naib Abdul Latif.
Commander Fakir Muhammad.
Ditto Mohsun Khan.
Captain Haji Khan, Infantry.
Ditto Sher Khan, Artillery.
Ressaldars Emam Buksh and Sher Shah Khan.
Jemadars Fatteh Shah and Rawaz Khan.

6. 15th August.—His Highness received a letter from Sirdar Moolla Mahomed saying he was doing his best to settle the Brahamzai and Rastumzai case, the particulars of which were reported in last week's diary. The Sirdar wrote that if he failed he would write and say so, and apply for help in accordance with State custom. His Highness sent a letter in return giving a favourable answer to the effect that the Sirdar should have the aid required did he apply for it.

A translation of the diary of the District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee, for the weeks ending 30th June and 7th July was submitted for the perusal of the Khan, in which the conduct of Sahib Khan Choota and his brother Jan Muhammad was reported on. Also that a fight between the Khelat Government and Sirdar Gohur Khan, Zehri, was said to have taken place, in which 80 men of the Khan's army and 30 Brahooees of Zehri were killed. That Sirdar Gohur Khan himself was supposed to be wounded. His Highness in reply stated that the report was quite without foundation, although two months ago, and previous to the terms of peace having been arranged, a skirmish between Sirdar Gohur Khan's people and his troops did take place in the Mulla Pass, in which 18 soldiers were killed. In regard to the loss the Brahooees suffered, his Highness said he could give no information. In respect to Sahib Khan and Jan Muhammad's quarrel the Khan remarked that he had already given full particulars about it on a former occasion. That the two are brothers, and Jan Muhammad is not a bad character, although Sub-Inspector Ali Muhammad reported him to be so, but his Highness was of opinion that his doing so is due to a feeling of partizanship on account of Sahib Khan's being, like himself, employed as a Native Officer in the Kurrachee Frontier Police.

To-day a letter was received from Captain Reynolds, commanding detachment 3rd Sind Horse, complaining that some of his regimental bunniahs bringing supplies for his regiment had been charged transit duties, and four out of several detained, as the merchants refused payment, and asking Major Sandeman to interfere. A reply was sent to say that the bunniahs ought to pay the transit dues in accordance with the State laws. That as they had come viâ the Bolan Pass with a caravan, and were bringing merchandise,

it was impossible to exempt them; but if they had any special reasons to urge why they should not pay on certain articles, after having first paid the dues charged, if they would then attend in camp, and place them before Major Sandeman and his Highness' Wakil, their claim to exemption would be listened to, and if sufficient and reasonable grounds were given why a refund of the money should be made, it would be obtained from the Khelat Government. The levy of custom dues has been named "black-mail" by those objecting to them. This is clearly a misnomer, and the Khelat Government in taking them is in no invidious position, as even the British Government levies them on sugar, salt, &c. Moreover, the amount taken by the Khelat Government on each camel load was fixed in consultation with the British authorities, and is levied in accordance with the treaty of friendship existing between the two Governments.

No. 189, dated Camp Khelat, 21st August 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat and Khelat Frontiers.

No. 123.

No. 295 P., dated Dera Ismail Khan, 28th August 1876.

From Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner, Derajat (on special duty), to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Submits Major Sandeman's report of 31st July.

I have the honour to submit a Report, No. 167, of the 31st ultimo, with Appendices, from Major Sandeman, on special duty in Khelat, summarising his proceedings and their results, since his second deputation to Khelat territory in April last, under orders conveyed in paras. 11 and 12 of the Government of India Resolution No. 671 (a) P., of the 14th March 1876, as quoted at length in para. 2 of his Report.

Two of the Appendices required translation.

2. Two of the Appendices, which are in tabulated abstract form, have been written in the Persian language, and I have deemed it advisable to attach English translations of these statements for greater readiness of reference.

Conditions of Commissioner's sanction to second expedition to Khelat.

3. I was required, by para. 12 of the Government of India Resolution, to satisfy myself, on a review of the results of Major Sandeman's first mission to Khelat, and the measure of success which had attended that deputation, that the Khan of Khelat and the principal Chiefs of the Sarawan and Jalawan parties were ready to accept Major Sandeman's arbitration, before arranging for a second meeting between Major Sandeman, the Khan, and Sirdars, in some convenient part of Khelat territory, to renew attempts to effect the objects contemplated by the Government of India Resolution of the 16th October 1875.

Reasons which influenced Commissioner in deputing Major Sandeman a second time to Khelat.

4. Difficulties had presented themselves in course of the former deputation, as already reported; but a consideration of the very favourable reception accorded to Major Sandeman personally by his Highness the Khan of Khelat and the leading Brahooee Sirdars of the Sarawan party, as well as by the people of the country generally, who had given unmistakeable signs of their confidence in Major's Sandeman's capacity to effect a lasting settlement of disputes between the Khan of Khelat, the Sirdars, and the dependent tribes, appeared fully to justify my arranging for Major Sandeman's second deputation to Khelat territory, as I was authorised to do in the Resolution of 14th March 1876, conveyed to me through your Department.

Jalawan Brahooees to be included in any general measures.

5. That Resolution required that the Jalawan party of Brahooees, and with them, as a natural consequence, the tribes inhabiting the south-western portions of the Khelat State, should be included in any pacificatory measures which might result from Major Sandeman's arbitration. Circumstances had, up to the period of his second visit, prevented that officer from communicating personally with the leaders of the Jalawan confederacy; but some Sirdars of that party were known to maintain a correspondence with the more influential Sarawan Chiefs, and to have expressed anxiety as to the probable position to be assigned to themselves in any approaching

Their known anxiety on the subject.

congress having for its object a settlement of those disputes which had prevented the semblance of cordial co-operation between the Khan of Khelat and his Sirdars for many years—indeed, almost since his accession to the Khanship—and had, moreover, caused much disorganisation and misery throughout Beloochistan.

Preparations for a second deputation made, and on what grounds.

6. Being thus encouraged to believe that, if Major Sandeman were to proceed a second time to some convenient place in Khelat territory, from which he could more easily maintain friendly communications with the Khan of Khelat and the Sirdars of the country, of whatever party; and if he could induce the contending parties to meet him at such place, he might, with better prospects of success than on the previous occasion, attempt to secure the results contemplated by the Government Resolution of 16th October last; I lost no time in making the necessary preparations for his departure from Jacobabad, properly escorted as ordered.

Major Sandeman's departure, 4th April.

7. The hot weather had already set in, necessitating speedy arrangements. Major Sandeman started on his second mission on the 4th April, as reported at the time.

Opening of Bolan Pass to traffic a principal preliminary object.

8. It will be remembered that a principal object of Major Sandeman's deputation to Khelat was to inquire and report what could be done for the protection of trade viâ the Bolan Pass, and whether a system of fixed tolls on caravans could not be arranged for, the proceeds of which should go to the tribes interested in the protection of that route; and he was accorded a discretion, within certain fixed limits, to do in regard to this matter what might seem to him to be most advisable.

Caravans blocked at Shikarpur.

9. In course of two visits paid from Jacobabad to Shikarpur by Major Sandeman and myself in the months of February and March last, we found crowds of Affghan caravan merchants blocked there, with goods valued at several lacs of rupees; these men were clamorous for some protective arrangement, by which a safe passage to Candahar, through the Bolan Pass,

Detention in Sind during hot weather ruinous to them.

might be secured to them. Detention in Sind during the hot season—the only alternative present to their minds in the then state of affairs—could but prove ruinous to them in every sense. Accessions to their numbers were constantly arriving from Hindustan, and the pressure was daily becoming greater. The Bolan Pass had been closed to traffic for some years;

Other passes also closed.

and the Mulla and other passes to the south-westward, which it had lately been the Khan of Khelat's object to keep open, so as to secure a monopoly of the transit dues to himself, had also become

Why.

impassable very recently, owing to the complications, culminating in actual hostilities, succeeding the assassination of Sirdar Noordeen Mingul at Khelat.

Re-opening of Bolan imperative.

10. As an important preliminary to further operations, the re-opening of the passage through the Bolan, and the safe transit of the numerous caravans detained, as above described, were pressing necessities. Intimation was given to all the expectant merchants that they must be prepared to start for Khorassan on a certain fixed date, and to travel at some distance in the wake of Major Sandeman's escort towards the Bolan Pass.

Brief reference to measures in report.

11. The results of Major Sandeman's measures for effecting this safe transit are briefly referred to in his report, the particulars having been fully reported at the time. The secure passage of

Value of goods passed through.

merchandise, valued at 11 lacs of rupees, of several thousands of unarmed men, and of beasts of burden, through a pass which had been rendered impracticable for some years past by neighbouring tribes of marauders, was in itself no ordinary achievement, if antecedent circumstances are duly estimated, especially when we bear in mind that this service was performed

Marauding tribes enlisted to protect the caravans.

through the instrumentality and paid assistance of those same tribes (whose previously unchecked inroads had caused the closure of this ancient traffic route for years), at a time when the military escort which had been calculated upon for protection was unfitted for the duty by the appearance in its ranks of a deadly epidemic.

Outbreak of cholera.

12. Cholera, as already fully reported, broke out in Major Sandeman's camp within a week of his departure from Jacobabad, but his movements were rather accelerated in consequence. The exertions of all the European officers, and more particularly of the medical officers, on the trying

Progress of mission accelerated in consequence.

occasion were most praiseworthy, and have been acknowledged. The sympathies of the uncouth hill men even

appear to have been enlisted, for assistance was cheerfully rendered at every stage of the rapid onward march, under a full conviction that the objects of the expedition were peaceful and conciliatory.

Selection of Mustung as a place of sojourn.

13. The heat of the season and experience of sickness amongst the troops composing the escort suggested the selection of a healthy elevated situation for the sojourn of the mission, and Mustung, a town three marches from Khelat, was chosen as the place from which Major Sandeman's communications with the Khan of Khelat, and the Sirdars generally, might be maintained without inconvenience to either party, and at which a general meeting might be arranged, when all danger of contagion should disappear from the camp.

Its advantages.

Accessibility of Sarawan leaders.

14. The Sarawan Chiefs of the neighbourhood, who had exhibited a friendly feeling from the first, responded with alacrity to the invitation to Mustung. The Khan of Khelat, impelled for a time either by sinister influences, or by a doubting reluctance to come to terms with his Sirdars, exhibited a disinclination to visit the British officer at Mustung; but he ultimately put his scruples aside, accepted the invitation, and proved to be both amenable to advice, and very reasonable in his demands. The details of Major Sandeman's dealings with the Khan of Khelat and the Sarawan Sirdars were furnished in the letters of 2nd and 14th June last, to which reference is made in para. 6 of the report.

Khan of Khelat's reluctance to join.

He accepts the invitation.

Details in former reports.

Jalawan Chiefs also arrive.

15. The Jalawan Chiefs, with Mir Jam Ali, of Lus Beyla, who joined the camp in acceptance of Major Sandeman's invitation from considerable distances, at the hottest season of the year, did not arrive at Mustung until the 5th of July.

Committee appointed to arbitrate.

16. All being thus assembled, it was resolved, the Khan, Sirdars, and advising officer all concurring, that the matters in dispute should be referred to a Select Committee, the members of which should be nominated, three by the Khan of Khelat, and three by the Sirdars. Two special complaints against the Khan's Government by Mir Jam Ali, of Lus Beyla, of which the particulars have been given in Major Sandeman's letters of the 26th May and 14th June last respectively, were reserved for separate disposal, subject to orders of the Government of India.

Its composition.

List of Sarawan cases.

17. Appendix B. contains a list of 34 cases, or causes of complaint, preferred by Sarawan Sirdars and their followers. Of these 29 cases were decided by the Committee in favour of the complainants, the Khan of Khelat making concessions in a liberal spirit. One dispute of all pervading consequence regarding contributions of lucern grass, required by the Khan from his subjects generally, has already been described by Major Sandeman in former communications, and it is especially referred to in his present report. The Khan has waived his claim for the current year, and the matter awaits final disposal under advice from the British authorities. The recommendations of the Committee of Arbitrators appear to be worthy of acceptance. A perusal of this abstract conveys an impression unfavourable to the action of some of the Khan's Naibs, especially Naib Faiz Muhammad, whose proceedings appear to have been uncontrolled, though of the most arbitrary and oppressive complexion.

General discontent as to grass exactions.

Settlement postponed.

Impression conveyed by perusal of abstract of cases.

List of Jalawan cases.

18. Appendix C. similarly contains a list of cases or complaints preferred by the Jalawan Sirdars, of which most were decided in favour of the complainants, the Khan acceding in the most generous manner, apparently, to all the proposals of the Committee. He, moreover, held a special investiture of Sirdars Gohur Khan and Shukur Khan with the turban of Chiefship, and their installation as successors to the late Sirdars Taj Mahomed and Noordeen; Asad Khan, Raisani, being at the same time recognised as principal Chief of the Sarawans.

Khan's proceedings.

Formal public ratification.

19. Formal declarations of the terms of reconciliation agreed to on both sides were made in open Durbar, and ratified, on oath, in the most solemn manner, according to Muhammadan custom.

Objects effected.

20. The principal objects of Major Sandeman's deputation to Khelat appear thus to have been effected with an amount of success which could hardly have been anticipated, considering the

virulence of pre-existing enmities, and the lengthened period during which such enmities and differences had prevailed. A formal reconciliation between the Khan of Khelat and his Sirdars, of whatever party, has been effected, mainly through the prudence and sagacity of the deputed officer, whose personal popularity and undoubted influence amongst the tribes of Beloochistan have been very largely instrumental in securing results which it would have been a difficult task for any officer not possessing these qualifications to effect.

Results of negotiations.

21. Although a section of the Murree tribe, viz., the Mazarani Murrees, on the Bolan, have been entertained to serve with the Koords in protecting travellers and traffic by that route, a conclusive settlement as to the future relations of the Murrees, as a tribe, with the Khan of Khelat, has not yet been arrived at. Major Sandeman is sanguine that success will attend his measures in this direction also. The disputes between Murrees and the Government of Khelat were stated in the Government Resolution No. 2819 of 16th October last to be closely connected with the intertribal quarrels prevailing in Beloochistan. The main portion of the tribe, under Ghuzzun Khan, the Chief, are tolerably amenable to any demands made of them by Major Sandeman; but the establishment of a permanent and practically useful understanding between the Khan of Khelat and this notoriously unmanageable tribe, who are his subjects only in name, and who for many years past have independently carried on a system of marauding expeditions in all directions, will doubtless require time and a continuance of the present measures of supervision and repression for its accomplishment.

State of affairs with the Murrees.

Supposed amenability of the tribe.

Their comparative independence.

Time and careful supervision required in regard to them.

22. Throughout the negotiations Major Sandeman appears never to have lost sight of the injunctions conveyed to him, which required him to do nothing calculated to fetter the future action of Government in regard to Khelat affairs on the one hand, or to lower the Khan of Khelat in the eyes of his Sirdars and subjects generally. Major Sandeman treated the Khan from first to last with the consideration which the latter's position as head of the State demanded, whilst maintaining, in the same manner, a conciliatory and encouraging attitude towards the Sirdars.

Major Sandeman's adherence to instructions.

Demeanour towards Khan and Sirdars.

23. In the diaries which Major Sandeman has furnished, and which have been transmitted weekly, as received, to the Private Secretary to the Viceroy and Governor-General, as ordered, full details of the deputed officer's proceedings, from time to time, have been given; and Major Sandeman refers to these details in various parts of his present report. The objects of his mission were authoritatively declared to be: 1st, to find out the real causes of the prevailing quarrels and general disorganization, which had previously been but imperfectly known; 2nd, to endeavour to effect an amicable settlement; 3rd, to give an expression of his views in regard to such differences as presented unusual difficulties, and as could not be settled under his own advice. Finally, he was required to report upon the future relations between the Khan's Government and the Murree and Boogtee tribes; and he was allowed a discretion, as already noted, within the limit of Rs. 66,960 per annum, sanctioned by the Government of India for expenditure, in connexion with these tribal affairs, to arrange for the re-opening of the Bolan Pass.

Contents of diaries.

Recapitulation of objects of mission.

24. That Major Sandeman's measures, to attain all these objects, have been attended with remarkable success cannot be gainsaid. The report now submitted, and his previous reports and diaries, sufficiently demonstrate the fact, and I cannot anticipate that any sacrifice of the advantages obtained by these preliminary successes (which require perseverance in following out the measures now begun so favourably, to ensure consolidation and prospective permanency) is contemplated. The deputed officer, in all his proceedings, appears to me to have fully justified the hope expressed regarding him in the 17th paragraph of the Government of India Resolution of 16th October 1875, viz., "that the arrangement, by which the conduct of "our relations with the frontier tribes had been entrusted to him, would in time produce "more substantial effects," than the difficulties under which he had, up to that time, laboured, rendered possible.

Success attending Major Sandeman's measures.

Justifying anticipations in previous order.

25. The Khan of Khelat's authority had, for many years, been very circumscribed, owing to the general disturbances consequent upon the disaffection of the Sirdars. He is shown to have had a personal object in keeping his Bolan Pass closed to traffic of all kinds, his direct power was confined

Limited authority of Khan of Khelat.

Objects as to Bolan.

to a short distance from Khelat, were the main portion of his little army has always been kept, doubtless to ensure his personal safety. Though naturally of a fickle and vacillating disposition the Khan has exhibited an unmistakably friendly spirit throughout, and he has shown himself to be amenable to good advice, and ready at all times to accede to Major Sandeman's proposals, and to be guided by that officer's counsel. His antecedents, as noticed in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Resolution of October 1875, did not afford good augury of his later conduct, which has proved more favourable than we could have hoped for. Personal intercourse with Major Sandeman may have induced a conviction that the deputed officer's earnestness in the discharge of the duties entrusted to him could not be ignored; that the causes of quarrel and disturbances would be thoroughly investigated, and that a strong effort would be made to restore a modicum of peace to the distracted State of Khelat, and of confidence to its inhabitants, who had so long been strangers to security either in life or property. Whatever the inciting causes the fact is patent, that the Khan of Khelat has recently met our advances in the most becoming spirit, and has shown a laudable amount of deference to the views and wishes of the Government of India, as conveyed to him through Major Sandeman. More could hardly, in my opinion, have been expected of his Highness, and the occasion would, therefore, seem to be suggestive of the propriety of reverting to our former friendly relations with him, as recommended by Major Sandeman in the 13 and 14 paragraphs of his report.

His character.

Amenability to advice.

His antecedents.

Major Sandeman's probable influence over him.

Probable, other cause.

Khan's favourable disposition.

What it suggests.

26. The state of the Sind border during the past eight or nine months has been one of almost undisturbed tranquility. The few outrages committed in Kutchi and other parts of Khelat by members of the discontented factions smarting under the more recent exactions of the Khan's Naibs and troops had caused some anxiety to be felt for a time, lest they should ultimately affect the peace of our border; but no such result ensued. The Murree tribe have been restrained from continuing their raids in Kutchi, in apparent expectancy of the issue of affairs at Khelat; and the Boogtees have proved to be quite amenable to our requirements, abstaining from every semblance of molestation. Circumstances in every direction point to the present opportunity as the most favourable for carrying out what has been so successfully begun, viz., the re-establishment of more friendly relations than ever with the Ruler, Chiefs, and people of Beloochistan, who have all been impressed by our later dealings toward them; and the confirmation and extension of our influence for good in this long distracted region; for without the exercise of a firm control over the affairs of this neighbouring State, we may expect a reversion, sooner or later, to the confusion and perils of the past. The discordant elements still exist, and nothing but the maintenance of a firm directing power, such as our Government alone possesses, can prevent their breaking out anew, should an opportunity be afforded.

Sind border tranquil.

Murree tribe restrained.

Good conduct of Boogtees.

Appearances favourable.

Continuance of control necessary.

Probable results of its withdrawal.

27. Major Sandeman deduces, reasonably in my opinion, from his recent experience of the state of affairs in Khelat, that a continuance of the control and guidance lately introduced is indispensable to the permanent success of his own measures. Without such, there can be no hope of anything approaching to respectable administration in Khelat, or of harmonious action between the Khan and his Sirdars. A withdrawal from the position would, in all probability, precipitate forcible interference, in the interests of British subjects, and of peace on our frontier. The restoration of the discontinued subsidy to his Highness the Khan, and the re-appointment of a Political Agent to Khelat, to aid and guide his Highness in acting up to his late professions, both towards the British Governments and his own Sirdars, are deemed by Major Sandeman to be necessary measures, in order to extend and perpetuate the advantages already gained; and I presume there can be little question as to the soundness of that view in the circumstances.

Major Sandeman's views on the subject.

His recommendations.

Commissioner's concurrence.

28. The proposal for temporarily locating Captain Wylie at Dadur, to supervise the Bolan Pass arrangements during the cold and trading season, appears to be worthy of sanction. The re-esta-

Captain Wylie's proposed location at Dadur.

blishment of friendly controlling intercourse with the Khan of Khelat, and the location at Khelat again of a European officer as Political Agent, would doubtless tend to obviate the necessity for any long continuance of a British officer at Dadur.

Temporary.

29. I do not consider myself to be called upon, in transmitting this report, to offer any comments upon what is set forth in paras. 21 to 25 inclusive, reviewing the former proceedings of 1872, in connection with the attempt then made to reconcile the Khan of Khelat and his Sirdars. As the reports of these proceedings are already before Government, Major Sandeman's explanations, in modification of the views then enunciated, can be judged of without any remarks from me. The description given in paras. 26 to 30 inclusive of Major Sandeman's report demonstrates that nearly 20 years of intestinal strife and disorder in Khelat have induced a feeling of abject dependence, or incapacity throughout the country, occasional signs of energy from either side notwithstanding. The deduction is that, under this sense of comparative exhaustion, all would welcome our friendly mediation and influence to be continued in the promotion of greater justice and security.

Remarks on paras. 21 to 25 of report unnecessary.

Contending parties in Khelat wearied out.

30. Before bringing this transmitting letter to a close, I may be permitted to remark that the experience of the intervening months has not led me to alter or modify, to any extent, the general views enunciated in my report of the 12th February last, to the address of the Secretary to the Punjab Government, some of the more important of which were accepted in paras. 14, 15, and 16 of the Government of India Resolution No. 671 (a) P, of the 14th March last. It is therefore unnecessary to repeat them here.

Commissioner's views on certain points unchanged.

31. It is my pleasing duty, in forwarding these papers, to allude to Major Sandeman's indefatigable earnestness and uniform success in conducting the affairs entrusted to his management to an issue so favourable, and so much in accord with the expressed wishes of the Government of India. If anything is wanting to complete success within the limits of the power and discretion assigned to him, it will be obvious, from a perusal of the records of his proceedings, that circumstances beyond his control interfered, and that there is still hope that, even in regard to these matters, ultimate success will be attained. Much difficulty and many obstacles had to be overcome in securing the advantages already gained; and I can have no doubt that the conspicuous merits and service of this officer will receive due acknowledgment from the Government he has served so zealously and successfully.

Major Sandeman's conspicuous services.

Impediments to complete success.

Difficulties overcome.

32. I concur generally in the commendation bestowed by Major Sandeman on the officers attached to his mission and to the escort, the conduct of the troops composing the latter having been uniformly praiseworthy under trying circumstances.

Commissioner's general concurrence in commendation of officers.

33. The remarks in favour of Captain Humfrey commanding the escort are, I believe, well merited; but the proposal made as to his allowances would be more properly considered in the Military Department. Captains Shepherd, Scott, Young, Lieutenant Harrison, and Surgeon McRury of the escort are all favourably mentioned.

Captain Humfrey and other officers.

34. Captain Wylie and Surgeon O. T. Duke were specially attached to the mission. The first-named officer accompanied Major Sandeman on his first mission to Khelat, and has rendered him most valuable assistance in various ways, besides mapping the country. Dr. Duke's exertions during the cholera outbreak were most conspicuous, and have already received acknowledgment. He is a zealous and accomplished officer, whose professional and other services on this occasion have been very marked.

Captain Wylie and

Dr. Duke.

35. Amongst Natives who contributed not a little to the success of Major Sandeman's negotiations, Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan Mazari and Jamal Khan Lughari deserve prominent notice. Both accompanied Major Sandeman in his two missions to Khelat, giving him their cheerful assistance on all occasions. To Imam Buksh Khan is largely due the merit of the satisfactory conclusion to the labours of the Committee appointed to arbitrate between the Khan of Khelat and his Sirdars, of which Committee Imam Buksh Khan was in all likelihood the most valuable member, Jamal Khan seconding him well.

Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan.

36. Ressaldar Amir Khan, of the 4th Punjab Cavalry, is highly commended by Major Sandeman, who also notices favourably his office assistants.

Ressaldar Muhammad Amir Khan.

37. It is, moreover, gratifying to observe that a few of the Khan of Khelat's Naibs and officials distinguished themselves in promoting the objects of Major Sandeman's mission to Khelat, and in thus obtaining a public expression of their master's approval.

Commendation of Khelat officials.

38. In concluding this transmitting letter, I have to state that a full report on the subject of the memorial in regard to the release from imprisonment of the Jam of Lus Beyla is under preparation. The correspondence on that subject is very voluminous, and has only recently been received by me in a complete state; but compliance with the requisition on that question shall be no longer delayed, as it has formed a prominent subject of solicitation on the part of the Jalawan Sirdars, and even by the Khan of Khelat himself, who has been induced to make a written application in the matter, which shall be submitted with my report on the case within a few days.

Concluding remarks regarding case of Jam of Lus Beyla.

Correspondence voluminous.

Report to follow speedily.

Enclosure 1 in No. 123.

No. 167, dated Camp Khelat, 31st July 1876.

From Major R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, to Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat and Khelat Frontier.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your No. 117, dated 3rd April 1876, forwarding for my special information and guidance a copy of the printed Resolution No. 671 (A) P. of the Government of India, dated the 14th March last, which was passed in reference to our reports as per margin concerning my former mission to Khelat.

•Major Sandeman's No. 8 of 5th February to Commissioner, Derajat.
Colonel Munro's No. 20 of 12th February to Secretary to Government, Punjab.

2. In forwarding to me the Government Resolution above referred to in the letter under reply, you directed my attention to the provisions of its 11th and 12th paragraphs, and desired that I should in conducting the present mission to Khelat be specially guided by them. For easy reference I here transcribe them:—

"Paragraph 11. After full consideration of all the circumstances of the case the Government of India are of opinion that the course proposed by Colonel Munro and supported by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab is the best that can be adopted under the circumstances, viz., that Major Sandeman should be allowed to endeavour to carry out, under more favourable circumstances, the objects for which he was deputed to the Murree Hills, it is clear that he has not as yet had a fair chance of achieving success, present circumstances are not such as to render success hopeless; on the contrary, there is so far as can be judged a desire on the part of all for the intervention of the British Government, until therefore a renewed attempt at mediation shall have been made and failed, the Government of India is not prepared to abandon the line of action taken in October last. Intervention under these circumstances will be widely different from that proposed by Sir William Merewether and rejected by the Government of India, in this office letter No 16P., dated 5th January 1875."

Paragraph 12. Accordingly orders will at once issue that if Colonel Munro is satisfied that the Khan and principal Chiefs of all parties, including Jalawans and Sarawans, are ready to accept Major Sandeman's arbitration, he is authorised, should he deem such a course desirable under present circumstances, to arrange for a meeting between Major Sandemen, the Khan, and his Sirdars, in Kutchi, or elsewhere, as may be convenient, and make a renewed attempt to carry out the objects set forth in the Government Resolution of the 16th October last, that is a general settlement of differences between the tribes themselves, and between them and the Khan, and further in extension of those orders if the Khan should show a proper spirit the re-establishment of friendly relations between him and the British Government. Major Sandeman should be accompanied by a military escort of such strength as the Commissioner may consider amply sufficient for his protection and dignity, the troops being taken from the Frontier Forces of the Punjab or Sind, or both the Punjab and Sind, as the Commissioner may think fit. Major Sandeman may also be allowed the services of any available officers, civil or military, whose assistance he requires and the Commissioner considers necessary, and the Commissioner is empowered to advance to him from the treasury such funds as he may need. In short the Government of India having confidence in Colonel Munro and Major Sandeman desire that the latter be allowed under the Commissioner's orders full opportunity of effecting under the most favourable circumstances a settlement of Khelat

affairs. A letter from his Excellency the Viceroy to the Khan of Khelat in reply to the latter's communication will be transmitted to the Commissioner in due course."

3. I will now place before you the manner in which I put these orders of the Government of India in force, but in order to do this as effectively as possible, it is advisable to review my recent reports and diaries describing the progress of the mission as they set forth clearly that its objects as laid down in the Resolution from the very commencement up to the day of my bringing my proceedings to a successful conclusion of which I have already informed you by telegram, were not for a moment lost sight of.

4. On the 4th of April 1876 I left Jacobabad with an escort of regular troops as per margin. My first duty was to re-open the Bolan Pass to the caravans returning from India to Khorassan, and which had been blocked in large numbers at Kurrachee, Shikapur, and elsewhere on account of the unsafe state of the passes. The way I conducted this duty I reported in this office letter No. 92, dated 21st April 1876. In addition to what I stated therein, it will be sufficient for me to note here that since I entered the country caravans in value 11 lakhs of rupees have from the date I reopened the Bolan to traffic passed to and, fro in perfect safety. The fees levied by me on kafilas, amounted to Rs. 11,919–7–9, have been divided between the Khan and his Sirdars in the following proportions:—His Highness the Khan received custom dues amounting to Rupees 7,917–6–3, Sirdar Moolla Mahomed (1-14th of the same) was paid Rupees 609, and the tribes escorting the caravans got Rupees 3,393–1–6.

2 mountain guns.
Wing, right, 3rd Sind Horse.
2 companies, 30th Bombay Native Infantry.
100 sabres, 4th Punjab Cavalry.
3 companies, 4th Sikhs Infantry.

5. In this office No. 94, dated 22nd April last, I reported to you the severe visitation of cholera that broke out amongst the troops of my escort. This, although in itself a great calamity, did not in any way, on account of the friendly conduct of the Bolan tribes, interfere with the mission, although it delayed it in the Bolan Pass for a fortnight. I was enabled successfully to arrange for the safe escort of the caravans by the tribes themselves, and after a sufficient time had elapsed to enable us to bring up our sick, which I had to leave behind for the reason given in the report above referred to, during which we entirely shook off the disease. I marched for Mustung a town belonging to his Highness the Khan, situated half way between Khelat and Quetta. I had previously acquainted the Khan of Khelat and his Sirdars, both of Jalawan and Sarawan, that I had fixed, in accordance with the orders of Government, upon Mustung as our place of meeting, and I invited them to come there to meet me.

6. What transpired up to this time and up to the date of his Highness the Khan and the Sarawan Sirdar's arrival at Mustung is fully detailed in my two reports to your address, Nos. 114 and 122, dated the 2nd and 14th June respectively. On the 5th of July the Jalawan Sirdars and Mir Jam Ali, of Lus Beyla, arrived in Camp. An account of their arrival is given in my telegram of the 5th July 1876, and in diary for week ending 7th idem. After the reception of the whole of the Sirdars by his Highness the Khan, a committee was appointed by his Highness to consider the different complaints and grievances of the whole of the Sarawan and Jalawan Sirdars and of Mir Jam Ali of Lus Beyla. The latter brought two grave complaints against his Highness' Government, viz., the invasion of Lus Beyla by the Khan contrary to the guarantee given by Major Harrison, and the occupation of the Kamal Khan estate. Full particulars of these two occurrences from the Khan's point of view, as well as that of the Jam, is also given in this office No. 122, dated 14th June, and its enclosure, and in No. 112, dated 26th May 1876. As the Khan and the Jam viewed these occurrences very differently, and as the Government of India alone can dispose of them, moreover as one of the enclosures to the first-named report is a letter from his Highness to his Excellency the Viceroy describing the state of his affairs, it seemed to me desirable, and in this the Khan and the Jam concurred, to leave the Lus Beyla questions to be disposed of by his Excellency in Council when replying to the Khan, should he consider this course desirable.

7. The list of the grievances of the Sarawan Sirdars named in the margin is annexed to this report. They numbered 34 complaints in all, and out of these they obtained a decree in their favour in 29 cases. The only dispute between the two sides that was not settled was the one about the lucerne tax, particulars of which were given in diary for week ending 23rd June. The Khan agreed not to levy the tax this year. Whether he will remit it for good will depend greatly on the way his affairs are finally settled by the Government, but this point I will notice further on in this letter.

Sirdar Moolla Mahomed of Sarawan.
Sirdar Alla Dina Koord.
Sirdar Shadi Khan, Bungulzai.
Sirdar Said Khan, Mahomedshahi.
Sirdar Junda Khan, Shawani.
And other minor Chiefs.

8. The other cases brought by the Jalawan Sirdars against the Khelat Government were also of grave importance. First of all there was the vacant Chieftainship of the Zehris to be settled, the "dustar" of which was claimed by Sirdar Gohur Khan. The case of the late Sirdar Noordeen had to be considered, as well as the recognition of the deceased Sirdar's son as successor to the Chieftainship. There were also a list of 37 cases brought by the Sirdars against the Khelat Government. Of these 34 were given in favour of the Sirdars by the committee appointed by the Khan to investigate them, and its decisions were confirmed by his Highness. A correct list of these cases is also annexed to this report.

9. His Highness the Khan, after disposing of all the grievances brought against his Government in the way recorded above, attended at my camp, and there in full Durbar, according to old State rule and custom, recognised Sirdars Gohur Khan and Shakar Khan as the successors respectively of the late Sirdars Taj Mahomed and Noordeen. To each the Khan gave a khillut, and congratulated them on succeeding to the Chieftainship of their respective tribes. His Highness also recognised the young Sirdar of the Sarawans, Asad Khan, as successor of his father, and bestowed on him the usual khillat. His father, Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, is still alive, but for reasons unnecessary to record here the Sarawans in 1872 had deposed him, and given his "dustar" to his son Asad Khan, who is a fine intelligent lad, and now with me here.

10. At the close of the Durbar, a full description of which is given in diary for the week ending 14th July, the whole of the settlement papers, as well as the terms on which the Khan had agreed to make peace with the Sirdars, were introduced into Durbar on a chair on which the Koran was placed. The terms of peace were then read out by Lala Hittoo Ram, also the agreement for the better protection of the Bolan Pass,* as well as the Khan of Khelat's memorandum, on the basis of which the Khan agreed to come to terms of peace with the Sirdars.

* See p. 226.

11. At the conclusion of the reading of these papers a salute of 19 guns was fired to announce to all that peace between the Khan of Khelat and his Sirdars had taken place. All then said the "Fattiah" or Mahomedan oath usually taken on all such ceremonies and occasions as the one the Khan and his Sirdars had been engaged in, whereby they bound themselves to be guided by the terms of peace just declared, and by the settlement as recorded in the papers then before them in Durbar. An account of the Durbar, and the programme according to which it was conducted, as well as the translation of the spontaneous address presented to me at its conclusion by Mir Jam Ali and the whole of the Sirdars of Beloochistan, were submitted to you along with the diary for the week ending 14th July.

12. I have thus, as described above, carried out the instructions of the Government of India as contained in their Resolutions of the 16th October 1875 and the 14th of March 1876, which can be briefly summed up as follows. I was directed to arrange a meeting between the Khan of Khelat and his Sirdars of Jalawans and Sarawans; to influence the Khan of Khelat cordially to carry out at this meeting the objects of the Government set forth in the first-named Resolution. These briefly were to arrange for the safety of the Bolan Pass traffic, to settle tribal quarrels, and to report on the general relations between the Boogtee and Murree tribes and the Khelat Government. As stated, all these have been carried out; but with reference to the last point it is desirable here to notice that the Boogtees are on friendly terms with the Khelat Government. The negotiations with the Murree clan have not yet been entirely brought to a conclusion. The Muzerani or Bolan Murrees have taken service and agreed to help Sirdar Alla Dina Koord in the protection of the Bolan Pass, and a few of them and one headman will always remain with the Koords on duty for the protection of the pass at Kirta. His Highness the Khan has written a letter to the Murree Sirdar regarding the terms of peace to be arranged between the Khelat Government and the entire Murree clan. This letter his Highness made over for delivery to Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan, who is now at the Murree head-quarters, endeavouring to consolidate present arrangements for the protection of Kutchi. His Highness in his letter to Sirdar Ghuzzun Khan has invited the Murree Sirdar and his headman to meet him in Kutchi in the cold weather. *Until* this meeting takes place I trust to be able to keep the peace between the two sides. I may here mention that for nine months the Murree Sirdar at my request has succeeded in preventing his tribe from raiding in Kutchi, which augurs well for the honesty of his professions, and for his desire to act up to them.

13. His Highness the Khan of Khelat having, therefore, cordially carried out the orders of the Government of India as described in this and former reports referred to

herein, I am of opinion that the provisions of paragraphs 29 and 12 respectively of the afore-named Resolutions with regard to future relations with the Khelat Government should be at once put in force. I here quote the former for the sake of easy reference; —" Should the measures now authorised be successful in affording reasonable security " to trade through Khelat territory, and should his Highness the Khan show an earnest " desire to co-operate for this end, and to return to a proper sense of his duties, it will " afford the Governor-General in Council great pleasure, on receiving an expression of " regret for what has occurred, to restore the former subsidy, and re-establish the old " friendly footing with his Highness' Government." In considering this point I earnestly hope that the requests of his Highness, as contained in his letter to the address of his Excellency the Viceroy alluded to in paragraph 6 of this report, may receive the favourable consideration of the Government of India. I believe from what I have heard that his treasury is nearly exhausted, and that to give his Government a fair start the material aid of our Government is required. This might be done by applying a portion of the arrears of the allowance due to his Highness in the way proposed by me in my former report, No. 122, dated 14th June 1876, and the remainder in replenishing his treasury and in re-imbursing him for the Rs. 90,000 paid by him for the plunder of kafilas in 1872.

14. In considering this it has to be remembered that the Commissioner's settlement of 1872 declared the Sirdars liable not only for the plunder of the kafilas, but for the losses the ryots of the Khelat State sustained during the rebellion of that year. Their poverty apparently necessitated Rs. 90,000 of the Rs. 1,00,000 given to his Highness being distributed to the plundered merchants, while nothing, it seems, was recovered of the plunder taken from the ryots of Gundava, Bagh, Mustung, Quetta, Khozdar, and Dadar. As already reported by me, it was the hope of getting the present peace arranged on the basis of the former one that caused the Khan to delay in coming to Mustung. For reasons given in that report I could not consent to his Highness' request. Moreover, I knew the Sirdars were too poor to pay anything. I trust, therefore, that what I now advance may tell in favour of his Highness when the Government come to fully consider the present sitnation.

15. Regarding my proposals for the protection of the Kandahar caravan trade as contained in this office No. 139, dated 1st July 1876, in addition to what I have already said therein, I merely desire to add that I propose to depute Captain Wylie, directly it is cool enough, to Dadar to report as to whether the Koords and others are acting up to their agreements. The presence of a European officer at Dadar to mediate when necessary between the tribes and the Khan's officials regarding disputes about fees, &c. due on kafilas (for the present at all events) would be very valuable, and in deputing Captain Wylie on the duty I know that my views and wishes will be scrupulously attended to and carried out with tact and judgment. I propose that he should hold with reference to the Candahar trade very much the position towards the Khelat Government which the British Joint Commissioner at Ladakh holds towards the Government of Cashmere. It is well in considering this proposal to remember that the additional Rupees 25,000 which I propose to add to the subsidy of Rupees 50,000 to be paid to his Highness the Khan is conditional on the Bolan Pass being permanently kept open. His Highness therefore would, I know, under such circumstances be glad of Captain Wylie's aid with his officials in maintaining the pass arrangement intact, while the Sirdars would hail it with the greatest satisfaction and rejoicing.

16. Before concluding this portion of my subject it is desirable to acknowledge here receipt of your docket No. 234 A., dated 20th June 1876, forwarding for my information and guidance copy of Foreign Secretary's telegram to your address, dated Simla, 14th June 1876. It is convenient for my purpose to transcribe it here. I therefore do so. It runs as follows:—

" Your telegram of the 12th received. You are to convey to Major Sandeman the Viceroy's congratulations on his having obtained the assent of the Khan, as well as the Sirdars, to the mediation of the British Government. You will also inform him that the Khan's letter has been received, and that the answer to it will be forwarded together with further instructions to Major Sandeman on receipt of the report referred to by Major Sandeman in his letter of the 24th May, but you are at the same time to instruct Major Sandeman that he must in the meanwhile be scrupulously careful not to commit the Government of India to a line of policy towards either the Khan or the Sirdars.

" The Viceroy desires to draw your attention to the fact that Major Sandeman has not yet furnished his Excellency with the details necessary for the formation of an opinion as to the true character of the complaints addressed by the Sirdars in general terms to that officer, and that many of these complaints are founded on statements

apparently incompatible with recorded facts which were carefully examined into at the time of their occurrence. The Viceroy also expects that Major Sandeman will now afford the Khan adequate opportunity to learn and answer the accusations brought against his Highness by the Sirdars, and to lay his own case fully and fairly before the Government of India. Major Sandeman will doubtless collect with impartiality and report with fidelity the statements made to him on both sides, but he will be careful not to commit himself or the Government to an opinion, or to do or say anything which can have the effect of weakening the Khan's authority in the eyes of his disaffected vassals. On receipt of the complete information which is now awaited, the Government of India will form its own judgment, and thereupon take such steps as it may deem expedient in reference thereto."

17. In reference to the first portion of the telegram recorded above, it was with feelings of deep gratitude and thankfulness that I received his Excellency the Viceroy's congratulations on the success which had attended my negociations with his Highness the Khan and his Sirdars. In regard to the middle and concluding portions, I telegraphed to you in reply referring the Government to the contents of my reports, and stating that from the first I had been scrupulously careful to maintain the honour and dignity of his Highness the Khan on every possible occasion.

18. I now desire specially to draw your attention to the statement in the telegram, the exact words of which I here again quote, viz., that "many of these complaints (of the "Sirdars) are founded on statements incompatible with recorded facts which were carefully examined into at the time of their occurrence." In stating this I think there is some misconception on the part of Government, for if you refer to the Commissioner in Sind's report No. 340, dated Jacobabad, 5th April 1872, to the address of his Excellency the Governor of Bombay, and compare the grievances of the Sirdars brought forward in it with those recently settled by me with the approval and consent of his Highness the Khan's Government, lists of which form annexures to this letter, I think you will find them to be one and the same. If I may be permitted to say so, the difference between the present mediation and the former one simply consists in the settlements now agreed to having been carried out, while the first one was merely settled on paper, but never put in force. There is abundant proof of this. I will here illustrate it.

19. For instance, take the Sirdars' complaint about the lucerne tax. Regarding this the Commissioner in his 21st paragraph of his report above referred to says:—"There "would appear to be some foundation for one act on the part of his Highness the "Khan, or his followers, which savored of not sufficient regard for the interests of the "people, that during his tour last summer in some places an undue quantity of forage "(lucerne) was appropriated and full compensation not given. At least the Wuzeer's "replies on this point are not complete, and in conversation he allowed this might have "been the case. But I would point out that this was the first time for eight years or so "that the Khan had been able to visit that neighbourhood, and it is after all not such an "unusual circumstance when native rulers traverse their country. I do not mean to say "it is right, but surely it is not sufficient to warrant rebellion as a means of obtaining "redress."

20. The above impression of this grievance of the Sirdars was given by the Wuzeer to the Commissioner, and, to say the least of it, putting it in the above light was most disingenuous of him, as it entirely misled the Commissioner as to the true nature of the complaint. The Sirdars do not object to give the Khan, free of cost, ordinary supplies of forage when encamped amongst them, this they did lately during the Khan's stay at Mustung, but what they really complained of was a very oppressive tax newly imposed on them by his Highness, full particulars of which were given in diary for the week ending 23rd June 1876. His Highness the Khan has merely in defence of the imposition of this tax to say that the obtaining of forage for the winter months by requisitions on all in the way complained of is necessary as he has an army to maintain which no former Khan kept up. He fully admits the grievance, but says he is too poor to remove it. I think the matter is one which demands the serious attention of the Government of India, simply on account of the nature of the measure called a "trangar," as it may mean, I found, any size the fancy of the Naib chose to dictate. The Brahooees did not expect to be altogether exempt from giving lucerne (which is cultivated by them in the same way as wheat, barley, &c.), but they reasonably enough desired that the size of the "trangar" should be fixed, or that the Khan's Government should levy the tax in cash instead of in kind. I very nearly obtained the sanction of the Khan to the last-named proposal, and I feel certain his Highness, if liberally dealt with regarding his yearly allowance in the way proposed by me, will take my advice on the point. He

knows that this tax falls heavily on the poorer class of cultivators, and that its levy affords a fertile source of bribery. I believe the empty state of his treasury, caused by rebellion, and having to keep up in consequence such large establishments, has had much to do with this and other acts of oppression which, without doubt, the Khelat Government has been guilty of during the last 12 or 15 years.

21. But if other examples are necessary regarding what I state, there is the fact that the grievances of the Jalawan Sirdars, including those of the Jam of Lus Beyla, for reasons given by the Commissioner in the 36th, 37th, and 38th paragraphs of his report, were not inquired into and disposed of at all. Moreover, the Sarawan Sirdars were not obliged, as directed by him, to restore all property seized during the rebellion by the Sirdars and their followers from the ryots of Beloochistan, whether in Khorassan or Kutchi. From the first the Sirdars apparently objected to do this, knowing probably that it was out of their power to do so, for the Commissioner in his 27th paragraph records: "At first the Sirdars raised objections to Nos. 2 and 3—(2) that the property "plundered from the kafilas be given up to the owners, (3) all property seized during "rebellion to be restored—but I informed them no deviation could be allowed, &c."

22. Doubtless it can be advanced that kafilas were plundered in the Bolan by the tribes after the Commissioner's mediation, and also in Bagwana and Khozdar by the late Sirdar Noordeen, and that the Rupees 90,000 paid from the Khan's treasury went to reimburse the losses of the merchants to whom they belonged. I do not think that this fact, if such it is, alters the line of reasoning in the least, for the principles on which the Commissioner's decision was based are clearly laid down in his 25th paragraph, and these are in no way altered, were this the case. He annunciates them in the following words:—"The second and third stipulations I considered only equitable and un-"questionable necessary. Were they not enforced, a premium on rebellion would have "been established, and the faithful many would have been in a worse position than the "rebellious few. The Sirdars and their followers would have largely benefited by the "plunder they got possession of when engaged in lawless proceedings, and it would have "been to the advantage of the unruly in future to side with any Chief who chose to raise "the standard of revolt, while traders who were passing through the country relying on "the good-will of the inhabitants thereof, and the poor people of the country who were "leading peaceful lives, would have been the chief sufferers."

23. These words surely can leave no doubt as to the intentions of the Commissioner and the grounds on which his decision was given, and that therefore his Highness is right when he says that it was not in accordance with the mediation of 1872, that he was mulcted in Rupees 90,000 to pay the merchants who had been plundered by the robber tribes, and that the Sirdars could not be considered to have fulfilled the conditions of the mediation until after they had returned to the ryots the plunder they and their followers had taken from them during their successful rebellion.

24. I have been particular in bringing these points forward, as to my mind they go a long way to demonstrate why it was that the former mediation did not prove successful. It seemed, moreover, desirable and necessary to explain the Khan's statements on this subject contained in his letters to my address already forwarded. But the cause for the former mediation proving unsuccessful will be still more apparent if in addition we consider the case of the late Sirdar Noordeen and his exclusion from it, as well as the imprisonment of Sirdar Mir Khan of Lus Beyla, his son Mir Jam Ali, and brother-in-law (Noordeen's own brother) Mir Ibrahim Khan. The fact of the exclusion of Noordeen from the mediation did not escape the notice of the Government of India, for in the 4th paragraph of the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 1214P., dated the 30th May 1872, to the Secretary to Government, Bombay, in recording their opinion on the subject, they expressed their anxiety at it in the following words:—

"As to the advisability of the Commissioner's procedure in abstaining from further endeavours to bring Noordeen Mingul within the compass of the reconciliation effected between the other Sirdars and the Khan, his Excellency in Council is disposed to believe that it would be better even yet to hold out to him a direct offer of an amicable settlement. Unless, indeed, Sir William Merewether feels sure of the Khan's ability to coerce him. Until the disorders consequent on the Sirdar's continuance in arms are put a stop to, the suppression of the insurrection cannot be considered as complete. Intelligence of the steps taken with this end, and of the measure of success by which they are attended, will therefore be anxiously awaited by the Government of India."

25. After this was written, it is true that Sirdar Noordeen did submit to the Shahgassee, and that such was reported, and that in consequence he was placed by his Highness in charge of the province of Lus. But I would ask you in considering this

to remember that notwithstanding his nominal surrender (subsequent events have proved it was only nominal), his sister's husband, Mir Khan, whose place Sirdar Noordeen took as ruler of the province of Lus Beyla, remained in our hands a prisoner, as well as his own brother and nephew. Under such circumstances, unless (as noticed by the Government of India in their letter above referred to) the Khan had the power to coerce Noordeen and maintain the peace of the Jalawan country, as well as that of Lus Beyla, the suppression of the insurrection could not be considered as complete, and therefore as a sequence the mediation could hardly have been expected to prove effective.

26. I will now briefly notice the form of Khelat rule and demonstrate the absolute necessity that exists for the Government of India in order to preserve the peace of the country which it has brought about only after great trouble and expense, taking a much more active part in Khelat politics than it has hitherto done. Both the Khan of Khelat and his Sirdars look to the British Government as the paramount power to settle all quarrels and difficulties that from time to time may arise between them, and consider themselves entirely subordinate to it. This feeling is very strong with both sides, and in our own interests surely we ought to cherish and maintain it.

27. On account of the long civil war which has existed more or less since the present Khan came to the throne 20 years ago, the estrangement of the Khelat Government from the Sirdars of Beloochistan has become greater and greater year by year, until the two sides had come to act as if their interests were entirely separate, instead of being, as is really the case, identical. Until the date of the recent peace not one of the Sirdars of Beloochistan, with the exception of Sirdar Fakir Muhammad Bezonjao, Naib of Kedj, had the least intercourse for good with the Khan or his Government.

28. But recent events have shown that however deep the evil had penetrated at heart, both sides felt it to be a great one, and one the British Government alone had power to cure. This appears clear from the memorandum filed by the Khan, which formed the basis on which peace was made, and from the fact that the Khan, on the opportunity being afforded him by the intervention of the British Government, at once recognised the election by the tribes of Sirdars Gohur Khan, Shakar Khan, and Asad Khan to the Chieftainships respectively of Zehri, Mingul, and Sarawan. This is a very important point and worthy of much thought, for it is also a fact that Gohur Khan since the death of Sirdar Taj Mahomed in 1865 had refused, because he was not recognised as his successor, to be reconciled to the Khelat Government. He and his followers infested the roads and injured trade and the Khan's Government, on the opportunity offering, in every possible way. Yet when called upon by me to come to Mustung and pay his respects to his Highness, he not only did so without demur, but on his election by the tribe being recognised, he made full submission to the Khan and took the oath of allegiance to his Government. As a result it is admitted on all sides that for the future the Raj route to Kurrachee viâ Lus Beyla, as well as the one by the Mulla Pass to Jacobabad, will be perfectly safe. Surely this is a very instructive episode in the history of Khelat politics and speaks volumes. I read it in this light. That although the Khan and his Sirdars have been separated by circumstances for years, their estrangement is not incurable. That both sides feel the necessity that exists for supremacy being maintained over them by the British Government, and recognise to the full that its interference in their joint interests when necessary can alone preserve the peace of their country. This is further clear, I think, from both sides desiring the British Government to deprive them of the power to wage civil war until after they have obtained permission from it to levy it.

29. At the present moment the Khelat Government consists of the Khan and his Naibs as the civil administrators of the country, and his two commanders, Fakir Muhammad and Mosun Khan, at the head of about 2,500 mercenary soldiers, most of whom are Pathans from the Candahar and Pesheen valleys, as his military power. Most of the Naibs are household slaves, and the Khan has invested them with absolute and irresponsible power. In short, on account of the life of retirement his Highness leads, being shut up in his palace from one year's end to the other, there is no check on them whatever. As said, with the exception of Sirdar Fakir Muhammad, not a single Sirdar is connected with the civil administration of the country.

30. When I first asked his Highness to come to Mustung, I heard he was quite *willing* to do so; but that one of his Commanders, Mosun Khan, who is a Pathan *from* the Pesheen Valley, did all he could to prevent it. However, the influence of *this officer* was not all powerful, and the Khan, on certain matters regarding which I have already reported being explained to him, at once did as I requested.

31. Still, as the Sirdars are very numerous, and as they and their tribes form the real strength of the country, to preserve the peace between the two sides under present

circumstances and difficulties of the situation, the direct interference of the British Government acting as the paramount power is absolutely necessary and must be maintained. The Khan, his Sirdars, and civil and military administrators know this perfectly, and have one and all expressed to me their conviction of the entire impossibility of forming or continuing a united or harmonious administration without a continuance of the assistance and direction so lately afforded them by my mediation; hence the mention even of my leaving the country has been viewed by both parties in the State with dismay. But to make its interference really effective for the future, the British Government must state to both sides that it accepts the responsibility they desire to enforce on it, and will aid them materially, as the paramount power, to preserve the peace of the country, and moreover in my opinion it should be fully impressed on all that the British Government will view with extreme displeasure, now that the affairs of the country have been got into respectable order, any departure on the part of his Highness' Government or on the side of the Sirdars from the terms of peace agreed to between them at Mustung, and which they have taken a solemn oath to abide by.

32. Personally the Khan, Mir Khodadad Khan, is a weak Prince, but at the same time he is not without considerable ability. During the recent negotiations, I have watched him carefully and well; and although convinced of this, I am equally so of his loyalty and devotion to our Government, whose interests he considers to be his care, as far as he has the power to watch over them. He is very easily influenced for good or evil, but has the greatest respect for the British Government, and I feel certain from what I have seen of him that any advice his Excellency the Viceroy may consider it expedient to give him when replying to his letter lately forwarded will not pass unheeded. But much will depend on the form it takes, and in saying this, I trust I do not exceed my province. I say so because my own experience of the Khan has told me that on account of his peculiar temperament and education, advice when given to be lasting must be impressive, and must act as a salve to his own doubting, uncertain, and hesitating nature. There is nothing that I have seen about him to make me believe that he is at heart evil-disposed, cruel, or in any way unworthy of the kindness and consideration of our Government. Far from it: I firmly believe the present unhappy state of his Government has been brought about and is due as much to force of circumstances over which he had no control as to any other cause. But taking the state of affairs as described by me into consideration, and as I believe them really to exist, it will, I doubt not, readily be admitted that the presence of an experienced European officer (for the present at all events) at his Court, fully supported by our Government, to aid and guide him in the management of the Khanate is essentially necessary, and unless this is granted, I am of opinion the present mediation will not get a fair trial, and the peace of the country consequently will probably not last.

33. It now becomes my pleasing duty to bring to notice the exemplary conduct of the troops composing my escort, which has been very prominent and has merited my warmest thanks and gratitude. Since the time we entered Beloochistan up to date not a complaint of any kind by the people of the country has been brought against any officer or soldier belonging to them.

34. To Captain Humfrey my most sincere thanks are due for the ready aid he has rendered me on every possible occasion. I consider his services to the Government on account of the way he has maintained discipline amongst the troops and for the help he has given me generally have been conspicuous, as certified to in the last paragraph by fact. He informs me that although the troops of the escort of all ranks number 900 men, yet, as he is on escort duty and not on field service, he gets no command allowance; I have seen his work and know the responsibility he has had to accept in its performance. I trust, therefore, the Government of India may be pleased to allow me to enter in the political bill of the mission, the command allowance of Rupees 600 a month, which Captain Humfrey would have been entitled to had he commanded the troops as a field force and not merely as an escort. He is a most deserving officer, and I trust the Government, on an opportunity offering, will not forget his services during the present mission to Khelat. He has been ably aided by his staff officer, Lieutenant Harrison, whose services I doubt not he will bring to the notice of Government. I merely mention them here to certify that they have not passed unnoticed by me, and that I thoroughly appreciated them.

35. The officers on special duty with me, Captain Wylie and Dr. Duke, are entitled to very high praise for the way they have worked under me. Captain Wylie has been with me for nine months, and is a most reliable and industrious officer, doing his duty on all occasions with such thorough heartiness and good-will as to ensure to him at once the confidence of the officer under whom he is serving. I have asked in paragraph 15 of

this report to be allowed to retain his service in connexion with the Bolan Pass trade.

36. Dr. Duke's conduct, as already reported, during the cholera was beyond all praise I believe it was due to his zeal and devotion to duty that we were able so speedily to shake off the disease, and that so few who were seized with it died. I understand that he desires to remain with the Political Agency on its re-establishment, and I am sure you will confirm what I say in stating that Government, should it bestow the appointment on him, could nowhere find a medical officer more fitted for the duty. I do not know what the emoluments are, but I trust they will be sufficient to induce an officer of Dr. Duke's medical skill and ability to accept the appointment. From a political point of view a medical officer attached to this Agency of tried skill and ability must be very valuable and a great desideratum.

37. Where all have behaved well it seems invidious to mention any officer or officers in particular, but I feel I would not do my duty did I not mention Captains Young, Scott, and Shepherd, and Dr. MacRury. These officers had a very trying time of it during the cholera. Captain Shepherd I employed on several occasions with his Highness the Khan. I consider him a most reliable, obliging, and deserving officer, and one in whom I could place confidence. His Ressaldar Mahomed Amir Khan was of the greatest value to me, as I employed him once or twice on really important duty in connexion with the recent negotiations, and I consider he is deserving of the consideration of Government.

38. The services of Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan, who from the first conducted the negotiations with the Khelat Government, and were members of the committees which assembled to decide the disputes pending between his Highness the Khan and the Sirdars, were invaluable. Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan's zeal and devotion to British interests has already received on many occasions the highest approval of yourself and every officer without exception, military or civil, with whom he has served. Only lately you specially brought his eminent services on our frontier to the notice of Government. I will address you separately regarding these two Sirdars' services, and will recommend what, in my opinion, would be a suitable reward.

39. The services of Lala Hittoo Ram and Ganpat Rai, respectively my Vernacular and English clerks, although performed in a humbler capacity, have not been of less value. The duty I had to entrust to them has been heavy and important, as the commissariat work to a great extent had to be performed by them, and many miscellaneous accounts in consequence had to be kept. No officer could have been better served in this particular than I have been by them, and I will also in a separate communication propose a suitable reward for them.

40. This report would not be complete did I not record that, although some of the Khan's Naibs are not deserving of praise, some are. Wakil Muhammad Khan, his son Naib Pir Jan, and Mustaufi Fakir Muhammad worked very well, and in settling the disputes between the Khan and his Sirdars evinced an excellent spirit. In reward I bestowed on them khilluts in the name of the Government in public Durbar, and I trust my doing so will meet with your approval and with that of the Government.

Enclosure 2 in No. 123.

Appendix A.

Translation of the terms of peace arranged between his Highness the Khan of Khelat, Mir Khodadad Khan, and Mir Jam Ali of Lus Beyla, acting for his father, Jam Mir Khan, and the Brahooee Sirdars of Beloochistan.

1. Whereas quarrels for some years past have existed between the Khelat Government, Mir Jam Ali Khan, son of Jam Mir Khan, Ruler of Lus Beyla, and the Sarawan and Jalawan Chiefs, Major Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan, on special duty, was deputed by the British Government to mediate between the said Khan of Khelat, Mir Jam Ali, and the Jalawan and Sarawan Sirdars; and whereas the said Major Sandeman has so mediated and given his advice to the Khan of Khelat and his Sirdars, and the said parties having availed themselves of it, have willingly agreed to make peace (the terms of which are recorded herein) and we do hereby declare it.

2. We, the Sarawan and Jarawan Sirdars, do announce our submission and allegiance to his Highness Mir Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat, which we make in accordance

with ancient rule and custom, his Highness having restored to us (in accordance with ancient law and precedent) our ancient rights and privileges, and having promised for the future to treat us with every kindness and consideration, provided we continue loyal and faithful to the Khelat Government according to old State usage.

3. His Highness the Khan has granted the following concessions to us, his Sirdars :—

1st. His Highness confirms the election of Sirdar Asad Khan, son of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, to be the Sirdar of the Sarawans, and has acknowledged him as such in Durbar, and has presented him publicly with the usual khillut.

2nd. His Highness acknowledges and confirms the election of Sirdar Gohur Khan of Zehri by the Jalawans as Sirdar of Zehri in room of the late Taj Mahomed, and has presented him with the usual khillut.

3rd. His Highness recognises Mir Shakar Khan, son of the late Sirdar Noordeen, as Sirdar of the Minguls, and agrees that Mir Ibrahim Khan, his uncle, shall act for him until he is of age. He has received the usual khillut from his Highness.

4. We, Mir Jam Ali Khan, son of Jam Mir Khan, and the Sarawan and Jalawan Sirdars having made public submission to his Highness according to precedent and ancient custom, and having presented the Khan with a petition asking his Highness to intercede with the British Government for the release of Jam Mir Khan, now in confinement in British territory, and his Highness the Khan having received the petition and having granted it; his Highness forwarded it under cover of a letter from himself to Major Sandeman asking that officer to send both to the British Government with a view to Jam Mir Khan being released. This wish we repeat in this record for the consideration of the British Government.

5. His Highness presented Mir Jam Ali with a khillut as an acknowledgment of peace having been declared between Khelat and Lus Beyla and of his having been taken into favour.

6. The complaints and grievances brought by the Sarawan and Jalawan Sirdars regarding the confiscation of lands, &c. against the Khelat Government were settled by a Committee appointed by his Highness the Khan. The members of the Committee were Sirdars Moolla Mahomed of Sarawan, Imam Buksh Khan, Mazari, and Jamal Khan, Lugari, on the part of the Sirdars, and Wakil Nawab Muhammad Khan, Mustaufi Fakir Muhammad, and Mulla Abdulla Jan on the part of his Highness the Khan. The Committee having carefully inquired into each case recorded their opinion in writing, which was presented to his Highness, who also recorded his opinion and order on each case. The papers containing the list of cases, the result of each inquiry and final decision are separate, but we, the Brahooee Sirdars, agree to the decisions recorded therein by his Highness the Khan, and will abide by them.

7. The separate agreement recorded in writing come to by Major Sandeman with his Highness the Khan regarding the protection of the Bolan Pass trade, we, the Khan of Khelat and the Sarawan Sirdars, do hereby agree to and will abide by its terms.

8. His Highness the Khan hereby agrees to treat his Sirdars of Sarawan and Jalawan with kindness and consideration in accordance with their respective positions which have been handed down to them from their forefathers. On the other hand, the Sirdars do promise to obey the Khan of Khelat's order according to old usage. His Highness the Khan and the Sarawan and Jalawan Sirdars do hereby agree that what has passed between them be forgotten. For the future should the Khan's Naibs or other officials cause any Brahooee injury or oppress him, the matter will be referred to the Khan for inquiry and decision, and the Sirdars on this account will not rebel against the Khelat Government; but should the Khan not do justice, will first refer the disputed point to the British Government for decision. In the same way the Khan will not wage civil war against the Sirdars for any offence until his Highness has first referred the point in dispute through the Political Agent to the British Government. I, Mir Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat, and we, his Sirdars of Sarawan and Jalawan, agree to this condition. In short, we all bind ourselves to hold (1) by the conditions contained in the memorandum which set forth the preliminary conditions of peace; (2) by the settlement papers containing the award of the arbitrators confirmed by the Khan; (3) by the Bolan Pass agreement, to which we (the Khan of Khelat and his Sirdars of Sarawan) have affixed our seals, and we swear to be bound by their conditions. Further, we (the Khan of Khelat and his Sirdars of Sarawan and Jalawan) do hereby heartily agree to aid to the best of our power in keeping open the trade routes, to preserve the peace of the country, and we swear we will do nothing to violate this our written agreement of peace. This

our joint agreement we make over to the British Government as a record of the terms of peace made between us, and to which we have affixed our seals.

(Seal of) Mir Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat.
(Seal of) Mir Jam Ali, of Lus Beyla.
(Seal of) Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, of Sarawan.
(Seal of) Sirdar Gohur Khan, of Zehri.
(Seal of) Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, Mingul.
(Seal of) Wudera Shadi Khan, Bungalzai Chief.
(Seal of) Sirdar Said Khan, Muhammadshahi.
(Seal of) Sirdar Alla Dina, Koord.
(Seal of) Sirdar Rahman Khan Zagar, Chief of Noshki.
(Seal of) Sirdar Kadir Buksh, Sarfara.
(Seal of) Sirdar Alam Khan.
(Seal of) Sirdar Chakar Khan.
(Seal of) Sirdar Junda Khan, Shawani.
(Seal of) Sorah Khan.

Witnessed and signed by Major Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan.

Camp Mustung, 13th July 1876.

Enclosure 3 in No. 123.

Translation of Appendix B.

Statement of Complaints made by Brahooees of the Sarawan Faction against the Khelat Government, in regard to Confiscation and Attachment of Lands, &c. formerly held by the Complainants, as brought before the Committee of Arbitrators approved by the Khan of Khelat and the Complainants, in Camp, at Mustung, in July 1876.

No.	Name of Complainant.	Abstract cause of Complaint.	Abstract rejoinder by Mulla Faiz Muhammad, Naib of Mustung.	Abstract Decision of Arbitrators.		Order of his Highness the Khan of Khelat.	Notes by Major Sandeman.
				On part of Khan. — 1. Nawab Mulla Muhammad Khan. 2. Mulla Fakir Muhammad Mustaufi. 3. Mulla Abdulla Khan.	On part of Sirdars. — 1. Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan. 2. Jamal Khan. 3. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Khan Raisanee.		
1	Muhammad Khan and Shadi Khan, sons of Kaisar Khan and Muzar.	The Hufdu Tank Karez has ever belonged free to complainants who possess the following Sunnuds :—1, from Nusseer Khan the Less dated 11th Rujub 1258 H.; 2, from the same, dated 1st Jumadi-ul-awul 1259 H.; 3, Sheredil Khan of 21st Rabi-ul-awal 1280 H.; 4, Mir Khodadad Khan Sahib, 11th Jumadi-ul-sani 1280 H., in which last it is written that these grants are upheld as per his father's Sunnuds. The grants come from Mir Mehrab Khan. These have been confiscated since commencement of troubles. Restitution is claimed.	These lands are in the Shaul Ilaqua. I know nothing of them. It is the Khan's prerogative to confer such grants.	The right of complainants is clearly proved by an examination of the Sunnuds which have been granted by successive rulers, including the present Khan, who will probably not object to the restoration of the grants.		The request of the arbitrators is acceded to.	The Khan has granted fresh Sunnuds to the claimants in accord with the decision.
2	Khelati Gurani -	Possesses a Sunnud of Mir Abdulla Khan, dated 1st Mohurrum 1141 H., to the Maliks of Pishin, confirmatory of purchase of shares of irrigation water in the Askuna and Pushkurm, watercourses from Duranis and Mulazais, and a 2nd Sunnud from Mir Nusseer Khan the Greater of 8th Zikut 475 H. Mir Khodadad Khan confirmed these by a Sunnud of 15th Mohurrum 1281 H. produced. Naib Faiz Muhammad attached these last year.	Although the attachment for one year was made owing to complainant's failure to serve, his rights have lately been restored to him.	As the Naib admits restoration, there is no cause for further inquiry.		Complainant's rights will be maintained without dispute.	Ditto.

3	Ahmed Gurani	Complainant's uncle purchased a share of irrigation water from Mirza, son of Gul Muhammad Malik of Pyzhgurm. Possesses a Sunnud of Mir Nusseer Khan the Less, dated 10th Zulkud 1250 H., confirmatory of the purchase.	I attached this share of water for one year, but was directed by the Khan to release it to the owners.	As the Naib admits restoration, there is no cause for further inquiry.	Complainant's rights will be maintained without dispute.	The Khan has granted fresh Sunnud to the claimants in accord with the decision.
4	Said Khan and others, Muhammad Shahi Headmen, Kadir Buksh Surpurra.	The lands of Tori and Dusht in Ghurk belong to complainants, a Sunnud of Mir Kallay Khan, dated Mohurrum, 1128 H., who divided the lands. The Tori lands were confiscated by Mir Mehrab Khan, a Sunnud not being forthcoming; the Dusht lands are waste. The Naib Faiz Muhammad has attached these. The Sunnud is now produced and the lands claimed.	In the time of Mir Mehrab Khan and Muhammad Khan the ancestors of Malik Karun and others claimed these lands, and they were found to be theirs. The lands have since remained in their possession. The Khan only takes 1-10th of the mahsul. The complainants should sue the zemindars. If the lands are found to belong to zemindars, the Khan will take mahsul as usual; if otherwise complainants will receive the grant. Again, he says the proprietory right in the lands is the Khan's, who takes besides 1-10th mahsul, 1-4th share as malikana. The zemindars are goat-herds and possess Sunnuds.	The Tori lands were confiscated in Mir Mehrab Khan's time, and no claim to them will now stand. Inquiry is necessary regarding the Dusht lands according to the Muhammadan law. No zemindars appearing, it is decided that the Dusht lands remain with complainants. If any zemindar claims, he must sue according to the Muhammadan law. The Government has no claim to the land which belongs to the zemindars.	This case has come up twice to-day. The proposal of the arbitrators is accepted and I have no claim. If the zemindars sue, they must do so according to Muhammadan law.	Ditto.
5	Mittha, son of Jehan Khan Shahwani.	By Sunnud of 10th Jummadi-ul-Awul 1183 H., from Mir Nusseer Khan the Greater, the mahsul of two nights of water from the Chotu Karez was granted free to complainant, but in Mir Khodadad's time a cess has for years been levied by the Government.	The Sunnud presented by the complainant is genuine. But subsequently to the grant it was sometimes resumed and sometimes released in the time of Mir Mehrab Khan and Mir Nusseer Khan. If the Khan is addressed by the Sirdars he will confirm the grant.	Dad Rusim zemindar having taken oath that this mafi was resumed in time of Mir Nusseer Khan, the arbitrators consider that it should not now be released.	The cess imposed will be taken as usual. There is no reason for release.	The Khan confirmed the arbitrator's decision.
6	Nawab Shoranzai, son of Hirbeg.	The lands of Hazangungi belong to complainant, as per following Sunnuds —1st, deed of sale between Jehan Khan, Saleh Khan, and Ibrahim Khan, sellers, and Yar Ali and Miru, purchasers of 4 bunds Khuskaba for Rs. 30, dated Shuban, 1252 H.; 2nd, of Safr 1246 H. Arbabs Khwaja Hussan and Ali Muhammad sell 1 bund Khuskaba for Rs. 90 to Miru and Hirbeg Shoranzai; 3rd, deed of sale Mohurrum 1241 H., of Puttu Khan, son of Sheikh Dad and Khwaja Dad, Imdad and Walidad, three *kuos* of land in Hazangungi to Miru Min-	The zemindars sold these lands to the Khan, and they will prove their proprietary right. Four zemindars appear at Mustung, viz., Dad Rusim, Ali Murdan, Dad Muhammad, Pir Baksh, and stated that at the time of their sale of the lands to the Khan they did not see the Sunnuds now produced; seeing them now they attest them as genuine deeds of their ancestors. Let the lands be examined. Whatever is proved to belong to the complainants can be given to them. The rest will be the Khan's, according to the sales of	As the claim of complainants appear good according to the Sunnuds, they are entitled to be deemed proprietors of these lands. Should any remain over beyond the limits of the puttahs it may be deemed to belong to the Khan. Arbitrators should settle the boundaries.	The Khan accepts the decision of the arbitrators.	The Khan has issued orders to the Naib in accord with this decision.

Translation of Appendix B.—*continued.*

No.	Name of Complainant.	Abstract cause of Complaint.	Abstract rejoinder by Mulla Faiz Muhammad, Naib of Mustung.	Abstract Decision of Arbitrators.		Order of his Highness the Khan of Khelat.	Notes by Major Sandeman.
				On part of Khan. — 1. Nawab Mulla Muhammad Khan. 2. Mulla Fakir Muhammad Mustaufi. 3. Mulla Abdulla Khan.	On part of Sirdars. — 1. Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan. 2. Jamal Khan. 3. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Khan Raisani.		
		gul for Rs. 50; 4th, deed of sale 1st Rubi-ul-Sani 1247 H., from Abdul Ghunni Malikdad Mulla Shah Morad of 3 bunds Khuskaba land to Miru Shoranzai; 5th, deed of sale Rubi-ul-Sani 1247 H., from Abdul Gunni and Malikdad Miran and Malikdad of 3 bunds of Khuskaba land in Hazangungi for Rs. 30 to Miru Shoranzai; 6th, deed of sale, torn, Sheikh Gul Sher of one kuo of land to Miru for Rs. 17; 7th, deed of sale by Malik Muhammad Hosein a piece of land for Rs. 75 to Miru Shoranzai.	land by zemindars to the Khan. Three other Arbabs arriving later made the same statements.				
7	Shukar Khan Bundrani, son of Bijur Khan.	Two and a half nights of water from the Wutten Karez were granted according to the following Sunnuds free:—1st, deed of sale of Mohurrum 1230 H.; 2nd, deed of sale of Zulkud 1248 H.; 3rd, Sunnud of Mir Mehrat Khan of 9th Zilhuj 1248 H.; 4th, Sunnud of 1st Mohurrum 1276 H, from Mir Khodadad Khan; 5th, Sunnud 10th Mohurrum 1277 H., of Mir Khodadad Khan.	The Naib expresses ignorance of this case, and refers to Munshi Muhammad Murad, who also professes ignorance.	The mafi rights are proved by Sunnuds, and on the Khelat Government's part there is no proof of attachment or confiscation in Mir Nusseer Khan the Less' time; it is proper that the mafi should be released.		The Khan orders the cess to be discontinued and the mafi maintained according to the decision of arbitrators. The Naib must not interfere with complainant.	The Khan has granted complainant a new Sunnud.
8	Ditto - -	One night's water rate of Karez Dukun Singi was granted to complainant free as per Sunnuds; notwithstand the Naib levies the rate or cess—1st sanad deed of sale 1st Rumzan of 1226 H., from Malik Dushada Khan, and Safar Khan, of one day and one night's water, a cess being leviable on the land; 2nd, Sunnud of Khodadad Khan of 10th Mohurrum 1273 H.	Expresses ignorance. Refers to the Sunnuds and zemindars.	From the Sunnuds it appears that the zemindars in the first instance entered in the deeds that no "Kulong" was leviable; the complainants are entitled to the mafi. Let the Khan's agents recover the cess from the zemindars on whom the *onus probandi* will lie.		Khan agrees to decision of arbitrators that Government dues be not levied from complainants, but from the selling zemindars if they can't prove mafi on their own account.	Ditto.

9	Ditto - -	A piece of land in Bund Mal Khama belongs to complainant. Possesses sanads as follows:—Deed of sale of Mohurrum 1227 H. The Naib has deprived him of the land.	The Government doesn't claim the land but $\frac{1}{10}$th share as mahsul. One Butu Hoti claims the land. Let the parties settle the matter according to the Shuryut. The Khan will realise his revenue.	Butu did not appear, and his claim cannot be accepted on statement of another party. The land should remain with complainant. Butu can sue at the Shuryut if he chooses; the Government will receive its share of Butai.	Agrees to decision	Ditto.
10	Mitha, son of Jehan Khan, Shawani, Nubbee Buksh, and Imam Buksh Kalundrani.	By a deed of sale of Zulhuj 1247 H., from Dewun Gungarum of two nights of water from the Chotu Karez for Rs. 1,200 to Taj Muhammad Kalundrani, Suleiman Shahwani, Rumzan Kalundrani. Mir Mehrab Khan's seal is on the deed of sale. Land has been attached.	I did not at first see the seal on the paper. Now that it is found to bear Mehrab Khan's seal there can be no objection to it.	According to deed of sale and the Khan's seal, complainant's claim is just and proved. Nobody can interfere with them.	Ditto - -	Ditto.
11	Ditto - -	Of 13 Shabunu or night shares of water the rate for two was mafi, and they paid in the other 11. Now they are dealt with differently from what a Sunnud of Mir Nusseer Khan the Great requires, dated 10th Jamadi-awul 1183 H.	Now on seeing the Sunnuds can give no good reply, the matter must be disposed of by the Khan.	The state of this case is similar to that in No. 5, and they recommend as in that case.	Khan concurs -	Ditto.
12	Khoda Buksh and Nubbee Buksh Shawani.	According to puttah of 1283 H., the Shubji boundary between the lands Chotu and the Karez Sultan Arfin. The Hindu proprietors of the latter should be confined to the part below the limit.	The limit fixed by the puttah is correct, but the cultivated land is within the Arfin bounds, whose owners are present. The Government has a $\frac{1}{4}$th share in the Karez but not in the Chotu Karez. Let the owners and neighbours be examined.	According to the Sunnud the limit is fixed. Should any land according to this Sunnud prove to be complainants', it should be given to them.	Khan agrees -	Khan has given orders to his Naib and a Sunnud to complainants.
13	Wali Muhammad, Muhammad Shahi.	A piece of land in Thul Dura Khan, according to a deed of sale Mohurrum 1275 H., is complainant's. Mulla Faiz Muhammad has taken $\frac{1}{4}$th of produce for a year past.	When the mark of a Karez is visible, the Government is entitled to a $\frac{1}{4}$th share. Former Naibs did not levy it, but I assert the Government right. There is no mention of a Government share in the deed of sale.	As the descendants of the sellers are present, and they attest the sale and mafi, of which latter they hold the proofs, but the Naib declares that Government has taken $\frac{1}{4}$th as Butai for 18 years, and complainant denies having ever given Butai, which has been levied since last year only. Accounts were called for, but the Naib could not produce them. The arbitrators accordingly rule in favour of complainant.	Khan concurs -	Ditto.
14	Buhmu Khan, son of Abdul Ghunni Muhammad Shahi.	In Thul Hajdurra Khan there is a bund the bounds of which are in a Sunnud, property of complainant's ancestors, in Mustung. A deed of sale, from Isarmul of Mohurrum 1267 H., under seal of Mir Nusseer Khan the Less, proves it.	Although owing to the seller and owner was a Government servant, the Government had a claim, the presence of Nusseer Khan's seal shows that there can now be no claim.	The deed of sale bears the seal of Nusseer Khan, hence the Naib's claim upon this land cannot be entertained.	Ditto - -	Ditto.

Translation of Appendix B.—*continued.*

No.	Name of Complainant.	Abstract cause of Complaint.	Abstract rejoinder by Mulla Faiz Muhammad, Naib of Mustung.	Abstract Decision of Arbitrators.		Order of his Highness the Khan of Khelat.	Notes by Major Sandeman.
				On part of Khan.	On part of Sirdars.		
				1. Nawab Mulla Muhammad Khan. 2. Mulla Fakir Muhammad Mustaufi. 3. Mulla Abdulla Khan.	1. Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan. 2. Jamal Khan. 3. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Khan Raisani.		
15	Buhmu Khan, son of Abdul Ghunni Muhammad Shahi.	By a deed of mortgage of Jummadi-Awul 1278 H., Arbad Khwaja Husn and Abdul Ghunni a Kushur of land in Karez Tul limits was mortgaged for Rs. 600. Last year Naib Faiz Muhammad appropriated this land.	Having a claim against the Khwaja Khel, he took possession. The case can be settled according to the Shuryut. If it is not this, he will release it. The Bunhers are wealthy.	The Khwaja Khels confirm the fact of the mortgage, and the Naib is in the place of mortgager by proxy. The Naib Faiz Muhammad can sue the Khwja Khela at the Shuryut; complainants must keep the land till their money is restored.		Khan concurs -	Khan has given orders to his Naib and a Sunnud to complainants.
16	Ditto - -	By deed of sale of Jumadi-ul-Awul 1274 H. from Sahib Zada Mulla Muhammad Yakoob, 3 nights and 2 watches out of 4 nights and days of water with land on the Akhond's Karez was given for Rs. 2,250, but it has been attached.	The Naib says he and his brothers owned 6 nights share of water in this Karez, and some of the land was Government's. In Mehrab Khan's time the Akhund, who was a Vakil of the Khan, brought the land into his own possession. The Naib, for the above reasons, got all the sharers last year to surrender 2 nights of water under the Kazi's seal to himself.	The Naib having failed to produce the alleged co-sharers in the water referred to by him, the complainants' claim is deemed to be a just one.		Ditto - -	Ditto.
17	Ditto - -	The Dundla lands in Mustung belong to complainants according to deed of sale of 1257 H. From that time they never paid "Kulung" or other dues upon them. Since last year the Naib takes "Kulung" on their account.	No dues were formerly paid on these lands, but six years ago, during the Naibship of Rahimdad, revenue began to be levied. Last year the arrears due for four years were exacted.	It has been shown that no "Kulung" used to be taken on the lands referred to. If the Naib has lately taken it, he should not have done so, and the lands should be freed from it in future.		Ditto - -	Ditto.
18	Ditto - -	By deed of sale of Rumzan 1277 H. a piece of land near the Tut Karez belongs to complainants. The Government has confiscated them for 5 or 6 years.	The Naib says the confiscation took place previously to his appointment as Naib, and he knows nothing about it.	It appears from a Sunnud produced by Nek Muhammad Khwaja Khel, written in Sufar 1242 H., that this land belonged to the Khwaja Khels, who voluntarily sold it. Complainants' claim is a just one.		Ditto - -	Ditto.
19	Shadin Khan Muhammad Shahi.	By deed of sale Shabun 1251 H. a piece of land on the Tundla Karez was bought for Rs. 40, but it has	Naib's reply as in No. 17 - -	The same ruling as in No. 17 -		Ditto - -	Ditto.

20	Bahara Khan Muhammad Shahi.	By deed of sale of 1275 H. a cultivated piece of land within the Shur Karez limits belongs to complainants, and on it no "Kulung" was levied; but last year the Naib took possession.	Naib says he did make a claim, which he has since abandoned in view of the objections raised.	The Naib's reply shows that complainants are entitled to what they claim. They possess ample proofs moreover.	Ditto - -	Ditto.
21	Samandur Muhammad Shahi.	Several pieces of land—Kubr Kul-under in Mehab town have ever belonged to complainant's family. Possesses several Sunnuds, but the Naib Faiz Muhammad interferes.	The Naib denies having ever preferred any claim to these lands.	This is a clear case requiring no further investigation. Complainant's claim is just.	Khan concurs -	Ditto.
22	Daulat Khan Shawani.	Two nights of water in the Mubarik Karez are complainant's, according to a deed of purchase from one Ata Muhammad Shah for Rs. 900. The Naib Faiz Muhammad has taken possession.	This land was given long ago by Said Atta Muhammad Shah to Atta Muhammad Shah for digging a Karez, but the latter was unable to dig the whole. After that Syud Mir Muhammad, a relative of Ali Muhammad Shah, sold the land to Naib Mulla Muhammad Hussan, whose property being confiscated, these lands were included in the confiscation, and a Karez was dug on them; there has been 10 years possession.	After inquiry of Syud Ali Muhammad Shah, it is found that Atta Muhammad Shah, the seller, was sole proprietor. Muhammad Hussan the Naib's right is not proved. Complainant's claim appears a just one, and should be conceded.	itto - -	Ditto.
23	Saleh Muhammad Mingul.	Has cultivating rights in Kung, as per following Sunnuds held of the present Khan of Khelat and his predecessors, —1st Sunnud of Muhammad Khan of Rubi-ul-sani 1220 H., 2nd of Mehrab Khan 27th Zilhaj 1254 H., 3rd of Mir Nusseer Khan the Less, Shawul 1262 H., 4th of Jamadi-ul-Sani 1281 H., from Mir Khodadad Khan.	Naib prefers no claim. Let the rights conceded by Sunnud be maintained.	Complainant being in possession of genuine Sunnuds, to which no objection is made, he should be confirmed in possession of his rights.	Khan agrees to adherence to terms of the Sunnuds.	Orders issued accordingly to the Naib of Mustung.
24	Ditto - -	Uncultivated land in Kung limits belongs to complainant, as per Sunnuds. Let these be seen and the lands released from attachment.	This mafi was confiscated in time of Nusseer Khan, and cannot be released.	Muhammad Khan Isiani and Sirdar Mulla Muhammad Khan attest the confiscation in Nusseer Khan's time. Complainant's claim cannot therefore be entertained.	Concurs with arbitrators.	Ditto.
	Khan, Arit Sohrab Khan, mad, er.	The Karezes of Kalir and Piri belong to complainants, as per Sunnud of Rujub 1255 H., proving purchase from Said Ali Muhammad Shah, whose receipt they hold. The Naib has attached two nights water.	If complainants or Said Ali Muhammad Shah possess Sunnuds, let them produce them. Complainants have forcibly held possession 8 or 10 years ago in the Naibship of Rahman Khan. The mafi was suspended and night shares of water fixed for Government. If there are no Sunnuds, let boundaries be settled according to puttahs.	On investigation, it is found that the lands on these Karezes have long been held as free grants by the claimants and those from whom they purchased them. Having been attached in Mir Khodadad's time, they should be released; the boundaries to be maintained according to puttahs. Munsiffs to settle these on the spot.	Khan concurs in the decision.	Ditto.

Translation of Appendix B.—*continued.*

	[illegible]nt.	Abstract cause of Complainant.	Abstract rejoinder by Mulla Faiz Muhammad, Naib of Mustung.	Abstract Decision of Arbitrators.		Order of his Highness the Khan of Khelat.	Notes by Major Sandeman.
				On part of Khan. — 1. Nawab Mulla Muhammad Khan. 2. Mulla Fakir Muhammad Mustaufi. 3. Mulla Abdulla Khan.	On part of Sirdars. — 1. Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan. 2. Jamal Khan. 3. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Khan Raisani.		
	Saleh Muhammad Mingul, Shahizai.	All the land on the Kungur Canal, according to following Sunnuds, are complainant's :— 1st, Rubi-ul-awul - 1199 H. 2nd, Ramzan - - „ 3rd, Ditto - - „ 4th, Rujub - - 1197 5th, Jamadi-ul-awul - 1187 6th, Zulkad - - 1199 7th, Rubi-ul-awul - 1199 8th, Ramzan - - 1188 9th, Rubi-ul-awul - 1199 10th, ditto - 1199 The Naib has taken possession of them.	The Government had a claim to four "khurwars" of grain annually on these lands. The Naib never took it from complainants but from Shadi Khan Khwja Khel, the real proprietor. He is now impoverished, and the Naib has taken it lately from complainants.	Complainant is in possession by right of Sunnuds possessed by him. The Naib has no right to interfere. If any partner in the lands has a claim, he can sue at the Shuryut.		Khan concurs in the decision.	Orders issued accordingly to the Naib of Mustung.
27	Ali Muhammad and Mian Khan Shawani.	According to the following Sunnuds complainants pay a $\frac{1}{5}$th share on the Chakul Karezes. The Naib exacts $\frac{1}{4}$th share—1st Sunnud of Rubi-ul-Sani 1186 H., of Mir Nusseer Khan the Greater; 2nd, of Rubi-ul-Sani 1284H., of Mir Khodadad Khan.	Faiz Muhammad Naib says that $\frac{1}{4}$th had been fixed previously to his Naibship. Whatever is in the Sunnuds can be followed.	As the complainants' Sunnuds are not disputed, their terms should be acted up to.		Khan concurs -	Ditto.
28	Saleh Muhammad Mingul Shahizai.	By deed of sale of Mohurrum 1271 H. owns a tuppah of land purchased by him, on part of which are certain buildings. The seal of Naib Abdul Aziz is on the deed. Another writing of Mir Nusseer Khan of Rujab 1266 H. proves. The Naib Faiz Muhammad has confiscated these or attached them.	The Naib rejoins that one Wali Muhammad Durani gave these lands to the Khan of Khelat as a gift five or six years ago. Let the complainant and Wali Muhammad settle the matter between themselves.	Complainant being in possession of written proofs of his claim under seal of the Khan's Naib, the lands should be released and made over to complainant. Any other claims can be settled at the Shuryut.		Ditto - -	Ditto.
29	Rustam Mehri	By deed of sale Rubi-ul-awul 1281 H., from Wuzeer, complainant owns two shares (watches) of water and two pieces of land in the Kingur land, for which he paid Rs. 100. The Naib takes cesses contrary to Sunnud.	Naib has no rejoinder to make -	The seller having attested the fact that no kulong cess was ever levied on this land, it should be released to complainant.		Ditto - -	Ditto.

30	All the Sarawan Sirdars in concert.	Complain that in the time of former rulers of Khelat, the levy of a trangar of grass from the people was not customary. The present Khan has imposed this tax for several years past. The weight or size of a trangar as a measuring test has not been fixed, and the people are oppressed by the exaction. In fact, this imposition is a chief cause of the troubles in the State. The Khan's officials do as they like with the people in this matter. Let the British Government relieve the people from this. They have no objection to give supplies on occasions of the Khan's journeys through the country in ordinary course according to old usage.	This grass contribution by trangars has been fixed by the Khan of Khelat for the camels and horses of his military force. If it is stopped, it will be difficult to maintain these troops. No fixed measure of trangar exists, every fourth day one trangar per Karez is taken. For six months this grass is collected from the zemindars. It constitutes the forage of the animals during the winter months.	As this contribution has been ordered for the first time during the Government of the present Khan of Khelat, owing to his having raised a larger military force than was customary, and especially as the size of trangar has not been fixed, and little regard is paid to the capacities of Karezes, there can be no doubt that the zemindars are much oppressed. It is advisable either that the Khan let the people off contributing half the trangar and fix the size of the other half, or, in lieu of this imposition, take a money contribution in lieu, to be collected with the ordinary revenue.	The Khan represents that the troops cannot get on without grass, and that he therefore can neither reduce the quantity nor take money in lieu. For the present year, he agrees to waive levying this contribution from the Brahooees, and for the future will be led by what the British Government may advise.	There is no doubt that this matter of levying grass trangars has been a main cause of dispute. A proper settlement of it is desirable. I have entered my views on the subject in my report for the orders of Government.

Enclosure 4 in No. 123.

Translation of Appendix C.

Statement of Complaints by Jalawan Sirdars against the Khelat Government and the Decisions arrived at regarding them by the Committee of Arbitrators, as below appointed, with sanction of the Khan of Khelat and approval of Complainants, by Major Sandeman, to arbitrate at Mustung in July 1876.

Members of Committee on part of his Highness the Khan.

1. Nawab Mulla Muhammad Khan Wakil.
2. Mustaufi Fakir Muhammad.
3. Mulla Abdulla Khan.

Members approved by Sirdars.

1. Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan, Mazari.
2. Sirdar Jamal Khan, Lugari.
3. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Khan.

No.	Representations of Jalawan Sirdars.	Decision of Arbitrators.	His Highness the Khan of Khelat's Order.	Remarks by Major Sandeman.
1	Sirdar Mir Jam Ali Khan, in concert with all the Jalawan Sirdars, solicit the release from imprisonment of Jam Mir Khan, on their security, that the said Jam shall, in accordance with the custom of his ancestors, maintain friendship with his Highness the Khan of Khelat, who has acceded to the requisition intimating that he (the Khan) shall not without permission of the British Government commence hostilities against the Jam, and the requisitions as sureties for the Jam promise the same on the Jam's part.	The arbitrators are of opinion that there is no objection or impediment now to the release of the Jam of Lus Beyla.	Agrees to the recommendation of the arbitrators.	All the Sarawan and Jalawan Sirdars have unanimously made solicitations in favour of the release of Jam Mir Khan. The Khan of Khelat having acceded to their request sent a *Murasila* or letter to Major Sandeman soliciting the Jam's release, which has been sent by him to the English Government.
2	The Jalawan Sirdars in concert solicit that the properties left by will of one Mir Kumal Attazai in Baghbana Kutchi, &c., which had never for 25 years during the Governments of Mir Nusseer Khan, Mir Khodadad Khan, Sheredil Khan been attached, should now be released to Mir Jam Ali Khan from the attachment which the present Khan has imposed a second time during his supremacy; 8 years ago the Khan released the lands from a former attachment giving Sunnuds. Again, 4 or 5 months afterwards he caused a reattachment.	This matter is worthy of disposal by the Government of India, until the receipt of whose orders the Khan of Khelat can retain possession.	Khan agrees to proposal of arbitrators.	Particulars of this case have been reported to the Government, whose orders on it will be awaited.
3	The Sirdars declare they are ready to acknowledge Sirdar Mir Gohur Khan, in room of Sirdar Mir Taj Mahomed Khan, as Sirdar of all Zehri and Jalawan.	The Khan of Khelat having agreed, there can be no objection.	Khan concurs in the proposal.	The Khan of Khelat formally invested Mir Gohur Khan in Durbar, giving him at khillut.

4	The Sirdars make a similar requisition in favour of Mir Shakur Khan, a minor to be installed as Sirdar of the Minguls, in room of his late father Noordeen, Sirdar Mir Ibrahim, his uncle, and brother of the late Noordeen, to act as guardian until Shakur Khan come of age.	There seems to be no objection to the proposal -	The Khan concurs -	The Khan presented a khillut to Mir Ibrahim Khan in Durbar.
5	Similarly, Sirdar Mir Saleh Muhammad should be acknowledged as Chief of the Musianis, in room of Kaisur Khan, his nephew.	The arbitrators are of opinion that Umeid Ali, brother of Kaisur Khan, has a preferable claim.	The Khan agreed to confer the turban of Chiefship upon Umeid Ali, as recommended by arbitrators.	The parties agreed that the turban of Chiefship should remain with Umeid Ali, who will be aided by Saleh Muhammad in conducting affairs.
6	Again they recommend that Sirdar Futteh Muhammad Sotiani be appointed Chief of the Sotianis, in room of his deceased brother Kumal Khan.	Arbitrators approve - - - -	Khan concurs.	
7	The Sirdars request that the property of the late Taj Mahomed, whether in Kutchi or in Khorassan, and his share in Mula Kelun, &c., which the Khan of Khelat and Taj Mahomed shared equally, be given to Mir Gohur Khan, and that certain taxes levied for the last 3 or 4 years from the Hindoos of Zehri be discontinued.	The transfer to Gohur Khan of the real property of Taj Mahomed Khan in Kujun Kutchi and Zehri is not objected to by the Khan, but half of Mula Kelun belongs to the Khan, and the other half was given to the Khan by deed of gift, which is producible. The arbitrators do not think this last point to be proved, because the Khan of Khelat's possession anteriorly to Taj Mahomed's imprisonment is not proved. If the tax on Hindoos comes down from Nusseer Khan's time, good and well; if not, it should be discontinued.	Khan concurred in proposals of arbitrators.	As one matter regarding a provision for the mother and widows of Taj Mahomed had to be considered, all the Sirdars, whether Sarawan or Jalawan, proposed that Rs. 1,200 and 24 khurwars of grain harvest should be given them by Gohur Khan. The Khan of Khelat concurred in the propriety of carrying out that proposal.
8	In Zehri there is a stream or canal. Three courses from it are maat, and from the other three $\frac{1}{6}$th share of produce is taken by the Khelat Government. Besides that, the Government now takes grass and other products; this is contrary to custom. It is solicited that only grass be taken, as before.	The request is proper - - - -	Khan concurs - -	The Khan has issued a fresh Sunnud to the complaining parties.
9	After Sirdar Noordeen's death, 7 months ago, Dad Muhammad Kulram and two slaves were detained. Their release is solicited.	The request is proper - - - -	Ditto - - -	The Khan on arrival at Khelat released them according to promise.
10	The property of one Khusal, which comes rightly by inheritance to Mir Saleh Muhammad, Muhammad Khan, and Mir Gohur Khan, was confiscated by the Khelat Government, and should be released.	Whatever may be shown to belong to these persons should be given them, and whatever it has been customary to give the Sirdars should be continued.	Ditto - - -	As Umeid Ali has been appointed Sirdar, the share of the Chief will be given to him. A Sunnud has been given to the others.
11	A sum of Rs. 60 kulong annually levied from Rahnju village in name of Mir Shakur Khan, and all the Jataks has been taken by the Government for 10 years past, and this year the crops of Rahnju and Kuni have also been seized. A return is solicited.	If complainant possesses a Sunnud confirmatory of the grant, and can show that he was in possession during the time of Nusseer Khan the Less, and that the attachment took place in time of the present Khan, there is no objection to release.	Khan agrees to conditions imposed by arbitrators.	The Khan has issued a new Sunnud to the claimants.

Translation of Appendix C.—*continued.*

No.	Representations of Jalawan Sirdars.	Decision of Arbitrators.	His Highness the Khan of Khelat's Order.	Remarks by Major Sandeman.
12	A similar request is made regarding the property of one Ghozak Fazliwalla, which has for three years been attached.	This property was confiscated owing to murder of Shumir and a brother. Complainant says he has satisfied their relatives. If he can prove that the attachment will be taken off.	Khan agrees to conditions imposed by arbitrators.	
13	One fourth of Ghozak's land produce used to be taken. Since 3 or 4 years $\frac{1}{3}$rd is taken. It is solicited that the old custom may be reverted to.	If the $\frac{1}{4}$th was fixed in Mir Nusseer's time it should be taken now. Proofs to be produced at Khelat.	Ditto - -	The Khan has given a new Sunnud.
14	Owing to Badajung and Dinarzai fight, the Khan took a bond for Rs. 5,500 as a fine. In presence of Sirdar Noordeen Khan, 7 months ago, the Khan agreed to remit the fine; but the bond remained in his office. Its return is solicited with the order of remission endorsed, as the parties will settle among themselves. The Khan was not in the habit of levying fines.	There is no objection, apparently, on the Khan's part to return of the bond, which will be given over by his officials on arrival at Khelat.	Khan concurs.	
15	The property of Ali Sher Moghimzoi in Ghizuk has been attached for 7 or 8 years. Its release is solicited.	If the attachment took place in Nusseer Khan's time it will remain. If in the present Khan's time it will be released.	Ditto - - -	Orders issued accordingly to the Naib.
16	In Kutchi the whole property of Chatr Faleji in Bast Ghurdher was confiscated by Nusseer Khan the year of his death. Its release is craved.	As it was done in Nusseer Khan's time the request is not to be entertained.	Ditto.	
17	After death of Sirdar Noordeen, the property of Chatr Faleji in Kutchi and Sohrab belonging to the Shubizai and Minguls was all confiscated, 7 months ago. Release solicited.	No objection to this request - - -	Ditto - - -	The Khan has granted a new writing in this case.
18	The property of Shabizai and Minguls in Kota became the property of Government owing to the issue of springs—Kalapani—in the time of Mehrab Khan on drying up of the springs. Mir Nusseer Khan restored the lands to the original owners. Again, in this Khan's time, the springs again gave out water, and he re-attached the lands; but 7 years ago they closed again. Release of this land is requested.	If the springs are dry the Khelat Government will have nothing to say to the land. If they flow again the land will be attached, as before.	Ditto - - -	Ditto.
19	Sheru, a servant of Sirdar Noordeen, after his master's death, went to Baghbana where he had property and a brother. The Naib of Khozdar, by order of the Khan, took from him Rs. 200 and a horse forcibly. Return of these solicited.	The horse will be restored by the Khan's officials, and Major Sandeman will give order as to the money.	Ditto - - -	No remark.

20	Mulla Muhammad Munshi, Mubaruk and 14 other persons, including women and children, were imprisoned by the Khan 4 years ago, and Sirdar Noordeen Khan wanted to release them, on payment to the Khan of Rs. 1,600. At time of Noordeen's death a balance of Rs. 140 was due. On account of this the Khan of Khelat's officials re-imprisoned the Munshi and his cousin, asking Rs. 400, and placing the women and Mubaruk under surveillance at Khozdar. The release of all these is requested and remission of the additional Rs. 400 asked for.	The Mulla, his cousin, and all the others will be set free. The Khan's officials have no objection to this.	Khan consents - -	The Munshi and his cousin were set free on Khan's arrival at Khelat.
21	The property of Mir Saleh Muhammed Shabizai in Nasirabad was attached 12 years ago by the Khan. Restoration solicited.	If complainant had possession at Mir Nusseer Khan's death the property will be restored; and if, owing to lands being waste, he did not hold possession, and they were not attached, they will be released.	Ditto - -	The Khan gave a new Sunnud and orders to the Naib accordingly.
22	Mir Futteh Khan Shaizai had property in Tong village. The Khan's servants seized it 7 years ago. Its restoration solicited. In Beg Meri Ilaqua, village Kori and in Kutchi, Duh Chutr and Kanori village, $3\frac{1}{2}$ shares of our inheritance were. Of these the whole of Kuria Kori and the rest were taken possession of 7 years ago. Return solicited.	As these attachments or confiscations took place in the time of Mir Nusseer Khan they cannot now be released.	Khan concurs.	
23	Last year Ruhmut, a Shahwani Mingul, was imprisoned by the Khan's officials, on account of the murder of one Dada Zehri, and 400 sheep and two guns, and a sword were taken possession of. Ruhmut is still in prison. It is hoped that fair blood-money shall be taken and his release sanctioned.	The property confiscated in this case cannot be returned. The Khan will order release of the prisoner.	Ditto - - -	On arrival at Khelat the Khan ordered Ruhmut's release from prison.
24	Lands in Mal Gorukmuri belonging to Mir Mohim Khan and others were attached 4 or 5 years ago by Khan's officials. Release solicited (details of shares given).	In Mal village the Khan had no property; the Minwaris gave him some. The complainant claims two shares, and the Khan will release them. If others have claims amongst themselves, they can be settled at the Shuryut, and if the Minwaris are found to own any part of the 2 shares at the Shuryut, that part will revert to the Khan.	Ditto - - -	The Khan issued a new Sunnud.
25	The property of Gauhur Khan Dadmuri in village Sohrab was attached 2 years ago. Restoration sought. Rs. 2,700 were imposed on account of the murder of a Zehri by another person, and Rs. 200, a sword, and matchlock were actually taken. Return solicited.	Sums credited to the Khan's treasury cannot be returned, but property confiscated will be accounted for, and the Khan will not claim the balance of money due. Complainant must satisfy relatives of the murdered man, with aid of Sirdar Gohur Khan.	Ditto - -	An order to Gohur Khan was issued by the Khan, asking him to aid in settling the matter with the deceased's relatives.
26	The property of Muhammad Murad Harowni in Gurgul was taken possession of by Government three years ago. Rs. 2,000 are asked oppressively, and Rs. 100 have been paid. Let that and the land be returned.	As in last case - - - - -	Ditto.	

Translation of Appendix C.—*continued.*

No.	Representations of Jalawan Sirdars.	Decision of Arbitrators.	His Highness the Khan of Khelat's Order.	Remarks by Major Sandeman.
27	Mir Muhammad Shabizai, who has long been with the Khan, should be prohibited from interfering with Jalawan possessions henceforward, and especially with Mir Ibrahim Khan and his nephew's affairs.	No objection to this request being complied with -	Khan agreed - -	Mir Muhammad and Mir Ibrahim Khan voluntarily produced a written engagement to the effect that Mir Muhammad would not interfere with Sirdar's matters again.
28	The practice of seizing camels and taking grass, &c. in certain villages (16 of which are named) which has obtained for 4 or 5 years on the part of Khan's officials towards the inhabitants, and which practice is opposed to ancient custom, should be at once discontinued.	Camels will be taken by the Khan on occasions of hostilities arising, or of travelling to or from Kutchi at the rates of hire fixed by Mir Nusseer Khan. As regards the rest remission will be accorded.	Khan consents - -	The Khan issued a new Sunnud confirmatory of this arrangement.
29	The Hindoos living in Jallawan were formerly exempted from taxation. The Khan for 4 or 5 years past has taxed them, and they won't come. Their absence is a great loss. Reversion to old system solicited.	If taxes were not taken by Nusseer Khan, the imposition will be done away with. Proofs to be produced by Khan's servants before the Sahib; if they can't produce the proofs, the taxes will be taken off.	Ditto - - -	Khan has issued orders accordingly to Naibs.
30	The Mingul Kafilas that go to Punjkoor with dates used to be free from taxation. The Khan's officials now exact 1 rupee per camel, and have done so for 3 or 4 years. Exemption solicited.	Arbitrators rule as above. If not taken in Nusseor Khan's time, exemption will be granted.	Ditto - - -	Ditto.
31	The property of Taj Mahomed in Punjkoor and Khelat was confiscated after his death. It is requested that it may be restored to Sirdar Gohur Khan.	Gohur Khan lays no claim to property in Khelat. Whatever may remain in Punjkoor will be released by the Khan, on attestation of Muhammad Khan Isiani, Futteh Khan Shabizai, Saleh Muhammad Shabizai, Isa Khan Mingul.	Ditto - - -	A new Sunnud issued by Khan in accord with this decision.
32	One Zarur Zehri was imprisoned last year by Khan's order; Rs. 2,000 are demanded of him. He paid Rs. 1,000, and was in prison two months; released on security for payment of remainder. As injustice was done, remission solicited.	Return of money from treasury impossible; the rest remitted.	Khan consents.	
33	The property of Mir Murad Ali and Mir Isa Khan Shabizai in Kutchi, at Chuttur and Palaji, has belonged to the Jalawans for generations, who have always enjoyed the produce. Last year the Khan of Khelat took forcible possession of these lands, the restoration of which is claimed.	The claim is correct. The Khan will have no objection to restore the lands.	Ditto.	

MEMORANDUM.

A note by the Khan of Khelat subjoined to the Statement records that he has perused this statement, the opinions and recommendations of the arbitrators, the replies of his officials, and has ratified the whole by his seal and signature on the 11th July 1876 at Mustung. The signatures of 8 Sirdars, viz., Sirdars Mir Ali Khan, Mir Gohur Khan Zehri, Haim Khan Goruknari, Mir Ibrahim Khan Mingul, Mir Chakur Khan Jung, Mir Gauhur Khan Rodmani, Saleh Muhammad Misiani, Futteh Muhammad Khan, are also attached with seals to the statement.

Enclosure 5 in No. 123.

Appendix D.

Rules.

The following rules for the guidance of the Sirdars and Naibs in conducting the civil administration of the Khelat State received the assent of his Highness the Khan of Khelat on the 1st August 1876 :—

Whereas the late civil war created great difficulty in the administration of the Khelat State, which of late years, contrary to ancient usage, has been entirely in the hands of the Naibs, supported by a small body of regular troops; and whereas peace has been again restored to the country, I, Mir Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat, direct that the former civil administration of the country be restored, and I publish the following rules, which this day have received my assent, for the guidance of my Sirdars and Naibs :

The civil administration of the country is divided into four parts—

1. Collection of revenue, whether in cash or in kind.
2. Settlement of claims for money, &c.
3. The disposal of criminal cases.
4. The protection of the civil power by the military.

Regarding the first, I direct my Naibs not to interfere in any way with revenue free grants. These are to remain, as formerly, entirely in the hands of the Brahooees. But should a Brahooee purchase from a ryot land on which revenue, either in cash or in kind, has been fixed, the Naib will collect from him the usual assessment. Should any Brahooee refuse to pay the assessment to the Naib, the latter will at once refer to the Sirdar of the tribe to which the Brahooee belongs, who will realise the amount due. Should the Sirdar consider the Brahooees had just grounds for refusing to pay the assessment, he will refer them to the Naib, and should the latter concur, the claim will be dismissed. Should the Naib not agree with the Sirdar the latter can refer the dispute to his Highness the Khan, whose decision in the matter will be final, and the Sirdar will be responsible for putting it in force. After putting the Khan's order in force, should the Sirdar consider the Khan's order unjust, he can refer the matter through the Political Agent at Khelat to the British Government. The procedure recorded here applies to all disputes regarding the collection of revenue, whether in cash or in kind.

2. Money transactions, debts, &c.—As a rule, when the plaintiff and defendant belong to one and the same tribe, the Sirdar of the tribe will in accordance with ancient custom hear and dispose of the case. In the event of the Sirdar's decision giving dissatisfaction to either plaintiff or defendant, party dissatisfied can appeal to his Highness the Khan, whose decision shall be final. The Sirdar, on being informed of the Khan's decision, must put it in force. In the event of a Hindu or Dewar complaining against a Brahooee, the claim in the first instance must go before the Sirdar of the tribe. Should a settlement in which both sides concur be come to, well and good; if not the claim will be brought by the complainant before the Naib, who will dispose of it according to State law. Appeal from the Naib's order will lie to his Highness the Khan, whose decision is final and must be carried out by the Sirdar. In the event of the plaintiff being a Brahooee and the defendant a Dewar or Hindu, the claim in the first instance must be brought before the Naib, who will dispose of the case according to State law. From the Naib's order an appeal will lie to his Highness the Khan, whose decision shall be final. The order of the Naib need not be put in force by the Sirdar until the Khan's decision is known, then it must be put in force at once.

3. Regarding the disposal of all criminal cases. Should plaintiff and defendant be Brahooees or Belooch and belong to the same tribe, the Sirdar will according to ancient custom dispose of the case. An appeal from his order will lie to his Highness the Khan, whose decision shall be final and must be put in force by the Sirdar. In the event of the Sirdar not having the power for any course whatever, to enforce his Highness' order, in that case he will apply to his Highness for help to enforce the order of the Khelat Government. Should the Sirdar consider the act of his Highness an oppressive one, he can complain to the British Government through the Political Agent. In the event of the complainant being a Dewar or Hindu and the defendant a Brahooee, the case must go before the Naib, and the Sirdar, on the Naib's application, must seize the defendant and make him over to the Naib. The Sirdar can attend at the inquiry, and take part in it, and if the Naib and the Sirdar agree in the finding and sentence they will together dispose of the case. Should they differ in opinion the case will be referred to his Highness the Khan for final Orders, which will be binding on the Naib and Sirdar. Should a Brahooee escape to any tribe after committing an offence the Sirdar of that tribe

is responsible to apprehend him, and to dispose of his offence in accordance with the procedure just recorded.

4. Protection and aid to be rendered to the civil power by the military.—His Highness the Khan has the power to place troops in any part of the Khanate, whether inhabited by the Brahooees or not, for the protection of the civil power. In the event of any tribe or portion of a tribe disobeying a lawful order of the Khan, the Sirdars will be called upon in accordance with ancient law and precedent to cause the offending tribe or portion of a tribe to submit. In the event of its being necessary to resort to arms to enforce submission, the Sirdars will aid the Khan with their followers in accordance with old custom, but before war on the tribe or portion of a tribe is declared, the Khan will obtain first the sanction of the British Government before waging it. In the event of the Naibs using the troops stationed with them contrary to the procedure laid down for their guidance, and that of the Sirdars in the rules herein recorded, the complainant must refer the matter direct to his Highness the Khan, who will inquire and do justice. Should the Sirdars consider that the Khan's decision is unjust, they will not raise the standard of revolt, but will first refer the matter to the British Government for decision.

No. 124.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 22nd August 1876.

1. 16th August.—Sirdar Asad Khan of Sarawan waited on his Highness the Khan with a letter from his father addressed to the Khan, the contents of which were to the effect that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed had effected a temporary settlement of the quarrel between the Brahamzai and Raisani Brahooees, but the Sirdar asked his Highness to aid him in keeping the peace with a few sowars. His Highness the Khan sent a favourable reply to the Sirdar, and directed a few sowars to proceed and aid him as requested.

A dispute took place near Khelat between one of the Khan's peons and a Brahooee, a follower of Sirdar Asad Khan, regarding the terms on which the former was entitled to a certain supply of water for his land. His Highness the Khan referred the dispute to the Sirdar, directing him to dispose of it under the rules lately sanctioned for guidance in such matters. Sirdar Asad Khan inquired carefully into the case and ultimately took the parties before his Highness. The Kazi was sent for, and the dispute was finally settled in accordance with Muhammadan law to the satisfaction of all concerned. The case, although in itself trifling, was in other respects of importance as it established a precedent for the future.

2. 17th August.—One lakh of rupees arrived in camp from Jacobabad: Rupees 80,000 for the pay of the escort and Rupees 20,000 for the use of the Civil Department. It was escorted by 50 Sind Horse and 50 Belooch Guides, and came viâ the Mulla Pass, it being the nearest route to Jacobabad. Ressaldar Itbar Khan Rind, father of Golab* Khan, who led the murderous attack made on Raza Muhammad, reported in this office No. 163, dated 23rd July 1876, was in command of the Guides, and his deposition was recorded on the subject of his son's conduct on that occasion. The Ressaldar fully admits his son's guilt, but pleads in his son's favour that the murders of Raza Muhammad and five others were committed in revenge for the murder by Raza Muhammad of Waidad Rind, which occurred about four years ago. That he was prepared to abide by his Highness' decision in the matter. His Highness the Khan is now investigating the case, and it is expected that it will be settled according to Belooch custom without further bloodshed. The relatives of the deceased Raza Muhammad and others have arrived in Khelat and are anxious that the quarrel should be thus arranged.

* Golab Khan and the other murderers have arrived at Khelat and surrendered themselves to the Khan.—R. G. S.

3. 18th August.—Kadir Dina, brother, and Dost Muhammad, son, of Sirdar Alla Dina, arrived in camp and reported that the tribal chowkies were established in the Bolan Pass, at the Siri Bolan and at the village of Kirta. That the son of Bakhtiyar Khan, headman of Kott Mundai, was in charge of the Murrees on duty in the pass. That all was going on well, and travellers and traffic passing to and fro in perfect safety. Mullick Tail Khan and other zemindars of Kirta were busy ploughing their lands, and very shortly their families would return to the village.

4. 19th August.—Kadir Dina and Dost Muhammad visited his Highness the Khan and asked the Khan to issue orders to the Naib of Shaul Kot (Quetta) to take precautions for the protection of the kafila route to the north-west of that place. His Highness issued orders on the subject, and it was arranged that the Naib and Sirdar Alla Dina

should meet at Quetta to discuss the question. There was some doubt as to whether the portion of the route in question was within the Khelat boundary or within that of his Highness the Amir of Cabul. A letter from his Highness to Major Sandeman having reference to this point was sent to the Commissioner under cover of this Office No. 181, dated 14th August, asking the Amir to direct the Naib of Peshin to co-operate with the Naib of Quetta in protecting this portion of the kafila route. His Highness the Khan visited Major Sandeman at his camp. Letters had this day been received by his Highness from Sirdar Ghuzzun Khan and the Murree Chiefs in reply to his Highness' letter to their address sent by the hands of Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan, particulars of which were given in diary for the week ending 21st July. The contents of the Murree Sirdars' letters were discussed. They were most submissive. The Chiefs agreed to the terms of peace offered by his Highness, and wrote that they would proceed to Kutchi to meet his Highness there as requested to make their submission. (In regard to this the vernacular expression used by the Murree Sirdars was "Kadambosi," literally to kiss his Highness' feet.) At the same time letters were also received from Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan and Jamal Khan, who delivered the Khan's letter to the Murree Sirdars, and who were present when the Murri Chiefs in Council discussed its contents. The contents of these letters were also discussed. The Sirdars wrote to his Highness that they remained for a whole week at Kahan. That Sirdar Ghuzzun Khan called into Kahan the whole of the principal Murree headmen, viz., Nehal Khan, Chief of the Loharani Murrees, Fatteh Khan (Karam Khan, head Chief, was ill) Bijarani, Murree Chief, Muhammad Khan Mamdani, Murree Chief, and Shahdad Khan Sherani, and many others. The Murree Chiefs fully discussed the contents of his Highness the Khan's letter, also what Major Sandeman wrote them, and decided to make peace and to meet his Highness in Kutchi to make their submission, &c. In the meantime, in accordance with their agreement made with Major Sandeman, they decided to maintain at Kott Mundai the sowars placed there, who would be always in charge of either a cousin or nephew of Sirdar Ghuzzun Khan, their duty being to prevent attempts by Murree thieves to plunder from that direction in the Bolan Pass or Kutchi.

Note by Officiating Commissioner. Letter forwarded to Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.—A. A. MUNRO.

5. 20th August.—Mir Khera Khan, Sirdar of the Bezonjass, took his leave and started from Khelat for Nal. He obtained his Highness' permission to visit Mir Ibrahim Khan at Wudd to condole with him on account of the death of his brother, the late Sirdar Noordeen.

20th August.—Sirdar Gohur Khan of Jalawan arrived and paid his respects to his Highness the Khan, who sent a Chobdar to show the Sirdar where to encamp. His Highness also provided the Sirdar with tents.

6. 21st August.—To-day Sirdars Asad Khan of Sarawan and Gohur Khan of Jalawan together paid their respects to his Highness the Khan. Vakil Muhammad Khan privately afterwards informed Major Sandeman that his Highness was much pleased with the respectful behaviour of the two Sirdars, especially of Sirdar Gohur Khan.

Mannu Khan, Girani Brahooee, on duty in the Murree Hills, reported that some Murree thieves carried off some Dhoombkee cattle from Lehri in Kutchi. That Sirdar Ghuzzun Khan heard of it, and recovered the cattle, and sent to Sirdar Sorab Khan Dhoombkee to send for the cattle, and they would be at once given up to him. On hearing this news his Highness was much pleased.

The diary of the newswriter stationed at Kahan, the Murree head-quarters, was received to-day. It contains the following news :—

(1st.) A Hindu merchant, by name Badla, had sent 105 maunds of wool from Kahan to Rajhan in the Punjab.

(2nd.) A Khetran merchant had been plundered by a Boogtee of some property and money. The young Khetran Chief, Kadir Buksh, had visited Sirdar Ghuzzun Khan at Kahan (Sirdar Ghuzzun Khan married Kadir Buksh's father's widow) and asked him to help him to force the Boogtee thief to disgorge the plunder. Kadir Buksh had first applied for aid to Sirdar Golam Murteza, the Bugti Sirdar, who refused to in any way interfere. Sirdar Ghuzzun Khan collected his headmen and they agreed to help Kadir Buksh, provided the property was not restored by the Boogtees within two months. The Murree Chiefs informed the Boogtee Sirdar of this decision.

(3rd.) The Murree Sirdar Ghuzzun Khan had sent off his cousin Jalah Khan and 20 sowars to Mundai to prevent Murrees passing by that route on plundering expeditions towards the Bolan or Kutchi.

7. 22nd August.—Major Sandeman paid his usual weekly visit to his Highness the Khan at the palace or Miri. The usual conversation took place regarding the state of the Khanate.

A report was received that one Nechara and one Baranzai wounded in the recent fight reported in diary for week ending 15th August had died of their wounds.

No. 194, dated Camp Khelat, 29th August 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat and Khelat Frontiers.

No. 125.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 31st August 1876.

23rd August.—A letter was addressed to his Highness the Khan asking for certain information regarding the plunder of kafilas called for in Foreign Secretary's No. 1700, dated 24th July 1876, to the address of the Commissioner, Derajat. To-day, his Highness' Vakil Nawab Muhammad Khan intimated that the Khan had permitted the Khelat merchants to re-open their old trading relations with Wadd and the Jalawan country. A letter was received from Syud Aurung, Shah of Dadar, which stated that the people of Kutchi were this year cultivating largely, and that there were great rejoicings amongst them at the peace lately established between his Highness and the Brahooee Sirdars.

2. 24th August.—Mulla Faiz Muhammad, Naib of Mustung, paid a visit to Major Sandeman, and stated that he had received his Highness' orders to return to his duty at Mustung and Dadar, as he was Naib of these two places; that his Highness in dismissing him had presented him with a khillut. The Naib asked Major Sandeman to write to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed to aid and co-operate with him in dealing with the tribes, and stated that he (Faiz Muhammad) would do all he could to act in a friendly way towards the Sirdars and their tribes. Permission having been obtained through the Vakil from his Highness, Major Sandeman wrote to the Brahooee Sirdars telling them to work heartily with Naib Faiz Muhammad, who had promised on his part to show them and their tribes every consideration in his dealings with them.

3. 25th August.—To-day his Highness the Khan paid his usual weekly visit. The conversation turned on the Brahooee Sirdars and their tribes. His Highness produced a letter he had received from Sirdar Sir Biland Khan Barozai, informing his Highness that Sirdar Ghuzzun Khan, Murree, had stationed his cousin Jalab Khan with 20 sowars at Kott Mundai, and had also placed a few men on the frontier, to prevent Murree inroads into Kutchi and the Bolan Pass. The Khan expressed his pleasure at this intelligence.

4. 27th August.—To-day the Rind headman Mannu, Golab, Pahli, and others, the murderers of Raza Muhammad, Rind, arrived in camp with 35 sowars. The Vakil, Nawab Muhammad Khan, took them to his Highness the Khan, who very severely addressed them regarding their conduct in taking the law into their own hands, and destroying Raza Muhammad and his friends. His Highness said it was his intention to settle the case according to the State custom on his Highness arrival in Kutchi.

5. 28th August.—To-day Koti Khan, the cousin of Bakhtiyar Khan, Thingani Murree, the headman of Kott Mundai, accompanied by Yar Muhammad, the eldest son of Sirdar Alladina Koord, arrived in camp and paid their respects to his Highness the Khan. Koti Khan told his Highness that Bakhtiyar Khan had ten Murrees always on duty in the Kirta Chauki in the Bolan Pass; that not a single Murree had committed depredations in his Highness' territory during the past hot weather, and that he himself had been taken into service, and would loyally fulfil the agreement come to between the Murree clan and the Government of Khelat. A letter was received from Sirdar Muhammad Khan, Baruzai, Chief of Seebee. Its contents stated that the Murree Sirdar was acting up to his agreement, and that his cousin, Jalab Khan, had arrived at Kott Mundai with a party of sowars, to prevent Murrees raiding in the direction of the Bolan or Kutchi. Another piece of intelligence that Sirdar Muhammad Khan gave in his letter was that the Boogtees, to the number of 600 or 700, out of revenge for the destruction of Hyder Khan, Massurie,

and a number of Boogtees at the hands of the Zerkhan Pathans residing in Kulu, had attacked one of the Pathan townships and carried it sword in hand, killing 90 Pathans; that the Bijarani Murree Chief, on hearing of this, wrote to the Boogtees to leave Kulu and do the Pathans no further harm. The Boogtees, in reply, told the Murree Chief that he was at liberty to try and turn them out of Kulu, but Karam Khan had declined under the circumstances to attempt it. Sirdar Shah Baz is said to have led the Boogtees on the occasion named against the Zerkhan Pathans.

6. 29th August.—With reference to the above, a letter was received to-day from Sirdar Golam Murteza confirming the news sent by Sirdar Muhammad Khan, Baruzai. The Boogtee Sirdar wrote that his tribe attacked the Pathans on account of their having killed one of his headmen and a number of Boogtees; that the Boogtees were led by his son, who was completely victorious over the Pathans, carrying one of their kots or townships by assault and killing 90 of them. They captured 20 horses, 80 cows, besides a number of arms and other articles. On their side they lost 20 Boogtees killed and a number wounded.

7. 30th August.—Nawab Muhammad Khan, Vakil, by order of his Highness, sent letters for perusal received from the Naib of Punjgur. News had been received there that Sirdar Fakir Muhammad, Naib of Kedj, had made peace with Sheik Umar, Gichki; that the latter had agreed to make his submission to his Highness the Khan, and had paid up 700 gold ashrafis as revenue. It was reported that Sirdar Azaad Khan of Kharan had invited Mir Isa Khan, Gichki, to Kharan, and had betrothed his daughter to the latter's son. Mir Isa Khan had not as yet started for Kharan.

8. 31st August.—To-day his Highness directed Sirdars Gohur Khan, Zehri, and Asad Khan of Sarawan to take up and settle the Nechara and Baruzai case, particulars of which were given in diary for the week ending 15th August. The Sirdars did so, and arranged a peace between the two sides. They informed his Highness that the amount of fine the two sides would have to pay on account of blood-money could not be settled yet, as it was doubtful whether all the wounded would completely recover. They, however, became personally responsible for the future good conduct of the Brahooees concerned, and wrote a security bond binding themselves to produce the offenders on his Highness summoning them to Kutchi during his visit there in the cold weather, when the case would be finally disposed of. His Highness was pleased to approve of this arrangement.

Very heavy rains have fallen during the week. No post has been received in consequence for days, and it is reported that the roads between Khelat and Jacobabad are quite impassable on account of the hill torrents having come down and flooded the entire country. The latest advices received from Jacobabad are dated the 22nd of last month.

No. 205, dated Camp Khelat, 4th September 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

No. 126.

No. 301, dated 4th September 1876.

From Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of this office No. 295 of the 28th ultimo, forwarding Major Sandeman's final report, with appendices, on his negotiations with the Khan of Khelat and the Sirdars of that State, I have the honour herewith to submit a letter from Major Sandeman, No. 180 of the 14th ultimo, with its annexure, which latter document he wishes to be attached to his report No. 167 of the 31st July as Appendix D.*

2. The copy to which Major Sandaman refers as having accompanied the Khelat diary for the week ending 7th ultimo had been forwarded to the Private Secretary to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General previously to the receipt of the letter now enclosed.

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* Page 271.

Enclosure 1 in No. 126.

No. 180, dated Camp Khelat, 14th August 1876.

From Major R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

I submitted to you, along with diary for the week ending 7th August 1876, a translation of the rules for the better civil administration of the Khelat State promulgated by his Highness the Khan of Khelat to his Sirdars and Naibs for their information and guidance. On consideration I think it would be suitable were these rules made an appendix to this office letter No. 167, dated 31st July 1876, reporting the final result of the mediation effected by me between his Highness the Khan and his Sirdars. I shall be obliged therefore by your placing them with the appendices to that report and marking them Appendix D.

2. I make this request because already in one or two cases that have occurred since peace was declared the efficacy of these rules has been tested, and it was found that they worked well. I see prospects, therefore, of their promulgation proving of much benefit to those entrusted with the civil administration of the Khelat State, and of their aiding materially, if acted up to, in enabling the Sirdars and Naibs to maintain the peace of the country.

No. 127.

No. 302P., dated Dera Ismail Khan, 4th September 1876.

From Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In furtherance of the arrangements made by Major Sandeman in concert with his Highness the Khan of Khelat and the Chiefs of tribes on the Bolan Pass for the safe conduct of caravans through that defile to and from Candahar, it seems necessary that order should be solicited from his Highness the Amir of Cabul for securing protection to caravans between Quetta (Shawl Kot) and Peshin, the latter place being in the Amir of Cabul's territory.

2. With that view the Khan of Khelat has addressed Major Sandeman in a letter dated the 2nd ultimo, which that officer has forwarded to me, with a translation under cover of his No. 181 of the 14th ultimo, requesting me to transmit them for the consideration and orders of the Government of India.

3. I accordingly do so in the hope that the Government of India may deem it advisable to cause his Highness the Amir of Cabul to be favourably moved in this matter.

Enclosure 1 in No. 127.

No. 181, dated Camp Khelat, 14th August 1876.

From Major R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on Special Duty, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty.

I desire to draw your attention to the remarks contained in my diary for the week ending 7th August 1876, intimating that his Highness the Khan of Khelat had restored to the Dumar Kakars inhabiting the hills between Quetta and Peshin the cash and grain allowances they used to receive from the Khelat Government, but which were confiscated on account of their misconduct on their portion of the caravan route.

2. In reference to these remarks I have now the honour to submit, in original, with translation, his Highness' letter to me on the subject, and in explanation of his Highness' remarks contained therein, asking that the co-operation of the Cabul Government may be solicited in affording protection to caravans traversing that portion of the route, I desire to state that the boundary separating Afghanistan from Beloochistan occurs between Quetta and Peshin, and at some distance from these two places. His Highness the Khan's object, therefore, is to get his Highness the Amir to direct the Naib of Peshin

to act in concert and communication with the Naib of Quetta in making joint arrangements to protect caravans when traversing the road between Peshin and Quetta.

3. As I am of opinion that without some such arrangement as the one proposed the protection of caravans after they leave Quetta or Peshin, when passing to and fro between them, must remain in an unsatisfactory state, I would suggest your addressing the Government of India on the subject, with a view to their requesting his Highness the Amir of Cabul to take the protection of kafilas when traversing the portion of the caravan route referred to, into his favourable consideration, in the way requested by his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

Enclosure 2 in No. 127.

Translation of a letter, dated 11th Rujub 1293 (2nd August 1876), from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to Major R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

As Sirdar Alla Dina Koord is now in charge of the Bolan Pass arrangements for the protection of the caravan traffic, I have directed my Naib of Shawl Kot, Abdul Latif, to make over to the Sirdar Rs. 30 in cash and 5 kharwars of wheat and 5 kharwars of jowar, for payment to the Dumar Kakars, with a view to their allowing kafilas to pass unmolested up to the Gaza Bund. My Naib will render the Sirdar every aid possible in this matter. But it happens that the plunder of kafilas occurs between the Gaza Bund and Sibat border in the territory of his Highness the Amir of Cabul. I hope, therefore, you will communicate with the Amir with a view to his Highness issuing strict orders to his officials to make arrangements for the safety of caravans when traversing that part of the caravan route.

No. 128.

Dated Poona, 8th September 1876.

From his Highness Jam Mir Khan, Ex-Chief of Lus Beyla, to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

I most humbly and respectfully beg to lay these following few lines for your Lordship's favourable consideration, under the firm conviction that I shall be redressed.

It is seven years past since I am kept as a State prisoner in this country, and I am assured that your Lordship has full knowledge of the particulars of my case, consequently I do not express the same.

Under these impressions I pray to Almighty God for your Lordship's welfare and benign Government. In the meanwhile I beg to draw your Lordship's kind attention as I am given to understand that as Government had kindly sent Captain Sandeman for the amicable settlement of Beloochistan affairs, he did so, and settled the matter with my son, Sirdar Jam Ali Khan, and other Sirdars at Mustung.

With regard to the necessary arrangement of my country I have already appointed my son in charge of it, in having him full authority of the same, and I approve the agreement he may have made with Government.

I beg to crave your Lordship's attention to the fact that it is four years and half since I am in Poona, but the climate of it is disagreeable to me now. I therefore beg your Lordship will kindly allow me to remain in Bombay, that I may change the climate, pass the winter season, and the month of Ramzan festival there.

It is seven years since I am in this country, and do not desire to go to my country without permission, if your Lordship keep me ten years more. As I am disrespectfully brought from my country I do not wish to show my face there unless I am respectfully sent back to it.

Under these circumstances I beg and pray your Lordship will kindly permit me to remain in Bombay. In complying with my humble prayers I shall ever pray to God for your Lordship's long life, health, wealth, and prosperity. Answer this, please.

No. 129.

Khureeta, dated 10th September 1876 (Confidential).

From his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

It has given me sincere gratification to learn from your Highness' letter of the 10th of May last, and by subsequent communications received from Major Sandeman, that your Highness appreciates so cordially the efforts made by the British Government to extricate you from the difficulties with which you have long been surrounded.

My friend, it is not necessary for me on this occasion to consider the many points of detail raised in your letter concerning the past affairs of your country. I need only assure your Highness that, although the distracted state of affairs in Khelat has given the British Government just cause of concern and dissatisfaction, this Government has, at no period, had any other wish than to assist you in the maintenance of your power and dignity, to secure the peace and safety of your dominions, to promote the prosperity of your rule, and to enable you to exercise your authority in the manner most conducive to the interests of your Highness and the welfare of your people.

I need not point out to your Highness that these objects cannot be attained without a due regard to the established rights of the hereditary nobles of Khelat.

My friend, I offer you my sincere congratulations on the result of your successful co-operation in the peaceful settlement of the recent disputes between yourself and your Sirdars; and I have no hesitation in according my general assent to the principle of those arrangements, which, with the concurrence of your Highness, have been made by the British Agent for the future safe transit of trade through your country, and the lasting reconciliation between yourself and your nobles.

On such points of detail as are necessary I shall address a separate communication to Major Sandeman.

My friend, I am about to visit the western frontier in person, and it is my intention to be at Jacobabad on or about the 6th of December next. In a recent letter to my predecessor, your Highness, whilst expressing your desire to remain under the protection of the British Government, represented your wish to meet the Viceroy in person, in order to explain much that is in your heart.

My friend, it will give me much pleasure to meet your Highness on the occasion to which I have referred. I feel assurred that, by such personal conference, we may now bring our mutual relations to a satisfactory settlement, and permanently strengthen the ties of amity and friendship between the two Governments. It is my sincere desire that the reign of your Highness should henceforth be not only peaceful, but powerful and prosperous; and, so long as you continue to desire, and deserve, the friendship of the British Government, it will be my study to give effect to this desire.

As a special mark of my consideration for your Highness, I send this khureeta by the hands of Colonel Colley, a high officer of my personal staff, to whom your Highness can unreservedly explain your wishes, and settle, in communication with him and Major Sandeman, the necessary arrangements for our meeting at Jacobabad.

No. 130.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 8th September 1876. (Extract.)

1. 1st September.—To day Ressaldar Itbar Khan, his sons Denar and Golab, accompanied by Pahli, Mannu, and others, the murderers of Raza Muhammad, attended before his Highness the Khan, who took them all severely to task for their late conduct. The late Raza Muhammad's sons and other near relatives were also present; and his Highness, after discussing the blood feud with the two sides, made peace between them, and said he would himself, when he came to Kutchi, settle the amount of blood-money Raza Muhammad's relatives were entitled to receive from Golab and the others. Further, his Highness wrote to the Naib of Bagh in Kutchi to make arrangements to preserve the peace until the cold weather. The sons of the deceased were also warned to keep the peace.

His Highness paid Major Sandeman his usual weekly visit. A good deal of conversation took place regarding the responsibility for the kafila plundered in the cold weather by the Jalawans.

His Highness' reply to Major Sandeman's letter of the 23rd August, asking for certain information called for by the Foreign Secretary in his letter No. 1700, dated 24th July last, regarding the plundering of kafilas during the past few years, was received. A translation of his Highness' letter was submitted to Colonel Munro under cover of this Office No. 204, dated 4th September 1876.

Note by Officiating Commissioner.
Submitted in the Foreign Department.—A. A. MUNRO, Officiating Commissioner.

2. 2nd September.—Sirdars Asad Khan of Sarawan and Gohur Khan of Jalawan together paid their respects to his Highness the Khan. The Chief of the Sasolies (a branch tribe of the Jalawans) was also present in Durbar. A long-standing quarrel has existed between the Zehris and the Sasolies, about the proprietary right to certain lands. His Highness heard what Sirdars Gohur Khan and Pahar Khan had to say, as representing the two sides, and decided that the disputants ought to settle the matter according to Muhammadan law, before the Kazi. This was arranged, and a day fixed for hearing the case. The two sides were directed to produce their sunnuds, showing the grounds on which they respectively maintained their right to the disputed lands.

3. 3rd September.—Mussamut Hoor Bibi, the mother of the late Taj Mahomed, again visited Major Sandeman, and asked that a settlement should be brought about between Sirdar Gohur Khan and herself. The Sirdar was sent for, and promised to be as a son to her. She agreed to return to Zehri. His Highness the Khan also wrote to her, advising her to return home.

4. 4th September.—Sirdar Rahman Khan, of Noshki, wrote that there was a bitter quarrel between him and his nephew, Afzal Khan, about the title to the Sirdarship of the tribe. That his Highness the Khan had already arranged that the dispute was to be settled at the gathering in Kutchi in the cold weather, when his Highness and all the Sirdars would be present; but that, notwithstanding this settlement, Afzal Khan was showing signs as if he intended to put the question to the issue of a battle, and he requested that his Highness should write to Afzal Khan to tell him to behave. Sirdar Rahman Khan's letter was made over to the Vakil Nawab Muhammad Khan, who took it to his Highness for persual, who, on hearing its contents, wrote to Afzal Khan, warning him to behave, and to return to Rahman Khan certain lands of his of which he had taken possession. His Highness stated in the letter that the quarrel would be taken up and settled by him in concert with all the Sirdars on their arrival in the cold weather in Kutchi.

5. 5th September.—Major Sandeman paid his usual weekly visit to his Highness the Khan at the Miri or palace. The conversation turned on the state of affairs in Cabul, and the news lately brought by some merchants from Candahar. His Highness' Vakil Nawab Muhammad Khan said that lately the Amir had changed his habits, and was not as friendly as formerly to the British Government.

To-day the Vakil brought Pahar Khan, the Sasolie Chief, to pay his respects to Major Sandeman. Sirdar Gohur Khan was also present, and the two Chiefs were allowed fully to discuss the matter in dispute between them. The result of the discussion went to Show that Sirdar Gohur Khan had right on his side. On the Chiefs leaving, it was expected that the matter would be amicably arranged before the arrival of the sunnuds, which his Highness had directed the two sides to produce before the Kazi.

6. 6th September.—Yakub Khan, brother of Tail Khan, and Nubbee Buksh, the headmen of the village of Kirta, in the Bolan Pass, arrived in camp, and reported that 20 families had returned, and had re-occupied the village; that they were busily engaged in re-building their houses, and had also cultivated about 200 acres of land, with *jowar* for the autumn harvest, and were engaged in ploughing the land for the spring or wheat crop. That the Murrees were quite friendly, and some Muzerani Murrees were employed in the Kirta Chowki. These headmen were made over to Vakil Muhammad Khan, who was to take a favourable opportunity of introducing them to his Highness the Khan.

To-day Koti Khan, nephew of Bukhtiyar Khan, the Murree Chief of Kot Mundai, took his leave, and departed for his village.

7. 7th September.—Sirdar Gohur Khan, of Jalawan, reported that he and Pahar Khan had made up their quarrel, the latter having abandoned his claim to the land. That he (Sirdar Gohur Khan) had paid Sirdar Pahar Khan a visit at his tent, and they were now friends. The two Chiefs, with their headmen, visited Major Sandeman, who sent them with Sirdar Asad Khan, of Sarawan, to his Highness the Khan, to whom they stated the way the dispute had been disposed of. His Highness was much pleased at the result, and gave Sirdar Pahar Khan leave to return to his home.

The Langhaw Brahooees complained to Sirdar Asad Khan that the Khan's officials had demanded from them 1,000 loads of lucerne grass; that they could not give so much,

and they asked their Sirdar to interfere. The matter was referred to the Vakil, who promised to represent the case to his Highness. It was arranged that the Langhaws would give 400 loads, and it was hoped that this amount would satisfy the Khan.

A suitable khillut was bestowed on each of the headmen of Kirta, and 200 rupees given them in cash to help them to rebuild their houses. The re-occupation of Kirta is an immense boon to the caravans passing to and fro through the Bolan Pass.

8. 8th September.—To-day his Highness paid his usual weekly visit. The proclamation, dated the 18th August, of his Excellency the Viceroy announcing to the people of India that Her Majesty the Queen had assumed the title of Empress of India, and that a Durbar was to be held at Delhi, in celebration of the event, on the 1st of January next, was carefully translated, and read to his Highness the Khan, who expressed great interest in the auspicious event. Although the question was not put to his Highness as to whether he would like to be invited to the Durbar, still, from what passed, the impression was formed that he would be glad of an invitation, which, if given, he would accept.

Were his Highness to visit Delhi to be present at the Durbar, he would require to go as the guest of the British Government, as he is far too poor to pay his own expenses.

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Sirdar Gohur Khan, with permission of his Highness, exhumed the remains of the late Sirdar Noordeen, and sent them to Wudd, to be buried beside the late Sirdar's forefathers.

Mussamut Hoor Bibi visited Major Sandeman, who was present at an interview between her and Sirdar Gohur Khan, at which arrangements were come to about her debts. On taking her leave she said she was to depart next morning for Zehri.

No. 211, dated Camp Khelat, 11th September 1876.

Endorsed by the Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

No. 131.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 15th September 1876.

1. 9th September.—This morning his Highness the Khan visited the camp of the 4th Sikh Infantry, and witnessed a parade of the troops under Captain Scott. The Khan was greatly interested in the manœuvres, and expressed himself as highly pleased with them. At the close of the parade his Highness inspected the different classes of men, viz., Sikhs, Dogras, Pathans, and Mussulman Punjabis, of which the 4th Sikhs are composed, and in taking his departure presented the men with 100 rupees. Some races were run between the 4th Sikhs and Jacob's Rifles, all of which were won by the former.

To-day Sirdar Gohur Khan visited his Highness the Khan, and asked permission to return to Zehri. The Khan granted it. The Sirdar then asked the Khan to employ him in any way he could be useful. In reply his Highness exhorted him, now that he had been recognised as the Sirdar of the Zehris, to treat his people kindly and justly; that by doing this he would continue in favour with his Highness and with the British Government. The Sirdar thanked his Highness very gratefully for speaking to him so kindly, and promised to do as advised, and hoped the Khan would always find him loyal and true to his Government.

2. 11th September.—Sirdar Moolla Mahomed reported that he had failed to settle the Rustumzai and Shahizai quarrel, particulars of which were given in diary for the week ending 31st August. He had, however, made a truce between the two sides for one and a half months. His Highness the Khan and Major Sandeman, after consulting together regarding the settlement of this quarrel, decided that the whole of the Sarawan Sirdars should assemble and consult as to what was best to be done, reporting the result to his Highness the Khan. Letters containing instructions to this effect were accordingly sent to the Sarawan Sirdars by his Highness and Major Sandeman.

Sirdar Alladina Koord and Daroga Alladad reported that the Kirta and Siri Bolan Chowkis had been commenced. Sirdar Alladina also wrote that he intended to proceed to Quetta to arrange with the Naib there for the protection of the route between Peshin and Shaul-Kot (Quetta).

A petition was received from the whole of the Barozee headmen of Seebee, also one from Sirdar Muhammad Khan, asking that he should be recognised as the Sirdar of Seebee in room of his brother, the late Sher Zaman Shah. The two petitions were sent to Daud Khan, the correspondent at Candahar, with instructions to submit them to Sirdar Safdar Ali Khan, with a view to orders being passed on them, as Seebee is a dependency of the Amir of Cabul. A reply was received from Candahar to the effect that the Barozai petitions had been forwarded to his Highness the Amir for orders.

News was received from Candahar to the effect that the merchants there were in doubt as to whether it was safe to send kafilas through the Bolan Pass, as the country was reported to be under water. After consulting with the Khan, a reply was sent to say that the pass was open to traffic.

3. 12th September.—To-day Major Sandeman paid his weekly visit to his Highness the Khan at the Miri or palace. The usual conversation took place, and Major Sandeman proposed he should go to Mustung to settle the Brahooee quarrel. His Highness approved of the proposal. During the interview his Highness asked whether all the Nawabs and Rajas of Hindustan were to be present at the Delhi Durbar, the distance Multan was from Kutchi and Multan from Delhi, and other questions showing he was interested in the matter. In last week's diary it was recorded that were an invitation to the Durbar sent to his Highness, it was believed that he would gladly accept it, but that no account of his Highness' poverty, the Government would require to pay the expenses of the journey.

The news-writer stationed at Kahan, the Murree head-quarters, reports—

1st. Sirdar Ghuzzun Khan, the Murree Chief, to be very ill with fever.

2nd. That the owners of the cattle plundered from Lehri in Kutchi had arrived in Kahan, and that the stolen cattle were being restored to them.

3rd. That three horses from the Khetran valley had been plundered by Murree thieves, but that the Murree Sirdar had recovered them and restored them to Nassir Khan Nahar, who came to Kahan to receive them.

Sirdar Alladina reported that Sherdil Mazarani Murree, who is at present residing with the Bijarani Murrees, carried off some sheep from his kinsman Kechi Khan, as there is a family quarrel between the two. The latter desired to retaliate on the former, but this Sirdar Alladina wrote he would not permit, as Kechi Khan was on duty in the Bolan. He, however, asked Major Sandeman to direct Sirdar Ghuzzun Khan to arrange the quarrel. A letter was sent to Kahan directing Sirdar Ghuzzun Khan to arrange the matter, and to cause Sherdil to restore Kechi Khan's sheep at once. The Sirdar of the Koords was directed to send the letter by the hands of a special messenger. Sirdar Moolla Mahomed was also written to and directed to see that Sherdil and Kechi Khan settled their quarrel.

4. 13th September.—To-day at half-past four in the afternoon Major Sandeman, accompanied by Captains Scott and Shepherd and Dr. Duke, at the invitation of his Highness the Khan, proceeded to the parade-ground of the Khelat garrison to inspect the troops. They were received by his Highness (who was dressed in uniform) at the Mustung gate, and the cortège proceeded to the parade-ground. The two infantry regiments called the Nurwahi and Fatteh Jang were drawn up in line, with Mir Mahmud Khan (the heir apparent) in command, who received his Highness with a general salute. Commander Fakir Muhammad then took command of the parade, and the troops went through several manœuvres. The infantry numbered about 600 and the cavalry about 200. On the whole, under the circumstances, the parade was creditable. After it was over Major Sandeman addressed a few words to the troops commending them for their loyalty to the Khelat State during the late civil war, now happily over, and said that although it was to be hoped there was no more fighting to be done, still they must not think there was no work for them, as troops were absolutely necessary to maintain the peace of the country, &c.

5. 14th September.—To-day several cases of cholera occurred in the Miri or palace. The disease was not of a severe type. There were eleven seizures, and by night one of the Khan's younger sons, Abdulla Khan (a baby one year old) and two female slaves had succumbed to the disease. The others were reported as recovering. Major Sandeman that evening visited the Khan in the palace, and condoled with him on the death of his son, sitting with him for several hours. The Khan expressed himself on Major Sandeman's taking his leave as most grateful to him for visiting him at such a time.

6. 15th September.—To-day the report from the Miri of the cholera is satisfactory Two sons of the Khan, Mir Shah Newaz Khan and Azam Khan, had been taken ill but were recovering. The other patients were doing well.

The contents of the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 1873P., dated 16th August, with enclosures, received from Colonel Munro on the subject of Dad Mahomed Rind's conduct towards the Political Agent, Gwadur, regarding certain fugitive slaves, were communicated through the Wakil to his Highness the Khan. In reply his Highness stated that the Naib of Kedj, Sirdar Fakir Muhammad, had previously written to his Highness on the subject, and that Dad Muhammad would be summoned to Khelat, when his case could be disposed of. Major Sandeman in reply said he considered the proposal a good one, and Dad Muhammad was summoned accordingly to Khelat.

The Daroga and statistical writer of the Bolan Pass, Alladad Khan, reported that the caravan season had commenced. One kafila, numbering 319 camels and 142 donkeys, had arrived from Candahar, and had been escorted through the pass in safety. Rupees 309 had been realised as escort fees, and Rupees 1,078–6 as custom dues. The value of the caravan was said to be Rupees 38,168, and to have consisted of wool, fruit, and other miscellaneous goods.

No. 223, dated Camp Khelat, 18th September 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

No. 132.

No. 5406, Bombay Castle, 20th September 1876.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am directed to forward to you, for submission to the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, the accompanying letter to his Excellency's address from the Ex-Jam of Lus Beyla, at present under detention at Poona, praying that he may be allowed to change his residence from Poona to Bombay during the cold season and the month of Ramzan. Copy of a letter addressed to this Government by the Ex-Jam is also enclosed.

2. In forwarding these papers I am desired to state that his Excellency the Governor in Council is not prepared to offer any objection to the Ex-Jam's proposed change of residence. In the event of the Government of India assenting it will be necessary in the first instance to warn the Jam that he cannot look for any addition to his allowance on account of his change of residence.

Enclosure 1 in No. 132.

Dated Poona, 8th September 1876.

From his Highness Jam Mir Khan, Ex-Chief of Lus Beyla, to his Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor of Bombay.

I most humbly and respectfully beg to state for the information of your Excellency in Council that it is four years and half since I am in Poona, but the climate of it is disagreeable to me now.

I therefore beg your Excellency in Council will be pleased to permit me to remain in Bombay, and pass the winter season and the month of Ramzan festival there, and also change the climate. I have also made an application to his Excellency the Viceroy and the Governor-General of India relating the same.

I beg to crave your Excellency's attention to the fact that it is seven years since I am in this country, and do not wish to go to my country without permission if Government keeps me ten years more.

As I am disrespectfully brought from my country I do not wish to show my face there unless I am respectfully sent back to it by Government.

Under these circumstances I beg and pray your Excellency in Council will be pleased to take the measures that I may be allowed to remain in Bombay, for which act of kindness I shall ever pray to God for your Excellency's long life and prosperity.

No. 133.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 22nd September 1876. (Extract.)

1. 16th September.—No fresh case of cholera has occurred in the Miri or palace. The two sons of the Khan who were attacked by the disease have entirely recovered. A few fresh cases are reported from the city and neighbouring villages. The disease, although epidemic, is of a mild form, and it is hoped that in a few days hence it will have disappeared entirely.

2. 17th September.—Sirdar Sohrab Khan, Dhoombkee, and Russul Buksh, the nephew of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed (residing at present in Seebee), report the death at Kahan on the 6th of Sirdar Ghuzzun Khan, the Chief of the Murree tribe. The reports stated that all the Murree headmen were assembled at the Murree head-quarters, and that Sirdar Mirulla Khan and Sher Muhammad respectively, the brother and cousin of the deceased Sirdar, had written them requesting them to be on the outlook for thieves on the frontier, and to take necessary precautions until the Murree headmen had returned from Kahan to their homes. On receipt of these letters Major Sandeman visited his Highness the Khan at the Miri, to consult with him as to what precautions should be taken for the protection of Kutchi, until the effect of the death of the Sirdar on the tribe was known. It was decided that Captain Wylie should be sent to Dadar with the detachment of Sind Horse now at Khelat as soon as the Government of India orders were received regarding the settlement come to at Mustung of Khelat affairs. His Highness at the same time wrote a letter to Sirdar Mirulla Khan, the brother of the late Chief, condoling with and comforting him, and promising to recognise him as the Sirdar of the tribe on his attending on him after his arrival in Kutchi. The letter said that the usual khillut would be bestowed on him in recognition of his having succeeded to the chieftainship. Major Sandeman also wrote to Sirdar Mirulla Khan directing him to attend on the Khan with all his headmen directly his Highness arrived in Kutchi.

In the last diary it was reported that Sirdar Alla Dina Koord was directed to go to Shawl Kot and join with the Naib there in endeavouring to arrange with the tribes for the protection of the kafila road from the Peshin border to Shawl Kot. Sirdar Alla Dina now reports that the Naib there raised difficulties about this portion of the kafila route, that it had nothing to do with the Bolan Pass, as by it the kafilas took the road to Kurrachee, &c. After great deal of conversation with the Khan and the Wakil on the subject it was arranged that Major Sandeman and the Wakil Nawab Muhammad Khan should visit Shawl Kot, and together consult as to what protection to this portion of the kafila route was really required. Major Sandeman casually mentioned to his Highness that when the arrangements for the protection of the Bolan Pass reported in this office No. 139, dated 1st July, were come to, nothing was said about their being any danger to kafilas traversing the route between the Peshin border and Shawl Kot (Quetta). His Highness in reply agreed as to this being the case, but said that he thought that Sirdar Alla Dina should be held responsible for the whole route, and that if the Government made over to him the whole of the money paid to the Bolan tribes and to the Murrees he would himself be responsible for the entire route. To this Major Sandeman replied that if his Highness took into consideration the unprotected state the kafila routes were until very lately in, which led to the Government orders, No. 2819P. of the 16th October last being issued, he would see how impossible it was to make over the pay of the tribes to him. In fact that a measure of this kind had formerly been adopted with regard to the pay of the Murrees for the protection of Kutchi, and had failed. But for all this Major Sandeman assured his Highness that he was not in any way to consider himself as relieved of his responsibilities, and, in order to prove this, the Mustung proceedings were produced and read. Ultimately his Highness directed an order to be written to each of his Naibs of Dadar and Shawl Kot (Quetta), telling them to co-operate with and to heartily aid Captain Wylie with the Bolan Pass arrangements. It was admitted that during no former period had the pass been so safe, and also that the present arrangements for the security of trade were working well. The Wakil did not attempt to conceal that his Highness was only anxious now to have sole charge of the pass in the hopes that the pay of the pass officials would be made over to him; but that in his opinion this would be a most unwise measure, and would not succeed, and he strongly advised that the settlement come to at Mustung, and to which the Khan had affixed his seal, should in its integrity be maintained.

3. 18th September 1876.—His Highness the Khan sent for perusal a letter from Gajian, the Naib of Punjgur, in which it was stated that Sirdar Azaad Khan threatened to raid Punjgur. * * * * *

5. Two Hindus, by name Hema and Parema, were introduced by the Wakil, who said that they were anxious to open shops at Kirta and Siri-Bolan for the benefit of the kafila people. Permission was at once granted, and orders sent to Darogah Alla Dad to aid them, and to establish their shops alongside the (pass) stations inhabited by the kafila guards.

6. The Bolan Pass Darogah and statistical writer reports that during the week a kafila consisting of 162 camels and 91 donkeys en route from Candahar and Herat traversed the Bolan in safety. Fees, Rupees 179-11-6, were realised on account of budrukki, and Rupees 581-15-6 on account of custom dues. The caravan was estimated at Rupees 20,057-12 in value.

No. 233, dated Camp Khelat, 25th September 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

No. 134.

Special Political. Office Memo. No 980S., dated Simla, 27th September 1876.

From Officiating Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Foreign Department.

It is understood in the Military Department that, at all events for some time, half the escort with Major Sandeman's Mission was encamped, "for convenience sake," eight miles from Khelat, at which place the other half of the escort was encamped with Major Sandeman.

2. The Military Department would be glad if the Foreign Department would ascertain and inform it whether the convenience in question was one of a political nature, or whether it was owing to a dearth of supplies, forage, or water, or to any other cause that would operate against a body of troops of the strength of the escort being encamped for any time in the immediate vicinity of Khelat.

No. 135.

No. 325P., dated Dera Ismail Khan, 30th September 1876.

From Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

On receipt of your No. 1700 of the 24th July last, I communicated with Major Sandeman, requesting him to furnish replies to the queries contained in it regarding compensation claimed for caravans plundered in the Khelat State during the last few years, and I have now to enclose that officer's detailed report, No. 204 of the 4th instant, on the subject.

2. Major Sandeman solicited the Khan of Khelat to furnish him with details, which are given in the translation of his Highness' reply embodied in paragraph 3 of the report. In paragraph 4 Major Sandeman quotes the Khan of Khelat's reply, written in February 1872, to the Commissioner in Sind, on the subject of the earlier cases of caravan plundering, which date as far back as 1871-72. In that letter the Khan explains how he felt himself called upon to pay compensation amounting to Rs. 90,000 in two cases of plunder by Brahooees and Murrees from a sum of one lakh of rupees which had been granted to himself by the British Government.

3. Having thus described the state of the case from the Khan of Khelat's point of view, Major Sandeman proceeds to reply specifically to the questions contained in your letter under acknowledgment. The note appended to his answer No. 1 suggests the advisability of a reference to the Commissioner in Sind regarding the disposal of a sum of Rupees 5,000 and the value of 12 camels realised from the Murree clan by Major Sandeman during 1874-75 and transferred to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

4. The balance of compensation, as estimated by the Khan of Khelat, amounts to Rupees 87,000, besides an unascertained sum said to be still due to certain Candahar merchants, whose caravan was plundered in 1872 at a place called Baghwana in Khelat.

5. The responsibility of the Khan of Khelat for the protection of caravans passing through his territory appears to have been clearly recognised in connexion with the negotiations of 1872, which proved unsuccessful. I concur in Major Sandeman's view as expressed in paragraph 8, that no relaxation of the terms on which that responsibility was then fixed is called for. The entertainment of any claims to compensation on account of the caravans plundered in the Mulla, Takari, and Gazak Passes in the early part of this year, soon after the assassination of Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, and solely in consequence of that event, is quite out of the question on a just consideration of all the circumstances. What is really due to Candahar merchants in the Baghwana case cannot be ascertained without personal communication with the claimants.

6. My deduction from Major Sandeman's description of the cases in regard to which the Khan of Khelat claims a sum of Rupees 87,000 is, that the amount cannot be deemed to be fairly due by the British Government, which had undertaken no responsibility whatever for the internal administration of the Khelat State. The reasons advanced in the last four paragraphs of Major Sandeman's report for disallowing any such claim appear to be sufficiently cogent, apart entirely from the other consideration as to our non-responsibility.

7. Had the negotiations of 1872 resulted successfully, the Sirdars actively concerned in promoting or abetting the plunder of caravans would in all probability have been held responsible for the payment of compensation. It fell to the lot of the Khan of Khelat himself, however, to disburse compensation to the various claimants, and he appears to have done so from the amount granted to him by the British Government for general purposes.

8. The point for consideration now seems to be whether in the altered state of affairs, and in the present impoverished state of the Khan's treasury, Government are prepared to give consideration to the circumstances under which the Khan was placed at the time, and to come to his relief as solicited by himself.

Enclosure 1 in No. 135.

No. 204, dated Camp Khelat, 4th September 1876.

From Major R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your No. 274, dated 29th July, forwarding copy of Foreign Secretary's No. 1700, dated Simla, 24th July 1876, on the subject of the compensation demanded for kafilas plundered in the Khelat State during the last few years, and directing me to reply to a list of questions which the letter contains. I will reply to the questions referred to seriatim, but will first record a letter I addressed to his Highness the Khan regarding them, and his reply; also a letter from his Highness on the same subject to the address of Sir William Merewether. I submit a copy of this letter, as its contents throw much light on the subject under reference.

2. Translation of a letter from Major R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, dated 23rd August 1876, to the address of Mir Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat: "I have the pleasure to inform your Highness that your memorandum presented to me on 6th June at Mustung, containing the terms on which your Highness had agreed to make peace with the Sarawan and Jalawan Sirdars, has been received by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, and with reference to your Highness' demand contained therein that the British Government should compensate the Candahar merchants plundered by the Jalawans in the Mulla and other passes, I have been directed by the Government of India to furnish at an early date more precise information showing—

"(1.) the caravans on account of which compensation is claimed;
"(2.) the time and place at which the caravans were plundered;
"(3.) the persons by whom the caravans were plundered;
"(4.) the loss estimated by the owners;
"(5.) the compensation, if any, paid up to date, and by whom paid.

" (6.) the balance fairly due;

" (7) A brief statement of the grounds on which your Highness claims compensation from the British Government.

" To enable me to comply with the above instructions, I shall feel obliged by your Highness giving these questions your full consideration, and by your favouring me with an answer to each. Replying to them will afford your Highness a full opportunity of placing before the Government of India the circumstances, from first to last, which led to the plunder of kafilas, and the grounds on which your Highness has formed the opinion that the Government of India, out of consideration for the difficulties your Highness' Government has lately been placed in, ought to compensate the merchants who have suffered severely during the late civil war."

3. To the above his Highness the Khan sent the following reply, dated 29th August 1876, to my address: "I have to acknowledge receipt of your letter asking, by the order of his Excellency the Viceroy, certain information regarding the kafilas lately plundered. In reply, I send you the following information: In the year 1288 (1871-72) kafilas were plundered in the Bolan Pass. Two by the Sarawan Brahooees, Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, and other Raisanis, and by Sirdars Alladina Koord, Shadi Khan Bungulzai, Said Khan Muhammad Shahi, and Samandar Khan Lehri. The two places at which these kafilas were plundered was at Dadar, at the foot of the pass, and at Khak Daho, in the pass itself. The value of these two kafilas can be ascertained from Major Harrison's papers, as he valued the merchants' losses. I was debited with Rupees 30,000, which sum I had unfairly to pay to the merchants.

" The third kafila was plundered by Sherdil Murree, at Machh. He committed this act because the Sarawan Brahooees caused the Samalani Minguls to raid his (Sherdil's) tribe, and in retaliation Sherdil attacked the kafila. He was aided also by the other Brahooees referred to above. The value of this kafila will also be found with the British records. Again, very unfairly, Major Harrison caused me to pay Rs. 50,000 compensation for this kafila to the merchants.

" In the same year a fourth kafila was plundered by Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, near Baghwana. The value of this kafila amounted to Rs. 35,000. From Noordeen a portion of the value of the kafila was realised. Major Harrison again unfairly made me pay Rs. 5,000. The entire state of the case regarding this kafila and the compensation still due can be seen from Major Harrison's papers.

" The fifth kafila* was plundered by Gohur Khan Zarukzai, Saleh Muhammad Musiani, Haibat Khan Samalani, Chakar Khan Jattak, and other Zehris in the Mulla Pass. The value of this caravan is estimated at Rs. 80,000. The owners of the plundered kafila are clamorous for payment of compensation. Haibat Khan Samalani also with his followers plundered the merchants of Khelat once in the Takari Pass, and the other time in the Gazak Pass. These two last-named kafilas valued Rs. 7,000. The Hindus, their owners, are clamorous for payment of compensation.

* This was during last cold weather, and after the death of Sirdar Noordeen, and was done out of revenge for his destruction.

" With regard to your asking me to explain the grounds on which I claim compensation from the British Government for these kafilas, in reply I beg to state that in the first year the kafilas were plundered Sir William Merewether settled my affairs with the Brahooees, who were directed by him to pay compensation for the kafilas, and for the plunder taken by them from the subjects of the Khelat State. The Brahooees also agreed to this decision. The Commissioner desired that the payment for State property plundered by the Brahooees from Kutchi and elsewhere should be excused, and to this I very unwillingly agreed, but I did so for two reasons:—(1.) Because the British Government desired that I should do so; (2.) because the Brahooees had to pay compensation for the plundered kafilas, and for the property taken from the ryots of Kutchi and elsewhere. But the Brahooees could not pay and could not fulfil their promise, and I did not attempt to force them to pay, as I was afraid of the British Government. As the last settlement was come to by the British Government through the Commissioner, Sir William Merewether, I hope the British Government will get me compensation from the Brahooees, or pay me from its own treasury. This is all I have to state. All else is well, &c."

4. His Highness's letter to Sir William Merewether on this subject is dated the 1st of Zilhaj 1289 (February 1872), and runs as follows:—

" I have received your letter dated 29th January, and have been highly pleased to read it. In reply, I beg to state that I have fully put the contents of the agreement which I wrote at Khelat on the 25th Rajab into execution, *i.e.*, I have paid from my own treasury compensation amounting to Rs. 30,000, to the merchants of kafilas plundered by the Sarawan Brahooees, who were held responsible to pay the compensation due;

but as I saw that they were delaying doing so, I paid it myself to satisfy the merchants. But now I have arrived in Kutchi, I am daily employed in arranging to pay the remainder of the compensation due. I have very nearly paid the whole. I have also paid Rs. 5,000 as compensation for a kafila plundered by Sirdar Noordeen. For the payment of the remainder of the compensation due on this kafila the property of the Sirdar has been mortgaged.

"With regard to the payment of the kafila plundered by the Murrees, in reply I beg to state that you are quite aware that for the last few years the Murree clan is not under my orders, but they are causing injury to my country and people. Now, as the British Government desired me to compensate the merchants of the plundered kafilas, I, in order to obey its wishes and in accordance with the instructions contained in your No. 7 of 29th January, paid the merchants Rs. 55,000 as compensation from my own treasury, and I have settled all the merchants' claims. A copy of the merchants' receipts are herewith forwarded for your perusal. I consider you and the British Government my support in every matter.

"The British Government, after considering the state of my affairs, was kind enough to grant me one lakh of rupees. Out of this sum I have paid Rs. 90,000 as compensation to the plundered merchants. I paid this sum in the hope that the British Government would be kind to me, and that you would grant me an interview. You are quite aware of the income of my country, and the conduct of the Murrees and Brahooees. I don't think I can recover from them the Rs. 90,000 which I have paid as compensation. Should I try to recover the amount, great disturbances in the country would at once arise. I am very anxious to meet you to consult you regarding certain matters. Consider me your well-wisher and continue to correspond with me, &c."

5. Having given the above correspondence as an introduction to my subject, I will now return to the questions contained in the Foreign Secretary's letter under reply. For convenience sake, I will divide the time during which the kafilas were plundered into two periods, viz., those plundered during 1872, and those plundered in 1875–76. It is necessary to my purpose to do this, to enable me fully to answer the Foreign Secretary's questions. I will here again record them:—

Question No. 1.—State the number of caravans on account of which compensation is claimed?

Answer.—There are three. First, a sum is still due for the kafila plundered by the late Sirdar Noordeen in Baghwana in 1872. See Foreign Secretary's letter No. 376 P., dated Fort William, 10th February 1874, to the Secretary, Government, Punjab; also extract from Sir William Merewether's No. 1178, dated 6th September 1873, to the Secretary to Government of India; also Commissioner, Derajat's, No. 144, dated 11th April last, to Major Sandeman's address. This is the only kafila plundered in 1872 for which compensation has not been fully paid.

NOTE.—It will be observed from the Khan's letter recorded above to the address of the Commissioner in Sind that the compensation for the kafilas plundered by Sherdil (Bolan Pass) Murree was, with that for other kafilas, fully paid by his Highness the Khan; but it is well to note here, that after the settlement come to by order of the Government of India with the Murree clan by me in the spring of 1874–75, I realised from the clan Rs. 5,000 in cash, and sent the money to Jacobabad to Colonel Loch. I also recovered 11 camels from Kahan of the plunder taken from this kafila. They were also sent to Jacobabad. The money realised for them, as well as the Rs. 5,000, ought to be available to reimburse the Khan in part payment of the Rs. 55,000 paid by him for the kafila plundered by Sherdil Murree. It will be remembered that Sherdil was at this time in the Khan's service and responsible for the safety of kafilas. He turned against the Khan during the insurrection, and joined the other Chiefs in the plunder of kafilas.

Question No. 2.—The time and place at which the kafilas were plundered?

Answer.—One in Baghwana in 1872. One in the Mulla Pass in the cold weather of 1875–76, after the death of Noordeen Mingul. Also two small kafilas, in value Rs. 7,000, in the Takari and Gazak Passes, by Haibat Khan Samalani Mingul.

Question No. 3.—The persons by whom the caravans were plundered?

Answer.—By Sirdar Noordeen Mingul and Gohur Khan and other Jalawan Chiefs.

Question No. 4.—The loss estimated by the owners?

Answer.—The owners are not in Khelat, but his Highness the Khan estimated the compensation due at Rupees 87,000, plus the sum due for the Baghwana kafila.

Question No. 5.—The compensation, if any, paid up to date, and by whom paid?

Answer.—Rupees 90,000 were paid by his Highness the Khan in full compensation

due for the kafilas plundered in 1872 in the Bolan Pass. A portion of the compensation due was paid by Noordeen for the Baghwana kafila plundered in 1872. Amount still due not known. The owners are at Candahar.

Question No. 6.—The balance fairly due ?

Answer.—It is estimated by his Highness at Rupees 87,000, plus the amount still due for the Baghwana kafila. It is impossible to get hold of the owners, unless I send for them, to finally dispose of the case, as they are at Candahar.

Question No. 7.—A brief statement of the grounds on which the Khan claims compensation from the British Government ?

Answer.—In order to reply fully to this question it is necessary now to record the object I had in view when I called on the Khan, in the correspondence given at the commencement of this letter, to state in writing his own reasons for asking for compensation for the kafilas plundered by the Jalawans from the British Government. Further, it seems to me of the last importance, in order to obtain a fair knowledge of the question and of what is passing in his Highness' mind regarding it, that I should give a brief statement of what I have learnt from his Highness when conversing with him on this subject.

6. I find that his Highness' mind is strongly impressed with the belief that the former settlement of his quarrel with the Brahooee Sirdars has relieved him from all responsibility for their acts, whether against kafilas or against the neighbouring clans on the frontier, leading to possible disturbances on the British border and in the Bolan Pass. His Highness has adopted this view of his position on account of what the Commissioner records in paragraph 23 of his report describing the mediation, which decreed, (1st) that the property plundered from the kafilas be given up; (2nd) that all property seized during the late rebellion by the Sirdars and their followers from the ryots of Beloochistan, whether in Khorassan or Kutchi, be restored. In reference to Commissioner's reasons for giving this decree, a copy of which was, I believe, supplied to his Highness, Sir William Merewether in his 25th paragraph says: "The second and third "stipulations I considered only equitable and unquestionably necessary. Were they "not enforced, a premium on rebellion would have been established, and the faithful "many would have been in a worse position than the rebellious few. The Sirdars and "their followers would have largely benefited by the plunder they got possession of when "engaged in lawless proceedings, and it would have been to the advantage of the unruly in future to side with any Chief who chose to raise the standard of revolt, while "traders who were passing through the country, relying on the good will of the "inhabitants thereof, and the poor people of the country, who were leading peaceful "lives, would have been the chief sufferers."

7. But these preliminary conditions of peace, and no one knows this better than the Khan himself, imposed on the Chiefs were never put in force (as we have seen by the correspondence quoted at the commencement of this letter), and the Commissioner in his letter No. 1178, dated 6th December 1873, to the address of the Foreign Secretary, gives his reasons for obliging his Highness the Khan to pay compensation for the kafilas in the way described by the Khan as follows: He writes:—"Regarding "caravan No. 3 little is known. It was plundered by Sherdil Mazarani Murree in "reprisal for the attack made on him by certain Brahooees from the neighbourhood of "Mustung. Major Harrison's referring the owners to the Deputy Commissioner of "Dera Ghazi Khan was not correct, and he has been so informed through the Political "Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier. The outrage was committed on merchants "travelling through the territory of his Highness the Khan, and the latter was "the sole responsible person, and should have been called upon to reimburse the "sufferers. From what, however, was gathered at the time, the claim by the "merchants would seem to have been greatly exaggerated." Here then was the responsibility of the Khan fully declared for the acts of the Sirdars in the Bolan Pass and elsewhere, and the Khan himself, in writing to the Commissioner in the letter given above, states that under the circumstances the only course open to him was for himself to pay. The Brahooee Sirdars had not the means, and the Khan says any attempt on his part to enforce the conditions of the mediation made by the Commissioner himself would have again thrown the country into a state of rebellion against his Government.

8. The fact of the responsibility of the Khan of Khelat in such matters as laid down by the Commissioner in the last quotation given above is incontestable. It is in accordance with the terms of his treaty with our Government, and it would have a very bad effect on the Khan and his Sirdars was this fact lost sight of. This opinion, and my reasons for holding it, I have fully placed before his Highness. I exemplified

it by bringing to his Highness' recollection what passed last cold weather when I first visited him at Khelat. If you refer to my report No. 8, dated 5th February 1876, paragraph 83, you will find that I addressed a letter to the Khan pointing out that the kafila routes were unsafe, and offering to secure a safe passage for a caravan that had then arrived at Khelat from Candahar, and asked his Highness to allow it to accompany me on my return journey to British territory. His Highness did not agree, but instead attacked Sirdar Noordeen and killed him, and this very caravan, for which compensation is now demanded and for the safety of which I did all I could, was plundered in the Mulla Pass by the followers and friends of the deceased Sirdar, led by Sirdar Gohur Khan, whom the Khan up to that time and until the recent settlement come to at Mustung had refused to recognise as Sirdar of the Zehris. Surely then for such acts it would be contrary to the interests of all concerned to in any way lessen or ignore the responsibilities of the Khan and his Government.

9. I think it necessary to bring these facts before you, for the Khan, as said from conversations I have had with him, is clearly anxious to avoid his responsibilities as laid down in the treaty. Although there can be no question that Sirdar Noordeen was conspiring against the Khan at the time of his destruction, still it was the uncompromising way he and Gohur Khan were treated by the Khelat Government that led to the plunder of the two kafilas in the Mulla and Takari and Gazak Passes during the past cold weather, and which his Highness values at Rupees 87,000.

10. But there is still one other point, of even greater importance, that has to be remembered in fixing the responsibility for the recent plunder of the kafilas. Were it to rest on the Sirdars, as the Khan's letter giving his reasons for demanding that the British Government should pay the sum due to the merchants would lead one to believe was what he desired, his Highness would escape from one of the conditions of the recent peace. The reason for this is as follows: If you refer to this office No. 112, dated 24th of May last, you will find that the Jalawan Sirdars in their petitions then submitted had many real grounds for complaint against the Khelat Government. I did not ask the Khan to admit any of these, but I advised him, as the civil war had lasted for so long, to consider whether, if he really desired a permanent peace, it would not be desirable to leave the past alone. Did he agree to this, I said I would get the Brahooee Sirdars to do the same thing. His Highness agreed to this proposal, and before the Jalawan Sirdars arrived at Mustung, it was arranged that the Khan and all his Sirdars should waive all claims to blood money that either side might desire to bring forward, and which had arisen out of the late war, or to compensation for plundered property, or for the plunder of kafilas.

11. I took this step advisedly for several reasons. Amongst them are the following: The Government of India, in their Resolution No. 671 A.-P., dated Fort William, the 14th March, had desired me under the most favourable circumstances to settle Khelat affairs, and in the 12th paragraph of that Resolution they expressed their views in the following words: "Accordingly orders will at once issue that if Colonel Munro is satisfied that the Khan and principal Chiefs of all parties, including Jalawans and Sarawans, are ready to accept Major Sandeman's arbitration, he is authorised, should he deem such a course desirable under present circumstances, to arrange for a meeting between Major Sandeman, the Khan, and his Sirdars in Kutchi, or elsewhere as may be convenient, and make a renewed attempt to carry out the objects set forth in the Government Resolution of the 16th October last, that is, a general settlement of differences between the tribes themselves and between them and the Khan, and further in extension of those orders, if the Khan should show a proper spirit, the re-establishment of friendly relations between him and the British Government, &c."

12. Such being the desires and orders of the British Government, and being aware from his Highness himself that the former conditions imposed on the Brahooee Sirdars as a necessary preliminary to a reconciliation between them and his Highness had proved in practice to be an impossibility, it was resolved by the Khan and his Sirdars that the mediation entered on at Mustung should have for its basis conditions that all could fulfil. One of these conditions, as already stated, was that the Khan was to relinquish all claims for compensation for loss of property and loss to caravans, and that the Sirdars should make no claims to blood-money or any loss their property had suffered from the Khan's army.

13. It was clearly understood by the Khan from the very first that in pressing on the Government of India his demand that they should take on themselves the compensating of the merchants for the loss of their property, that the ground on which I should urge it was simply that of consideration for the empty state of his treasury, and because the money formerly granted him was used to compensate the merchants

contrary to the decree given in 1872, which obliged the Brahooee Sirdars to pay for the kafilas then plundered. If my report No. 122, dated 14th June 1876, paragraph 8, is referred to, it will be found that the Khan delayed in coming to Mustung in the hopes of getting me to engraft on the new mediation the terms of the former peace, but which I steadily refused to do, knowing well that any such conditions, if imposed on the Brahoee Sirdars as a necessary preliminary to reconciliation between them and the Khelat Government, could never be fulfilled. His Highness therefore in founding his present claims to compensation on the basis of the former peace does so knowing that from the first I, before undertaking the late mediation, had rejected them. There are, however, obvious reasons why the Khan should in the present state of his affairs press these on the British Government, and these will doubtless receive the consideration they are entitled to at its hands.

No. 136.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 30th September 1876.

1. 23rd September.—Sirdar Abdul Karim Mirwani wrote to say that directly the Sirdars of Kedj and Mekran joined him, they would together attend to the Khan's summons and proceed to Khelat. A report was received from Sirdar Muhammad Khan, the brother of the late Barozai Chief Sher Zaman, to the effect that the Murree headmen were assembled at Kahan, and in consultation had decided to give the "dustar" of the chieftainship to Sirdar Mehrulla Khan, the brother of the late Sirdar. That the late Sirdar before his death gave Rupees 1,000 to his Murree wife and Rupees 1,000 to each of his daughters (he had no son), but to his Afghan wife he only gave Rupees 100. After the Sirdar's death the Murree headmen divided his property as follows:—Two shares were given to the eldest brother Sirdar Mehrulla Khan (one share on account of his succeeding to the Sirdarship) and one share to the younger brother Asad Khan. The headmen intended after a week's time to perform the ceremony of bestowing the "dustar" on Sirdar Mehrulla Khan. They had decided to hold to the agreement made by the late Sirdar Ghuzzun Khan for the protection of Kutchi and two headmen were always to remain on duty at Kott Mundai to prevent raids into the Bolan Pass and Kutchi.

2. 24th September.—With regard to the protection of the kafila route (vide last week's diary) from Ghaza Bund to Shawl Kot, Major Sandeman at the Wakil's request visited his Highness at the Miri to discuss the matter. A long conversation took place on the subject. His Highness was anxious that this part of the route should be included in the Bolan Pass arrangements. Both the Wakil and Major Sandeman pointed out to his Highness that this measure would not be suitable, as from the Ghaza Bund Pass the kafila routes led in various directions to Kurrachee viâ Khelat and Mustung, to the Mulla Pass, as well as to the Bolan Pass. Moreover the orders of the Government which had been put in force only contemplated Major Sandeman's securing the safety of the Bolan Pass. Major Sandeman said he was glad to accompany the Wakil when he proceeded to arrange for the safety of this portion of the road, but could not accept any responsibility in the matter without first referring to Government, and this step appeared unnecessary at present, as there seemed no reason for supposing there was the least difficulty in securing the safety of the kafilas traversing it. Major Sandeman was glad of the opportunity offered of accompanying the Wakil into camp for a few days, as he had been suffering from fever and the medical officer recommended the change.

At this meeting his Highness the Khan issued instructions to the Naibs of Dadar and Shawl Kot to co-operate with Captain Wylie in the event of that officer proceeding to Dadar. A telegram proposing that he should do so for the reasons given therein had been sent to Colonel Munro. On leaving, Major Sandeman told his Highness that for the few days during which he should be absent from Khelat, Captain Wylie would conduct any necessary business that should transpire. It was arranged that Captain Wylie and his Highness should interchange visits of courtesy.

A letter arrived from Sirdar Gohur Khan telling of the Sirdar's return home from visiting Khelat, and that all was well in the Jalawan country, and that his people had all left the hills and taken up their quarters in the town of Zehri, where they were enjoying the blessings of peace.

A translation of the District Superintendent of Police, Kurrachee's diary for weeks ending 13th and 20th August on the subject of Jan Muhammads, and Sahib Khan Choottah (brothers) having settled their affairs was read out to the Khan's Wakil, Nawab Muhammad Khan. He said that although he had heard that the brothers had arranged their affairs he had no faith in the settlement being permanent. That a permanent settlement could not be come to until both brothers were summoned to Khelat.

3. 25th September.—To-day at 4 p.m. Major Sandeman, accompanied by Dr. Duke and the detachment 4th Punjab Cavalry under Captain Shepherd, marched from Khelat for the Ziarat, a distance of eight miles.

4. 26th September.—To-day marched for Bareen Chanaw, distant 18 miles. The country through which we passed is inhabited by the Langhaw Brahooees. Water and grass very plentiful.

5. 27th September.—Arrived at Zard a distance of eight miles. There is a large village near here belonging to Madad Khan, Muhammad-shahi Brahooees.

6. 28th September.—Arrived at Sheereenah, a distance of 18 miles. Here the Naib of Mustung, Faiz Muhammad, came out to meet us and joined the camp.

7. 29th September.—Marched to Kahnak in the Mustung valley, a distance of 12 miles. Received the diary of the news writer stationed at the Murree head-quarters. The only news it contains of importance is the intimation of the Murree Sirdar's death.

8. 30th September.—Alla Dad Khan, Darogah and statistical writer of the Bolan Pass, reports that during the week kafilas numbering in all 254 camels and 9 donkeys had arrived from Candahar and Mustung, and had been escorted through the Pass in safety. Rupees 254–8 had been realised as escort fees and Rupees 792–8 as custom dues. The value of the caravans was said to amount to Rupees 13,933–8, and to have consisted of fruits, wool, and other miscellaneous goods.

No. 235, dated Kahnak, Mustung Valley, 2nd October 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

No. 137.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 7th October 1876.

1st October.—To-day the Khan's Wakil, Nawab Muhammad Khan, came to an agreement about the protection of the kafila route from the Cabul border to Shaulkot (Quetta). The matter was reported to his Highness the Khan. The kafilas in passing Ghaza Bund enter a valley which has roads leading to Khelat and Shaulkot, and by either of these, as the case may be, caravans proceed to the Bolan or Mulla Passes en route to Sind, or by the Raj route and Lus Beyla to Kurrachee. Sirdar Mehrulla Khan, the Chief of the Murrees, wrote to say that the Murree headmen, Karram Khan Bijarani, Nehal Khan Loharani, Mir Hazar Khan Gazaini, Bakhtiyar Khan, and others had elected him as Sirdar of the tribe, instead of his late brother, Sirdar Ghuzzun Khan, and had placed on his head the *dustar* of the chieftainship.

2nd October.—The diary of the news-writer stationed at Kahan, the Murree head-quarters, for the month ending 13th September was received to-day; but its contents did not contain news of any importance.

A letter was received from Shahbaz Khan, eldest son of the Boogtee Chief, reporting his entire restoration to health. A reply was sent directing him to attend on the Khan in Kutchi on his Highness's arrival there.

A letter was received from Sirdar Rahman Khan of Noshki, stating that he and his nephew had quarrelled, and that the Khan's Naib's son, Ido, was acting against him on the side of his nephew. The letter was sent to the Wakil with a view to its submission to his Highness for orders.

A letter was received from Ressaldar Itbar Khan Rind intimating that, notwithstanding his Highness had himself made peace between Raza Muhammad's relations

and himself, the Wudera of the tribe, Imam Buksh, was interfering in the matter. A reply was sent to the Ressaldar to the effect that as he was at Khelat he ought himself in person to bring any cause for complaint on the subject before the Khan, and ask for orders being issued regarding it.

Major Sandeman wrote a friendly letter to his Highness the Khan, informing him of the state of affairs in the country and of his arrival at Kanak, and that the Naib of Mustung, Faiz Muhammad, had met him at Shirin-ab; also that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed had joined his camp.

3rd October.—To-day information was received from Jacobabad that Colonel Colley, the Military Secretary to his Excellency the Viceroy, and Major Upperton were en route to Khelat with letters for his Highness the Khan and Major Sandeman, and intended coming viâ the Mulla Pass. Major Sandeman at once despatched an express to Jacobabad, asking them to come viâ the Bolan Pass instead of by the Mulla, as doing so would save them at least 60 miles of marching. Ressaldar Muhammad Amir Khan, 4th Punjab Cavalry, was despatched to Dadar to meet these officers and escort them through the Bolan Pass.

4th October.—To-day Sirdar Moolla Mahomed paid his respects to Major Sandeman, and afterwards took his leave of him, as he was about to proceed to Kutchi. A letter was received from his Highness the Khan in reply to the one sent from Kanak. In it his Highness stated that he had received Major Sandeman's letter under acknowledgment with great pleasure; that his Highness had received news from Panjgur, which he had communicated to Captain Wylie. A reply was sent to his Highness telling him of the expected advent of Colonel Colley and Major Upperton. His Highness was also informed that Saheb Khan Choota had received strict orders to come to Khelat, and his Highness was asked to send for Jan Muhammad, with a view to arranging their quarrel on their arrival in Khelat.

5th October.—Marched to Shaulkot, a distance of 12 miles. Atta Muhammad, the Naib of Quetta, joined the camp at Barg. Letters were despatched to the Naibs of Dadar and Bagh by the Wakil, and one to the officer commanding at Haji-ki-Shahr, directing these officers to afford Ressaldar Muhammad Amir Khan every aid in arranging for Colonel Colley's onward journey from Bagh to Major Sandeman's camp. The Guide Ressaldar, at Hajiki-Shahr, was directed to escort Colonel Colley with a party of Guides to Dadar, where he would meet Ressaldar Muhammad Amir Khan. The latter was, however, instructed to proceed as far as Bagh, should the officers referred to not have reached that place by the time the Ressaldar got to Dadar.

6th October.—Letters from Mekran state that Alladad Khan and Mohabat Khan, who were sent to summon the Mekran Chiefs to Khelat, had arrived at Panjgur. Mir Gajan Khan was to leave on the 12th Ramzan. They were about to proceed to Kedj. Mir Dad Khan, Mulla Alladad, Said Khan, Dad Muhammad, Mulla Sharbat, and other Sirdars, also wrote to the same effect. There was some doubt as to the exact time of their leaving for Khelat, as they were uncertain as to the intention of Sirdar Azaad Khan of Kharan, who was threatening to raid Panjgur. In reference to this intention Mir Gajan sent to his Highness an original letter from Sirdar Azaad Khan to the address of Mulla Dad Muhammad Kouda, Muhammad Khan, Alladad, and others inviting them to separate from Mir Gajan and join Mir Isa Khan. He advised them to destroy Mir Gajan and give up his fort. Did they refuse to do this Sirdar Azaad Khan threatened to wage war on them.

7th October.—Alladad Khan, the Darogah of the Bolan Pass, reports that during the week kafilas, numbering in all 163 camels and 274 donkeys, had arrived from Candahar and had passed through the Bolan Pass in safety. Rs. 933–14 were realised as custom dues, and Rs. 376–1 as escort fees. The value of the caravans was estimated at Rs. 50,655–14, and their contents were said to consist of silk, shawls, some gold, and a few turquoises.

Captain Wylie's diary from Khelat, for the week ending 1st October, was received Its contents are as follows:—

"Khelat, Monday, 25th September.—A kafila, consisting chiefly of wool and dried fruits, and numbering 120 camels, arrived this day at Khelat from Candahar en route for Kurrachee.

"2. Major Sandeman, accompanied by Surgeon Duke, and taking with him as escort Captain Shepherd and his squadron of the 4th Punjab Cavalry, started from Khelat on a tour in the district.

"3. Major Sandeman left Captain Wylie on especial duty at Khelat.

"Tuesday, 26th September.—Captain Humfrey, commanding the escort, called on Captain Wylie. He represented that the Government camels of his regiment were geting so weak for want of forage that he considered them unfit for work; and that if the escort were called upon to march, they would in all probability break down at once. He therefore requested that his Highness the Khan might be asked to try and procure him 24 camels to enable him to be in a fit state to march. Captain Scott, commanding detachment 4th Sikh Infantry, also made a like request on the same grounds for 15 camels.

Captain Wylie was written to requesting him to arrange to send for grazing purposes the camels to Zehri. This could easily be arranged in communication with his Highness.—R. G. Sandeman, Major, Deputy Commissioner.

"2. Captain Humfrey further requested that some arrangement might be made with the Khelat bunnias to sell milk in his camp, as, owing to cholera being in the city, he had ordered his men not to enter it.

"3. In the afternoon Captain Wylie visited his Highness the Khan in the Miri. He informed his Highness of Captain Humfrey's and Captain Scott's requests, and orders were at once issued to the Mustaufi to see if they could be complied with. The rest of the conversation between his Highness and Captain Wylie was of a purely unofficial character, and was carried on by his Highness in a very friendly way.

"Wednesday, 27th September.—Captain Humfrey wrote to Captain Wylie for permission to entertain four Brahooee syces in the 3rd Sind Horse. Captain Humfrey's request was forwarded to his Highness the Khan, who requested to see the men personally before giving his leave. Captain Humfrey was written to accordingly.

"2. Two bunnias were sent to Captain Wylie by the Khan who undertook to supply milk to the men of the escort in their camp. They were sent over to Captain Humfrey.

"Thursday, 28th September.—The kafila which arrived at Khelat on the 25th instant marched for Kurrachee by the Raj route, viz., viâ Khozdar and Lus Beyla.

"2. A letter was received from Ex-Wuzeer Atta Mahomed stating that he had started from Murro for Jacobabad in accordance with Major Sandeman's orders issued at the general settlement at Mustung.

"Friday, 29th September.—A letter was received by Captain Wylie from Captain Humfrey, requesting that accredited officials from his Highness the Khan might be sent to the camp of the escort to collect the custom fees* due on goods sold therein, as at present any of the Khan's sepoys and officials walking through the camp claim (when questioned) to be on duty as custom collectors.

* Town tax.

"2. His Highness the Khan paid a visit to Captain Wylie in the evening attended by four of his sons. No subjects of importance were touched on, except that his Highness seemed to be anxious to know whether any orders had been received from the Government of India or not. His Highness was spoken to about Captain Humfrey's request for accredited custom officers being attached to his camp, and he promised to issue orders on the subject.

"Saturday, 30th September.—A letter was received to-day by his Highness the Khan from the Naib of Panjgur, which was sent to Captain Wylie for perusal. Another letter was received in camp from Sowar Alladad, whom Major Sandeman had sent with a Motbir of the Khan's to Kedj Mekran, saying that he (the sowar) had arrived at Panjgur, and would leave on the 20th September for Kedj Mekran. Both letters were forwarded to Major Sandeman.

"2. His Highness the Khan sent two men, one Daud, Kotwal, and the other Muhammad, sepoy of artillery, as his accredited agents for the collection of custom dues in the camp of the escort. They were accordingly forwarded to Captain Humfrey with a letter to that effect.

"3. A kafila arrived at Khelat from Candahar consisting of 143 camels, bearing 47 loads of wool and 96 loads of dried fruit.

"Sunday, 1st October.—A letter was received by Captain Wylie from Major Sandeman enclosing a descriptive roll of four Brahooee syces whom the officer commanding 3rd Sind Horse wished to entertain, with directions to ask the Khan's approval. A copy of the roll was sent to Captain Humfrey, with a request that the men mentioned therein, and also the four syces mentioned in diary for the 27th September, might be sent into Khelat the following morning.

"2. This morning a large parade of the Khan's troops took place close to Captain Wylie's camp.

"3. During the past week the cholera, which has before been reported as being in the city and neighbourhood of Khelat, cannot be said to have decreased. Dropping cases

here and there are reported daily, but it does not appear to be in an epidemic form anywhere.

"4. The health of the troops of the escort at and near Khelat is on the whole fairly good.

"5. The Brahooees in some considerable numbers are emigrating to Kutchi, and the country is sufficiently quiet for them to travel in single families, or indeed sometimes as single individuals, and there appears to be no let or hindrance to their proceeding by whichever route they prefer.

"6. Good accounts are daily received in Khelat of the state of the Bolan Pass."

No. 240, dated Camp Mustung, 11th October 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty.

No. 138.

No. 2376P., dated Simla, 13th October 1876.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind.

I am directed by the Governor-General in Council to inform you that Mr. W. C. Furnivall, Under Secretary to the Government of India in the Public Works Department, has been deputed on special duty with the view of making certain inquiries in respect to the Sind frontier and the adjacent tracts of Beloochistan.

2. Mr. Furnivall will, in the first instance, proceed to Jacobabad, and the officer in charge of the political affairs of Khelat will be instructed to afford him every assistance in his power. The co-operation of the Sind authorities is also requested, and his Excellency in Council will be obliged if you will cause such instructions to be issued as will ensure Mr. Furnivall being furnished with any guards, guides, or other aid which he may require, and which the officers under your control may be able to supply.

No. 139.

No. 5964, dated Bombay Castle, 18th October 1876.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am directed to invite attention to this office letter No. 5406, dated the 20th ultimo, and to request that you will be so good as to obtain the orders of the Government of India on the application submitted by the Ex-Jam of Lus Beyla that he may be allowed to change his residence from Poona to Bombay during the cold season and the month of Ramzan. The Jam has asked for an early answer.

No. 140.

Translation of a letter from his Highness the Khan of Khelat to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, dated 1st Shawal 1293 (19th October 1876).

Your Excellency's kind and complimentary letter sent to me by the hands of Colonel Colley, informing me of your welfare, reached me at a very happy moment. I have perused every word and line of it, and doing so has made me extremely happy. I am convinced of your Excellency's kind wishes and intentions towards me.

For the present I have affixed my seal to the draft treaty and have made it over to Colonel Colley and Major Sandeman, who will submit it to your Excellency.

In reference to what your Excellency says about meeting you at Jacobabad on the 6th December 1876, in reply, I beg to state that I am very glad to hear of your Excellency's proposed visit, as I am most anxious to have an interview with your Excellency, and by the grace of God I will leave this for Jacobabad on the 14th Shawal 1293 (1st November 1876), where I trust to have the pleasure of meeting your Excellency.

By the kindness of God all is well here. I trust your Excellency will consider me your obedient servant, and will continue to favour me with your kind letters.

May God cause the prosperity of your Excellency's rule to increase daily.

No. 141.

Docket, No. 327T., dated Simla, 19th October 1876.

From Officiating Assistant Secretary to Government of India, Public Works Department.

Copy of the following forwarded to the Foreign Department for information;—

No. 326T., dated Simla, 19th October 1876.

From Colonel C. H. Dickens, C.S.I., R.A., Secretary to the Government of India, Public Works Department, to Director-General of Telegraphs in India.

I am directed to request that you will select and detach an experienced officer of your department for the survey of a line of telegraph to run from Jacobabad to Dadur and Khelat, and to make the necessary arrangements for the immediate subsequent construction of the line.

2. The officer whom you may select should be ordered to wait on Colonel Pomeroy Colley at Jacobabad, and to receive his instructions as to when he may proceed with the survey and general location of the line.

3. Stores for the construction of the line may be at once collected at Jacobabad in anticipation of formal sanction to the regular estimate, which should be submitted for sanction as soon as it can be prepared.

4. You are requested to state if the funds required for this line can be provided by re-appropriation or the existing telegraph budget grants, or whether it will be necessary that an additional grant should be provided. In the latter case the amount should be approximately stated.

5. The telegraph line in question will be a military one, and Afghan or Pathan sappers may be employed in its construction. On this point you should communicate with the Commandant of Sappers, Roorkee.

6. The signallers should all be soldiers, and, if possible, the telegraph masters also should be soldiers.

No. 142.

Docket, No. 330T., dated Simla, 19th October 1876.

From Officiating Assistant Secretary to Government of India, Public Works Department.

Copy of the following forwarded to the Foreign Department for information and for issue of the necessary orders with reference to paragraph 3:—

No. 329T., dated Simla, 19th October 1876.

From Colonel C. H. Dickens, C.S.I., R.A., Secretary to the Government of India, Public Works Department, to Director-General of Telegraphs in India.

In continuation of my letter No. 326T. of this date, I am directed to say that the survey of the proposed line of telegraph to Khelat should be through or communicating with the stations occupied by British troops and the residence of the Political Agent.

2. It is understood that the stores required for this line can be taken from Bombay free of charge to Kurrachee by the Government steamer "Amberwitch," and as she is about to sail at once, it is necessary that early steps should be taken in the matter.

3. The Foreign Department will be requested to issue the necessary orders for affording every facility and the necessary protection to the telegraph officers employed on this duty.

No. 143.

No. 2526P., dated Fort William, 26th October 1876 (Confidential).

From F. Henvey, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind.

In forwarding for your information a copy of the papers marginally noted regarding the survey and construction of a proposed line of telegraph from Jacobabad to Dadur and Khelat, I am instructed to request the co-operation of the Sind authorities in the matter, and to state that his Honour the President in Council will be obliged if you will cause such orders to be issued as will ensure the officers and others entrusted with the survey and construction of the line being furnished with any guard, guides, or other aid which they may require, and which the officers under your control may be able to supply.

From Public Works Department, No. 327T., dated 19th October 1876.
From Public Works Department, No. 330T., dated 19th October 1876.

2. A copy of this letter, and of the papers herewith forwarded, will be sent to the officer in charge of the political affairs of Khelat, who will be directed to afford the Telegraph Department every assistance in his power.

No. 144.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 18th October 1876. (Extract.)

* * * * * *

9th October.—Marched from Siriab to the village of Tiri, a distance of 18 miles.

10th October.—Marched to Mustung, a distance of seven miles. En route visited the large village of Farringabad. It is the property of the Khan's sister, Bibi Alla Denee, the wife of Jam Mir Khan of Lus Beyla, and is one of the largest and most flourishing villages situated in the valley of Mustung. A letter was received from Mir Jam Ali of Lus Beyla. Its contents were to the effect that Jam Ali had sent one of his servants, by name Dad Muhammad, to Major Sandeman to inquire about the release of his father Jam Mir Khan; that as Dad Muhammad had returned to Lus Beyla without bringing with him satisfactory news, Jam Ali wrote himself to ask Major Sandeman if he had any good news about his father to give to do him the kindness to write it. In reply Jam Ali Khan was informed that up to date noo rders by the Government had been issued regarding the release of Jam Mir Khan.

A letter was received from Mir Muhammad Khan of Seebee intimating that peace prevailed in the Khan's country, and that the people of Kutchi were busy cultivating their lands, but that the peace of Seebee was still disturbed through the intrigues of his cousin Sarbiland Khan, who aspired to succeed the writer's late brother, Sher Zaman, as Sirdar of the Barozais. The letter also stated that Sirdar Mehrulla Khan in consultation with the Murree headmen had deputed Jalab Khan, Ghazni Murree, with Murree Hazar and Sheran Khan, to Kott Mundai to prevent Murree raids into Kutchi, and that Sirdar Mehrulla Khan was doing his best to keep his tribe in order and hold to the agreement made by his late brother Sirdar Ghuzzun Khan for the protection of Kutchi.

11th October.—To-day Sirdar Rahman Khan Mingul visited Major Sandeman and complained about the conduct of the Naib of Noshki's son Ido, who, he said, was instigating his nephew, Afzul Khan, to create disturbances. In consultation with the Wakil it was decided to send an agent of the Khan's to summon Afzul Khan and Ido to Khelat, and Ressaldar Nawab Khan of the Dera Ghazi Khan Police returned to Noshki with Sirdar Rahman Khan, with a view to obtaining full particulars of all that was going on at Noshki. After doing so he was instructed to proceed direct with Sirdar Rahman Khan to Khelat, and report the whole case to his Highness for orders.

12th October.—To-day Alladad Khan, the Darogah of the Bolan Pass, arrived in camp. His accounts of the cost of erecting covering for the guards of the Pass were examined. The posts were ready for roofing, and a sum of Rupees 815 had been expended up to date.

13th October.—Arrived at Amanulla, a distance of six miles. The place derives its name from a "karez."

Mahomed Amir Khan, Ressaldar, who was sent to arrange for the onward journey of Colonel Colley and Major Upperton to Mustung from Dadar, reported his arrival at Dadar, and that he was about to proceed to Bagh in Kutchi, where he hoped to meet the travellers. It had been arranged that Sirdar Moolla Mahomed and Alla Dina Koord were to bring on Colonel Colley and party from Haji-ki-Shuhr and escort them through the Bolan Pass. The Ressaldar reported that the Sarawan Sirdars had given him every assistance in completing the arrangements for Colonel Colley's journey through the Bolan Pass to Khorassan.

Alladad Khan, Darogah of the Bolan Pass, reports that during the week kafilas numbering in all 308 camels and 15 donkeys had arrived from Candahar and had been escorted through the pass in safety. Rupees 1,336 had been realised as custom dues, and Rupees 301 as escort fees. The value of the caravans was estimated at Rupees 11,633, and their contents were said to have consisted of wool, fruits, and other miscellaneous goods. * * * *

15th October.—Received an express from Captain Wylie reporting that Colonel Colley was coming viâ the Mulla Pass, and was expected to arrive at Khelat that evening. After receipt of this news Major Sandeman next morning rode into Khelat and found that Colonel Colley had arrived at Khelat the previous evening. Visited his Highness the Khan and discussed with him the object of Colonel Colley's visit, as explained by that officer to Major Sandeman.

16th October.—Colonel Colley, accompanied by Majors Sandeman and Upperton and Captain Wylie, paid his Highness the Khan a visit of ceremony.

17th October.—To-day the Khan of Khelat, accompanied by his sons, Mirs Mahmud Khan, Shahnewaz Khan, and Azam Jam, returned Colonel Colley's visit at Major Sandeman's camp.

18th October.—To-day a grand Durbar was held at the Miri, at which all the European and Native officers of the escort were present. The letter of his Excellency the Viceroy to the address of his Highness the Khan was publicly, and with every ceremony, presented to his Highness. On Colonel Colley's producing the letter all in the Durbar rose. It was then handed to Major Sandeman, who made it over to his Highness. A salute of 21 guns was then fired. The Khan received the letter standing and with every respect, and made a " salam " to it. A translation of its contents was then read by Major Upperton. At its conclusion all sat down. A conversation then took place between his Highness the Khan and Colonel Colley on the subject of the former visiting Delhi, and the number of Chiefs who should accompany him to the Imperial Assemblage. Shortly after this Colonel Colley rose, took his leave, and the Durbar was broken up. Major Sandeman remained behind, and discussed with the Khan the terms of the new Treaty to be entered into between the Government of India and his Highness' Government. A few remarks were entered by his Highness on the translation of the draft Treaty, who then affixed his seal to it, and made it over to Major Sandeman, who then took his leave.

The following is a copy of the diary of Captain Wylie for the week ending 8th October 1876 :—

" Monday, 2nd October 1876.—The kafila of 143 camels mentioned in diary for 30th September as having arrived at Khelat left for Kurrachee by the Raj route.

" Tuesday, 3rd October 1876.—A letter was received from the officer commanding the escort stating that the Khan's officials had threatened the Sarawans of those camels which had been hired by the escort in this country that they would either seize their camels for the Khan, or levy a tax of Rupees 5 a head on them."

In the afternoon Captain Wylie visited his Highness the Khan, and in the course of conversation mentioned the above circumstance. The Khan at once promised the camels should not be seized, but that there might be some taxes to be collected from their owners, about which he would inquire and let Captain Wylie know the result.

" The Khan then informed Captain Wylie that the collectors of custom dues, which had by joint agreement been sent to the camp of the escort, had been turned out of it, and not allowed to collect the taxes. As no previous report had been made to Captain Wylie on this subject, he said that he hoped it was some mistake, and that he would make inquiries. The rest of the conversation was on ordinary subjects."

Wednesday, 4th October.—" Captain Wylie wrote to Captain Humfrey about his Highness the Khan's report that his Kotwal was not allowed to levy custom dues in the camp of the Sind portion of the escort. Captain Humfrey in reply requested Captain Wylie to visit his camp the following day and see what mutual arrangements could be made; he at the same time represented that on no former occasion had the

escort of the Political Agent at Khelat paid any taxes whatever to the Government of that State."

Thursday, 5th October.—"In the evening Captain Wylie rode over to the camp of the Sind portion of the escort at Kooing, and in consultation with Captain Humfrey it was arranged that, if his Highness the Khan approved, custom fees should in future be levied in the following manner at that camp by his Highness' Kotwal.

"All entrances to the camp, save one, should be closed by sentries, who would prevent all vendors of goods or provisions from entering the camp, and who would direct all such to proceed to a market place, which was formed outside the one entrance left open. All goods should be sold in this market, and not within the lines, and that the Khan's custom officers should live in the market place and collect the regulation taxes. The place fixed upon for the market was good, as it was immediately outside an empty serai, and there was water and shade close by.

"Captain Humfrey reported that a sepoy named Alla Bux of the 30th Bombay Native Infantry had deserted the previous night. Information of this fact was sent immediately to the Khan, with the description of the sepoy, whose home was said to be at Kharan; the last information of the man's whereabouts was that he had during the night visited a woman in Khelat, at whose house the man's brother was staying. This woman gave evidence that they had left early in the morning together, and taken with them a camel, and said they were going towards Dusht-i-Goron. His Highness immediately sent men in pursuit, and wrote to his Naibs of Punjgur and Noshki, ordering them to endeavour to arrest the deserter, but up to the end of this week nothing has been heard of him.

"A kafila arrived from Candahar, consisting of 51 camels laden with dried fruits, proceeding to Kurrachee."

Friday, 6th October.—"A letter was received by Captain Wylie in the morning from Major Sandeman, enclosing one from Colonel Nuttall, Commandant at Jacobabad, informing him that the Military Secretary to the Viceroy, accompanied by Major Upperton, was about to visit Khelat with despatches, and that they would probably travel by the Mulla Pass route. He was further requested to make arrangements with the officer commanding the escort to lay post horses on 120 miles along the road from Khelat, and to send a suitable party to escort these officers on the road, Captain Wylie accordingly rode over to see Captain Humfrey on the subject, who, though he had received no orders, agreed to send out three sets of post horses, with escorts of seven Sind horsemen at each halting place for the three stages farthest from Khelat.

"His Highness the Khan of Khelat also received information through Major Sandeman that the Military Secretary was coming to Khelat with letters for both the Khan and Major Sandeman.

"In the afternoon his Highness paid a visit to Captain Wylie, when that officer took the opportunity of explaining to him all the arrangements which he, in concert with the officer commanding the escort, had made for the collection of custom dues in the camp. To these arrangements the Khan gave his cordial assent, and it was agreed that Captain Wylie should take the Kotwal of Khelat and the accredited agent for taxes to Captain Humfrey the following morning, and point out all the arrangements on the spot."

Saturday, 7th October.—"Captain Wylie, as had been arranged on the previous day, took the officials then named to the camp of the Sind portion of the escort, and with Captain Humfrey pointed out to them the market place and all the arrangements which had been made to prevent goods being sold in the lines. To these the Kotwal assented, and the Customs Agent was placed in the market to collect fees.

"A kafila arrived from Candahar, consisting of 132 camels laden with wool for Kurrachee.

"Saheb Khan Choota arrived at Khelat in obedience to an order issued by Major Sandeman. In reply to a question if the Raj route was open and peaceful, he replied that it was perfectly so, and that he had passed several kafilas proceeding to Kurrachee along it, and numbers of private travellers.

"His Highness the Khan was requested to supply Sahib Khan with a tent during his stay here, to which he agreed, and sent one over."

Sunday, 8th October.—"During the night a dâk was received from Major Sandeman; it contained a letter from his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and Major Sandeman directed Captain Wylie to present it in Durbar with all honour, and to report having done so. Captain Wylie accordingly sent word to his Highness of the honour done him by the Lieutenant-

Governor, and to request that if convenient he might present the letter in Durbar that afternoon; to this the Khan gave a ready assent.

"Orders were to-day received by the officer commanding the escort to lay outpost horses for the Military Secretary and Major Upperton.

"Captain Humfrey engaged a kossid through Captain Wylie, who was sent over the hills to Jacobabad with the answer that the orders for post horses and escorts were being complied with.

"In the afternoon Captain Wylie visited his Highness the Khan, and in his Durbar, with due ceremony, presented him with the letter from his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, which the Khan opened and read.

"His Highness' mind was, however, much taken up with the news of the approach of the Military Secretary to the Viceroy, fresh information about which he had just received in a dâk from some of his people at Jacobabad, who stated that Colonel Colley was to leave Jacobabad that very day for Khelat. His Highness' conversation was full of speculations as to why that officer was being sent, and he appeared very doubtful as to whether it would be for his advantage or not. I endeavoured to calm him, but without much success. However, when I managed to change the conversation into the state of the Mulla road, and requested some help in the way of swift camels for Colonel Colley's kit, he immediately agreed, and would not let me go till I had heard him give his different officers detailed instructions as to what was to be done for Colonel Colley and Major Upperton at all the stages along the road, and he added that if he had had longer notice he would have arranged everything for them from Gundava up to Khelat. As it was, he sent off six riding camels at once to Pir Lakha for their clothes, &c.

"A kafila of 19 camels arrived from Candahar laden with fruit for Kurrachee. The kafilas mentioned in diaries of the 5th and 8th instant marched to-day for Kurrachee by the Raj route viâ Lus Beyla. This seems at present to be the route preferred, as owing to the floods in Upper Sind kafilas find it difficult to reach Shikarpur.

"In concluding this diary for the week I may mention that cholera is rapidly disappearing in the city and neighbourhood of Khelat. There have been no fresh cases reported this week, though several people have died from the after effect of attacks previous to this week.

"The Brahooee are moving towards Kutchi in large numbers.

"The weather is fine, with frosty nights. Forage is getting extremely scarce both for horses and camels.

"Reports from the country round state everything to be quiet and peaceful, with all roads open to traffic.

"The minds of the Khan and his officials appear to be very considerably disturbed by the news that the Viceroy is sending his Military Secretary to Khelat."

No. 251, dated Camp Bagh (Kutchi), 28th October 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat and Khelat frontiers.

No. 145.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 27th October 1876.

19th October.—Colonel Colley, accompanied by Majors Sandeman and Upperton, and Doctor Duke, left Khelat for Mungocher. A letter was received from Mir Jam Ali, the contents of which were to the effect that he was not, as had been stated, realising more than the usual custom dues on caravans, and that he would be careful that nothing of the kind was done by the Lus Beyla officials.

The diary, with dates up to 1st October, of the news-writer stationed at Kahan, the Murree head-quarters, was received. The Murree headmen who had assembled to elect the Sirdar of the tribe had returned to their homes. Some men of the Lugari tribe had arrived at Kahan with a view to the recovery of certain stolen cattle, and the Sirdar had expressed his willingness to aid in their restoration. Thieving in Kutchi by Murrees was still going on, but the Murree Sirdar had deputed his cousins, Mir Hazar and Jallab Khan, with 21 sowars to be on the outlook to prevent it.

A letter from the Mazari Chief, Imam Buksh Khan, reports disputes having broken

out between the Gurchani tribe and the Murrees likely to end in bloodshed. Mr. Gladstone was written to on the subject.

20th October.—Colonel Colley, C.B., and party arrived at Mustung, a distance of 30 miles.

21st October.—Marched for Quetta.

22nd October.—Halted at Quetta and selected a site where the detachment 4th Sikh Infantry on their arrival were to hut themselves.

Advanced to Captain Scott Rupees 1,000 for the purpose.

The diary of the news-writer stationed at Kahan for the week ending 7th October was received. It contains the following news :—

1st.—That Turk Ali Murree had carried off three camels from British territory. The Murree Sirdar on hearing this, and where the animals were, seized them and returned them to their owners.

2nd.—The cattle and sheep carried off by Sher Dil Muzerani from Kechi Muzerani, numbering 320, had been restored to the latter. Three mares and 14 cows had been restored to the Khetrans which had been plundered by Murrees.

3rd.—That the Mazari Chief had sent Gujandar Khan, Balachani, to Kahan to recover certain cattle belonging to Sohna Khosa. That Sirdar Mehrulla Khan had sent his brother Asad Khan to recover the cattle, who had seized 25 cows, the property of Sohna Khan, and restored them to him.

23rd October.—Colonel Colley, C.B., and Majors Sandeman and Upperton, and Doctor Duke left Quetta for Siri Bolan, where they arrived in the afternoon. The tribal escort stationed here, with Sirdar, Alla Dina at their head, and Alladad Darogah received the officers on arrival. The post lately erected here was inspected. Here the Khan's Wakil, Nawab Muhammad Khan, joined the camp. Rain fell during the night. Sirdar Mehrulla Khan, Murree, reports that a Gurchani carried off a woman and received an asylum with the Murrees. Her relations assembled and caught her in the village of Dad Ali, Mamdani Murree, and there killed her. Dad Ali at once retaliated and killed two Gurchanis. On the 12th instant the Durkani-Gurchanis raided the Murrees and killed the brother of Sher Dil, Muzerani Murree, and carried off his arms. The Murree Sirdar requested the interference of the British officers to prevent further bloodshed. Mr. Gladstone was written to on the subject.

24th October.—Colonel Colley, C.B., and party arrived at the village of Kirta, in the Bolan Pass. They were met at Bibi Nani by the headmen Nubbee Buksh and Til Khan. The lands of Kirta are being brought slowly under cultivation. The headmen reported that 20 ploughs are at work. A letter was received from the Murree Sirdar Mehrulla Khan acknowledging receipt of a letter from Major Sandeman. The letter was couched in most submissive terms, asked Major Sandeman not to forget that the writer was his obedient servant, and that he had deputed Mir Hazar and 20 sowars to prevent Murrees raiding in Kutchi or the Bolan Pass.

25th October.—The diary of the news-writer stationed at Kahan for the week ending 14th October was received. The writer stated that Dewa Khan Powadee Murree had collected 100 men and raided the Luni Pathans, killing one man and capturing 60 cows and seven mares. The Durkani-Gurchanis had killed five Murrees on their way to British territory to purchase supplies. Colonel Colley, C.B., and party arrived at Dadar, and were met just before leaving the Bolan Pass by Sirdar Moolla Mahomed of Sarawan and a party of Brahooee, and by Syud Aurang Shah of Dadar and other Dadar notables.

26th October.—Colonel Colley, C.B., and Major Sandeman en route to Bagh visited Mittree, and when there selected a site for the detachments of 3rd Sind Horse and 4th Punjab Cavalry to encamp on, belonging to Major Sandeman's escort on their arrival at Mittree.

Arrived at Bagh in the afternoon and found Messrs. Furnivale and Pitman had just arrived there.

27th October.—Colonel Colley, C.B., and Major Upperton left in the morning for Jacobabad. Major Sandeman halted and decided to return to Mittree with Messrs. Furnivale and Pitman to arrange for the onward journey of these officers through the Bolan Pass to Khorassan. It was arranged that Doctor Duke should accompany them and give them en route the benefit of his local knowledge.

Alla Dad Khan, the Darogah of the Bolan Pass, reports that during the week caravans numbering in all 969 camels and 182 donkeys passed through the Bolan Pass. Rupees 4,130-7-6 were realised as custom dues, and Rupees 1,408 as escort fees. The value of the caravans was stated to amount to Rupees 1,21,070, and that their contents consisted of wool, fruits, carpets, and other goods.

Captain Wylie's diary for the week ending 15th October is as follows:—

Monday, 9th October 1876.—" Sirdar Sahib Khan, Choota (who came to Khelat by order of Major Sandeman, and arrived on the 7th instant), called on Captain Wylie, and was told that he must wait to have his affairs inquired into till Major Sandeman's return. He then proceeded to the Miri to pay his respects to his Highness the Khan. In Captain Wylie's presence Sahib Khan was inclined to be rude and independent.

Tuesday, 10th October.—" Captain Wylie visited his Highness the Khan in the afternoon. His Highness had just received a letter from Pir Jan from Jacobadad, telling him that he was making arrangements through Kutchi for the journey of the Military Secretary to the Viceroy. All the conversation turned on this subject, the Khan speculating much as to what could be bringing Colonel Colley into his country.

" Fifty-one camels laden with wool arrived from Candahar and proceeded next day to Kurrachee viâ the Raj route.

Wednesday, 11th October.—" A letter was received from Sirdar Gohur Khan of Zehri in reply to one written by Captain Wylie, inquiring about the capabilities of the Zehri Valley for grazing the camp camels. The Sirdars stated that the grazing was excellent, and that even if 200 or 300 head of camels were sent he would be responsible for their safety, and give their drivers his aid and protection.

Thursday, 12th October.—" Sirdar Sahib Khan Choota again called on Captain Wylie and apologized for his conduct on a former visit. Captain Scott, commanding detachment 4th Sikhs, reported officially to Captain Wylie, and Captain Humfrey, commanding escort, spoke to that officer on the subject of an order the Khan had just issued, to the effect that no lucern grass or bhoosa should in future be sold to any one, as all was required now by the Khan himself for the winter consumption of his horses and cattle. Captain Wylie wrote to his Highness on the subject.

Friday, 13th October.—" His Highness the Khan paid Captain Wylie a visit, and entered at once into the subject of the grass referred to in yesterday's diary. He said that at this season of the year he always claimed the balance left of the lucern grass as his property; but that he had placed no embargo upon bhoosa.

" It was then represented to him that many sowars had purchased the lucern crops of fields till the end of the season, and that his order told hardly on these men, who, in making this bargain, had understood there was nothing to debar them from using the fields as long as they remained in Khelat. The Khan, on this, promised that all such fields should be left to the purchasers as long as they remained here, and that he would not take the produce thereof. Information of the Khan's ruling was given to Captains Humfrey and Scott.

Saturday, 14th October.—" Information was received in the morning from Major Sandeman that Colonel Colley, Military Secretary to the Viceroy, might be expected to arrive at Khelat that day by the Mulla road. Captain Wylie sent this news on to his Highness the Khan, who directed his eldest son, Mir Muhammad Khan, and a party of cavalry to accompany Captain Wylie on the road out to meet Colonel Colley, who was received in due form at about eight miles from Khelat. Both parties dismounted and shook hands on meeting, and then proceeded towards camp. Colonel Colley was received with a salute of 11 guns from the Miri on arrival outside Khelat.

" Two hundred and fifty camels laden with wool, " zeera," and fruits, arrived from Candahar, and left next day for Kurrachee viâ the Raj route.

" Khodadad Raisani also started by the same route with 14 horses for sale in India.

Sunday, 15th October.—" Major Sandeman arrived in Khelat about 9 a.m. 130 camels laden with wool and fruits arrived from Candahar en route for Kurrachee."

No. 258, dated Camp Mittri (Kutchi), 31st October 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

No. 146.

No. 2627P., dated Simla, 2nd November 1876.

From F. Henvey, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

With reference to your letter No. 5964, dated the 18th of October 1876, regarding the application of the Ex-Jam of Lus Beyla that he may be permitted to reside at Bombay during the cold season and the month of Ramzan, I am directed to state that the matter is under consideration, and that orders will be issued hereafter.

No. 147.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 5th November 1876. (Extract.)

28th October.—Naib Pir Jan reported that during the week caravans numbering 500 camels and donkeys had arrived at Jacobabad from Khorassan. They brought manjeeth in large quantities, dried fruits and other miscellaneous goods.

2. 29th October.—Major Sandeman and Messrs. Furnivale and Pitman left Bagh for Haji-ki-Shuhr.

3. 30th October.—Marched to Mittree, the head-quarters of the Sarawan Brahooee. The town is situated on the Nari River, and used to be a large and flourishing place until desolated by civil war. It was burnt by the Khan's troops some years ago. The remains of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed's house are still conspicuous. At one time it must have been a large and commodious building. There is plenty of grass and wood to be got here. Here the main portion of the escort are to be quartered during the cold weather.

Instructions were issued to Ressaldar Mal Guzar Khan to the effect that the Haji-ki-Shuhr Guide Post was now done away with, it being no longer necessary on account of a large portion of the escort being about to be stationed at Mitree. That the guides lately stationed there would be used to keep open the communications with Quetta. Detailed orders regarding this arrangement were issued to the Ressaldar.

A letter was received from Jam Ali of Lus Beyla stating that the Jamotes had plundered the cattle of the Doda tribe at the instigation of Jan Muhammad Choota. The Jam requested that his Highness the Khan should be asked to punish Jan Muhammad for his evil doings, and obtain from him the return of the plundered Doda cattle. A copy of this letter was made over to the Wakil Nawab Muhammad Khan, with the request that he would ask the Khan to do what was right in the matter, and to send for Jan Muhammad.

4. 31st October.—To-day Messrs. Furnivale and Pitman, accompanied by Doctor Duke, left Mittree for Khelat, and were to travel by the Bolan Pass, visiting Quetta en route. Sirdar Alla Dina was directed to arrange for an escort of Brahooee to accompany these officers under command of two of his sons.

A letter was despatched to Sirdar Iman Buksh Khan, Mazari, asking him to join Major Sandeman without delay, with a view to aiding in the settlement of the Murree quarrel with the Khelat Government. Letters were also sent to the Murree Chiefs asking them to join Major Sandeman without delay. The Commissioner, Colonel Munro, was informed by telegram of these arrangements.

5. 1st November.—To-day the detachments 3rd Sind Horse and 4th Punjab Cavalry under the command of Captain Reynolds marched into Mittree.

6. 5th November.—A letter was received from his Highness the Khan to the address of Sirdar Mehrulla Khan, Chief of the Murree clan, summoning him and his Chiefs to meet his Highness at Gundava. The letter was at once sent by an express messenger to Kahan, the Murree head-quarters.

The Commissioner, Colonel Munro, sent for perusal the diary of the District Superintendent, Police, Kurrachee, for the week ending 17th September, in which it is stated that Major Sandeman presented Mirs Jam Ali Khan, Gohur Khan, and Ibrahim Khan with Rupees 500 each, and directed them, three months after date, to appear at Jacobabad to meet his Excellency the Viceroy. The report is untrue. Nothing of the

kind ever took place. The other statements in the diary as to what occurred at Mustung are also very inaccurate.

The following diary for the week ending 1st November 1876 has been received from Captain Wylie from Khelat:—

"Thursday, 19th October 1876.—Colonel Colley, Military Secretary to the Viceroy; Major Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty; Major Upperton and Surgeon Duke, left Khelat in the afternoon en route for Quetta and Dadar. Orders were issued for the distribution of the escort as under:—

"Detachment, 4th Punjab Cavalry,	Dadar.
Ditto, 3rd Sind Horse,	
"Detachment, 4th Sikh Infantry,	Quetta.
Ditto, No. 2 Mountain Battery,	To form escort to Captain Wylie.
Ditto, Jacob's Rifles,	

"Captain Wylie was ordered by Major Sandeman to remain at Khelat in political charge, and when his Highness the Khan was ready to march, to accompany him to to Gundava by the Mulla Pass.

"Friday, 20th October.—Sirdar Sahib Khan Choota having obtained leave from Major Sandeman, marched for Gundava. Gajihan, Naib of Punjgur, with several leading men of that district and about sixty followers arrived to see his Highness the Khan and Major Sandeman. It was arranged that his Highness should take these men down to Gundava with him when he marched.

"Saturday, 1st October.—His Highness the Khan advanced the treasure chest of the Mission Rupees 5,000, to be repaid at Jacobabad. This money was required by the detachment, 4th Sikh Infantry, both on account of pay and as an advance to enable them to hut themselves at Quetta.

"The Khan called upon Captain Wylie in the afternoon, and had a long talk about the journey to Delhi and the Durbar which was to take place there. He seemed to take a keen interest in everything connected with it, and to be looking forward very much to going there.

"Sunday, 22nd October.—The 3rd Sind Horse, under command of Captain W. Reynolds, marched for Mungocher en route for Dadar, with the exception of a detachment which had not rejoined from Colonel Colley's dâk.

"Monday, 23rd October.—The detachment, 4th Sikh Infantry, under Captain Scott, marched for Gurock en route for Quetta. The detachment, 3rd Sind Horse, from Colonel Colley's dâk, under command of Lieutenant Hogg, marched into camp.

"Tuesday, 24th October.—Captain Wylie paid a visit to his Highness the Khan. The conversation, as on the previous day, turned principally on the approaching grand Durbar at Delhi. It was arranged definitely that his Highness should march from Khelat on the 3rd November, and that Captain Wylie should precede him with the guns and detachment of Jacob's Rifles on the 1st, and that both parties should make a day's halt at Sohrab, Nurr, and Paneewant, to rest their camels on the road down. Captain Wylie was informed that the Naib of Punjgar had not been able to pay his respects to either him or the Khan since his arrival in Khelat, owing to illness.

"Sirdar Hubbeeb Khan, Shawani, of Skulko, paid Captain Wylie a visit, and pressed that officer to ride over and see his town and valley. This is mentioned merely as one of many little instances which are almost daily occurring, and which tend to show on what thoroughly friendly terms the people of the country and their Sirdars are with the British officers employed up here.

"Wednesday, 25th October.—The detachment, 3rd Sind Horse, under Lieutenant Hogg, marched viâ the Robdar Pass to rejoin their regimental head-quarters at Dadar.

"As a summary of the week it might be added that everything has been strictly quiet. The greater portion of the Brahooees have left the country for Kutchi. Reports from all parts state the roads to be quite open and safe for even single travellers.

"Thursday, 26th October.—Captain Wylie, accompanied by Haytoo Ram, the Superintendent of Major Sandeman's Office, visited the valley and village of Skulko, inhabited by Shawani Brahooees. It is situated about eight miles north-east of Khelat. It is watered by a spring rising at the base of the Great Harbui Mountains, which form the eastern boundary of the village. The whole ground, being on a considerable slope to the westward, it is, for purposes of cultivation, terraced, and the whole place appeared cleaner and kept in better order than any spot the writer has seen in Beloochistan. The Sirdar Hubbeeb Khan was most civil, as indeed were all the inhabitants, and they seemed greatly pleased at a 'Sahib' paying their town a visit. Like

all Belooch towns, it was half empty, and partly in ruins, proving that both the population and the desire for peaceful occupations have decreased of late years, probably on account of the constant wars from which the country has suffered. Every man feeling that whatever he built might not be his own in six months' time. The people all expressed pleasure at the idea of a British force being permanently stationed up here.

" Friday, 27th October.—His Highness the Khan called according to custom. He showed a letter to Captain Wylie which he had received from Sirdar Mirulla Khan, Tomandar of the Murrees, in answer to one he had written condoling with the Sirdar on the death of his brother, Ghuzzun Khan, the late Chief. Mirulla stated that when the Khan came down to Kutchi he would come and pay his respects to him there. The Khan showed Captain Wylie a reply he had written to this letter, in which he informed Mirulla Khan that he would be in Kutchi about the 20th November, and summoned him to meet him there.

" During this interview his Highness was attended by Ghajian, Naib of Punjgur, a nice-looking, gentlemanly man of about 35 years of age. In reply to a query as to whether the Kedj people were coming in or not, he said that up to the present there was no certain information about them.

" Saturday, 28th October.—The Khan sent to inform Captain Wylie that as he wished to see Khozdar, he proposed proceeding to Gundava viâ that place instead of by the direct Mulla route. As this would only lengthen the journey by two days, Captain Wylie said he had no objection to the proposed change.

" The Commandant of the Khan's troops, Mosun, who has been on (so called) leave at his home, returned last evening from Peshin to Khelat, on a distinct promise that he should not be asked to accompany the Khan down to Kutchi, Jacobabad, &c. This man, I believe, to be one of three whose influence is being exerted to prevent a settlement of the Khan's difficulties and of a reign of peace and order being established in the Khelat State. The other two I have good cause for believing are the Mustaufi Fakir Muhammad and the Khan's sister, the Bibi Aladini, wife of the Jam of Lus Beyla. These three people are trying to influence the Khan, for their own ends, against the British Government.

" Their reasons for wishing the country to remain in a disturbed state are, I believe, as under :—

" At the time of the murder of the late Sirdar Noordeen Mingul, who was known to be in league with the then Wuzeer Atta Mahomed, the Commandant Mosun and his regiment were employed to attack Atta Mahomed's house. The plunder obtained there was believed to be considerable, and was retained by Mosun. The Khan was endeavouring to get this plunder back from Mosun when Major Sandeman's mission entered Khelat territory for the second time. The Khan, therefore, thought it advisable for the present to abstain from pressing Mosun for the late Wuzeer's wealth. Mosun, about last August, on the Khan's return to Khelat from Mustung, took three months' leave, and went to his home in Peshin, taking with him the plunder alluded to, and it was generally understood that he would not return to Khelat again, but it appears the Khan has induced him to do so by a promise that on the Khan's departure to meet the Viceroy at Jacobabad, he (Mosun) should be left in command at Khelat.

" Of course it will be seen that if a peace is really established between the Khan and his Sirdars and people, the Khan will naturally have the time and opportunity to inquire what Mosun has done with Atta Mahomed's wealth, and to require him to pay it into the State treasury, and also all chance of Mosun's obtaining money in future by looting the people would be at an end. A further reason for his wishing for no settlement is that the former Commandant of the army, by name Shukur Khan, is in confinement in British territory; he would probably be released, and might again obtain the Commandantship.

" Mustaufi Fakir Muhammad's reasons for wishing the country to remain in a state of anarchy are much the same. The former Mustaufi is in confinement in British India, and if released would probably obtain his old office. Fakir Muhammad's father, moreover, is Naib of Bagh, and is very fearful of the Khan's taking up his accounts. This the Khan cannot very well do as long as the country is so disturbed as to prevent his summoning the Naib to his presence." The Bibi Alladini's reasons are somewhat different. She fears the release of her husband, the Jam of Lus Beyla, as in that case she may have to rejoin her husband, and to this arrangement she appears to have a very decided objection.

"It will be seen from what I have said what a difficult position the Khan himself is in, surrounded by people ready to dissuade him from accepting the terms of the British Government, or indeed from making any arrangements which may lead to the peace and better government of his country.

"Monday, 30th October.—Captain Wylie was informed in the morning that his Highness the Khan had ordered the Commandant Mosun to accompany him to Kutchi, &c.; that Mosun was very angry at the Khan's breaking his promise to him, but there was no way of escape for him.

"This will remove from Khelat a man who might do much damage in the country during the absence from it of the Khan and Major Sandeman. Captain Wylie was further informed that a betrothal had been arranged by the Khan between his two little boys, Mir Shahniwaz Khan and Mir Bahram Khan, and two young daughters of his Senior Commandant, Fakir Muhammad. This Fakir Muhammad is a good man, a Bonairwal, and, it is believed, loyally disposed towards the British Government.

"Tuesday, 31st October.—Captain Wylie called on his Highness the Khan. The latter was in very good humour, and rather twitted Mosun, who was present, at having to go to Delhi, telling him how much he would see and learn. * * *

"The Khan seemed thoroughly happy at the coming move, and at all he was to see at Jacobabad and Delhi.

"It was arranged that as the Khan was to have a very large camp going down the Mulla and 3,000 followers (much of the baggage of which camp was directed to precede him by one day) that Captain Wylie and the detachment of artillery and Jacob's Rifles should march two days ahead of him.

"Wednesday, 1st November.—The detachments No. 2 Mountain Battery and Jacob's Rifles, under command of Major Humfrey, marched to Rodinjo en route for Gundava viâ the Mulla Pass. Captain Wylie accompanied them.

"A list of the kafilas recently passed through Khelat is appended.

Khelat Kafila Report for the week ending 1st November 1876.

Date.	Number of camels.	Load.	From	For
16th October - - - -	176	Wool - -	Candahar -	Kurrachee viâ Raj route.
18th „ - - - -	68	Wool and fruits - -	Do. -	Do. do.
19th „ - - - -	37	Wool - - -	Do. -	Do. do.
20th „ - - - -	122	Wool and fruits - -	Do. -	Do. do.
21st „ - - - -	106	Do. - -	Do. -	Do. do.
22nd „ - - - -	63	Wool - - -	Do. -	Do. do.
23rd „ - - - -	122	Wool and fruits - -	Do. -	Do. do.
24th „ - - - -	101	Do. - -	Do. -	Do. do.
25th „ - - - -	57	Do. - -	Do. -	Do. do.
26th „ - - - -	134	Wool - - -	Do. -	Do. do.
27th „ - - - -	12	Fruits - - -	Do. -	Do. do.
28th „ - - - -	17	Do. - - -	Do. -	Do. do.
29th „ - - - -	108 donkeys.	Posteen and fruits -	Do. -	Do. do.
30th „ - - - -	30	Wool - -	Do. -	Do. do.
31st „ - - - -	35	Do. - - -	Do. -	Do. do.
	1,080 camels, 108 donkeys.			

(Signed) R. SANDEMAN, Major,
Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

No. 265, dated Camp Mittree, 7th November 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

No. 148.

No. 360, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 20th November 1876.

From Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division (on special duty), to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to enclose, for information, copies of orders issued by Major Sandeman, in connexion with the distribution of the troops composing his escort to Khelat, rendered necessary in furtherance of the arrangements for maintaining communication through the Bolan Pass, recently made by Major Sandeman, in personal communication with Colonel Colley, C.B., Military Secretary to the Viceroy and Governor-General.

2. Major Sandeman's letter, No. 260, of the 2nd instant, explains the circumstances under which the instructions were issued, and that letter is also forwarded, together with a copy of the directions given to Captain Scott, of the 4th Sikh Infantry Regiment, detached to Shawl Kot or Quetta, as received under Major Sandeman's endorsement, No. 266, of the 8th instant.

Enclosure 1 in No. 148.

No. 260, dated Camp Mittree, 2nd November 1876.

From Major R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

I have the honour to forward, for your information, copies of the orders issued by me to the officer commanding my escort for the march of the troops consequent on the departure of his Highness the Khan of Khelat for Gundava, preparatory to proceeding to Jacobabad to meet his Excellency the Viceroy.

2. These orders for the march of the escort were issued in concert and communication with Colonel Colley, C.B., Military Secretary to his Excellency the Viceroy, during his recent visit to Khelat. With his approval I advanced to Captain Scott, commanding at Quetta, Rs. 1,400, with which to hut his men as speedily as possible before the severe cold of the winter sets in.

3. I also submit for your information copy of the written instructions given to Captains Scott and Reynolds, commanding respectively at Quetta and Mittree.

Until Captain Wylie's arrival here I have sent for Mr. Bruce, who will for the present be in political charge of the Bolan Pass arrangements.

A copy of the orders issued and arrangements made to keep open the communications between Quetta and Mittree are also submitted. These arrangements will be under Ressaldar Mal Guzar Khan, who will employ the 150 Belooch Guides on the duty supplied to me in April last, when setting out on this mission. The duty of keeping open the communication is a very important one, and I believe it will be well performed by these Guides, who are in every way suited for that sort of work.

P.S.—The copy of the instructions referred to in the commencement of paragraph 3 will be forwarded hereafter, as they have been left at Khelat.

Enclosure 2 in No. 148.

No. 259, dated 1st November 1876.

From Major Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, to Major Humfrey, Commanding Escort.

In continuation of this Office No. 241, dated 16th ultimo, on the subject of the march of the escort consequent upon the departure of his Highness the Khan from Khelat, I have the honour to request that on your arrival at Gundava with the portion of the escort under your immediate command, that you will march with it for Mittree, where the main portion of the escort, as per margin, will for the present encamp.

Detachment, 3rd Sind Horse.
Detachment, 30th Native Infantry.
2 mountain guns.

2. On the arrival of the Khan at Gundava it is my intention myself to relieve Captain Wylie, now in personal attendance on his Highness. I have requested Captain Reynolds, in command of the cavalry, and who is to arrive here to-morrow, to place on duty with me the detachment, 4th Punjab Cavalry under Captain Shepherd, and this portion of the escort will take the duty of the troops under your immediate command on your marching for Mittree.

Enclosure 3 in No. 148.

Dated 29th October 1876.

From Major R. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, to Ressaldar Ma Guzar, Commanding the Belooch Guides at Haji ki Shahr.

The Haji post is to be done away with, as the cavalry is to be permanently stationed at Mittree. You will march at once for Quetta, placing the men under you at convenient distances along the route between the village of Mittree and Quetta. There ought not to be less than five sowars in each chowki to keep open the communications with Captain Scott at Quetta. The following chowkis you are to establish :—

5 sowars at Mittree.
5 ,, at Dadar.
5 ,, at Koondlanis.
5 ,, at Bibi Nani.
10 ,, at the chowki of Abgum, called the Chowni.

Captain Scott has Jemadar Denar Khan with 10 sowars at Quetta, who will bring his communications to the first Bolan Pass chowki. I have placed 10 sowars at the top of the Bolan Pass, as the distance to Quetta is great, but on seeing Captain Scott you might ask him to place five of his men at Siriah.

I put you in charge of the communications, as I feel certain you will perform the duty well. All your men have to do is to carry the dâk or topal. They have nothing to do with the protection of the Bolan Pass, with which you will not interfere. You might establish your own head-quarters at Dadar, and go backwards and forwards to see that your men are on the alert. You will use the Jemadars under you on this duty. Directly the sowars, now absent in Jacobabad, join you, the line of posts is to be continued from Mittree to Jacobabad, and also to wherever my camp may be. Give the matter your serious attention and carry out the duty well. A copy of this order will be sent to Mr. Bruce and Captain Scott. Mr. Bruce will be asked to send you the absent men at once.

Enclosure 4 in No. 148.

Instructions issued to Captain Scott for guidance in accordance with the provisions of this Office Letter No. 241, dated 16th October 1876, to the Officer Commanding Escort, paragraph 1.

Captain Scott is clearly to understand that he is on escort duty. That in no way is he to interfere with the Khan's Naib of Shawl Kot. Should he have any complaints at any time to bring against the Khan's officials, they must be made to the Assistant Political Officer in charge of the Bolan Pass.

A suitable site will be pointed out to him for lines for his detachment, on which he will hut his men as speedily as possible. He will do so in such a way as to permit of an increase to the lines of the escort being made at any time.

Major Sandeman will advance to Captain Scott from time to time from his treasure chest whatever funds he may require for this necessary work. Captain Scott will give receipts for whatever sum he receives, and will furnish monthly accounts of the work done.

His Highness the Khan has issued the enclosed orders to the Naib of Shawl Kot to render Captain Scott every assistance in the work of erecting huts for the escort.

It is to be understood that the Shawl Kot escort is on duty there in attendance on Assistant Political Agent in charge of the Bolan Pass. The Bolan Pass Darogah, Alladad Khan, has been directed to report himself to Captain Scott. He will be under that officer's order until the arrival of the Assistant Political Agent. The officer com-

manding Guides at Haji ki Shahr will detach 10 Guide Sowars to be under Captain Scott's orders. He will send a post twice a week by them to the nearest Bolan Pass chowki. It will be forwarded by the officer on duty there to Dadar, and thence to Jacobabad.

Captain Scott should march, if possible, on Monday next, taking the Sheereenab route.

No. 149.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 22nd November 1876.

15th November.—A letter was received from Mir Jam Ali Khan of Lus Beyla stating hat he was to leave his country for Gundava on the 9th of November.

2. 16th November.—Arrived at Gundava. Received a letter from Sirdar Gohur Khan, Zehri, stating that he would join Mirs Jam Ali and Ibrahim Khan and the Jalawan Sirdars, and, together with them, would proceed to Gundava. Major Sandeman agreed to this arrangement, and wrote and told Sirdar Gohur Khan to do as he proposed.

3. 17th November.—Captain Wylie and Mr. Furnivall arrived at Gundava and joined Major Sandeman's camp.

4. 18th November.—Colonel Nuttall, Commandant-in-Chief, Sind Frontier Force, arrived in camp on a visit to Major Sandeman.

5. 21st November.—His Highness the Khan to-day arrived at Gundava. His Highness was met about three miles from the palace by Major Sandeman, Captains Wylie and Shepherd, and a detachment of the 4th Punjab Cavalry. Sirdars Moolla Mahomed of Sarawan, Rahman Khan of Nushki, and Sirdar Kaisar Khan, Magussie, also accompanied Major Sandeman to meet his Highness and escort him to the palace. On the way, about half a mile from Gundava, the infantry of the Khelat army, to the number of about 1,000 men, were drawn up and saluted his Highness as he passed. The guns fired several salutes.

In the afternoon Major Sandeman proceeded to the palace, and in public Durbar presented his Highness the Khan with his Excellency the Viceroy's letter inviting his Highness to attend the Delhi Assemblage. The Khan received the letter standing and with marked respect. The contents were read out to his Highness, who expressed great pleasure at the kind and cordial terms in which the invitation was couched, and said he not only would gladly go to Delhi, but wherever his Excellency the Viceroy desired his presence. His Highness there and then directed a suitable reply to be written accepting the invitation, and the Durbar broke up.

The Darogah of the Bolan Pass reports that during the week a caravan (donkey) numbering 93 donkeys passed through the Bolan. Its contents were said to consist of poshteens and fruits, and to have valued Rupees 2,946. Rupees 88–14 were realized as custom dues, and Rupees 33–3 as escort fees.

6. 22nd November.—A Committee assembled in camp, consisting of Wakil Nawab Muhammad Khan, Naib Abdul Aziz of Bagh, Mustaufi Fakir Muhammad, and Lalla Hittu Ram to draw up a paper for the guidance of troops when on the march in Khelat territory. The paper would show the stages troops should halt at, the aid in supplies, &c. the Naibs could give, and the procedure necessary before these could be obtained. When ready a copy will be sent to the Officer Commanding at Jacobabad, and one to each of the Officers Commanding at Mittree and Quetta.

To-day the Munshi of Mir Jam Ali, of Lus Beyla, arrived in camp. He reported the arrival of the Jam and Mirs Gohur Khan and Ibrahim Khan at Kotra, one march from Gundava.

The following diary has been received from Captain Wylie :—

"Rodinjo, 1st November 1876.—As shown in Khelat Diary for week ending 1st November 1876, Captain Wylie, on special duty with his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and the portion of the escort to the mission left with him consisting of two guns, No. 2 Mountain Battery, and the left Wing, 30th Bombay Native Infantry, under Major Humfrey, marched from Khelat to Rodinjo, en route for Gundava viâ the Mulla Pass. His Highness the Khan arranged to march on the 3rd instant, and it was also settled that the escort should keep two marches ahead of his Highness during the journey, except when a meeting should be necessary between the Khan and Captain Wylie.

"Captain Scott, commanding detachment 4th Sikh Infantry at Quetta, took advantage

of this move to send down 21 invalids with Captain Wylie, the men to be replaced from regimental head-quarters.

"The troops which his Highness the Khan was taking with him to Kutchi, numbering by report 300 cavalry, 1,200 infantry, and two guns, moved from barracks into camp outside the walls of Khelat.

"Gundagen, 2nd November.—The troops marched from Rodinjo to Gundagen. His Highness the Khan moved into camp outside the walls of Khelat.

"Sohrab, 3rd November.—The escort marched from Gundagen to Sohrab, and his Highness the Khan from Khelat to Rodinjo.

"Sohrab, 4th November.—The escort halted at Sohrab. The Naib of Sohrab visited Captain Wylie in camp. He reported that three days before a bunniah and a Brahooee woman had been murdered by some Rodenhi Brahooees, who had fled in the direction of Kharan. On inquiry it was ascertained that the man and woman had been found in adultery, and been killed according to Belooch law.

"Two large camel kafilas of wool passed through Sohrab, while Captain Wylie was there, en route for Kurrachee viâ the Raj route.

"Sohrab, 5th November.—The escort marched in the morning for Anjira, but Captain Wylie remained at Sohrab until the afternoon in order to see his Highness the Khan, who marched in with his troops about 1 p.m., and received Captain Wylie in his Durbar tent.

"The Khan appeared well and in the best of spirits. He told Captain Wylie that Mustaufi Fakir Muhammad had just paid a lakh and a half of taxes into his treasury. He further said that Jam Ali of Lus Beyla would not come in as his country was in too disturbed a state. The conversation, however, principally turned on the approaching Imperial Assemblage at Delhi. His Highness made minute inquiries as to what his position would be, the etiquette of a Durbar, the ceremonies to be observed, &c. He also asked about the other Native Princes who would be there, and the number and description of troops, and appeared in the highest state of delight at the prospect of going there.

"After a long and friendly talk, Captain Wylie took his leave and rode on to Anjira.

"Bapow, 6th November.—The escort marched from Anjira to Bapow, while the Khan halted at Sohrab.

"Pissee Bent, 7th November.—The escort marched to Pissee Bent, his Highness the Khan to Anjira. On the line of march Captain Wylie received a message saying that Sirdar Gohur Khan of Zehri was close by, and would, with his permission, pay him a visit in camp. To this Captain Wylie agreed, and in the afternoon Gohur Khan, with about a dozen followers, arrived at Pissee Bent. He was spoken to about the unsatisfactory news received about Jam Ali of Lus Beyla, but replied that the accounts were greatly exaggerated, and that in his opinion Jam Ali would certainly come into Major Sandeman's camp, and go to Jacobabad or Delhi or anywhere he was ordered with pleasure. For himself, he said, he was just about to be married, but after spending three days with his bride, he would march for Gundava, and reach that place on the 22nd instant.

"Gorombabad, 8th November.—The escort marched to Gorombabad and the Khan to Bapow, where he was met by Gohur Khan's brother, and not by Gohur Khan himself.* This I was sorry for, but the Khan did not seem to consider it as any insult, nor has he alluded to it since in conversation.

* The peace established is too recent to admit of Sirdar Gohur Khan going alone to the Khan's camp.—R. SANDEMAN, Deputy Commissioner.

"Pasht Khana, 9th November.—The escort marched to Pasht Khana, and the Khan to Pissee Bent.

"Nurr, 10th November.—The escort marched to Nurr, and his Highness the Khan to Gorombabad.

"Nurr, 11th November.—The escort halted, and his Highness the Khan marched to Pasht Khana. Letters were received from Major Sandeman for Jam Ali and Sirdars Gohur Khan and Ibrahim Khan, these were forwarded by Captain Wylie to their destinations. The Jah Noshin of Khozdar arrived at Nurr to pay his respects to the Khan. He informed Captain Wylie that Sirdar Ibrahim Khan had already commenced his march from Wudd to Kutchi, but said he had no news from Lus Beyla.

"Nurr, 12th November.—The escort marched to Pir Lakha, and the Khan to Nurr. Captain Wylie met him there and had a long talk. The Khan seemed happy, and was much pleased at a letter which Hittu Ram, the Superintendent of Major Sandeman's office, read him out of a vernacular paper about the preparations made by the Maharaja of Jummoo for the reception of the Viceroy. The rest of the conversation was about

Major Sandeman's plans, and the march to Mooltan, &c. Captain Wylie rejoined the escort after his interview with the Khan.

" Hattarji, 13th November.—The escort marched to Hattarji, and his Highness the Khan halted at Nurr.

" Paniwaut, 14th November.—The escort marched to Paniwaut, and the Khan to Peer Lakha.

" Nowlung, 15th November.—The escort marched to Nowlung, and his Highness the Khan to Jah. In the evening Dr. Duke arrived in Captain Wylie's camp from escorting Messrs. Furnivall and Pitman through the highlands of Beloochistan. He reported everything quiet at Khelat and Quetta, and that he had received every assistance from the Khan's officials. Mr. Furnivall he had left behind in his Highness' camp at Jah.

" Nowlung, 16th November.—The escort halted, and his Highness the Khan did the same. Dr. Duke left for Gundava to rejoin Major Sandeman, and Mr. Furnivall, Under-Secretary to Government, Public Works Department, Railway Branch, arrived in Captain Wylie's camp. He gave the same account as Dr. Duke about the state of the country, and the civility with which he had been treated by the Khan and his officials generally.

" Peer Chhutta, 17th November.—The escort marched for Pir Chhutta, and his Highness the Khan for Paniwaut.

" Kotra, 18th November.—The escort marched for Kotra, while his Highness' camp moved to Kaboo.

" Gundava, 19th November.—The escort marched into Gandava, where Major Sandeman was found encamped with an escort consisting of Captain Shepherd's squadron, 4th Punjab Cavalry. His Highness the Khan marched to Pir Chhutta.

" Gundava, 20th November.—His Highness the Khan marched to Kotra.

" Gundava, 21st November.—Major Sandeman, Captain Wylie, and Captain Shepherd, with 50 sabres, 4th Punjab Cavalry, proceeded half way to Kotra and met his Highness the Khan of Khelat on the line of march from that place to Gundava, and accompanied him to his Miri in the latter place. The entry was performed in considerable state. Salutes of artillery being fired, whilst the troops were drawn up in line and saluted as his Highness passed."

No. 289, dated Camp Gundava, 24th November 1876.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

No. 150.

Note of Conversations with his Highness Mir Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat, at Jacobabad, on the 8th December 1876.

Reception.—His Highness the Khan paid his first visit to the Viceroy at 11.15 a.m., on the 8th instant. The meeting took place in the Durbar-room, at the residence of the officer commanding the Sind Frontier Force, known as " Jacob's Castle."

With his Excellency were present Mr. T. H. Thornton, Officiating Foreign Secretary; Colonel Sir William Merewether, K.C.S.I., C.B., Commissioner in Sind; the Brigadier-General Commanding in Sind; Colonel Munro, Commissioner, Derajat; the Officer Commanding the Sind Frontier Force; Colonel A. B. Johnson, Deputy Military Secretary to the Government of India; Lieutenant-Colonel O. T. Burne, C.S.I., Private Secretary; and Colonel G. P. Colley, C.B., Military Secretary to his Excellency the Viceroy, and other officers.

The Khan was accompanied by Major Sandeman and the following Sirdars and officers:—

Sirdars of Beloochistan.

Mir Karam Khan, nephew of his Highness the Khan.
Mir Gohur Khan, ditto.
Sirdar Abdul Aziz Khan, Barakzai, Afghan.
Jam Ali Khan, son of the Chief of Lus Beyla.

Sirdar Asad Khan, of Sarawan.
Sirdar Gohur Khan, of Jalawan.
Mir Ibrahim Khan, Mingul.
Wudera Shadi Khan, Bangalzai.
Muhammad Said Khan, Mahomedshi.
Mir Gajian, Gichki.
Mir Khan Muhammad Khan, Ailtazai.
Mir Kaisar Khan, Magassi.
Mir Khira, Bezonjas.
Sirdar Rahman Khan, Zagar Mingul.
Sirdar Alla Dina, Khurd.
Sirdar Sohrab Khan, Dhombkee.
Sirdar Dost Muhammad, Lehri.
Sirdar Ummed Ali Khan, Musiani.
Sirdar Chakar Khan, Jattak.
Dost Muhammad Khan, Mageri.
Ahmed Khan, Boledi.
Passand Khan, Longhani.
Jhunda Khan, Shawani.
Afzal Khan, the nephew of Sirdar Rahman Khan, Zagar Mingul.
Azim Khan, Kahiri.
Jaffer Khan, relation of the Rind Sirdar.
Lashkar Khan, Jamali.
Samandar Khan, Lehri.
Sardar Imam Buksh Khan, Mazari. } British Belooch Chiefs.
Sardar Jamal Khan, Lugari. }
Sardar Moolla Mahomed, Raisani.
Mirulla Khan, Chief of the Murrees.
Shah Baz Khan, Boogtee.
Sher Muhammad, nephew of the Murree Chief.
Mir Hazar Khan, ditto.
Mir Muhammad Khan, of Seebee.
Nur Muhammad Khan, Alkazai, Afghan.
Abdulhak Khan, Alkazai, Afghan.
Abu Bakar Khan, Afghan.

Officers of Khan's Government and Household.

Nawab Mulla Muhammad Khan, Vakil of his Highness the Khan.
Mulla Abdulla Jan.
Mulla Fakir Muhammad, Mustaufi.
Mulla Pir Jan, son of the Vakil Nawab Muhammad Khan.
Mulla Azim Jan, ditto.
Abdul Rahman, late Naib of Mustung.
Dad Muhammad, Naib of Pringabad.
Fakir Muhammad, Commandant of the Khelat troops.
Mohsun Khan, ditto.
Mir Baz Khan, ditto.
Abdul Wahid, Commandant.
Munshi Umed Ali.
Imam Buksh Khan, Ressaldar.
Sher Shah Khan, Ressaldar.
Fatteh Khan, ditto.
Zado Khan, ditto.
Sher Shah Khan, Captain of the Artillery.

The Khan was received on alighting by the Foreign Secretary and the Commissioner of Derajat, and conducted into the Durbar-room, where he was met by his Excellency the Viceroy a few paces from the entrance, and led to a seat on his right hand.

His Excellency then proceeded to express in cordial terms the great pleasure it afforded him to welcome his Highness to British territory as a guest of the British Government, observing that in journeying from his distant capital to visit his Excellency in India, his Highness had given fresh proof of the anxiety he had often expressed in letters, to cultivate friendly relations with the British Government.

The Khan replied that it gave him the greatest pleasure to proceed to British territory

to pay his respects to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, whose servant he was, and whose orders he would implicitly obey.

After thanking the Khan for the cordial reception given to Major Sandeman's Mission, for the readiness wherewith he had agreed to submit the dispute between himself and his Sirdars to arbitration, and the loyalty with which he had accepted and carried out the awards that had been made, his Excellency observed that he had learnt from Colonel Colley, who had recently visited his Highness in Khelat, that there were already gratifying signs of the beneficial results of that arbitration and of the return of peace in the rebuilding of deserted villages, and the increase of cultivation, and expressed a hope that the peace would be a lasting one, and that the amicable relations now existing between his Highness and the Sirdars would continue and be strengthened, and that both parties would show their appreciation of the efforts of the British Government on their behalf by adhering faithfully to the terms agreed on. The Khan from time to time expressed his assent to all that was said, and repeated his sincere desire to carry into effect all that had been agreed upon.

The Sirdars and officials were then presented, after which the Khan took leave.

On arrival and departure a salute of 19 guns was fired, and a Guard of Honour presented arms.

Return Visit.—At the return visit, which took place shortly afterwards, the conversation was chiefly of a complimentary character, but the Khan took occasion to express his gratitude to the British Government for having sent Major Sandeman to Khelat, and his great esteem for that officer. He also expressed his regard for Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan, Mazari, and Sirdar Jamal Khan, Lughari, the British Belooch Chiefs, who accompanied Major Sandeman, and bore testimony to the assistance they had rendered in settling disputes.

(Note of conversations continued.)

No. 151.

Execution of New Treaty.

At 3.30 p.m. on the 8th, December 1876 the Khan, accompanied by his principal Sirdars and officials, and by Major Sandeman, paid a private visit to the Viceroy for the purpose of executing the new Treaty.

The following officers were present on the occasion :—

T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Foreign Secretary.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner, Derajat Division, Punjab.

Lieutenant-Colonel O. T. Burne, C.S.I., Private Secretary.

Colonel G. P. Colley, C.B., Military Secretary.

The new Treaty, the provisions of which had been previously explained to the Khan and Sirdars, was then executed in duplicate, one copy being retained by his Excellency and one by the Khan, after which the Viceroy addressed his Highness to the following effect :—

His Excellency commenced by expressing the sincere pleasure he felt in meeting his Highness at Jacobabad, and in signing with him a new Treaty on behalf of the British Government.

This Treaty, his Excellency proceeded, would, it was hoped, prove the lasting basis of close and cordial relations between the two Governments, and also serve to maintain unbroken the peace and good order of Khelat.

In order to strengthen still further the bonds of friendship between his Highness and the British Government, and at the same time to afford his Highness material assistance in replenishing his treasury, which had been exhausted by the anarchy of recent years, his Excellency had now the pleasure of offering for his acceptance a sum of three lakhs of rupees, which sum would be made over to any officer his Highness might depute to receive it. The Khan received the announcement with great gratification.

His Excellency then adverted to the pleasure with which he looked forward to again meeting the Khan at Delhi, observing that in his journey thither through British territory his Highness would see further evidence, not only of the power and prosperity of the great Government with which his Highness was now closely allied, but also of its friendly feeling towards himself.

The reception of his Highness at Delhi would be marked by all the honours which, as representative of the Queen and Empress of India, his Excellency gladly offered to the representative of an important and friendly State in firm alliance with the British Government, and so long as his Highness continued to act in a manner worthy of his high position he might confidently count on the continuance of our friendship and protection.

"But in order," his Excellency continued, "to act in accordance with the principles of the Treaty now signed with your Highness, it is necessary (and of this I am sure I need not remind you) that you should scrupulously respect the rights of your Sirdars and subjects, and that you should abstain from all oppression.

"By this Treaty the British Government has undertaken serious obligations on your behalf. It therefore expects that your Highness will listen to its counsels, which will always be dictated by a sincere desire for your welfare and that of your subjects.

"It expects that you will loyally act upon the advice tendered to you by its representative, and abide by his decision in all cases referred to his arbitration."

His Highness replied that he fully understood and accepted all the obligations, and recognised all the duties imposed upon him by the Treaty.

Then, addressing the Sirdars, his Excellency reminded them that they had been named in the Treaty, and were therefore equally bound by its terms; that the Treaty imposed obligations upon them as well as upon the Khan, their suzerain; and that any breach of these obligations by further acts of rebellion would bring upon them the displeasure of the British Government.

They replied that they fully understood and accepted the duties imposed upon them.

Then, addressing both the Khan and Sirdars, his Excellency continued—"Those who "have entered into an engagement with the British Government for the common "advantage must remember that if they fail to carry out the terms of the engagement, "they must forfeit the advantages secured by it."

The Viceroy proceeded to inform the Khan that he had selected Major Sandeman to reside at the Court of his Highness as the representative of the British Government. "I have done so," his Excellency said, "for two reasons: first, because it is to Major Sandeman that your Highness is indebted for the renewed friendship of the British "Government; and, secondly, because Major Sandeman possesses my entire confidence; "I trust this appointment will be agreeable to your Highness."

The Khan replied that the arrangement was entirely satisfactory to him, as Major Sandeman was an officer for whom he had the highest esteem and regard.

With regard to the Khan's representative, his Excellency continued, he might for the present continue to reside at Jacobabad, or at the head-quarters of the Government of India, or at any other place in British territory which might be more convenient to his Highness.

His Excellency then informed the Khan that having learnt from Major Sandeman that it was his Highness' wish that certain persons, viz., Shukur Khan, Commandant, and Munshis Saleh Muhammad and Gul Muhammad, now detained in British territory, should be released, it was his Excellency's intention to comply at once with the wishes of his Highness, trusting that he would recognise in this act a further proof, not only of the friendship of the British Government, but also of his Excellency's personal confidence in the continued loyalty of his Highness' own Government.

Further, that having considered his Highness' recommendation in favour of the return of Mir Khan, the Ex-Jam of Lus Beyla, he was prepared to accede to it on the following conditions:—

(1.) That the Jam acknowledges the Khan's suzerainty in accordance with ancient usage.

(2.) That he accepts and abides by all the conditions of the reconciliation which his son, the acting Jam, agreed to on his behalf at Mustung in July 1876.

(3.) That he accepts as final and agrees to respect the decision given by Major Harrison and confirmed by Colonel Sir William Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, on the 3rd June 1869, regarding the Kamal Khan estate, whereby the said estate was awarded to his Highness the Khan.

(4.) That he agrees to accept as binding on himself and successors all the terms of the engagement executed this day between the British and Khelat Governments on behalf of their respective subjects and officers, so far as those terms may in any wise effect or be applicable to him.

"And now," his Excellency concluded, "I have only to wish that, under the benign protection of Almighty Providence, your Highness may long continue to enjoy all health and happiness, whilst also promoting the happiness of your Sirdars and your subjects."

His Highness, after expressing his gratitude for the favour shown him, and repeating his desire to carry out to the utmost the wishes of the British Government, whose servant he was, said he would venture to prefer one request, viz., that whenever the British Government contemplated the location of any cantonments in Khelat territory, or the establishment of lines of telegraph, or the construction of railways, the Governor-General would, before carrying out the intention, cause him to be informed and consulted in regard to it.

His Excellency, in reply, assured his Highness that nothing could be further from his intention than to take any action of the kind without previously informing his Highness and carefully considering all he had to say in the matter; and he further pointed out that it was expressly provided in the new Treaty that such measures as those referred to by his Highness were to be carried out in concert with him.

The Khan expressed himself fully satisfied.

T. H. T.

No. 152.

Treaty between the British Government and the Khelat State.

Whereas it has become expedient to renew the Treaty of 1854,* between the British Government and Nusseer Khan, Khan of Khelat, and to supplement the same by certain

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* Treaty between the British Government and Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat, concluded on the part of the British Government by Major John Jacob, C.B., in virtue of full powers granted by the Most Noble the Marquis of Dalhousie, K.G., &c., Governor-General of India, and by Meer Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat.

Whereas the course of events has made it expedient that a new agreement should be concluded between the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat, the following Articles have been agreed on between the said Government and his Highnes.

Article 1.—The Treaty concluded by Major Outram, between the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat, on the 6th October 1841, is hereby annulled.

Article 2.—There shall be perpetual friendship between the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat, his heirs and successors.

Article 3.—Meer Nusseer Khan binds himself, his heirs and successors, to oppose to the utmost all the enemies of the British Government, in all cases to act in subordinate co-operation with that Government, and to enter into no negotiation with other States without its consent; the usual friendly correspondence with neighbours being continued as before.

Article 4.—Should it be deemed necessary to station British troops in any part of the territory of Khe late, they shall occupy such positions as may be thought advisable by the British authorities.

Article 5.—Meer Nusseer Khan binds himself, his heirs and successors, to prevent all plundering or other outrage by his subjects within or near British territory; to protect the passage of merchants to and fro between the British dominions and Afghanistan, whether by way of Sindh or by the sea port of Soumeeanee, or other sea ports of Mekran, and to permit no exactions to be made beyond an equitable duty to be fixed by the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan, and the amount to be shown in the Schedule annexed to this Treaty.

Article 6.—To aid Meer Nusseer Khan, his heirs and successors, in the fulfilment of these obligations, and on condition of a faithful performance of them year by year the British Government binds itself to pay to Meer Nusseer Khan, his heirs and successors, an annual subsidy of fifty thousand (50,000) Company's Rupees.

Article 7.—If during any year the conditions above mentioned shall not be faithfully performed by the said Meer Nusseer Khan, his heirs and successors, then the annual subsidy of fifty thousand (50,000) Company's rupees will not be paid by the British Government.

Done at Mustoong this fourteenth day of May, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four.

(Signed) JOHN JACOB, Major.
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier of Upper Sindh.

Mustoong, 14th May, 1854.

Schedule showing amount of duty to be levied on merchandize passing through the dominions of the Khan of Khelat, referred to in Article 5 of this Treaty:—

On each camel load, without respect to value, from the northern frontier to the sea, either to Kurrachee or other port, Company's rupees, 6.

additional provisions calculated to draw closer the bonds of friendship and amity between the two Governments, the following additional Articles are herewith agreed upon between the Right Honourable Edward Robert Bulwer Lytton, Baron Lytton of Knebworth, in the county of Hertford, and a Baronet of the United Kingdom, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and Grand Master of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, on behalf of the British Government on the one hand, and his Highness Meer Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat, on the other.

Article 1.—The treaty concluded between the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan, Khan of Khelat, on the 14th of May 1854, is hereby renewed and re-affirmed.

Article 2.—There shall be perpetual friendship between the British Government and Meer Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat, his heirs and successors.

Article 3.—Whilst on his part, Meer Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat, binds himself, his heirs, successors, and Sirdars to observe faithfully the provisions of Article 3 of the Treaty of 1854, the British Government on its part engages to respect the independence of Khelat, and to aid the Khan, in case of need, in the maintenance of a just authority and the protection of his territories from external attack, by such means as the British Government may at the moment deem expedient.

Article 4.—For the further consolidation of the friendship herewith renewed and re-affirmed between the two Governments, it is agreed on the one hand that British Agents with suitable escorts shall be duly accredited by the British Government to reside permanently at the Court of the Khan and elsewhere in his Highness' dominions, and on the other hand, that a suitable representative shall be duly accredited by his Highness to the Government of India.

Article 5.—It is hereby agreed that should any dispute, calculated to disturb the peace of the country, arise hereafter between the Khan and the Sirdars of Khelat, the British Agent at the Court of his Highness shall in the first place use his good offices with both parties to effect by friendly advice an amicable arrangement between them, failing which the Khan will, with the consent of the British Government, submit such dispute to its arbitration, and accept and faithfully execute its award.

Article 6.—Whereas the Khan of Khelat has expressed a desire on the part of himself and his Sirdars for the presence in his country of a detachment of British troops, the British Government, in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the Treaty of 1854, and in recognition of the intimate relations existing between the two countries, hereby assents to the request of his Highness, on condition that the troops shall be stationed in such positions as the British Government may deem expedient, and be withdrawn at the pleasure of that Government.

Article 7.—It is also agreed that such lines of telegraph or railway as may be beneficial to the interests of the two Governments shall be from time to time constructed by the British Government in the territories of the Khan, provided that the conditions of such construction be a matter of previous arrangement between that Government and the Government of his Highness.

Article 8.—There shall be entire freedom of trade between the State of Khelat and the territories of the British Government, subject to such conditions as the British Government may, at any time, in concert with the Khan of Khelat, deem necessary for the protection of fiscal interests.

On each camel, as above, from the northern frontier to Shikarpore, Company's rupees, 5.

The same duties to be levied on merchandise passing in the contrary direction from the sea, or from Sindh to the Khelat territory.

(Signed) JOHN JACOB, Major,
Political Superintendent and Commandant
on the frontier of Upper Sindh.

The foregoing Articles of Treaty having been concluded between the British Government and the Khan of Khelat, and signed and sealed by Major John Jacob, C.B. on the one part, and Meer Nusseer Khan on the other, at Mustoong, on the 14th May, A.D. 1854, corresponding with 16th Shaban, A.H. 1270, a copy of the same will be delivered to his Highness, duly ratified by the Governor-General in Council, within two months from this date.

(Signed) DALHOUISE.
" J. DORIN.
" J. LOW.
" J. P. GRANT.
" B. PEACOCK.

Ratified by the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, Fort William, this 2nd day of June 1854.

(Signed) G. F. EDMONSTONE,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Article 9.—To aid Meer Khodadad Khan, his heirs and successors, in the efficient fulfilment of the obligations contracted by them under the Treaty of 1854, and the present supplementary engagement, the British Government hereby undertakes to pay to the said Khan, his heirs and successors, an annual sum of one lakh of rupees, so long as they shall faithfully adhere to the engagements heretofore and hereby contracted.

Article 10.—The British Government further undertakes to contribute Rupees 20,500 annually towards the establishment of posts and development of traffic along the trade routes in his Highness' territories, provided such money is expended by the Khan in the manner approved of by the British Government.

Executed at Jacobabad this eighth day of December one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six, Anno Domini.

(Signed) LYTTON,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

(Seal) of Khan of Khelat.

No. 153.

No. 3089P., dated Fort William, 12th December 1876.

From F. Henvey, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division (on special duty).

With reference to your letter No. 360, dated the 20th of November 1876, I am directed to state that the Governor-General in Council approves of the orders issued by Major Sandeman for the distribution of the troops composing his escort in consequence of the departure from Khelat for Jacobabad of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and in furtherance of the arrangements made by Major Sandeman, in conjunction with the Military Secretary to his Excellency the Viceroy, for the maintenance of communication through the Bolan Pass.

No. 154.

Extract from the Proceedings of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, No. 57C.P., dated 12th December 1876.

Read—

Memorial from Mir Khan, Ex-Jam of Lus Beyla (now in detention in British territory) to his Excellency the Viceroy, dated 19th January 1876, forwarded with Bombay Government's letter No. 1210, dated 29th February 1876.

Also, Memorial signed by 110 Sirdars and inhabitants of Lus Beyla, praying for his release and restoration.

Also, paragraph 2 of memorandum by his Highness the Khan of Khelat regarding the settlement of his quarrel with the Sirdars, dated 6th June 1876, recommending, under certain conditions, the release of the Ex-Jam.

Also, the office correspondence connected therewith.

Resolution.—The Right Hon. the Governor-General, after considering the above, in communication with Major Sandeman during his visit to Jacobabad, is pleased to assent to the release of Mir Khan, Ex-Jam of Lus Beyla, on his accepting the following conditions:—

1. That he, the Ex-Jam, acknowledges the Khan's suzerainty in accordance with ancient usage.

2. That he accepts and abides by all the conditions of the reconciliation which his son, the acting Jam, agreed to on his behalf at Mustung in July 1876.

3. That he accepts as final and agrees to respect the decision given by Major Harrison and confirmed by Colonel Sir William Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, on the 3rd June 1869, regarding the Kamal Khan Estate, whereby the said estate was awarded to his Highness the Khan.

4. That he agrees to accept as binding on himself and successors all the terms of the engagement executed on the 8th December 1876, between the British and Khelat Governments, on behalf of their respective subjects and officers, so far as those terms may in anywise affect or be applicable to him.

No. 58C.P.

Ordered, that a copy of the above Resolution be sent to the Government of Bombay, with a request that the conditions above set forth be carefully explained to the Ex-Jam Mir Khan, and that he be asked whether he accepts them. In the event of his accepting the conditions a record of such acceptance, duly signed or sealed by him, should be forwarded to the Government of India.

No. 155.

Extract from the Proceedings of the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, No. 62C.P., dated 12th December 1876.

Read—

Paragraph 6 of a memorandum by his Highness the Khan of Khelat, presented to Major Sandeman on 6th June 1876, praying for the release of Shukur Khan, Commandant, Saleh Muhammad and Gul Muhammad, Munshis, formerly in the employment of his Highness, and now in detention in British territory.

Also—

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to Government of Bombay, No. 717P., dated 10th April 1873, and previous correspondence having reference to the detention of the above persons.

Resolution.—The Right Hon. the Governor-General is pleased to accede to the request of his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and directs the release from detention of the said Shukur Khan, Saleh Muhammad, and Gul Muhammad.

No. 156.

No. 414, dated Camp Rajanpur, 16th December 1876.

From Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour herewith to submit a letter, No. 307 of the 14th instant, with annexures, in original, from Major Sandeman, reporting an outrage lately committed by Murrees at the village of Mull near Seebee, in the territory of his Highness the Amir of Cabul.

2. Major Sandeman has lately communicated with the Murree headmen on the subject during their visit to Jacobabad; and he hopes to effect a reconciliation between the contending parties, who, it appears, have been long at feud.

3. The instructions mentioned in the 3rd paragraph of Major Sandeman's letter were called for in the circumstances, as the scene of the outrage is not within the limits of Khelat territory; and he solicits orders from Government as to his ultimate disposal of the case.

Enclosure 1 in No. 156.

No. 307, dated Camp Rajhan, 14th December 1876.

From Major R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, to Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

I have the honour to submit, in original, for orders, two letters from the officers commanding at Mittree, on the subject of an outrage committed by a few Murree footmen on the villagers of Mull in Seebee territory, resulting in the death of one villager and the kidnapping of another.

2. I took advantage of the Murree Chiefs being at Jacobabad to pay their respects to his Excellency the Viceroy to question them regarding this outrage. They firmly denied all knowledge of it, but said it had doubtless occurred, as there is a long-standing blood-feud between the people of Mull and their clansmen the Sherani Murrees. This feud, they said, they were quite prepared to make up did they come to a final settlement with the Khan of Khelat. This I trust to be able to negotiate very shortly.

3. As the village of Mull is not in Khelat territory, but in that of the Amir of Cabul, I told Colonel Malcolmson verbally the other day at Jacobabad that he ought to recall the Duffedar and eight sowars placed in that village by Captain Reynolds. That I thought it would be quite sufficient for him to keep a good look out from Mittree, and in the event of Murrees entering the plain country, I considered he ought to attack them and drive them back into the hills. More than this, I said, I did not think the Government expected of him.

4. Doubtless it is an unfriendly act to all appearances this outrage on Mull, but on the other hand, in considering it we ought to remember that up to the present time the people of Seebee and the Murrees have been at deadly feud, and an improvement between the two sides can only be brought about gradually. Such outrages will, moreover, be liable to occur unless we decide to take upon ourselves the protection of all the plain country, Seebee territory included, a responsibility we could hardly accept without first communicating with his Highness the Amir of Cabul.

Enclosure 2 in No. 156.

No. 6, dated Camp Mittree, 28th November 1876.

From Captain W. Reynolds, Officer Commanding Troops at Mitri, to Major R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

I have the honour to report that Sirdar Hussad Khan informed me this morning that he had received intelligence that yesterday evening about 5 p.m. seven Murrees on foot attacked two zemindars about three or four miles from Mull in the direction of Lehri, killed one outright, the other was wounded and died about an hour or two after. The latter before his death stated that a young lad, who was with them, was carried off by the Murrees ; also that the said Murrees took away two swords, a shield, and two bullocks, their property. The name of one of the murdered men is Mahmood. To prevent the recurrence of such a raid in that direction, I have, in accordance with the spirit of the verbal orders received from you at Khelat, detached a Duffedar and nine sowars of the 3rd Sind Horse to Mull to remain there until further orders.

Enclosure 3 in No. 156.

No. 7, dated Camp Jacobabad, 1st December 1876.

From Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolmson, Commanding Political Escort, Mittree, to Major R. G. Sandeman, Assistant Commissioner, on special duty.

In forwarding the accompanying letter from Captain Reynolds, I should be glad if you will give me written directions as to the intention of placing the troops now quartered at Mittree, and inform me whether, in the event of similar outrages to that now reported occurring, I am to take any steps as to capturing the perpetrators, and whether parties are to be stationed at any point I may think fit to prevent their recurrence. In fact, whether I am to take measures for preventing anything of this nature, or whether I am to remain passive, unless I accidentally come across these robbers.

I should also feel much obliged if you could (in the event of my having to send out patrols) supply me with some more Jukrani horsemen.

No. 157.

Memo. No. 9, dated on the Indus, 8th January 1877.

From Commissioner in Sind.

With reference to the Resolution of the Government of India Nos. 62 and 63C.P., dated 12th December 1879, the Commissioner in Sind has the honour to report that the prisoners Shukur Khan, Saleh Muhammad, and Gul Muhammad left Kotri for Sukkur by steamer on the 3rd instant. The Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, under instructions previously issued, will forward the three men to their destination, and inform Major Sandeman accordingly, as desired by the Government of India.

2. The original warrants will be returned in due course, the Political Superintendent, Thur and Parkar, having been directed to return them to this office.

No. 158.

No. 186, dated Bombay Castle, 11th January 1877.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., C.S.I., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Adverting to the Resolution of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, No. 58C.P., dated the 12th ultimo, with accompaniments, assenting to the release of the Ex-Jam of Lus Beyla on his accepting the conditions therein specified, I am directed to forward to you herewith, for the further orders of the Government of India, copy of a letter from the Acting Collector of Poona, No. 13, dated the 4th instant, together with the written acceptance by the Ex-Jam of the conditions proposed to him in original, with translation of the same.

2. I am to state that this Government presumes that the expense of conveying the Ex-Jam and his party to the Sind frontier will be borne by Government.

Enclosure 1 in No. 158.

No. 13, dated Poona, 4th January 1877.

From G. Norman, Esq., Acting Collector and Magistrate, Poona, to C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

With reference to Government Resolution No. 7409, dated 20th ultimo, I have the honour to report that I have duly explained to the Ex-Jam of Lus Beyla the conditions upon which Government are willing to release him. I beg to forward an acknowledgment under his signature, in which he expresses his willingness to accept the terms offered.

2. The Ex-Jam represents that his household consists of about thirty persons, and he prays that Government will be pleased to grant him a sum of money sufficient to enable him to return to his native country.

3. The delay in submitting this report has been caused by my absence from Poona on duty.

Enclosure 2 in No. 158.

No. 1, dated Oriental Translator's Department, 6th January 1877.

Translation of a writing passed by Jam Mir Khan, the Ex-Jam of Lus Beyla.

I pass this writing—To wit—The District Magistrate of Poona has this day explained to me the conditions contained in the Government of India's Order No. 57C.P., dated the 12th December 1876. I agree to all those conditions. Dated Poona, the 4th January 1877.

(Signed) JAM MIR KHAN.

No. 159.

Khelat Diary for week ending 7th December 1876.

1st December 1876.—Major Sandeman and other Sirdars marched from Kanda at daybreak and reached Barshori at 9 a.m. His Highness the Khan having started at 7 a.m. arrived at 11 a.m. The distance is about 12 miles. Water obtainable from kutcha wells. Forage for horses and camels plentiful. Formerly this village was well populated, but at the beginning of this year, when the Sarawan tribe plundered the village and set it to fire, many of the inhabitants deserted it. Some of them, hearing of the Khan's negotiations with the English Government, and consequent peace in the country, have since returned.

Mir Esa Khan and Mir Ahmad Khan, Barozai, resident of Kuruk (Cabul territory), report that on the 27th November last Jalba, Kalwani Murree, with six men of Kalwani and Shirani clan fell on Mull village, and after killing Raes Mahmud and Jewan, who was watching his field, carried away two bullocks with them.

Said Khan, Salaji, Sirdar of Talli, relates that all the Mukaddams of upper and lower valley of Murree Hills having been summoned by Mehrulla Khan, Tomandar of Murrees, have gone to Kahan. The result is not known as yet.

Sirdar Jamal Khan, Tomandar of Lugharis, joined Major Sandeman's camp at Barshori.

His Highness the Khan of Khelat and his Sirdars paid the usual weekly visit to Major Sandeman. Sirdars Imam Buksh Khan, Tomandar of Muzaris, and Jamal Khan, Tomandar of Lugharis, and Munshi Hitu Ram, were present.

Asad Khan, Sarawan Sirdar, Wodera Shadi Khan, Bungalzai, and Sirdar Muhammad Saeed Khan, Mahomedshahi, joined the camp to-day.

His Highness the Khan left Barshori for Nasirabad at 10 p.m., and reached there at 3 a.m.

2nd December.—Major Sandeman, with all Jalawan and Salawan Sirdars and others, started from Barshori early in the morning and arrived at Nasirabad at 12 a.m. The distance is about 32 miles. No vegetation of any sort to be seen, and no water procurable on the road. Water and grass are in abundance at Nasirabad. Naib Mulla Pir Jan, Naib of Nasirabad, presented himself to Major Sandeman and reported all well.

3rd December.—Major Sandeman and all the Brahooee Sirdars marched for Ahmad-Khan Ka-Gote at 6 a.m., and reached there at 10 a.m. His Highness the Khan arrived there one hour later. The distance is about 9 miles. *Sursoo* cultivation extensive. There are only three or four huts in the Gote.

4th December.—Major Sandeman, his Highness the Khan, and all the Brahooee Sirdars left for Jacobabad at 5 a.m. Near Noorwah bridge his Highness was received by the civil and military officers and a guard of honour, and arrived at Jacobabad at 10 a.m. under a salute of 19 guns.

Sirdar Mehrulla Khan, Tomandar of Murrees, joined Major Sandeman's camp at Jacobabad.

5th December.—All well.

6th December.—Shahbaz Khan, son of Ghulam Murteza Khan, Tomandar of Boogtees, arrived at Jacobabad with 150 followers, and paid his respects to Major Sandeman.

7th December.—His Highness the Khan, accompanied by Major Sandeman and other Sirdars, went to meet his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, who arrived at Jacobabad at 7 p.m. A salute of 21 guns was fired from the Station battery.

Dated Calcutta, 17th January 1877.

Endorsed by Major R. G. Sandeman, on special duty.

Forwarded to the Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

No. 160.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 15th December 1876.

8th December.—The Sirdars of Kedj, who were ordered by Major Sandeman to join his camp, reported their arrival at Mull (in the district of Zehri Sirdars), and stated that as Major Sandeman had already travelled a long distance towards Jacobabad, and had an intention for further journey, they were inclined to return to their homes.

A letter was received by Major Sandeman from Sirdar Fakir Muhammad, Bezonjao, stating that he will shortly join the camp.

His Highness the Khan of Khelat had a state interview with his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

9th December.—His Excellency the Viceroy and suite left Jacobabad for Sukkur. Major Sandeman, with his Highness the Khan, and other Sirdars, left Jacobabad en route to Delhi.

10th, 11th, 12th, and 13th December.—All well.

14th December.—The list of kafilas received from Alladad Khan, Darogah of Bolan Pass, shows that 974 camels and 9,224 donkeys laden with fruits, wool, cloth, &c., to the value of Rupees 2,17,163, have passed through the pass during the week ending 1st December 1876. Custom dues, amounting to Rupees 3,280–6, and escort fees aggregating to Rupees 1,820–4, have been realized from them.

Dated Calcutta, 17th January 1877.

Endorsed by Major R. G. Sandeman, on special duty.

Forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information.

No. 161.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 22nd December 1876.

16th to 20th.—All well. Nothing of importance.

21st.—Naib Pir Jan reports that he is informed by a sowar named Dilmorad, who has lately arrived from Punjgur, that about one and a half months ago the Sirdars of Kedj had left their country to pay their respects to his Highness the Khan. During their absence Azaad Khan, Nowsherawani of Kharan, besieged the Khudabad village. Five of Azaad Khan's men were killed in the fight which ensued. The disturbances are still going on.

22nd.—All well.

No. 28, dated Jacobabad, 15th January 1877.

Endorsed by Assistant Commissioner, on special duty.

Forwarded to Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat, on special duty.

No. 162.

Docket, No. 16T., dated Fort William, 17th January 1877.

From Officiating Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Public Works Department.

Copy of the following forwarded to the Foreign Department for information, in continuation of Public Works Department, No. 330T., dated 19th October 1876:—

No. 15T., dated Fort William, 17th January 1877.

From Secretary to the Government of India, Public Works Department, to Director-General of Telegraphs in India.

In continuation of Public Works Department, No. 329T., dated 19th October last, I am directed to request that you will issue the necessary instructions at once for extending the telegraph system from Jacobabad to the British frontier military post on the projected route to Quetta, and that you will communicate these orders to the Political Superintendent, Jacobabad.

No. 163.

Khelat Diary for the week ending 31st December 1876.

1. 23rd to 28th.—All well; nothing of importance.

2. 29th.—A letter was received from Colonel Malcolmson, Commanding at Mittree, forwarding a petition to that officer's address from Sirdar Mir Muhammad Khan, Barozai, of Kuruk (Cabul territory), begging for aid from the British troops stationed at Mittree against the Murrees, who he apprehended were going to raid on his country, with reference to which Colonel Malcolmson requests instructions as to whether he should take the troops into Seebee to protect the villages there. Also, as to how he should act in case Murrees commiting raid in Khelat territory.

3. Mr. Bruce, Assistant Commissioner, on special duty, replied that Seebee being in Cabul territory no direct interference should be exercised there, [illegible] troops enter the Amir's territory; but that with regard to Khelat the Assistant Commissioner was of opinion that the Officer Commanding at Mittree was [illegible] repel any body of raiders caught hot-handed in the act of committing [illegible] the territory of his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

4. Colonel Malcolmson, Commanding Political Escort, writes [illegible] camelman of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed Raisani, has reported [illegible] sowars on the night of the 22nd instant of nine she-camels [illegible]

5. 30th.—Alla Dad, Darogah of Bolan, reports that from 3rd to 22nd December 1876 caravans numbering 335 donkeys, 1,711 camels, and 22 horses have passed in safety through the pass. The value of the caravan was estimated at Rupees 1,41,995, the contents being wool, fruits, cloth, &c. Octroi fees (Sung) amounting to Rupees 8,408–7, and safe-conduct fees (Badraki) aggregating to Rupees 1,740–9–6, were realized from the merchants.

6. 31st.—Nothing of importance.

No. 25, dated Jacobabad, 18th January 1877.

Endorsed by Officiating Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, Jacobabad.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat, on special duty.

No. 164.

No. 74P., dated Fort William, 18th January 1877.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., C.S.I., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

With reference to your letter No. 414-3, dated 16th December 1876, I am directed to inform you that the Government of India cannot undertake the duty of protecting the inhabitants of Seebee, a possession of the Amir of Afghanistan, from outrage.

2. Major Sandeman was therefore right in requiring the Officer Commanding at Mittree to recall the Duffedar and sowars whom he had despatched to Mull in Seebee with the view of preventing the recurrence of Murree raids in that quarter.

3. His Excellency in Council, however, is glad to observe that Major Sandeman hopes to put an end to the blood-feud which gave rise to the outrage in question, by arranging a final settlement of the disputes between the Murree tribe and the Khan of Khelat.

No. 165.

Khelat Diary, No. 1, for the week ending 7th January 1877.

1st January.—Buland Khan Lehri personally reports that four days ago he had left Shikarpur in charge of a horse-load, weighing one maund, containing silk and cotton cloth and some metal cups, sent by Sait Eessar Dass for Siloka and Aishi Buniahs of Dadur. On reaching half-way, in the desert between Kandah and Burshori, he was suddenly seized by three sowars, who forced him to accompany them to Mal near Shahpur. Late at evening they released him, carrying away the mare with the merchandise and other property valuing Rupees 7 or 8. The value of the merchandise is unknown.

Inquiries being made.—R. J. B.

As the thieves had their faces covered he could not recognise them, but from their language he concluded they were Murrees.

2nd January.—Malguzar Khan, Ressaldar, reports from Dadur that he has received information that Murrees are collecting their men to raid on either the Khetrans, Hassanis or Musà Khels.

Four men of Shawl Kot on returning from Mustung with six others were looted by 40 sowars of Dhumar clan. One of the former, by name Mar Sang Koord, was severely wounded.

This was apparently in prosecution of some feud ...veen the Dhumars and Koords. Further inquiries ...ho these people were, and the cause of the ...&c., are being made.—R. J. B.

...an Shawani, who had abandoned his home since last year, and had been ... Dhumars, was killed by men of that clan. The reason is not known.

...—Sirdar Mir Muhammad Khan, Barozai, of Kuruk (Cabul territory), ...ukaddams of the Murree tribe having returned from Major Sandeman's ...r forces and went to attack the Upper Afghans. The result is not ...

...urree) of Badra had gone to plunder the Sang village. The ...nation of their intention, and confined their cattle within the

Langhanis, finding the villagers on the alert, returned unsuccessful.

The Revenue Collectors of the Cabul Government are expected here at the end of this month (Zilhija).

4th January.—Colonel Malcolmson, commanding political escort at Mittree, writes that Ahmed, camelman of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisani, reports that he has recovered seven camels out of the nine carried away by Murrees on the 22nd December (vide Khelat Diary for the week ending 31st December) without any payment. The other two, being good ones, have been regained on paying a ransom (bunga) amounting to Rupees 7–8.

Further inquiries being made.—R. J. B.

5th January.—Ressaldar Malguzar Khan reports from Shawl Kot that Rupees 50 had been extorted by robbers from Haji Khan of Pishin, near Dozan (Bolan Pass). Gul Muhammad, sowar of Alla Dina Koord, recovered the amount from the culprits and made it over to the owner in presence of Captain Scott, Commanding at Shawl Kot.

Further particulars called for.—R. J. B.

Caravans are passing through the Bolan Pass in safety.

7th January.—Sirdar Alla Dina Koord intimates from Dadur that up to the 5th January 1877 all caravans have crossed in safety through the Bolan Pass, and that he and his sons are attentive in the protection of it.

No. 28, dated Jacobabad, 18th January 1877.

Endorsed by Deputy Commissioner, Jacobabad, on special duty.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty.

No. 166.

Khelat Diary, No. 2, for the week ending 15th January 1877.

8th January.—Sirdar Mehrullah Khan, son of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisani, writes that to-day a band of Murrees (Singanis led by Piara Mukaddam) committed a raid on a Panni village (in Seebee-Cabul territory), carried away 200 camels belonging to Brahooees and Pannis. The latter pursued the marauders, but before they could overtake them they had crossed the hills and effected their escape with the booty. The pursuers, after consultation, dismissed the footmen, and looted a herd of goats belonging to Murrees (Mazaranis). On their return journey they divided themselves into two parties. When they arrived near their own ilaqua, the Khajjak clan attacked one of the parties, and a fight ensued. The Khajjaks rescued the booty from the Pannis, and killed one of their horses. As the Khajjaks have acted unjustly there will be enmity between the two clans in future.

From inquiry it appears that the Mazaranis (Murrees) were living under Khajjaks' protection.—R. J. B.

2. Naib Pir Jan, his Highness the Khan's Agent at Jacobabad, reports that he is informed by Miah Khan that a buniah named Wadhu and his nephew were going to Mazarani Murree Hills with a donkey load of merchandise. On the bank of Boharwah they were met by two Murrees, who plundered them. The Hindus defended themselves, and were severely wounded. Wadhu has since died, and the other is doing well.

3. He further states (with reference to paragraph 6 of Diary No. 1 for the week ending 8th January) that the nephew of Palia Kingrani with four sowars carried away seven camels belonging to Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisani. Some men of the Takani clan met them on the way back and rescued the camels, and returned them to the owner.

4. 9th.—Sirdar Mir Muhammad Khan, Barozai, reports from Kuruk to the same as Sirdar Mehrullah, Raisani (vide paragraph 1 of this diary).

5. 10th.—Ressaldar Malguzar Khan reports from Bagh to the same Mehrullah, Raisani (vide paragraph 1 of this diary).

6. Sirdar Muhammad Khan, Khajjak, reports from Seebee to the same Mehrullah, Raisani, regarding Murree raid on Pannis, and, in addition, that the Pannis pursued and overtook the Murrees near the Nari River, but returned unsuccessful. When the Pannis reached the Khajjak ilaqua they found the cattle of Mazarani Murrees, whom they well knew to be the

clan. Khajjaks on being informed collected their men, and sent one Khair Shah Syud to intercede for them with Pannis, and recover their cattle. Pannis wounded the Syud, who, in return, wounded one of their men and a horse. A fight ensued, in which another Khajjak was wounded. Pannis at last dispersed, leaving a part of their spoil behind them.

7. 11th.—Naib Azim Jan writes from Lehri to the same effect as Sirdar Muhammad Khan, Barozai (vide paragraph 6 of this diary). He further states that the camels plundered belonged to Sirdar Sarbuland Khan, Barozai, and Phullu Gola. With regard to the men wounded in the fight, he relates that five men of Khajjak were killed and two wounded.

This information is incorrect, only two Khajjaks and one Panni were wounded. None killed.—R. J. B.

8. Major R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, writes from Delhi that he entirely approves of the opinion of Mr. Bruce (in charge of Khelat political affairs) with regard to political relations with Seebee country (vide Khelat Diary for the week ending 31st December last).

9. 12th.—Aishi, Tiloka, and others report from Dadur to the same effect as Bulanda Lehri (vide Khelat Diary No. 1 of 1877, paragraph 1).

10. 13th.—R. J. Bruce, Esq., in charge of Khelat political affairs, has written from Jacobabad to Sirdar Mehrullah Khan, Tomandar of Murrees, that he has been fully informed of the late depredations committed by Murree tribe on Seebee country. That it will be better for his (Tomandar's) own reputation, and for the satisfaction of the English Government, to stop such acts for the future. That he should have taken precautions to prevent these occurrences, and that Mr. Bruce hopes that he (Tomandar) will return the plundered cattle to their lawful owners, and give assurances that he (Tomandar) has thoroughly restrained his people from committing such outrages for the future, which, if allowed to go on unchecked, will spread to the injury of himself and of his tribe.

11. 13th.—Captain Scott, commanding political escort, reports from Quetta having completed four barracks, with native officers' houses, huts, and cook-houses, each barrack calculate to accommodate 80 men.

12. Further reports the arrival of some sowars from Candahar to collect his Highness the Amir's rent in Seebee. Durani Sirdar will accompany them to collect the rent, and receive his allowances, returning to Quetta in a few days.

13. 14th.—Captain Scott, commanding political escort, writes from Quetta, demi-officially, that a short time since a mare, belonging to the Subadar of his regiment, was stolen by a Pathan cooly working on the barracks. The mare was traced to the village of Sirdar Azim Khan, Arbab of Kasi, and returned to the owner. The accused had absconded and taken refuge in his Highness the Amir of Cabul's territory.

14. 15th.—Alla Dad, Darogah of the Bolan Pass, reports from Quetta that from 23rd to 31st December 1876 caravans, numbering 140 camels and 14 donkeys, have passed in safety through the Bolan Pass. The value of the caravans was estimated at Rupees 16,855, the contents being wool, raisins, madder (*majith*), posteens, &c. Octroi fees (sung) amounting to Rupees 474–8, and safe conduct fees (badraki) aggregating to Rupees 143–4, was realised from the merchants.

No. 39, dated Jacobabad, 25th January 1877.

Endorsed by Officer in charge of Khelat political affairs.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty.

No. 167.

No. 7, dated Camp Quetta, 30th January 1877.

[illegible]. Scott, Commanding Detachment Her Majesty's 4th Regiment Sikh [illegible] Major R. G. Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, [illegible]cobabad.

[illegible] report that, agreeably to your instructions received on 16th [illegible]ment of the 4th Regiment Sikh Infantry under my command [illegible] reaching Quetta on 2nd November 1876.

On the 3rd and 4th of November I proceeded with Naib Atta Muhammad to visit the different sources of water, and to select one for a supply to feed my works.

On the 5th I commenced to mark out the position of the different barracks, &c. to be erected, and on the 10th the foundations commenced to be cut.

Barrack site.

Barracks, &c., on the site fixed by you according to the plan attached, to accommodate a full wing of a regiment, at a cost of Rupees 2,300, were completed on 16th January 1877 under the following adverse circumstances :—

1st.—Most of the Brahooee inhabitants of the valley having migrated to Kutchi to escape the winter, I was dependent on labourers from the hill tribes around, or those occupying the inner slopes of the "Tukatu" and "Zarghun" Hills. With the aid of the Naib the following high rates marginally noted were fixed. For four days there were 120 men employed daily at the works, but on the fifth day they all struck work and demanded higher wages. As their manner was most overbearing, I assembled them in front of the detachment, quarter-guard, paid them their dues, and informed them they might return to their homes, and at once turned out the detachment in reliefs to carry on the works.

Labour.

Mason	- -	8 annas.
Diggers	- -	4 „
Coolies	- -	3 „

This summary procedure surprised them, as also the detachment turning out so readily to proceed to the works. After some ten days, however, they returned in large numbers, and took up work again of their own free will, accepting the reduced rates noted in the margin. As I could not depend on these men as fixed labourers, employing some 70 of them, the detachment continued furnishing working parties.

Mason and diggers	-	4 annas.
Coolies	- - -	3 „

2nd.—Rain, hail, severe frosts, and snow combined at first injured my walls to a very great extent. Snow commenced to fall on the hills around so early as 9th November 1876, severe frosts set in and bit the walls, causing them, as they dried, to crumble away. I was therefore obliged to mix straw (bhoosa) and litter with the mud, and protect it from the frosts at night by strewing straw thickly over it.

Weather.

3rd.—My water supply from the Hunna River, which fed my works, was constantly being interfered with and cut off, owing to a difference of opinion between the Naib and the late Mûhammad Said Khan, Durani, as to who was the actual owner.

Water supply.

4th.—No material for roofing but green poplars and mulberry, or the small lana bush and hill grass was procurable in the valley, nor could I at first make any arrangements for its supply. Through the aid however of the late Muhammad Said Khan, I contracted for a supply of timber and matting from the Hunna and Pishin valleys, but carriage (camels) was required to bring these in.

Timber roofing.

5th.—No camels were in the valley, and I was obliged therefore to keep back the regiment camels attached in the detachment for this purpose. The severity of weather, entire scarcity of grazing, and the long marches into the valleys soon reduced their former good condition, and has for the present rendered them unfit for use, five have since died. On the 18th instant I was forced to send them down to the Sind camp at Mittree, and they will remain there until again required.

Carriage.

All these difficulties, I am happy to say, have been overcome, owing in a great measure to the cheerfulness and goodwill with which the whole detachment set to work to complete their barracks. They received no working pay beyond two days, when I gave them two annas each and extra rations, costing Rupees 70 on 1st January 1877.

I need hardly remark that in consequence the saving to Government has been great, and further I feel confident that the lines would not have been completed this winter, had not the detachment pushed them on with such spirit.

Since the completion of the lines we have had very severe weather, and the heaviest snowstorm that has fallen as yet fell on the night of the 23rd instant, 6 inches being on the ground in the morning, this was followed by sleet, and then heavy rain fell and continued to pour until 8 p.m. on 24th. Rain fell again for several hours on the 25th, and another heavy storm set in on night of 26th, continuing until 3 p.m. on 28th instant. Notwithstanding this severe test to new buildings, the barracks, beyond leaking a good deal, have received no damage. We are all still under canvass, but having made the men

build small temporary huts for themselves on first arrival, they are protected from the wet and cold, and all are, I am thankful to say, well and comfortable.

In conclusion, I would bring to your favourable notice the great support given me by the late Said Muhammad Khan, Durani, and his son, Abdul Wasid, in arranging for wood, &c. with the Kakur and other tribes, without which I fear the barracks would not have been roofed in for sometime yet.

Naib Atta Muhammad aided me as much as he could, but having no influence with the tribes beyond his own district he was not able to do much.

I enclose a letter from Assistant Surgeon E. Tootell regarding the barracks, and also copies of the thermometer reading since arrival here.

Enclosure 1 in No. 167.

Dated Quetta, 1st February 1877.

From Surgeon E. Tootell, Medical Officer in charge of Detachment Her Majesty's 4th Regiment Sikh Infantry, to Captain A. Scott, Commanding Detachment Her Majesty's 4th Regiment Sikh Infantry.

Having examined the newly constructed barracks, I have the honour to report—

1st.—That they are fit for the occupation of the men, both as regards dryness, warmth, and ability to stand severe weather without leaking (the latter point having been tested by the very severe weather which we have lately experienced).

2nd.—That the accommodation, though not so great as might be wished, is still amply sufficient for the men, without risk of any of the consequences of overcrowding. The amount of cubic space per man is 263⅓ cubic feet, and this might be increased to 372 cubic feet by raising the roof to 12 feet. The amount of superficial space is 30 square feet per man, which is decidedly a small allowance, though at present in tents the men have less.

3rd.—That the ventilation is sufficiently provided for by the number of doorways in each barrack and a number of holes pierced in the centre wall opposite each doorway, thus allowing a free circulation of air throughout the whole building.

4th.—That the site is higher than the immediately surrounding lands, and the aspect is one which affords plenty of light and air.

5th.—That there are admirable facilities for good water supply and drainage, and favourable sites for latrines.

These three last points I have not reported on at large, as the arrangements for their completion have not yet been carried out.

I have also the honour to attach the readings * of the minimum and maximum thermometers, with remarks on the weather, for the months of December 1876 and January 1877.

* Not sent.

No. 168.

No. 14, dated Camp Sukkur, 30th January 1877. (Extract.)

From Captain H. Wylie, on special duty with his Highness the Khan of Khelat, to Major R. G. Sandeman, C.S.I., Deputy Commissioner, on special duty, Calcutta.

I have the honour to report for your information that his Highness the Khan of Khelat arrived at Sukkur yesterday in the Government Steamer "Chenab." His Highness is in good health and spirits, and expresses himself on every occasion as much pleased and gratified with his whole trip, and with the arrangements made for his comfort and amusement.

2. Before leaving Mooltan his Highness visited the Chenab, and was so much pleased with her that he made it a particular request that he should be allowed to embark at Sher Shah, instead of going by rail to Bakree.

Captain Plummer agreed to this if 50 men and the camels were sent by country boat, and it was arranged so to do, but at the last moment his Highness again changed his mind, and sent his camels and the detachment, for whom there was no room on the steamer, by land viâ Dera Ghazi Khan to Jacobabad.

3. The steamer and flat were of course very much crowded, but Captain Plummer did everything in his power to make all comfortable, and his never failing attention, and the capital way in which he brought down his vessel elicited repeated praises from the Khan.

This was the more creditable as the river was very low and difficult of navigation. The Khan specially requests that Captain Plummer's conduct may be brought to the favourable notice of Government, and I would mention that by Captain Plummer's taking upon himself to bring such a crowded and heavily laden steamer from Sher Shah, Government have been saved the expense of conveying the Khan to Bakree, and of a couple of country boats, the hire of each of which was Rupees 550.

4. On arrival here his Highness the Khan mentioned that he particularly wished to visit place called Ranipur, distant 38 miles, where lives a certain very holy peer, whose blessing he is anxious to secure. I telegraphed to you about this wish of the Khan's and have received your affirmative reply, and his Highness will start to-morrow or next day for Ranipur, the whole expenses of the journey being defrayed by himself. He goes there in two marches, returns in two more, and halts one day at Ranipur. In the meantime his heavy luggage, troops, and followers will go to Shikarpur, and await him there.

* * * * * * * *

6. Disturbances are reported as having taken place in Noshky and several men as having been killed: of all these reports the Khan hopes to have authentic information when he reaches Gundava, and he will then tell the Political officer with him.

* * * * * * * *

8. I hope to reach Jacobabad with the Khan on the 7th February.

No. 169.

No. 604, dated Bombay Castle, 2nd February 1877.

From C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., C.S.I., Officiating Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter from the District Magistrate of Poona, No. 131, dated 25th idem, and of its enclosure, reporting the release of the Ex-Jam of Lus Beyla, and his departure from Poona en route to Kurrachee.

Enclosure 1 in No. 169.

No. 131, dated Camp Saswal, 25th January 1877.

From G. Norman, Esq., District Magistrate, Poona, to C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

With reference to the telegram dated 18th instant, and Government Resolution No. 355, dated 20th idem, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a report, No. 27, dated 22nd instant, from the City Magistrate of Poona, from which it will be seen that the orders of Government regarding the Ex-Jam of Lus Beyla have been duly carried out.

2. I now request sanction to the expenditure of Rupees 111–2 incurred on account of railway fare, carriage hire, &c.

3. The Jam has been paid his allowance up to 20th instant. A last pay certificate from the Treasury Officer is enclosed.

Enclosure 2 in No. 169.

No. 27, dated Poona, 22nd January 1877.

From A. H. Plunkett, Esq., City Magistrate, Poona, to G. Norman, Esq., Collector and District Magistrate, Poona.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 90, dated 19th instant, forwarding copy of a telegram from the Secretary to Government, permitting the release of the Ex-Jam of Lus Beyla.

2. In accordance with your directions, I fully explained to the Ex-Jam the purport of the telegram, and took from his Highness an acknowledgment in Marathi to that effect, which I beg to submit.

3. Having desired his Highness to furnish a list of his dependents and followers, I was furnished with a list of persons declared by him to be his dependents and followers who

intended to accompany him to his territory. The list (which I beg to attach) having been duly checked, I attended at the railway station, and furnished each of the persons named therein with a ticket, the class of carriage in which each was to travel being determined by the condition or employment of each follower or dependant.

4. His Highness took his departure from Poona on the morning of the 21st instant. His own railway passage and that of his dependants and followers was defrayed by me, the necessary money having been drawn from the Treasury. The passages so paid for from Poona to Bombay were as follows :—

First Class.

Two tickets (the Ex-Jam and Ghulam Muhammad Khan, Physician).

Second Class.

Six tickets (four for male and two for female dependents).

Fourth Class.

Nineteen tickets (for servants and dependents).

5. The amount paid for passenger fare was Rupees 85–7 (eighty-five and seven annas) as per account in Marathi hereto attached; a sum of Rupees 25–11 (twenty-five and annas eleven) has also been expended for carriage hire and conveyance of his Highness' baggage from Poona to Bombay, as per copy of bill from Luddah Ebram & Co. appended, the original having been kept for transmission to the Treasury as a voucher for the expenditure.

6. At the request of the Ex-Jam he was paid his allowance at Rupees 666–10–8 per mensem up to 20th instant. A last pay certificate from the Treasury Officer to that effect is submitted.

No. 170.

Khelat Diary, No. 3, for the week ending 22nd January 1877. (Extract.)

16th January.—Sirdar Alla Dina Koord reports from Quetta the safety of traffic through the Bolan Pass up to 13th January.

2. 17th.—Alla Dad, Darogah of the Bolan Pass, reports from Quetta that from 1st to 9th January caravans, numbering in all 865 camels and 218 donkeys, have passed through the Bolan Pass. Rupees 3,007–0–6 were realized as custom dues (sung), and Rupees 923–5–3 as escort fees (badrakki). The value of the caravans was estimated to Rupees 65,863, and that their contents consisted of wool, cloth, and asafœtida.

* * * * * * *

4. 20th.—Captain Scott, commanding political escort, reports from Quetta, all well up to 15th instant. That for some days the weather has been severe, with snow storms, the hills being covered with snow from summit to base; the thermometer down to 12° at night, maximum in the day 55°.

5. Commander Shukur Khan and Munshis Saleh Muhammad and Gul Muhammad, having been released by order of Government of India, arrived at Jacobabad on the 20th instant, and were made over by Colonel Nuttall to Mr. Bruce, officiating in charge of Khelat Mission, who made them over to Naib Pir Jan, Agent to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

6. 21st.—Malguzar Khan, Ressaldar of Belooch Guides, reports from Mittree that, on the 18th instant, 17 camels were missing from a herd grazing near Gullanwer, belonging to Bacha Barani. Search was immediately made, and the foot prints of the camels, and those of two sowars, were found leading towards the Murree Hills.

This case is under inquiry.—R. J. B.

7. 22nd.—Sirdar Gholam Murteza Khan, Tomandar of Boogtees, writes from Dera Bibrak, that Massuris (Boogtees) are making preparations for a raid on the Afghan country. The result will be reported as soon as known.

8. A statement showing traffic through the Bolan Pass from 1st April 1876 to 31st December 1876 is herewith appended.

9. Sirdar Mehrullah Khan, Tomandar of Murrees, has sent a reply to Mr. Bruce's letter, referred to in paragraph 10 of Diary No. 2 for 1877, stating that he had already

sent his sowars to Kot Mundai to collect and keep the plundered cattle, and that he was also ready to start for that place to return the cattle to the owners, and requested that Manu Garani might be sent direct to Kot Mundai to assist him.

10. The bearer of Mehrullah Khan's reply states that the Tomandar having ordered him to start for Jacobabad left for Kot Mundai.

11. He further states that he was informed that the sheep and goats belonging to Mazarani Murrees, and carried away by Pannis (vide paragraph 1 of Diary No. 2 for 1877) have all been returned to the owners through Mehrullah Khan, son of Sirdar Mulla Mahomed Raisani.

No. 54, dated Jacobabad, 5th February 1877.

Endorsed by Officer in charge of Khelat Mission, Jacobabad.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, on special duty.

Enclosure 1 in No. 170.

[Vide paragraph 8 of Khelat Diary No. 3 of 1877.]

Statement showing Traffic through the Bolan Pass from 1st April 1876 to 31st December 1876.

From what Station.	Number of Kafilas.	Camels.	Ponies and Horses.	Donkeys.	Total.	Value of Caravan.	Amount realised from the Caravans on account of			Contents of Caravan.
							* Sung (Custom dues).	† Badrakki (escort fee).	Total.	
						Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	
Shikarpur -	275	3,265	509	58	3,832	13,45,229 0 0	9,186 0 3	3,983 0 6	13,169 0 9	Leather, lawsonia, country cloth of sorts, iron, turmeric, copper vessels, black pepper, Multani shoes, sugarcandy, black sugar, sugar, broadcloth, muslin, merino, shirting, penknives, wool, steel, brass, myrobalans, and sacks.
Cabul - -	2	—	75	—	75	12,500 0 0	383 12 0	37 8 0	421 4 0	Horses and camlets.
Herat - -	28	23	14	119	156	65,006 4 0	303 9 0	95 0 0	398 9 0	Pistachio, silk, silk cloth, carpets, turquoise, gold, shawls, small apricots, almonds, raisins, camlets, and assafœtida.
Khelat - -	43	803	79	12	894	76,079 8 0	4,338 10 0	1,079 3 0	5,417 13 0	Wood, ghee, almond, apple, madder, mulberries, tobacco, liquorice-roots, variety of grain, grapes, raisins, cumin seeds, wool, snuff, and horses.
Candahar -	291	5,033	160	1,561	6,754	5,69,958 2 0	16,303 0 6	5,055 6 6	21,358 7 0	Pistachio, cumin seeds, walnuts, madder, almond, posteens, barberries, manna, raisins, rice, wool, lace-work caps, small apricots, rosaries, violet (bunafsha), carpets, camlets, horses, silk cloth, silk, figs, apples, burk (cloth made of camels' hair), stockings, gloves, grapes, dates, leather, assafœtida, waistcoats, saddle bags, quince seeds, nutmegs, leopard skins, opium, and damascene plums.
Total -	639	9,124	837	1,750	11,711	20,68,772 14 0	30,514 15 9	10,250 2 0	40,765 1 9	

* NOTE.—Custom dues (sung) are realised as follows:—
On merchandise of all descriptions from Khorassan to Hindustan, at annas 4 per maund.
Ditto ditto from Hindustan to Candahar, at annas 5 per maund.
Ditto ditto from other parts of Khan's territory to Quetta (Shawl Kot), at Rupees 3-6 per camel-load.
Ditto ditto except ghee from Quetta (Shawl Kot) to other parts of Khan's territory, at Rupees 3-6 per camel-load.
On ghee from Quetta (Shawl Kot) to other parts of Khan's territory, at Rupees 7-10 per camel-load.
Escort fees (badrakki (are realised) from merchants passing through the Bolan Pass) as follows:—
Per camel-load of indigo, Rupees 2; wool, Rupees 1-8; silk, Rupees 2; madder, 1 sort, Rupees 1-8; 2nd sort, Rupee 1; sugar, Rupees 1-4; saddles, &c., annas 8; iron, Rupee 1; cloth, Rupees 2; medicines, &c., Rupee 1; oil, Rupee 1; and ghee, Rupee 1; variety of grains, per kharwar (9½ maunds), annas 6.

(Signed) R. J. BRUCE,
Officer in charge of Khelat Mission.

No. 171.

Note by Major R. G. Sandeman, C.S.I., on special duty, dated Calcutta, 8th February 1877.

The Secretary has sent me, demi-officially, Khelat Diaries for the weeks ending respectively the 31st December 1876 and the 7th January 1877, and has called my attention to two passages in them marked by him.

The first passage states that four Murree sowars carried off nine she camels from Kutchi. By referring, however, to an entry in the diary for the week ending 7th January, I find that on the 4th January seven of the reported stolen camels were restored to their owners.

I think it is very unlikely that the camels were in the first instance stolen. The Brahoocs permit their herds and flocks to graze right up to the Murree Hills, and even inside them, and when animals wander they are at once reported as stolen. Generally such cases are made over to the Chiefs for disposal, who, as a rule, settle them. In the event of their not being able to do so, reference is made to the Deputy Commissioner, who keeps a register of all pending cases, and when a suitable opportunity offers he takes up the case and settles it.

Entry No. 2, referred to me, states that the Murree tribe contemplate attacking the Upper Afghans. This statement is of no importance. The Murrees are at feud with all their Afghan neighbours, and the two sides are continually fighting each other.

I enclose telegrams from Messrs Bruce and Gladstone on the unsettled state of the Murree tribe. This is caused by the death of the late Sirdar Ghuzzun Khan. The new Chief (as is generally the case in such tribes as the Murrees) has a strong faction opposed to him, and will require, both from the Punjab and Sind, the hearty support of our officers to enable him to maintain his own.

I have directed the two officers referred to above to meet at Boogtee Dera, and in concert and communication with the Khelat authorities there to inquire into all tribal quarrels, and to do their utmost to settle these. Mr. Bruce has been directed to give the Sirdar every legitimate support.

I trust these measures will meet with approval.

Enclosure 1 in No. 171.

Telegram, dated 5th February 1877.

From Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan, to Major Sandeman, Calcutta.

I received to-day a report from Baham Khan, Mazari, that Meia Khan, Mamdani Murree, had informed him personally that the Murrees had a month since made a raid on Kutchi, carrying off 180 of Moolla Mahomed's camels, and have subsequently made two raids on Kutchi, carrying off cattle and goats without number. This is so far not confirmed. I will telegraph again when I have fully ascertained.

Enclosure 2 in No. 171.

Telegram, dated 7th February 1877.

From Deputy-Commissioner, Rajanpoor, to Major Sandeman, Calcutta.

Imam Buksh, Mazari, confirms his son's report about Murree raids. He accuses Mirullah of complicity in hopes of obtaining more pay. He says more raids are to be apprehended.

Enclosure 3 in No. 171.

Telegram, dated 7th February 1877.

From Major Sandeman, Calcutta, to Mr. Gladstone, Hurrund viâ Rajanpoor.

Bruce goes to Kutchi and Boogtee Dera to fully inquire into state of affairs. It would be an excellent plan if you and Sirdar Imam Buksh could meet him there. Communicate with Bruce and cordially co-operate together.

Enclosure 4 in No. 171.

Telegram, dated 7th February 1877.

From Deputy Commissioner, Rajanpoor, to Major Sandeman, Calcutta.

I meet Bruce at Boogtee Dera on 10th instant. You may depend on cordial co-operation.

Enclosure 5 in No. 171.

Telegram, dated 7th February 1877.

From Mr. Bruce, Jacobabad, to Major Sandeman, Calcutta.

Have received information from Imam Buksh, Mazari, the late Seebee raids were instigated by Mehrulla Tomundar in hopes thereby to get his Government allowances increased; that on same grounds other depredations may be anticipated in Kutchi. Sher Muhammad Shah Buksh, other Murrees at Rojhan, were apparently his informants. This is in direct opposition to information received from Brahooees and others, who state that leaders committed raids to get Tomundar into disrepute. I believe latter version correct, and that there are intrigues against Tomundar, who is acting in good faith. There being no Munshi at Kahan, difficult to maintain proper relations with tribe. He is at Rojhan on two months' leave, which there is nothing on record to show that you gave him.

Enclosure 6 in No. 171.

Telegram, dated 8th February 1877.

From Major Sandeman, Calcutta, to Mr. Bruce, Jacobabad.

Full instructions sent you by post. Give Sirdar Mehrulla your full legitimate support.

Enclosure 7 in No. 171.

Telegram, dated 7th February 1877.

From Mr. Bruce, Jacobabad, to Major Sandeman, Calcutta.

Your telegram. Have telegraphed Gladstone to meet me at Sahaf and bring Imam Buksh, Mazari, with him. Murree sowars just arrived, strengthen my views regarding Tomundar as communicated last telegram, who will require your hearty support if intrigues are against him.

Enclosure 8 in No. 171.

Telegram, dated 8th February 1877.

From Major Sandeman, Calcutta, to Mr. Bruce, Jacobabad.

Be sure and fully consult Khan in all matters connected with tribes, and mode of procedure in regard to settlement of quarrels. Khan's hearty co-operation once secured success is certain.

No. 172.

Memorandum No. 63, dated 10th February 1877.

From R. J. Bruce, Esq., Assistant Commissioner, on special duty, to Major R. G. Sandeman, C.S.I., Deputy Commissioner, on special duty.

With reference to former correspondence, has the honour to forward a memorandum relating to Major Browne's visit to Kutchi in connexion with the proposed railway line to Dadur or Quetta.

Enclosure 1 in No. 172.

Memorandum.

During the month of January Major Browne, R.E., visited Thal, Gora, Nari, Tullar, Lehri, Mal, and Dadar, and closely inspected that part of country with reference to the proposed line of railway to Dadur or Quetta.

He is now engaged in the examination of the direct line viâ Barshori and Bagh, intending to return again by the northern line.

(Signed) R. J. Bruce,
Assistant Commissioner, on special duty.

No. 173.

No. 317P., dated Fort William, 15th February 1877.

From T. J. C. Plowden, Esq., Officiating Under Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Munro, on special duty.

With reference to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Khelat Diary for the week ending the 31st of December 1876, forwarded with your endorsement No. 428, dated the 22nd of January 1877, I am directed to state that the Governor-General in Council approves of Mr. Bruce's reply to the letter from the Officer Commanding at Mittree, on the subject of the petition of Sirdar Mir Muhammad Khan, Barozai, of Kuruk, in Afghan territory, praying for aid against the Murrees.

No. 174.

Khelat Diary, No. 4, for the week ending 31st January 1877.

25th January.—The Murree news-writer reports from Kahan that on the 4th January Dewa Khan, Powadi Murree, with 900 Murree sowars and footmen, made a raid on the Musa Khail Pathans, plundering 1,500 cows and killing 10 men.

2. 30th January.—Alladad, Darogah of the Bolan Pass, reports that from the 12th to 21st January caravans, consisting of fruits, cloth, wool, &c., numbering 760 camels, 502 donkeys, and 11 ponies, valued at Rupees 98,007, passed in safety through the Bolan Pass from Candahar and other places. Rupees 2,830–4 were realised as custom dues (sung), and Rupees 894–7 as escort fees (badrakki).

3. The value of caravans and amount of custom and escort fees from the 1st January are respectively—

	Rupees.
Value of caravans - - - -	1,63,870–0–0
Custom dues - - - - -	5,837–4–6
Escort fees - - - - -	1,817–12–3

4. 31st January.—Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan, Mazari, reports his arrival at Rojhan on the 30th January, and that Muhammad Khan and Shah Buksh, Mamdani Murrees, who were there with their sick brother, Mian Khan, gave him the following information.

1st. That Piara, Thingani Murree, with 40 men, raided Kurk village in Seebee country and carried away 180 camels.

2nd. That Daru, Langhani Murree, with 20 men, plundered a large number of sheep and goats from Seebee.

3rd. That some Thingani Murrees carried away some cows and bullocks from Seebee, and that the Murrees, in concert with Sirdar Mehrulla Khan, Murree, intended to raid in Kutchi. Taking the usual propensities of the Murree Chief into consideration, Sirdar Imam Buksh Khan is of opinion that the raids in Seebee country have been committed through his instigation, as he believes that by doing so his Government allowance will be increased. The Mazari Chief has also received information from other sources that the Murrees are still preparing to commit raids in Kutchi. Sher Muhammad Khan, Murree, when lately at Rojhan, promised to send the Mazari Chief full information of the Murree's doings, which, when received, will be communicated. The Mazari Chief is of opinion that it would be advisable to withhold the Murree pay, and also to punish them

This does not agree with the information received by the undersigned, which shows that the Murree Tomundar is working in good faith, recovering the stolen property to be returned to the owners.—R. J. Bruce, Officiating in charge of Khelat Mission.

so severely that others may take example by it. It is also reported that the Murree Chief has gone to Koot Mundai, but whether to recover the plundered cattle or to instigate further depredations is not yet known.

No. 19, dated Camp Badalwah, 15th February 1877.

Endorsed by Officer in charge of Khelat Mission.

Submitted to Colonel A. A. Munro, Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division.

No. 175.

Khelat Diary, No. 5, for the week ending 7th February 1877. (Extract.)

2nd February.—Sirdar Sohrab Khan of Lahri reports that on the 1st February four Hindus went out to cut "khar" at the foot of the Murree Hills, where at mid-day Alam Khan, Shaheja Murree, with three sowars, robbed them of their clothes.

2. Mehrulla Khan, son of Sirdar Moolla Mahomed, Raisani, writes—(1st) that the report of a Murree raid on the Samalanis is incorrect, but that 10 or 12 Thingani Murrees, headed by Shakru Murree, made a raid on the Sangan village, but finding nothing there returned empty handed; (2nd) that his Highness the Amir of Cabul has sent by the hands of Pista Khan, Mir Akhor, and Sirdar Mir Golam Mohiyuldeen, the nephew of Sirdar Saido Khan (who were sent by the Amir's order to realise the Government revenue of Seebee), a khillut and dustar of Chieftainship for Sirdar Muhammad Khan, Barozai. The above-named officers collected all the Pannis, and with their consent gave the Sirdar his khillut, and elected him Chief. Surbiland Khan, with three or four persons of his faction, alone declined to join the assemblage, or acknowledge the Chief.

3. 3rd February.—The news-writer stationed at Kahan, the Murree head-quarters, writes to the same effect as Mehrulla Khan, Raisani, vide paragraph 1 of Diary No. 2. He further reports that Dad and other Langhani Murrees, with 20 followers, raided on Golam Bolaks (Seebee country), carrying off a number of goats. That the Thingani Murrees had three times stolen cattle from Kutchi, and that Sirdar Mehrulla Khan, Murree, had gone himself to Mundai to recover the property plundered from Seebee and Kutchi.

4. 4th February.—Alladad Khan, Darogah of the Bolan Pass, reports that Zarif Khan, Paihlwanzai, stated to him that a few Murree thieves carried off three camels belonging to the Paihlwanzai tribe residing in Dahna Gharri. That he (Zarif Khan) pursued the culprits, but could not overtake them. He reported this occurrence to Colonel Malcolmson (at Mittree) and to Sirdar Alla Dina Koord. The latter told him to come after four days, when he would arrange to obtain the restoration of the stolen animals.

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No. 176.

No. 316P., dated Fort William, 15th February 1877.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., C.S.I., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Major R. G. Sandeman, C.S.I., on special duty.

With reference to the telegraphic correspondence which has taken place between yourself, the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan, and Mr. Bruce, ending with your telegram to the latter, dated the 8th instant, on the subject of raids which have recently been committed by the Murree tribe, I am directed to state that the Governor-General in Council approves of your having instructed Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Bruce to meet at Boogtee Dera for the purpose of endeavouring to settle, in concert and communication with the Khelat authorities, the inter-tribal quarrels which are said to have been the cause of the raids.

No. 177.

Office Memorandum No. 340P., dated Fort William, 17th February 1877.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., C.S.I., Officiating Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to Military Department.

It having come to the notice of the Government of India that officers are in the habit of crossing the Sind border into Khelat territory without previously communicating with the Political Officer in charge of Khelat affairs, and the continuance of this practice being, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, undesirable, the undersigned is directed to request that the Military Department will issue suitable orders, making it imperative on all officers before proceeding into Khelat territory, whether on duty or otherwise, to notify their intention to the Political Officer with his Highness the Khan for his Highness' information and issue of the necessary orders. Such arrangements as may be necessary and practicable, will then be made for their protection and for their being furnished with guides and supplies, without which no officer should start.

No. 178.

No. 449, dated Camp Chini, 19th February 1877.

From Colonel W. R. Lambert, Collector of Kurrachee, to Colonel Sir W. L. Merewether, K.C.S.I. and C.B., Commissioner in Sind.

With reference to your letter No. 62, dated 1st instant, the Huzur Deputy Collector reports, under date the 14th idem, that Sirdar Mir Khan arrived in Kurrachee from Bombay on the 2nd, and left for Lus Beyla on Saturday the 10th instant.

No. 179.

No. 354P., dated Fort William, 19th February 1877 (Confidential).

Resolution—By Government of India, Foreign Department (Extract.)

Read—

The Treaty between the British Government and the Khelat State, dated the 8th of December 1876.

Observations.—1. Article 4 of the Treaty recently executed between the British Government and the Khelat State declares that, "for the further consolidation of the "friendship herewith renewed and re-affirmed between the two Governments, it is agreed "on the one hand that British Agents, with suitable escorts, shall be duly accredited by "the British Government to reside permanently at the Court of the Khan and elsewhere "in his Highness' dominions, and on the other hand, that a suitable representative shall "be duly accredited by his Highness to the Government of India;" and Article 6 that "Whereas the Khan of Khelat has expressed a desire on the part of himself and his "Sirdars for the presence in his country of a detachment of British troops, the British "Government, in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the Treaty of 1854, "and in recognition of the intimate relations existing between the two countries, hereby "assents to the request of his Highness, on condition that the troops shall be stationed "in such positions as the British Government may deem expedient, and be withdrawn "at the pleasure of that Government."

2. In conformity with the above provisions it is in contemplation to station Political Officers at Khelat and Quetta, and detachments of troops at Quetta and Mittree, namely:—

At Quetta—	At Mittree or its vicinity—
One regiment of infantry.	One regiment of cavalry.
One squadron of cavalry.	One wing of infantry.
One mountain battery.	One mountain battery.

3. Under these circumstances, * * * it becomes, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, matter of extreme importance that Quetta should be connected

without delay with the British telegraph system by a line proceeding by the Bolan Pass; a branch line being ultimately made connecting Khelat with the main line either at Quetta or at some point below the Bolan Pass.

4. In Article 7 of the Treaty it is agreed "that such lines of telegraph or railway as may "be beneficial to the interests of the two Governments shall be from time to time constructed "by the British Government in the territories of the Khan, provided that the conditions of "such construction be a matter of previous arrangement between that Government and "the Government of his Highness;" and in accordance with the proviso of the last clause, the proposal of the British Government as above described has been fully explained to the Khan, and he has cordially assented thereto.

5. The cost of the extension from Jacobabad to Quetta is approximately estimated as follows:—

Rupees 72,900 cash;
„ 1,05,700 stores;

the estimate being based on a rough survey by an officer of the Telegraph Department who accompanied Colonel Colley on his mission to Khelat. It is therefore

Resolved—That the Department of Public Works be desired to arrange for the extension of a line to Quetta by the route indicated without delay.

No. 180.

Office Memo. No. 377P., dated Fort William, 20th February 1877.

From Officiating Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Military Department.

With reference to the communication noted in the margin from the Military Department, making certain inquiries in respect to the encampment at eight miles from Khelat of half of the escort with Major Sandeman's Mission, the undersigned is instructed to forward an extract* on the subject from the Khelat Diary for the week ending with the 7th of August 1876, and to intimate that Major Sandeman states that the escort was divided into two parts at the request of the Officer Commanding, who expressed a wish that the troops should be separated as a mere matter of convenience, and that the measure was not prompted by political or any considerations other than the one indicated.

No. 980S., Special-Political, dated 27th September 1876.

* Clauses 2 and 3, paragraph 7. See No. 117.

No. 181.

No. 371P., dated Fort William, 20th February 1877.

From T. J. C. Plowden, Esq., Officiating Under Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

With reference to your letter No. 604, dated the 2nd of February 1877, on the subject of the release of the Ex-Jam of Lus Beyla, I am directed to state that the Governor-General in Council sanctions the expenditure of Rupees 111–2, incurred in sending the Jam and his followers by rail from Poona to Bombay.

No. 182.

No. 379P., dated Fort William, 21st February 1877 (Confidential).

Resolution—By the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Read—

Resolution of Government of India No. 2819P., dated 16th October 1875, and papers referred to therein.

Also Government of India's letter No. 150P.. dated 13th January 1876, to address of the Punjab Government, and subsequent correspondence relating to Khelat affairs.

Also Treaty concluded with his Highness the Khan of Khelat, dated 8th December 1876.

1. In the early part of 1873 the disturbed condition of Khelat necessitated the withdrawal of the Political Agent of the British Government and suspension of the subsidy paid to the Khan under the provisions of the Treaty of 1854.

2. Circumstances, which it is unnecessary to detail, led to the deputation, towards the close of 1875, of Captain (now Major) Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of the Dera Ghazi Khan District of the Punjab, to Beloochistan, for the purpose of effecting, if possible, a peaceful settlement of inter-tribal disputes and opening the way to a renewal, under certain conditions, of friendly relations with the Khan's Government. Major Sandeman returned in January 1876 with a satisfactory letter from the Khan, and the result of his mission was sufficiently encouraging to induce the Government of India to depute him a second time to Khelat territory with a letter from the Viceroy (Lord Northbrook) to his Highness in reply. During his second mission Major Sandeman succeeded in re-opening the Bolan Pass for traffic, and in effecting a reconciliation between the Khan and his Sirdars. At the commencement of the cold season the Khan and his Sirdars proceeded with Major Sandeman to British territory, and on the 8th December 1876, a new treaty of friendship, re-affirming and supplementing the Treaty of 1854, was executed at Jacobabad by his Excellency the present Viceroy and his Highness the Khan.

3. In the new Treaty it is agreed, *inter alia*, that the British Government shall aid the Khan, in case of need, in the maintenance of a just authority and in the protection of his territories from external attack (Article 3); shall assist, if need be, in settling disputes between the Khan and his Sirdars (Article 5); shall station troops in Khelat territory in such positions as may be deemed expedient (Article 6); and (Article 7) shall construct from time to time such lines of telegraph or railway as may be beneficial to the interests of the two Governments.

It is further agreed (Articles 9 and 10) that the British Government shall, in addition to an enhanced subsidy of one lakh of rupees per annum, contribute Rupees 20,500 annually towards the establishment of posts and development of traffic along the trade routes in his Highness' territories, provided such money is expended by the Khan in the manner approved of by the British Government; and (Article 4) that British Agents, with suitable escorts, shall be accredited to reside permanently at the Court of the Khan and elsewhere in his Highness' dominions.

4. Friendship between the Khelat and British Governments having been thus renewed and strengthened, his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council is pleased, subject to the approval of Her Majesty's Government, to sanction the re-establishment and extension of the Khelat Agency in the manner herein-after set forth.

5. The charge of the political relations of the British Government with the Khelat State and its dependencies shall be vested in Major R. G. Sandeman, C.S.I., under the designation of Agent to the Governor-General for Beloochistan.

6. As Agent to the Governor-General, Major R. Sandeman will be the representative of the British Government in Khelat and its Dependencies; will correspond directly with the Foreign Department of the Government of India, and have custody of the Khelat Records, now in the charge of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro; he will further be entitled to be referred to, and consulted by, the authorities of British districts adjacent to the Khelat border, whether in the Punjab or in Sind, in respect of administrative matters which may affect, or be likely to affect, the interests of the Khan or of his subjects, and the officers of the Sind Frontier Police will supply him with the reports and information now furnished to the Commissioner of the Derajat.

7. The Agent to the Governor-General will have his head-quarters and ordinarily reside in Khelat territory, but he shall have general permission to proceed on duty to any part of British territory lying Trans-Indus between Dera Ghazi Khan and the sea, for the purpose of conferring with the local authorities on matters connected with his special duties, in regard to which they will be expected to furnish him with any information he may require.

8. Until further orders Major Sandeman will receive a salary of Rupees 2,500 per mensem, and take rank with residents of the 2nd Class in the Gradation List of the Political Department, but will retain for the present his place in the Punjab Civil List.

9. Subordinate to the Agent to the Governor-General, there shall be three Assistant Agents; the head-quarters of the first will be, until further orders, at Quetta, whence he will supervise the arrangements for the protection of the Bolan Pass; the second will, for the present, have his head-quarters at Jacobabad and act as Commandant of the Belooch Guides, whom it is proposed to transfer from the Military Department and place under the orders of the Agent to the Governor-General; and the third will remain in attendance at the Court of the Khan.

10. Until further orders the First Assistant will draw a salary of Rupees 1,200 per mensem, and take rank with Political Agents of the 2nd Class; and the Second and Third Assistants salaries of Rupees 1,000 per mensem, and take rank with Political Agents of the 3rd Class; and they will further retain for the present a lien upon the appointments now held by them.

11. Mr. R. I. Bruce, Assistant Commissioner, Punjab, is appointed First Assistant; Captain E. S. Reynolds, of the Sind Horse, Second Assistant; and Captain H. Wylie, of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, Third Assistant.

12. In addition to the above officers, and in like manner subordinate to the Agent to the Governor-General, there shall be a medical officer, to be designated Medical Officer to the Beloochistan Agency, who will reside ordinarily at Khelat, but may be employed under the orders of the Agent to the Governor-General in any part of Khelat and its Dependencies, and will supervise the dispensaries, which it is proposed, with the assent of the Khan, to establish at Khelat and Quetta; until further orders he will receive the salary of a Residency or 1st Class Civil Surgeon, together with an allowance of Rupees 350 per mensem, and will retain a lien on his present appointment.

The Governor-General is pleased to appoint Surgeon O. T. Duke, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, Medical Officer.

13. For the above officers his Excellency in Council is further pleased to sanction the establishments and charges contained in the annexed Schedule A.

14. With regard to the Belooch Guides, the Military Department will be requested to arrange that Colonel Nuthall, Commanding the Sind Frontier Force, and Major Sandeman shall submit jointly proposals for effecting the transfer of this Corps from the Military Department of the Bombay Presidency to the Political Department of the Government of India, care being taken that such transfer is effected without prejudice to the interests of the men, and that provision is made for placing a number sufficient for duty at the outposts at the disposal of the Officer Commanding the Sind Frontier Force.

15. From the date of this Resolution the mission of Major Sandeman shall be deemed to have closed, and no time should be lost by that officer in preparing and submitting the accounts for final adjustment.

Enclosure 1 in No. 182.

Schedule A.

Referred to in paragraph 13 of Resolution No. 379P., dated 21st February 1877.

Establishments and charges.

I.—For the Agent to the Governor-General:

	Rupees.		Rupees.	
English and Vernacular Office -	670 per mensem*	-	8,040 per annum.	
Jemadar on Rupees 12, and four peons, at Rupees 8 each - - -	60	„	- 720	„
Tentage at usual rate up to a maximum of -	-	-	2,400	„
Durbar allowance (presents) - - -	-	-	5,000	„
Cost of entertaining Chiefs and contingencies	-	-	4,000	„
			19,896	

II.—For the Assistant at Quetta:

	Rupees.		Rupees.	
Office - - - -	100 per mensem*	-	1,200 per annum.	
Two peons, at Rupees 8 each -	16	„	- 192	„
Tentage up to a maximum of -	-	-	2,160	„
Contingencies - - -	-	-	360	„
	Total	-	3,912	„

* Detailed lists to be submitted by Major Sandeman.

III.—Assistant in charge of Belooch Guides:

	Rupees.	Rupees.
Office - - - -	75 per mensem* -	900 per annum.
Tentage up to a maximum of -	- - -	1,800 „
Contingencies - - -	- - -	240 „
	Total -	2,940 „

IV.—Assistant with the Khan:

	Rupees.	
Office - - - -	100 per mensem* -	1,200 per annum.
Two peons - - - -	16 „ -	192 „
Tentage up to a miximum of -	- - -	2,160 „
Contingencies - - -	- - -	240 „
	Total -	3,792 „

V.—Medical Officer:

Dispensary establishments* and charges as per estimate framed by Dr. Duke up to	- - -	3,624 per annum.
Tentage - - - -	- - -	1,800 „
	Total -	5,424 „

The Agent to the Governor-General is further authorised to incur expenditure not exceeding Rupees 10,000 in providing camp equipage for himself and subordinates, taking as a general guide the scale of camp equipage allowed for Political Agents, and to incur expenditure not exceeding Rupees 5,000 in building, furnishing, and providing outfit for dispensaries at Quetta and Khelat.

The above arrangements do not interfere with the sanction given in paragraph 27 of Government of India's Resolution No. 2819P., dated 16th October 1875, to expenditure of Rupees 66,960 per annum in the manner therein set forth.

(Signed) T. H. THORNTON,
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 183.

No. 381P., dated Fort William, 21st February 1877.

Notification by Government of India, Foreign Department.

The friendly relations between the British Government and his Highness Mir Muhammad Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat, which were suspended in 1873, having been renewed, the Right Hon. the Governor-General in Council is pleased, in compliance with the wishes of his Highness, to direct the re-establishment of the Khelat Agency, withdrawn at the period above-mentioned, and to make the following appointments, subject to the approval of Her Majesty's Government:—

Major R. G. Sandeman, C.S.I., Deputy Commissioner, Punjab, is appointed Agent to the Governor-General for Beloochistan, and will take rank with Residents of the 2nd Class in the Gradation List of the Political Department.

Mr. R. J. Bruce, Assistant Commissioner, Punjab, is appointed First Assistant, and will take rank with Political Agents of the 2nd Class.

Captain E. S. Reynolds, Sind Horse, is appointed Second Assistant, and will take rank with Political Agents of the 3rd Class.

Captain H. Wylie, 1st Punjab Cavalry, is appointed Third Assistant, and will take rank with Political Agents of the 3rd Class.

Surgeon O. T. Duke is appointed Medical Officer to the Agency.

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* Detailed lists to be submitted by Major Sandeman.

No. 184.

No. 382P., dated Fort William, 21st February 1877.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., C.S.I., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to C. Gonne, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

With reference to Government of India's Resolution No. 379P., dated 21st February 1877, on the subject of Khelat affairs, I am desired to request that from this date the designation of the Political Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier be changed to that of "Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier."

2. I am further to request that the Government of Bombay will favour the Government of India with an expression of opinion as to whether the duties discharged by the Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier, now that the political duties of his office have ceased, are such as to require the services of an Assistant Superintendent.

No. 185.

Docket, No. 49T., dated Fort William, 21st February 1877.

From Officiating Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Public Works Department.

Copy of the following forwarded to the Foreign Department for information, in continuation of Public Works Department, No. 16T., dated 17th ultimo:—

No. 48T., dated 21st February 1877.

From Secretary to the Government of India, Public Works Department, to Director-General of Telegraphs in India.

In reply to your letter No. 247T. of 18th January 1877, I am directed to request that you will commence at once the erection of the line of telegraph from Jacobabad to Quetta viâ the Bolan Pass. I am directed to request that you will submit proposals for working and protecting the line, which must be regarded, when made, as a military line.

No. 186.

No. 400P., dated Fort William, 22nd February 1877.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., C.S.I., Officiating Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to Agent to the Governor-General for Beloochistan.

With reference to the letter to your address from the officer commanding detachment 4th Sikh Infantry at Quetta, No. 7, dated the 30th of January 1877, I am directed to state that the Governor-General in Council has read with interest Captain Scott's report of the manner in which the difficulties connected with the construction of barracks for the men of the detachment under his command were overcome. His Excellency in Council considers that the exertions for this object of Captain Scott and the men of the detachment were praiseworthy, and desires that they may be informed accordingly.

2. His Excellency in Council also cordially appreciates the aid in the procuring of material, &c. for the barracks which was rendered to Captain Scott by the late Sirdar Muhummad Said Khan, Doorani, and his son, Abdul Wahid.

No. 187.

Khureeta, dated 23rd February 1877.

From his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

I have the pleasure to inform your Highness that, in fulfilment of the promise made by me at Jacobabad, and in accordance with the provisions of Article IV. of the new Treaty, I have arranged for the re-establishment of the Khelat Agency by the permanent deputation of Major R. G. Sandeman to represent the British Government in your Highness' dominions.

Major Sandeman has received the high and honourable designation of Agent to the Governor-General, and will correspond directly with the Government of India; he has

my entire confidence, and you will find in him a friend always prepared to co-operate heartily with your Highness in securing tranquillity in Beloochistan, and promoting arrangements for the development of trade, the improvement of communications, and other measures likely to be beneficial to the interests of the Khelat and British Governments.

I feel assured I may count upon your Highness reciprocating the friendly spirit which has dictated his appointment.

Major Sandeman will have under his orders three Assistants and a medical officer, with each of whom you are already well acquainted; one of them is Mr. Bruce, another Captain Reynolds, late Assistant Superintendent at Jacobabad, the third is Captain H. Wylie, and the medical officer is Dr. O. T. Duke.

Major Sandeman has conveyed to me the wish expressed by your Highness that it may be so arranged that the officer in charge of the British relations with Khelat should be also in administrative charge of the British district of Jacobabad.

I regret that considerations of importance prevent my acceding, for the present, to your Highness' request, but, in order to meet as far as possible the object your Highness has in view, instructions have been issued which I trust will secure the cordial co-operation of the officers of districts adjacent to the frontier with Major Sandeman in reference to matters affecting the interests of Khelat.

Your Highness has already been informed by telegram, that in accordance with your previously expressed desire, Major Sandeman, on his return to Khelat is to proceed to Mekran and Punjgoor for the purpose of settling, if possible, the affairs of that distant portion of your territories. I feel sure your Highness will gladly afford Major Sandeman, while so employed, your cordial assistance and support.

In conclusion, I beg your Highness will accept the expression of my best wishes for your welfare and that of your Sirdars and people, and my earnest wish that the friendship which has been so auspiciously renewed between the Khelat and British Governments may continue and increase; and that the arrangements now determined on may result in securing the maintenance of peace, and the increase of prosperity throughout your Highness' dominions.

No. 188.

Docket, No. 59T., dated Fort William, 26th February 1877.

From Officiating Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Public Works Department.

Copy of the following forwarded to the Foreign Department for information, in continuation of this Office No. 49T. of the 21st current:—

No. 58T., dated Fort William, 26th February 1877.

From Secretary to the Government of India, Public Works Department, to Director-General of Telegraphs in India.

In continuation of Public Works Department letter No. 48T. of the 21st current, authorising you to commence at once the construction of the line of telegraph from Jacobabad to Quetta viâ the Bolan Pass, I am directed to convey the sanction of the Government of India to the estimate,* amounting to Rupees 1,78,600, for the same, submitted with your letter No. 241 of the 23rd December last.

* Stores	-	Rupees	1,05,700
Cash	-	„	72,900
Total		„	1,78,600

2. This sanction has been registered in this office as No. 13T. of 1876-77, and the estimate is returned.

No. 189.

No. 495P., dated Fort William, 5th March 1877.

From T. J. C. Plowden, Esq., Officiating Under Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to Major R. G. Sandeman, Agent to the Governor-General for Beloochistan.

With reference to paragraph 10 of the Khelat Diary for the week ending with the 15th of January 1877, I am directed to state that the Governor-General in Council approves Mr. Bruce's letter to Sirdar Mehrullah Khan, the Murree Tomandar, on the subject of the raids recently committed by his tribe in the Seebee district.

Copy of diary enclosed for ready reference.

No. 190.

Docket No. 74T., dated Fort William, 8th March 1877.

From Officiating Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Public Works Department.

Copy of the following forwarded to the Foreign Department for information :—

No. 269T., Dated Calcutta, 24th February 1877.

From Director-General of Telegraphs in India to Secretary to the Government of India, Public Works Department.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 48T., dated 21st February 1877, and to report that I have ordered the telegraph line from Jacobabad to Quetta to be constructed without delay.

2. I will submit proposals, so soon as I know the requirements exactly, for working the line, but I understand that the political officers will provide quarters for our signallers and protection for the lines.

3. I request that the estimate submitted with this office letter No. 241T., of 23rd December 1876, may now be sanctioned and returned.

No. 191.

Telegram dated 13th March 1877.

From Major Sandeman, Jacobabad, to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Arrived here. Frontier perfectly tranquil.

No. 192.

Minute recorded by the Honourable Sir E. C. Bayley when signing the Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State, No. 50P., dated 23rd March 1877, on the subject of Khelat affairs.

While I cordially concur in the policy which has now been adopted in Khelat, and which is reported in this Despatch, I am sorry that I am unable to coincide in the historical review which occupies the first 10 paragraphs of the Despatch. I should not however have thought it necessary to say so, but for two reasons.

The first reason is, that these paragraphs give a view of the internal constitution of Khelat and of our relations to that State which I not only hold to be erroneous, but to have exercised a most pernicious influence in the past on our dealings with that State, and which, if allowed to prevail, may again work mischief. The second reason is, that while the Despatch agrees that the policy now working successfully is the necessary outcome of the action of the Government of India in 1872, it yet, by the adoption of the views stated in the first 10 paragraphs, virtually condemns that action, particularly by the adoption of the views of the Bombay Government quoted in the 10th paragraph.

I was not part of the Government of India in 1872, but I think it only just to say that it seems to me that the policy of 1872 was the policy which the Government of India had, at least ever since 1854, consistently enjoined. It was, however, practically enforced, though very partially, and for the time unsuccessfully, in 1872. It has now been followed to its legitimate conclusion, and its success I believe to be due to the fact that it is the only policy which has correctly recognised the true condition of the country, and which has dealt with that condition in a right and just spirit.

I desire only to say this much at present, because, in order fully to illustrate my views, it will be necessary for me to enter into a somewhat lengthened review of the past history of Khelat and of our dealings with it. This will take some time to prepare, and as it is not of immediate urgency, while it is very desirable that the present Despatch should be at once forwarded, I beg leave to send it in the shape of a memorandum, or further minute to be appended to this Despatch, and to send it by an early future mail.

(Signed) E. C. Bayley.

Calcutta, the 23rd March 1877.

No. 193.

Minute by the Honourable Sir E. C. Bayley, K.C.S.I., on Khelat Affairs.

In continuation of my Minute of the 23rd of March last, I now give at length my own view of the early history and condition of the State of Khelat, which differs in important respects from the view adopted in the first 10 paragraphs of the Despatch No. 50P., dated the 23rd March.*

I do so because the policy which from 1857 to 1872 has been followed upon the frontier of Sind, by the local authorities and by the Bombay Government, has been no doubt founded on a similar view of facts to that enunciated in the Despatch.

That policy (practically in part at least continued till 1875) can hardly be said to have had favourable results. I believe that I can show that its failure was the inevitable consequence of the mistaken view of facts on which it was based.

The present issue of the opposite line of policy for the first time practically insisted upon in 1872 by the Government of India (but not then first initiated) has been, as the closing paragraphs of the Despatch show, a signal success. This is, I believe, due wholly to the fact that it is founded on a correct appreciation of the real condition and requirements of the country, and because it deals with these on a just and equitable plan.

I trust also that I shall be able to make it clear that the general lines of policy which the Supreme Government has all along laid down have been consistent only with our later course of action towards Khelat, and that the present policy involves no change of opinion whatever on the part of the Supreme Government. I must express myself at some length, however, because I cannot otherwise explain the full importance of my disagreement from some of the simple statements of purely historical facts contained in the 4th paragraph of the Despatch.

In the first place, I believe it an error, and one fundamentally affecting the whole treatment of the question, to say that the institutions of Khelat are mainly of a feudal character, or that the position of the Chiefs resembles that of the barons during the feudal period of western society. It seems to me quite clear from (1) the history of the origin of the state of Khelat, (2) from the accounts of Masson, Pottinger, and Leech, and (3) from the action of the Khan and Chiefs at various points of the discussion during the last 19 years, that the institutions of Khelat are federal and not feudal. So far as I can discover, there is but one element, and that an accidental one, of a feudal character in the entire political constitution of the State of Khelat. Nor do I hold it to be correct to say that the position of the tribal Chiefs has never been sharply defined. On the contrary, the State of Khelat possesses an elaborate constitution of indigenous growth, which was undoubtedly thrown into a very definite shape more than 100 years ago by Nusseer Khan I. The constitution thus established seems to me, looking at the then condition of the country itself and of its surrounding States, a marvel of political sagacity and practical statesmanship. There is but little in it which, if we are wise, we should wish to change at the present day. It no doubt will require from time to time some slight modifications to meet changing circumstances, but it contains within itself, I believe, the means of effecting those changes, and in its essentials it seems admirably adapted to the condition and spirit of the people, even as they now stand.

I must observe here that the tribes of Beloochistan are very different in disposition from their Afghan neighbours. I am not prepared to explain the reason why this is so, but probably two centuries of comparatively good and settled government have had a considerable effect on the national character.

The people of Beloochistan no doubt are—especially some tribes—more or less predatory in their habits; they are brave, and if not equal to the Afghans in war, at least are by no means contemptible enemies. I can remember when they cut off Walpole Clarke's detachment of irregular horse, defeated Colonel Woodburn's column, and compelled Captain Lewis Brown, after a gallant defence, to surrender the fort of Kahun. No one who reads Sir Charles Napier's papers can doubt that he thought them no despicable antagonists.

On the other hand, they are chivalrous and true, as the Afghans are the reverse. When Walpole Clarke was killed, they themselves sent us word how bravely he had

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* Note.—In reference to what I said in my former Minute, I may mention that I now find I signed a Despatch in June 1872, reporting the policy adopted in 1872, but that policy was virtually settled before I joined the Government.

died, and how many of their own number had fallen before his sabre, and they of their own motion erected a monument over his grave.

When Captain Brown surrendered they not only observed strictly all the terms of the capitulation, but treated our troops with honour and even with kindness. Nor are they either fanatical or bloodthirsty. No attempt has ever been made on the life of a British officer except in the case of Lieutenant Loveday, who was sacrificed to the popular fury when the whole country rose in not unjust indignation at our policy and compelled us to change it.

Neither are the people of Beloochistan wholly reckless of human life. Even in the times of Nusseer Khan I., and the theory is still accepted, no sentence of death could be executed without the Khan's sanction.

I now turn to the very curious early history of Khelat. Although much is not known about details, the following outline seems to be pretty clearly established.

Up to the beginning of the seventeenth century the people of the town and district of Khelat itself were Hindu in race and religion and had been governed by a Hindu dynasty. How this came to be the case, or how a petty Hindu State had existed when for many hundred years all its neighbours had become Mahomedan, is not clear. But there seems little doubt of the fact. However, in the early part of the seventeenth century this dynasty came to an end; it is not quite certain in what manner, nor is this important. The people, isolated and pressed apparently by the power of Persia, sought to strengthen themselves by the aid of their neighbours, and invited the younger son of a neighbouring Brahooee Mussulman Chief, a Chief, that is to say, who ruled an independent Mahomedan tribe in the neighbouring hills, to ascend the throne of Khelat.

This Chief, from whose patronymic the dynasty still is called "Kambarani," and his immediate successors, appear to have pursued a policy of surrounding themselves with men of their own or kindred tribes, and by a process not by any means unfamiliar in India, the bulk of the landed property, and in Khelat itself the major part of all political influence, passed by degrees from Hindu to Mahomedan hands, till at last the large majority of the Hindus either embraced Mahomedanism or left the country.

But Khelat proper was still a very small and uninfluential State. The Khans, therefore, gradually engaged the assistance of the Chiefs of their kindred tribes in the neighbourhood, by giving them jaghirs in Khelat itself. They were bound to furnish in return troops in certain specified quotas raised among their own independent tribes, and these Chiefs so far became no doubt quoad these jaghirs quasi-feudal vassals of the Khan's, though at first wholly independent in their own territories. By means of the troops so raised, the territories of the Khan were gradually extended through conquest, but the force furnished by Chiefs was the only one at the disposal of the Khan up to the reign of Nusseer Khan II. Thus connected together, and finding the necessity for mutual cohesion and co-operation in the presence of three formidable kingdoms—Persia, Afghanistan, and Sindh—on their west, north, and east frontiers respectively, the independent tribes, the petty State of Khelat, and their joint conquests, gradually became more or less voluntarily amalgamated into one federal State under the authority of the Khan. As will be seen, however, the conditions of the arrangement apparently still secured to the confederate Chiefs practically entire self-government within their own previously independent territory.

In the first half of the eighteenth century the Ruler was one Muhabbat Khan, and he was the chief aggrandiser of his dynasty. Adroitly joining Nadir Shah, Muhabbat Khan obtained from that conqueror Kutch Gandava and other lowland districts which had hitherto really appertained to Sindh. Jaghirs were assigned to the Chiefs in these new acquisitions, but the direct administrative authority in this part of the country seems to have been retained by the Khan, whose sway over these and other acquisitions by conquest and over his own district of Khelat has ever been more direct and positive than elsewhere. His Naibs or Governors have always there ruled the principal towns and their adjacent districts. No Naibs were, I believe, ever appointed in the territories of the Chiefs; indeed, as I am informed, the attempt to do this on the part of the present Khan was one of the main causes of the outbreak which led to his dethronement in 1863.

Muhabbat Khan, however, incurred at a later period the disfavour of the great "Ahmed Khan Durani," and was removed by him in favour of his own younger brother Nusseer Khan I. Nusseer Khan, whose reign extended through a large part of the latter half of the eighteenth century, was the great organiser of his race and the consolidator of the power of his family.

It is to "the laws of Nusseer Khan" that appeal is made at this day, and it would seem, not only from the assertion of the people now, but of early British travellers, that he

reduced into a regular system the various customs which immediate exigencies had from time to time called into existence during the reigns of his predecessors: he introduced simultaneously some wise and and statesmanlike reforms as regarded especially the administration of justice and the encouragement of commerce, the just treatment of the Hindus, &c., &c.

No fully detailed account of the political constitution of Khelat as he left it has come down to us; but from the facts stated in various places by Masson, Pottinger, and Leech, confirmed by the appeals made to this constitution by the Chiefs during recent controversies, the following outline may, I think, fairly be considered as established. By one of Nusseer Khan's early predecessors the kingdom had been divided into two great provinces, Sarawan and Jalawan, answering to highland and lowland, and "Sirdarships" or Supreme Chiefships had been established over each, and these Chiefships were made hereditary, that of Sarawan in the Raisani, and that of Jalawan in the Zehri, family.

These Sirdars possessed an important authority in affairs of State, though apparently rather consultative than executive; they occupied chairs in durbar on the right and left hand of the Khan, and were admitted to some substantial share in all deliberations affecting the kingdom generally.

Another curious arrangement was also continued as it had been handed down from the first origin of the Kambarani dynasty. The Wuzeership was hereditary in a family, which, though converted to Mahomedanism, was of indigenous Hindu origin, and this mode of selecting the Wuzeer was maintained.

It may, I think, also be fairly gathered that, save so far as it may have been controlled by the consultative functions of the two Chiefs and by the Wuzeer, the power of the Khan as regards external matters was supreme and absolute.* He could make peace or war on behalf of the State. He had a right to call out any or all of the levies which each Chief was bound to furnish, and could utilise them for war or the maintenance of order. He could make treaties binding on the State, although it would seem that, if any particular Chief was endamaged by such treaty, he had a claim for compensation.

As regards internal authority, the Chief had apparently power to a certain extent to make general laws for the State. No sentence of death could be executed without his confirmation. There was a general right of appeal to the Khan, especially in regard to boundary questions.

Within the small district of Khelat itself and the conquered and annexed territories the Khan ruled directly by his Naibs or Governors. But within their own territories, subject to the exceptions above noticed, the Chiefs seem to have had almost entire freedom of internal self-government. The Chiefs themselves were elected by the elders of the tribes, and their election was subject to the confirmation of the Khan, but this confirmation once given, the Chiefs were only bound to obey the Khan in external matters, to submit to his orders when appeals were made, to require his confirmation to sentences of death, and to furnish their quota of troops when called upon, and in some cases also it would seem that they paid a small tribute.

On the other hand, the Chiefs elected the Khan on the occasion of a vacancy, though no doubt the Khanship was practically hereditary in the Kambarani family. And what was a very important point and one which the Chiefs very carefully guarded, the Khan had no other armed force whereby to maintain his authority, except that of the levies furnished by the Chiefs.

It seems to me that, as this outline indicates, Nusseer Khan's constitution was merely the consolidation into a regular system of the various agreements and compromises which had been arranged during a century and a half of mutual relations between the Khan and the Chiefs, and to me it seems also that it was framed with singular wisdom. To call this system "feudal" is surely to use an absolute misnomer, and one which gives wholly incorrect impressions as to the condition of the people and the relative positions of the Khan and of his Chiefs. There was, as above noticed, no doubt one feudal element, and one only, in the constitution of Beloochistan as thus settled, viz., that the Chiefs of the tribes received jaghirs in the Khan's own personal territories on condition of maintaining troops for the common service of the Government; but this was an accidental not an essential incident of the constitution.

As a matter of history, the kingdom of Khelat was, as I have shown above, founded by a voluntary federation, and this federation has naturally impressed its character on the institutions of the country, and it is remarkable that in 1869, when the Chiefs put forward the statement of their grievances, to which they have since steadfastly adhered,

* NOTE.—The Chiefs generally had perhaps some sort of share even in the decision of external matters, but it is not clear whether it was direct or merely through the two chief Sirdars as their representatives.

they made it one of their chief demands that all engagements with the British Government should be made not by the Khan personally, but by him as the head of the Belooch Confederation.

Indeed, the Chiefs themselves, though their appointment is subject to the confirmation of the Khan (it is recorded that by Nusseer Khan I. this confirmation was always given as a matter of course), are not as regards their tribal territory feudal barons exercising personal and hereditary authority over vassals who have little or no voice in their own government, and who are bound by the tenure of their lands to follow their Chiefs in war or politics. On the contrary, the Chiefs are merely the elective heads of free communities made up of subdivisions of tribes, and beneath these again, of villages, the heads of which are all elective. It is true that the higher the authority the more usual the selection from the family of the elective head or Chief; but this has not, I believe, by any means been an invariable rule.

No doubt on forming the Confederation by which the kingdom of Khelat was formed, the chiefs and their tribes parted with something of their external independence, and even agreed to make their own election subject to the confirmation of the Khan, and accepted a few general laws to guide them in their internal administration. But they still otherwise retained, and their people retained also, the full right of self-government. On the other hand, the Chiefs appear from the first to have had either directly or through their representatives some voice in the conduct of the external affairs of the Confederation, and an absolute voice in the election of their federal head, the Khan.

Surely, whatever its merits or demerits, nothing can be further from a truly feudal constitution than this system. I have been led to dwell on this point at length because I think it is exactly the error of treating that institution as feudal which has been the real cause of all the recent difficulties and complications in Khelat.

It is necessary for me, however, first to show that the local authorities in Sind held a totally different opinion on the point. For example, Sir W. Merewether in 1870, while remarking on a report from Colonel Phayre, thus spoke of the claims of the Chiefs made in December 1869, who claimed that the treaty with the British Government was made with the Khan merely as Chief of the Brahooee confederacy. On this point Sir W. Merewether, setting his opinion be it remembered against the unanimous assertion of the Chiefs, says:—

"The treaty is undoubtedly with the Khan as responsible Ruler of Beloochistan and not merely as head of a confederacy. This is one of the unfortunate errors the Chiefs will persist in."

Again, in his letter of the 26th January 1870, paragraphs 35, 36, and 37, Sir W. Merewether writes—

"Exactly the same course of events that occurred in Beloochistan is now going on in Afghanistan. His Highness the Amir, finding it impossible to trust to the doubtful support of his nobles and their treacherous levies, is putting an end to the feudal system * * * Colonel Phayre conceives * * that the Chiefs being a grievously ill-used set of people, measures should be taken to compel His Highness the Khan to treat them in a different manner. * * * * It is scarcely necessary to point out that this would now be a style of interference totally opposed to the orders of Government and unjust to His Highness the Khan. * * * It would destroy his power for good as Ruler of the country, and it would infallibly lead to greater dissensions than had ever occurred before, a scramble for power, ending in the country being parcelled out among a number of rival chieftains."

Again, on the margin of Colonel Phayre's report of the 6th December 1869, No. 1725, Sir W. Merewether writes as follows, commenting on Colonel Phayre's strictures upon the mercenary levies of the Khan:—

"It has to be proved that this system is a bad one. No Government, with a lot of ambitious Chiefs fighting for powers, would indeed be a dangerous matter in a country next to ours * * * ."

It is therefore the more necessary that there should be a strong Government in Beloochistan, and not that the country should be parcelled out among a number of mountain Chiefs.

But the entire view of the local authorities is well summarised in part of a minute recorded by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, then Governor of Bombay, on the 10th February 1871. He writes thus:—

"Colonel Phayre seems to consider that the Chiefs have rights which it is our duty to see maintained, and he quotes from despatches written at various times by General Jacob in support of his views.

"But the state of affairs in General Jacob's time was very different from what it is now. In truth the change appears to be taking place in Beloochistan of which history

gives so many examples in the old world, when feudal relations between a Sovereign and his Chiefs are, from the force of circumstances, from the growing power of the Sovereign, from his ability to maintain a regular force, and in consequence to suppress rebellion, succeeded by a regime in which the power of the Sovereign become paramount and his feudatories take the diminished rank of powerful subjects. I do not believe it our policy to prevent this result."

I do not stop to discuss the abstract theories laid down in this passage. All I have to say is that the argument it contains is, as I hold, founded on two cardinal errors. It assumes that the relations of the Chiefs were feudal and not federal, an assumption which I have tried to demonstrate above is opposed to the deduction from history and to actual fact.

It assumes also that the Sovereign had power to crush his so-called feudatories and to compel them to assume the position of subjects. I shall now proceed to show that this was an error in fact, and that the present Khan's endeavours to effect this object throughout his reign, although backed by the entire moral support of the local British authorities, have wholly failed. It was this attempt that has been the real cause of the disorder and anarchy which has so long prevailed in Khelat.

It has been, I believe, the practical recognition of that error now, which has at once solved all difficulties and has restored peace and order. But to show this I must enter at considerable length into the actual story of our relations with Khelat.

I will premise that the rough constitution, which had grown up in substance by voluntary arrangements since the inauguration of the Kambarani dynasty, had worked at least fairly well for some hundred and fifty years, up to the time, that is to say, of Nusseer Khan I.; and it may be said that its consolidation under him secured to the country nearly another century of substantial prosperity and peaceful government, although the character of his immediate successors was most unpromising. His son, Mahmud Khan, was indolent and debauched. Mehrab Khan, his grandson, was ambitious, violent, and cruel. Still the position of the Khan, Chiefs, and people, appears, according to the statement of English travellers, to have remained materially unchanged. Something of this, perhaps, was owing to the personal character of Nusseer Khan I., who had, according to Leech, made himself the spiritual as well as the temporal head of the people, and a part of the reverence so paid to him may have descended to his successors. The same traveller, indeed, relates that, even after Mehrab Khan had done much to alienate the people by his cruelties, the wild Brahooees from the hills used to kiss his door-posts as they passed.

Mehrab Khan was, however, the first to make a breach, and as it proved a fatal one, in the constitution of Nusseer Khan I., by removing the hereditary Wuzeer and by appointing a man of another family, a creature of his own, to the office. It is unnecessary to recapitulate here this sad story: Mehrab Khan fell fighting against us; and we placed the descendant of another branch of the Kambarani family on the throne without consulting the Chiefs, and disposed of part of the country as by right of conquest.

The Chiefs elected according to their constitution the son of Mehrab Khan as their Khan; the country rose as one man against us and our nominee. We were wise enough (under Outram's advice) to recognise the popular sense of right, and to reinstate Mehrab Khan's son. That act of justice has stood us in good stead and has made the people understand that, however mistaken we may be, our intentions are honest and our instincts equitable. Indeed, but for their reliance on our good intentions, our recent difficulties with these people would hardly have been so easily arranged, nor would they have been so long patient in the hope of our ultimately doing them right.

Mehrab's son was installed as Nusseer Khan II. At first matters went on pretty smoothly, but trouble soon arose. The treachery of the last representative of the hereditary family of Wuzeers had rendered a choice from that family impossible, and, as in the case of Mehrab Khan, disturbance arose from the substitution of a favourite in the place of the hereditary Wuzeer. This man for his own aggrandisement endeavoured to sow dissension between the Khan and Chiefs, and to exalt the Khan's authority at the expense* of that of the Chiefs. This favourite, however, was removed, and for a time the Chiefs and the Khan were reconciled. The Khan then fell into other and still worse hands, and under the advice of these new favourites apparently gave grievous offence to the Chiefs in various ways, but particularly by raising a small body of mercenary troops, a measure which the Chiefs regarded not unnaturally as a serious encroachment on their material power. The Khan, however, had apparently again shown signs of coming to amicable arrangement with the Chiefs, when in 1857 he died suddenly, as

* This had been the case also with Mehrab Khan's favourite; but, as is related in touching words by Leech, Mehrab Khan, though too late, described himself as alive to the folly of this policy, and expressed his regret at his past acts of ambitious violence, and his determination to rule in concert with his Chiefs for the future.

there is good reason to believe from poison administered by the new Wuzeer and his adherents, who feared he was about to abandon them.

Khodadad Khan, the present Khan and brother of Nusseer Khan II., was then a mere boy, and was said to have been already under the influence of the favourites, and even to have connived at their crime.

Be this as it may, matters were so managed that the Chiefs assembled in the usual way, and their choice fell upon Khodadad, who was the natural heir.

The struggle which has just terminated began from that day. The Chiefs seem after his election to have remonstrated somewhat rudely and sternly with the Khan in regard to the grievances which they considered themselves to have experienced during the latter years of the reign of Nusseer Khan II., and to have desired their redress. Khodadad's first act under the advice of his Wuzeer was without warning to open fire with his guns upon the Chiefs as they lay encamped near the city of Khelat. They fled at once and assumed an attitude of hostility.

Lieutenant Macaulay, who was in communication with them, says, however, that the main body of them, even then, still sought nothing beyond the removal of the evil advisers of the Khan.

Azaad Khan of Kharan, however, who shortly afterwards assumed the lead of the movement, would appear to have had more ambitious views. An attempt made by Sir Bartle Frere and General Jacob to arrange matters failed, the Chiefs having been led by the intrigues of two of the Khan's unworthy favourites (Gool Mahomed and Gunga Ram) to distrust the sincerity of the British Government. However, the Khan selected from among his "Khanazads," or household slaves, a new Wuzeer, one Shahgassee Wullee Mahomed. I see that General Jacob, writing to Sir H. Green, approves at this crisis of the action of the Chiefs.

Meanwhile the insurrection spread and Azaad Khan put forward a descendant of Muhabbat Khan's line as a claimant for the throne.

His favourites endeavoured to persuade the Khan that this was done by British influence, but in vain. And he appealed to Major Green, the then Agent, for assistance. Major Green promptly responded, and addressed the Chiefs. These again disclaimed all disloyal intention, but pressed generally for a redress of their grievances.

Major Green called upon them in the first place to show their loyalty by driving away Azaad Khan and the representative of Muhabbat Khan, whom he supported, and even to suppress an insurrection which had meanwhile broken out in Mekran.

They cheerfully complied with everything Major Green asked, and returned to Khelat, bringing the rebel Chiefs from Mekran prisoners. With this exhibition of their loyalty the revolt for the time being terminated, but there is nothing to be traced as to the redress of the Chiefs' grievances, nor apparently was even any inquiry made into them. There is nothing in fact to show that the British authorities exerted themselves for this object.

Shortly after this, Major Green appears to have advised the Khan to attack the Murrees, who certainly seem to have given ground for complaint; and subsequently by the aid of a British gunboat the Khan made a successful progress through Mekran, re-asserting his authority in that province.

The Government of India noticed these proceedings by commending Major Green's tact, temper, and perseverance, but at the same time distinctly said that the Government of India would not fight the Khan's battles against his own feudatories, and an intimation was conveyed to Major Green that he had shown a disposition to interfere more actively than the state of affairs demanded, or than treaty obligations warranted. Nothing, however, was done by the local authorities beyond continuing the support which had been given to the Khan's authority, and the Khan who, as it will be seen, had from the first ignored the grievances of his Chiefs and taken up a line of policy hostile to them, was encouraged in it, and made, it is stated, no voluntary effort to secure good-will, but on the contrary gave himself up to vice and excess.

Naturally the country fell into disorder, though from time to time temporary improvements followed pressure on the part of the Agent.

In August 1860 Major Merewether wrote:—

"The absence at any time of the support we have been in the habit of according to His Highness in the measures for the improvement of his territory, or the existence, even for a short time, of the feeling that we could or would no longer accord that support, would at once lead to the dismemberment of the kingdom.

These words amount to a direct admission that the local authorities were in the habit of giving assistance to the Khan "in the improvement of his country," and that this

support alone kept him in his throne. As a matter of fact, the opposing interests only could be those of the Chiefs (and this the formulated statement of their grievances in 1869 proves) against whom the Government of India had directed there should be no interference. Apparently at this time it had already come to be considered that the "improvement of the country" and the maintenance of the Khan's absolute authority, were synonymous terms. But the Government of India seem to have overlooked this. Things went on for some time still further. The Khan, it is recorded, showed the Chiefs every discourtesy possible, and at last his action in this respect and his general misconduct drew down a serious warning from the Political Agent,—the only instance up to 1872 of any active interference of any sort in favour of the Chiefs, on the part of the local authorities.

This remonstrance had, however, no effect, and matters went on from bad to worse. Early in 1861 the Chief of the Jalawans, Taj Mahomed, broke into revolt.* But he was brought into order by the Sarawan Sirdar, who, however, did not disguise his sympathy with Taj Mahomed. Later in the year the Jam of Lus Beyla and the Mingul tribe, with which he was connected by marriage, rebelled. The Khan, however, managed for the time to coerce them. The next year passed quietly, but the country was, it was reported by the local authorities, evidently seething with discontent. In March 1863 the storm burst. Sherdil Khan, a cousin of the Khan's, attempted his assassination, but succeeded only in badly wounding him.

* The immediate cause of his outbreak is said to have been a marked insult offered to him by the Khan.

It was at a time when all the Chiefs were assembled; Sherdil Khan fled to their tents. This was a signal for a general insurrection, which was gradually successful, and Sherdil Khan was declared Khan, while Khodadad Khan retired with a small body of followers to a village near the British frontier.

Oddly enough an incident now occurred which showed how strongly the constitutional principle prevailed among the Chiefs. A small minority still adhering to Khodadad Khan, Sherdil's own supporters proposed that they should proceed to a regular and formal election. Preparations were accordingly made for this. But on the eve of the election Sherdil was killed in a personal brawl with a mercenary follower, and the Chiefs, having no other candidate before them when the election took place, again selected Khodadad Khan, after, it is said, taking from him agreements for his better treatment of them in future.

The Khan took the Chiefs of Jalawan and Sarawan to reside with him at his capital, and entered into marriage relations with them, but peace was not of long continuance. The Jam of Lus Beyla and the Mingul Chiefs again broke out in revolt, though Noordeen, the Chief of the Minguls, had taken the lead in the re-election of Khodadad.

For the time this insurrection was put down, the contingent of Taj Mahomed, the Chief of the Jalawan, loyally aiding in its suppression. Within another year, however, the Murrees attacked Kutch Gundava, and about the same time the Khan suddenly accused Taj Mahomed, the Chief of the Jalawan, of attempting to seduce his regular troops from their allegiance. He was seized after a short skirmish and imprisoned; thereupon Moolla Mahomed, the Chief of the Sarawan, fled from Khelat, and became a discontented wanderer, ready to instigate or lead revolt. In 1867, before he had been a year in prison, Taj Mahomed died. The great body of the Chiefs declared he had been poisoned. Later in the year Moolla Mahomed returned and set up the standard of revolt; few Chiefs joined him, and he was defeated and again fled. Failing in getting shelter from the Murrees, he asked Sir H. Green to intercede for him with the Khan. This the Agent promised to do, provided both parties would agree to abide by his decision, and the Khan assenting an interview took place, which for the moment satisfied the immediately contending parties. Sir H. Green, in reporting this interview, admitted that the Khan was only the head of semi-independent tribes, and that it was for the interest of the British Government to stand well with both parties. Nevertheless, in effect, the Agent supported the Khan entirely. He had before described Taj Mahomed as a desperate intriguer and traitor, and had expressed an opinion that so long as he was at liberty the Khan's life was not safe. Now he praised the Khan's mode of dealing with his Chiefs, and recommended the recognition of his loyal conduct by the grant of an extra subsidy. Before the year was out, however, there was a fresh outbreak, in which the Minguls, the Jam of Lus Beyla, and Azaad Khan of Kharan took part. After some indecisive fighting, negociations took place, and the Khan made certain promises, the chief of which was an engagement to restore to the revolted Chiefs and to Moolla Mahomed "all the land which they or he had held, or been deprived of, since the days "of Nusseer Khan."

Sir W. Merewether was now Chief Commissioner in Sindh, and he reported that the outbreak had been owing to the general aversion of the nobles to the Khan, "who has "insanely neglected to follow the excellent advice given him by Sir Henry Green, and "has entirely alienated the nobles of the country from himself." Sir W. Merewether, however, subsequently qualified these words, saying that there had been faults on both sides, "the Khan having from suspicion and jealousy withheld certain privileges which "had led to revolt and confiscation in reprisal."

The British Agent, who had been withdrawn ever since Khodadad's dethronement in 1863–64, was now restored, and Captain Harrison being deputed as Agent, the Chiefs represented mainly by Alladina Khoord and Moolla Mahomed, waited on him, and for the first time laid before him a full and regularly formulated statement of their public and private grievances.

The latter may for the present be neglected, but the former were contained in a very striking document, of which one article indeed related to the death of Taj Mahomed and was of a temporary character, but the gist of the remainder was a demand for the restoration of the political status of the country as established by Nusseer Khan I. The Chiefs claimed, that is to say :—

1st. The observance of the laws and forms of Government of Nusseer Khan I.

2nd. The disbandment of the mercenary troops and the restoration to the Chiefs of the jaghirs assigned for the support of the federal levies.

3rd. The reversal of the Khan's act in appointing his own son to the Sirdarship of the Jalawan instead of appointing one of the family in which that office was hereditary.

4th. The restoration to the Chiefs or their representatives of the right as of old to share in the civil and military councils of the State.

5th. That all treaty engagements should be made with the British Government by the Khan, not simply as Khan but as head of the Belooch Confederation.

6th. That since it had become impossible to continue the selection of the Wuzeer from the family in which that office had been hereditary, the Chiefs asked that the office might now be made elective, the Wuzeer being elected by the Chiefs.

Sir W. Merewether, who was still Commissioner in Sindh, expressed no opinion on these clauses at the time, but the Khan at once yielded the point as to the Sirdarship of the Jalawan, and in 1870 Sir W. Merewether admitted that the 4th clause was correct as regards the Sirdars of Jalawan and Sarawan, and allowed subsequently that its extension in some degree to other Chiefs might not be unfair, and even that the 1st might be granted if the Chiefs would be moderate, but he overruled entirely the 2nd, 5th, and 6th.

However much the Chiefs' claims may be disputed as of right, or on the ground of expediency, still it has never been denied, even by Sir W. Merewether, that the exposition of the actual state of facts in this document as to the position taken up by the Khan towards the Chiefs was in substance correct.

It may therefore, I think, be taken as certain that the laws of Nasir Khan I. had practically been abrogated, mercenary troops largely entertained,* and the jaghirs of the federal troops resumed to pay for the mercenary troops; that the rule of succession to the Jalawan Sirdarships had been set aside, and that the Chiefs had been excluded from all share in the Government.

* As a matter of fact, the small body organised by Nusseer Khan II., and the raising of which was no doubt one of the acts that gave offence to the Chiefs, had been raised to a far larger and really formidable amount by Khodadad Khan.

Neither is it to be disputed that up to the time of Mehrab Khan† there had been no such infractions of these customs,‡ and indeed there had been but very partial infractions in the time of his son Nusseer Khan II., and even these had been resented by the Chiefs.

† See Masson, Pottinger, and Leech's accounts generally.

‡ Except the fatal mistake as to the appointment of his favourite as Wuzeer.

It is clear, therefore, that the conduct of Khodadad Khan, which had alienated the Chiefs—and of which they complained as a violation of the federal pact by which the State was constituted, and to which they attributed all the disorders of the State—was in substance a series of invasions of the political power of the Chiefs.

I return, however, to the course of events. Nothing immediately came of the negociation thus commenced in 1869 through Captain Harrison, except a flat refusal by the Khan to yield anything. He subsequently agreed, indeed, to make large concessions, but at the last moment the managers of the Chiefs' party withdrew, though the exact reason why they did so is not known, as the British authorities refused to listen to Moolla Mahomed's explanation on this point.

Shortly after this, another insurrection broke out in Lus Beyla, which was completely suppressed by the Khan's troops. In 1871, however, a more general and formidable revolt occurred.

Various reasons were given for this rising. But Colonel Phayre, then in Civil employ in Sind, asked if we could afford any longer to ignore the national feeling, the result of absolute despair.

He said, "there is not a man of any influence who does not feel keenly that our "connexion with the Khan involves a certain amount of responsibility for his acts as "a ruler, because both the Khan himself and they too are perfectly well aware that, "if it were not for our support, he must either respect the just rights of the people or "lose his throne." He added at various times that the relation of the Khan and Chiefs was really federal, and that the Chiefs had rights which ought to be respected.

Colonel Phayre was, I believe, quite right, but pressing these views beyond the point of official decorum was subsequently removed from his appointment; still the Government of Bombay themselves referred the rebellion to the non-satisfaction of the claims of the Chiefs made in 1869, and this opinion was subsequently corroborated by the words of the Chiefs themselves.

The Government of India was now (in 1871) called upon by both Sir W. Merewether and the Government of Bombay to support the Khan by force of arms.

It was then argued (as I have shown above*) in substance that the idea that the Chiefs possessed anything but certain, more or less obsolete, feudal rights was absurd, it was argued at length that even those feudal rights were relics of a past age, and unsuited to modern times, incapable of preservation, and that it was impossible to revert to the past organisation or in any way to build it up again. It was urged that it was necessary to our position in the frontier to have a settled Government on the frontier, and that this could now only be gained by supporting the Khan's absolute authority by force of arms, if necessary, against the claims and pretensions of the Chiefs.

The Government of India absolutely refused to have recourse to arms in support of the Khan, but in order to terminate the disputes, desired both parties to submit their disputes to the arbitration of the British authorities, promising to the Khan a payment of one lakh of rupees if these terms were fully accepted and acted upon.

The Government of India insisted also that the Khan should be bound by the Commissioner's arbitration, and should agree to remedy all the well-founded complaints of the Chiefs in regard to confiscation of property, resumption of jaghirs, and oppressive taxation, and the Government of India also required him to agree to such a change in the administration as to give the principal Chiefs a due share in the administration of the country.

I cannot consider that, as the 4th paragraph of the present Despatch intimates, these conditions of 1872 involved any departure from the policy which the Government of India had hitherto enjoined on the local authorities. That policy had certainly been not to take the Khan's part against the Chiefs.

It is, however, quite true, no doubt, that since 1857 a contrary policy had practically been adopted by the Government of Bombay and by the local authorities in Sind.

It is in fact admitted again and again by Sir W. Merewether and by numerous authorities throughout the correspondence, that it was the moral support of the British Government alone which maintained the Khan on his throne from which he had been once actually driven by the Chiefs, and, as is evident from what has been already said, the opposition of the Chiefs, by which alone the Khan's position was threatened, arose entirely from the fact that the Khan had very materially invaded the authority which previous to his time the Chiefs enjoyed, and the Chiefs themselves have in plain words declared the same thing again and again, avowing that this invasion of their rights was the main cause of their hostility. The support therefore which the local authorities had so long and so effectively given to the Khan was in effect support given to him in aggressive action against the Chiefs' rights.

But the Government of India had never either fully accepted this theory of the relative position of the Khan and his subjects, nor the policy of interference based on it; on the contrary, they had again and again expressly forbidden the latter; when, therefore, Sir W. Merewether justified the policy of supporting the Khan's absolute authority on grounds of expediency, and the Government of Bombay supported him in urging the Government of India to carry it out to its logical conclusion, and to support the Khan by force of arms against the Chiefs, the Government of India in absolutely refusing this request, only maintained the policy which it had prescribed (though it had hardly enforced) from the first, and the recognition of the Chiefs' rights by the Government of India in 1872, though never pronounced, was hardly then made for the first time.

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* See Sir Seymour Fitzgerald's minute quoted at page 355.

A brief notice of events down to the present deputation of Major Sandeman will suffice to carry on the narrative by which I have endeavoured to elucidate and substantiate the above contention.

While the correspondence was going on between the local authorities and the Government of India, the Khan's Vakil had an interview with the Chiefs; they again took their stand on their formulated grievances of 1869, and the Vakil agreed to recommend compliance to the Khan. The Khan, however, indignantly repudiated these terms, and was supported by the strong approval of Sir W. Merewether; the Vakil was therefore disgraced and dismissed.

At length, after much hesitation and consultation, both sides agreed to the terms laid down by the Government of India, and Sir W. Merewether undertook the arbitration.

Considering the strong views already expressed by Sir W. Merewether, it was hardly to be doubted what shape that arbitration would assume.

He told the Chiefs that the Khan (who it is to be remembered began the quarrel immediately after his election by treacherously turning his guns on their encampment without warning) had committed no fault or error whatever, except perhaps that he had been too lenient. He further said that the entire fault lay with the Chiefs, who deserved everything that the Khan had done against them. He told them that they must absolutely submit themselves to the Khan, and implicitly obey him, and informed them that the rights which they had claimed never had any existence, and that no such limitations as they pretended had been placed on the authority of the Khan by Nusseer Khan I.*

* Sir W. Merewether says Nusseer Khan simply; the Chiefs certainly referred to Nusseer Khan I., but there is in several paragraphs an evident confusion between the two Chiefs of that name; as for example in paragraph 2 of his letter of the 26th January 1870, No. 42, Sir W. Merewether talks of Gul Mahomed having been Wuzeer to the Great Nusseer Khan. The Great Nusseer Khan was Nusseer Khan I., and Gul Mahomed was certainly never Wuzeer to him.

On the other hand, he promised that if they would now obey the Khan without hesitation, and if they would restore the property which they had plundered from the Khan's subjects and from the kafilas in the Bolan Pass,† he would recommend the Khan to restore to them the jaghirs and allowances which had been forfeited.

† The closing of the passes is a kind of recognised way by which malcontents make known their grievances, as "Baharwuttia," or wholesale dacoity, is in Central India.

It will be observed that these terms take no notice of the third condition insisted by the Government of India, viz., the admission of the principal Chiefs to a share in the Government. So far as I have been able to discover, this condition was absolutely ignored.

It need hardly be said that these terms did not satisfy the Chiefs, though they made partial attempts to recover the value of the property recovered from the kafilas, and something less than half of the estimated loss having been collected, the Khan consented to advance the balance required to complete the accounts, and compensation was made to the owners of the kafilas whose claims the Amir of Cabul was pressing somewhat urgently.

But this settlement was not calculated to produce final peace, and the Khan, it was soon seen, was as discontented as the Chiefs. He was well aware that there was no hope of compelling the subjection of the Chiefs without the use of force, and this the Government of India had refused to supply; on this as an ultimate resort he had doubtless calculated, and he apparently well understood he had little prospect of maintaining his policy successfully, or indeed of retaining his throne, from which he had been already once ousted, without such material support. He showed his discontent by various means, and ceased from attempting to repress, if he did not actually encourage, the fresh disorders which soon sprung up. Still further to complicate matters the Khan quarrelled with his Wuzeer Shahgassee Mahomed,‡ who had long been his most faithful and trusted supporter. He got a new set of advisers, who were apparently not well-wishers of the British Government. By a threat of withdrawing the Agent the Khan was compelled to dismiss these men, but did little else, and when Lord Northbrook saw him, he thought apparently of little but their restoration.

‡ I have learned that their quarrel arose from domestic matters and that the Khan had good ground for taking offence.

Continued disturbances followed, which the Khan did nothing to repress or compose, and in spite of the efforts of the Wuzeer, aided by Moolla Mahomed Raisani, the country fell day by day into greater confusion. At length, in May 1873, Sir W. Merewether called on Major Harrison, the Agent, to withdraw, and on his doing so the Wuzeer withdrew with him. The reasons assigned were:—

1st. That the Khan persisted in following the advice of certain evil advisers rather than that of the Political Agent.

2nd. That the Khan was persistent in demanding the restoration of the three advisers banished to Sind.

3rd. That he evaded all means for securing the peace of the border, and that he neglected all arrangements for the good government of Lus Beyla, and for the suppression of outrages on the British frontier.

The action taken by Sir W. Merewether was approved by the Government of India, and payment of the Khan's subsidy was suspended.

There is little to add; the practical result was that plundering and anarchy prevailed over the whole country save in the immediate neighbourhood of Khelat and on the Punjab frontier; the Bolan Pass remained closed to traffic for some three years, and the Khan maintained an unfriendly attitude towards us.

Sir W. Merewether at one time proposed the despatch of a British force to bring the Khan to his senses, but the Government of India refused, thinking that he had committed no act of a hostile character sufficient to justify such a course.

At last the Murree Chiefs on the Punjab border addressed Major Sandeman, begging his interference so far as their interests were concerned, and he was permitted to use his efforts in the matter, though not until another formidable insurrection was actually imminent, which would probably have ended in the Khan's death or dethronement.

The policy which Major Sandeman has followed has been the recognition of rights, claims, and the satisfaction for injuries on both sides, the practical adoption, that is to say, of the policy all along enjoined by the Government of India, and especially enforced by them in 1872, though no doubt an entire reversal of that followed for many years by the local authorities in Sind. I need not further follow what is said of the course of Major Sandeman's action; nor do I in the least dissent from the account of his success given in paragraph 23 of the Despatch; on the contrary, I entirely endorse it.

My conviction is that the policy which he has adopted, and which has so far proved successful, is precisely that which the Government of India has all along enjoined, rather than the result of an accidental departure from that policy in 1872.

It is, I believe, founded on a correct appreciation of the real state of the country as elucidated by its past history, and the application to that state of a simple, equitable, straightforward, and conciliatory course of action.

It is true that, in order to remedy the state of anarchy into which the country fell, we have been compelled to interfere between the Chiefs and the Khan more than it was the original policy or wish of the Government of India to do. It is true also that after the bitterness produced by the injuries and bloodshed of the past years it may be necessary to maintain this interference more or less for some time. But as matters settle down to their ancient condition the less interference is exercised, and the more we return to our original policy, except in case of urgency, the greater will be our influence, and the more vigorous the Native Government.

It is because the first ten paragraphs of the Despatch seem to differ from this view, and to express approbation of the policy previously enforced on the Sind frontier by the local authorities that I have expressed my dissent from them.

I cannot disguise my own opinion that this policy was founded on a grave misapprehension of the mutual relations of the Khan and the Chiefs, and that it dealt with these in a method that was neither just nor wise. The relations between the Chiefs and the Khan were never feudal, nor were they even as feudal, obsolete, and undeserving of consideration.

This is not the place for a discussion on feudalism. I am willing to admit, for the sake of argument, that it may be desirable in the abstract that feudalism should be crushed by the growing power of the Crown. When this is a natural process, it means that a majority of the people go with the Crown against the feudal Chiefs, and that feudalism has played its part. But here, neither was the system feudal, nor were the majority of the people opposed to it; on the contrary, as events have shown, the people are passionately attached to their existing form of Government, and there can be no reasonable doubt that if the parties had been left to themselves without external assistance the Khan, who attempted to make himself absolute, would long since have been driven from the country. As it was, our moral support has enabled him to carry on his scheme of "Thorough" for some 19 years, during which there were seven general revolts, besides numerous minor disturbances; and this policy finally ended in estranging from us alike the Khan and the people, in closing for three years all the external routes of communications, and in reducing the country to a complete state of anarchy. The return to the opposite line of policy, the recognition of the fact that the Chiefs and the

Khan have, if not co-equal, at least co-existing rights, and the treatment of their quarrel on this basis, has at any rate in less than nine months resulted in reconciling heartily to the British Government both the Khan and the Chiefs, and in the establishment of some sort of cordiality between the latter themselves. It has opened again the routes of external communication and enabled them to be traversed in safety, and it has restored to the entire country peace, order, and rapidly returning prosperity, though of course it is not to be expected that this happy state of things will be, especially at first, wholly unexampled.

I think, therefore, that, even judging by results, there can be no question as to the merits of the two rival policies, and I have endeavoured to show that there should be none on *à priori* grounds. It is because the Despatch seems to lend approval to the early local policy, and to deal with the recent policy as apparently, however fortunate, the accidental result of independent action in 1872, that I have thought it necessary to put on record this Minute, and, as far as I can, to show that the policy of 1872 was not only essentially right, but a necessary development of the principles consistently laid down from the first by the Government of India; at the same time I have endeavoured to show also that the opposite policy is clearly responsible for all the anarchy, misery, and bloodshed of the past nineteen years, and, so far from being deserving of praise, it was, I believe, (however honourable and conscientious the men who initiated it, carried it out, and who have defended it,) founded on fundamental errors, both of fact and principle. I think it therefore my duty to express my entire dissent from the adoption of any allegation of fact, or from any implied approbation of the principles on which it was based, or from any measure which may render possible the reversion to such a policy in the future.

14th May 1877. E. C. BAYLEY.

No. 194.

No. 50 of 1877. (Extract.)

Government of India. Foreign Department. Political.

To the most Hon. the Marquis of Salisbury, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. Encls. Nos. 74 to 193.

My Lord Marquis, Fort William, 23rd March 1877.

The letters we have from time to time addressed to your Lordship on the state of our Western border, the unsettled condition of Khelat, and our policy in reference thereto, will have furnished Her Majesty's Government with information up to a recent date of the general progress of affairs in that quarter. We have now to report the completion of arrangements for what is we trust a satisfactory and durable settlement of the various questions which in connexion with this subject have long caused us serious anxiety.

2. Your Lordship, in your reply to our letter of the 22nd January 1875, expressed the hope of Her Majesty's Government, that should the measures then reported by us for improving the condition of our Western Frontier produce their anticipated results, an early opportunity might be taken of again placing the relations between the Government of India and the Khan of Khelat on the friendly footing provided by the Treaty of 1854, and of thus "re-establishing a position of affairs desirable in the interests of the "British Government and essential to the continued existence of Khelat as an inde-"pendent State."

3. This injunction we have kept steadily in view throughout our dealings with the Khan, and we are hopeful that the information we now place before your Lordship may secure for our proceedings the approval of Her Majesty's Government. But as these proceedings may appear to involve a departure from the policy of our previous relations with Khelat, we deem it desirable to recapitulate briefly the history of those relations. This will sufficiently explain the causes and character of the situation we have had to deal with in our endeavours to give effect to the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, as expressed in your Lordship's above-mentioned letter.

4. The political institutions of Khelat are, as your Lordship is aware, in the main of a feudal character; that is to say, the Khan rules, not directly over the people, but over a number of tribal Chiefs, who in turn exercise over their own tribes a power which has never been sharply defined, but which practically resembles that of the great barons during the feudal period of Western society. The Khan's personal possessions are com-

paratively small; and the people who obey the direct authority of his Highness and his officers are few in number. The bulk of the population of Beloochistan belongs to one or other of the numerous tribes or clans included in the two great groups of the Sarawans and Jalawans. The respective Chiefs of these two tribal sections, in association with an hereditary Prime Minister, have at all times been recognised throughout Beloochistan as the constitutional advisers of its Ruler. The hereditary Prime Minister represents the original inhabitants, and present trading and agricultural population, of the Khanate, and without reference to these three Councillors nothing of importance can be undertaken by the Khan, in accordance with that unbroken national tradition which must be regarded as the constitutional basis of the paramount power in Khelat. These three personages occupy a prominent position throughout the history of the Khanate; the two hereditary Councillors as the champions of the nobles, and the hereditary Minister as the representative of the Khan's personal authority. From their incessant struggles for influence and power, rather than from anything that can properly be called popular discontent, have arisen most of the troubles which have hitherto distracted the Khanate. The history of Khelat is, in short, the customary chronicle of feudal society in an Asiatic State, from whose social ferment no stable political organisation has yet been evolved. Sanguinary revolts rapidly alternate with restorations of a power ruthless in retaliation. The Sirdars are ever ready to fight for their cherished liberty to be lawless, and the Khan is rarely able to enforce his authority, except by adroitly playing off one Chief or tribe against another.

5. Practically, this authority has always been in proportion to the vigour of the Khan's personal character, and dependent on the strength of his will rather than on that of law and tradition. But among all these elements of political disturbance and weakness there exists one source of stability, the importance of which can hardly be overrated. This is the exceedingly strong sentiment of clanship, and loyalty to the hereditary principle, which conspicuously characterizes both the people and its Chiefs. On the one hand, notwithstanding frequent assassination, periodical revolt, and chronic anarchy, this Khanate has decended in almost uninterrupted legitimate succession, through a period of 150 years, and a line of nine hereditary Princes, to the present Ruler. On the other hand, almost every effort on the part of a Khan to dispossess a hostile Chief of his power, uproot an opposing tribe, or suppress a disaffected family, has completely failed. Through good report and evil report the tribes have habitually clung to their hereditary Chiefs; and the Chiefs have habitually resumed allegiance to their hereditary suzerain.

6. From their earliest period our relations with Khelat have been embarrassed by the difficulties inseparable from all dealings with a weak unsettled Government. In the main our policy has been guided by the principles which would regulate our intercourse with the established Government of any neighbouring State. We have generally supported the ruling power; because it represents the only unit of collective authority with which we can conveniently deal, or which it is practically possible to hold responsible for the maintenance of international engagements. But it has not seldom happened that the proved and acknowledged inability of the ruling power to enforce its own authority has obliged us to act independently of it. Thus, both Sir C. Napier and General Jacob undertook, and carried out, the punishment of tribes nominally subject to the Khan of Khelat, but whose conduct the Khan was powerless to control; whilst, on the other hand, Sir Henry Green succeeded in compelling and enabling the Khan to punish very efficiently, on one occasion, the most troublesome and insubordinate of these semi-independent tribes. So also, a treaty extremely valuable so long as the Khanate was governed by a powerful ruler, became valueless when the country had practically fallen into the hands of rebellious and irresponsible Sirdars. If, therefore, the policy pursued towards Khelat during past years by the Government of India exhibits signs of frequent apparent change, such change is not attributable to vacillations of principle or purpose, but to the inevitably varying conditions of the situation with which this Government has had to deal.

7. The one thing which at no time, past or present, the Government of India has ever been able to do, however strongly it might wish to do it, is to remain an unconcerned and inert spectator of what passes immediately beyond our Western border. The connexion existing between the tribes and populations inside and outside this border is so direct, so closely intimate, that any disturbance of the latter vibrates instantaneously across the frontier; and civil war in Beloochistan involves, so long as it lasts, not only the closing of our main trade routes across that country, the maltreatment of our merchants who use them, and the incessant spoliation of their property, but also an unsettled and seriously unsafe condition of British territory extending along the whole length of the important province of Sindh. To this reason must be attributed the fact that the

strongest advocates of a policy of non-interference have, as regards our relations with Khelat, invariably ended by becoming the advocates or executors of measures of interference, sudden and violent, in proportion to the length of time during which more moderate and consistent intervention has been postponed.

8. It would be tedious and unnecessary to recapitulate the numerous occasions of such reluctant but unavoidable interference, or to describe the various forms it has assumed. Only two such instances call for special notice in our present letter. Of these, the first is the conclusion of a Treaty signed in 1854 with Nusseer Khan, the then ruler of Khelat. By that Treaty, the provisions of which are familiar to your Lordship, the Khan practically became subordinate to, and dependent on, the British Government. The position thus accepted by the ruler of Khelat has often been disregarded, and has long remained unenforced by the Government of India; but, theoretically at least, it has never ceased to be acknowledged, not only by his Highness, but also by the Sirdars and people of the Khanate. In all their internal dissensions they have constantly, and of late most urgently and unanimously, appealed to the British Government as the only power to whose impartial authority they are all willing to submit, and whose duty they all consider it to be to maintain peace between them.

9. The second instance is of less general importance, but it has a much more direct connexion with recent events; indeed, it may be regarded as the origin and cause of our present position in Khelat. As your Lordship is aware, the reign of Khodadad Khan, the present ruler of that Khanate, has been marked by more than the customary prevalence of anarchy and civil war. This, during the year 1871–72, culminated in a general rebellion, which occasioned such serious disturbance on our frontier as to necessitate the interference of the Government of India. Our Commissioner in Sindh was accordingly authorised to mediate formally between the contending parties; and, together with a representative of the Khan, the principal Sirdars of Khelat assembled to meet the Commissioner at Jacobabad on the 28th of March 1872. Of the details and results of that arbitration your Lordship is already cognisant. It temporarily suspended the civil war then desolating the Khanate and disturbing the British border. But our future relations with Khelat were neither settled nor improved by it. It constituted a marked and very important departure from the policy which till then had governed our relations with that Khanate. For the first time the Sirdars of Khelat appeared as recognised parties to what was virtually an international contract between the British Government and that of the Khanate, whilst at the same time the Khan was still, as heretofore, assumed to be the only responsible power in the country, and held answerable for the due execution of our award, not merely against himself, but also against his recalcitrant Sirdars, whom that very award had deprived his Highness of the power of coercing.

10. Such a position could not possibly be maintained. The temporary adoption of it had been forced upon the Government of India by the fact that the previous position had ceased to be tenable, and it was necessary to terminate as promptly as possible a situation which had become altogether intolerable. But it is only due to the Government of Bombay that record should here be made of the opinion then expressed by that Government, that the unprecedented acknowledgment of the rebellious Sirdars of Khelat as a recognised power in the Khanate must "subvert the Khan's authority and perpetuate troubles." This prediction was promptly verified; nor can there be any doubt that the step taken in 1872 rendered necessary and inevitable further steps in the same direction. By the arbitration of 1872 the British Government assumed and accepted a position in Khelat which could neither be abandoned without the simultaneous annihilation of its salutary influence in the Khanate, nor practically maintained without a greatly increased exercise of authority.

11. Meanwhile, matters in Khelat went on from bad to worse. The counsels of the British Agent, unsupported as they were by any exhibition of power, or any indication of the Government's determination to enforce them, were systematically disregarded by the Khan; until at last Major Harrison, who had lost all influence at the Court of his Highness, was withdrawn from it in 1873. The payment of the annual subsidy to his Highness was simultaneously withheld; and the Government of India ceased from all communication with the Khan in reference to the measures requisite for the security of our Western border.

12. From 1872 till 1875 our relations with Khelat continued to grow rapidly more and more unsatisfactory, and more and more detrimental to those British interests which it is our duty to protect. Outrage followed upon outrage; no redress could be obtained, and the frontier became so disorganised that the chief authority in Sindh recommended armed intervention in Khelat, and the deposition of its ruler. Our reasons for not adopting this recommendation were placed before your Lordship in our letter No. 13, of 22nd

January 1875. We preferred to make another effort in the cause of peace, by sending an officer of great experience in dealing with the hill tribes upon our Western border, under the orders of the Commissioner in Sindh, into the Murree Hills, with a view to effect, if possible, a settlement of the troubles on our immediate frontier, and to provide for the security of the Bolan route. We further instructed him that should these measures prove successful in affording security to trade through the Khelat territory, and should his Highness the Khan show an earnest desire to co-operate for that end, and to return to a proper sense of his duties, "it would afford the Governor-General in Council great "pleasure, on receiving an expression of regret for what occurred, to restore the "former subsidy, and to re-establish the old friendly footing with his Highness' Govern-"ment." We selected Major Sandeman to carry out these views.

13. Major Sandeman started from Dera Ghazi Khan on the 18th of November 1875. He was well received at once by the Murree and Brahooee Chiefs, and later by the Khan himself. Full reports of his first mission and its results are annexed to our Despatch No. 64, of the 17th of March 1876. Although, for reasons on which it is not now necessary to dwell, that mission was not in all respects successful, it was nevertheless productive of some valuable results. Both parties to the civil conflict in Khelat had become weary of it, and more or less exhausted by their protracted and apparently interminable struggle. The advent of a British officer, in the character of mediator between them, was welcomed by the Khan and Sirdars alike. The old instinct of willing subordination to the authority of the British Government was proved to be as strong as, and indeed stronger than, ever. An opportunity, of which his Highness immediately availed himself, was thus offered to the Khan for addressing the Viceroy, in terms tending to facilitate the renewal of friendly communications between the British Government and his Highness.

14. At the termination of this, Major Sandeman's first mission to Khelat, the Government of India determined to permit that officer to revisit speedily the Court of the Khan, with wider powers, a better defined authority, and a military force sufficient to ensure general submission to its verdict.

15. Only three courses were then open to the Government of India. Of these, the first was total abstention from any further interference in the internal affairs of Khelat. That course would, in our opinion at the time, and our unchanged opinion now, have infallibly prolonged an intolerable and aggressive anarchy upon our Western Frontier. . . . . The second course involved immediate intervention to the extent of deposing the Khan, and annexing the Khanate to British territory. This course the Government of India had indeed already rejected; but since the rejection of it the prospects favourable to any other course had not been very greatly improved. The third course was that of continued intervention to the extent only of what might be found sufficient to impose peace between the Khan and Sirdars of Khelat, with adequate guarantees for the protection of British commerce, and the tranquillity of British territory.

16. Taking into due consideration the partial success of Major Sandeman's first mission, the desire unanimously evinced throughout Khelat for further and continued intervention on its part, and the apparent certainty that if such intervention were withheld or suspended, the whole of Beloochistan would immediately relapse into anarchy, the Government decided on adopting the last of these three courses. Accordingly Major Sandeman, invested with fuller powers and a more definitely pronounced authority, was a second time deputed to Khelat, under instructions to use his best endeavours for effecting a complete and permanent settlement of the sanguinary and complicated disputes which were still distracting the Khanate. In order to give further weight to his mediation, and more distinctly mark the importance attached to its success by the Government of India, an escort consisting of 1,056 men of the Sindh and Punjab Frontier forces was detailed to accompany him. On this second mission, he left Jacobabad the 4th April 1876; and eight days subsequent to that event the administration of the Government of India was made over by Lord Northbrook to the present Viceroy.

17. The present Viceroy, having had the advantage before leaving England of personal communication with your Lordship on the general subject of our frontier relations, was strongly impressed by the importance of endeavouring to deal with them simultaneously, as indivisible parts of a single Imperial question mainly dependent for its solution on the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government, which is the ultimate guardian of the whole British Empire, rather than as isolated local matters. From this point of view, and bearing in mind the ambiguous and unsatisfactory character of our relations with Afghanistan, it had been his Excellency's intention to depute a confidential Envoy to the Court of Cabul viâ Candahar; in and about which locality the Afghan population is most friendly to the British Government. This Envoy, in addition to other amicable communications suggested by a desire for the improvement of our relations with that State, and the better definition of the mutual obligations at present

existing between its Government and our own, would have been instructed to explain frankly to the Amir our exact position in regard to Khelat, and the steps which had been or might be rendered necessary for the protection of British interest, on our Western Frontier.

18. The execution of this project was, however, rendered impossible by the instructions which had already been issued to Major Sandeman during his Excellency's journey to India; and the Viceroy, in these circumstances, immediately recognized the expediency of supporting and aiding Major Sandeman in the discharge of his difficult and important task.

19. The history of Major Sandeman's second mission to Khelat is recorded in the annexed reports from that officer to the Government of India in the Foreign Department. At the time when he re-entered Khelat a large number of caravans had assembled in Sindh, and were there awaiting the reopening of the great Western trade route through the Bolan Pass. Advantage was promptly taken of the truce in the civil war, and the friendly disposition of the tribes along the route, as well as of the special means of protection afforded by the strong military force which accompanied Major Sandeman's mission, to pass these caravans safely through the Bolan. A severe attack of cholera which had fallen on the expedition in the plains of Kutchee hastened, rather than delayed, its movements; but by vigorous measures and forced marches into a more healthy climate this epidemic was successfully overcome. The Chiefs generally responded with willingness to the call of Major Sandeman. But so wide and deep had become the alienation between them and the Khan that many of them declared to him that the country could only be pacified, either by the deposition of his Highness and the installation of a new ruler under the direct protection of the British Government, or else by this Government openly assuming to itself the sovereignty of the whole Khanate —an arrangement which they appeared disposed to urge on our adoption. The Khan on his part evinced at first considerable reluctance to meet the British Envoy. This reluctance appeared to be partly attributable to a not unnatural sentiment of personal humiliation at having to meet all his rebellious Sirdars, who had already joined Major Sandeman's camp, and with whom that officer had first placed himself in communication, partly also to a fear of treachery on their part, and partly perhaps by mistrust of the policy of the British Government towards himself. The tact and firmness of Major Sandeman, however, overcame all these obstacles, and on the 30th of May last the Khan arrived at Mustung, where the British Envoy had pitched his camp and assembled the leaders of the Brahooee tribes.

20. Major Sandeman's conduct in the negotiations which followed commands our warmest commendation. Although hitherto regarded throughout Khelat chiefly as the stray advocate of the cause of the disaffected Sirdars, he succeeded in rapidly winning the confidence of the Khan, without losing that of the Chiefs. With great judgment, he threw upon a body of arbitrators, nominated by the two parties, the difficult and invidious task of deciding between their rival claims; skilfully reserving to himself the advantageous position of an impartial adviser to both parties in the dispute, rather than that of a judge. He brought his influence to bear, with excellent effect, on the wild tribesmen, who seem to have followed his advice with unlimited trust; he calmed their apprehensions; he judiciously upheld the position of the Khan; and thus, by dint of impartial honesty of purpose, by well directed sympathy and unfailing patience, he persuaded both his Highness and the Sirdars to meet each other half way, in a rational and amicable spirit. Finally, having by such means reduced their respective claims and grievances into an intelligible shape, and narrowed them to a practical issue, Major Sandeman effected between them a comprehensive settlement of their disputes, on terms which were welcomed by the disputants on each side as mutually satisfactory.

21. The instrument embodying these terms of reconciliation was drawn up at Mustung on the 13th July, and read out formally in Durbar. In it the Sarawan and Jalawan Sirdars declared their submission and allegiance to the Khan according to "ancient "rule and custom;" the Khan, on his part, restored to them their "ancient rights and "privileges," and promised to treat them with every kindness and consideration so long as they continued loyal and faithful to the Khelat Government. Details connected with the nomination of certain Sirdars to be Chiefs of tribes, grievances arising from the confiscation of lands, &c., were also settled in this document; and assent given to measures for the protection of the Bolan Pass which had been previously arranged by a provisional instrument executed on the 30th of June. The Khan and Sirdars, moreover, made a solemn pledge to forget the past, and to avoid all hostilities against one another until after referring any future grounds of dispute to the British Government for its decision. "We do heartily agree," they declare, "to aid to the best of our power in

" keeping open the trade routes, to preserve the peace of the country, and we swear we " will do nothing to violate this our written agreement of peace. This our first agree- " ment we make to the British Government, as a record of the terms of peace made " between us, and to which we have affixed our seals."

22. In making his final report to us Major Sandeman reviewed with just satisfaction the results of his mission. But he did not conceal from himself, or from us, the necessarily transitory character of the settlement he had effected, if the maintenance of that settlement were to be left henceforth entirely to the unaided powers and uncontrolled impulses of the two parties to it. British agents had on many previous occasions brought about the amicable settlement of quarrels in Khelat, but experience had proved the futility of arbitration between disputants who have no confidence in the power and determination of the arbitrating Government to cause its awards to be respected. Major Sandeman pointed out very forcibly that the long civil war which had desolated Khelat almost without intermission since the accession to power of the present Khan, had for years been deepening between his Highness and the Sirdars a gulf, which could not practically be bridged over all at once by a mere piece of paper. The continued direct supervision and control of the British Government were, in his opinion, essentially necessary guarantees for the permanence of the results attained by his own arbitration. Speaking, after a careful study of the internal condition of the whole Khanate, and with every disposition to take a sanguine view of the results of his own work, he says:— " The direct interference of the British Government, acting as a paramount power, is " absolutely necessary, and must be maintained." And again: — " To make its " influence really effective for the future, the British Government must state to both " sides that it accepts the responsibilities they desire to enforce on it, and will aid them " materially, as the paramount power, to preserve the peace of the country."

23. Nor was Major Sandeman without good reason for believing that such interference would be cordially welcomed throughout Khelat, as conducive to the interests of the Khanate, no less than to our own. He had found that both the Khan and the Sirdars looked exclusively to the British Government as a paramount power—the only power able to advise and assist them in their difficulties, the only power able to compose their quarrels; a power, in short, on whose intelligent recognition of its opportunities and duties in Khelat the permanent peace of their country was practically dependent. The Khan himself, with all his faults, has always been credited with a sincere desire to maintain friendly relations with the British Government. This opinion of his Highness' disposition is strongly confirmed by Major Sandeman. Writing to us about the character of that Prince, he says—" Mir Khodadad Khan is a weak Prince; but at the same time " he is not without considerable ability. During the recent negotiations I have " watched him carefully and well; and, although convinced of this, I am equally so of " his loyalty and devotion to our Government, whose interest he considers to be his " care, as far as he has the power to watch over them. He is very easily influenced " for good or evil, but has the greatest respect for the British Government, and I feel " certain from what I have seen of him that any advice his Excellency the Viceroy may " consider it expedient to give him when replying to his letter lately forwarded will not " pass unheeded. There is nothing that I have seen about him to make me believe that " he is at heart evil disposed, cruel, or in anyway unworthy of the kindness and considera- " tion of our Government." Moreover, wherever he went Major Sandeman found himself and the troops composing his escort regarded, not as the emissaries of a foreign Power, but as the natural friends and protectors of the people, by whom they were warmly welcomed. During his sojourn in the country, Khelat had enjoyed (and not in vain) a period of repose, or rather of peaceful activity, long unknown to this unhappy State. Villages destroyed by recent war were already being rebuilt; land, left fallow by its fearful owners, was already being brought again under cultivation. Everywhere signs of reviving hope and confidence attested the reliance placed by the whole population of the Khanate on the efficacious continuance of our intervention.

24. Major Sandeman's final report reached us early in the month of September last, and at once received our most careful consideration. We had then to decide whether we should regard our intervention as terminated by the conclusion of peace between the ruler and the Chiefs of Kelat, or whether we should accept, with all its responsibilities, the task of prolonged intervention which had been so eagerly urged upon our acceptance by all the parties concerned. We had to consider, in the first place, all the conditions of the peculiar position we had assumed towards Khelat by the Treaty of 1854. This position, though sometimes ignored by ourselves, had been continually acknowledged and appealed to by the other contracting party. We had, in the next place, to consider all the practical consequences of the mediation of 1872. Our interference on that

occasion had prevented what then promised to be a decisive trial of strength between the Khan and his Sirdars. By according to the latter a position in which they had never before been formally recognised by the British Government we had certainly weakened the position of the Khan. Since then his Highness has never ceased to complain that, after having arrested his hand at the critical moment, when he believed himself able, at last, to crush his rebellious vassals, and after giving to those vassals a status prejudicial to his own, we had then heavily increased his obligations, whilst diminishing his power, had continued to hold him responsible for the exercise of an authority of which we ourselves had helped to deprive him, and had finally punished him for acts which we had left him powerless to prevent. We had also before our eyes the history of all previous mediations in Khelat. It showed plainly that each of them had resulted in confusion worse than that which mediation had attempted to remedy. And we had beneath our hand the strongly expressed opinion of an officer exceptionally well qualified to form a sound opinion on this subject, that a similar result would infallibly attend his own successful mediation if we decided on withholding the continued intervention which he deemed necessary to maintain and perpetuate the good effect of it. Finally, our consideration was duly given to the consequences foreseen and fully accepted by the Government of India when framing its Resolution of the 14th March 1876. That Resolution enabled Major Sandeman to carry out his last mission with unusual pomp and publicity, supported by an imposing military force. This circumstance had attracted to it the special attention of neighbouring States, at the same time securing to it the special confidence and respect of all parties and persons in Khelat. To the reliance thus inspired on our power and determination to protect order, maintain peace, and punish unprovoked aggression, must be mainly attributed the almost unprecedented eagerness of all concerned to follow the advice and accept the award of the British mediator. We had, therefore, to consider very seriously what would be the effect on the Khanate itself, more especially upon those of its inhabitants and rulers who had unreservedly placed their rights and interests in our hands, and what the effect upon our influence elsewhere, of immediately terminating an intervention which, on all sides, we were earnestly requested to prolong; or abruptly withdrawing those means of maintaining the settlement effected by our Agent, which the persons who had accepted it, and were directly interested in its maintenance, unanimously regarded as necessary for that purpose. The British mediator, himself, had in very emphatic terms recorded his deliberate opinion that a more direct and active interference than heretofore would long be needed to secure the fruits of his mediation. With this opinion before us we were constrained to acknowledge that we could not decline the position thus bequeathed to us by a long course of antecedent circumstance without thereby incurring the grave responsibility of deliberately plunging into renewed bloodshed, and interminable anarchy, a neighbouring and a friendly State which had urgently appealed to us for timely rescue from those evils.

25. Whilst, therefore, we were fully alive to the difficulties and responsibilities of the permanent intervention advocated by Major Sandeman, we could not disguise from ourselves the greater difficulties and responsibilities of renouncing the position in which the success of his mediation had conspicuously placed us. Moreover, we were also of opinion that the highest and most general interests of this Empire (interests no longer local but imperial) rendered it necessary to place our relations with Khelat on a much firmer, more durable, and more intimate footing than before. Whatever may have been the personal disinclination of this Government in times past to exercise active interference in Khanates beyond our border, it must now be acknowledged that, having regard to possible contingencies in Central Asia, to the profound and increasing interest with which they are already anticipated and discussed by the most warlike populations within as well as without our frontier, and to the evidence that has reached us of foreign intrigue in Khelat itself (intrigue at present innocuous, but sure to become active in proportion to the anarchy or weakness of that State and its alienation from British influence), we can no longer avoid the conclusion that the relations between the British Government and this neighbouring Khanate must henceforth be regulated with a view to more important objects than the temporary prevention of plunder on the British border. But indeed, the experience of late years is no less conclusive that even the permanent protection of British trade and property equally demand a more energetic and consistent exercise of that authority which we are now invited, by its Ruler, its Chiefs, and its people, to exercise in Khelat.

26. But although we have not shrunk from accepting and assuming the responsibilities we inherit from the mediation of 1872 and the armed mission of Major Sandeman, it has not appeared to us necessary or desirable to push intervention to the point

recommended by that officer. We learned by one of his latest reports to us that Major Sandeman had already given his sanction to a code of procedure issued by the Khan for the guidance of the Sirdars and Naibs in the civil administration of Khelat; and that this code involved a constant and minute interference on the part of the British Agent in the civil and criminal administration of that State, which seemed to us in the highest degree unadvisable. As therefore we were unable to ratify the sanction given by Major Sandeman to this code, or to concur unreservedly in the whole line of policy advocated by him, we deemed it expedient, before finally determining the permanent character of our future relations with Khelat, to place Major Sandeman fully and confidentially in possession of our views. It appeared to us that this object could be effected better and more promptly by personal communication than by official correspondence. We were also of opinion that as our adoption of the general basis on which Major Sandeman had, with our entire approval, succeeded in placing our relations with the Khanate, would necessitate the retention, for some time at least, of his escort in Khelat, it was desirable that we should have, as soon as possible, the opinion of a more experienced military officer as to the safety and distribution of the troops.

27. Accordingly, whilst withholding our official reply to Major Sandeman's abovementioned report, we deputed Colonel Colley, in accordance with the suggestion of the Viceroy (that officer being his Excellency's Military Secretary, and an officer of political as well as military experience, more especially in regard to the management of frontier tribes and troops), to proceed to Khelat in an unofficial capacity as the bearer of communications from his Excellency to the Khan and Major Sandeman respectively. We anticipated great advantage to the public interests from the opportunity thus afforded to Major Sandeman of learning our views in complete detail from an officer in the Viceroy's personal confidence. Our anticipations have been justified by the result. In personal communication with the Military Secretary Major Sandeman was able to withdraw from the position which he had assumed in issuing his new Code of Civil Procedure for Khelat. He wisely arranged that it should be treated as a temporary document pending the signature of a Treaty which should define the obligations we assumed, and the completion of a new and more complete Code based upon them. Colonel Colley carried out his mission with care and judgment, and in a manner which merits our warm acknowledgments. In concert with him Major Sandeman was enabled to lay before the Khan the draft of a Treaty framed in general accord with our wishes. It laid down the future relations between the two Governments in a sense favourable to Khelat, and calculated to promote the true interests of both. The Khan, with many expressions of gratitude, agreed provisionally to this treaty, after certain additions and alterations were made by himself, and he at once commenced his arrangements for meeting the Viceroy at Jacobabad early in December, with a view to its formal ratification.

28. The text of the treaty thus signed by the Viceroy and his Highness in private Durbar at Jacobadad on the 8th of December last, is annexed to this letter. The first three articles of this treaty renew and reaffirm the Treaty of 1854, whereby the Khan agrees to oppose the enemies of the British Government, to act in subordinate co-operation with it, and to abstain from entering without its permission into any negociation with other States: the British Government on its part agreeing to respect the independence of Khelat, and to aid the Khan, in case of need, by such means as it may deem expedient in the maintenance of his just authority, and the protection of his territory from external attack. By the 4th and 5th Articles of the Treaty of 1876 we re-establish our Agency at the Court of the Khan, and authorise our Agent to use his good offices for the settlement of any serious dispute between his Highness and his Sirdars. Failing the settlement of it by that means, the Khan will with our consent submit any such dispute to the arbitration of the British Agent; accepting, and faithfully executing, the Agent's award.

29. The 6th Article embodies that part of our present arrangements with Khelat which, more than any other, as your Lordship will readily understand, required our careful preliminary consideration. Had the question before us in connexion with this Article been whether we should now, even in compliance with the concurrent desire of the Khan, the Sirdars, and the tribes, introduce British troops into the Khanate, we might have hesitated before assenting to such a measure. But the troops of the British Government were already in Khelat, where their presence was cordially welcomed by the inhabitants of the country. The value of it, in giving weight to the counsels of our Envoy, and security to the peace of the population, had been tested and significantly proved by restored political harmony, revived agriculture, unmolested trade, reconstructed villages. What, therefore, we had now to decide was whether we should withdraw these troops, well knowing that their withdrawal would weaken the position

of our Envoy, discourage the hopes, and perhaps irretrievably alienate the confidence, of a population which recognised in their presence the only practical guarantee for its continued peace and future prosperity. Even before the signature of the treaty these troops had ceased to perform the part of a mere military escort to the Envoy. They had, with the cordial concurrence of the Khan, and with the best possible effect, been located in various parts of the country where their presence was deemed most conducive to its permanent pacification, or the protection of the re-opened trade routes. The security of the troops themselves had been carefully considered. After consultation with Colonel Colley, Major Sandeman had recommended that any occupation of the mountains and defiles of the Bolan should be avoided, but had selected two points of military as well as political importance, Quettah and Mittree, where the troops would be amidst a friendly, peaceful, and industrious population in open and well cultivated districts, free from any risk of being compromised, or provoking collisions or complications. Meanwhile there could be no reasonable doubt of the Khan's personal inability, for the present, at any rate, to enforce his newly re-acknowledged authority without at least some show of material support from the British Government.

Under all these circumstances we deemed it wise to give practical effect to an arrangement contemplated by the Treaty of 1854, and completely in accordance with the provisions and intentions of that Treaty, an arrangement obviously required by the present condition of Khelat, and the interests of the Indian Empire so far as they are thereby affected.

30. The subsequent articles of the Treaty of 1876 provide for the construction of lines of railway and telegraph; and in pursuance of this provision we have already, in concert with the Khan, made temporary surveys for a future line of railway from Sukkur to the Bolan Pass, and commenced preliminaries for the construction of a telegraph line from Jacobabad to Dadur, diverging thence to the town of Khelat on the one side, and Quetta on the other. Finally, it will be seen that to aid the Khan in a more efficient fulfilment than heretofore of the obligations contracted by him under the Treaty of 1854 and under the present supplementary engagement, we have agreed to grant him a sum of one lakh of rupees annually instead of the former half lakh, and to contribute a further sum of 20,500 rupees annually towards the establishment of posts and the development of trade routes in his Highness' dominions, so long as the money is expended in a manner approved by us.

31. Such are the provisions of the Treaty into which we have entered, and for which we seek the approval of Her Majesty's Government. This treaty was ratified in presence of the principal Sirdars; and the Viceroy took advantage of the occasion to impress earnestly on the Khan the necessity of scrupulously respecting the rights of his Sirdars and subjects, and of abstaining from oppression. "By this Treaty," his Excellency said, "the British Government has undertaken serious obligations on your behalf. It 'therefore expects that your Highness will listen to its counsels. These counsels will 'always be dictated by a sincere desire for your welfare and for that of your subjects. 'It expects that you will loyally act upon the advice tendered to you by its represen-'tative, and that you will abide by his decision in all cases referred to his arbitration." Turning to the Sirdars, the Viceroy reminded them that they had been specially named in the Treaty, and were equally bound by its terms; that the Treaty imposed obligations upon them as well as upon the Khan, and that any breach of these obligations by further acts of rebellion would bring upon them the displeasure of the British Government. The Khan and the Sirdars both eagerly replied that they clearly understood, and faithfully accepted, the obligations thus laid upon them.

32. While at Jacobabad, the Viceroy took advantage of the presence of the Commissioner of Sindh, together with that of the General Officer Commanding the Sindh District, and of the Officer Commanding the Sindh Frontier Force, to confer on certain questions connected with the disposal of Major Sandeman's escort, and the strength and disposition of the troops to be stationed in Khelat territory. For military as well as political reasons Quetta had been selected in preference to Khelat for the head-quarters of this force. It offers an exceptionally strong military position, a small hill rising in the middle of a wide open plain, well watered, and in the midst of a district abounding in supplies, a position almost unassailable if occupied by troops armed with the improved modern weapons, and which a small force could hold for a long time against vastly superior forces. It is an important strategical position, commanding the richest and most important valleys of upper Beloochistan, as well as the routes both through the Bolan and to Khelat. The surrounding population is peaceful, industrious, retaining the most friendly recollections of our rule, and welcoming the arrival of the troops as the security for peace

not considered advisable to locate troops in the Bolan Pass itself, isolated as they would be in a barren and mountainous district, in immediate contact with the wild and turbulent tribes, where their presence could hardly fail to bring about accidental collisions and complications, and their safety might be seriously compromised. But another open and secure position was selected at Mittree at the south end of the pass, covering the rich plains of Kutchee, connects Jacobabad with Quetta, and whence the pass could be patrolled if necessary.

33. One of the principal objects assigned to Major Sandeman in his missions into Beloochistan was the opening of the Bolan Pass. The arrangements made for that purpose are detailed in the accompanying papers. For reasons given above it was not considered advisable to place troops in the pass, but was thought preferable to depend on arrangements made with the tribes along the pass. Under arrangements made by Major Sandeman, and agreed to by the Khan and the Sirdars, the tribes along the road receive, as of old, a share of all duties levied on goods passing through. In the protection of the pass a number of men of each tribe are entertained, and dispersed in posts along the pass, whence they patrol the pass and furnish escorts to caravans. We believed it to be wiser thus to interest the tribes themselves in the protection of the Pass than that the Khan or ourselves should attempt to hold it by force. The general arrangements for the security of the pass were placed in subordination to the Khan under Moolla Mahomed, the most influential of the Brahooee Chiefs, and we have a not unimportant guarantee for his good faith in the fact that Mittree, his principal town and richest district, is occupied by our troops.

34. It was considered advisable that Quetta should be occupied by a detachment consisting of a mountain battery, a regiment of infantry, and a squadron of cavalry, from the Punjab Frontier Force; whilst another detachment of a mountain battery, a regiment of cavalry, and a wing of infantry from the Sind Frontier Force should be temporarily stationed at Mittree, with detachments along the foot of the hills as a check on the raiding propensities of the Murree and Boogtee tribes. There were obvious objections, however, to leaving troops in permanence at the latter place, inasmuch as it is said to be unbearably hot and feverish in the summer months. It was consequently decided that the main portion of the force detailed for duty at Mitri should be withdrawn to Jacobabad during the hot months of the year, leaving a chain of posts only to watch the hills. In connexion with the general arrangements at Quetta and Khelat, we deemed it fitting to sanction the establishment of dispensaries at those places.

35. In laying these arrangements before Her Majesty's Government, we are not unmindful that our relations with the Murree and Boogtee tribes have hitherto formed the groundwork of much of that divergence of policy between the Sindh and Punjab officials which has to some extent crippled our action on the frontier. Your Lordship is already aware that the raids of these troublesome tribes on our own border have given rise to many of our past misunderstandings with the Khan. Nominally they are subjects of Khelat, and they lie within the geographical limits of Beloochistan. Yet no Khan has ever been able to exercise any really effective control over them; and his own provinces have suffered more from their inroads than any portion of British territory. The attempt to compel the Khan to do what was not practicable, and to hold him to the letter of the Treaty of 1854, has, we believe, been a source of weakness in our past policy. We have therefore resolved to adhere, for the present, to the system adopted by us in 1875, and to continue our dealings with these tribes independently of the Khan. We shall continue the allowances to them which we have paid since that year; we shall, as heretofore, encourage them to take service in the ranks of our frontier police, but we shall repress by force any outrage which they may dare to commit on British territory. Their power for evil will have been much lessened by the establishment of a settled Government under British influence in their rear, where formerly, amidst the contending factions, they were [illegible] of sympathy, and refuge.

[illegible] It only remains for us to add that the Khan of Khelat and his Sirdars reached [illegible] the 25th of December. It was the first occasion on which the majority of the [illegible] attendants had left their homes to visit British territory. They expressed [illegible] their surprise and admiration on beholding the railways, telegraphs, and [illegible] peaceful civilisation which they saw on their way to Delhi, and their [illegible] kindly reception given to them. We may say, briefly, that the good [illegible] both the Khan and his Sirdars has exceeded our anticipations. [illegible] witnessed the power of the British Government. For the first [illegible] ength, and the benefits of that salutary order which it imposes [illegible] We cannot doubt that the association of the Khan and his [illegible] Delhi will bear good fruit in our future relations with Khelat.

37. In conclusion, we submit to your Lordship the Resolution we have issued regarding the appointment of Major Sandeman as Agent to the Governor-General in Beloochistan, and the measures we have adopted in connexion therewith. We feel assured that your Lordship will appreciate the services of that officer as fully as we ourselves have done; and no less do we entertain the hope that the settlement which we have endeavoured to effect of an anxious and difficult question will receive the approval of Her Majesty's Government. Of one thing we feel certain. If it be conducive to British interests, as we have no doubt it is, to influence the tribes and peoples who live beyond our border, we must be in contact with them. It is by the everyday acts of earnest, upright English gentlemen that lasting influence must be obtained; not by spasmodic demonstrations, nor any sudden and temporary influence purchased by money and presents. If, at length, we succeed in binding more closely to us the people of Khelat, by making them feel the benefits of peace, and the power for good exercised by the British Government, we shall have added an additional bulwark to our Empire. An important part of our frontier will no longer be harassed by mistrustful, wild, and dangerous neighbours, and our officers will have Chiefs and populations to deal with who welcome their counsels and receive them as their best friends.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.

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For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

BILUCHISTAN, No. 3.

PAPERS

RELATING TO THE

RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE WESTERN AND NORTH-WESTERN FRONTIER OF INDIA.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
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FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

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PAPERS

RELATING TO

The Re-organization of the Western and North-western Frontier of India.

No. 1.

Political, No. 15.

To his Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord, India Office, London, 3rd February 1876.

Paragraph 1. In the final paragraph of my Political Despatch, No. 91, dated the 8th July last, relative to the affairs of Khelat, I intimated my intention of addressing you more generally upon the changes which, under existing circumstances, seem necessary for the purpose of ensuring unity of action in the government of the Western and North-western Frontiers of India, and I now proceed to make such observations as occur to me on the subject.

2. The arrangement by which, shortly after its conquest in 1843, Sindh was constituted an integral part of the Government of Bombay, was perhaps, under the circumstances of that time, the best that could have been adopted. The province was, in effect, accessible chiefly from Bombay, and its subordination to that Presidency became almost therefore a political necessity. The management of relations with the tribes on the western frontier of the newly acquired territory thus fell into the hands of the Government of Bombay, and so continued until the year 1872, when that Government voluntarily proposed that, in view to facilitate the conduct of business, the Commissioner of Sindh should communicate direct with the Government of India in the Foreign Department on all questions of purely foreign policy in connexion with Beloochistan and the Trans-Indus tribes along the frontier, and those cases in which the interests of our own subjects might be directly and specially involved. This proposal was in accordance with previously expressed views of your Government, and was agreed to by you with a proviso that, for the present, at any rate, certain appointments subordinate to the Commissioner of Sindh should continue to be made by the Government of Bombay.

3. Although the arrangement thus effected had, no doubt, advantages over that which had previously been in force, it was by no means sufficient to secure unity of action on the Khelat frontier. The relations with the tribes on that frontier continued to be conducted, as they had heretofore been, partly by officers under the Commissioner of Sindh, partly by officers under the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. The only modification of previous practice was, that instead of the supervising authorities reporting one to the Government of India, the other to that of Bombay, both henceforwards communicated direct with the former. The evil remained that questions requiring consideration as a whole by a single mind were dealt with by officers brought up in widely different schools and with divergent interests. The unsatisfactory result of this dual system of management was recognised by your Excellency's Government, and in your letter of the 22nd January 1875, No. 13, you reported your determination that communications with the Murree and Boogtee tribes should be conducted through the medium of the Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ghazee Khan, a Punjab officer, who would be placed under the orders of the Commissioner in Sindh, to whom also would be referred any action proposed to be taken as regards the tribes whose proceedings mainly affect the Scinde frontier.

4. Your Excellency in Council is sanguine that the new arrangement will produce satisfactory results. I am, however, disposed to doubt whether it can be regarded as more than a partial remedy for the evils which unquestionably existed, or whether it will thoroughly obviate that clashing of authority which, though in the ordinary civil administration of the country an evil of perhaps moderate dimensions and easily controlled, becomes serious when it touches our foreign relations. At present, the intrigues upon the Khelat frontier are of an ordinary kind, and no great practical mischief results from the disjointed and anomalous government in that quarter. But in contingencies

which may at any time arise, such, for instance, as war or disturbance in Affghanistan or its neighbourhood, the condition of the Khelat frontier would be a subject of great solicitude. It would then be vitally necessary that all the officers, civil and military, in the valley of the Indus should obey a single will, and should look for their advancement to the same authority.

5. Under these circumstances, I desire to suggest, for your Excellency's consideration, the advisability of making new arrangements with respect to the administration of the province of Sindh, for the purpose of bringing the whole frontier under the direct control of the Government of India. This suggestion is no new one. At the time when the formation of the Punjab into a Lieutenant-Governorship was under discussion in 1856, it was the unanimous opinion of Lord Dalhousie's Government that the new province should include Sindh. When, however, the arrangements were finally carried out in 1858, the Home Government and the Government of India of that day, for reasons partly personal, partly connected with the then backward state of communications along the Indus, agreed in thinking that Sindh should remain attached to the Presidency of Bombay. Important changes in the facility of communication as well as in other conditions of the frontier have taken place since that time, and will in a short time receive a very material extension, and the reasons which decided the action of the Government in 1858 have lost their cogency. The exact mode in which the province in question and the frontier districts would be administered under the authority of your Excellency's Government is a matter on which I shall abstain from expressing any opinion until I have learnt your views. The whole territory may be annexed to the Punjab; or the lower portion of the valley of the Indus may be placed under a distinct Government; or the districts requiring special military supervision may be separately administered; or some other division of these provinces, involving larger readjustments, may be made. Local circumstances, facilities of communication, the character of the population under British rule, and of the tribes beyond the frontier, must be taken into careful consideration before any decision can be taken on this important point. If it shall be settled to sever Sindh from the Presidency of Bombay, this question will require your Excellency's earliest consideration.

6. Apart from the grave political reasons, already cited, in favour of the suggested change, there are some considerations of a different kind which may also be urged in support of it. The improvement of communication along the valley of the Indus, which is now being effected, promises not only to remove one of the main arguments for the dependence, but, taken in connexion with the works which have for many years been in progress at the port of Kurrachee, may be expected to create interests to a certain extent antagonistic to those of Bombay. The importance of Kurrachee is steadily growing, and if, as may be hoped, the material condition of its harbour continues to improve, or is even maintained as at present, the port will probably hereafter, on the completion of the Indus Valley Railway, become the emporium for all the trade from western Europe to Afghanistan, Sindh, the Punjab, and a portion of the North-west Provinces. This result must, however, entirely depend on the care with which the harbour is maintained, and for this purpose the Government of India will have powers and facilities which are not at the command of the Government of Bombay.

7. Should it be decided to transfer Sindh from the jurisdiction of the Government of Bombay, it would be proper to relieve the Government of India of a corresponding burden in some other quarter. In the Central Provinces would probably be found the territory fittest to employ the official strength which the changes I have indicated would leave at the disposal of the Government of Bombay. A portion of those provinces is not only geographically and ethnologically connected with the minor Presidency, but possesses in the port of Bombay the nearest, indeed, the sole outlet for the rich productions of its soil. The development of the cotton and coal-bearing districts chiefly interests Bombay, and it would seem that their charge might advantageously be entrusted to the Government of that Presidency.

In commending this subject to your Excellency's consideration, I need scarcely observe that any change that may be made should be taken with as little delay as is consistent with the mature consideration of so serious a step. It is obvious that much inconvenience and embarrassment would result if officers should be distracted with the petty difficulties of passing from one routine to another at a moment when their time and thoughts were engrossed by agitation and disturbance on the frontier. I hope, therefore, to be placed in possession of your views on this subject at an early date.

I have, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 2.

No. 672 P.

Service Telegram.

From Calcutta, 14th March 1876. From Viceroy, to Secretary of State, London.

Your Lordship's despatch, dated 3rd February 1876, on subject of securing unity of policy on Khelat border, under consideration. Expediency of effecting union of administration, more or less complete, of Sind and Punjab, generally admitted, but time must elapse before details can be worked out. Meanwhile, experience has shown that transfer to Punjab of portion of Upper Sind, known as Sind Frontier District, is matter of immediate necessity. Such transfer can be effected with sanction of Her Majesty by proclamation under 28 Victoria, chapter 17.

Telegraphic sanction to transfer is accordingly solicited.

No. 3.

Telegram.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 16th March 1876.

We think it might be questioned whether we were substantially complying with the Statute, if we sanctioned proposed proclamation without seeing it. On the whole it would be safer for you to make such provisional arrangements as you think best for administration of frontier, sending home the proclamation you propose by mail.

No. 4.

No. 65 of 1876.

Government of India. Foreign Department. Political.

To the Most Honourable the Marquis of Salisbury, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Marquis, Fort William, the 17th March 1876.

With reference to your Lordship's telegram of this day's date, in reply to his Excellency's telegram of the 14th instant, on the subject of a proclamation we proposed to issue under 28 Victoria, chapter 17, section 4, transferring the portion of Upper Sind, known as the Frontier District, to the jurisdiction of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, we have the honour to transmit herewith, as required, copy of the proposed proclamation.

2. We have been advised that the proclamation should issue under the powers conferred by the Indian Council's Act, 1861, section 47, as well as under the provisions of 28 Victoria, chapter 17, section 4; it has accordingly been drawn up in these terms.

3. Experience has shown that control over the internal administration of the Sind Frontier District, comprising the talooks of Jacobabad, Thoole, and Kusmore, specified in the proclamation, is essential for the proper conduct of our political relations with Khelat, and as the charge of those relations has, under circumstances already explained to your Lordship, been transferred from the Commissioner of Sind to the Commissioner of the Derajat Division of the Punjab, the transfer of the internal administration of the Frontier District to the Punjab Government, to whom that officer is subordinate, is necessary.

4. On the subject of the measures necessary for securing unity of political administration on this important portion of the border, we shall address your Lordship hereafter in reply to your Lordship's despatch No. 15, dated 3rd February 1876, but meanwhile we were led to solicit telegraphic sanction to the issue of the proclamation in consequence of

representations by Colonel Munro, the Commissioner of the Derajat, and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, that the transfer was a matter of immediate necessity.

5. In the event of sanction being accorded to the issue of the proclamation, intimation by telegraph is solicited.

We have, &c.
(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
W. MUIR.
A. CLARKE.

Enclosure in No. 4.

No. P.

Proclamation. Foreign Department. Political.

Fort William, the 1876.

In exercise of the power conferred by the Indian Councils Act, 1861, section 47, and by the 28th Victoria, chapter 17, section 4, the Governor General in Council is pleased to declare and appoint that the portions of Sind, specified in the schedule hereto annexed, and at present subject to the Presidency of Bombay, shall, from and after the , become subject to the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Punjab and its Dependencies.

The Schedule.

The Talooks known as—
Jacobabad.
Thool.
Kusmore.

By order, &c.
(Signed) T. H. Thornton,
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 5.

Memorandum by C. U. Aitchison, Esquire, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Recent events have brought out more clearly than ever the absolute necessity for unity of control in the political affairs of the Punjab and Sind. As this can probably be best secured by the union of the two provinces under one administrative head, I will note what our records contain on the subject of the annexation of Sind to the Punjab.

A few weeks before laying down charge of the Government of India, Lord Dalhousie recorded a Minute (20th February 1856) in which he made proposals for the relief of the Governor General in Council from the overwhelming pressure of work. The principal change which Lord Dalhousie wished to make was to constitute the Punjab, which was then a Chief Commissioner's charge, into a Lieutenant-Governorship, with or without Sind as might eventually be thought best for the public interests. In that Minute Lord Dalhousie wrote:—

"*If* it should be thought that the Punjab by itself would constitute too small a jurisdiction for a Lieutenant-Governorship, I would then propose that the Lieutenant-Governorship should also include the province of Sind.

* * * * * *

"The Punjab and Sind appear from their relative geographical position to constitute naturally the frontier province of the empire on its western side. Their common share in the great river which traverses the whole length of each seems to make them largely dependent on each other, and to point out their union under one authority as the natural administrative disposition of our Western Provinces.

"The difference between the systems which prevail at present in the two provinces need form no obstacle to their union.. Various systems of local government fall under the jurisdiction of each of the Lieutenant-Governors already appointed."

These views met with the concurrence of all the Members of Council, and Sir John Peter Grant wrote:

"I think that all will agree that Sind and the Punjab should be under one government. In respect to wealth and population, the Punjab will be a small charge as compared with the Lieutenant-Governorship of Bengal and Agra. It would be expedient, therefore, if it could be done without inconvenience, to add to the Punjab any districts that could be readily detached from other governments for that purpose, even though they might not be indicated by nature as fit to constitute, with the Punjab, one integral government. But here all physical and political considerations combine to indicate that such is the case with Sind and the Punjab.

"There are, on the Indian continent, but three natural boundaries; lofty ridges of mountains, extensive jungles, and great deserts or thinly peopled and unwatered plains. By the last of these boundaries Sind is cut off from the Bombay Provinces more decidedly than the Punjab is cut off from the Agra Provinces. At the same time it is tied to the Punjab by the strongest of all natural links, a single system of great navigable rivers, common to both. Sind is in fact the door of the Punjab. These two provinces united form the whole North-west Frontier of India. The whole of the political relations of that frontier ought to be immediately in one man's hand; and this cannot be, so long as the Punjab and Sind are disconnected as at present.

"These considerations are of such great and permanent importance that I hope no personal or other temporary reasons will be allowed to interfere with the immediate union of the two provinces."

The reply of the Court of Directors to the proposal was as follows *:—

"We are not prepared upon financial as well as other grounds to entertain at present the plan you have suggested for affording relief by the formation of the Punjab and Sind into a separate government under a Lieutenant-Governor.

"At a future period it will no doubt be desirable when the administration of the Punjab and Sind has been developed by a further exercise of the present political, judicial, and revenue powers united in the persons of the Commissioner and his deputies to introduce a system of administration through an officer with more control over details than at present the Commissioner possesses, and at that period we may be prepared to consider the vesting the Commissioner of the Punjab with the powers of a Lieutenant-Governor over the Punjab and Sind conjointly, or the Punjab separately from Sind as the public interests may then seem to require. * * * * *
As at present informed, we consider the single province of the Punjab to be too limited in extent to require the appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor."

With reference however to the position of Government after the mutiny and the great work of re-organization which lay before the Governor General in Council, the Secretary of State of his own motion revived the question, and in his despatch No. 7, of 11th November 1858, directed that the Punjab should be made a Lieutenant-Governorship. "The limits of the new Lieutenant-Governorship," the Secretary of State observed, "are "left to your Government to define. It does not, however, seem expedient to incor- "porate therewith the province of Sind. There are many reasons why that territory, "the affairs of which are so admirably administered by Mr. Bartle Frere under the "Government of Bombay, should remain attached to that Presidency. But there are "portions of the North-western Provinces recently brought under the superintendence "of the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab which you will probably consider it desirable "to bring permanently within the circle of the new Lieutenant-Governorship, regard "being had to the necessity of adopting an uniform system of administration in accordance "with that which has been so successfully introduced into the Punjab."

With respect to this decision, Lord Canning wrote as follows in his Minute of 1st January 1859:—

"When four years ago the question of establishing a Lieutenant-Governor at Lahore was first raised, it was suggested to the Court of Directors that Sind should be included in the government.

"The despatch now received does not sanction this arrangement.

"I may be permitted to say that this decision appears to me to be a right one.

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* No. 39, dated 8th October 1856.

" Whatever apportionment of territory may hereafter be made on our Western Frontier, I am satisfied that at present, and for some time to come, the task of closely watching the Punjab, and of administering its government in all details, will be enough to occupy the time of the ablest administrator. That task has been increased by the addition of the Delhi Division. But this tract of country, though it brings upon the Government of the Punjab the administration of 12,000 square miles yielding nearly 36 lakhs of revenue, is very homogeneous in all respects with the eastern districts of the territory already under that Government, and joins them conveniently.

" To have added to the duties of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab the charge of 400 miles of our Western Frontier, far removed from the seat of his government, would have been too burdensome an increase. Nor do I think that in the present backward state of our communications along the Indus the inclusion of the lower part of that river and of its seaport within the jurisdiction of the Lieutenant-Governorship would have been beneficial."

The districts* transferred from the North-western Provinces to the Punjab were what used to be called the " Delhi territory." They had practically come under the Punjab when the mutiny broke out and communication between Delhi and Calcutta was cut off, while communication between Delhi and Lahore remained open.

In paragraph 10 of his Public Despatch No. 10, of 16th January 1868, on the subject of the re-organization of the machinery of the administration in the Presidency of Bengal, and with reference particularly to arrangements for legislation, the Secretary of State observed :—

" The Punjab, Oudh, and the Central Provinces might be treated as non-regulation districts under the general government; with respect to others (Assam, Burmah, Sind, and possibly Orissa, if it should be thought to require separation from Bengal proper), it may be a question whether they should be placed directly under the general government, or under the subordinate governments."

The precise meaning of this was not fully understood by the Government of India, but with reference to it Lord Lawrence remarked :—

" I would say that in my opinion Sind should remain under Bombay; British Burmah is under the Government of India, and should continue so," &c., &c.

Sir William Mansfield, with reference to the same paragraph, remarked :—" I think it would be a mistake to alienate Sind from Bombay."

Sir Henry Durand, however, was of a contrary opinion. " I have before said," he wrote, " that Sind should be under the Punjab, and I remain strongly of that opinion." The opinion referred to is probably the one which Sir Henry Durand gave in his Minute of 5th October 1867 on Central Asian policy :—

" Without disturbing the details of administration, Sind should be subject to the Punjab Government, and thus come under the more direct control of the Government of India. I have elsewhere stated that it is anomalous that on so important a frontier we should be liable to have a different policy advocated in Sind from that pursued at Peshawur; still more anomalous that the military force on the Lower Indus should be under the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, whilst the troops on the Upper Indus and its affluents are under the Commander-in-Chief in Bengal. One government, one policy, and one command should watch over the frontier from the sea-board to Peshawur. There should, in these respects, be no more disconnexion or isolation than in its railways."

This view was not shared by Sir William Mansfield, who wrote :—

" As I have said elsewhere, I can see no advantage, but on the contrary, great harm, in making a disposition of Sind different from that which has been attended by marked success. This province has, under the Bombay Government, been administered separately, as it were, by a succession of able men from the time of Sir Charles Napier to the present day.

" The border of Sind is fairly peaceful and gives no trouble whatever. The progress of the province is, I believe, in all respects satisfactory.

" The Political Agents, as Superintendents of the Sind Frontier, have, in truth, nothing to do with Afghan politics; our relation with regard to which can alone be directed by the Viceroy himself. If there should be any improper interference or initiative on their part for the purpose of forwarding individual views, the remedy is of course a simple one, and in our own hands. But I cannot believe in the probability of such an occurrence on the part of experienced British officers."

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* Paneeput (Kurnal), Hissar, Delhi, Rhotuck, Goorgaon, Sirsa.

I cannot find on our records any further reference to the question of the union of the Punjab and Sind. But there is a note in the Home Department by Mr. Howell dated August 1869, in which the question is thus reviewed:—

"The main feature in the proposed redistribution of the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Punjab is the addition to it of Sind. This transfer has been often advocated, but hitherto the want of direct communication between Lahore and Sind has been the main obstacle to the measure. Recent events, however, have called imperatively for a more uniform policy on our North-west Frontier, and the recognition of the necessity of the Indus Valley line has quite changed the state of the question. At present Kusmore is the boundary between Sind and the Punjab, and there is a wide difference between the systems of frontier policy pursued north and south of Kusmore. The Sind population has been conquered and disarmed, and the defence of the frontier entrusted to the strong and costly Sind Frontier Force, established for that purpose to give security to the unarmed population. From Kusmore to Peshawur, there is a long frontier occupied under totally different circumstances. The people there are not disarmed, and could not be disarmed, unless we add very largely to our military forces, so as effectually to cover our territories. Indeed not only are the people not disarmed, but much of the security of our districts depends upon the efficiency of the local militia or armed border police acting under chiefs of influence selected from among their compatriots. Our military posts are few and far between, and the military are prohibited, except under special orders, from acting on the offensive within or above the Passes. The police of the frontier depends on the militia, and on the understanding, good, bad, or indifferent, maintained with the chiefs and leaders of border hill tribes. The military posts are supports seldom called into action, but giving solidity to frontier arrangements.

"In fact, no two systems can be more utterly different than those of the Punjab and Sind.

"These remarks are taken from a recent Minute by Sir H. M. Durand, who concludes thus: 'But throughout in this as in several other frontier matters, I am more and more impressed with the conviction that the whole Indus frontier, from Kurrachee to Peshawur, should be under the Punjab Government, not with the view of altering the system of the Sind administration, nor with the view of any alteration of treaty engagements, but with the purpose of securing, in all main features, one consistent policy along that important frontier, emanating from the Government of India alone, and directly under its control, in the hands of a Lieutenant-Governor acting in subordination to the instructions of the Governor General in Council.'

"Sir H. M. Durand's view is strengthened as above stated by the recent decision of the Government of India, that the Indus Valley line of railway should be undertaken. The grounds of this decision need not be here recapitulated, but this line will solve the main objection that has hitherto existed to the proposed redistribution. Kurrachee will then be a port of embarkation and debarkation under the Government of India, a point of considerable importance in a military point of view.

"It will be remembered that the transfer of Sind to the Punjab will be made (as stated by Sir H. Durand), not with the view of altering the Sind administration. Sind will remain in all points as before, but its local Government will be that of the Punjab in substitution for that of Bombay.

"The Punjab Government has recently applied for an additional Under-Secretary. If this appointment be sanctioned by the Secretary of State, the post should be filled by a young officer who has had experience in the administration of the territory now to be transferred from Bombay. As regards public works in Sind, it is certain that they can be better managed than at present from the head-quarters of the Punjab Government.

"The Sind Railway has already the same management as the Delhi Railway with headquarters at Lahore."

The fact of the matter is that Sind owes its connexion with Bombay to a purely accidental circumstance, viz., that it was conquered by us before the Punjab was. Sind became a British province in the spring of 1843. The Punjab became ours in March 1849. Had the order of events been reversed there can be no doubt that Sind would have been brought under the Punjab to which it belongs geographically, ethnographically, and politically. But during the six years that intervened between the conquest of Sind and the conquest of the Punjab it would have been impossible to have controlled Sind from the Bengal Presidency. The nearest point in Sind was separated from Upper India by more than 300 miles of Native territory. Under such circumstances Bombay was the only Government that could immediately exercise control over the new province. This circumstance of itself explains the connexion of Sind with the Bombay Presidency.

The subsequent annexation of the Punjab, the development of communications, the establishment of the telegraph, and the construction of the Indus Valley Railway have completely altered, indeed it may be said have reversed, the position of affairs. The Sind frontier is now conterminous with our own possessions in Upper India, while it is separated from Bombay at the nearest point (Ahmedabad) by 150 miles of Native territory. A railway runs from end to end of the Bengal Presidency and will soon be continued to Kurrachee. The gap between Mooltan and Kotree is being filled up at the rate of from 100 to 150 miles a year, and the entire line will probably be open in all 1878–79, except the bridge at Sukkur, which will be opened in 1880. Jacobabad, from which place Khelat relations are controlled, is as near to Mooltan as it is to Kurrachee. The communication between Kurrachee and Bombay is by steamer every third or fourth day, the voyage taking about three days, and also by a long circuitous and dangerous overland route through the Runn of Kutch. If Hyderabad be taken as the central point in Sind, the distance to Mooltan is only some 350 miles as the crow flies, and on this there will soon be through railway communication; the distance to Ahmedabad is only some 50 miles shorter, but through a wild desert and jungle country with scarcely even a road. It is probably this isolation of Sind, even from Bombay, which has made it necessary all along to invest the Commissioner with very high powers, and to place him virtually in the position of a Chief Commissioner.

The circumstances which originally necessitated the temporary connexion of Sind with Bombay are rapidly disappearing and will entirely cease to exist within the next two years when the railway line is completed. Meanwhile the permanent reasons which demand the union of the Punjab and Sind are every day acquiring greater force. It will be observed from the précis of correspondence given in this note that whenever the question of the annexation of Sind to the Punjab has been discussed the reasons adduced against it (with the exception of those given by Sir William Mansfield, and which have scarcely been justified by recent events) have been chiefly of a personal and ephemeral kind. The Court of Directors were quite prepared to discuss it after further experience. Although the Secretary of State said the objections were many; the only one he specifically mentioned was that Sind had been ably governed by Sir Bartle Frere. Lord Canning's objection was also a temporary one, that the hands of the Punjab Government were full at the time, and that communications between Lahore and Kurrachee were in a backward state. Lord Lawrence assigned no reasons for the opinion he gave; but they can easily be supplied by those conversant with the relations between the Punjab and Sind when he was at Lahore, and Sir Bartle Frere at Kurrachee.

The objections of a permanent nature appear to arise chiefly from the difference of administrative system in the two provinces. These objections have rather been obscurely hinted at than definitely expressed. They were anticipated by Lord Dalhousie in his minute of 1856. But inasmuch as no one proposes to disturb the details of administrative arrangement in Sind, the objections are more theoretical than practical.

On the other hand, the permanent reasons for the union of the two provinces under one administration have been ably stated by Lord Dalhousie, Sir John Peter Grant, and Sir Henry Durand. How far they have been borne out by late events, his Excellency in Council already knows. The recent painful correspondence with Sir William Merewether need not be further referred to in this note than to say that after years of patient correspondence, clear and explicit declarations of policy, and personal interviews with the Commissioner in Sind, the Government of India has been unable, under existing arrangements, to secure unity of political action in its Western Frontier, and has felt itself reluctantly compelled to take the control of political affairs altogether out of the hands of the Commissioner in Sind. Considering, indeed, that the tribes on the frontier of Upper Sind and in the Dera Ghazee Khan district in the Punjab belong to the same great classes, the wonder is that the double policy pursued towards them has not ended long ere this in very serious complications. The Upper Frontier district in Sind is inhabited chiefly by Beloochees and Jats; so is Dera Ghazee Khan. With exception of the mixed tribe of Khetrans there are none but Beloochees on the Dera Ghazee Khan Frontier; on the Upper Sind Frontier there are Beloochees and Brahooees, but the two intermarry and have similar customs. There is not the same difference between Brahooee and Belooch that there is between Belooch and Pathan.

But matters cannot safely be left on the present footing for any length of time. We have had evidence in the recent cases of Shahbaz Khan and Rogah Khan how intimately the affairs of the tribes beyond the border are bound up with the internal administration of Sind, more especially of the Upper Frontier District. The tribes who inhabit the hills have in many cases lands and jaghires on the canals within the British boundary, so that

to leave the control of political affairs under one administration, while the control of the internal Government is under another, is to perpetuate the system of double government in its worst form and to invite disaster. The step just taken of sending Colonel Munro to Jacobabad to take charge of frontier affairs is preparatory, it is to be hoped, to the adoption without avoidable delay of the further measure of the union of the administration of Sind and the Punjab, which, as shown in the foregoing précis, has been more than once advocated on other and more general grounds. The present division of authority cannot be long continued without risk of complete breakdown.

I annex in the margin * statistics of the area, population, and revenue of the Lieutenant-Governorships of Bengal, the North-western Provinces, and the Punjab, and of Sind. His Excellency in Council will observe that although the area of the Punjab is large, the population and the revenue are small. There is no reason to anticipate that the addition of Sind would give the Lieutenant-Governor a greater area than he could manage. The population would still be only one-third that of Bengal and two-thirds of the population of the North-western Provinces, while the revenue would be much under that of the North-western Provinces. As regards area, the completion of the railway system will make it quite manageable. From the centre at Lahore, the railway will radiate in three directions, throwing out its feelers to the furthest extremities of the province. But, if the area be considered too large, it can be reduced by giving back to the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-western Provinces the districts he lost in 1858—a measure which I believe the Government of the North-western Provinces would advocate.

What would be the financial effect of the change I have not had time (owing to the pressure of work in winding up matters preparatory to going on furlough) to work out. It is probable, however, that there would be a considerable saving. The pay of the Commissioner in Sind at any rate could be reduced, and probably some of the military force kept up on the Sind Frontier could be in time dispensed with.

Little if any legislation would be needed. On this, however, the Legislative Department may be asked to advise.

A memorandum † by the Assistant Secretary showing the number of Covenanted Civil Officers in Sind who would have to be provided for is appended. They are very few, and several them would probably be glad to try their fortune under the Punjab Government.

29-1-76. (Signed) C. U. A.

Enclosure in No. 5.

A.—MEMORANDUM.

Number of Covenanted Civilians employed in Sind.

For *revenue* purposes, Sind is divided into three Collectorates, Kurrachee, Hyderabad, and Shikarpoor. The collectors are all officers of the Staff Corps, and all the deputy collectors, with one exception, are officers of the Staff Corps, uncovenanted civilians, and

* Territory.	Area.	Population.	Gross revenue.	Total Expenditure.
	Square miles.		*Rs.*	*Rs.*
Lieutenant-Governorship of Bengal	189,034	62,724,840	[1] 14,77,46,000	[1] 5,59,38,000
Lieutenant-Governship of N.-W. Provinces	81,403	30,769,056	[1] 5,59,56,000	[1] 1,92,92,000
Lieutenant-Governship of Punjab	104,975	17,604,505	[1] 3,64,61,000	[1] 1,60,89,000
Sind	57,145	1,772,367	62,21,889	
Districts transferred from N.-W. P. to Punjab in 1858.				
Delhi	1,277	608,850	[2] 44,64,756	
Gurgaon	1,980	689,653	11,97,493	
Kurnaul	2,352	610,927	7,81,651	
Hissar	3,540	484,681	24,09,041	
Rhotuck	1,811	536,959	9,87,861	
Sirsa	3,121	210,795	2,22,778	
	14,081	3,141,865	1,00,63,580	

[1] These are the estimates of 1874-75. [2] Exclusive of Canal collections.

† Marked A.

(in the lower grades) natives. The exception is Mr. W. S. Forman, of the Bombay Civil Service, who is Acting 1st Class Deputy Collector of Shikarpoor.

For *judicial* purposes, Sind is also divided into three districts with a judicial Commissioner, who is a civilian. Of the present district Judges, one is an officer of the Staff Corps, and the remaining two are covenanted civilians.

A covenanted civilian is also Educational Inspector in Sind; so also is the Conservator of Forests.

In the Administrative Department an officer in the Staff Corps is Commissioner and a covenanted civilian Assistant Commissioner.

The following table shows the names and appointments of covenanted civilians at present employed in Sind:—

Permanent Appointments.

1. Mr. J. G. Moore, Assistant Commissioner.
2. Mr. F. D. Melvill, Judicial Commissioner.
3. Mr. S. H. Phillpotts, Judge of Hyderabad.
4. Mr. S. N. Tagore, Judge of Shikarpoor (*Acting*, Hyderabad).
5. Mr. E. M. H. Fulton, Assistant Collector and Magistrate and Educational Inspector.
6. Mr. J. McL. Campbell, Conservator of Forests.

Acting appointments.

1. Mr. W. B. Mulock, Acting Assistant Commissioner.
2. Mr. W. Wedderburn, Acting Judicial Commissioner.
3. Mr. G. Ayerst, Acting Judge of Shikarpoor.
4. Mr. W. S. Forman, Acting 1st Class Deputy Collector, Shikarpoor.

There are three political appointments in connexion with the province, the Political Superintendentship of Thurr and Parkur, the Political Superintendentship of the Upper Sind Frontier, and the Political Assistantship at Gwadur, but they are all held by military officers.

14–1–76. (Signed) W. F. P.

N.B.—The statement has been carefully compiled from the Bombay Civil List for October, 1875. I do not think any changes have occurred since it was published.

No. 6.

MEMORANDUM by Sir Bartle Frere.

Sind and Punjab Frontier Systems.

IN the following remarks I may often describe things as they were 15 years ago rather than as they are now. Many alterations have been since made in the Sind frontier system, not often, I think, for the better, and there may have been some useful assimilations in both systems. I have, however, described things as they were in my day.

The only really useful object of such descriptions is to discover what is the best system for the present and future.

The annexed map shows in a very general way the Western Frontier of India and the portions under Sind and the Punjab respectively. But, for a careful study of the question, the military maps, showing the force at each post on the frontier and the supporting garrisons, should be referred to.

Thoroughly to understand the difference between the Punjab and Sind frontier systems, and to judge how far any such difference is needful or inevitable, requires some

general idea of the physical features, inhabitants, commercial passes, government, and history of the frontier line from Cashmere to the Sea.

Starting from a barrier of snowy peaks, from 15,000 to 20,000 feet high, in Cashmere, our frontier line runs south-west to the Indus, follows the river round the Bonair Hills, bends westward to circuit the Peshawur plain, makes a loop to avoid the Kohat Pass, and then runs in a generally southern direction at the foot of the higher ranges to near Mittunkote, where the frontier of the Punjab ends. Frontier lines.

The frontier line then leaves the immediate neighbourhood of the Suleiman range, crosses the plains of Kutchee in a westerly and south-westerly direction till it nears the Gundava Hills west of Shikarpoor; follows thence the range till near Sehwan, whence it runs south through the hills till it meets the Hubb river, which it follows to the sea. This part of the frontier is under Sind.

As a general rule, the whole frontier from Cashmere to the Hubb river avoids the highest and most inaccessible hill ranges. There is but little plain country between the frontier and the hills, except in Kutchee.

The commercial passes are few and far between. The best known are the Kyber and the Bolan, which have been the usual routes for armies invading India or leaving India. It is a noteworthy fact that neither has ever been successfully defended by the hill tribes against an army seriously attacking it. Both have been forced, in our own time, by British columns not exceeding 12,000 fighting men, of whom more than half were Native troops. It is also noteworthy that the real Kyber pass has never been open for trade for more than a few weeks at a time since we have had the Punjab. The Amir cannot keep it open, and, it is supposed, would not like us to take the task of opening it into our own hands, which, apparently, would not be at all difficult. Meantime trade goes by less easy routes to the north of the real Kyber, between the Kyber and the Cabul river. Passes.

Between the Kyber and the Bolan are several other good passes little known to Europeans, but used by the trading caravans, who are able, if necessary, to fight their way through from Guzni, Khelat-i-Gilji, and Quetta, to the Derajat.

South of the Bolan are several passes, such as the Moola and Gundava passes, occasionally used by traders. But those who do not use the Bolan usually take the route south from Khelat without entering Sind, till they cross the Hubb, 20 miles from Kurrachee.

Away from the passes there is not so much difference as is generally supposed in the obstacles which the hills present to invasion or military occupation. From Dhera Ghazee Khan southward the hills are generally inferior in height to the Great Suleiman and Sub-Himalayan ranges. But what they want in elevation is made up for by the precipitous character of the valleys, which, in the Belooch Hills, are often rifts in the rock, with perpendicular sides many hundred feet in sheer descent. These and the frequent almost total absence of water and firewood render military operations in the ranges south of the Derajat quite as difficult as to the northward.

The tribes inhabiting the frontier fall under two great divisions. Northward of Dhera Ghazee Khan they are generally of Pathan or Afghan origin, speaking Pustoo or some cognate dialect. South of Dhera Ghazee Khan they are almost exclusively of Belooch or Brahooee origin and speech. There is considerable difference in appearance and character, the northern, or Afghan and Pathan, tribes being the handsomer and more intelligent race. But, as fighting men, the Beloochees have never shown any inferiority to their neighbours. Tribes.

As regards their government the Punjab tribes are in a very anomalous position. Most of them are practically independent, but many, probably the greater number, acknowledge some sort of nominal subordination to the Ruler of Cabul. This subordination we have generally been shy either to recognise or deny, and have never made much use of it in keeping the border peace. We have generally treated the tribes as useful buffers between us and the Amir, and the tribes themselves have been too glad to play off the one power against the other.

The result is that they are in a position quite unlike anything known either to European or Indian diplomacy. We are neither at peace or war with them—an armed truce would perhaps be the nearest description of any similar state elsewhere. No one can tell who is their master or sovereign. We abjure, in terms, all responsibility beyond our own border line, but we cannot get quit of it in fact. We decline to recognise effectively, whilst we cannot but feel, the Amir's influence over the tribes. If they

offend us we retaliate. Then there is blockade or more active war. In the latter case, the war is generally as sudden and as much by surprise as we can make it, rarely with any civilized forms of declaration of hostilities. When we have secured our point, or had enough of fighting, there is cessation of hostilities, and the enemy are allowed to act as if there were peace.

Till lately the position of the tribes on the Sind border was, in a diplomatic sense, better defined. They were treated as the subjects of the Khan of Khelat. Over some of the more powerful his authority had long been little better than nominal, but it was never denied by the tribes in terms, was always distinctly recognised by us, and was in every way a very useful lever for acting on them. In 1870, after a conference at Mittunkote between the Sind and Punjab frontier officials, it was decided to adopt in part the Punjab system in dealing with two powerful tribes (Murrees and Boogtees), whose country lay partly on the Sind and partly on the Punjab frontier. This seems to me to have been a grave mistake, and to account for much of the subsequent disorder.

Neither class of frontier officials seem to have altered their own principles of dealing with these tribes. The Sind officials still regarded them as subjects of the Khan, and to be dealt with through him; the Punjabee officials looked on them as practically independent, and to be dealt with accordingly as separate powers. The Sindees would have coerced them; the Punjabees wished to persuade them by motives of self-interest, and to take them into British service.

But the division of authority on our side the border remained, and the tribes were still able to play off one set of British officers against the other. Nor were either Sindee or Punjabee officials allowed by the Government of India to follow out their several principles to their legitimate consequences.

The object was to put a stop to the plundering and disorder. This could have been effected by the Khan, had we supported him as we did in 1859, or it could have been done by our Punjab officers, had they been allowed to use an adequate force of our own troops, but neither course was effectively carried out, and the old see-saw went on.

A little further authority to interfere was given to the Punjab officers after Sir William Merewether's visit to Calcutta in March 1875, but no power to enforce obedience or good conduct was given to any one.

Is it a subject of surprise that the only result has been to embroil our officials, and to make the confusion where there was conflict of authority worse than before?

It must be remembered that Sind was annexed to British India in 1843, and for some years after the frontier was much disturbed by incursions of the Belooch tribes. Life and property were insecure for a considerable distance within British territory, and as late as 1847 many thousand head of cattle were swept off by a raid of Beloochees, who plundered up to the immediate neighbourhood of Shikarpoor. Up to this time there had been much division of authority on the frontier. In 1847, General John Jacob was placed in command, and gradually introduced a system which was acted on, with little variation, up to about six years ago, when some changes were made after the Mittunkote conference between the Punjab and Sind Frontier officers above referred to. These have since led to the Punjab system being this year extended to Sind.

The relations between the Khan of Khelat and the British officers in Sind had till lately been generally friendly, though the Beloochees had no great reason to love us. In 1839, Sir J. Wiltshire, returning from Cabul, stormed Khelat, killed the ruler, Mehrab Khan, in his citadel, and plundered his capital. A rival was set up by us as Khan, in place of his son, a child, Nusseer Khan, who fled westwards, but, having been brought back by Mehrab Khan's widow, the interloper was deposed, Nusseer Khan was elected ruler, and we found it convenient to acquiesce in the succession. He behaved well after the British conquest of Sind from the Belooch Amirs, and in 1855 a treaty was concluded with him, by which he became a subordinate ally of the British Government, and a small subsidy was allowed him, to aid him in restoring order to his distracted country.

For some years past his successor, Khodadad Khan, has evinced a spirit the reverse of friendly. This is possibly in part owing to foreign intrigues, as the first manifestation by him of an indisposition to be guided by the Commissioner in Sind coincides very closely with a visit of a Russian officer to Khelat, where he resided for some time; but whatever may have been the cause, it is certain that for some years past the Khan has been quite "out of hand," oppressing his chiefs, and setting at nought the counsel of

the Commissioner in Sind to such an extent that payment of his subsidy was suspended, and the Commissioner proposed to send a force to bring him to order, but this was not allowed by the Government of India. The Government of India were persuaded that the personal influence of Captain Sandeman, a Punjab Deputy Commissioner, would be sufficient to adjust all differences between the Khan and his disaffected subjects. This interference naturally led to a misunderstanding between the Commissioner, Sir William Merewether, and Captain Sandeman. The Government of India have supported the latter, and instructed him to relieve Sir William Merewether of all political duties connected with the frontier. Major Monro has since been sent down to look after Captain Sandeman, and the result appears to be a complete deadlock.

The Punjab was not finally annexed till 1849. The arrangements then made for the management of frontier affairs have continued with little variation up to the present time.

We began by being on terms of semi-hostile intercourse with the ruler of Cabul; a better understanding with him, and finally a treaty, was brought about by the late Sir Herbert Edwardes, in 1855, but we have avoided recognising the Amir as sovereign of the tribes in contact with our frontier; our relations with them are, as above described, so anomalous that they are hardly capable of definition according to any recognised diplomatic formula.

The main differences between the Sind and Punjab system of dealing with frontier tribes may now be briefly stated as follows:—

1. In Sind it was a cardinal rule to attempt no disintegration of the Khan of Khelat"s sovereignty, whether nominal or real, over the Belooch tribes, but rather by every means in our power to uphold his authority. Complainants below the rank of Chiefs, small or great, were told to apply to their Chiefs. Chiefs, or complainants against Chiefs, were referred to the Khan. Every effort was made to enable or induce the Khan to give redress when needed, and to keep his people in order. The Khan was regarded as our independent ally, free to act as he pleased in internal affairs, but under military subordination to the English Government in all that could affect anything beyond his own border.	1. The Punjab policy was "divide et impera." Deal separately with each tribe and each section of a tribe,—avoid, as far as possible, recognising any authority over the frontier tribes,—keep them as buffers.
2. In Sind it was our main object to concentrate all power and responsibility, civil as well as military, in the hands of the frontier Commandant and Political Superintendent. He commanded all troops on the frontier, whether local or belonging to the regular army. In his military capacity he was responsible to no one but the Commander-in-Chief and Government. He was also sole Political Agent and Superintendent of Police, Chief Magistrate, judge, and engineer, fiscal officer, and canal officer of a strip of territory of various width from 10 to 50 miles on the frontier of Kutchee. He had assistants to aid him in the several departments, but he had no superior except the Commissioner, who ruled the whole province, through whom he corresponded with Government.	2. In the Punjab there has always been much greater division of power and responsibility. The civil and military officials are kept separate and independent, the nearest authority common to both being in some cases the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, but more often the Viceroy. The military authority is again divided. The troops of the regular army are under one brigadier, responsible to the Commander-in-Chief. The Punjab troops holding all outposts are under a separate brigadier, only partially responsible to the Commander-in-Chief. The engineers for public works are in four divisions, the police in two, all independent of each other, and of the Commissioners.
3. In Sind the force employed on the frontier was special in discipline and equipment, local as regarded the scene of its ordinary service, but its discipline was under the general control of the Commander-in-Chief, and the force formed an	3. In the Punjab the frontier force was partly from the regular army under the Commander-in-Chief, partly from the frontier force under local Governments, and partly from the police, both the latter independent of the Commander-in-Chief.

integral part of the army under his command.

From the excellence of the original constitution of the troops, from their officers being well selected, and from constant practice, they were among the best in the army.

4. The principle laid down for our dealings with the frontier tribes in Sind was to be actively good neighbours to them, "to do as we would be done by," not to meddle or interfere across the border with what did not concern us, but to regard the good or bad fortune or conduct of our neighbours as matters of intimate concern to us; "not to let his house burn lest ours should burn also;" to help the Khan's authority, not to supersede it, but to allow nothing to go unnoticed within reach of our outposts if the evil threatened to involve our people. Active interference by using our troops was only permitted in case of overt acts of outrage by armed men, such as no local police could cope with, cattle lifting by armed bands and the like. In all such cases our troops acted at once as against a civilised enemy in the field, pursued and attacked, without reference to border; because if on our side, they were armed enemies of the British Government; if on the other side, they were armed enemies of our ally the Khan.

Prisoners made in the latter case were handed over to the Khan for disposal.

5. In Sind the limit of our active interference across the border was a purely military limit. The Commandant was charged to use his troops, for the protection of life and property of all peaceable people against all armed evil-doers, not only in our own territory but in that of our ally, "within our reach." This was defined in a military sense. Our troops were never to move without proper supports and reserves, never to enter on ground where they could not act with efficiency, thus excluding the cavalry from attempts to enter the hills without supports of infantry or guns.

But of all this, the Frontier Commandant was the sole judge, in the first instance, responsible through the Commissioner in Sind to Government and to the Commander-in-Chief direct.

6. When following up an enemy across the Sind border, beyond British territory,

But, as in Sind, all the troops on the frontier of every arm were the best of their kind, and in a military sense, patterns to the rest of the army.

4. The principles laid down for the dealings of our frontier officers in the Punjab with the tribes over the border were, as I have been variously told by such officers, "absolute non-interference," and "masterly inactivity," "budi for budi" (*i.e.*, evil for evil), if our neighbours injured us, but, otherwise, abstention from all interference. On no account were our troops to cross the border without express instructions from Government. We were to hold ourselves absolutely irresponsible for the good or bad conduct of our neighbours over the border as long as they let us alone.

It is noteworthy that I never yet met a good Punjab frontier officer who seemed to me quite satisfied with the principles on which he had been acting, or the mode in which he was allowed to carry them out. The dissatisfaction often was shown by an exaggeration of desire for greater severity. I have frequently heard the remark that "the way General Avitabile treated them "was the only way to keep these people "in order." Avitabile's plan being to hang every malefactor, and, in bad cases of murder or plunder, if the malefactor could not be caught, to imprison his family or fellow tribesmen, with threats of putting them to death, if the real malefactor were not seized or slain. Tradition went that the threat was not always mere menace. It was said to have been sometimes executed, and this was looked on as strong government.

5. On the Punjab no troops were allowed to cross the border except under distinct orders for a regular expedition, previously sanctioned by Government. Such expeditions were extremely frequent, and often planned and executed with consummate courage and military ability. But the ultimate result was often small in proportion, owing apparently to division of authority intervening, just at the critical moment, to mar the complete success of the military operations, or to prevent its permanence being secured.

6. When an expedition by our troops across the Punjab border was sanctioned,

the ordinary rules of war in civilized countries were ordered to be strictly observed: armed men resisting were to be attacked and defeated, made prisoners, or slain; unresisting or unarmed men were to be everywhere spared and protected; no plunder was permitted; no wanton destruction of houses, trees, crops, or other property was allowed; provisions taken from unarmed country people were to be duly paid for.

The object aimed at was the individual punishment of the evil-doer, not the punishment of his tribe or family. Punishment of the culprit's clansmen, with a view, by coercing the innocent, to reach the guilty, was not allowed.

7. In Sind, no notice was taken of tribal ties or local custom as excuses for offences against British law. Private warfare and private reprisals by cattle lifting, &c. were forbidden. The excuse of "custom" in such case was ignored or treated as an aggravation of the offence, inasmuch as it was a proof of premeditation. In the strongest case of all, *i.e.*, blood-feuds, &c., the tribes were made to understand that the prosecution of a feud was not permitted by our Government, no allowance was made for the excuse that the murder or robbery would have been venial or permissible under the Native Government. No favour was shown to men who, according to our ideas, were malefactors.

8. Crime being treated not as a private wrong, but as a public offence, and the protection of persons and property from open armed violence being undertaken by the State, it was not necessary in Sind for every one to carry arms. None but soldiers and servants of Government were allowed to go armed, all others were required to leave their arms at home, or to give them up at the first police post in British territory.

9. Every aid in Sind was given to the Khan's officers and subjects to obtain redress for injuries inflicted in Khelat territory or on Khelat subjects by our people. It was a point of honour to mete out to the Khan and his people the same measure that we exacted from them.

We dealt with Khelat as far as possible as we would with Belgium or Switzerland.

10. The result in Sind was, after a very few years, entire freedom of the frontier districts from raids, and perfect security of

the great object seemed to be to strike terror into the enemy. For some years, prisoners were rarely made and quarter rarely given to armed men. Houses, trees, crops, &c., were destroyed. Tribal punishment was the object, and whatever inflicted loss or suffering on the tribe was permissible without reference to the chance of the punishment reaching the individual evil-doer. With a view to bring tribal pressure on the culprit, his whole tribe might be blockaded, or the culprit's tribesmen who could not possibly have shared his guilt might be imprisoned till he made restitution.

I am assured that the severity of this system has of late years been much mitigated by the humanity of the officers employed. But it is still rare for experienced Punjab officials to admit that it is both possible and desirable to carry on war againt such barbarous frontier tribes on the same principles as against civilized mountaineers in Europe.

7. On the Punjab frontier, much use was made of tribal bonds in managing the tribes, and much allowance was made for local custom as an excuse for what in our territory was regarded as crime. Private warfare and private reprisals were winked at, if not encouraged, and men would ask for and obtain leave to cross the border, and commit crimes, such as murder to avenge a blood-feud, which would have been punishable in our own territory.

8. The carrying of arms was generally permitted on the Punjab frontier, and all men were rather encouraged to undertake their own defence. Much use was made of volunteer fighting men prosecuting old tribal feuds to keep their neighbours in order.

9. In the Punjab it was never expected that the authorities beyond the border should surrender malefactors, and no surrender of malefactors who were British subjects for offences done in Afghan territory was ever thought of.

We dealt with the tribes beyond our frontier as the French would with tribes beyond their border in Algeria, as powers outside the pale of civilized diplomacy.

10. I am hardly in a position to describe fully the effect of our twenty-five years'

life and property within our border. During the nine years I knew the frontier, up to 1859–60, the Bolan Pass and other trade routes were open and secure for travellers; there was greater general security within the Khan's territory than had been known for ages. The Khan and all his people were obedient to every demand of the British Government. British officers used to go habitually to the Khan's upper districts, Quetta, &c., and stay there for weeks together during the hot weather, hunting or shooting in the hills, and everywhere received as welcome guests, and they traversed all parts of the Khelat territory up to the Persian frontier with merely honorary escorts of British sowars. The Murrees were the only exception to this description. They were partially supported in an independent position by being partly within the Punjab frontier jurisdiction and by the refusal of the Government of India to allow them to be brought to order by an expedition to put down their marauding.

Even this, however, had been effected by the Khan, acting under the advice of Colonels Merewether and Henry and Malcolm Green, and shortly before I left Sind in 1859, he had occupied the Murree capital and there received the submission of the Murree chiefs. I append a copy of their report, as it throws very important light on the general question of frontier defence and management.

trial of the Punjab system. The border is at this moment probably as quiet as it ever was before, but it is still in the state described by Sir Hugh Rose when Commander-in-Chief in India as "neither peace nor war," and no English traveller has for 25 years been allowed to pass the border unless protected by an armed force.

The two principal passes (Kohat and Kyber) leading to Peshawur are at this moment, I believe, closed, against our will and contrary to our interests, and I do not know that on any part of our frontier our position can be described as better than during an armed truce.

General remarks.—I have heard it objected to the Sind system, that the union of so many duties—military and civil, political, revenue, judicial, &c.—in the hands of one military commandant, requires a combination of talent not often found in any single officer.

There is, of course, some truth in this. It is contrary to our policy in old settled provinces in the interior. The several duties would, separately considered, be each better performed by separate officials; but the combination of authority in one military officer's hands has advantages which seem to me to outweigh all objections. The Frontier Commandant had expert assistants under him, who devoted special attention to their special branches, and however imperfectly any separate department might be conducted, there could be no doubt it was always better administered than under any Native Government, sometimes better than in our oldest provinces. In general efficiency, simplicity, and economy, there can be do doubt of the excellence of the old Sind system.

"Why then," it may be asked, "has the Sind border latterly returned to a state of "disorder little better than it was in before 1847, when General Jacob took it in "hand?" Simply, it seems to me, because we have forsaken the old system.

Colonel Phayre began by quarrelling with the Khan and supporting his chiefs against him. This was a departure from a cardinal principle of the Sind system, and was the primary element of confusion.

Since the Mittunkote conference, between the Punjab and Sind officials, in March 1870, there has been a more or less divided system of management in all that effects the Murrees and Boogtees, two important frontier tribes.

Since 1875 this dual system of management has been extended to Khelat itself and to all the border tribes. This seems to me quite sufficient to account for the present confusion and dead lock.

As I read the correspondence, I cannot imagine how any Belooch Chief can make out who he is to obey,—the Khan, Sir Wm. Merewether, Captain Sandeman, or Major

Monro. He will probably avoid, if he can, obeying any one, and will naturally go back to his old habits of plundering on his own account. I cannot imagine how anything but confusion and disorder can result from such a state of things.

At the best the result could only be to extend to the sea the Punjab frontier system This, perhaps, may be regarded as a good result. I may be excused if I cannot view it in any such light. To my judgment it is deliberately to give up a system which, whilst it was in force, gave us peace and good order on both sides the frontier, and the fullest military command of all Beloochistan, and to accept in exchange a system which confines us strictly to our own frontier line, and forbids any British Officer to move beyond it.

I have always been in favour of uniting Sind to the Punjab, so as to have one government from Cashmere to the sea, but I should regard any abandonment of the distinctive features of the Sind frontier system as too high a price to pay for any such advantage of unity of administration along the whole line of the Indus.

Nor does it seem to me to be the least necessary. The distinctive features in the Sind system to which I attach most importance are,—

1. It was a *military* system. Military defence and security were the first objects.
2. It was a *neighbourly* system, and made the Khan and his tribes not only glad to have us as neighbours, but anxious to be submissive and obedient neighbours to us.
3. *Authority was undivided* on both sides the border.
4. *It was in accordance with civilized usages* in war as well as in peace.

That it was also simpler, and perfectly intelligible and defensible according to European ideas, that it was economical as well as efficacious were additional advantages.

But there is nothing whatever to prevent its being worked as well from Lahore as it ever was from Bombay; and if the Punjab frontier officers would candidly examine it, I am not without hope that they would find much to improve, and something, perhaps, to adopt.

For instance, would our position at Peshawur, or anywhere else on the Punjab frontier, be less strong, if, instead of the present multitude of independent departments and commands, there were only one chief, as military commandant and Viceroy's Agent?

Or if he had authority to deal with the Amir and the frontier tribes, so as to establish the best possible neighbourly relations with them, helping them if they wanted help, punishing them severely if they insulted, annoyed, or thwarted us, and using, for the purpose of such punishment, whatever force might be necessary to convince rude and arrogant men that we were far stronger than they were, and were not to be insulted, annoyed, or thwarted with impunity, but that, if our neighbours behaved well to us, we behaved well to our neighbours.

I cannot but think that any of our great frontier commanders would feel his hands much strengthened if he were told that he had the confidence of Government, and that his instructions were to act on the above principles; that between the Indus and the mountains he was supreme, and that he was to deal with his neighbours over the border as England deals with Greece, not as France deals with Algerian Arabs.

H. B. E. Frere.

Her Majesty's Ship "Serapis,"
22nd March 1876.

No. 7.

Minute by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab on—I. Frontier Relations on Sind Border. II. Subordination of the Adminstration of Sind to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

Under the orders of the Government of India, the political functions of the Commissioner in Sind have already been transferred from that officer to the Commissioner of the Derajat.

2. Colonel Munro from the beginning recommended that the Political Superintendent should control the border relations from Vihowa to the sea, so as to secure the direction of our dealings with the Belooch tribes by a single officer. In his letter No. 60, dated 3rd instant (herewith annexed), he expresses his conviction that it is essential to the successful management of those relations that the district of the Upper Sind Frontier should be under the jurisdiction of the Political Superintendent.

3. This district is small in area and revenue, and has hitherto been managed by the officer commanding the Jacobabad Brigade, aided by an assistant and a deputy collector.

Relieved of military duties and of civil details, the extension of the frontier charge to Vihowa, or, as now proposed by Colonel Munro, to Harand, would not render it too onerous.

4. The Superintendent, it is understood, would, as heretofore, be the direct medium of communication with the Khelat Government. In my opinion this arrangment is preferable to placing a resident at Khelat, as it will, in all probability, restrict the necessity for interference and the chances of friction.

5. The Political Superintendent would be bound, like the Commissioner of Peshawur, to keep the Government of India fully and promptly informed, but would be subject to the control of the Commissoner of the Derajat and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. The whole North-western Frontier would then be under one authority, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, with whom would rest the responsibility of seeing that the policy of the Government of India is fully carried out by all subordinate agents.

6. Although the initiation and direction of that policy must remain with the Governor General in Council, who must therefore be directly furnished with minute information, I think it would be a mistake to do away with the intervention either of the Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor; for although this might be done, perhaps not disadvantageously, if the States of Afghanistan and Khelat were made up of compact and isolated nationalities, still, seeing that the contrary is the case, that cognate tribes sometimes independent, sometimes our own subjects, dwell on the boundaries, that our relations with these are too petty and multifarious to be managed otherwise than on the spot, and that if not well managed, they may seriously complicate our understanding with the larger States, I cannot think that it would be expedient to dispense with the local knowledge inherent in the position of those experienced officers.

7. I consider that the devolution on a single officer of the management of our relations with the Khelat Government, and the Belooch tribes generally, and of the civil administration of the Upper Frontier District—that officer being placed in subordination to the Commissioner of the Derajat and of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab—would meet the pressing and essential issue at stake. The Government of India might then renew negotiations with the Khan without risk of their being traversed by the cross purposes of a divided executive.

8. Colonel Munro has, however, at my request, also examined the existing system of frontier defence. His conclusion is that the military force is amply sufficient, and might possibly be reduced. He also strongly recommends that the numerous Belooch levies (400) he separated from the force, and subordinated to the Political Superintendent (as newly constituted). I am of opinion that this recommendation should be sanctioned at once. The question of the strength of the military force to be maintained at Jacobabad has many ramifications; all that I would propose now is that it be carefully investigated. If the circumstances admit of the arrangement, unity of military command along the frontier is in itself to be desired.

9. The special frontier police would, as a matter of course, be under the Political Superintendent, and, as our relations with Khelat are improved, might be reduced.

10. There remains the question of subordinating the Commissioner in Sind to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, instead of to the Bombay Government. There would, in my opinion, be no difficulty about this if the Punjab Secretariat were strengthened as proposed by Mr. Thornton. At the same time I cannot say that I think it essential to the main object that I understand the Government of India to have in view, the concentration of political affairs on the frontier: that would be accomplished by the annexation of the Upper Frontier District to the Punjab. There would then be no pressing necessity to change the position of the Commissioner in Sind until the railway is completed. Still, if deemed advisable, it could be done. During Sir William Merewether's incumbency, it would not, I presume, be desired to introduce much alteration in the administrative machinery, and time would thus be gained for the decision of the question whether the territory should be formed into one or two Punjab Divisions.

11. In the present circumstances, the smallness of the Upper Frontier District is no disadvantage. The real matter in hand is to renew the attempt, free of former hindrances, to give peace to Khelat, and safe passage to the Candahar trade. The attempt may yet fail, but delay is in no case advisable. The first duty of the Political Superintendent is, in my opinion, to press upon the Khan, under the guidance of the Government of India, the imperial necessity that exists for the composition of the local feuds of Khelat; and as he professes himself willing and anxious to act in accordance with the wishes of the Government of India, I cannot, making allowances for the tergiversation of his character,

perceive any good reason for withholding energetic support to the exertions of Captain Sandeman: that officer believes the Khan to be under the fixed impression that his coercion of his Sirdars was in accordance with the policy of the British Government. The Khan declares that his main aim is to shape his course in accordance with that policy. His Highness is no doubt of unstable temper, and swayed to and fro by fitful passions, but it still remains to be seen if he cannot be made amenable to counsels of the paramount power, which he can no longer pretend to misunderstand. But time presses and action is demanded.

12. Until the Khan is brought to his bearings, I would spare the Political Superintendent as far possible from civil details. Afterwards it might be a good arrangement to add the Rajanpoor Subdivision to the Upper Frontier District. And considering the additional work thrown on the Commissioner of the Derajat, it is, I think, advisable as sugggested in Mr. Griffin's note,* to transfer at once from that to the Peshawur Division, the district of Bunnu, in the population of which the Pathans largely predominate.

* See note on para. 19 of Colonel Munro's letter, p. 21.

13. The question of giving up districts to the south of the Sutlej in exchange for the districts annexed from Sind has been discussed in Mr. Aitchison's note, but I do not think any decision now necessary or desirable. The question, which is purely one of administrative covenience, is quite distinct from the question of a uniform frontier policy. The Delhi districts give no trouble whatever, and I have no reason to believe that their remaining in the Punjab, with which they have been long and in various ways connected, will occasion any inconvenient increase of administrative work.

Camp Sirhind, the 11th March 1876. (Signed.) R. H. Davies.

Enclosure in No. 7.

No. 60, dated Jacobabad, 3rd March 1876.

From Lieut.-Col. A. A. Munro, Offg. Commr. and Supdt., Derajat (on special duty). To Lepel H. Griffin, Esq., Offg. Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

Replies to telegraphic messages.

In telegraphic messages of the 25th ultimo and 2nd instant, respectively from his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, my opinion has been asked on the following points :—

1st. How Sind may be placed under the Punjab Government effectually without disturbance of existing administrative arrangements ; and

2ndly.—Whether any, and what changes appear to be called for in the system of frontier defence, with the financial result, either way.

2. I shall now endeavour, as briefly as possible, to comply with the above instructions in so far as a short acquaintance and study of the subject enable me to do so, craving indulgence for any deficiencies under present circumstances, and giving a preliminary sketch of the existing state of things.

Area of Sind.

3. The total area of Sind—Cis and Trans-Indus—may be estimated at not more than 60,000 square miles. Of that area large portions in the Cis-Indus tracts of Thur and Parkur, Hydrabad, Khyrpoor, and Rohri, and also on the Upper Sind Frontier, Trans-Indus, consists of Thul, or desert, very sparsely populated, much of it being unculturable. The population of the whole province is believed not to exceed two millions, or to be about one-tenth that of the Punjab and its dependencies.

Extensive wastes.

Population.

Present civil administration of Sind vested in Commissioner under Bombay Government.

4. The control of the Sind administration, as at present constituted, rests with the Commissioner in Sind, who, except in so far as he may, from time to time, be specially invested with the powers of a local Government by legislative enactments, is subordinate to the Government of Bombay. The Commissioner in Sind immediately controls all departments of Government in the province. Until recently he was Governor General's Agent for the Beloochistan Frontier, retaining the direction, and supervising the conduct, of British relations with his Highness the Khan of Khelat. The Commissioner in Sind discharges no judicial functions, but he is asisted by two Assistant Commissioners on his personal staff.

His personal staff.

Division of Sind into three Collecterates.

Collector and Magistrate, his powers and duties.

5. For purposes of revenue administration Sind is divided into three extensive Collectorates viz., of Kurrachee, Hydrabad, and Shikarpoor ; each presided over by a Collector and Magistrate, who exercises extensive powers of revenue and magisterial executive superintendence, and who, in his varied sphere of duty, may not inaptly be compared to a 1st Class Deputy Commissioner in the Punjab. He is charged with the chief executive administration of his Collectorate (or Zillah, as it might be called in Bombay), in the Revenue and Judicial Departments—in the latter hearing, I believe, all appeals from the orders of subordinate magistrates, as he does in the revenue department from the orders of his deputy collectors, as they do from those of Mukhtiarkars (or Tehsildars).

6. Each Collectorate is divided into several districts, presided over by Deputy Collectors, having also magisterial powers, with Assistants (European and Native) subordinate to them. Under these come the native Mukhtiarkars, whose office corresponds with that of Tehsildar in the Punjab, The Tuppahdar is an exclusively revenue official, whose position more resembles that of Canoongo than Naib Tehsildar with us, and whose duties are confined to revenue collection within tuppah circles under control of the Mukhtiarkar.

Deputy Collectorates.

Subordinate officials.

7. It will be observed that the Collectorates proper, of which the areas may thus be approximately given,—

Approximate areas of Collectorates.

Kurrachee	16,600	square miles,
Hydrabad	9,200	„
Shikarpoor	10,200	„

are much more extensive than an ordinary sized Punjab District. The sub-division of each into deputy collectorates, or districts, will, on the other hand, be generally found to be much smaller than a Punjab district. Of these, there are five in Kurrachee, five in Hydrabad, and six in Shikarpoor, each under charge of its Deputy Collector, Assistant Collectors, and Mukhtiarkars, whose circles of supervision are termed "Talookas" instead of Pergunnahs as with us.

Larger than ordinary district of Punjab.

Deputy Collectorships smaller than Punjab Deputy Commissionerships.

Talookas.

8. Distinguished from other districts, though included like them, I believe, as regards revenue matters only, in the Collectorates of Shikarpoor and Hydrabad, respectively, are the districts of the Upper Sind Frontier, Trans-Indus, and Thur and Parkur, Cis-Indus.

Districts under Political Superintendents.

9. These districts are immediately controlled by a Political Superintendent. The area of the Frontier District of Upper Sind Frontier is little more than 2,000 square miles, and the head-quarters are at Jacobabad, where the Political Superintendent has hitherto necessarily resided; his civil and political charges being combined, with or added to, the command of the Sind Frontier Brigade. Under him are an Assistant Political Superintendent and Deputy Collector, who are also invested with magisterial powers.

District of Upper Sind Frontier.

Civil, Political, Revenue, and Military control all combined.

10. The Thur and Parkur District, Cis-Indus, is a tract of extensive area said to exceed 12,000 square miles, with a population of only 18 to the square mile, and this charge is also held by a Political Superintendent, who has under him a European Deputy Collector and several Mukhtiarkars. This district did not originally form part of Sind; but it was taken from the Political Agency of Kutch, about 20 years ago, and incorporated. The territory of Khyrpoor, between the last-named district and that of Rohri, Cis-Indus, is held in jaghire by Mir Ali Murad of the Talpur family.

Thur and Parkur District. Political Superintendent. Subordinates.

11. The entire revenues of Sind, of which two-thirds may be estimated roughly as land revenue, are stated to aggregate from 60 to 65 lakhs of rupees. Extensive systems of canal irrigation exist throughout the province, supervised and conducted by a special department.

12. The judicial administration of Sind is controlled and supervised by a Sudder Court at Kurrachee, presided over by a Judicial Commissioner. The Criminal and Civil Procedure Codes are in force. In each Collectorate (or Zillah) there is a District Civil and Sessions Judge (with Subordinate Civil Judges, formerly styled Munsiffs), who conducts the judicial work, and exercises appellate jurisdiction over Magistrates and Civil Judges generally.

Judicial administration of Sind.

13. The police force numbers nearly 4,000 men, including a small body of frontier police, specially entertained on the lower, or Kurrachee frontier, last year, in connexion with Khelat border disturbances. The Commissioner in Sind is *ex-officio* Inspector-General of Police, and the force is more immediately controlled by three District European Superintendents (with one European Assistant Superintendent for Kurrachee) and 14 Inspectors, chiefly, if not wholly, natives, with the usual proportion of subordinate officers spread over the province. In the Upper Sind frontier district the police are controlled by the Political Superintendent. Sir Bartle Frere, who held the Commissionership in Sind for several years, has left his opinion on record that the Sind police are excellent.

Number of police in Sind.

Control.

Upper Sind Frontier Police.
Sir B. Frere's opinion of Police.

14. Kurrachee and Hydrabad are held by a regiment of European infantry, some artillery, and two regiments of Belooch infantry. The Upper Sind Frontier station of Jacobabad is the permanent cantonment of three regiments of Sind Horse (numbering about 1,500 cavalry), of a regiment of Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles), and a light field battery of artillery. Besides these, a body of irregular cavalry, designated "Belooch Guides," and numbering from 300 to 400, is maintained exclusively in the military department, though under orders of the Political Superintendent.

Military force.

15. I consider that much difficulty would not be experienced in placing Sind effectually under the Government of the Punjab, without any material disturbance of the existing administrative system.

Commissioner's opinion on annexing Sind to Punjab.

16. Were the present *quasi* Chief Commissionership to be replaced by an assimilation to the apportionment into divisions and districts of the Punjab province, Sind might not inappropriately be formed into two divisions, each under a Commissioner, as in the Punjab.

Might form two divisions.

17. Bearing in mind what has been already advanced in my letter No. 20, of the 12th ultimo, to your address, and not having as yet so intimate a knowledge of Sind in all its requirements as would justify the expression of a too confident opinion, I shall merely note what appears to me, on a general survey, and a necessarily superficial view, to be both feasible and practicable.

General suggestions.

18. Instead of one Chief Commissionership and three Collectorates as now, we might have two Commissionerships in Sind; a territorial redistribution of the present revenue circles and subordinate Deputy Collectorship being so made as to cause the least possible change of existing administrative arrangements.

As to territorial re-distribution.

19. Of two proposals which suggest themselves, the first is that which commends itself most to my mind, and it is this: to make the divisional boundary throughout Sind, as it now is, between Rawul Pindi and two districts of the Peshawur division, and to some extent between the Mooltan and Derajat divisions. Sind might very advantageously be thus divided into "Eastern" and "Western" divisions; or they might be designated the "Hydrabad" or Cis-Indus" and the "Frontier" or "Trans-Indus" divisions; the head-quarters of the former to be Hydrabad, and of the latter Shikarpoor in the winter, and Kurrachee in the summer months.

Indus an appropriate dividing line.

Note.—I do not think this a good division, as the Frontier Commissioner would have an onerous charge, including Kurrachee, that would have no connexion with his special work. The frontier must be treated as a whole, and if the road through the Kohat Pass be made and held, the Commissioner of Peshawur could take Bannu, and the Southern Frontier Commissioner from the Peyzu Pass to Larkhana or Shikarpoor, and leave all the country below to the Commissioner of Kurrachee.—(Sd.) L. H. G.

Designation of divisions.

20. Presupposing such an arrangement to be approved, there is nothing peculiarly noticeable regarding the Cis-Indus or Hydrabad division, which would very much resemble some of our divisions in the Punjab.

Cis-Indus division.

21. The frontier division would necessarily present some unusual features; but I am convinced that if a Trans-Indus Sind Frontier division were properly administered from the vantage points of Shikarpoor and Kurrachee alternately, our border arrangements, our relations with the Khelat, our influence in maintaining the traffic routes to and from Khorassan and Central Asia, whether through the Bolan and Mulla Passes, or those from Kurrachee through Lus Beyla and Khelat, and our power of controlling the Murree and Boogtee tribes, might be established on a far firmer footing than they have ever been.

Trans-Indus or Frontier division.

22. The alternative proposal is that of attaching such parts of the present Kurrachee Collectorate as do not trench upon the frontier to the Hydrabad Commissionership, from considerations rather of the large amount of internal administrative work to be expected in and near Kurrachee (a rising seaport, the importance of which must steadily increase) than any other. A closer scrutiny or a more intimate knowledge of the actual state of affairs might demonstrate the non-existence of this supposed difficulty.

Alternative proposal.

Reasons.

23. I apprehend that the Commissioner of Hydrabad would exercise the powers of a Civil and Sessions Judge throughout his division as is done in the Punjab; the necessity for an additional Commissioner or for Sessions Judges to be determined by the amount of work to be done.

Commissioner to discharge judicial functions.

24. The Frontier Commissioner, too, might fairly be expected to discharge judicial functions to a more limited extent, although much of his time would necessarily be devoted to controlling border arrangements and conducting our political relations with the Khelat State through the Political Superintendent in Upper Sind, who would be stationed at Jacobabad. In the event of the annexation of Sind to the Punjab, some modification of the proposals made in my report of the 12th ultimo might be desirable. The limit of direct interference by the Commissioner of the Sind Frontier division with the Derajat border might be fixed at Harrand, or the Sakhi Sarwar Pass, instead of Vehoa. The authority of the Commissioner in Sind *qua* the Murree and Boogtee tribes has extended to the former place for several years, ever since the Mittunkote Conference of 1871, and it would be disadvantageous in the highest degree to relax the hold which the Political Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier has obtained upon the Murrees and Boogtees, through their intermarriages with the Mazaris, Drishaks, and Shagharis of the Derajat border, and otherwise, or to risk failure of our proposed measures by resigning the exercise of that great moral force into the hands of any less experienced officers, until our influence over the Murrees especially becomes more firmly established. The Assistant Commissioner in charge of the Rajanpoor sub-division should remain, as before, subordinate to the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, and to the Frontier Sind Commissioner, in regard to all his dealings with the border tribes of that sub-division.

Slight modification of former proposals.

Reasons.

Part subordination of Assistant Commissioner, Rajanpoor.

25. Each Commissioner would exercise the powers of an Inspector-General of Police over the police force of his division as is now done by the Commissioners of the Peshawur and Derajat divisions.

Each Commissioner to exercise the powers of an Inspector-General of Police.

26. The division of Sind into two Commissionerships, as above, would add nothing, in so far as I can judge, to the cost of administration; a redistribution of the allowances now granted to the highest officials in Sind, with special reference to the arrangements here proposed, would probably meet all our requirements. I state this broadly, however, having no reliable data before me on which to found a more exact opinion.

No increased cost contemplated.

27. Although it would doubtless be practicable to reduce the number of Civil and Sessions Judges now employed in Sind (the Kurrachee Judgeship excepted), if two Commissioners with judicial powers were appointed, I presume that the present arrangements in regard to the highest judicial court in the province, viz., the Sudder Court of the Judicial Commissioner in Sind, must stand. Until the completion of the Indus Valley Railway, Lahore would be too distant a point of resort to parties from Sind having occasion to refer to the highest Appellate Court in matters of law and justice.

Retention of Sudder Court.

28. On the second point referred to at the commencement of this letter, I would now offer a few remarks in conclusion, annexing also copy of a letter on the subject written at my request by Major Sandeman.

Point of frontier miltiary defence.

29. From the sea near Kurrachee, upwards to Khyra Gurhi, the most south-westerly point of the frontier district of Upper Sind, the boundary line between Sind and Khelat is well defined by the Hubb river and the hill ranges of Pabb and Kirthar, the last rising in some places to heights of 6,000 to 7,000 feet. In the Kurrachee

Lower frontier of Sind described.

and Sehwan districts of the Kurrachee Collectorate several low spurs of hills abut upon the plain of Sind from the Pabb ranges, but higher up the Kirthar continuation retires, forming an admirable western boundary to the districts of Mehar, Larkana and Shikarpoor, which districts all lie between the Kirthar range and the Indus.

Character of people unwarlike.

30. Along the whole extent of this line the tribes, whether of the hills or plains to the westward, have never proved formidable in any sense, nor was it until the disorganised state of affairs in Khelat generally, and the banishment to and imprisonment of the Jam or Chief of Lus Beyla in British territory led to some disturbances on the lower Kurrachee border, that the precaution of establishing a special frontier police even was found necessary to keep those tribes of *Chôotas*, *Jamotes*, and others, chiefly Jats, in check.

31. With an improvement in our relations with the Khelat State, and a restoration of settled rule in his Highness the Khan's outlying dependency of Lus Beyla, it will probably be found possible to withdraw the special police. The general character of that part of the border may be judged from the fact that for many years past it has not been found necessary, I believe, to station any troops along it for protection.

Northern Sind Frontier.

32. From the northern part of the Larkhana district the boundary line leaves the mountain ranges and takes a curve by Khyra Gurhi, Jacobabad, and the desert towards Kusmore, where it touches the Indus.

Kutchi.

33. Westward of this line lies *Kutchi Gundava* (commonly known as *Kutchi*), a level and fertile tract, stretching 100 miles backwards to the towns of Bagh and Dadar on the one hand, and up to the foot of the Murree and Bagh hill ranges on the other. This plain originally formed part of Sind, of which it is simply a continuation.

Formerly part of Sind.

It is said to have been wrested from the Kulharas of Sind, and annexed to Khelat by Nadir Shah, in compensation for the death of a former Khan of Khelat who was killed fighting with the Kulharas.

34. This boundary line so entirely different from any other on the north-western frontier of India, is that of which we have heard so much in the Punjab from the side of Sind since annexation, and I may confidently say that it appears to me to be the least formidable in my experience of all parts of the frontier. Had the Khans of Khelat been able properly to administer their territories, or even to maintain any respectable authority in this tract of Kutchi since the British annexation of Sind, we might have been saved from much trouble and administrative anxiety. Unfortunately the case was otherwise. The Jakranis, Dhoombkees, Kahiris, and other tribes of Kutchi itself, were our first concern, and, after them, the Murrees and Boogtees, occupying the hill ranges behind them. The former were trained and brought under British subjection by translation to British territory, where hundreds of their horsemen are now in British pay, possessing also extensive grants of land along the Shahiwah, or desert canal. Their withdrawal from their hereditary haunts tended to expose the plains of Kutchi to depredations by Murrees and Boogtees alike, and it is unnecessary here to chronicle the various raids and contests of which those plains have from time to time been the scene.

Reformed Belooch tribes of Kutchi.

Results as regards Kutchi.

Defence of this frontier.

35. From Khyra Gurhi to Kusmore the frontier line has been defended by detachments from the large force stationed at Jacobabad, consisting still of three regiments of Native Cavalry (the Sind Horse), one regiment of infantry (Jacob's Rifles), and a light field battery of artillery besides an irregular force of tribal levies, numbering from 300 to 400 horsemen. The Sind Frontier Force originally consisted, I believe, of four cavalry regiments and two of infantry; but it was found practicable some years ago to reduce it by one regiment of each arm.

Force at Jacobabad.

Outpost stations.

36. At present detachments of the Sind Horse are stationed at the outposts, of which the two first-named in the neighbourhood of Jacobabad are not considered permanent, having been established last year in consequence of the conflicts in Kutchi between the Khan's troops and his rebellious Brahooee Sirdars. The present outposts are Khyra Gurhi, Rojan (near Jacobabad), Guranari, Sunri, Toj, and Sooi. All these, with the sole exception of Toj, are beyond the boundary line, and that of Sooi is well within the Boogtee hills, the original occupants of Kusmore outpost having been advanced to this post. There is another outpost at Gundoi, also in the Boogtee hills, held, however, by an irregular body of Boogtee guides or militia under military orders.

Names of outposts.

Outposts within Boogtee hills.

37. The peculiarity of the defence, as compared with that on the Punjab Frontier, is that the outposts on the Sind border have been advanced to particular points in independent territory, whereas those in the Punjab are all without exception in British territory. Of late years it has been found practicable considerably to reduce the strength of men at the outposts, as the Boogtees and Murrees, especially the former, became more and more tractable. The only danger from without, to which any importance seems now to be attached, is that from the Murrees, and their depredations on this side have of late years been almost entirely confined to the Khelat territory of Kutchi.

Great comparative strength of Jacobabad garrison.

38. The existing system of frontier military defence appears to me, comparing it with that of the Punjab, and also with reference to calibre of the tribes beyond the border, in both provinces to be more than ample for every requirement, and it might prove a question for serious consideration whether, with every allowance made for Murrees, Boogtees, Bolan, and Khelat tribes, and the maintenance of a strong outpost commanding one of the principal highways to Afghanistan, the strength of the cavalry force now occupying Jacobabad might not be considerably reduced without detriment to imperial interests. Moreover, it is probable that the continued location in one place, so exposed to inundations of such a large body of troops, acts prejudicially upon the health of the force, in addition to the drain which it causes upon the financial resources of Sind.

Possible reasons for a moderate reduction.

39. Referring to paragraph 52 of my No. 20, of 12th ultimo, to your address, I may remark that increasing local experience and inquiry only tend to confirm me in the belief that, with the exception of a few, say five guides to each outpost, the whole of the irregular body of "Belooch Guides" maintained here, at such cost to the State, as also the Boogtee detachment at Gundoi, should be placed unreservedly at the disposal and under the orders of the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, if the new proposals are sanctioned; their services in warding off Murree inroads into Kutchi, and in carrring out arrangements to keep open the passes for traffic, in communication with the Khan of Khelat, would be invaluable.

Further reference to irregular Belooch levies.

Why they should be under Political Superintendent.

40. Continued observation and a growing conviction that the views antagonistic to our policy, hitherto entertained and even cherished in Sind, especially in this Upper Frontier District, if not firmly counteracted, may continue less or more to impede the action of the officers appointed by Government to deal with this frontier and Khelat henceforward, induce me here to record an opinion that, whether the larger projects herein discussed be carried out or not, the retention of the Upper Sind Frontier District (which is after all but half the size of an ordinary Punjab district) in all matters of administration, political and civil, under the Political Superintendent, who will henceforth perform no military duty, is imperative.

Reasons why the Upper Sind Frontier District should also be placed under Political Department in all departments of administration.

No. 8.

Minute by his Excellency the Viceroy (Lord Northbrook).

I AGREE with the opinion, which I gather from the despatch of the 3rd February last, is entertained by the Secretary of State, that the province of Scinde should be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Government of Bombay and attached to the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Punjab.

2. This proposal was brought to my notice shortly after my arrival in India, and when I visited the Punjab and Scinde in the autumn of 1872 I had the advantage of discussing it with Sir Henry Davies and Sir William Merewether. Their opinion then was that the measure was premature; I found that no practical inconvenience existed at the time, and I thought that it was desirable to postpone further consideration of the change until the Indus Valley Railway was completed, which would connect Lahore with Kurrachee.

3. Recent events in Khelat, however, have shown that some change is required at once. We had hoped that the transfer of the political business in Scinde from the Government of Bombay to the Government of India, which was arranged at the suggestion of Sir Philip Wodehouse in 1872, would have enabled the Government of India to rely on the cordial co-operation of the Scinde and Punjab officers upon any question that might arise with regard to Khelat or Beloochistan. Our expectations have been disappointed. Although every endeavour has been made to bring the Scinde authorities to act cordially with the Punjab officers, they have not done so The removal of the Scinde officers from any concern with our political relations with Khelat was consequently forced upon the Government of India. When we expressed an opinion that this arrangement would produce "satisfactory results," an opinion which has been quoted in the fourth paragraph of the despatch under reply—I by no means looked upon it to be "satisfactory" as a final settlement, but only as the best means within the powers of the Government of India of dealing with the immediate difficulty.

4. We have since recommended the Secretary of State to place the Upper Scinde Frontier District under the direct administration of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. If, as I hope, authority is given to us to issue the necessary proclamation, a further advance will be made towards unity of administration; but I believe that nothing less than the entire transfer of Scinde to the Punjab will secure that complete identity of action regarding frontier affairs which is necessary, and which is rightly insisted upon in the Secretary of State's despatch of the 3rd of February.

5. Frontier affairs over the long line from the Persian Gulf to the northern boundary of Scinde must be intimately connected with the internal administration of the province, and it would be hopeless to expect that officers serving different Governments—the one entrusted with the political relations, and the other charged with the internal administration—would act intelligently or cordially together. This is still more impossible in consequence of the strong differences of opinion which have existed, and which still exist, between the Punjab and the Scinde officers with regard to the manner in which the frontier tribes are to be dealt with.

6. I therefore recommend that measures be taken to transfer the province of Scinde to the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Punjab. There is no reason that I know of against

this change to counterbalance the obvious advantage of securing unity of policy in frontier affairs; on the contrary, Kurrachee will probably become the principal port for the export of the produce of the Punjab, and the land revenue system of Scinde has much more similarity to the Punjab than to Bombay. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab is prepared to take charge of Scinde with a slight increase to his Secretariat, and the transfer will probably in the end prove to be economical. There do not appear to me to be any serious difficulties in carrying out the change, and the details might, I should say, be safely left to be arranged by the Government of India in communication with the Government of Bombay and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. The troops at Kurrachee and Hyderabad would remain part of the Bombay army. The Scinde Frontier force would probably require to be reorganized and joined to the Punjab Frontier force.

7. In the seventh paragraph of his despatch the Secretary of State suggests that it might be desirable to transfer a portion of the Central Provinces to the Government of Bombay. A proposal to break up the Central Provinces, allotting a part to Bombay and dividing the remainder between Madras and the North-western Provinces, was also brought under my notice in the year 1872, and I consulted Mr. Morris, the Chief Commissioner, and several other officers of the Central Provinces upon it in the winter of 1872–73. I annex extracts from their opinions, which were adverse to the change.

8. Mr. Morris thought that the dismemberment would be followed by a greatly decreased rate of progression, that it would be unpopular, that it would revive old disputes and questions that had been settled, and that it would disturb the popular mind. He represented that the Central Provinces comprise a compact area, almost entirely surrounded by independent Native and feudatory States. Out of a total boundary of some 2,700 miles, only about 160 miles march with British territory. Of the five territories which form the Central Provinces, the Nagpore province and the Nerbudda territories were fused, because it was found they could not be separately administered efficiently from any other British province; Sambalpore was transferred because the Bengal Government could not exercise supervision over it; the Upper Godaveri district is the most distant part in the Central Provinces, but it would be equally distant from Madras, and Mr. Morris thought the non-regulation system more fitted to it than the regulation system of Madras would be; Nimar was added later to the Central Provinces; the people are Hindoo, and have no affinity to the people of the districts of Bombay.

9. Mr. Morris gave his opinion that the immediate consequence of the proposed change would be an increase of expenditure. The Public Works and Financial Departments would have to be kept up on the same footing. Instead of the Judicial Commissioner there would be another judge of the High Court, if not two; the Chief Commissioner and his secretaries would revive in the shape of a member of the Board of Revenue, a revenue commissioner, and under-secretary. From an economical point of view, Mr. Morris was convinced the dissolution of the Central Provinces would be a mistake.

10. Mr. Morris sent me papers written by Mr. Charles Grant, the Commissioner of the Jubbulpore division, by Mr. W. B. Jones, the Officiating Commissioner of the Nerbudda division, and by Mr. W. G. Pedder, Bombay Civil Service, who had been in charge of the Nagpore division. These gentlemen concurred in the opinions expressed in the Chief Commissioner's note.

11. Mr. E. C. Bayley informed me that he thought that the arguments of Mr. Morris and his officers were sufficient to show that it was not desirable to break up the Central Provinces for the present. Lord Mayo, Mr. Bayley said, who had once favoured the proposal for dismemberment, came to the conclusion that it was wholly premature. Sir William Muir, then Lieutenant-Governor of the North-western Provinces, was decidedly against the proposal.

12. I should much regret that an alteration should be made at present in the constitution of the Central Provinces. In my opinion changes in the distribution of territory in India, unless absolutely required for public reasons of importance, are objectionable. They disturb the minds of the people and give rise to considerable administrative difficulties. The government of the Central Provinces has been carefully conducted, and the provinces are prosperous and contented. I see no advantage from an alteration in their present government.

13. Even if some administrative advantages might be obtained from a change, I should not be disposed to increase the size of the Presidency of Bombay. I am sorry to say that there is more discontent expressed in the native press of Bombay than in any other part of India, and the language of some of the native newspapers has been disloyal to the British Government. How far these feelings may extend it is not very easy to say. I

believe, for my own part, that they are principally confined to the young and imperfectly educated Mahratta Brahmins. But in India feelings of this kind have a tendency to pervade the particular area of administration in which they arise, and I consider that it would be a political disadvantage, and that it might become a political danger, to increase the area of the Presidency of Bombay.

14. As this will be the last occasion on which I shall be called upon to give my opinion upon the territorial arrangements of this part of India, I wish to express my decided conviction that it will not be desirable to replace the superintendence of the Baroda state in the hands of the Bombay Government. I shall not be personally concerned in the matter, and therefore I may, without any hesitation, say that I believe it would be for the great advantage of the public service that the political relations of all the principal Native States should be under the direct management of the Government of India. I have seen in the last four years the disadvantage which has followed from placing such matters in the hands of a local government. The troubles that took place at Baroda afford a striking instance. They were very much aggravated from the fact that the Government of Bombay had not that choice of officers which would have enabled them to place men of sufficient experience to be Residents at Baroda. The officers appointed doubtless did their best, but they had a limited acquaintance with political affairs, they were put in very difficult circumstances, and they failed; while the Bombay secretariat could not support them by that varied experience which is possessed in the Foreign Department of the Government of India. Moreover, the advice which the Viceroy can command from the Members of his Council must always be of greater weight than can be at the disposal of a local governor.

15. I believe it would be an advantageous change to extend the functions of the agent to the Governor General at Baroda so as to embrace the political relations of some of the neighbouring States. I know that this is the opinion of Sir Richard Meade and of Sir Lewis Pelly, and I will request them to place their views in writing, so that they may be forwarded to Her Majesty's Government.

16. After these alterations have been made, the Presidency of Bombay will still be as extensive as it was before the conquest of Scinde. The lapse of time has greatly increased its commercial importance. There are many social and financial questions of great consequence under consideration, which together with the ordinary work of administration will, in my opinion, afford ample occupation for the Government of Bombay.

NORTHBROOK.

March 30th, 1876.

Enclosure 1 in No. 8.

OPINIONS of MR. J. H. MORRIS, Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces, upon the Proposed Abolition of the Chief Commissionership of the Central Provinces.

It is only 11 years since the Central Provinces were formed and placed under the administration of a chief commissioner, and yet it is already proposed to parcel them out afresh, and throw, of the *disjecta membra*, some to Bombay, some to the North-western Provinces, some apparently to Bengal, and some to Madras. It is not that the administration of the Central Provinces has not been successful. Testimony to the good that has been effected by the administration from Nagpur as a centre, is borne by the strongest advocates of the disruption of the provinces. Why then is it desirable to undo what was done only a few years ago? As I am firmly convinced that dismemberment would be immediately followed by, if not absolute retrogression, still a greatly decreased rate of progress; that the measure would be eminently unpopular, not because it would wound a fanciful feeling, but because it deprives the people of advantages and privileges they have now for some years enjoyed; and that it would tend to revive disputes and questions that have been settled, and would thereby disturb the popular mind and induce a belief in the instability of all things Governmental,—I consider it a duty to place on record my own opinions. I have also thought it well to ascertain the way in which some of the best officers serving in the Central Provinces would view their dismemberment, and the appended papers from Mr. Charles Grant, Mr. W. B. Jones, and Mr. W. G. Pedder of the Bombay Civil Service give forth no uncertain sound. A very remarkable concurrence of opinion will be found in them, though one dwells more particularly on one point, and another on a different one.

I will now show how the matter strikes me. The Central Provinces as they are now constituted embrace 112,600 square miles of territory. Their extreme length from north to south is 500 miles, their extreme breadth from east to west 600 miles. They were accurately described by Sir Richard Temple in his first administration report as "dissociated geographically and politically from other British Provinces, and though occasionally touching upon neighbouring British districts, yet for the most part surrounded on all sides by foreign territory. The Sagar district on the north touches the British district of Lullutpore under the Government of the North-western Provinces, but otherwise the whole Northern Frontier marches with Native States. The extremity of the Nimar district reaches

to Khandesh in the Bombay Presidency, but the line of contact is not a long one, and with this trifling exception, foreign States, counting the Hyderabad Assigned Districts as such, hem in the Central Provinces on the north-west, and west, and south. At a point in the south-east the Upper Godavari district manages to touch the district of Rajamandri in the Madras Presidency, and on the east the Jeypore State under Madras jurisdiction, the Cuttack Tributary Mehals and Chota Nagpur form the boundary. From this it will be seen that extensive as the provinces are, and different as may be the component parts in physical features and in ethnical character, they comprise a compact area that is almost completely surrounded by Independent Native or Feudatory States, the contact with Native States being absolutely complete in the north, north-west, and west, except at two points, one in the Sagar district in the north, the other in the Nimar district in the west. Altogether, of a total boundary of some 2,700 miles, only about 160 march with British territory.

The position, then, of the Central Provinces would seem to mark them out for a government or administration apart, seeing that they are isolated from all other British provinces. The territories that went to form the province were—1st, the Nagpur province, which, besides the Nagpur province proper, included Chhattisgarh. The Nagpur country proper, comprising the districts of Nagpur, Wardha, Bhandara, and Chanda, extends over 19,735 square miles, and has a population, according to the census of 1872, of 2,075,874 souls. Chhattisgarh, which consists of the districts of Raipur and Bilaspur, lying to the east of Nagpur proper, has an area of 23,338 square miles, and a population of 2,224,869. Chhattisgarh thus exceeds the Nagpur province in area and population.

2ndly. The Sagar and Narbada territories, with an area of 35,764 square miles and a population of 3,540,572.

3rdly. The Sambalpur district, which, with the Feudatory States attached to it, extends over 15,000 square miles, and has a population of 1,052,534 souls.

4thly. The Upper Godavari district, which has an area of only 1,926 square miles, but has attached to it the Feudatory State of Bastar, extending over 13,000 square miles of the wildest jungle. Together they have a population of about 200,000.

5thly. The district of Nimar, 3,340 square miles, with 211,264 inhabitants.

First of all, the Nagpur province and the Sagar and Nerbada territories only were fused into one administration, because it had been found that separately they could not be efficiently administered from any other British province. The Sagar and Narbada territories had been for some years under the Government of the North-western Provinces, but the attention which that Government was able to bestow on so distant a frontier district was insufficient to develop its resources, to improve the machinery of administration, and to infuse into it that spirit of life and progress that had roused the districts more favoured by their position.

Sambalpur was transferred because the Bengal Government could not even exercise as much supervision over it as the North-western Provinces' Government had exercised over the Sagar and Narbada territories.

The Upper Godavari district was formed out of certain taluks on the banks of the Godavari ceded by his Highness the Nizam. It is the most distant part of the Central Provinces, and is difficult of access, but it would be equally distant from Madras, and its administration from Madras would be not less difficult than it is now, while the system of administration of a non-regulation province is more suited to a backward district that the regulation system of Madras would be.

Nimar was added after the Central Provinces had been in existence for some years, and Nimar is a border land that might have been added to any British province it might adjoin. The choice lay between the Central Provinces and Bombay, and many reasons preponderated why it should rather go to the Central Provinces. It had been formerly under the Government of the North-western Provinces, and instructions had been issued from there for its settlement. The population, too, is thoroughly Hindi, and such ancient customs as it has have descended from the time of the great Mohammadan Emperors. It had no particular affinity to the districts of Bombay.

If it be admitted that the formation of the Central Provinces in 1861 was an excellent and indeed an absolutely necessary measure, circumstances must have very greatly changed, if what was not only expedient but necessary then is now no longer even expedient. The heterogeneous parts of the present Central Provinces were moulded into one whole because it was much easier to administer the whole from Nagpur than to administer them in any other manner. Is it now easier to administer them in any other manner? It can, I think, scarcely be said that it will be *easier* to do so. It is true that Bombay is now in railway communication with Nagpur, and that Allahabad is similarly connected with Jabalpur, but the railway journey from Bombay to Nagpur takes 26 hours, and I have only recently learnt that so little traffic exists between Nagpur and Bhosawal that the railway company are actually thinking of running only a single train between the two places to carry the mails, passengers, and goods. If this were done, at least four more hours would be occupied by the journey, and Bombay would be 30 hours distant from Nagpur. Could the old Nagpur province be efficiently administered from Bombay? It is proposed that the greater part of the Nagpur and Chhattisgarh Division should be ceded to Bombay. It would scarcely do to split up Chhattisgarh proper (the Raipur and Bilaspur districts), which forms one homogeneous whole, so what would go to Bombay would be the districts of the Nagpur Division and Raipur and Bilaspur. Nagpur is, to take the present minimum, distant from Bombay 26 hours (520 miles), but Raipur is 180 miles distant from Nagpur, and Bilaspur is 250 miles off. Here there is no railway as yet, and even if a railway were constructed to Dongargarh, and as yet we have not got beyond the surveys, the Raipur and Bilaspur districts would still lie at a long distance from the terminus, unconnected even by any line of road. Chhattisgarh could be less efficiently administered from Bombay now (looking only to position and distance) than the Sagar and Narbada territories could have been from the North-western Provinces in 1861. I am unable to see any difference in the circumstances that would invalidate this conclusion. As regards the Nagpur Division, the difficulty is perhaps not so great, and, as an outlying dependency, the Nagpur Division might be administered from Bombay, as Ajmere was for many years from the North-western Provinces; but I do not think it can be pretended that the administration from Bombay could be so vigorous as if the districts were administered from Nagpur; and if Chhattisgarh cannot be managed by Bombay, I think it would be most unwise

to take the Nagpur Division only, and thereby sever a connexion which has existed since the last century, a connexion which, first political only, has now become commercial, and is becoming closer and closer every year. Of course I do not mean to say that if the Nagpur Division were administered from Bombay, and Chhattisgarh from some other point, that the commercial connexion between the two would be broken off, but I feel sure that if Chhattisgarh and the Nagpur Division ceased to be under the same administration, less would be done to open up the important districts of Chhattisgarh and bind them to the west. Of the Nagpur Division itself there are parts which are even now difficult of access from Nagpur, and from their remoteness remain undeveloped and almost unknown. Such is the enormous district of Chanda, which lies in the south of the Nagpur Division. Chanda is distant from Nagpur and from the railway nearly 100 miles, and it has hitherto been difficult to open up communication with it. This will now be more possible, since the coal railway to Warora is about to be constructed, but even then there will lie an enormous tract to the east in which everything as yet remains to be done.

Take next the upper portion of the Central Provinces, comprised in the Narbada and Jabalpur Division. Are these to go entirely to the North-western Provinces? On the supposition that they are, let us see what the facilities are for their administration from the North-western Provinces. The railway joins Allahabad and Jabalpur, and from Jabalpur a line of railway runs down the Narbada valley. These railway districts are in as easy communication with Allahabad as the Nagpur districts are with Bombay; but Sagar, Mandla, Chhindwara, Betul, and Seoni would be the Chhattisgarh of those parts. They are not on the rail; they lie at a great distance from it. Sagar is about 100 miles off, the Mandla district stretches 120 miles beyond Jabalpur, the Satpura districts of Seoni, Chhindwara and Betul are 80 miles south of the line. Would they be as efficiently administered from the North-western Provinces, of which they would form the extreme southern fringe? Would they, an unimportant poor territory tacked on to the most thriving part of India, receive the attention and be subject to the supervision they receive now, when they lie in the very heart of the Central Provinces? If, on the other hand, it were intended to transfer part of the Narbada and Jabalpur Division to Bombay, there would exist objections of another kind which I will refer to in another place. I cannot, then, think that the mere fact of the railway communication having been completed between Allahabad and Jabalpur, Bombay and Nagpur, and Bombay and Jabalpur, renders it perfectly easy to administer one part of the Central Provinces from Allahabad and the other from Bombay.

It must be remembered that the Central Provinces do not consist merely of the Nagpur Division with a Maratha population, and the Jabalpur Division with a Hindustani population. There are the districts along the Narbada with a Hindustani population, the Satpura districts with a mixed population of Hindustanis and aborigines of various kinds, and there is the enormous Chhattisgarh Division with a population in Chattisgarh proper of Hindi speakers, and in Sambalpur of Uriyas. The interests of those districts and of their inhabitants must not be overlooked when the question arises of parcelling out the provinces. It seems to have been thought that because the easiest way to go from Nagpur to Jabalpur is now by railway round by Bhosawul, a journey of about 26 hours, and a distance of 585 miles, that therefore the two principal sections of the provinces, that above and that below the Satpuras, are now more completely separated than they were before, but I cannot see the force of the argument. Formerly one went by mail cart or dak gari from Nagpur to Jabalpur along the northern road, taking from 22 to 25 hours, and although one goes now by a different route, the time taken is very nearly the same. But altogether this test of time and distance is so extremely fallacious that it is scarcely worth while saying more on the subject. I may, however, be permitted to ask why, if it is thought that Nagpur, at a distance of 26 hours from Bombay, can be efficiently administered from there, then Jabalpur, 26 hours from Nagpur, cannot be equally well administered from that place? If it were certain that the Jabalpur Division transferred to the North-western Provinces, and the Nagpur Division transferred to Bombay, would be better or more economically administered than they are at present,—then their severance from the Central Provinces might be desirable, but that is a question on which grave doubt may be entertained. On this point it is urged that the two main divisions of the country, the districts above the Satpura Range and those below it, are quite distinct in language, customs, and landed tenures; that the northern districts resemble the districts of the North-western Provinces, while the southern districts are peopled by a Maratha race having language, manners, and customs, and landed tenures, the same as the people of the Bombay Presidency. The conclusion drawn is that it would be better to join the former people to their congeners of the North-western Provinces, the latter to their congeners of Bombay, instead of placing under one administration two different nationalities. This is quite a distinct argument from that of position or geographical connexion. I do not think I need try to show that it would be quite impossible in India, and in no place more impossible than in Central India, to separate the people over whom we rule according to a philological or ethnological system, and give to each separate nation—if one is pleased to term it so—a separate government. We know that difference of language does not invariably indicate difference of origin; or identity of language imply identity of sentiment or customs. In the Central Provinces we have a substratum of an aboriginal population, which has been overlaid by strata of immigrants from the west, the north-west, and the north-east, and the south. The last conquerors of the country were the Marathas, and they held at one time the whole of the country at present included in the Central Provinces, but it is only between the Wainganga and Wardha rivers that they have imposed their manners and customs and language on the people. Within this area the Maratha element distinctly predominates; elsewhere the Marathas have left their mark but did not settle in sufficient numbers to impress their natural idiosyncrasies on the conquered. If the Nagpur Maratha districts adjoined Khandesh there would be good reason for forming them into a Collectorate of the Bombay Presidency. Separated from Khandesh by the entire breadth of Berar there seems no good reason to do so. The mere fact that the Nagpur Maratha districts have a different language and different customs from the districts north of the Satpuras does not constitute sufficient ground for declaring that they cannot be placed properly or conveniently under the same Government. There is scarcely a province in India which does not contain within it several nationalities speaking different languages and having different customs. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal rules over Behar, Bengal Proper, Assam, and Orissa; in the Punjab there are Pushto and Hindustani

districts; in the Madras Presidency the Tamil speakers and Telingas are under the same Government; and in Bombay the different languages of Canarese, Maratha, and Gujrathi, signifying differences as great as exist between the Maratha speakers of the Nagpur districts, and the Hindi speakers beyond the Satpura range. The exigencies of British Government of India do not permit of a division of territories strictly according to nationalities. But though in itself the fact that the Nagpur Division has a Maratha population, to speak loosely, is not a sufficient ground for severing it from the other divisions of the Central Provinces, there might be a difficulty in administering it properly and a difficulty of this kind is asserted to exist. It is said that an officer who has been serving in a Hindustani district would on being sent to a Maratha district be ignorant of much he should know; his local experience gained in the one district would be of no service in the other, and that he would moreover understand little of the language of the people. These inconveniences are, it is added, aggravated in the Central Provinces by the fact that the number of officers at the Chief Commissioner's disposal is small. I think the difficulty is exaggerated; certainly the language difficulty is. Everywhere throughout the Nagpur Division the Hindustani language is understood by the people, who do not speak a pure Marathi by any means, but a local patois of their own. All officers serving in the Marathi districts are now also required to pass an examination in the Marathi language, and I do not think that any fear need be entertained of the district officers and the people not being able to communicate directly with each other.

The transfer of the Nagpur Division to the Bombay Presidency has been advocated in order that experienced officers of the Bombay school who understand the feelings and old customs and tenures of the people may in a wise, quiet, and gradual way correct the errors that have taken place; in other words, that they may break down the settlement. Much as I should desire to see some things changed, not only in the settlements of the Maratha but of the Hindustani districts, I think it more important that we should remain guiltless of a breach of faith; and I hold that if many strong reasons should exist for transferring the Nagpur Division to Bombay, the mere fact that the Bombay Government and Bombay officers would not be able to withstand the temptation to tamper with the settlement ought to prevent our entertaining the idea of the transfer. I do not think Bombay officers could withstand this temptation, and Mr. Pedder, a Bombay officer, may be trusted for a reliable opinion. He says "all "the Bombay officers who might have anything to do with it (the settlement) would be constantly "calling for fundamental modifications in it." If the chief reason for wishing to transfer the Nagpur Division to Bombay is that the settlements may be fundamentally altered, I think it would be a more dignified course to annul the settlements, boldly and openly, setting forth the reasons which compel Government to take back what it gave. But if this is not done, and in my opinion it cannot be done without a breach of faith, the settlements should be worked loyally, and in the interests of the mass of the agriculturists; and the officers of the commission may be trusted to do this. They are not men brought up in any particular school, the majority have passed the greater part of their service in the Central Provinces, and they may be credited with at least as much knowledge of the people of their districts as imported Bombay officers could possess. *Primâ facie* one would imagine that their "local experience and knowledge" would be superior to that of officers fresh from the Bombay Presidency. And here let me remark that the Maratha character of the Nagpur districts is very much overrated. The people of pure Maratha origin do not reach a million in number, though the Maratha language is generally spoken. Neither are the land tenures absolutely identical with those of the pure Marathas. On their first arrival as immigrants into the country of Gondwana,—the kingdom of Deogarh, the Maratha immigrants had to suit themselves to the people of the country, and the land tenure that prevails is not purely characteristic of the Marathas. Besides, be it remembered, that when subsequently Maratha chiefs brought in their followers, and settled them on the land, it is not likely that the leader of a band of fighting men would introduce the perfect home system. If inquiry be carried sufficiently far, I think that, if the characteristic of Maratha land tenure be considered to be that each ryot was liable to pay his share only of the Government assessment proportioned to the amount of land held by him, this will be found to be no characteristic of Maratha land tenures exclusively.

It would be an error too to imagine that the Marathas of the Nagpur Division acknowledge or feel any race sympathy for the Marathas of the Bombay Presidency. They now certainly look upon themselves as quite a separate people, and a very remarkable instance of this feeling occurred only within the last few months, when a petition was presented to me from the Nagpur Division, complaining of the extent to which foreigners were employed in public offices and places of trust to the exclusion and detriment of the people of the country. The complaint was directed against the Bombay and Poona Marathas, who have of late years obtained employment in the Central Provinces in great numbers, and who are accused of introducing into all offices in which they themselves are employed their own relations or countrymen. There was a very strong feeling in the matter, and I felt obliged to issue instructions to the effect that natives of the Central Provinces, if equally well qualified for any post, should have a preference over all strangers.

But to return: I may say that I look upon the difference of land revenue system as quite the most important argument against the transfer of any part of the Central Provinces to Bombay. There are, however, others; and as I do not know of any other argument for the transfer, except that the dignity and magnitude of the Government of Bombay require that its territory should be larger, I will now more generally note why I think it inexpedient to break up the Chief Commissionership. It may be considered an all-sufficient answer if I say that I do not see any single advantage to be gained thereby. It is true that the old Sagar and Narbada territories, now the Jabalpur and Narbada Divisions, could be more easily administered from the North-western Provinces than formerly when they were under that Government, but they would be an outlying part of the North-western Provinces, altogether cut off from them, forming no integral part of them. Being remote, they would be least cared for, whereas now they are the most valued and favoured part of the Central Provinces. The administration could scarcely fail to be less vigorous from Allahabad than it is now from Nagpur, and to the districts there would be loss, not gain.

The Nagpur Division stands to Bombay now exactly in the same position as the Sagar and Narbada territories did to the North-western Provinces in 1861. Jabalpur could then be reached from Allahabad

in as short a time as Nagpur can be reached now from Bombay, and if it was considered impossible to administer the Sagar and Narbada territories from Allahabad or Agra in 1861, it would follow that it is impossible (or to put it in a milder form, it would be very inconvenient) to administer the Nagpur Division from Bombay now. There is this also to be said, that the laws and regulations in force in the Nagpur Division have all been derived from Bengal, they are the same or nearly the same as those of the North-western Provinces, they are different from those of Bombay. The whole judicial and administrative system is also different. It would be necessary, then, for Bombay either to regulationise the Nagpur Division, that is, to put the administration on the same footing as the regular Bombay collectorates, or else to maintain the existing system and have a small non-regulation province at a considerable distance from the presidency, with a very small staff of officers, which would give little room for the selection of officers, and a small field for a regular service. The regular civilians would scarcely like to take service in an outlying district, of which the climate is dreaded, and the attractions very few, where communications are defective and society reduced to a very small circle, and where the appointments are not so well paid as in the regular districts. Regular civilians would then have to be more highly paid, in which case a constant selection of efficient officers might be secured; or if things remain as they are, the service in the commission will be a very small one, and it will be difficult to keep up the staff of selected officers with great local knowledge. The distant division is almost certain to be neglected, and there will be few at the presidency acquainted with its circumstances and its wants. Supposing, however, the Narbada and Jabalpur Divisions to be transferred to the North-western Provinces, and the Nagpur Division to Bombay, the question is, what is to become of the enormous Chhattisgarh Division? Sambalpur might be restored to Bengal, which has already too much territory, and in 1862 was glad to be relieved of the district; but there remains a vast amount of territory and a large population in Raipur and Bilaspur. I look upon the transfer of Chhattisgarh to Bombay as quite out of the question. I have in an early part of this note referred to its distance from Nagpur and the want of communications; to this should be added the nature of its inhabitants. They have ethnologically no connexion with the Marathas, they speak a different language, a form of Hindi; in manner and customs they are distinct, their land tenures are different. The inhabitants of the Khalauti are a mixture of all sorts from the north and north-west. Among them the custom of periodically distributing the village lands still holds good, their Gaonthiyas or village headmen are not mere patels or mall guzars. They are very superior to the ryot class. The latter are more poor and ignorant than in any other part; they are in every way behind the rest of the province. Their cultivation is inferior, their attachment to the soil is not strong. Though politically joined to the Nagpur province by conquest, Chhattisgarh was always a country apart. I think if it were only on account of the difficulty of administering Chhattisgarh, the Chief Commisionership of the Central Provinces should not be broken up. I cannot see how, in the event of that, the interests of that large tract of country are to be provided for. I consider that the proposal for breaking up the Central Provinces makes no provision for Chhattisgarh, and without such provision being made I do not see how the proposal could be accepted.

The wild tribes and semi-independent chiefs whose territories are to the extreme east and south-east of Chhattisgarh require even more supervision than it is possible now to give them. The outbreak of the Khond population of Patna is of recent date, and though it was fortunately suppressed without difficulty by the action of the Deputy Commissioner of Sambalpur, it would take but little to rouse these rude people, and once thoroughly roused they might give no little trouble. Experience should have taught us this. Far from removing the centre of administration still further from these rude States, anything that would bring it nearer to them would be distinctly advantageous and eminently desirable. What I have endeavoured to show is, that such parts of the present Central Provinces as could possibly be administered from the North-western Provinces and Bombay would be less efficiently administered than now, while a third of the province could not be administered by either of the above Governments. The Government of the country would be less strong. I would add further, that the change would be disliked greatly by the people, and would cause them much serious inconvenience. Nagpur is not so distant from the extremity of Chhattisgarh but that petitioners can reach the head-quarters and prefer their complaints to the Chief Executive or Judicial authorities. Could they proceed as far as Bombay, and is a Governor as easy of access as a Chief Commissioner, and will a rustic not be quite lost in a large Europeanised city like Bombay? Would it be right or expedient, now that we have for so long kept the centre of administration within easy reach, to remove it to to Bombay, and could that be done without causing dissatisfaction? Now the Chief Commissioner visits every district of the Central Provinces within three years at the outside. Would it be possible for the Governor of Bombay or the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-western Provinces to do as much if to their own territories so much were superadded, and can it be doubted that much political advantage and much good to the administration accrues from tours of the Chief Executive authority? Personal acquaintance with all the officers of the administration, the more important landholders, the native gentlemen holding the position of honorary magistrates, the influential zamindars (talukdars they might be called elsewhere), and the feudatory chiefs, and a knowledge of the different parts of the country derived from personal visits are of the greatest possible advantage to an administrator, and I think it will be readily conceded that without the knowledge gained by Sir R. Temple by extensive tours over the whole province it would have been impossible for him to have effected so much during the few years of his administration.

Would there, however, be any compensating advantage for the weaker and less popular administration that would follow on the breaking-up of the Chief Commissionership? Would any economy attend the measure? On the contrary, I believe the immediate consequence would be an increase of expenditure. It is true that to the Central Provinces there is attached a staff of officers similar to what is attached to great local Governments, but be it added the officers of the staff draw proportionately less pay in accordance with the lesser dignity of the administration. The Public Works and Financial departments would be exactly on the same footing whether the Central Provinces remained a separate administration or not; the staff would be divided with the territory. The Judicial Commissioner would certainly become a Judge of the High Court if he did not become two, one at Allahabad, another

at Bombay; and the establishment attached to his office would be proportionately magnified. The Inspector-General of Prisons is an officer who has to visit every year every district of the Central Provinces. His salary is Rs. 1,000, and he has a very small office. Is it likely that the Inspector-Generals of Prisons of the North-western Provinces or Bombay, or whatever officials may correspond to them, would be able to do his work in addition to their own? Similarly, could the Inspector-General of Police and the Directors of Public Instruction in Bombay and the North-western Provinces divide the inspection work of the Central Provinces between them? In these cases, be it remembered, it is distance and area that have to be considered, not the number of police or the number of educational institutions. An indication that the Bombay Educational Department has already as much as it can do may be found in the fact that within the last year the Bombay Government, at the instance of their Director of Public Instruction, asked the Chief Commissioner if the Central Provinces Educational Department could undertake an annual inspection of schools at Mhow and Sehore, as it would be impossible for Bombay officers to do so; and yet for the immense area of the Central Provinces there are only three Educational Inspectors and an Inspector-General. This is of course merely an instance. There is no separate Inspector-General of Vaccination in these provinces, the work is gratuitously performed by the Sanitary Commissioner in addition to his own duties; and if sanitary commissioners are to remain an institution, one for the Central Provinces does not seem excessive. I doubt if one of the supervising officers could be dispensed with if the Central Provinces were divided between the North-western Provinces and Bombay. Each Government might appoint a deputy this or that for the part of the province assigned to it, but the united cost of the two deputies would be certain to exceed that of the single chief. There remains the Chief Commissioner and his secretaries. Their occupation would doubtless be gone, but they would revive in the shape of a member of the Revenue Board and a Revenue Commissioner, and an Under-Secretary to Government, or several such Under-Secretaries, for it is very evident that increase of territory brings increase of work to the Government and to its secretariat, and unless the Bombay and North-western Provinces secretariats are too strong already they would require assistance.

But further, I do not believe that one of the great Governments would carry on the administration of the Central Provinces in the rough way it is at present carried on. There would be at once a cry for increase of establishments, for it is certain that almost all departments are under-officered. If Nagpur become a part of the Bombay Presidency there would almost certainly be an attempt made to change the system of administration. The Judicial and Executive would be separated, and they could not be separated except at great expense. If they were not separated, the Nagpur districts might grumble at not being thought worthy of so good and scientific an administration as Khandesh. I have already referred to the result that would follow on the introduction of regular civilians, and the alternative disadvantage of a small separate body of officers, among whom promotion would stagnate, who would afford a confined field for selection, and would always be grumbling and dissatisfied if outsiders were brought in amongst them.

From the economical, as well as the administrative point of view, I am convinced that the dissolution of the Central Provinces would be a blunder. At a time, too, when we are beginning to ask whether the machinery of Government is not being driven at too fast a pace, whether we have not been too capricious in changing our modes of taxation and the forms of our laws, and whether a period of comparative rest should not be allowed to succeed a period of change, I think it would be impolitic to unsettle the minds of the people of any province by severing ancient connexions, and telling them that they must look for government to a distant quarter, and there seek for what they formerly found near at hand. The administration of the Central Provinces has done good service, and change is not urgently called for, and unless the promise of better administration is very sure, or some political necessity therefor exists, it would be more prudent to be content with the good we have, than to strive for a better that is so far from certain.

J. H. Morris,
Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces.

Camp Jondwani, Balaghat District, 18th January 1873.

Inclosure 2 in No. 8.

Note by Mr. Charles Grant, Commissioner of the Jabalpur Division, on the proposal to break up the Central Provinces, and to transfer Nagpur to Bombay.

The abolition of the separate Central Provinces administration, and the transfer of fragments to other provinces, were much discussed two or three years ago; but the idea was abandoned by the late Viceroy, Lord Mayo, after his visit to the Central Provinces in 1870. It has now been revived, mainly, I understand, in connexion with a general scheme of re-distribution, originating in the proposed transfer of Sindh to the Punjab. It is believed that the loss of so much territory without compensation would reduce the jurisdiction of the Bombay Government in a degree incommensurate with its capacities and importance, and the partition of the Central Provinces is therefore suggested as a means of restoring equilibrium by the transfer of the Maratha districts of Nagpur to Bombay. I may probably take it for granted that little weight will be given to this argument taken *per se*, and independently of other considerations, for it would be a reversal of the natural order of things to adapt the jurisdiction to the Government instead of the Government to the jurisdiction. If the governing body of Bombay should ever become too numerous for its diminished functions, the inference would be that it should be reduced; not that it should absorb new territory simply to give occupation to its staff, or, indeed, on any ground other than the paramount plea of the interests of the governed. Taking this point of view, however, probably no one would seriously plead for administering the country in the interests of its servants, instead of adapting the Government machinery to the work which it has to do. The plea for compensation is in fact supported by the far more important subsidiary arguments that parts at any rate of the Central Provinces are not at present administered on the system best suited to their welfare. It is

urged that the province consists of two distinct portions, with separate interests and characteristics, and that while the Hindi-speaking country has a natural affinity for the North-western Provinces, to which it might be annexed without injury, the Maratha districts would absolutely benefit by being transferred from the guardianship of administrators trained in the Northern Provinces of India to the more congenial Government of Bombay.

Although thus unreservedly stated, the argument will not bear the test of examination under the light of intimate local knowledge; it does really include the essence of by far the most plausible objection to the present constitution of the Central Provinces. I think it would, therefore, be out of place to meet it by what is nevertheless a very natural remark, viz., that many, if not most, of the provinces of India are also dually constituted, including the very presidency to which it is proposed to transfer the Nagpur districts to ensure their more harmonious administration. To unaccustomed eyes, the differences between the Guzerathi and Marathi races might be dwarfed by distance and ignorance; but it is certainly open to question whether the bastard Marathas of the Nagpur country are not more akin to the Central Indian Hindu races, to whom they have been bound for centuries by the relations arising out of a common administration, than to the Guzerathis, who would be their fellow-subjects under the Bombay administration, or indeed, than the Marathas of Bombay are even now to the northern section of the Bombay population. I do not, however, wish to lay any stress on this consideration. There can be no question that want of homogeneousness is a defect, and the existence of a possible source of weakness in other provinces is no plea for its retention, if it can be avoided, in the Central Provinces. The real point at issue is not whether anomalies elsewhere justify their preservation here, but what system of administration, broadly speaking, promises best for the prosperity and well-being of the populations now ruled by the Government of the Central Provinces?

The first point to ascertain in discussing this question is what the Central Provinces really consist of. The popular idea is that they are made up of a Northern Hindi province and a southern Maratha province with some less important outliers. The fact is that the Maratha element is very small, while the Hindi element is very large, the substratum of the population being homogeneous, and formed almost entirely of the non-Aryan races. This fact would probably not have dropped out of sight had the Central Division of India retained its old and true name of Gondwana—the country of the Gonds. The Hindu population, which overlies this subordinate element, in parts crushing it, elsewhere amalgamating with it, but everywhere more or less affected in its beliefs and habits by it, is recruited from the four quarters of the compass; but the stronger northern races have so hemmed back and outnumbered the immigrants from the south and west, that out of a population of some nine* millions, rather more than half a million only, or less than six per cent., are Marathas. In addition to this, about one million of the helot and menial races of the Nagpur country have assimilated themselves to their Maratha conquerors, and may be, roughly speaking, included among the Maratha-speaking population, though they are too low in the scale to aspire to the name of Maratha, or to be affected by any change of administration short of a social revolution. To them one civilized Government must be the same as another; they have neither traditions nor tenures to be brought into harmony with any particular form of administration. Taking, then, what may be called the Bombay point of view (and, so far as I understand, this is the most important aspect of the question, because the weakness of the dual constitution is supposed to have shown itself most in the incongeniality to a Maratha population of an administration conducted on North-western principles), the question resolves itself into this:—Would the benefit of incorporation into the Bombay province, to a population of half a million scattered over four districts†, be sufficient to outweigh the disadvantages of breaking up the connexion between nine millions of population and nineteen districts which have admittedly never been really prosperous or well governed until they obtained a separate government of their own? It is not, I think, contended that the Hindi-speaking population of the Central Provinces would be better off under any government than their own; and, indeed, it almost stands to reason that, if a strong central check is of any use at all, the Sagar and Narbada territories must suffer by changing their present position, as the land of Goshen of a small province, for that of the outlying fragments of a large and distant government, already embarrassed with the weight of a vast territory, and whose natural and immediate interests would always lie in the rich districts and populous cities which have been so long identified with its administration. The only advantage claimed, I believe, for the administration of the old Sagar and Narbada territories from Allahabad, instead of from Nagpur, is that of economy. It is quite possible that some saving might be effected by reduction of supervising officers, if the Central Provinces administration were swept away; but I doubt whether it would be at all considerable without a far more than counterbalancing sacrifice of efficiency. The area of the Central Provinces is so vast that the various heads of departments rarely complete their circuit of the province within a single year. It is to be presumed that the corresponding officials in the North-western Provinces have their hands sufficiently full as it is, or their offices should not have survived the economical crisis of the last few years, so that the addition of some twelve or fifteen districts mostly difficult of access to their charge would simply result in this,—that the districts on the line of the railway, now kept under constant inspection, might hope for a hurried annual visit, while those on and beyond the hill plateaus, which are now visited almost annually, would scarcely ever be inspected at all. In short, the area of the Central Provinces being so large as to be barely manageable by a separate inspecting staff, would be simply unmanageable if thrown in as a makeweight to charges which already absorb almost all the time of the official body set aside for them. Education, sanitation, vaccination, excise, registration, and all the numerous off-shoots of European government which have been introduced and fostered with so much difficulty during the last few years in these backward and remote regions, would languish and fall back without the constant and minute watchfulness which now keep them in life and vigour; and the day-to-day administration of the country would drop more and more into separate local ruts and mazes under an administrative body too small to ensure a healthy circulation among its members, and too little brought into contact with its chiefs to draw a uniform and stimulating inspiration from their counsels. The Chief Commissioner now visits many parts of his charge two or three times in the

* I have not had access to the papers of the last census, so quote from the "Central Provinces Gazetteer."

† Half Chanda is Telugu.
Half Balaghat is Hindi.

year, and all once, at least, in two or three years; he can hardly fail to be personally acquainted with every native of position and note in the province; while the concentration of his energies on the guardianship of a young and rising province must give him a knowledge of its condition and a pride in its progress, as compared with old jurisdictions, which could scarcely be felt by a distant Governor engrossed in other and often weightier cares. A North-western Lieutenant-Governor might make a favoured province of the Sagar and Narbada territories, in which case they would for a time be worked with spasmodic energy under a changed and semi-alien system, only to drop into oblivion when their novelty wore off, and more immediate and pressing interests re-asserted themselves; or he might content himself with at once assigning to them the comparatively low position in his provincial economy, to which they seemed entitled by considerations of wealth and population. If so, they would enter upon a second chapter of the quiet old history which is now becoming more and more a thing of the past in all parts of India. It is true that a railway now connects Allahabad with the stations of Jabalpur, Narsinghpur, and Hoshangabad; but how would an occasional and rare visit from a Lieutenant-Governor, whose six months' residence in the plains is now barely sufficient for the claims of his great province, compensate even those towns for losing the constant supervision and intimate local knowledge of a Chief Commissioner who spends his whole year in or near them, whilst the remaining seven (or including Chhattisgarh, ten) Hindi-speaking districts would be so difficult of access from Allahabad that their people must give up all hope of retaining their present facilities of access to the real representative of the government by which they are taxed and ruled. All native observers tell us, even if our observation could fail to assure us, that personal government is the first essential of successful administration in India, and, if so, any measure which tends to make the ruling power an abstraction to a large and exceptionally simple population must be politically injurious. It might, indeed, be argued that the economical gain would outweigh the political loss, and that a poor country like the Sagar and Narbada territories has no right, in the present financial condition of India, to so expensive a government as it now possesses. This would be a perfectly logical and consistent argument; and if the question of adding the Sagar and Narbada territories to the Allahabad Government were made to turn upon the issue raised by it, a fair field for discussion would no doubt be opened up. The case, too, would then be placed in its true light, and there would be no concealment of the fact that the administration of the transferred districts must, in the nature of things, suffer from the transfer.

This branch of the question need not, however, be pursued further here, because I do not think any statesman in power, or likely to be in power, in India, would justify an admittedly retrograde step in the administration of a whole section of the country simply on the plea of economy. So far, then, it may safely be assumed that the re-transfer of the Sagar and Narbada territories, and perhaps the addition of Chhattisgarh to the North-western Provinces, are advocated mainly, if not entirely, in the interests of the Maratha districts of Nagpur: and this brings back the inquiry to a survey of their real condition and constitution.

It has been seen that the Maratha population, so far from forming an important element in the population of the Central Provinces, as is popularly supposed, is numerically insignificant, and has no claim whatever to the factitious prominence which it has gained from the historical eminence of its founders. The few leading families in whose veins the old turbulent Maratha blood might perhaps have lingered are fast dying out; and the agricultural population, as is known to all who have dealt with questions of administration in these provinces, is eminently pliable, and even submissive, in its character and habits. All administrative measures, whether purely authoritative, such as the levy of taxes, or semi-persuasive, such as the promotion of education, make their way far more readily and completely in the Nagpur districts than among the more stubborn and independent northern races; and it can scarcely be believed that a small outlying body, thus easily influenced, and exposed for at least a century to alien influences, can have preserved their original speech and customs in such integrity as to make life irksome to them except under an administration conducted in accordance with pure Maratha tradition. As a fact, I believe that both the habits and beliefs of the Nagpur Marathas show marked traces of inter-communication as well with the aboriginal as with the Hindi-speaking races, and that the so-called Maratha speech of Nagpur is a mere semi-Hindi *patois*. Indeed, the case could scarcely be otherwise, for when the Hindi-speaking population of the Sagar and Narbada territories has so separated itself from its parent stock as to form almost a distinct nationality, disowned by its so-called caste fellows in the north as worshippers of strange gods and the offspring of unhallowed unions with the daughters of the country, the Marathas—a far smaller and less independent body of men—could hardly have escaped a similar contagion. It must be remembered that the Maratha settlers of Nagpur were not introduced by the Maratha conquests, but date back to the days of the Bakht Buland, the greatest of the Gond rulers. The proximity of the Berars and the subsequent accessions to their body under the Bhonslas led to their out-numbering (in the Nagpur plains) the northern settlers who were drawn down by the Gond kings' connexion with Delhi; but still the fact remains that the first Maratha immigrants had to adapt themselves both to their Gond rulers and to their Hindustani co-settlers, and that in the process they lost much of their individuality. Whether, then, the earlier policy of the administration of the Central Provinces in dealing with the Nagpur land tenures was right or wrong—a question which I have not the special knowledge to discuss satisfactorily—it is clearly a mistake to condemn it on the ground that it does not harmonise with pure Maratha tradition. The aboriginal rulers of the country, too facile to be grasping and too conscious of the superior race organisation of their Aryan subjects to attempt a dead level, or purely monarchical administration, dealt with these settlers, not directly by the agency of *patels* or paid headmen, selected from the rank and file, but by means of the influence of their natural chiefs, who were encouraged to take farms of large tracts of territory, and to make their own arrangements for cultivating them. Hence arose in Nagpur the *malguzari* form of tenure, which, though probably afterwards obscured, and sometimes even superseded, by the stronger and more profitable Maratha plan of dealing direct with the tillers of the soil, retained sufficient vitality to recommend itself to Sir Richard Temple as the natural system of the country. It is not my business to discuss the justice of this conclusion; but even on the supposition that it was affected more or less by the previous official schooling of an administrative body largely recruited from Northern India, and that an unprejudiced study of local

circumstances might have led to a different result—a view which, to say the least of it, has not yet been proved,—it can scarcely be imagined that the evil would be remedied by rushing into the opposite extreme, and attempting to subject to a purely Maratha system of administration a people who were very half-and-half Marathas to begin with, and who have now, whatever may have been their original tendencies, learned by a long and gradual experience to suit themselves to the organisation under which they live. It may be (though this is not my own opinion) that the system of land tenure now prevailing in the Nagpur provinces springs from an extreme theory, based on a foreign experience; but if so, the ryotwari system of Bombay no less represents the opposite extreme; and even admitting that the latter is at present the more in favour of the two, it would be very questionable policy, even if it were legally possible, to attempt the extirpation of a well-established and thoroughly familiarised organisation in favour of a new system, scarcely less alien in its origin, on the ground that the latter was most in accordance with the latest theories of land tenure. The malguzari settlement of the four Nagpur districts, be it bad or good in principle, is an accomplished fact and cannot be honourably undone. The people have habituated themselves to it, and any attempt to force it into a different mould would simply create disorder and disturbance without leading to any useful result. Even if it could be made to give way to the ryotwari system as easily and thoroughly as a dissolving view, it would still remain doubtful whether the latter would be suited to the traditions and habits of the people; while under any ordinary circumstances the attempted change must be attended by a convulsion, which it would be rash to risk for the uncertain advantages of a mere leap in the dark. If, then, a full inquiry should really bring out the fact that Nagpur province has suffered from its subjection to an alien administrative system, the proper remedy, to my mind, would not be to call in from a distance an opposite and no less alien school of administrators, but to let the province educate a service of its own, who would come to their work without preconceived opinions of any kind whatever either to forget or to support; and this is actually the course which has been followed during the last few years. Whatever may have been the ingredient elements of the original commission, the administrative body, as now constituted, consists almost exclusively of men who have either been entirely trained or who have passed the greater part of their service in the Central Provinces. The few among the senior officers who commenced their career in northern India have now had a local apprenticeship of eight or nine years (except in the case of a recent appointment), while the great majority of the Commission have gained their whole civil training in the Central Provinces. The mistakes, if mistakes they were, of the earlier revenue administrations, were made by officials who had only foreign experience to guide them in organising what was then probably the least known and most chaotically-managed province of India. After ten years of change and experiment the Central Provinces have now begun to settle down into an independent career of their own, with distinct traditions and separate local interests. The administration is conducted by a body of officials whose experience in the past and prospects for the future belong almost exclusively to the province with which they have cast in their lot; and who, whatever may be thought of their success, may fairly claim to be animated by the strongest feeling of *esprit de corps* and pride in their special charge. However the interest of the provinces might be affected in other respects by disintegration, it can scarcely be doubted that they would suffer by the disorganisation of this official body. They would no longer be managed by a united and disciplined service, recruited on uniform principles and on a scale sufficiently large to allow of a healthy circulation and a fair field for advancement, but by two or more small irregular contingents, hanging on to the outskirts of large regulation provinces, and only connected with them to an extent sufficient to injure the prospects of all their members except covenanted civilians. For, as a rule, the same or similar services command a higher rate of remuneration in regulation than in non-regulation provinces; so that a small province of the latter class, attached to a large one of the former, might serve as an outlet for favoured young civilians seeking early advancement, but would not be sufficiently attractive to retain them throughout their service. A similar difficulty was actually experienced in the Punjab before the promulgation of the new furlough rules practically cut off its connexion with the North-western Provinces. The size and prestige of the former province mitigated in its case the evils of this tendency to a constant influx of young officers and efflux of experienced ones; but what compensating force is there which could be expected to work like results if (say) the four Nagpur districts were attached to Bombay. The lower scale of pay obtaining in the former would still necessitate the employment of a large proportion of military and covenanted officers in their administration; and these would remain tied to the soil, far from head-quarters and the fountains of favour, while such civilians as elected at all for service in districts so remote, and (considering their climate) probably so unpopular, would be mere birds of passage, tempted perhaps for a time by exceptional terms. No less healthy state of things can be conceived for the welfare of a province than to be worked by a small stagnating local service, officered by chiefs looking to a distant capital alike for principles and prospects. Thus, simply considering the interests of the four Nagpur districts, the gain to them from the dismemberment of the Central Provinces would be the certainty that their administrators knew the Maratha language,—an advantage which, though real, is not so important as it seems, because (1) the speech of the country is not pure Marathi, and the people understand and talk Hindi; (2), because under existing rules, officers serving in Maratha districts are bound in pass in Marathi under severe pecuniary penalties. Still it would no doubt be better that the administrators of the Maratha districts should come to their work already skilled in Marathi, than that they should acquire their knowledge of it *whilst* called upon for active service; and so far the argument of language may fairly be used, provided that undue stress be not laid on it in favour of transfer to Bombay. On the other hand must be taken into account three very serious disadvantages:—

(1.) The substitution of a distant and, from its traditions and interests, a comparatively apathetic Government for an admittedly strong and successful home administration.

(2.) The breaking up of a compact, well-disciplined, and zealous service into two or more fragments too small and disconnected to be really efficient.

(3.) The complete change of policy which would necessarily follow any radical change of the *quarter* of administration; and which, in the present case, would be intensified by the popular idea that a province naturally forming part of Bombay has been mal-administered on so-called "Bengal" principles. This seems to me by far the most serious danger to be guarded against. There can be no

doubt that, partly from the unavoidable necessity of somewhat forcing forward progress in so backward a country, and partly from the want of full information regarding its circumstances, the first few years of the new administration in Nagpur were characterised by constant experiment and almost restless movement. Like other Eastern races, the people have a high appreciation of rest, and rest they are only just beginning to attain, as the administration uses the knowledge painfully gained by its first period of activity to settle down into harmony with local wants and traditions. This prospect would be made more distant than ever by the proposed transfer ; and a change of administration, more especially one avowedly made to redress the errors of a false system, would re-open all the controversies, and renew all the hopes and apprehensions, which are only now beginning to subside after keeping the province in agitation for the better part of 10 years. If wrong has been done by the settlement, worse harm would be done by uprooting it, and the only possible remedy lies in the gradual process of adaptation, which is now being attempted. Probably this might be furthered by enlarging the field from which the Commission is now recruited, and infusing a larger Bombay and Madras element into its composition. This would be a measure of reform perfectly consistent with the cardinal maxim that administration should be conducted not in accordance with the theories of any particular school, but on a careful observance of local circumstances, while the reversal of policy which would follow the transfer of Nagpur to Bombay might be more fully described as akin to revolution.

The balance, then, of advantage seems to me to be against dismemberment, even in the case of the Nagpur province, in whose interests the change is mainly advocated ; while all that is claimed for the scheme as affecting the Sagar and Narbada territories is that they would not absolutely suffer by it. I have given my reasons for thinking otherwise, and it seems to me that the gain to the four Maratha districts and the half million of Marathas should be placed beyond all manner of doubt, before a territory three times as great, and a population outnumbering the Marathas in even a larger proportion, are deprived of all the advantages of a resident Government in their behalf. But, on the view taken above, the position is not only that the gain to Nagpur will not outweigh the loss to the northern and eastern districts, but that Nagpur will suffer by the transfer scarcely less than the rest of the province.

C. GRANT,
Commissioner, Jabalpur Division.

Camp Dongasari, Sagar District,
27th December 1872

Enclosure 3 in No. 8.

Note by MR. W. B. JONES, Officiating Commissioner, Narbada Division, on the proposal to dismember the Central Provinces.

THE first thing that strikes me is, that one would like to know what the *effective* reason for the proposed change is. Two utterly distinct reasons are assigned,—*first*, that on wide administrative and financial grounds it would be convenient to break up the Central Provinces; *second*, that the interests of the people of the south-west portion of the province demand that they should be united to Bombay.

Now, it is important to know which of the two reasons has most weight with the advocates of change. My impression is that the *first* is the substantial reason, and that the second is somewhat of an afterthought. But be this as it may, I would recommend that in any reply which may be prepared by the Administration, the *two* things should be kept *very* distinct. The Government of India may decide to dismember the province *either* for general administrative and financial reasons, *or* for the good of its inhabitants, *or* for both ; but unless we know how much weight each reason has in the ultimate determination of the question, it may easily happen that a change detrimental to the interests of the people of these provinces is carried out ostensibly for their benefit.

In reply to the argument, that the dismemberment of the province would be an administrative convenience, it is difficult to say much. The question is one of which the Government of India is the only judge. At the same time we of this province may perhaps offer an opinion on those points in the scheme which fall within our field of view.

If effect be given to the proposals, the most backward portion of the province—that tract for which most may be hoped if the Central Provinces are maintained—will be cut off from its best prospect of satisfactory administration. It is impossible that Chhattisgarh should go with the Sagar and Narbada territories, and be ruled from Allahabad; it seems to me almost equally impossible that it should be added to Nagpur, and be governed from Bombay. If the western tendencies of the Nagpur province render it undesirable that it should be ruled from Calcutta, it can scarcely be right that Raipur and Bilaspur, with their peculiar institutions, numerous feudatories, and *liability to famine*, should be governed from Bombay. Let but one season fail, and Chhattisgarh in the hands of a distant Government might too probably become another Orissa.

The difficulty about Chhattisgarh I regard as a positive bar to the dismembering scheme. To show that it would be otherwise a measure of questionable expediency many reasons might be advanced. I will mention two which strike me as particularly worthy of attention. The first is the vastness of the areas which it proposed to transfer. It looks a small matter to transfer two-and-threequarter millions of people to the North-western Provinces, the proposal looks much more formidable when attention is turned to the area which will be added to that Government. The case of the Nagpur province is even stronger. I can imagine the Nagpur district being governed from Bombay, but it is difficult to suppose that the south of Chanda could receive much attention from a Government on the Western Coast, or that effective control or supervision could be exercised over Bastar from Bombay. Secondly, I would submit that the homogeneousness of the populations of the North-western Provinces and Sagar and Narbada territories is too unreservedly assumed. To a considerable extent the people of the plains in these parts undoubtedly resemble the inhabitants of the north-east of India, but of the two-and-three-quarter millions whom it is proposed to transfer, a large proportion belong to Gonds and other so-called aboriginal tribes ; and the single fact that we have only 79, while the North-western Provinces have 420 inhabitants per square mile, implies a world of difference in the wants and circumstances of the two populations.

The arguments advanced in the preceding paragraphs have been directed to the question of the expediency of dismemberment as a general administrative measure. I will now express my opinion very briefly on the proposal as it affects the well-being of the people of the Nagpur province and of the Sagar and Narbada territories. I omit Nimar for reasons which will appear further on; and of Chhatisgarh I shall say nothing: being convinced that it is not practicable to add this tract to Bombay, I need not attempt to show that the transfer would be detrimental to the interests of its inhabitants.

Stress is laid on the importance of attaching the Nagpur province to a presidency where a congenial revenue system obtains. This argument for dismembering the Central Provinces would have deserved much more weight 20 years ago than it does now. For good or for evil the Bengal revenue system has been introduced into the Nagpur province, and all rights connected with the land are now based upon it. The question is not what kind of settlement to make, but how to work a settlement already made. In the stage in which the settlement question now is, it seems to me to matter very little to which presidency Nagpur is attached. Bengal officers have introduced and are now working the Bombay system in Berar with marked success. A Bombay officer settled two districts of the western side of the Central Povinces—Chhindwara and Betul—on principles differing in nothing from those of settlement made by Bengal officers in adjoining districts. If Nagpur goes to Bombay there may be some risk of a too violent subversion of existing rights; if it stays in the Central Provinces there may be some timidity in making changes which are desirable, but the end will be much the same. What is needful will be done, and in any case the Government of India may feel confident of this, that error* having been ascertained to exist, no prepossession (should such exist) in favour of the North-western Provinces revenue system will impede the application of the remedy.

But supposing for argument's sake that there would be some advantage from a revenue point of view in attaching Nagpur to Bombay, it has still to be shown that the advantage would be so great as to outweigh the certain disadvantages which would accrue in all other departments, both to the Nagpur province and to the Sagar and Narbada districts, if their centre of government were removed to Bombay and Mahbleshwar on the one hand, and to Allahabad and Nynee Tal on the other. If this change is made, both tracts, the Sagar and Narbada territories especially, will become outlying and comparatively unimportant sub-divisions of great governments; the stream of administrative life will circulate in them more feebly than at present, and for the watchful care of an ever-present local government, they will have nothing but flying visits from members of revenue boards, and on rare occasions from a governor or lieutenant-governor.

The argument that the Nagpur province and the Sagar and Narbada territories are accessible from Bombay and Allahabad has to me very little weight. If there is one thing certain in Indian administration it is this, that good government cannot be secured by flying visits from inspecting officers however highly qualified, and I would remark further that accessibility ought not to be judged of from the point of view of the governors, but from that of the governed; and that to the people of these provinces, Governments at Bombay and Allahabad will appear distant and unapproachable. If we could have a plebiscitum, the stability of the Central Provinces would not be doubtful.

I will conclude this short note by endeavouring to meet the argument that the *raison d'être* of the Central Provinces' administration in great measure disappeared with the completion of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway. Admitting, what it is at first sight somewhat difficult to believe, that our isolation (it must have been quite evident even in 1861 that it would only be *temporary*) was the cause of our existence as a separate administration, I would submit that since the formation of the province another and better *raison d'être* has been discovered. In the continuance of the Central Provinces' administration lies, as I believe, our best hope of being able to carry the benefits of good government to some of the wildest tracts and least civilized races in India. The future of the 1 millions of aborigines, and of as many more persons belonging to the recognised Hindu castes, but resident in the wilder parts of the province, seems to me to be bound up in the maintenance of a watchful and sympathetic local administration. There are many districts in the Central Provinces which are so advanced that it matters comparatively little what government they are under, but one half of the province is as it were emerging out of darkness, and I hold that the true *raison d'être* of the Central Provinces' Government is this, that it has done much, and promises to do much more to develope the material resources of its least advanced tracts and to spread the benefits of civilized government among backward and helpless populations. If I thought that these ends could be as well secured when the various parts of the province become the distant satellites of great Governments, I would not oppose dismemberment; but believing that they cannot, I would earnestly deprecate it. The Central Province tree was planted only 12 years ago, and so far has borne good fruit. Let us not precipitately root it up. Let us at least wait until the railway to Chhattisgarh is completed, or as I would rather say, until the limits of the various governments and administrations in India can be finally mapped out. Some years hence, when the backward portions of the province have advanced, it may be possible to dismember it without injury to the interests of the people. While deprecating *present* dismemberment, I would not refuse to recognise the fact that the proposals will year by year become more feasible and will at some future time be carried into effect.

In what has preceded I have avoided all reference to Nimar, and have confined myself to the question of dismembering the Central Provinces as first constituted. With regard to Nimar I am of opinion that it ought not to have been added to these provinces, and that it might even now be desirable to transfer it to Bombay. Apart from the fact that in its revenue and population Nimar resembles Khandesh much more than it does the adjoining districts of the Central Provinces, it seems to me matter for regret, that by adding this geographical excrescence to the ring fence of the province, we interposed a third jurisdiction on the rail and high road between Bombay and Central India. Should the transfer of Nimar recommend itself to the Chief Commissioner, it would go far to satisfy those who desire the dismemberment of the province.

W. B. JONES,
Offg. Commissioner, Narbada Division.

*I assume this for argument's sake: I have not studied the settlement question at Chanda sufficiently to enable me to offer any opinion as to the *fact* of the existence of error.

Enclosure 4 in No. 8.

NOTE by MR. W. G. PEDDER, Bombay Civil Service.

Bombay, 3rd January 1873.

MR. MORRIS has asked me to give him my opinion on the suggestion to break up the Central Provinces. I have no hesitation in saying that I think such a measure would be a retrograde one, and would certainly keep back the progress of the provinces.

My reasons are briefly as follows :—

1st. If the provinces are broken up, I presume that the greater part of the Nagpur division with Nimar would be transferred to Bombay ; the Jabalpur and the greater part of the Narbada division to the North-west Provinces ; the Chhattisgarh Division to Bengal, and the Upper Godavari district to Madras. Each of the transferred portions would then be the most remote part of the presidency to which it was transferred, and would be in consequence the territory most neglected ; while the whole of the provinces, as at present constituted, would lose the great advantage of the direct rule of a chief Commissioner intimately acquainted with every part of them.

2ndly. The whole system of administration of the Central Provinces, and especially of the revenue and judicial administration, differs materially from the various systems in force in the North-western Provinces, Bombay and Bengal, and consequently if the present system were maintained, it would be worked by governments and supervising officials who would not thoroughly understand it, and probably not have time to learn it. And to attempt to assimilate the present system to that of the territories with which each fragment of the Central Provinces would be incorporated, would, I think, be on the whole undesirable, as unsettling the people, and perhaps shaking confidence in Government. This is especially the case with the settlements and revenue system. Of the principle of the settlements I myself have never professed to approve. But they are in force, and though certain carefully considered modifications in them are I think both practicable and expedient, yet I should strongly deprecate any attempt to over-ride or alter them fundamentally. But I do not think that the present revenue system of the Nagpur Division could be administered from Bombay. All the Bombay revenue officers who might have anything to do with it would be constantly calling for fundamental modifications in it. And the same, though not perhaps to so great a degree, would, I imagine, be the case with North-west Province officers.

3rdly. I am inclined to think that the ultimate cost of the change would soon overtake or exceed any immediate saving which it might effect. In particular executive and judicial functions are now united in the same officers. This system, for reasons stated in a letter which, as Commissioner of the Nagpur Division, I had the honour to address to the Chief Commissioner, I think suited to the present state of that division. But it certainly would not last long after Nagpur were transferred to Bombay, and the change would cause a large increase of expenditure.

I should, however, advocate the transfer of the Upper Godavari district to Madras. It could be supervised from Madras and Coconada, as far as distance alone is concerned, much more easily than from Nagpur,* while the difficulty of language, which hardly any officers or amlah in the Central Provinces understand, is very considerable.

* The Deputy Commissioner was called on duty at Nagpur in the rains of 1871, and was forced to return via Poona, Madras, and Coconada.

W. G. PEDDER,
Bombay Civil Service.

No. 9.

MINUTE by Sir W. MUIR on the proposed transfer of Sind to the Punjab.

CONCURRING entirely in the Viceroy's proposal for the transfer of Sind to the Punjab, and in the political and administrative reasons advanced to justify the transfer, I should simply have concurred in his Excellency's Minute, but for one or two points incidentally connected with the subject.

The first regards the political control of Baroda. This was assumed by the Government of India at the end of 1874 ; and then I doubted the policy of detaching so entirely the political control even temporarily from Bombay. Baroda is so close to Bombay, its territorry is so mixed up with our own, and the interests of its subjects must be connected at so many points with those of the inhabitants of the interlaced and adjoining districts, that I question the wisdom of not leaving the immediate political control under the Government of Bombay. And I should have expected that this course would have been resumed, so soon as the immediate troubles which affected the State had been composed.

(2.) To counterbalance the additional weight thrown upon the Punjab by the addition of Sind, I think that it might be lightened by the transfer of Delhi and some adjoining territory to the North-western Provinces. When Lieutenant-Governor of the latter provinces, I repeatedly advocated this measure. The city of Delhi is virtually in the North-western Provinces, and could be more conveniently, and I believe more effectively and popularly, administered therefrom ; and moreover the Agra canal which traverses part of the tract should be throughout its whole length under one administration.

I continue of the opinion referred to by his Excellency, that the Central Provinces ought not to be dismembered. They form a compact whole, the administration of which should rest in one hand. And in their present backward condition, these districts seem to be specially of the description which requires the local attention and fostering care of a Chief Commissioner. For the present, therefore, at least, I would not disturb the existing mode of administration or its direct dependence on the Government of India.

1–4–76. (Signed) W. M.

No. 10.

No. 20 of 1876.

Political Department.

To Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for India in Council, London.

My Lord Marquis, Bombay Castle, 3rd April 1876.

We beg to request your Lordship's early attention to the following observations on the present state of affairs in Sind :—

2. Since the close of the year 1872, the local management of the relations between the British Government and his Highness the Khan of Khelat, and certain tribes on the West and Northern borders of Sind, has been entrusted to Sir W. Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, an officer of this Government, but who received his instructions on these matters directly from the Government of India without any intervention on our part; while to the northward of Sind and along the border of the Punjab similar duties have been performed by Major Sandeman, an officer of the Punjab Government, who was to a certain extent made subordinate to Sir W. Merewether. Such being the position of these officers, Sir W. Merewether, on the 13th December last, telegraphed to the Government of India that a revolution in Khelat was clearly imminent, that he was himself proceeding to the frontier to watch events, avoiding all interference, and that he had made Major Sandeman aware of the state of things, and ordered him to avoid any communication with the Brahooe Sirdars, and on no account to go beyond the Murree Hills, towards Bolan, Seebee, or Kutchee. On the 16th December the Government of India simply replied "Policy of non-interference approved." Not a word was said in disapproval of the orders sent to Major Sandeman. On the 17th December Sir W. Merewether telegraphed that he had heard that Major Sandeman had acted in direct opposition to his orders. The Government of India on the 20th December replied, "While directing Sandeman not to interfere in the troubles apparently impending "between the Khan and his subjects, you should take care not to interfere with "Sandeman's execution of orders he has received from Government of India, and "particularly not to be hasty in condemning his conduct before he has explained it. "Sandeman's movements among Murrees should not be interfered with."

3. It was thus rendered clear that Major Sandeman had received instructions which were not known to Sir W. Merewether, whose orders, as the former telegraphed to the Government of India on the 23rd December, clashed with those he had received from the Punjab Government. On the 7th January 1876, the Government of India informed Sir W. Merewether that Major Sandeman would be no longer subject to his authority. On the 9th the Commissioner in Sind remonstrated, and on the 10th he was relieved of all responsibility for Khelat affairs, which were entirely transferred to Colonel Munro, an officer serving on the border of the Punjab under that Government. It was ordered that all requisitions for military and police he might make on Sind should be promptly complied with.

4. If the directions of the Government of India had stopped here, it would have been our duty only to point out to your Lordship how improbable, or almost impossible it was that such an arrangement could work satisfactorily. All the means in the shape of military police, etcetera, were left in the hands of the officers of Sind, whose services had been summarily dispensed with from want of confidence in them. All the authority was transferred to an officer belonging to another government, who had no means at his own disposal.

5. This objection, however, appears to have soon presented itself to the Government of India; for, in a letter dated the 20th March, they observe that "experience has

" shown that the officers conducting our political relations with Khelat and the Frontier " Tribes should have full administrative control over the tract in question (the Frontier " District), and if the officer discharging these double functions, that is, of political " officer and administrator, is an officer of the Punjab administration, it is desirable that " he should be subordinate to his own government, and not to that of Sind."

6. The Government of India have therefore applied for your Lordship's sanction to the transfer of the Frontier District to the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Punjab. Even so, the objection will remain in full force. They have declared the authority of the Punjab officer to extend along the whole western border of Sind down to the sea; and thus the conflict of authority and division of means will in the lower districts be fully preserved. Colonel Munro has already demanded of Sir W. Merewether the delivery of his records respecting those districts, in terms of which the Government of India has been obliged, at our suggestion, to point out the impropriety.

7. It appears therefore to be the duty of this Government to submit to your Lordship, that these changes have been ordered hastily and without due regard to considerations extending beyond the disputes of the Border tribes. The scheme has been devised, it would appear, to meet what the Government of India regard as an emergency; and it is necessary to examine what is the apparent character of the emergency. During the last few years every effort has been made by persuasion, threats, and gifts, to induce the Khan of Khelat to govern properly and maintain peace between the tribes. All the attempts have totally failed. The last, with a view to mediation, was that made by Major Sandeman in opposition to the orders of Sir W. Merewether. And, to quote the words of the Government of India, "unfortunately during the stay of the mission two " events occurred which seemed likely to place difficulty in the way of effective media- " tion," and " made it necessary for the Government of India to pause for a time and watch the progress of events." But it is the opinion of the Government of India that "it is clear that he (Major Sandeman) has not as yet had a fair chance of achieving success; present circumstances are not such as to render success hopeless." He is to make another attempt. And because after three or four years of abortive efforts, this is not to be considered " hopeless," the whole administration of Sind is to be thrown into confusion, a very important district is to be severed from it, and divided and conflicting authority is to be established from end to end of its border. We have already received orders by telegraph to suspend immediately from the exercise of his functions, Colonel Loch, an officer of high rank in the Bombay army, commanding in Upper Sind and in civil charge of the Frontier District, and to replace him by an officer of good judgment with positive instructions to co-operate heartily with Colonel Munro. The Government of India have not stated for what offence Colonel Loch is to be dismissed.

8. It is in the opinion of this Government essentially necessary for the proper administration of the country, and for the security of the officers employed, that the local management of Border affairs should be entrusted to those administering Sind itself,—they being, as has for the last three years been the case, directly subordinate, in respect of Border affairs to the Government of India. If that government are not prepared to accept the officers of this government as their agents for this purpose, it will, we think, be right for them to transfer either to themselves or to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, the entire administration of Sind; and your Lordship will find on inquiry that towards the close of Lord Mayo's government, a proposal was under consideration for annexing Sind to the Punjab, and at the same time attaching to this Presidency the Central Provinces and other Mahratta-speaking districts in the direction of Jubbulpur, to which there is easy access from Bombay by the G. I. P. Railway.

9. We may therefore express a hope that if, for reasons of which we are at present very imperfectly informed, Sind cannot remain in the position it has for several years occupied, the alternative suggested above may receive careful consideration at the hands of your Lordship.

10. We have not forwarded copies of the telegrams to which reference has been made in this despatch, as we feel certain they must have been transmitted to your Lordship by the Government of India. We have received scarcely any information as to the views on which the Government of India are acting; and shall no doubt feel it necessary to address your Lordship at greater length by a subsequent mail.

We have, &c.,

(Signed) P. E. WODEHOUSE.
W. STAVELEY.
A. ROGERS.
J. GIBBS.

No. 11.

No. 85 of 1876.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.—Political.

To the Most Honourable the Marquis of Salisbury, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Marquis, Fort William, the 7th April 1876.

In your Lordship's despatch No. 15, dated 3rd February, our attention was directed to the changes which, under existing circumstances, seem necessary for the purpose of ensuring unity of action in the government of the Western and North-western Frontiers of India, and in particular to the advisability of making new arrangements with respect to the administration of the Province of Sind.

2. Previously to the receipt of that despatch, the subject was under our consideration, recent events having demonstrated the necessity for administrative changes on the Khelat border more radical than those effected in January 1875. By the telegram of his Excellency the Viceroy, of the 14th March, your Lordship was informed that the expediency of effecting a union, more or less complete, of the administration of Sind and the Punjab was generally admitted, and by the same telegram, and another of the 27th March, that the transfer to the Punjab of the portion of Sind known as the Sind Frontier District was deemed a matter of immediate necessity.

3. We have now the honour to transmit, for your Lordship's consideration, copies of the undermentioned papers *:—

Note by C. U. Aitchison, C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Minute by the Honourable Sir H. Davies, K.C.S.I., Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and annexure.

Minute by his Excellency the Viceroy, and annexure.

Minute by the Honourable Sir William Muir, K.C.S.I.

4. From these papers it will be perceived that it is the opinion of the Governor General that nothing less than the entire transfer of the province of Sind from the Presidency of Bombay to the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Punjab will secure that complete identity of action regarding frontier affairs which is necessary; that such transfer is desirable not only on political but on other grounds of administrative expediency; that it can be effected without serious difficulty and should be carried out without delay, the details being left to be arranged by the Government of India in communication with the Government of Bombay and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

5. In these views we unanimously concur. We would add, with reference to the alternative arrangements suggested in your Lordship's despatch, that there are no districts on the Western Frontier requiring, in our opinion, a separate military administration, and that any arrangement involving a severance of the frontier districts of the Punjab from the government of that province is to be deprecated. Such severance would be detrimental to the internal administration of those districts, on the efficiency of which the political arrangements of the frontier in great measure depend for their success, and would deprive the Government of India, *quoad* its administration of the western border, of the assistance of a government which has cordially carried out our policy and is best fitted by position and experience to conduct, under our orders, the relations of the British Government with its Beluch and Afghan neighbours.

6. With regard to paragraph 7 of your Lordship's despatch we concur with his Excellency in the opinion that no change in the existing administrative arrangements of the Central Provinces is at present desirable or called for, and that after the transfer of the Sind to the Punjab there will remain ample occupation for the Government of Bombay.

7. It is further the conviction of his Excellency that it will not be desirable to replace the superintendence of the Baroda State in the hands of the Bombay Government, and that it will be an advantageous course to extend the functions of the Agent of the Governor General at Baroda so as to embrace the political relations of some of the neighbouring States. These views have the concurrence of the Council, with the exception of the Honourable Sir William Muir, who, for reasons recorded in his separate minute, questions the propriety of depriving the Bombay Government of the immediate political control of Baroda affairs.

* Nos. 5, 7, 8, and 9.

8. The suggestion of Sir William Muir, that to counterbalance the additional weight thrown upon the Punjab Government by the addition of Sind, a transfer should be made of Delhi and some adjoining territory to the North-western Provinces, has not been considered by us on the present occasion, but the subject has been twice considered previously, and no change was considered necessary. The proposal will be again considered, if deemed desirable, in the event of our recommendation for the union of Sind with the Punjab receiving the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

We have, &c.,

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
W. MUIR.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.

No. 12.

Political, No. 72.

To his Excellency the Right Hon. the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord, India Office, London, 13th July 1876.

Para. 1. I have received and considered in Council the political letter from the Government of your Excellency's predecessor, No. 85,* dated the 7th April last, expressing the unanimous opinion of that Government that the transfer of the province of Sind from the Presidency of Bombay to the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Punjab is desirable, not only on political, but on other grounds of administrative expediency; that it can be effected without serious difficulty; and that it should be carried out without delay, the details being left to be arranged by the Government of India, in communication with the Government of Bombay and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

2. These views are, I am glad to find, in full accordance with those expressed by me in my Despatch, No. 15,† of the 3rd February last, and the requisite steps to give effect to them may be taken at as early a date as your Excellency's Government may deem advisable. Under these circumstances, and on the assumption that the transfer of the whole province will now be effected, it is needless for me to notice further the earlier proposal of the Government of India, contained in their letter, No. 65,‡ dated the 17th March last, in regard to the Upper Sind Frontier District. The peculiar condition of affairs which was thought to render the transfer of that district to the Punjab urgently necessary, without reference to the larger measure, has, it may be hoped, passed away.

3. Although the principle of the transfer of Sind from the charge of the Government of Bombay may thus be considered as decided, I am fully sensible that many difficult questions of detail in regard to the future management of the two provinces of Sind and the Punjab remain to be settled. It will, no doubt, require careful consideration whether the Trans-Indus territories shall be governed as a single district, or shall be divided; whether, for administrative purposes, they shall be entirely disconnected from districts on this side the Indus; and whether the system of administration shall be civil or military. The late Government of India was opposed to a separate military administration of any portion of the Western Frontier, and to any arrangement involving a severance from the Government of the Punjab of the frontier districts which are now under its control. Nor does it appear to have been disposed to dissent from the view recorded by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab adverse to any change in the position with reference to that Government of the territories south of the Sutlej at present administered by it. These are points on which I do not desire at present to express any opinion. They will be decided with less difficulty should your Excellency be in a position to personally visit the localities, and consult with the officers by whom the arrangements which may be ultimately thought best will have to be carried out.

4. The Government of your Excellency's predecessor considered that the exclusion of Sind from the Bombay Presidency would not require to be followed by any addition, in other quarters, to the territories administered by the Government of Bombay. I

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* No. 11. † No. 1. ‡ No. 4.

cannot agree in this view. A measure so considerably reducing the extent of the presidency, and necessarily affecting so seriously the prospects of the services employed in it, must, in my opinion, be supplemented by provisions for utilizing elsewhere under the orders of the Government of Bombay the official strength which will be placed at its disposal. The transfer would, otherwise, be open to serious objection, as involving great waste of force, tendency to undue centralization, throwing a heavy additional burden on the Viceroy, and degrading the position of the Bombay Government in a manner which could not fail to greatly impair the administration of the territories left under its control. I cannot consider that the seditious tone of a certain portion of the Native press of Bombay furnishes a valid argument against an increase to the area of that Presidency, still less against a proposal to prevent that area from being seriously reduced. The influence exercised by the Native press, whatever may be its extent, is the result mainly of propinquity, sympathy of feeling, or similarity of race on the part of its readers, and is not likely to be affected, save in a very small degree, by administrative arrangements.

5. In my Despatch of the 15th February last, I suggested various reasons which seemed to me to recommend the transfer to Bombay of at least a portion of the Central Provinces. There is, unquestionably, force in the arguments urged in 1873 by Mr. Morris against the dismemberment of those provinces which was proposed at that time. But it was then contemplated to apportion the fragments into which the territories under the charge of the Chief Commissioner would have been resolved between the several local governments, one district being annexed to Bengal, another to the North-western Provinces, a third to Madras, and the remainder to Bombay. The objections to such an assignment to widely separated authorities of districts heretofore administered as a homogeneous charge may well have been held to outweigh the arguments in its favour. But the same objections would not apply to a transfer of the provinces as a whole from the controlling authority of the Government of India to that of the Government of Bombay. Their unity would thus be preserved. Chattisgurh, the extreme eastern district of the Central Provinces, is not more distant from Bombay than is Nimar, the district in the extreme west from Calcutta; Nagpore would probably remain, as at present, the centre of government, and I see no reason to suppose that the general administration would be less efficient if conducted by officers appointed by, and under the orders of, the Government of Bombay, than it is under the existing system.

6. This arrangement, if carried out, would largely increase the extent of British territory administered by the Government of Bombay, and give sufficient scope for the employment of the officers whose services will be set at liberty on the transfer of Sind.

7. There is, no doubt, much to be said in favour of the view held by the late Viceroy, that the conduct of the foreign affairs of India, internal as well as external, should rest with the supreme Government, and that, to this end, the management of relations with all the principal Native States should be directly in their hands. On the other hand, it is very desirable to maintain, under the minor governments, an efficient service ready to occupy the highest posts in the State, and, from this point of view, the removal from them of all prizes in the political department may be open to objection. I entirely agree in the propriety of maintaining, for the present, the connexion of Baroda with the Government of India, but, before it is decided that this arrangement shall be permanent, I should desire that the subject be considered in all its aspects, and that I should have the benefit of your Excellency's views in regard to it.

I have, &c.
SALISBURY.

No. 13.

REPORT by Sir W. Merewether, Commissioner of Sind, on the Administration of the Frontier Districts of Sind, dated 30th September 1876.

THE Northern and Western Frontier of Sind, with which this report will only deal, commences near Tega in the Sooee Pass, a mountain torrent having its source in the Boogtee hills. The waters of this torrent are usually lost in the plain soon after they leave those hills about 24 miles north of Kusmore, but in high flood they find their way to the Indus. At the point above mentioned near Tega, the Khelat, Punjab, and Sind boundaries meet. The division between the two last provinces is about 29 miles in length, and runs down to the Indus at Mittree, 11 miles eastward of Kusmore. From

Tega the boundary line is solely between Beloochistan, or Khelat territory, and Sind, and passes along the Northern and Western Frontier of the latter to the sea, which it reaches at Cape Monze, about 19 miles west of Kurrachee, a total distance of some 400 miles.

2. At first the line follows the northern limit of the Frontier District of Upper Sind to Khyree Ghurree, skirting the southern edge of the desert which divides Sind from the plain of Cutchee in Khelat territory. From a little below Khyree Ghurree it passes due west to the Khyrthur range, and then south to where the Gaj river breaks through that chain of mountains, in this part belonging to the Collectorate of Shikarpur. From the Gaj it takes the watershed of the above range until it reaches the Hubb River, about 46 miles north of Kurrachee, whence that river marks the boundary to the sea at Cape Monze. The line from the Gaj to the sea forms the western limit of the Kurrachee Collectorate.

3. The portions of Sind then connected with the boundary are the Frontier District of Upper Sind, and the Skikarpur, and Kurrachee Collectorates.

4. In the Frontier District the administrative establishment consisted of a Political Superintendent (a military officer) who likewise held command of the troops, a Political Agent at the court of Khelat, an Assistant Political Superintendent taken from the brigade, and a Deputy Collector, a purely civil officer.

5. In the Shikarpur district, there was the Collector, two Deputy Collectors, who had charge of the two divisions of Larkana and Mehar, which lay immediately inside the border, and a superintendent of police.

6. In Kurrachee, there was the Collector, a Deputy Collector in charge of the Sehwan division, and a native official called Kotwal, who held charge of the Kohistan, a barren tract of hilly country lying between the Sehwan Division, and the sea, also a Superintendent of Police, all under the general superintendence of the Commissioner in Sind.

7. The other Deputy Collectors belonging to the two above collectorates are not mentioned, because their charges are altogether away from the boundary, and they have nothing to do with frontier matters.

8. The Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier of Upper Sind, and Commandant-in-Chief Frontier Field Force, as he was styled, had, under the Commissioner in Sind, the entire management of political relations with the State of Khelat, the country beyond the border throughout the whole length down to the sea. He was thus brought into communication with all the different tribes of Belooch and Brahoee, forming the body of which the Khan of Khelat is the head. Also with the Patan tribes inhabiting the small district of Seebee, situated in the north-eastern corner of Cutchee, subordinate, and belonging to the Government of Kandahar. Within the border he had control over the various Belooch and Sindee tribes in the Frontier District, which is bounded on the north by the line from Tega to Khyree Ghurree, on the east by the Indus, and on the south mainly by the Biggaree canal, but having a small triangular piece to the south of that canal near its tail. He had revenue charge of the district under the Commissioner, regulating the distribution of land, and manner of recovering Government dues, and performed judicial duties as magistrate of the district. He had also general superintendence over all irrigational works, three executive engineers being in actual charge, one for the Desert canal, one for the Kusmore and Biggaree Bund, and the third for the Biggaree canal; with another to look after public buildings, local fund works, &c. He was Commandant-in-Chief of all the troops employed on the frontier, the only military force in Upper Sind consisting or a mountain train, three regiments of Sind horse, 499 strong each, and the 30th Regiment N. I., or Jacob's Rifles, 712 of all ranks. To each regiment of Sind Horse there was attached a body of 1 russuldar, 3 jemadars, and 100 Belooch sowars, in all 3 russuldars, 9 jemadars, and 300 men, recruited from the tribes in and beyond the border, and used as guides, or scouts to obtain intelligence of the movements of intending marauders. In a country where there were no roads, and tracks were obliterated by the first passing dust-storm, this was a most valuable body of men. Their knowledge of the habits of, and acquaintance with, plunderers, people similar to themselves, enabled them to get early, and good information as to projected forays on a large scale, while through their familiarity with the usual haunts resorted to by robbers, they could point out the best direction to be taken for intercepting small bodies, that had ventured to leave the hills. In all military matters the commandant-in-chief reported to the general officer commanding the Sind district for the information or decision of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. The staff consisted of a brigade major taken from the brigade, who was also superintendent of Bazars, and as such disposed of all minor cases within the cantonment. The troops were used for the protection of the border from external aggression. For the maintenance of good order

and preservation of life and property within, there was a body of police, strength as per margin, entertained from the people of the country, Belooch and Sindees, and under the PoliticalS uperintendent. No others beside the troops and police were ever allowed to bear arms.

Inspector	1
Mounted Police	51
Foot Police	80
Total	132

9. The Political Agent at Khelat, a military officer selected from the regiments serving on the frontier for his special fitness for the duties required of him, remained as a rule with the Khan of Khelat, wherever he might be, whether above the passes, as was usual in summer, or in the plains of Cutchee during the cold weather. His duties were to represent the British Government at the Court of the Khan, to be the channel of communication between the Political Superintendent and the Khan, to aid the latter on all occasions with suitable advice in matters in which the interests of both Governments were concerned, or wherein he could see advantage might accrue to the State he was accredited to; at the same time being very careful to prevent any action on his part appearing like undue interference, or that he had any leaning to any particular circumstances, or party in the State. He was also to keep the Political Superintendent acquainted with all that took place in the country, of the general feeling of the chiefs and people, and to do his best to obtain reliable information on what was passing in the countries beyond Beloochistan.

10. The Assistant Political Superintendent, an officer likewise chosen from the Frontier Brigade, gave his aid to the Superintendent in political matters generally, relieved him of as much of the judicial work as his powers as a full power magistrate would allow of, and had charge of the town of Jacobabad.

11. The Deputy Collector, a gentleman of the Uncovenanted Civil Service, conducted all the revenue duties of the district under the orders of the Political Superintendent, and was answerable to him only for their proper performance. He was likewise a magistrate with full powers, but as his revenue work was as much as he could well attend to, cases were seldom taken up by him, being generally referred to the Assistant Political Superintendent. A settlement was introduced by the late General Jacob in 1858, and sanctioned by Government and the Court of Directors for 20 years. It was based on fair and liberal terms, and under it as well as under a wise local rule of General Jacob's, disallowing the recovery of debt by law, the people were gradually becoming well-to-do, in many cases wealthy; but unfortunately the introduction of the Civil Code in 1864 cancelled the local order, the people foolishly recommenced borrowing from the money-lenders, until the latter have them completely in their power, and scarcely a Zemindar in the whole district is now free from debt, while many have been sold up and irretrievably ruined. Such a state of affairs would be lamentable anywhere, but in this particular district it was the more especially to be regretted. The great object had been to reclaim a lot of reckless wild spirits from habits of lawlessness and crime to those of industry and honest living. This was being rapidly and most effectually done, when the chance of giving way to the infatuation of debt was unhappily thrown open to them again before they had become thoroughly able to resist it.

12. Since the introduction of the Civil Code, all cases coming under the Act are taken and disposed of by a subordinate native judge. But a proposal is under consideration to transfer this part of the administration to the Assistant Political Superintendent, a course which will be decidedly advantageous, as from his knowledge of the people and their circumstances he could often bring about arrangements which might help, if not save the involved ones.

13. There is no Treasury at Jacobabad, and all payments of revenue are made into the Collectorate Treasury at Shikarpur, and the revenue accounts kept there, but the Political Superintendent submits annually a revenue and administration report of his own.

14. The district is divided into three Talukas, with a Mukhtyarkar, and establishment of Tapadars to each. The Mukhtyarkars are also subordinate magistrates with the powers of that class.

15. As regards the frontier from Khyree Ghurree southwards, neither the collectors of Shikarpur, or of Kurrachee, or their deputies have any political powers in connexion with affairs or people beyond the frontier. If any cases occur in which people belonging to Khelat territory are concerned, they are reported to the Commissioner for instructions, or if immediate action is required, they are referred at once to the Political Superintendent on the frontier. There has never been much trouble on this part of the border, nothing scarcely beyond petty cattle-stealing, against which the ordinary police of the district have sufficed to provide. But within the last few years the lower part of the frontier has become more disturbed, owing to quarrels among the Brahoee chiefs

there, and the disorderly state of Khelat generally. An extra body of 100 policemen was added to the original force as a temporary measure. The fact however is, that if the Khan of Khelat maintains proper rule in his country, and kept the Brahooee Sirdars of this the Jalawan or southern portion of his Khanate with him, there would never be any difficulty beyond what the ordinary constabulary would be able to meet effectually. The boundary is for the greater part of the distance a high range of hills with only a few passes, which can be easily watched, while the Brahooees of these parts have at present none of the daring and enterprise displayed by the Belooch tribes to the north, to venture on plundering as a means of livelihood, or to engage in extensive raids. The number of police actually on this frontier has been for many years only—

Shikarpur police - - - -	26
Kurrachee police - - - -	40

To these 100 more men were added in April 1875 to strengthen the latter, in consequence of the unsettled state of the country outside the Kurrachee Collectorate.

16. The tribes beyond the British border, commencing from the right and facing north, are in the hills, the Belooch clans of Boogtees and Murrees. The Khetrans are north again of them, and little affect the Sind border, excepting in their connexion with and friendliness to the Boogtees. In the plains on the eastern side of Cutchee, below the Boogtee and Murree hills, there are the Oomranees at Manootee, once a powerful, but now weak and scattered tribe; the Kyherees, a priestly sect, who joined the Belooch from Tabreez while the latter were in Kirman about 1,000 years ago, who have never been celebrated for much courage, and who certainly do not now belie their ancient fame. They occupy the villages of Chuttur, Tahar-ke-Gote, Koonree, and Phoolajee, where they were placed by Sir Charles Napier after he had removed the Dhoomkees and Jukranees into Sind in 1845. Next at Lehree is a portion of the Dhoomkee tribe, the senior branch of the Great Rind Division of the Belooch. These were left by Sir Charles Napier at Lehree, because the then chief, Belooch Khan, had kept apart from the robber "Beejar," and did not abandon his place, when the other Dhoomkes fled into the Boogtee hills before the British force in 1844-45. Beyond the Dhoomkees are the Patan tribes of Baroozye and Kujjuck, occupying the district of Seebee, and subjects of the Ameer of Cabul. These two have always been at feud with each other, and constantly fighting with the Murrees, who never miss an opportunity of trying to raid in Seebee, but they are boldly met by the Seebeeites, who manage to hold their own. At Muskaf near Dadur there are a few Cosahs—Belooch— and on the west side of Cutchee there are the rinds at Shoorun, and Mugzees at Jull. The remaining inhabitants of Cutchee are mainly Sindee* or Jutts, the former peaceful cultivators when left alone, the latter breeders of camels. Though neither are naturally combatant, yet on occasions of disturbances they will freely give their services as petty plunderers and thieves, and their expertness in this respect will be well remembered by those who were, engaged in the first Affghan war. Dadur being a trade halting place, situated at the southern end of the famous Bolan Pass, is a considerable town with a mixed population. From Dadur to the "Dusht-be-Dowlut," at the head of the Bolan Pass, or about 54 miles, the country is so bare that it may be called almost uninhabited. The Koords have lands, and a little cultivation near the upper end, and a portion of the Murrees, the Muzzeeranee section, who had separated themselves from the main clan some years ago, settled down at Kirta, in the lower portion, that they might let out their services for the protection of kafilahs, and travellers moving through the pass. But these have lately removed, and rejoined the clan. The other towns of importance in Cutchee are Bagh, and Gundava. The first is quite in the centre of the plain, well situated on the Nara river, from which it obtains a regular and good supply, and is on the high road from Sind to Dadur. It has a high wall all round with several gates, but no strength against artillery. It is the residence of the Khan's Naib, or Governor of Cutchee. Gundava is on the west side of Cutchee, about 10 miles from the mouth of the Moolla pass. It is a considerable town, but open, not walled all round, and is generally considered the principal town in Cutchee, because the Khans usually made it their residence in the cold weather, when the severity of the winter above the passes drove all, who could move down, to the plains. In Gundava, Bagh, and Dadur, Hindoo merchants are largely congregated, and they drive a thriving trade by lending money to the Khan, chiefs, and people, and exporting grain from Cutchee, of which they get the chief possession, one of them generally purchasing the Government share from the Khan; when there is a good fall of rain in the hills, sending water over the plains, the return of grain is very large. The lands in Cutchee are partly held by the Khan, as ruler of the country, and partly by

* Formerly under the Kaloras the Sind rule extended to Dadur, but Nadir Shah on his return from Delhi gave it to the ruler of Khelat for services performed.

various chiefs, principally Brahooee, to whom free grants of considerable extent have been made on condition of their giving feudal service to the Khan. The cultivators are chiefly Sindhees, with some of the poorer Belooch. The cultivation consists of jowaree, bajree, till, and cotton during the summer season; wheat, barley, rape, and muttar in the winter. The soil is most fertile, three crops of jowaree have been known to be taken from one sowing, the plant growing out again from the roots, and forming a new head after a fresh supply of rain-water. The Khan's share of the revenue amounts to from two to two and a half lakhs of Rupees, but if the country was kept in proper order, and better looked after, he might realise a great deal more. The plain is watered by five rivers, the Taywagh, Lehree, Nara, Bolan, and Moolla; of these only the Nara, and Bolan have water all the year round outside the hills, the former as far as Bagh, the latter to a little below Myhesur. The others are mere mountain torrents, having water in their beds inside the hills, but only showing it outside when conveyed by artificial conduits, or during heavy rain, when they discharge a large volume of water, which is intercepted and disposed of for purposes of cultivation. One good soaking of the soil will give a tolerable crop. There are some other torrent beds, such as the Lunda, Sirani, and Zemani near Shahpoor, and others on the west side near Sunnee, Shorun and Jull, but they are of comparatively minor importance, though affording means for some cultivation.

17. There is no record of the population of Cutchee, but it may be roughly estimated now at 50,000 souls, including all classes. The numbers have diminished of late owing to the disturbed state of the country having led many to emigrate to Sind.

18. Cutchee has been thus largely dwelt upon, as it is the most important piece of country facing the British border.

19. The Mugzees of Jull were the last tribe mentioned. Below their country the boundary is entirely within hilly country, and to the west of it down to the sea the inhabitants are all either Brahooees of Jalawan, under their respective Sirdars, principally the Zehrees, Sassoolees, Minguls, &c., with the Chootahs, a tribe of Sindee (that is of Rajpoot) origin. Opposite the last 80 or 90 miles of the Kurrachee border, lies the district of Lus Beyla, a tributary of Khelat, but the Jam, as the ruler is called, has for many years past attempted to make himself independent of the Khan, has paid but scant allegiance, and rebelled some eight times in 15 years, till at last he fled into Sind to escape the results of his continued misconduct. He has the credit of aspiring to the Khanate, but neither the Brahooee or Belooch would ever accept him, as, though connected by marriage with the Khans of Khelat, his tribe is of Sindee origin, and both Belooch and Brahooees look down on the Sindees. The inhabitants of Lus Beyla are mostly all of Sindee, Rajpoot, origin.

20. None of the tribes on the west of Cutchee, or those below down to the sea, have ever shown themselves aggressive against or harassing to the British Government beyond petty robberies of cattle, with the exception of one instance in February 1874, when 200 armed Sassoolees entered British territory near the Gaj, and carried off some slaves who had fled there for protection. This they would never have dreamed of doing, had not the Khan of Khelat changed from his former friendly feelings towards the British Government. About the same time, and from the same cause, petty robberies increased on the border below, and as before stated 100 extra police were entertained, principally from the local tribes, to check these, which it has done. But if the Khan became permanently unfriendly, or the tribes got beyond his control, incessant plundering would inevitably follow.

21. Facing the Sind border there is but one country, presided over by one ruler, the Khan, to whom all the chiefs of the various tribes within it own allegiance, though they have not always scrupulously paid it. The Murrees and Boogtees, though of late years, with the former at least, most deliberately defiant, and disorderly, never attempt to deny their fealty to the Khan, and however disobedient they may be, they periodically wish to be restored to favour. In the time of the Great Nusseer Khan, the Murrees and Boogtees, Dhoomkees and Jukranees, were all kept under perfect control.

22. The Khan is easily accessible from the British side, and in this way having the opportunity of dealing with only one person, and with a fixed government, instead of with a number of factious chiefs, is greatly to the advantage of the Sind border, and cannot be too carefully regarded. With a resolute Khan on the throne, steadily, and consistently supported by the British Government, the Sind border might be as tranquil as any other part of India, and the road from Sind into Affghanistan as safe as that from Bombay to Poona.

23. The country is divided into two parts, Sarawan, all the northern portion above Khelat; Jalawan, the southern, below. The tribes are designated in the same way, and

are as shown in the appended list. The Khan is elected, and he must be of the family of the Ahmedzye, from which they have been taken since the Khanate was established in supersession of the old Hindoo Raj When formed for battle, the Sarawans are the right wing, the Jalawans the left; and in Durbar the chief Sarawan Sirdar sits on the right of the Khan, and the others with him; the chief Jalawan on the left; and most jealous are they of precedence being correctly observed. On all great State questions, such as war, making treaties, and so forth, the Khan is supposed to hold counsel with his barons, taking the opinion of the chief of the Sarawans first, then of the Jalawan. The Wuzzeer is selected and appointed by the Khan, but the Sirdars claim the right of approving the selection. In all other points the Khan's power is absolute, and if wisely wielded, might be most beneficial to the country. The same, however, as has been the case in all feudal countries, the Khans of Khelat, with the exception of one, the Great Nusseer Khan, who was a very superior man, have had incessant trouble with unruly barons, and the present Khan more so than any other.

24. The tribes outside having been described, those within the border have to be noticed. Commencing again from the right, there is first a portion of the Muzzaree tribe about Kusmore. The largest part of this tribe is within the Punjab, about Rojan, and the chief of all, Shere Mahomed, resides there. Those within Sind, when we became first acquainted with them, were systematic cattle-lifters, plundering from their brethren in the Punjab, from the districts on the east of the Indus, and from their next neighbours, the Boordees. The Boordees, who inhabit the large tract between Kusmore and Garhi Hassan, had an equally bad reputation with the Muzzurees, but both have improved of late years, as better means for cultivation have been afforded them. The other Belooch in the Frontier Districts consist of the Dhoomkees and Jukranees, with some Rumdanees, who were brought from Cutchee by Sir Charles Napier in 1845, and located near Khangur (now Jacobabad). Of these some have lately had lands given them, also on the Desert canal near Kusmore. The Cosahs, a portion of the Cutchee Oomeranees, and the Jumallees at Rojan, and Khyree Ghurree. These were all originally "Lootoos," or professional plunderers, but have been gradually reclaimed, and are now good, peaceful cultivators, while some are employed as guides or police, and do excellent service for Government. The other inhabitants of the Frontier Districts are Sindees, or Hindoos of the Bunniah, or trading class. In the Shikarpur collectorate, from Khyree Ghurree down to the Gaj, and again from the Gaj to Sehwan in the Kurrachee collectorate, the population on the border is very sparse, the line being within the hills, while between the hills and the alluvial plain of the Indus there is a belt of bare land the whole way down to a little above Sehwan, in which there are a few villages, and only cultivation after rain. The Belooch tribes in this part are portions of the Jumallees, Lugharees, and Rinds. There are also Chootahs and other Sindee tribes, but all are at present fairly quiet, inoffensive people. Below Sehwan the country is all hilly, mostly barren, but with some slight cultivation in the valleys where any water is found. The inhabitants are chiefly Sindee, nomades almost entirely, and beyond occasionally stealing a few bullocks or cattle from the Khelat side of the border, are a very harmless set. When heavy rain falls in this hilly district, grass grows luxuriantly, and cattle come there in large numbers from Sind. The people in the hills have any cultivation they may manage to raise free of all charge, on condition that they do not interfere with any who may come into the hills to graze their cattle or cut grass, when it is plentiful, or more so than in other parts of British territory.

25. From what has been above written it will be seen that the most important part of the Sind border is the northern part of it, or that called the Frontier District of Upper Sind. This has immediately in its front the only tribes who have ever given trouble, and the measures connected with the management of this portion have necessarily caused the British officials employed there to be brought into immediate contact and close communication with the Khan of Khelat, and this led to all arrangements with that State being entrusted to the Political Superintendent on the frontier only. To show correctly the exact nature and merits of the administration of this district, as originated by the late General Jacob, so successfully carried out by him, and desired to be followed ever since, it will be necessary to notice briefly the circumstances that occurred previous to his taking charge in 1847.

26. Our first acquaintance with this country was formed when the army marched into Affghanistan in 1839. The troops were much harassed when passing through Cutchee and up the Bolan by the plundering of robbers and difficulty in procuring supplies. All this was laid to the door of the then Khan of Khelat, Mehrab Khan, but not justly so. It was due to the intrigues of his treacherous Wuzzeer, Moolla Mahomed Hoossein, and

certain Native officials in our camp, combined with our ignorance of the people and country.

27. Mehrab Khan was made to pay penalty with his life and the capture of his capital, Khelat, by Major-General Wiltshire in November 1839. A member of an elder branch of the Ahmedzye family, Meer Shah Nawaz Khan, was put on the throne of Khelat in the place of Mehrab Khan, and the son of the latter became a fugitive in Kharan. Meer Shah Nawaz's reign did not last long. He was personally disliked by the majority of the chiefs, who also disapproved of the return to the older line, and looked only to the son of their late ruler. This son, Meer Nusseer Khan, was set up by them, Meer Shah Nawaz was ousted, retiring into Sind, and ultimately Nusseer Khan was recognised by Major Outram on the part of the British Government, a treaty being concluded with him under the orders of Lord Auckland, then Governor General of India. Friendly relations were thus established between the two powers. Meer Nusseer Khan reigned ably and well for some 16 years, and was much esteemed; but his unscrupulous minister, Darogah Gool Mahomed, who had always hated the British, thought the young Khan was joining too heartily with them. To check this he caused poison to be administered to Nusseer Khan in May 1857, and placed the present Khan, Khodadad Khan, then some 18 years old, on the throne. Gool Mahomed believed Khodadad to be a youth of weak intellect, and that he could easily manage him, keeping the chief power in his own hands. In this he was greatly mistaken, for a few years afterwards he was removed from his position and kept a prisoner at large. This was done at the advice of the British officers on the frontier, but it was promptly carried out by the Khan. During the years 1841 and 1842 reinforcements and large convoys were sent into Affghanistan in consequence of disasters to our troops there. These were well protected by the Sind Horse under Captain Jacob,* who had his head-quarters at Chuttur, with detachments at Khanghur, Phoolajee, Lehree, and Mull, between the line of route of the troops and stores and the hills. The principal plunderers in those days were the Dhoomkees and Jukranees, under the famous leaders Beejar Khan Dhoomkee and Toork Jukranee, both most active and daring. The Dhoomkees lived at Lehree and Phoolajee, the Jukranees at Tahar-ka-Gote, Chuttur, and near Shapoor, so the Sind Horse were immediately over them, and could watch their every movement. The Boogtees and Murrees did not then plunder much in Cutchee. They had had a lesson taught them by the force under Major Billamore, which passed successfully through their hills in 1839, defeating the Boogtees in two stout engagements, and making their chief Beebruck a prisoner; also overawing the Murrees by paying their capital Kahun a visit. Moreover, the Dhoomkees and Jukranees wished to keep the plunder of Cutchee to themselves, and only allowed the Murrees and Boogtees to join them occasionally in small numbers. The Murrees sometimes plundered in the Bolan Pass, but only in a petty way. The Boogtees and Murrees had the Mittunkote district, in the Punjab, and Boordikha, in the north-eastern corner of Sind, to make raids upon, and used their opportunity freely.

* There were detachments of infantry also at Bagh, Seebee, and Dadur, with two guns at the latter place, and reserves of all arms at Shikarpur and Sukkur.

28. When the troops came back from Affghanistan in 1842 they were all withdrawn to Sukkur, on the Indus, leaving the frontier to the predatory tribes to deal with as they like. On Sind becoming a British possession after the war in 1843, Sir Charles Napier caused the frontier to be again occupied. A large force was established at Sukkur and Shikarpur, in support, and the district was placed under a general officer, Major-General Hunter, of the Bengal army.

29. The Dhoomkees and Jukranees had become much emboldened by the freedom and success they enjoyed after the withdrawal of the troops in 1842. Their excesses became so insolent, and frequent, that Sir Charles determined on conducting an expedition against them, and in 1844 moved a force of 7,000 men under himself, with two other major-generals, across into Cutchee. The Dhoomkees and Jukranees retired into the Boogtee hills, whither Sir Charles Napier followed them, and after four months' hard labour, and aided by Meer Ali Moorad, and the Murrees, he made them surrender, and transported them into Sind. The Boogtees fled for the time to the Khetran country, but returned to their own hills on the retirement of the troops.

30. By the Dhoomkees and Jukranees being removed Cutchee and Sind were laid open to the Boogtees, and they soon began to avail themselves of the chance thus offered of extending their predatory excursions. During 1846 they made several forays but the grandest of all, and boldest ever attempted, was in December of that year, when a large body of them, horse and foot, accompanied by nearly every chief of note in the clan, descended on Chandran, a village only 16 miles from Shikarpur, and

within a mile of Mirpur, one of our cavalry outposts; remained there the whole day, and carried off every head of cattle they could lay their hands on, to the extent of some 15,000.

31. The troops in Upper Sind then consisted of a regiment of Native infantry at Sukkur, with the general and his staff, two regiments of Native infantry, a field battery, and head-quarters of a regiment of Native cavalry at Shikarpur; the latter furnishing troops to the frontier at the outposts of Mirpur, Moobarikpur, Khanghur and Shapoor. At the last place there were also two companies of Native infantry from one of the regiments at Shikarpur. At Larkana was the Sind Camel Corps, 500 strong, with 500 armed camel drivers. Political management was in the hands of the general commanding, under the Governor of Sind, Sir Charles Napier.

32. The commanding officer at Mirpur sent intelligence of the raid to Shikarpur, and asked for reinforcements. The officer commanding the cavalry moved out at once with the remainder of his regiment, and 80 mounted policemen, while instructions were sent to all the outposts to converge on the line the mauraders would probably retire by. The pursuers caught up the robbers early in the morning in some broken ground near Hooddoo. By that time the cavalry commander had 250 sabres of his own regiment and the 80 policemen. Misled by the raised appearance of the ground caused by "miraj," he unfortunately imagined the enemy to be strongly posted, and deemed himself too weak to attack them. He turned back to Shikarpur, and the Boogtees re-entered their hills in safety and triumph, securing the whole of their immense booty.

33. On hearing of this disaster Sir Charles Napier immediately ordered Captain Jacob to the frontier, with one of the two regiments of Sind Horse, leaving the other at Hyderabad.

34. Captain Jacob was to use his own discretion as to frontier defence, under the general control of General Hunter at Sukkur, reporting through him. On reaching Khanghur on the 9th January 1847, he found the Boogtees had it pretty much their own way. The very night before the Sind Horse arrived Sunjur Rind with a party of Boogtee horsemen carried off a large number of Government camels from near Jagun, only 14 miles from Shikarpur, and that distance inside the outposts. This, however, was the last successful foray they made. The tables from this time were turned upon them. Captain Jacob at first left the outposts as he found them, relieving the Native regular cavalry by parties of Sind Horse, keeping the head-quarters at Khanghur, instead of at Shikarpur, as had been the case. The posts were Mirpur half a troop, Mubarickpur the same, with a troop at Shapoor. It was soon found the two first were too far inside the border, so they were moved up to Ghurree Hassan and Dil Moorad. Small parties of horse were also placed at Rojan, and Khyree Ghurree to the west, to prevent maurauders creeping round that side. Detachments from the Camel Corps at Larkana held Shadadpur, Dost Ali, and Kumbur. The last was given up soon after, and the two former were also abandoned in a few years as unnecessary. The country to the eastward of Ghurree Hussun or Boordikha as it was called, belonged to his Highness Meer Ali Moorad, and was not then taken into consideration in protective arrangements, the Meer making his own. There was however a detachment of mounted police at Kusmore.

35. Captain Jacob at once abandoned the defensive system, and instituted a course of active patrolling. Parties were kept perpetually on the move to the front from Khanghur and from all the outposts, meeting occasionally at advanced points, such as Hooddoo and Punnian, places where water was procurable in the dry mountain torrents, a few feet below the surface, and where the "Lootoos" often used to rest either before or after a foray. The country was a hard flat desert, and this was soon marked by the tracks of moving parties, a significant sign to the Lootoos of the danger there was now of being fallen in with. This first occurred on the 20th January, 11 days after arrival, a duffadar and 18 sowars of the Sind Horse fell in a little north of Ghurree Hussun with a party of about 200 mounted robbers, and at once attacked them. The enemy were surprised at a bivouac, and in spite of their number fled ignominiously, abandoning some of their mares, and throwing away their arms in the hurry to escape. It happened to be dusk, so only a few were killed; had there been daylight many more would have received the punishment ordered for them,—capture, or death if resistance was offered. This was an early lesson to them that times had changed, and the Boogtees were more careful in future. It was discovered that a great deal of the plundering was brought about by the Belooch settlers at Janidhera near Khanghur, Jukranees and Dhoomkees.

These were under a special commissioner, Lieutenant Hamilton, but they managed to elude his vigilance, and were in the habit of crossing the frontier by stealth, and either plundering from there, or what was more often the case, joining the Boogtees in their forays, and afterwards bringing their share of the plunder back with them. A party was actually caught so returning, and were made prisoners. This was immediately put a stop to, and it was ordered that no one on the border should be allowed to bear arms, save those actually in the service of Government as soldiers or police. And it was generally notified that the State would protect all peaceful subjects, so arms were unnecessary for any one also beside the servants of the State. This had the best possible effect, and combined with the activity shown by the troops, soon instilled confidence in the well-disposed, while evil-doers became disheartened.

36. The year 1847 was one of incessant work for the Sind Horse, but their labours were crowned with success. The Boogtees met at all points, and being prevented getting grain from Sind, became desperate from loss of their usual livelihood, and from threatening starvation. After various futile attempts they sallied forth from their hills in strength, some 700 armed men, and made a descent on a Kyheree village near Chuttur. The Shahpoor outpost, which had been strengthened to a squadron, intercepted them on the 1st October on the Zimanee river, near Koonree, as they were returning to the hills, and with 133 sabres utterly defeated them, killing (for they long refused quarter) or capturing nearly the whole; 120 prisoners were brought into Shahpoor. On this occasion the Murrees not being friendly with the Boogtees, gave valuable information, which helped in a great measure to the interception of the Boogtees. This severe blow broke the strength and spirit of the tribe, and during the following year they came in, surrendered unconditionally, and were located near Larkana. They were unfortunately ill-managed there, and the chiefs fled back to the hills in the same year. They made one desperate attempt on Kusmore in April 1849, when they were assisted by both Murrees and Khetrans, but it proving unsuccessful, they remained quiet till in October 1851 they were at the intercession of the Khan of Khelat finally forgiven, and have behaved well towards Sind ever since. Some of the tribe were taken into service as guides, and proved most faithful, being placed at the advanced post of Gandui to watch and to furnish information.

37. Sir Charles Napier left Sind on the 1st October 1847, and was succeeded by Mr. Pringle, of the Bombay Civil Service, who was appointed Commissioner. The troops were placed under Colonel Dundas, the senior officer in Sind. Mr. Pringle thought fit to put the frontier under the Collector of Shikarpur, but this was so manifestly unsuitable, and would have so utterly tied Captain Jacob's hands, that the change was shortly after reversed by Sir George Clerk, Governor of Bombay.

38. In February 1848, Major Jacob was invested with sole political powers on the frontier, and authorised to arrange with his Highness the Khan of Khelat all questions relating to matters between the two Governments, and to tribes beyond the frontier, subjects of the Khan.

39. The frontier line was extended eastwards to Mittree on the Indus, 11 miles beyond Kusmore, and outposts of the Sind Horse were placed at Tungwanee, Kundkote, Koombree, and Kusmore.* The 2nd Regiment had been previously ordered up from Hyderabad to meet this extra duty. The outpost of Shahpoor was withdrawn as unnecessary, and no troops were located beyond the desert which separates Sind from Cutchee. The same system of patrolling to the front was however maintained, and is so to the present day, to prevent the hill tribes thinking any slackness would or could occur. Roads were made and bridged connecting all the outposts, and cut through the thick jungles of Boordikha, formerly a perfect nest of thieves.

* It was a great pity that the Sind Frontier was not in the following year, when the Punjab fell under British rule, extended up to Hurrund. This would have brought the whole Belooch tribes under one management, instead of two, and have prevented the unfortunate results that have occurred, of which the end has yet to be seen.

40. The system introduced and the principles followed by Major Jacob cannot be better stated than in his own words as given in a rough memorandum drawn up by him in August 1854. They were entirely offensive measures :—

"EXTRACT from a rough memorandum by Major J. Jacob on Sind Frontier proceedings since 1846, dated 9th August 1854.

"Entirely offensive measures on the part of the troops, the possibility of attack by the marauders never being contemplated. No defensive works whatever allowed any-

where, existing ones destroyed or abandoned, the troops always freely exposed, and obstacles to rapid movements removed as much as possible; the people protected.

"No distinction permitted between plundering and killing by private persons, whether friend or foe. Robbery and murder treated as equally criminal, whether the victim be a British subject or not.

"The plea of family blood-feud, or retaliation, in such cases, considered as an aggravating circumstance, as proving the most deliberate malice aforethought. No private person allowed to bear arms, or possess arms, without written permission.

"The highest moral ground always taken in all dealings with the predatory tribes, *treating them always as of an inferior nature so long as they persist in their misdeeds: as mere vulgar, criminal, and disreputable* persons with whom it is a disgrace for respectable persons to have any dealings, and whom all good men must, as a matter of course, look on as objects of pity, not of dread—with hatred, possibly, but never with fear.

"As perfect information as possible of all movements or intended movements of the plundering tribes residing beyond our border. Such information acted on with the greatest activity, our knowledge of the nature and habits of the Beloochee robbers being sufficient to enable us in almost every single instance to judge correctly of their probable proceedings, and effectually to check and counteract them at a distance from the British boundary.

"The feeling instilled into every soldier employed being, that he was altogether of a superior nature to the robber—a good man against a criminal; the plunderers being always considered not as enemies but as malefactors.

"The strictest justice always acted on, and no success, or want of success, or any other circumstance whatever, being allowed to influence the terms offered to, or the treatment of, offenders, whether whole tribes or individuals. Violence, robbery, bloodshed, held as equally criminal and disreputable in all men; the abandonment of such practices, and the adoption of peaceful and industrial habits, being considered as most honourable, and encouraged in every way. A few words will sum up the whole system. At first, put down all violence with the strong hand, then, your force being known, felt, and respected, endeavour to excite mens' better natures, till all men, seeing that your object is good, and of the greatest general benefit to the community, join heart and hand to aid in putting down or preventing violence.

"This is the essence of the whole business.

"The working of true principles is now apparent here in almost total absence of open physical force.

"When we came to the Sind Frontier in 1847 the people had no idea of any power but violence. The proceedings of the British authorities tended to confirm this state of feeling.

"When the men of Cutchee plundered in Sind, the only remedy applied was to encourage the Sindees to plunder in Cutchee. Both parties then were equally guiltless or equally criminal; no idea of moral superiority was thought of.

"Such being the case, it was absolutely necessary in the first instance to have recourse to violent measures, to show the predatory tribes that we possessed, in far greater degree than themselves, the only power which they respected—mere brute force.

"Our first year (1847) on the border was one of enormous bodily labour; we had literally to lie down to rest with our boots and swords on for many months together. We crushed the robbers by main force, and proved far superior to them, even in activity. And it may be well to observe that, at this time, but one regiment of the Sind Irregular Horse was on the frontier.

"When our frontier was in a disturbed state, I had my posts close to the hills, esteeming this arrangement to be an *advantage*. Since quiet has been established, I have withdrawn them, save as respects some Beloochee Guides. But though we had succeeded in forcibly subduing the robber tribes, I should have considered our proceedings as a failure, had it been necessary to continue to use violent measures.

"Having by the use of force made ourselves feared and respected, we were able to apply better means, and to appeal to higher motives than *fear*. This I had in view from the very first.

"The barbarians now feel (which they could hardly imagine before) that strength, courage, and activity may be possessed in the highest degree by those also influenced by gentle and benevolent motives.

"Under the influence of this growing feeling, the character of the border plunderers

has been changed; whole tribes, within and without our border, amounting to more than twenty thousand souls, have totally abandoned their former predatory habits, and taken to peaceable pursuits.

"Our Jukranees and Dhoomkees, formerly the wildest of the border riders, are now the most honest industrious people in all Sind.

"Every man of the Sind Irregular Horse is looked on and treated as a friend by all the country folk.

"In truth, the moral power of their bold and kindly bearing and proceeding has spread far and wide through the country, and effected what no mere force would have done. Even the Murrees, who have not felt our physical force much, are fast coming under this influence, and are beginning to feel themselves disreputable.

"If the irritation and excitement to evil practices, caused by the incursions of our Muzzarees, and others, do not interfere with the full development of the causes now at work on our border, it seems to me certain that perfect peace and quiet will be established among *all* the tribes, in hill and plain, whose sole or chief pursuits have hitherto been robbery and murder."

41. To maintain proper and wholesome influence over the wild spirits to be met on the border, firmness and consistency are absolutely necessary, combined with kindness and just treatment. They must be taught to know and feel that the administration is working for the public good, and for them, if they will only behave themselves properly, and that implicit obedience must be unhesitatingly yielded by them. That the British officers were their best friends, but friends to be respected, and not thought lightly of. Palliative measures are not only ephemeral, but they only lead to greater complications afterwards, and are regarded as exhibitions of weakness. Win the confidence of these people by proofs of superiority in all respects, by showing a keen and thorough interest in their concerns, and a determination to be obeyed, and all decisions passed will be readily accepted. Major Jacob saw that previous want of success was in a great measure due to the non-existence of such a feeling of trust. The officers who had to serve on the frontier disliked the locality and work excessively. The climate was bad, and accommodation of a most wretched description; they were merely there to perform certain military duties at the command of some one, who was not even on the spot; they had little or no interest in what was passing around them, and they longed for the day of their release to a more congenial abode. It was not suprising that the people of the country, seeing and knowing this, felt repelled from, instead of drawn towards, their protectors, and there was no looking up to or confidence. Major Jacob determined it should be understood that he intended to remain and make the frontier his home. He built a large house and laid out an estate, and to ensure as far as possible the system he introduced being perpetuated, he endeavoured to establish a school of officers who would be trained to fill the different positions in regular gradation. Officers who would become well acquainted with the people and their circumstances, have a thorough interest in the work, and being assured of speedy rise if they showed themselves efficient, would willingly set at defiance all insalubrity of climate, or other disadvantages, and cheerfully adhere to their leader. This system was continued for some time, the commandant on the frontier was permitted to select his own officers, and his recommendations were approved and confirmed. But unfortunately of late years this has been changed, and what has gravely injured the *esprit* that formerly existed to such a wholesome extent, breaking up in fact the above school, is, that senior officers have been sent up to command the regiments of Sind Horse, who had no previous experience of the place, some not even any of cavalry training, and who superseded those who had been steadily and honestly working on for years in the confident hope of enjoying vacancies when they occurred. This has acted as a terrible damper, and if continued, will soon bring back the listless feeling which proved before so detrimental to the public interests.

42. The Commissioner Mr., now Sir, Bartle Frere, who came to Sind in 1850, thoroughly appreciating Major Jacob's worth, supported him in every possible way. He aided him in having pushed on large irrigational works to increase cultivation, and give peaceful employment to the old robber classes, and in 1852 placed the revenue charge of the district in Major Jacob's hands, so that the latter had complete control over everything on the border. He still reported on military matters through the Senior Officer commanding in Upper Sind, but was not interfered with. The advantages of all arrangements being concentrated in one person cannot be over-estimated. All officers, military as well as civil, with the people, look up to him as the sole arbiter of their fates. There are no clashings, the objects of all are identical, and the military

take the fullest interest in all that is going on around them, hoping to rise in time to the higher places. All business was transacted in one range of buildings made for the purpose, so that all questions could be discussed and disposed of at once.

43. The military force has varied at times. When the 2nd Regiment Sind Horse came to the frontier, the infantry detachments were returned to Shikarpur. In 1857, during the mutinies, one regiment of Sind Horse,* aided by a regiment of Bengal Irregular Cavalry, held the frontier successfully, in spite of a most determined attempt at outbreak by the Belooch tribes, and a threatened rebellion at Khelat. The confidence that had been won was at this time most valuable, for the mass of the people were on our side, and kept the local authorities so well informed of all the plottings going on, that repression of the intended outbreak was effected without bloodshed, and merely by the arrest of the ringleaders. At the end of that year a third regiment of Sind Horse (all three, 800 strong) was raised, and in the following year two regiments of Rifles, 800 each, were formed on a plan proposed by General Jacob, similar to the Sillidar system of the Horse, viz, that, receiving a fixed amount of pay, they should be self-supporting and, keeping up their own carriage regularly, be ready to move anywhere at the shortest notice. General Jacob was made Commandant-in-Chief of the whole Frontier Field Force. In 1859 a mountain train was added. But in 1861, owing to the necessity of reduction, the three regiments of horse, 800 strong, were converted into four of 364 sabres each, one regiment of rifles was disbanded, and the other reduced to 712 of all ranks. Afterwards the four regiments of horse were again made three of 499 sabres each, and so they remain. Besides these, there are no troops now in Upper Sind; none north of Hyderabad. Those at Shikarpur were finally withdrawn in 1859, and Sukkur had been vacated some time before.

44. On the untimely and deeply-to-be-lamented death of General Jacob, he was succeeded by his subalterns; first by Major, now Colonel Sir, William Merewether, from 1859 to 1862, and then by Major, now Major General, Sir Henry Green, till 1868. Colonel Phayre followed from 1868 to 1872, then Lieutenant-Colonel Mainwaring, and finally Colonel Loch.

45. The cultivation in Boordikha had advanced so far to the north, that in 1865 it was found necessary to push forward the Gurhee Hussun, Tungwanee, Kundkote and Koombree outposts to Goranaree, Sunree, Toj, and Sooee. The two first and the last are in Khelat territory at the southern edge of the low hills bounding the Boogtee country. Sooee is the most advanced, 24 miles north-north-west of Kusmore, and is admirably situated to cut off any marauders that may attempt to enter Sind or the Punjab in that part. An outpost is also now sometimes placed at Diggree, north of Jacobabad. The desert tract formerly existing between Boordikha and the hills has almost ceased to exist as such, and is now covered with rich fields of corn by means of the Desert canal projected by General Jacob, which leaves the Indus near Kusmore. At present this canal is only carried westwards as far as the boundary line close to Sunree, but it is intended ultimately that it should enter Khelat territory, and passing round below Ooch, end not far from Manotee. The object of this canal is to give occupation and a means of peaceful livelihood to such of the hill and other Belooch who may be induced to abandon their predatory habits and take to agriculture.

46. The district has been unfortunate for the last five or six years in being overrun by heavy floods destroying villages and crops and injuring the soil. A bund, however, has been made from Kusmore, to the mouth of the Biggaree, intended to keep out these floods. This year the rise of the river has been excessive, and the bund (partly also from being a new work) has given way. But this can be made secure, and no expense should be spared to make it so, as the thorough pacification of the Belooch can never be made certain as long as a means of gaining an honest livelihood is not left open to them. This can never be the case while these floods render cultivation so precarious.

47. The political relations with Khelat have been so fully discussed of late, that it is unnecessary to enter upon them at any length in this report.

48. General Jacob was instructed to make a new treaty with his Highness Meer Nusseer Khan in 1854. This treaty was continued with his successor, his brother Khodadad Khan. A copy of the treaty,† as also of the excellent advice given at the time by General Jacob to Meer Nusseer Khan, is appended.

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*The other regiment was employed in Persia.

†See Khelat No. 1.

49. From the time his Highness Khodadad Khan ascended the throne in 1857 up to the present time, there has been constant endeavour by the nobles to limit authority in his hands, if not to take it all away. He was wounded and deposed in 1863, his cousin Shere Dil being put up in his stead. The latter was murdered in the following year by the commandant of the regular troops, and Khodadad reinstated. There have been constant quarrels ever since between the Khan and his nobles, caused by faults on both sides. The feeling of enmity between the two has become intense, and most difficult to mend.

50. This unhappy state of affairs may in some measure be attributed to the absence of a consistent line of policy towards the Khan on our part, and our forgetting that to ensure peace, and quiet throughout such a long length of frontier, our object should be to confine our transactions to the head of the State, hold him responsible for everything done by his subjects, but at the same time to use our best endeavours to strengthen his government in every way, and to induce him to rule with firmness, tempered with justice and suitable moderation.

51. In general, as before stated, all transactions with any people, chiefs or others, belonging to the Khelat State, were conducted through the Political Superintendent on the Frontier of Upper Sind and the Khan. But in one instance this course was not followed, and it may be considered certain that the deviation from so manifestly sound a plan had a very baneful effect. The ignoring of the Khan and his position which took place, and the danger of lessening the Khan's power by so doing, was pointed out by the Political Superintendent at the time, but he was overruled by the Commissioner in Sind. The case was the establishment of the telegraph line along the Mekran coast to the Persian Gulf.* After the first 17 miles the line entered the territory of the Jam of Lus Beyla, and it was desirable to get his assistance in the protection of the line after completion. Although as a chief the Jam was subject to the Khan of Khelat, an engagement was entered into with him *direct*, under which he was to receive a large subsidy, for the protection of the line and telegraph offices within his district, of Rupees 15,000 per annum. This chief had always been a bad subject, repeatedly creating disturbances, and breaking out in rebellion against the Khan, and this direct recognition of apparent independence of the Khan, may well be understood to have given him encouragement in his refractory demeanour towards his sovereign; and from statements made by him since, when he even spoke of himself as an ally of the British Government, it would seem unquestionably to have been so. It may be here added that the Jam after his last unsuccessful rebellion fled into Sind, and was located in the Deccan. A portion of the subsidy, nearly Rupees 7,000, is applied to paying individually, through the telegraph department, the line riders, who actually watch and protect the line. The remainder is placed to the credit of the Khan of Khelat, who allows out of it Rupees 8,000 per annum to be paid to the Jam of Beyla while he remains quiet in British territory.

52. There have been several Political Agents at Khelat, all of whom have filled that delicate and dangerous post with the greatest advantage to the State and credit to themselves. The first was appointed in 1856, in the person of Captain Henry Green of the Sind Horse. He shortly afterwards joined the Persian Expedition, and during his absence, Lieutenants Macaulay and Dickinson, also of the Sind Horse, acted for him. On his return in the end of 1857 he rejoined the Khan's court, and when he became Political Superintendent in 1862, his brother, Captain Malcolm Green, succeeded him. The next and last was Captain Harrison, likewise a Sind horseman. He was appointed in 1868, and displayed great coolness and judgment at a most critical time, when rebellions constantly threatened, and actually broke out twice. In April 1873 he was withdrawn to Jacobabad in consequence of the Khan's neglect to act fully up to the terms of the treaty, and in April 1875, the appointment was placed in abeyance by order of the Government of India.

53. The Murree tribe, owing to the weakness of, and dissensions amongst the Boogtee tribes, have become of late years all powerful in the hills, and most insolent towards the Khan, as also to the British Government. Last year they plundered Cutchee as they pleased, and appeared to openly defy everybody. Cutchee and the trade route through it could be most easily protected by placing outposts again at Chuttur, Phoolajee, Lehree, and Mull, but this might drive the Murrees on to the Punjab. Even if it did, it would only require a year's good work, such as that of 1847, to bring them to their bearings, and read them such a lesson as they would not readily forget, and this without any very large addition of military force. But to do this effectually,

* Discussion commenced in 1861, finished in 1863.

Government should alone be the executive, all working of tribal animosities should be discarded and forbidden absolutely.'

54. The Murrees could muster now about 5,000 armed men. The Boogtees not 3,000. Both tribes are sub-divided into *paras* or sections, headed each by its own chief. The principal divisions of the Murrees are the Ghuzzani, to which the Chief Ghuzzen Khan belongs, residing mainly at Kahan; the Beejeranees at Mahmund and Kullu; the Loheranees on the Bamboor hill and on the north-west of the Shum Plain; and the Muzzeranees in the Bolan. These last had entirely separated themselves from the others, but lately they have left the Bolan, rejoined the clan, and set up with the Beejeranees. Ghuzzen Khan's power over the tribe is not very strong or certain, but they all render to him the chief's share (a fifth) of all plunder taken, and he regularly accepts it. The sections are again broken up into numerous sub-divisions.

55. The Boogtees have as large divisions—the Raeja, to which Goolam Moorteza the chief belongs; the Nothanees, Kulpurs, Mussorees, Phoongs, and Keeazyes. There are many subdivisions of these too numerous to mention. Islam Khan, the father of Goolam Moorteza, is still alive, but though quite in his prime then, he abdicated in about 1850, in favour of his son, and has been an element of evil in the tribe ever since by perpetually intriguing against him.

56. As these are the only two tribes that there is much, if anything, to do with from the Sind border, they are the only ones regarding whom any detail is offered.

57. There is but one special law in force on the Frontier of Sind introduced in 1872, to simplify the settlement of frontier cases. Under Act 33 Vict. Cap. 3, certain regulations were sanctioned by the Governor General of India, and brought into force for improved preservation of peace and better Government in the several Talukas bordering on the Frontier of Sind. Copy of the Government of India Notification on the subject with the regulations is appended.

58. A sketch-map is annexed, showing the position of the above two and other tribes, the divisions of Khelat, the Frontier Outposts, the Military Civil Stations, and connecting roads.

W. L. Merewether, Colonel,
Commissioner in Sind.

Commissioner's Office,
Kurrachee, 30th September 1876.

Appendix A.

List of the principal Brahoee Tribes of Biluchistan (Sarawan and Jalawan).

Tribe.	Sirdar's Names.	Residence.
	SARAWANS.	
Raisanee - - -	Sirdar Moola Mahomed - -	Kanuk.
Shawanee - - -	Do. Abdool Kadur - -	Mustoong.
Zuggur Mingul - -	Do. Rehman Khan - -	Nooshkee.
Bungoolzai - - -	Do. Adum Khan - -	Ispilunjee.
Rustumzai - - -	Do. Mahomed Khan -	Kanuk.
Raisanee - - -	Do. Hybut Khan - -	Mitree.
Koord - - -	Do. Ala Deenah - -	Moorao.
Mahomed Shai - -	Do. Syud Khan - - -	Mustoong.
Shawanee - - -	Do. Hubeeb Khan - -	Iskulkote, near Kelat.
Lehree - - -	Do. Jehangeer - - -	Nurmookh.
Do. - - -	Do. Samunder - - -	Do.
Bungoolzai - - -	Do. Shahdad Khan - -	Ispilunjee.
Koord - - -	Do. Aktah Khan - -	Do.
Surpurah - - -	Do. Kadur Buksh - -	Mustoong.
Lungao - - -	Do. Rahimdad - - -	Mungoochur.
Mingul - - -	Do. Saleh Mahomed - -	Near Much.
Sumalanee - - -	Do. Peer Buksh - -	Near Abgoom, in the Bolan.
Do. - - -	Do. Muzar - - -	Do.
Do. - - -	Do. Hybut - - -	Do.
Satukzai - - -	Do. Koortub Khan -	Near Quetta.
Peer Khanee - -	Do. Kushmeer - - -	Zehree.
Rodanee - - -	Gohur Khan - - -	Soorab.

Tribe.	Sirdar's Names.	Residence.
	JALAWANS.	
Zehree - - -	Sirdar Gawur Khan - -	Zehree.
Mingul - - -	Do. Meah Mahomed - -	Wudd.
Do. - - -	Do. Futteh Khan - -	Do.
Mahomed Hoossanee -	Do. Essoo Khan - -	Mushka.
Gitchkee - - -	Do. Meah Esau - - -	Punchgoor.
Do. - - -	Do. Bahi Khan - - -	Kedj.
Moosanee - - -	Do. Kaisah Khan - -	Ghat, near Zehree.
Bezunjo - - -	Do. Faquir Mahomed - -	Naib of Kedj.
Do. - - -	Do. Meah Kerah - -	Nal.
Meerwanee - - -	Do. Meah Khan - -	Kolewah.
Mugzee - - -	Do. Kaisar Khan - -	Jull.
Kubranee - - -	Do. Khan Mahomed Khan -	Kelat.
Goorugnaree - -	Do. Moheem Khan - -	Zehree.
Lotanee - - -	Do. Kumal Khan - -	Do.
Mishk - - -	Do. Chakur Khan - -	Juttuck.
Mahomed Hussanee - -	Do. Jahan Khan - -	Mushka.
Sassoolee - - -	Do. Pahar Khan - -	Kozdar.
Haroonee - - -	Do. Peer Bux - - -	Soorab.
Nutwanee - - -	Do. Gul Mahomed - -	Kozdar.
Daizar - - -	Do. Saleh Mahomed - -	Nal.
Khanzai - - -	Do. Attah Khan - -	Huttajee.
Sajee - - -	Do. Sakur - - -	Nal.
Moondranee - - -	Do. Shere Khan - -	Do.
Samalee - - -	Do. Bahee Khan - -	Near Karan.
Oomranee - - -	Do. Sudeek - - -	Mahomed Abad Soorab.
Moogairee - - -	Do. Dost Mahomed - -	Near Bagh.
Ubrah - - -	Do. Abdool Kair - -	Mungool, near Bagh.
Pundranee - - -	Do. Muddut Khan - -	Near Kelat.
Neecharee - - -	Do. Abdool Ahud - -	Kelat.
Jamote Noomreeah, Sindee -	Jam Ali Khan - - -	Lus Beyla.

W. L. MEREWETHER, Colonel,
Commissioner in Sind.

APPENDIX B.

MEMORANDA of Personal Communication by Major John Jacob, C.B., to his Highness the Khan of Khelat, at Mustoong, on the 13th May 1854, referred to in letter No. 88, of the 14th May 1854, to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Heads of Conference with the Khan.

In the year 1841 the British Government, through Colonel Outram, made with your Highness a treaty, by which your Highness bound yourself to be true to the British Government and to Shah Soojah, to protect trade, &c., through your territory, and to conform to some other arrangements, while the British Government agreed to protect your Highness against all foreign enemies.

The death of Shah Soojah, the overthrow of his dynasty, and the complete change of circumstances which have since taken place, necessarily rendered this treaty void, as Government formerly decided, at the recommendation of Sir Charles Napier, when the question was raised in 1842–43.

But your Highness has done nothing in breach of the treaty, and has deserved well of the British Government. While, with reference to the state of the Frontier of Sind, it has always been my opinion that the establishing of a firm, active, and friendly power at Khelat would be greatly for the advantage of the British interests; and accordingly, since I was placed in political charge of the Sind Frontier in 1847, I have never ceased to urge this on Government.

22nd September, 1854.

Conference with his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

There were, however, serious objections to the course recommended by me, which I will presently explain to your Highness. But, on the whole view of the case, the British Government has now authorised me to conclude with your Highness a new treaty, on such terms as will, I trust, afford satisfaction to your Highness, and I hope prove of beneficial effect on all concerned. The difficulties hitherto experienced in effecting a satisfactory arrangement between the two Governments have been caused by the peculiar state of affairs in your Highness' territories, and by the conduct of some of your Highness' officers, especially of the Wuzzeer Mahomed Hussan. Without order and unity of purpose there can be no good government. The British Government for long thought it hopeless to attempt to assist your Highness, because until some intention of establishing order and some unity of purpose appeared, such assistance would have been abused, or, at all events, have been of no permanent benefit.

When the subjects of your Highness plundered and laid waste all the British border in 1843–44, and the Governor of Sind called on your Highness to put a stop to these outrages, your Highness asserted

your inability to control your turbulent subjects. A British army was then led by Sir Charles Napier against the predatory tribes in rebellion against your Highness; punishment was inflicted on them, but still the authority of your Highness did not appear to have been strengthened; your subjects were no better controlled than before, and the British territory was still insulted and wasted by their lawless inroads.

Under these circumstances, to assist your Highness with troops appeared of little use, while pecuniary assistance seemed to be equally objectionable, because whatever aid might be granted would probably be misapplied and wasted on the private intrigues and quarrels of your Highness' feudal chiefs, instead of being employed, as intended, in effecting general arrangements for the good government of your country.

From the first day of my receiving charge of the Frontier of Sind, I have exerted every effort in my power to bring about the establishment of order and good government in your Highness' neighbouring dominions. But I laboured to little or no purpose, for I was always secretly thwarted by your Highness' officers.

As your Highness is aware, the Wuzzeer Mahomed Hussan twice visited me at Jacobabad, and I, thinking that he had the welfare of your Highness in view, fully explained to him my opinions regarding the existing state of affairs, &c.

At our first interview I did not understand his intrigues, but on his second visit he exposed his real object to me, which was nothing less than to induce the British Government to recognise and treat with him on his own account, independently of the Khan of Khelat; in fact, it was treason towards your Highness, his lawful sovereign.

All this I have already explained to your Highness personally, and by letter, and your Highness is acquainted with all that has occurred since.

It was now evident to me wherein had existed the cause of all the disorder and bad management in your Highness' dominions, and the matter soon became publicly apparent; for the Wuzzeer no longer even pretended to restrain evil doers, but encouraged the rebellious subjects of your Highness, the Murrees, in their outrages, released their hostages, and by the presence of his relations and followers, assisted these robbers in plundering Phoolajee, &c.

Mahomed Hussan is, I understand, now finally dismissed from your Highness' councils, and I trust that under the arrangements about to be entered on, a new era of prosperity will commence in your Highness' dominions, which neither the ex-Wuzzeer nor any other traitor will be able to disturb.

It must be evident from my actions as well as words, that from the first I had but one plain object in view. I have not the slightest private enmity towards or regard for Mahomed Hussan or any other of your Highness' officers; but my sole object and that of my Government in this business is to arrange matters so that there may be a strong and friendly Government established throughout the dominions of your Highness. To bring this about it is necessary that the officers of your Highness should be faithful, active, and united.

22nd September 1854. Conference with his Highness the Khan of Khelat.

By the terms of the new treaty your Highness engages to prevent all outrage by your subjects on British territory; but to cause the country to be prosperous and wealthy, and the Government of your Highness to be respected, it is necessary to do more than this.

Measures should be taken to protect life and property within your Highness' own dominions also, and I strongly advise your Highness, as your very true friend, to adopt means to ensure this result.

No oppression or violence should be allowed, whether by great or small.

Justice should be strictly administered to all men. Cultivators and traders should be encouraged and protected, roads made safe and easy, and no private transit, or such like exactions, should be allowed. All this cannot be accomplished without exertion, but if your Highness attend to this advice, and act on it, the State of Khelat will, under your Highness' rule, by God's blessing, become rich, powerful, and respected. But without some such arrangements and efforts from within, no amount of external assistance alone will make it really strong and flourishing. Your Highness should understand that the pecuniary aid now to be given to you by the British Government is really of far more value to your Highness than would be assistance by force of arms, inasmuch as in the latter case it must be apparent to all that your Highness, wanting strength yourself, is only upheld by British troops. On the other hand, the aid now to be afforded to your Highness will, with proper arrangement, materially assist your Highness in establishing a strong Government of your own, in improving your own resources in various ways, and in making such arrangements as will cause your country to become rich, flourishing, and powerful, as it is the wish of the British Government that it should be.

The matter stands as if a man being sick and weakly were assaulted by an enemy, and a friend at hand strike that enemy down; in this case one enemy may be overthrown, but the weak man is no stronger than before, nor in any way permanently benefited. But if, instead of acting thus, the friend, when the other is threatened, administer food, medicine, &c., and thus cause the weak man to become healthy and vigorous, and able to support and defend himself by his own strength, the assistance thus afforded is far more important than the other, and the benefit is evidently infinitely greater.

Your Highness may rest assured that no effort will be wanting on my part to enable your Highness to carry out measures such as I have alluded to, and that they, and they only, can lead to the happiness and prosperity of your Highness, your nobles, and your people.

I beg also to recommend to favourable notice your Highness' servant, Moollah Ahmed, who has so long resided with me as your Highness' representative. He has, in all things, and on all occasions, conducted himself as your Highness' true and faithful subject; he has laboured hard for your Highness' advantage, and it gives me pleasure to be able to say that he has never, on any occasion, while performing his public duty, sought to secure his own private advantage. He is, I know, well acquainted with the views of the British Government towards the State of Khelat, and is well deserving of your Highness' favour.

(Signed) JOHN JACOB.

Appendix C.

Political Department.

The following notification by the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 56-C. P., dated 18th instant, as also the Regulation attached thereto, No. 57-C. P., are republished for general information :—

"No. 56-C. P.

"Foreign Department—(Political).

"Dated Viceroy's Camp, Bombay, the 18th November 1872.

"The following Resolution of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council is published for "information :—

"'At a meeting of the Council of India, held on Thursday, the 3rd October 1872.

"'Resolved, that the provisions of the Act 33 Vict. cap. 3, to make better provision for making Laws and Regulations for certain parts of India, section I., be, and the same are hereby made applicable to the districts noted in the margin hereof, from and after the 1st day of January 1873.'

Kohistan, Johi, Nasirabad, Sujawal, Sehwan, Kakkar, Kambar, Jacobabad, Thul, and Kashmor.

"(Signed) C. U. Aitchison,

"Secretary to the Government of India."

No. 57-C. P.

Foreign Department—(Political).

Dated Viceroy's Camp, Bombay, the 18th November 1872.

With reference to the preceding notification, the following Regulation is published for general information :—

Whereas the Secretary of State for India in Council has, by Resolution in Council, declared the provisions of the thirty-third of Victoria, chapter three, section one, to be applicable from the first day of January 1873 to the districts of Kohistan, Johi, Nasirabad, Sujawal, Sehwan, Kakkar, Kambar, Jacobadad, Thul, and Kashmor, bordering on the Frontier of Sind, from Mithi on the Indus to the sea west of Kurrachee:

And whereas the Governor of Bombay in Council has proposed to the Governor General in Council a draft of the following Regulation, together with the reasons for proposing the same, for the peace and government of the said districts:

And whereas the Governor General in Council has taken such draft and reasons into consideration, and has approved of such draft, and the same has received the Governor General's assent:

In pursuance of the direction contained in the said section, the following Regulation is now published in the "Gazette of India," and will be published in the local "Gazette," and will thereupon have the force of law:

1. In the event of any frontier tribe acting in a hostile or unfriendly manner to the British Government, it shall be lawful for the collector or magistrate of the district, with the previous sanction of the Commissioner in Sind, to sentence to simple imprisonment, for such term as he thinks fit, all or any members of the said tribe, and to detain or confiscate their property (provided that the person so sentenced and the property so detained or confiscated be within British territory), and also to debar members of the tribe from access into British territory, and to prohibit British subjects from all intercourse with such tribe.

2. No new hamlet, village, tower, or walled inclosure shall be erected in British territory, within 20 miles of the frontier line, without the consent of t e collector and magistrate of the district, who shall have power to prohibit the erection thereof if deemed necessary. In the event of the collector and magistrate prohibiting such erection, he must record the grounds of his decision. The collector and magistrate shall also have power to pull down any such walled inclosure erected without his knowledge.

3. The deputy collector and magistrate of the division of the district, with the concurrence of the collector and magistrate of the district, may impose fines on village communities, the members of which, after due inquiry, are found to be guilty of colluding or harbouring criminals, or combining to suppress evidence in criminal cases:

Provided that when the fine imposed shall exceed Rupees (10) ten per head of offenders of the village, the case shall be referred for sanction to the Commissioner in Sind.

All fines imposed under this section shall be recoverable in default of payment in the same manner as arrears of land revenue.

4. When any person is known or believed to have a blood feud, or other cause of quarrel likely to lead to bloodshed, with parties beyond the border, the collector and magistrate may require such person to reside beyond the limits of the territory to which these rules apply, or in such place within the territory as he may deem desirable:

Provided that if such person be a resident of the village, hamlet, or place from which he is required to remove, the sanction of the Commissioner in Sind be obtained.

5. Whenever it may be expedient on military grounds, it shall be lawful for the Commissioner in Sind to direct the removal of any village on the immediate border to any other site within 50 miles of the original site, and to award such sums to the inhabitants as shall, in the opinion of the Commissioner in Sind, be proper in compensation for any loss which may have been occasioned to them by such removal. The Commissioner shall grant an order on the proper officer for the amount of the compensation awarded.

6. When a person is accused of murder or other offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code with death or transportation for life, and the case appears to the collector and magistrate to be one which, from the inadequacy of evidence or other causes, it is not expedient to try according to the

ordinary procedure, the collector and magistrate may cause the case to he referred to the decision of elders, convened according to Pathan or Beluch, or other caste usage, and cause such decision to be carried into effect as if it were a sentence of court, provided such sentence shall extend only to the infliction of a fine on the convicted party.

7. Any man who has sexual intercourse with a person who is, and whom he knows or has reason to believe to be, the wife of another man, without the consent or connivance of that man, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape; and any married woman who knowingly and by her own consent has sexual intercourse with any man who is not her husband, without the consent or connivance of her husband, is guilty of the offence of adultery, and shall be punished with rigorous or simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both.

8. The collector and magistrate of the district, any magistrate of the 1st class inquiring into the case, or, with the sanction of the collector and magistrate of the district, any magistrate duly empowered to commit to the Court of Sessions, may, after recording his reason for doing, tender a pardon to any one or more of the persons supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to any offence, on condition of his or their making a full, true, and fair disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his or their knowledge relative to the crime committed, and every other person concerned in the perpetration thereof.

Any person accepting a tender of pardon under this section shall be examined as a witness in the case under the rules applicable to the examination of witnesses.

Such persons, if not on bail, shall be detained in custody pending the termination of the trial.

A magistrate having tendered a pardon under this section, and examined the accused person, is precluded from trying the case himself.

9. Persons offending against any of the rules here laid down, or against any prohibition on requisition made under the 1st, 2nd, 4th, or 5th sections of this Regulation, shall be liable, on conviction, to imprisonment, rigorous or simple, which may extend to six months, or fine which may extend to Rupees 1,000.

10. In every district a Register shall be kept up of all cases dealt with under this regulation, and a statement of all such cases shall be submitted half-yearly to the Commissioner in Sind.

11. In so far as this Regulation is inconsistent with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian Penal Code, this Regulation supersedes the provisions of those enactments.

C. U. Aitchison,
Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 14.

Punjab Frontier. Memorandum by Mr. Lepel Griffin, Officiating Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated October 1876.

The instructions in accordance with which the report is prepared.

Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India has called for a special report clearly explaining the present system of administration of the frontier districts of the Punjab, the respective duties of the civil, political, and military authorities with one another, and the manner in which all are supervised and controlled. It is further directed that the report, besides embodying such statistical information as may be availiable with reference to the territories with which it deals, should note any laws or rules in exclusive operation in the frontier districts, as distinct from the other parts of the province, and be accompanied by a sketch map showing the civil and military stations, the roads by which they are connected, and the location, names and strength of the independent tribes bordering on each district.

The method of treating these subjects in the report.

2. In order to carry out the instructions of the Secretary of State with clearness and conciseness, it is necessary in the first place to briefly describe the characteristics of the frontier districts and of their population, and then to note the civil, political and military arrangements for their administration. The names locality, and strength of the various independent tribes on the border will then be given, followed by a description of the policy adopted towards them by the Punjab Government and detailing those measures which, within the last few years, have been carried out with the object of maintaining the peace and good order of the frontier. It will then be necessary briefly to notice what may reasonably be presumed to be the effect of the policy pursued and the measures adopted, in the attitude assumed at the present time by each individual tribe towards the British Government, and, in conclusion, to show how closely the interests of the tribes are bound up with those of the districts to which they are contiguous; the degree in which the interior tracts have advanced in prosperity and security, and the identity of interests of both border and plain country Trans-Indus with the tracts to the eastward of the river.

General description of the frontier.

3. The North-west Frontier of the Punjab comprises the six districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Dera Ghazi Khan; the line of frontier being conveniently held to extend from a point on the river Jhelum, halfway between the hill sanitaria of Abbot-abad and Murree, running due north with the Kaghan ranges into the high Himalayas, nearly to Chilas, and then descending to the south till it touches the Indus

where that river emerges from the hills at Torbeyla. Turning to the north to enclose the fertile plain of Yusafzai, it again takes a southerly direction, where it crosses the Swat river, and, from that point, descends almost due south till it touches Kasmor on the Indus, on the border of Sind. The frontier line has never been strictly defined, and the boundaries shown on maps is merely that of the topographical survey, the limits of which were influenced by considerations of departmental convenience and not of general policy.

Two of these districts, Hazara and Kohat, are hilly, and in parts mountainous. The other four are almost level plains, only broken by deep ravines and torrent beds which make even the Peshawar valley difficult for the movements of cavalry and guns.

The characteristics of the people inhabiting them differ almost as much as the character of the districts themselves, and it is necessary, in as few words as possible, to describe each district before giving an account of the independent tribes beyond the border, and of the system by which they are controlled.

4. The area of the Hazara district is 2,835 square miles, and it is 95 miles in length. The land revenue amounts to Rs. 221,366, and the gross revenue to Rs. 252,922 per annum. The upper portion, especially that known as Kaghan, is entirely composed of mountain ranges, covered with magnificent forests; the lower portion of the district is, although elevated, more level, and possessing an abundant supply of water, produces excellent corps. The population, numbering 367,218 persons is generally peaceable and unwarlike. Its largest element consists of immigrants expelled, some centuries ago, from the neighbouring Swat valley, a physically weak and contemptible race. These form nearly a third of the inhabitants of the Hazara district; nearly half of the remainder is composed of descendants from Rajput and other Hindu tribes, Gujars, Ghakkars, Dunds and Karals, who have for the most part adopted the Muhammadan creed. They are industrious and good cultivators, and form the best part of the Hazara population. Descendants of Afghan immigrants, related to the Yusafzai and other tribes in the neighbourhood, constitute a fifth of the whole. It has, of recent years, been asserted that the inhabitants of the Hazara district are of a fierce and warlike disposition, and exceedingly difficult to control; but this false idea is really due to the fact of their rebelling against the oppression of the Sikh occupation. The country no doubt is mountainous and strong, but the people, though litigious, are singularly unwarlike in their habits. Their treatment has been so liberal, and the assessment of land revenue so light under British rule, that they are generally content; that they are prosperous is shown by the large annual export of silver from the district; and the only Hazara difficulties of late years have been in connexion with certain unruly independent tribes who will be hereafter referred to.

The Hazara district.

5. The Peshawar district contrasts remarkably with that just described. Consisting of a wide and level plain, it is abundantly watered by the large rivers of Swat and Kabul, and is broken only by deep ravines which intersect it in every direction. The area, 2,497 square miles, is somewhat less than that of Hazara, but the land revenue, which exceeds Rs. 651,000 per annum, is larger than in any other frontier district. The length from north to south is 50 miles, but the border adjoining independent territory is 170 miles long, adjoining the lands of the Jadans, Bonerwals, Swatis, Ranizais, Utman Khel, Mohmands and Afridis, independent and fanatical tribes. From Sikh and Afghan days Peshawar has had an infamous reputation for the character of its inhabitants, who required for their control the sternest administrators the Sikh Government had at his command, and for its climate, which, owing to the excessive irrigation from the streams and rivers, and also from the valley being inclosed by lofty hills, is, at certain seasons of the year, pestilential in the extreme. The inhabitants are strangely mixed. Ninety-five per cent. are Muhammadans, the few Hindus being found as bankers, merchants, and shopkeepers in the city of Peshawar and the larger villages. This observation, indeed, applies to all the districts south of Peshawar. The population is Muhammadan, the Hindus being but a small minority carrying on money-lending and trading in the towns. The majority is of Pathan blood, for the census estimate of 46 per cent. is believed to be considerably below the mark, and 60 per cent. to represent it more nearly. The total population of the district is rather more than half a million, of which about one-sixth are Yusafzais, an Afghan clan inhabiting the high plain to the north. After the Yusafzais the most important tribe is the Mohmand, about 30,000 in number, and related to the independent tribe of the same name beyond the border. The remainder of the population is made up of numerous Afghan tribes, representing all the tribes and clans on the Peshawar border, and Punjabi Muhammadans from Cis-Indus districts.

The Peshawar district.

The Kohat district.

6. The district of Kohat is almost entirely composed of a system of low barren hills, from which it derives its name, intermingled with small but fertile valleys. Its area is 2,839 square miles, and it yields a gross revenue of Rs. 1,98,167 per annum, of which Rs. 94,213 is from the land. The importance of the district is due to the existence of extensive salt mines, the produce of which is used throughout the Trans-Indus territory and Afghanistan, and which, chiefly from political considerations, is taxed much more lightly than the produce of the Jhelum mines which supply the greater part of North India to the east of the Indus. The Afridis are the principal carriers, and the power of being able to raise the price or stopping the supply of this necessary article is an important means of controlling this and the neighbouring tribes. The city of Peshawar is the central depôt of the salt trade, from whence it is taken by traders to Jalalabad, Kashmir and Kashgar, and exchanged for the produce of those countries. The Sikh Government charged the same rates on the Kohat as on the red Jhelum salt, without any known injurious effect on the trade; but their income from this source never exceeded half a lakh of rupees, which is now doubled, notwithstanding the exceedingly low rate of duty levied. The inhabitants of this district, amounting to 145,419, of whom 102,431 are Afghans, are, in the north, Khattaks, one of the finest tribes on the whole of the frontier, who supply our regiments with many of their best soldiers. The Bangash tribe is almost as numerous, amounting to 31,212, and generally is quiet and well disposed. The Kohat valley, which runs up to Afghan territory as far as the Kurm river, is well watered and fertile; but the trade of Kohat, as its political importance, is centred in its mines of grey salt.

The Bannu district.

7. Bannu is a flat, open plain like Peshawar, and, like it, abundantly watered by the Kurm and Gumbela rivers. The rainfall being exceedingly scanty, cultivation is almost entirely dependent upon irrigation from these streams. The area of the Bannu district is 3,171 square miles, and a large subdivision named from its principal town, Mianwali, lies Cis-Indus. In this part of the district there is a larger proportion of Hindu cultivators than in the Trans-Indus portion, where Bannuchis, a mongrel Afghan tribe, are about the worst specimens of the race on the frontier,—avaricious, litigious, bigoted, and false. Their physique, owing to the malarious climate, is as degraded as their morals. They are cowardly and unwarlike, and on this account give less trouble than the next most important section of the population, the Waziris, who are in appearance and in character immeasurably their superiors. The south of Bannu district is inhabited by the Marwatis, a high caste Pathan race, brave, simple, and honest, who form as great a contrast as can be conceived to their northern neighbours, the Bannuchis. Their country, a high plain with water so far below the surface that few wells can be sunk, is almost entirely dependent on rainfall for its crops, receiving in a few tracts partial irrigation from the mountain streams. The people are, however, in spite of great natural difficulties, successful agriculturists. They are exceedingly well disposed towards the British Government, and crime against property is rare among them. The land revenue of the district is Rs. 4,23,858 per annum, and the total revenue Rs. 4,70,076, raised from a population of 287,547 persons.

The Dera Ismail Khan district.

8. The district of Dera Ismail Khan, separated from Marwat by a range of hills which here crosses the Indus and joins the Salt Range in Rawalpindi and Jhelum, is a long strip of country, measuring 102 miles from north to south, dropping with an almost imperceptible slope from the independent hills to the Indus. That portion of it which has a sufficiency of irrigation is fertile, and especially the Tank valley, which till recently has remained in semi-independent charge of its hereditary chief. In a great part of the district, however, the rainfall being very small and irrigation wanting, the country is little better than a desert, and can only be cultivated in those exceptional years when abundant rain may happen to fall. The population of the interior of the district is as peaceable and orderly as that of any Cis-Indus territory, in which, indeed, by far the larger portion of this district lies, but this, with the exception of the low lands near the river, or where water is sufficiently near to permit wells to be sunk, is but thinly peopled and little cultivated. The manner in which cultivation has been extended since the last settlement in this wild and difficult country will be adverted to later. The area of the district is 7,096 square miles, but although, with one exception, more than double the size of any other frontier district, it stands only second in point of revenue; both the gross collections of Rs. 4,72,992 and the land assessment of Rs. 3,85,806 per annum, being below those of Peshawar. The original population of the district appears to have been Jat. Then came an immigration of Biluchis from the south, forming the bulk of the present population of the Kolachi subdivision, below the Ushtrana country, few being found north of the town of Dera Ismail Khan.. In the south they are the dominant class; in the country Cis-Indus they are mixed with and practically on an equality with the Jats.

The only Biluch tribe found together in any numbers is the Kasranis, inhabiting the country about Daulatwala. The Pathans occupy the north of the district up to Isa Khel, together with Marwatis, all recent settlers and rapidly increasing in numbers. They are not, like Jats and Biluchis, scattered over the district, but form a continuous fringe along the Kolachi and Tank subdivisions, and in number amount to about 50,000.

The Dera Ghazi Khan district.

9. The characteristics of Dera Ghazi Khan resemble closely those of the Trans-Indus portion of the Dera Ismail Khan district. It consists of a strip of country, some 170 miles in length, lying between the Indus and the hills, here entirely occupied by Biluch tribes. The area of the district is 4,740 square miles, the land revenue amounting to Rs. 3,88,007 per annum, and the gross collections to Rs. 4,66,816 per annum. The character of its independent neighbours has exercised as great an influence upon the interior of Dera Ghazi Khan as it has in the districts to the north. Out of the 308,840 forming the population, a third are Biluch. Half the population of the district consists of Jats, originally of Hindu descent but Muhammadans for many generations past, and the remainder is composed of Pathan immigrants, and a larger proportion of pure Hindus than are found elsewhere on the border. The character of the population of Dera Ghazi Khan may generally be described as being as well-disposed and law abiding as that of any district in North India. As in Dera Ismail Khan the rainfall is very scanty, in some years no rain falling at all. The people are, however, skilful cultivators, and the elaborate system of inundation canals from the River Indus both attests their industry and raises the producing power of the district to a not unfavourable standard of comparison with others possessing much greater natural advatages.

Communications.

10. The length of frontier thus described* is about 704 miles. As regards communications, the Trans-Indus territory is, owing to the character of the country and the poverty of the local funds, far behind the rest of the Punjab. Communications are carried on for the greater portion of the length of the frontier by two roads, one in the interior of the districts connecting the principal towns, and the other, close to the border, connecting the outposts of the regular army and the militia, and maintained in order by the military commandants. All travelling has to be performed on horses or camels, and during the rainy season, owing to the alluvial character of the soil which becomes after rain almost as slippery as ice, travelling is exceedingly difficult and laborious. The only break in the frontier line is where a narrow strip of independent territory intervenes between the important stations of Peshawar and Kohat, regarding which a dispute is now unsettled with a portion of the Afridi tribe, which will be referred to hereafter.

The civil administration.

11. The system of civil administration of the frontier is similar to that which prevails throughout the Punjab. The three northern districts form the commissionership of Peshawar, the three southern ones that of Derajat. The Commissioner of Peshawar is the officer who, under the Lieutenant-Governor, conducts all necessary negotiations with the Kabul court. So far, indeed, as the tribes on the immediate border are concerned, there is little communication with the Amir; for he has no authority, real or asserted, over them, with one or two exceptions, which will be noted in their place. The questions most frequently referred to Kabul are matters of general policy, not specially affecting the Punjab border, in which the Lieutenant-Governor being, *ex officio*, the diplomatic successor of the Governor General's Agent on the North-western Frontier, merely acts as the medium for communicating, either through the officer most conveniently situated, or personally, like Sir John Lawrence in 1855, the wishes, policy, and orders of the Supreme Government. This method of conducting the diplomatic business of the British Government with Kabul has remained unchanged since the annexation of the Punjab, and has worked without

	Population according to census of 1868.	Area in Square Miles.	Land Revenue in 1875–6.	Gross Revenue 1875–76.	Length of District.	Length of Frontier District.
			Rs.	Rs.		
*Hazara - - -	367,218	2,835	2,21,366	2,52,922	95 miles.	120 miles.
Peshawar - -	523,152	2,497	6,51,537	7,75,213	50 „	170 „
Kohat - - -	145,419	2,839	94,213	1,98,167	50 „	60 „
Bannu - - -	287,547	3,171	4,23,858	4,70,076	55 „	60 „
Dera Ismail Khan -	394,864	7,096	3,85,806	4,72,992	102 „	124 „
Dera Ghazi Khan -	308,840	4,740	3,88,007	4,66,816	170 „	170 „
Total - - -	2,027,040	23,178	21,64,787	26,36,186	522 miles.	704 miles.

difficulty or friction. The Punjab Government, from the nature of the case, has never had a policy of its own towards Kabul, and has only carried out the policy prescribed by the Government of India.

Each district is governed by a Deputy Commissioner, who, in subordination to the Commissioner of the Division, has full control over the civil and political work. He is the chief magistrate, original and appellate, and carries on all necessary communications with the independent tribes on his border. He has nothing to do with questions affecting Kabul; for the frontier of his district does not touch, except in one or two points, territory owned by or in any way controlled by the Amir of Kabul. Subordinate to him, in the three most heavily worked districts, is a civil judge, bearing the title of Judicial Assistant, and, in all, European and Native assistant magistrates with the rank of Assistant and Extra Assistant Commissioner, having both civil and criminal original jurisdiction, and their number varying with the amount of work to be performed in the district. Still lower in the administrative scale are the Native revenue officials in charge of the several subdivisions, the Tahsildars; whilst each revenue charge has a subordinate Native judge who disposes of the less important civil cases, and from whose orders an appeal lies to the Judicial Assistant. There are, moreover, honorary magistrates, of whom a list is given in a statement annexed, chosen from among the more capable and influential of the chiefs, and not only disposing of a considerable amount of judicial work, but strengthening the administration by their example and their active exertions in the cause of law and order. The entire control of the civil, political, and police arrangements of the districts of their divisions rests with the Commissioners, under the direct orders of the local government. These officers have been, in Peshawar permanently, and in the Derajat temporarily, relieved of the necessity of hearing civil, and, so far as they may choose, criminal appeals, by the appointment of additional commissioners as civil and sessions judges. They have thus been set free for the most important part of their work, the administrative control of their districts and the satisfactory management of the relations of Government with the independent tribes.

Appendix A., p. 83.

The military arrangements of the frontier.

12. The military defence of the frontier is, one district excepted, entrusted to the Punjab Frontier Force, under the immediate orders of the Lieutenant-Governor of the province. This force consists of 12,402 men, of whom 8,967 are infantry, 2,827 cavalry, and 606 artillery, with 16 mountain guns, two light field batteries with four guns each, being now converted into mountain batteries. The exception is Peshawar, the headquarters of a brigade of the Bengal army, and, with Nowshera and five outlying fortresses in the valley, absorbing nearly a quarter of the whole of the Bengal force in the province. The Peshawar garrison occupies one of the most important military positions in India, and the character of the command is shown by the fact that while the portion of the Bengal army quartered in the province amounts to 16,889 British troops, and 18,244 Native, with 97 field guns, no less than 8,059 men of this force, 2,976 British troops, 5,083 Native, and 19 guns, are cantoned in the Peshawar district.

The Punjab Frontier Force is composed of many races, but principally Sikhs, Afghans, Gurkhas and Punjabi Muhammadans. A large proportion of the soldiers are recruits from independent territory, who readily take service; and that there is a very general spirit of loyalty and contentment in the force is shown by the fact that during the year 1874 there were, notwithstanding the ample opportunities of absconding, only 27 desertions, many of these being the cases of men who failed, for unknown reasons, to rejoin from leave from foreign territory. The Afridis, splendid fighting men, take service most readily. Of them are to be found in the force 732 men; while of other independent mountaineers, Orakzais, Mohmands, &c., there are 333. In regiments under the Commander-in-Chief are 1,196 men of independent tribes, chiefly Afridis. The Biluchis do not take service, there only being a few in the different regiments. A statement annexed to this memorandum gives the exact composition of the force. The policy of enlisting men of independent tribes with whom hostilities at some time or another are not improbable, has been sometimes questioned, but there is a general agreement among competent authorities in its favour. It results in leaving among the tribes an influential body of men favourably disposed to the Government, and impressed with a knowledge of its power and resources: while in war the sense of military honour and fidelity of these mountaineers is strong, and they fight, against even their own clansmen, without demur. The command of the Frontier Force is with a brigadier-general, and the military administration is locally distinct from the civil and political, but combined with it in the hands of the Lieutenant-Governor.

Appendix B., p. 84.

The co-operation of the civil and military authorities.

13. The military head-quarters in each district is also the head-quarters of the magistrate of the district, who, under the general Army Regulations, is empowered, at his discretion and on his

personal responsibility, to call upon the officer commanding for such military service as may be of an urgent nature, reporting at once to his immediate superior and the local Government the character and necessity of the requisition.

All the troops of the Frontier Force are furnished with carriage, and are ready to move out at a moment's notice. All military operations are directed by the officer in command, who is supported by the local knowledge and influence of the district officer and the tribal chiefs. No inconvenience or conflict of authority is found to arise from this separation of civil and military authority. It has, indeed, the best results, and in the normal and peaceful state of the frontier it merely represents that division of labour which aids and ensures good administration. Nor does the fact of the Frontier Force being under the local Government give rise to any conflict of authority even in the Peshawar district. Where active service is such as to require only the use of the local force, the brigadier-general commanding the Frontier Force directs the operations; but if it be advisable to unite with them troops of the Bengal army, the whole force at once passes under the command of the Commander-in-Chief.

The discipline and efficiency of the force were only last November praised by the Government of India, and in the recent camps of exercise at Hassan Abdal, at Delhi and before His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, regiments of the Frontier Force were held to compare not unfavourably with those of the Bengal army.

Under the officer commanding in each district, in consultation with the magistrate so far as recommendations for enlistments and dismissals are concerned, are the Frontier Militia, who hold the intermediate outposts not occupied by troops. The intimate knowledge of the country, of the headmen and chiefs, and of the independent tribes, which this duty enables military officers to acquire, is of the utmost advantage to the civil head of the district and is most freely made use of. Their services have proved of great value to the civil administration, and the reorganisation of the militia, to which reference will hereafter be made, was effected chiefly on the advice and with the assistance of the officers commanding the several districts on the frontier.

14. The following is a list of the principal independent tribes on the Punjab border, showing the district which they adjoin, and their estimated number of fighting men :

The independent tribes on the border.

Locality.	Tribe.	Race.	Number of Fighting Men. Of each.	Total.
Adjoining Hazara	Akazais	Pathan	1,000	7,200
	Hassanzais	Pathan	1,700	
Adjoining Peshawar	Jaduns	Pathan	2,500	
	Bonerwals	Pathan	2,000	
	Swatis	Pathan	6,000	11,000
	Utman Khels	Pathan	5,000	
	Mohmands	Pathan (dependent on Kabul.)	16,000	16,000
Adjoining Kohat and Peshawar	Afridis	Pathan	23,500	23,500
Adjoining Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan.	Orakzais	Pathan	29,500	29,500
	Zaimusht Afghans	Pathan	4,500	
	Turis	Pathan	5,000	53,500
	Wazirs	Pathan	44,000	
Adjoining Dera Ismail Khan	Sheoranis	Pathan	5,000	
	Ustranas	Pathan	900	7,400
	Kasranis	Biluch	1,500	
	Bozdars	Biluch	2,700	2,700
	Khetrans	Pathan	4,500	4,500
Adjoining Dera Ghazi Khan	Khosas	Biluch	4,000	
	Lagharis	Biluch	3,700	
	Gurchanis	Biluch	1,200	
	Marris	Biluch	2,500	14,900
	Bugtis	Biluch	1,500	
	Mazaris	Biluch	2,000	
		Total	- -	170,200*

* The numbers here given differ in many cases and in the total from those furnished in the Administration Reports of this Government, but the present statement has been carefully compiled and is believed to give as near an approximation of the numbers as can be attained. No census of these tribes is of course possible, and the figures must be accepted as a mere approximation. They comprise all the adult males in the tribes capable of bearing arms, and in the case of no single tribe would it be possible to bring into the field much more than half the numbers here entered, even were it not that, with the Afghans, feuds of the most deadly description between the numerous sections of a particular tribe prevent them from coalescing as a whole, except in the presence of extreme danger threatening the safety of the whole tribe.

15. The attitude at the present time of each of these tribes towards the Government will hereafter be noticed; but it is in the first place necessary to explain and illustrate the general policy which has of late years been pursued towards them. The Secretary of State has desired that any discussion of a controversial character as to the merits of the systems pursued in the Punjab and Sind should be scrupulously avoided. Such a discussion under no circumstances and at no time would the Lieutenant-Governor desire to open. He does not know a Sind policy or a Punjab policy, and his endeavour has uniformly been to carry out on the frontier the imperial policy approved by the Government of India. He would not assert any superiority in the measures adopted in the Punjab, or in the men who worked them, over Sind policy or Sind officers. If they have differed as to the policy to be pursued, it may be presumed, not that one province was right and the other wrong, but that circumstances differed in the Punjab and Sind. It is important to bear this in mind, or there will be an irremediable confusion as to the merits of particular systems of frontier policy, and a belief in the existance of a rivalry between those favoured by the Punjab and Bombay, a rivalry which is most certainly unknown in the Punjab. The conditions of the borders of the Punjab and Sind are absolutely different; conclusions drawn from the state of affairs on the Sind border would not necessarily be applicable to the Punjab; and experience gained in Sind alone furnishes no certain guide for the decision of disputed questions on the Punjab frontier. The Lieutenant-Governor has no reason to doubt that the policy of Sind has been wise and successful; but the political officers on that border have only been concerned with two or three Biluch tribes, such as the Marris and Bugtis, who are the nominal subjects of the Khelat State, and who border on Dera Ghazi Khan. With this district alone would a comparison be possible, for throughout the whole remaining Trans-Indus territory the conditions of comparison are altogether absent. This point is one of extreme importance, and in discussions on frontier policy is generally overlooked.*

The policy pursued towards the independent tribes by the Punjab Government.

16. The boundary between the Afghan and Biluch tribes is ordinarily fixed at Vihowa, opposite Dera Fatah Khan, and at the southern extremity of the Dera Ismail Khan district. This point has been somewhat arbitrarily fixed, but, as a general rule, it may be said that all the tribes *north* of this point are *Afghan* and all below it, with the single exception of the Khetrans, are *Biluch*.

The Biluch-Afghan boundary. The extreme difference between these races.

The Punjab Government, so far as it can be justly said to have any regular system at all in the management of the hill tribes, has two systems,—one suited to Afghan tribes, and one to Biluch. Between these races there is, so far as their national and political constitution is concerned, little in common. While both the Afghan and Biluch communities are in the tribal phase of social progress, the organisation of the former resembles the germ from which democratic institutions may have arisen, whilst in the constitution of the latter may be traced the rudiments from which monarchical principles may have been devoloped. The Biluch tribes have thus a tendency towards an aristocratic and oligarchical form of government, rendering obedience and service to their acknowledged chiefs, who are thus the natural channel of communication with their tribesmen, and through whom any desired amount of control can be effectively exercised. This manner of influencing the Biluch tribes has for many years past been followed in the Dera Ghazi Khan district, and generally with success.

With the Afghans to the north such a system of management would be useless. Their national constitution inclines rather to the republican than the aristocratic. Every tribe is divided and sub-divided into numerous clans, each independent of the others and yielding but small obedience to its own petty headmen; constantly indulging in internecine war; hating each other with the hatred begotten of generations of blood feuds; with interests ever in collision, and only uniting under the most exceptional circumstances against a common enemy. Control exercised over such tribes through their chiefs would be impossible, for the chiefs do not exist. With them the only policy which showed hopes of success was, in peaceful times, to render the whole tribe friendly by conciliatory, just, and liberal treatment, and by encouraging their settlement in British territory; and when times of difficulty arose, to divide the hostile tribe by playing the interests of one section against those of the others.

17. One great superiority of Biluchis over Afghans is their freedom from religious bigotry. Afghans are blindly subservient to their priests, and this is the chief reason that European life is so insecure in their hills, while it is safe among the Biluchis, there being no instance on record of a

Superiority of Biluchis over Afghans.

* The great difference of the Sind and the Punjab in questions having reference to the States on their border, Khelat and Afghanistan, is further noticed in para. 40-41.

European being assassinated by them. The character and influence of the Afghan religious teachers have been described by many writers. The *Taliban-ul-ilm*, or "seekers of wisdom," half students, half secular priests, swarm in the mosques, leading an idle life and ever ready to incite their clansmen to mischief. They are ignorant and fanatical in an extreme degree. Where life is easy and food cheap, as in the Swat and Daur valleys, they most abound, and with reference to the last-named tract, the scene of our latest military expedition, it is notorious that to the dictation of these priests are the Dauris indebted for any exhibition of martial spirit which they may have ever shown. The entire absence of religious bigotry in the Biluchis makes their control comparatively easy, for there is not the perpetual fear of some outbreak of fanatical rage against the infidel, which, to the north and among Afghan tribes, has always to be guarded against.

The effects of Sikh misgovernment and the difficulties of early English rule.

18. The system of the Punjab Government on the North-west Frontier has varied with the times. We succeeded to an inheritance of anarchy, the result of the Sikh management of the Trans-Indus districts. They had ever been in a state of war with the border tribes and even with the people in the interior of the districts. The whole country was studded with forts, each the head-quarters of a robber chief, and the revenue was collected by an army or not collected at all. With the introduction of English rule a change was at once apparent, and the border became tranquil in comparison with its condition in the time that had preceded it. But it was not to be expected that the savage and suspicious races in the independent hills should at once accept the new order of things, abandon their predatory habits, and look upon the English successors of their old enemies as their friends. Expedition after expedition was necessary to show each tribe, in turn, the strength of the British Government, and the folly of resisting it by force of arms; while, the lesson having been taught, no effort was spared to encourage friendly feelings, and to show the mountaineers that all the British Government insisted upon was the peace of its border. This ensured, the hillmen were as free to go and come and trade within British territory as our own subjects.

The results of the firm yet friendly policy of the Government.

That this policy has been successful is proved by the fact that within the last six years but one expedition has been necessary into independent territory, and this took place so far back as 1872, when the inhabitants of the Daur valley to the west of the Bannu district received a necessary lesson by which they have so far profited as to remain on good terms with the Government ever since.

The nature of frontier punishments.

19. The active measures which the Government adopts, when necessary, for the punishment of hostile or unfriendly tribes beyond its border, consist in fines, blockades, and military expeditions. Before describing the manner in which these punishments are applied, it is desirable to say a few words upon the nature of the outrages which the independent tribes are in the habit of committing in British territory, and to describe the character of their country from a military point of view.

The military aspect of the border.

20. The whole line of the frontier, from the extreme northern limits of Hazara to below the fort of Harrand, in the Dera Ghazi Khan district, consists of a continuous line of difficult and rugged mountains. From the lofty peaks of Khagan and the lower Himalayan ranges above Peshawar to the low hills on the Dera Ghazi Khan and Sind frontier, the ranges generally decrease in height and the passes in difficulty, from the north towards the south, only rising again to a formidable elevation in the Suliman range opposite the district of Dera Ismail Khan.

The map which accompanies this report does not show the line of hills, and would thus give, unless the character of the frontier were specially noted, an erroneous impression. The fact is that the territory in possession of the British Government runs up to the very foot of the hills which have from obvious reasons of convenience been called the frontier. In the lower part of Dera Ghazi Khan the hills become low and easy, and on the Jacobabad border altogether recede from the line held by the Government.

The military qualities of the Biluch and Afghan tribes.

21. A reference to maps and to the records of our hostile operations on the Biluch and Afghan frontiers will clearly show that the *Afridis*, Mohmands, and the Bonerwals are each as much more formidable an enemy than the Biluchis, as the high rugged mountain ranges of the northern Punjab frontier are more difficult of penetration and invasion than the flat plain on the Sind border. Mere detachments have penetrated to the headquarters of the Marri tribe; but no one acquainted with the facts would assert that anything less than a *corps d'armée* could cross our frontier and enter the Khaibar or the Tira hills with a

prospect of success. So far as the fighting qualities of the border tribes are concerned it has been already shown that those adjoining the Hazara district are comparatively contemptible as soldiers, their extreme religious bigotry alone making up for their absence of martial qualities.

To the south, between the Swat river and Dera Ismail Khan, the Afghan tribes are both fanatical and brave in an extraordinary degree. Courage with them is the first of virtues, and cowardice the worst of crimes.

The Biluchis as turbulent and formerly of habits quite as predatory as their neighbours, are still of a far milder and more amenable disposition. They are as brave as the Afghans, but they are animated by no fanatical hatred of the English, they have not the military genius of the Afghans, and as an enemy on the hillside they are far less formidable. As an illustration of their rude conception of tactics it may be mentioned, that though famed as horsemen, it is their rule to dismount for a fight, which is conducted hand to hand, and often with sword and shield. Less robust than the Afghans they still are remarkable for their endurance and make incredibly long journies on their mares of a renowned breed. The character of their country seems, to a certain extent, to have developed their method of attack. Comparatively low ridges intersected by numerous and easy passes, favour their style of attack and reprisal, which consists of dashing and unforseen inroads followed by precipitate retreats.

22. The outrages perpetrated in British territory by the independent tribes are numerous and of many kinds. Sometimes, and especially in the early days of British occupation, raids in force have been directed against British territory, almost rising to the dignity of open war. Such was the attack of the Kasranis on Dera Fatah Khan in 1852. On the northern frontier, especially in the Peshawar district, fanaticism has excited wild and bigoted men to attempt the life of individual Europeans, believing that the assassination of an infidel was a sure passport to Paradise. To this fierce feeling of fanaticism may be attributed the deaths of the customs officers, Messrs. Tapp and Carne in 1851, on the Khagan frontier, and the murders of Colonel Mackeson and Major Adams, Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, and Lieutenant Ommanney, in 1853 and 1865. Nor have Europeans alone been the object of attack. Natives and Native officers have been the victims of assassination; villagers killed in the commission of raids, and detachments of troops inveigled into murderous ambuscades. If these more special forms of frontier offences be put aside, together with a large class of murders due to female infidelity, and offences against the person attributed to the possession of arms, there remains as the residuum, those crimes which it might naturally be presumed would be committed by fierce and savage tribes inhabiting barren hills impregnable except to a large force, and overlooking fertile plains which from time immemorial they have considered as their rightful prey.

The nature of the outrages of the border tribes.

23. Those offences which mostly fill the frontier calendar are, horse stealing, house breaking, and above all, cattle stealing, the mere brigandage of wild tribes and the gravamen of which consists in an association of numbers to accomplish the offence, and the free and sacred asylum given in the independent hills to the successful marauders. The complete suppression of robbery in a land of brigands is of course impossible; depredations may be said to be almost invited by the character of the country and by special causes, prominent among which is the annual migration of the great trading tribe of Afghanistan, the Powindas, with their camels and immense herds and flocks to Hindustan, for whose protection special measures have been adopted which will be hereafter noticed.

Ordinary frontier offences.

24. For the defence of the plain country against the incursions of hill robbers there is a line of posts, military and militia, along the frontier. On the border of the Hazara, Peshawar, and Kohat districts these are comparatively few and far between, but are held in considerable strength by regular troops. Here the difficulty of the country, and, as regards the Peshawar and Kohat border, the jealous and stubborn character of the tribes render the pursuit of raiders and robbers too difficult and too likely to cause future complications to be hastily adopted. Indeed, with the exception of the Afridis, the tribes on the Punjab border, including the districts of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, are the jealous guardians of mountain passes that lead to nowhere. Under such circumstances, and with no possible advantage to be gained by the occupation of these barren hills, obvious considerations of military prudence limit pursuit, in the case of a raid, to the mouth of the passes; and an officer who attempted to enter, with an inadequate force, a defile in possession of the enemy, would be undertaking a grave responsibility.

Military defence. The forts and outposts.

The line of defence in Bannu and the two southern districts of the Derajat is maintained by smaller and far more frequent posts, only 10 or 12 miles apart, and each situated so as to command one or more of the numerous passes leading to the hills. These outposts are garrisoned, in part by troops of the Frontier Force, and partly by them associated with the Frontier Militia; and the smaller and less important ones by the Frontier Militia alone. While, from the local knowledge of the militiamen, intelligence is often gained which leads to the prevention of a raid or robbery, yet such is the inevitable exposure of the villages and cultivated lands which lie between the posts and the hills, such the carelessness of a population habituated to danger, and such the facilities for attack and flight which the numerous passes afford, that it is only too often the case that the first intelligence which a military outpost receives of a raid is the news that it has been committed and that the robbers are already back in the hills.

A list of the military and militia outposts on the Punjab border, showing the composition of the garrison of each, is attached as an appendix to this memorandum.

Appendix C., p. 85.

25. Such being the nature of the country from a military point of view, such the martial qualities of the independent tribes, and such the nature of the offences committed by them against British territory, it remains to note the manner in which these offences are punished.

Modes of punishment used. Fines.

The most simple method of punishing a refractory tribe, and in many cases the most effectual, is to inflict a fine and demand compensation for plundered property or for lives lost. When the tribe is dependent upon trade with British territory, or when a portion resides within British limits, or is easily accessible from the plains to the attack of a military force, the demand for payment of fine and compensation is usually acceded to, and being paid, the tribe is again received into favour. Should the demand be refused, hostages are demanded, or members of the tribe and their property found within British territory are seized, until such time as the compensation and fine are paid.

26. Against some tribes, as at the present time against that section of the Afridis responsible for the safety of the Kohat Pass, a blockade is an effective measure of punishment, though year by year it has been found less necessary to make use of it. It can only be employed against such tribes as trade with British territory, like the Afridis, who undertake most of the carrying trade of the northern portion of the frontier. During the continuance of a blockade the offending tribe is prohibited from entering British territory, and any members found there, in contravention of the order, are arrested. This means of punishment has often been found most effectual, and if effectual, it is preferable to a military expedition, which leaves behind it bitter memories in the destruction of property and loss of life. A very full statement is appended showing, for all the frontier districts, the offences committed, the method of coercion, and the reparation exacted.

Blockades.

Appendix D., p. 87.

27. Last, as a means of punishment, comes the military expedition, which is only resorted to in exceptional circumstances and when every other means of coercing a hostile tribe has failed. A statement attached to this memorandum gives the number of expeditions which have been undertaken since annexation, and it is sufficient proof that they were necessary and effected their object,—that the tribes formerly so persistently hostile have so far changed their attitude as to have rendered, since 1869, but one expedition necessary, and that of a small force and only of a few days' duration.

Military expeditions.

Appendix E., p. 119.

28. The manner in which expeditions against hostile tribes on the Punjab frontier have been conducted has been much misunderstood, and has been the object of much undeserved reprobation. It may be truthfully asserted that the operations against the independent tribes have been distinguished by the utmost consideration, both before the march of the expedition and during the continuance of actual warfare. An expedition is never proposed by the local Government unless the officers on the spot are able to show so long a list of insults and offences that military action is absolutely necessary to maintain the prestige of the British Government. Sometimes, when it is necessary to strike a sudden blow, no previous notice is given to the tribe; at other times, as in the Ambeyla and Black Mountain expeditions, warning after warning has been given, and troops slowly collected, in order to allow the recusant tribes to make their submission and render hostilities unnecessary. When an expedition has entered the hills its proceedings are not characterised, as has so often been stated, with any unnecessary harshness or barbarity. The universal habit of Pathan tribes, when they have made up their minds to fight, is to remove their women, children, and cattle to a distance. They are well armed, fine marksmen, and fond of fighting. Their tactics are to contest our advance as long as they can in safety. Under

The manner in which expeditions are conducted

cover of breastworks, and aided by the naturally strong features of their country, they inflict much more loss than they suffer. As we retire they advance, and are most formidable in their pursuit. Their villages and crops are really their only vulnerable point. If they submit they are spared, if they continue to resist they are destroyed. The stories of indiscriminate destruction and refusal of quarter, are libels which require no serious refutation. Those officers who have been most distinguished on the frontier, and who have served in numerous expeditions, assert that they have on no single occasion seen quarter refused, or an unresisting or wounded enemy treated otherwise than with the greatest consideration by our troops.

Measures of a special character and importance.

29. It is now necessary to refer to two measures of great importance carried out along the whole frontier of the Derajat in the years 1873–4, and which, of themselves, have done much to render the exercise of force towards our unruly neighbours unnecessary. These are the re-organisation of the Frontier Militia, and the enforcement of Pass responsibility. These two measures are in reality so intermingled as to form but portions of one uniform system, which consists in making the tribes immediately on the border, and over whom the Government has some control from their possessing lands in British territory, responsible for the safety of the interior portion of the district from raids, and liable to pay compensation for property carried off through the passes of the independent tribes which lead through their lands.

Re-organisation of the Frontier Militia.

Previous to 1872 the Frontier Militia, or military police garrisoning the outposts on the immediate border, was far from efficient. The numerous retainers of the Saddozai and Alizai and other chiefs, who performed conspicuous service in the war of 1848–49, had to be provided for, and were nominated to the militia. In many cases they had become, from old age, incapable of active service, or, not being natives of the part of the border where they were stationed, were generally destitute of that precise local knowledge which can alone render a frontier militia efficient. In 1872 this system was reformed. A committee, composed of the district officers and military officers commanding the several districts, was convened, and the militia was entirely re-organised, a certain number of nominations to horse and foot being given to each tribe on the border in proportion to the number of passes and the length of the territory it occupied. In return for these appointments the emoluments of which were a matter of great moment to the several tribes, they were required to be responsible that the passes leading into their lands were not used by raiders into British territory, or, if they were so used, that the tribe through whose pass they issued should make good any loss so caused. This system, which has during the past year been completed by the adhesion of the important Bhittanni tribe on the Dera Ismail Khan frontier has been successful, and along the whole Derajat border raids from the hills have been reduced to a minimum. This system will probably be never found suited, in its entirety, to the Hazara or Peshawar frontier, but it is being introduced with modifications into the former and into Kohat.

Prohibition of private war.

30. It is of course difficult to prevent militia of the same race as the hillmen from using the arms and training they have received from the Government in private war on their own account and in prosecuting their own blood feuds. This disposition has been always sternly repressed, as the following extracts from the Brigade Orders of the Frontier Force will show :—

"When employed with regular troops the militiamen are expected to act merely as guides, and are not justified, except when an engagement takes place, or in self-defence, in using their arms against or attacking marauders."

"The object of this order is to prevent these men carrying out their own private feuds under the pretence of performing Government service, or unnecessarily creating blood feuds, as would often happen on the lower border if Biluch militiamen acted against Biluch marauders."

"The Brigadier-General desires that officers in charge of frontier outposts will again impress upon the militiamen, horse and foot, serving under their orders, the absolute necessity for their abstaining from mixing in any way in border feuds, and they should again be warned that severe and summary punishment will follow every infringement of the standing orders on the subject."

The settlement of members of independent tribes in British territory.

31. Another measure which has already proved successful and which each year increases in value, so far as the control of the independent tribes is concerned, is inducing them by grants of land on favourable or even nominal assessments to settle within British territory; and many frontier tribes, such as the Wazirs, Afridis, Gurchanis, Bhittannis and Bugtis have extensive lands and numerous villages in British territory, and are thus able to influence their independent clansmen in the hills in the most favourable manner.

32. Another measure proposed by the Punjab Government, and sanctioned by the Government of India, in 1873, owed its origin to the fact that from the extreme difficulty of the frontier languages Pashtu and Biluchi, and the absence of good text-books for their study, but few officers in civil employment were able to converse freely with the independent tribes in their own vernaculars. This caused much inconvenience, and the hillmen complained that the Native interpreters did not properly represent their grievances and their wishes. In the above-named year it was made compulsory on all frontier officers to pass in the vernacular of the border of the district in which they happened to be stationed, and as a reward for this additional labour an extra allowance of Rs. 100 a month was sanctioned for those who might prove their competency within a fixed and reasonable time. The consequence of this rule has been that almost every officer now employed in the frontier districts has proved his colloquial knowledge of the frontier languages, and the administration has been immensely strengthened. The intelligent interest of civil officers in the Punjab Commission in the frontier districts in which they serve is shown by the publication, within the last few years, of the "Haiyat-i-Afghani" by Muhammad Haiyat Khan, C.S.I., Assistant Commissioner, being an account of all the Afghan tribes of the frontier, translated by Mr. H. Priestley, late of the Civil Service; by histories of the Dera Ghazi Khan district by Mr. Robert Bruce, Assistant Commissioner, and Lieutenant-Colonel Minchin, formerly Deputy Commissioner of that district; and by a work on the Afghan frontier at Bannu by Mr. Thorburn, Settlement Officer of the Bannu district. Next may be mentioned a work on Pashtu literature called the "Kalid-i-Afghani," compiled by the Reverend Mr. Hughes, of Peshawar, and translated by Captain Plowden, Assistant Commissioner of the Peshawar district, which has been adopted by the Punjab Government as the text-book for Pashtu examinations; and a Biluchi grammar and vocabulary by Mr. Gladstone, of the Civil Service. Dr. W. H. Bellew, C.S.I., late Civil Surgeon of Peshawar, and for many years in the Punjab Frontier Force, has published a valuable work on Yusafzai, and a Pashtu dictionary and grammar. It may be doubted whether the civil officers of any other part of India have shown greater literary industry, or more interest in their districts than those on the Punjab frontier.

The compulsory study of the frontier vernacular by civil officers.

The literary activity of frontier officers.

33. The last of the special means for securing the good order of the border is by legislation suited to the peculiar circumstances of the case, and modifying in some particulars the general law.

Special legislation.

It must be remembered, and there is no greater proof of the excellence and adaptibility of our systems of procedure and substantive law, that no radical difference exists between the law as administered on the frontier and that in force elsewhere. This fact struck the Honorable FitzJames Stephen, the Legislative Member of the Government of India, very forcibly, and in his minute on the administration of justice in British India he wrote to the following effect:—

The civil and criminal law in force on the frontier is ordinarily that in force elsewhere in India.

"The Punjab Local Government has lately submitted rules for the government of the districts on the frontier lately brought under the operation of 33 Vict. c. 3. Similar rules have been made under the Agror Valley Act by the same authority. It is instructive to see how very little it has been thought necessary to deviate, even in these wild districts, from the ordinary course of law established for the rest of British India. Power to fine villages for crimes not brought home to individuals, and power to punish women as well as men for adultery, are the most important differences between the rules established on the frontier and the law in force in the rest of the Punjab. The officers responsible for the peace of the district ask for no substantial alteration in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Yet this is the very district in which, within the memory of men still in middle life, Avitabile tried in vain to suppress crime by hanging people by scores from every tree, at the discretion of chiefs who, as far as I can understand the matter, often differed very little from the robbers and murderers whom they mutilated or put to death."

Where the procedure in frontier districts differs from that in force in the rest of the Punjab, it will probably be found that it differs for the better, inasmuch as it has endeavoured to recognise existing facts, and acknowledge the tribal constitution of society. In the quiet districts to the east of the Indus, tribes, with their characteristics as clearly marked as those on the border, exist; but their cohesion, under the English system of administration, is apt to become weak. Nor is this, in settled and advanced districts, matter for either surprise or regret. In the eye of the trained lawyers who preside in the courts, the tribal idea is weak or absent, and attention is given alone to the rights and claims and wrongs of the individual. On the frontier the cohesion of the

tribes has been partly maintained by force from without, the necessity for union against the enemy in the independent hills, and partly from the readiness with which the Government has recognised the temporary advantages, in the present backward condition of the frontier, of tribal union, and has encouraged its existence by judicious concessions to tribal claims and even tribal prejudices. The whole system of special law on the frontier, putting on one side such regulations as were of a temporary nature, or whose effect was limited to a single district, have their origin, either in the contiguity of independent territory, or in the recognition of the fact that, beyond the Indus, tribes and communities must be dealt with as such, and the social peculiarities which spring from tribal and clannish sentiment practically acknowledged.

It will be seen, however, that, as stated by Mr. Stephen, the deviations from customary law and procedure, though important and significant, are not very numerous. Generally the Trans-Indus districts are legally in the same position as those Cis-Indus. They are administered under the same laws; subject to the same procedure; and their civil and criminal courts are under the appellate jurisdiction of the Chief Court at Lahore. When this arrangement was introduced and the frontier districts placed under regular legal discipline and control, there was a strong impression on the part of some frontier officers that the change was premature, and that these districts could best be governed without the interposition of the Chief Court. Experience has, however, proved the wisdom of the action of the Government. The introduction of regular procedure has in no way crippled the power or diminished the legitimate influence of the administrative officers; whilst the supervision of the Chief Court, which has not been exercised in any hypercritical or arbitrary spirit, has greatly improved the standard of work in the civil and criminal courts.

Special rules needed for the suppression of special border offences.

34. The special regulations which have, in accordance with the principles above noted, been found necessary to lessen the rigidity of the regular courts and provide for circumstances which no formal system of law or procedure can forsee, will be found as an appendix. The most important is Regulation I. of 1872, which consists of rules sanctioned by the Imperial Government on the recommendation of the Government of the Punjab, and places under legislative sanction a procedure which considerations of administrative convenience had compelled the local authorities to adopt. These rules empower the Deputy Commissioner to arrest and seize the property of members of offending tribes; to prohibit the erection of villages or hamlets in so close a proximity to the frontier as to give rise to apprehensions for their safety; to fine village communities for harbouring or assisting criminals, a most important regulation and one the enforcement of which has done the greatest possible good in the Peshawar district; to remove from any place where his residence would be likely to cause bloodshed any person having a blood feud with persons beyond the border; and to provide for the trial and punishment by fine, by a committee of Pathan or Biluch elders, of persons against whom there might be a strong presumption of guilt, but whom, from strong clan feeling or other reasons, it may be impossible or undesirable to prosecute in the criminal courts. Another rule makes women punishable for adultery, experience having shown that among Afghan tribes the infidelity of the wife is the cause of the great majority of the murders committed; and Regulation VII. of 1873 gives the magistrate of the district power to prevent persons passing the frontier of any one of the border districts when such action might cause grave inconvenience to the Government.

Appendix F., p. 119.

Regulation I. of 1872.

Regulation VII. of 1873.

35. Act XXIII. of 1867, the Murderous Outrages Act, was passed to ensure immediate punishment for fanatical attacks of assassins on English officers, of which at one time there were many instances in border districts. But it is matter for congratulation that it has never been necessary to enforce this Act, though as a precautionary measure it may be desirable to retain it for some time longer on the statute book.

Act XXIII. of 1867.

36. Regulation I. of 1874 legalises rules, which were framed by the Committee on Frontier Militia, to prevent grazing within the military road along the border, unless the flocks so grazing were adequately guarded. These rules had been found imperatively needed to check the carelessness of Powindas and other trading or pastoral tribes, in allowing their cattle to graze without an armed guard the moment they enter the presumed security of British territory, and thus offering the greatest incentive to cattle theft.

Regulation I. of 1874.

37. It has been found necessary to make special regulations for the safety of the Powinda traders, who, during the autumn months, move down the Ghwalari or Znob Passes, entering the Derejat

The protection of the Powinda traders.

by the Gumal valley and returning with their caravans, which go as far as Bombay and Calcutta, in the following spring. They move through the Waziri country in large bodies of from 5,000 to 10,000 in number, led by a Khan or Chief, and observing regular marches and encampments. It is thus inevitable that skirmishes should occur, stragglers be cut off, and cattle lifted. Beyond British territory, however, the Powindas, brave and powerful men, are well able to take care of themselves. It is only within the English border that their precautions are relaxed. During the former governments of the Punjab, the Powindas were subjected, in addition to various cesses, to a grazing tax for the privilege of feeding their flocks on the fertile banks of the Indus, With British rule the cesses were discontinued, with the exception of the grazing dues which amounted to upwards of Rs. 8,000 per annum. In 1872 this tax was somewhat raised, and from the funds at the disposal of Government, a special establishment formed to protect the interests of the different Powinda encampments. This establishment, known as the Powinda Police, has been raised with the aid and consent of the Powindas, and as far as possible from among themselves. Since its institution the Powinda trade has increased, and its losses from robbery have diminished.

Forest and Land Revenue Rules.

38. Other regulations referring to the frontier districts—the Forest Rules of Hazara, and the Hazara Tenancy Act—have been framed to meet peculiarities in the tenures and customs of the districts in question, but, only differing in a few details from the general law of the country, require here no special notice.

The effect of the special legislation. Appendix G., p. 122.

39. A list of cases which have been tried and of the action taken under the frontier rules is appended to this report. It will be seen that some rules have been frequently worked, others it has hardly been necessary to use at all, and that they have been used very differently in different districts, Their general effect has, however, been excellent; they have given to the Executive a strength in the particular direction in which it required support, without in any way interfering with the general course of law and procedure followed in the regular criminal courts.*

The tribes beyond the British border.

40. It is now necessary to advert in somewhat more detail, though as briefly as clearness will permit, to the attitude of the independent tribes on the Punjab frontier.

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* NOTE.—It is not necessary to encumber the text with an account of the legal position of the frontier districts, but the Memorandum will not be complete without a brief review of the position.

Act XXXIII. Victoria, Cap. 3, empowers the Secretary of State by Resolution in Council to declare the provisions of section 1 to be applicable to any part or parts of the territory under a local Government or Administration. When this is done the head of such Government or Administration may submit draft regulations for the peace and government of such part or parts of the territory, and the draft regulations when sanctioned by the Governor General in Council have the force of law.

The provisions of Act XXXIII. Victoria, Cap. 3, were extended to the districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan, and the parganna of Spiti by the resolution of the Secretary of State, dated 6th October 1870, published in *Gazette of India*, Notification No. 2101P, dated 2nd December 1870.

Under the authority of the above-mentioned Act and Notification, the Punjab Frontier Regulations have been passed.

They fall into two classes—

(1.) Those arising out of temporary needs consequent upon the introduction of the regular settlement, such as the Peshawar District Limitation Regulation No. 1 of 1871, and the Hazara Settlement Rules (Clause 13 of No. 1 of 1872).

(2.) Those due to the permanent peculiarities which distinguish the frontier from other parts of the province such as No. I. of 1872, Nos. IV. and VII. of 1873, Nos. I. and VII. of 1874, and No. II. of 1876.

The Hazara Forest and Tenancy Regulations occupy an intermediate position, being partially designed to meet temporary necessities and partially to supply permanent wants.

So far as the distinction between regulation and non-regulation provinces has a legal aspect, the last remaining trace of it in the Statute Book was removed by the passing of Acts XIV. and XV. of 1874. The first of these enactments enables local Governments (with the previous sanction of the Governor General in Council) to do for the so-called scheduled districts what the Punjab Laws Act has already done for the Punjab generally, *i.e.*, to declare what enactments are in force in them. The second of these enactments, called the Laws Local Extent Act, 1874, does for British India at large what XIV. of 1874 enables local Governments to do for the scheduled districts, that is (without affecting the operation of any Act or Regulation before extended to or declared to be in force in, any of the scheduled districts) declares certain Acts to be in force throughout the whole of British India *except in such scheduled districts*.

Under both Acts the scheduled districts include the districts of the Punjab frontier.

It is, therefore, a peculiarity of the Punjab frontier, in common with the other scheduled districts throughout India, that it is exempt from the operation of Schedule I. of Act XV. of 1874, the enactments therein enumerated not applying thereto unless previously in force there; and it is another such legal peculiarity that with the previous sanction of the Government of India the Local Government can declare what enactments are and what are not in force on the frontier, and can extend to the frontier any enactment in force in any part of British India. But so slight is the divergence between the legal necessities of the frontier and of the province at large that no use has been made of this power.

The independence of the great majority of these is complete; while over a few the neighbouring States of Kabul and Khelat exercise an authority differing in kind and in degree. Afghanistan, as a geographical and ethnographical expression, signifying the countries occupied by races of Afghan blood, must not be confused with Afghanistan as constituted and acknowledged by treaties and engagements with the British Government. The treaty of the 30th March 1855, between the British Government and Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, recognised that chief as ruler of Kabul and all those countries of Afghanistan at that time in his possession: and any pretensions to authority over such Afghan countries as Buner and Swat, on the part of the Amir of Cabul, have been, in 1857 and 1858, expressly repudiated by the Government. Over the Mohmands inhabiting the country between the Swat and Kabul rivers the Amir exercises authority, and during the past year he has demanded from them the payment of fines aggregating Rs. 32,000, as punishment for the contumacious behaviour of Naoroz Khan, the Chief of Lalpura, who, when summoned to Kabul, refused compliance and raised the Mohmand clans in rebellion.

The nature of their independence

The position of Kabul towards the tribes.

Over the Afridis to the south Kabul has never pretended to exercise any control. Certain of the Wazirs, and especially the Mahsuds, while repudiating any supremacy of Kabul, have been known to refer grievances to that Darbar; and the undoubted right of the British Government to the Dour valley, which had been relinquished by Shah Shuja in the treaty of the 26th June 1838 with the Sikh Government, and to which the British Government succeeded as inheriting all Sikh possessions, was waived in favour of Kabul in 1855. Still further to the south, below the Vihowa Pass, the Biluch tribes generally, and the Marris and Bugtis in particular, acknowledge the supremacy of the Khan of Khelat, though over them he has never been able to exercise any effective control.

The position of Khelat towards the tribes.

41. Still, the position of the Biluch tribes in reference to Khelat differs most materially from that of the Afghans in relation to Kabul; and this difference affects the diplomatic procedure of the Government. The supremacy of Khelat, though constantly opposed by the predatory Biluch tribes, in hostile action directed against the Khan of that State, is nevertheless generally acknowledged, and this has justified the attempt to control them by means of the Khelat Darbar, which claims the Biluchis as its subjects, and professes to be able to influence and punish them. That these professions have rarely been carried out does not affect the question in any important degree; for, supposing the Khan to be able to control his acknowledged subjects, negotiations to secure this result would naturally be conducted through his agency. It is merely an accidental circumstance that, the Khan being unable to enforce respect for British territory, and diplomatic arrangements with his court being conducted through Bombay, the Punjab Government has been ordinarily compelled, while in no way denying such supremacy over the Biluch tribes as the Supreme Government may have considered his, to negotiate direct with the tribes on its border and to make with them such arrangements as might provide for the security of British districts.

With the Afghan tribes the case is altogether different. Independent in fact as in name, repudiating all connexion with or dependence on the Kabul State, the Punjab Government has merely recognised an unquestioned fact in dealing with them, without any reference to his Highness the Amir. Even the Afridis, on the main road between Kabul and Peshawar, boast that they have seen kings come and go, but have never paid homage to a king themselves, and to emphasise their boast they plundered the baggage of the Amir on the last occasion that he passed through the Khaibar, which at no time he would ever be able to do without an escort so strong as to be called an army. Lastly, the political position of Khelat, with reference to the British Government, is altogether different from that of Kabul. The latter State is independent in the absolute and unconditional sense of the word. It is free to act as it chooses, and, in its alliances, to consult alone its own interests or fancies. But Khelat is only independent in the narrow and circumscribed sense that Native States in Hindustan are so. The British Government is its paramount; it is, under treaty, forbidden to ally itself or enter into diplomatic relations with other powers; English troops may, under engagement, at any time, occupy the country; and its position, under the strict definition of treaties now in force, is less independent than the Cis-Sutlej Sikh States of Patiala Jind or Nabha.

42. It will be convenient to treat the independent tribes in the order given at page 63, commencing with the Northern Frontier. First come the Akazais, who form a sub-division of the great Yusafzai tribe, inhabiting the eastern slope of the Black Mountain on the Hazara border. Since 1868, they have continually

The Hazara border. The Akazais.

given trouble and committed many raids on the Agror border. The chief of this latter place, being dissatisfied with the action of the British Government towards him, encouraged the hostilities of the tribe; and the refusal of the British Government to surrender to them the village of Shahtut, which was destroyed in 1869, in punishment for their raids, has been, till recently, a constant cause of dispute, the Government persistently refusing to allow them to rebuild and occupy the village. During the past year, however, the relations with this tribe have been most satisfactorily settled. In September 1875 the headmen visited the Deputy Commissioner of the Hazara district in Agror, and entered into agreements for the future. They surrendered all claim to the disputed lands of Shahtut, expressed regret for the past, and pledged their faith to respect in future British territory and British subjects. Since that date they have kept their word and not a single offence has been committed by any member of the tribe, some of whom have been entertained in service in the police.

The Hassanzais.

43. The Hassanzais form another division of the Yusafzai tribe, living on both sides of the Indus, on and in the immediate neighbourhood of the Black Mountain. They have since 1851, when they murdered two officers of the Customs Department, given continual trouble to the British Government, which in 1852 sent an expedition against them under the command of Colonel Mackeson. They with the tribe last named continued to join in all the attacks on Agror, and upon the slightest provocation were always ready to threaten hostilities. With these, too, satisfactory and it is to be hoped permanent arrangements have been completed. In December of last year the headmen of the tribe came in to the Deputy Commissioner at Haripur; one party through the instrumentality of the Nawab of Amb, and the other, and more important body, of their own free-will. Both parties agreed to respect British territory in future, and since that date no member of the tribe has committed any offence. Accidental circumstances favoured the submission of both these tribes. An attack of the Hassanzais upon the Akazai induced the latter to come in; while the inconvenience of their consequent isolation compelled the submission of the Hassanzais themselves.*

The Hazara border completely tranquil.

44. The year 1875 has seen the submission to the British Government of the Black Mountain and other tribes, Chagarzais, Hassanzais, Akazais, Tikri, Allai, and the Syads of Pariari who, since 1868, have set the Government at defiance: and the arrangements made on this border have received the special commendation of Her Majesty Secretary of State.

The Jaduns.

45. The Jadun tribe, like those last named, live on the slopes of the Mahaban and in the Hazara district. In former years they have given considerable trouble, but since 1870 their conduct has been little open to complaint. During the past year they have given no cause of offence.

The Bonerwals.

46. The warlike tribe of Bonerwal inhabits the valley at the immediate north of the Yusafzai plain, and in the Umbeyla Expedition of 1863 were our most gallant opponents, losing so large a number of men and being so completely humiliated by the occupation of their country and the destruction of Malka, the head-quarters of the fanatical Wahabi colony of Hindustanis, that they have since behaved in a manner which has not given rise to much complaint. During the past year they have been much divided by internal feuds, but have not committed any offence against British territory.

The Swatis.

47. The people who inhabit the rich and highly cultivated valley of the Swat river are the immediate neighbours, and generally the allies of the Bonerwals. They are, however, very much inferior to the latter in courage and physique, the climate of the Swat valley being unhealthy and malarious. The valley of Swat is divided into five districts: 1 Baizai; 2, Rhanizai; 3, Khadakai; 4, Abazai; and 5, Khwazozai. Of these the two first are situated to the north, and the three last to the south of the Swat river. The names of the districts are taken from the names of the clans inhabiting them belonging to the Abazai division of the powerful and numerous Yusafzai tribe, other portions of which inhabit Dir to the west and Boner to the east. From the annexation of the Peshawar district in 1849 the Pathans of Swat have shown themselves hostile to the Government, and not only continually sent marauding expeditions into the plains, but permitted their country to became an asylum for all the enemies of the British. Of late years, however, the influence of the Akhund, who exercises supreme spiritual authority over northern Afghan tribes, has created a far more

* Atta Muhammad Khan, the late Khan of Agror, on the immediate border, owing to whose intrigues many of the Hazara complications had arisen, died a month after these events, and was succeeded by his son, now a minor, who is being educated in the Abbott-abad district school.

friendly feeling, or at any rate, has repressed any outward signs of hostility. The great age and failing health of the Akhund have given rise to intrigues as to the succession to the chiefship in the valley, his son, Mian Gul, being anxious to be appointed, although he was not supported by his father, who nominated Syad Ahmad, an incompetent person, without authority, who has since been refused the succession, and the only other candidate of importance is Sherdil Khan, the Chief of the Ranizais, whose claims are supported by several of the clans.

The Akhund of Swat.

The Utman Khels to the north of Peshawar, between the Mohmands and the Ranizai, hardly claim space as a separate tribe, being an off-shoot from the Afghans of Swat. During the early years of British rule they gave great trouble, and were punished by a military expedition in force under Sir Colin Campbell, in 1852. Of late years, and indeed consistently since this punishment their conduct has been good. In June 1875 all old cases against the tribe, all of them of a mild character, were settled, since which no case of misconduct has occurred.

48. The Mohmands are a most important tribe inhabiting the hilly country between the Kabul and Swat rivers. A very large number of the tribe inhabit British territory, giving their name to a subdivision of the Peshawar district. From 1849 to 1866 this tribe perhaps gave more trouble to the British Government than any other on the Peshawar border. The raids committed by them were innumerable, and the number of British subjects killed and cattle carried off was very large. The influence brought to bear upon them by the Kabul Government was not of much effect till 1866, when strong pressure having been exercised by our Government the Khan of Lalpura, the head of the principal clan, was carried prisoner to Kabul, where he afterwards died. Since 1866 the Mohmands have given little trouble except in the case of the murder of Major McDonald, in March 1873. As has been before noticed, during the past year Naoroz Khan, son of the Khan deposed in 1866, was expelled from Lalpura for rebellion and for his complicity in the murder of Major McDonald, the several clans being heavily fined. A portion of the fine was paid, while the leading men of one of the sections were arrested and kept prisoners until arrangements were made for the payment of the whole. The marked distinction of this tribe is that it is subject to the Amir of Kabul, and to that court reference has always been made when it has been necessary to obtain redress for offences committed by the tribe.

The Mohmands.

49. The powerful Afridi tribe, one of the bravest and most turbulent on the border, inhabits the southern frontier of the Peshawar and the northern frontier of the Kohat districts. Their numerous clans are much divided by feuds, and the action of one section is generally altogether independent of that of the others. The two sections which have given the most trouble in Peshawar live for the greater part of the year in the neighbourhood of the Khaibar Pass. These are the Zakka Khels and the Kuki Khels, most inveterate and audacious robbers, whose depredations up to the very walls of Peshawar, and even within the city and cantonments, have been notorious from the days of the Sikh occupation. During the past year attempts have been made, with very considerable success, to conciliate the Zakka Khels by inducing representatives of the different clans to come into Peshawar. This they have done, promising good behaviour for the future; and during the past year the conduct of the clan has been fairly good. Engaging very little in trade of any kind, and possessing sufficient food in their own hills to support themselves, and being moreover difficult to attack, it must be expected that they will be, for a long time to come, more or less addicted to plunder, which has been from time immemorial the custom and pride of the Afridi race. The Kuki Khels have, on the whole, been well behaved; the principal reason of this being that they are active traders, and it is their interest to remain on good terms with the Government. The last affair of any importance was on the 4th April 1875, when a police constable was wounded and five mules carred off by Kuki Khel robbers; but the whole of these were recovered. There are no other cases pending against this clan.

The Afridis.

The Zakka Khel Afridis.

The Kuki Khel Afridis.

50. The only event of any importance on the Kohat border has been the closing of the Kohat Pass and the blockade of that section of the Afridis responsible for its management. Negotiations towards the close of last year were opened with the Pass Afridis for the repairing of the road through it, forming the direct communication between Kohat and Peshawar. An option was given to the Pass men either to improve the road themselves or forego the allowances paid them for the use of it. The Sherakki clan of the tribe opposed the

The Pass Afridis and the Kohat Pass.

measure in so insolent a manner, insulting the messengers of the Deputy Commissioner, as to necessitate the closing of the road to British subjects, and further misconduct on the part of this section led to the blockade of the whole of the Pass Afridis, as they were either unwilling or unable to coerce the refractory section. The blockade still continues, and two other sections, the Hasanzais and Asha Khels, it has been necessary to include in it. The institution of this blockade has, as a matter of course, led to some raiding and robbery in British territory, but these offences have been comparatively few and unimportant.

The blockade of the Pass Afridis.

The blockade is enforced by additional police levies without any movement of troops and without any cost to the Government; any additional expense being met by the suspension of the allowance ordinarily granted to the Pass Afridis. The blockaded sections are almost entirely dependent upon trade with Kohat and Peshawar, especially as carriers of salt, so that they suffer materially from the maintenance of the blockade, and the great body of the Afridi tribe have, so far, shown no inclination to join them.

The Orakzais.

51. The Orakzai tribe live on the northern Kohat border, and in the mountainous region known as Tira, to which they retire in the summer months. They are a powerful and fanatical tribe, and one section, the Daulatzai, committed many acts of hostility, till 1869, when an expedition against them and the Bazotis, another section of the tribe inhabiting the immediate vicinity of Kohat, brought them to their senses. Since that time they gave no cause of offence until certain sections joined the Pass Afridis in the present dispute. Their whole border, together with that of the Zaimusht and Turi Afghan tribes, has during the past year been absolutely free from serious outrages, and the few cases of petty plundering which have occurred, have been, as a rule, promptly adjusted by the councils of the tribes concerned. A long-

The disputes between Shias and Sunis in Tira in independent territory.

standing feud between the Tira Muhammadan sects of the Sunis and Shias in the Orakzai and Afridi tribes threatened inter-tribal warfare during the past year; but this in no way affected British territory, and the only action necessary on the part of the British authorities was to prevent the residents of the frontier villages proceeding into Tira to take part in the disturbances.

The Zaimusht.

52. The Zaimusht Afghans are physically a fine race, inhabiting the hills between the Miranzai valley and the Kurm river. They have generally maintained a friendly attitude, and this it is their interest to do, as they trade very largely with British territory. As has been noted, no cases during the past year are recorded against them. A trade route, though not of first class importance, passes through their country, which the expedition of General Sir N. Chamberlain proved to be less difficult than had been supposed.

The Turis.

53. The tribe next in order is the Turis, inhabiting the valley of the Kurm river. They are a wild, fierce, thieving tribe; but in recent years they have respected British territory, their feuds with their Waziri neighbours to the south, alone causing some disturbances on the frontier. During the past year this portion of the border has, however, been perfectly tranquil.

The Waziris.

54. One of the most important Pathan tribes on the north-west border is the Wazirs or Waziris, who inhabit the whole country to the west of the Trans-Indus frontier from Thal and the Minranzai valley, on the Kurm river, to the Gumal Pass on the southern border of Tank. They are strong in numbers, and brave and powerful individually, making excellent soldiers, many of them taking service in British regiments. There is little tribal cohesion among them, the different individual sections being generally indifferent to the action or policy of the others, some behaving in a friendly manner, others remaining persistently hostile.

The Mahsud section of the Wazirs.

The powerful section of the Mahsuds, inhabiting the immediate border of Bannu and Tank, for many years gave great trouble, and their raids have disturbed the whole of the frontier from Bannu to Kulachi. Their country is exceedingly difficult to penetrate, being intersected by deep ravines, the only roads being through difficult passes, while a blockade affects this tribe less than many others with a smaller trade, for the reason that the Waziri country is fertile, well watered and well wooded, and the tribe is able to support itself on the product of its fields and cattle. Of the Mahsuds there are three main sections, the Alazais, the Shaman Khels and the Balolzais. The first have been friendly during the past ten years, and their intercourse with the British Government has been uninterrupted. The Balolzais, mustering some 8,000 fighting men, which is more than the other two

sections can together muster, have ever been among the most inveterate of our foes, and in 1860 their conduct had become so outrageous that it was necessary to send against them an expedition of more than 5,000 men, under General Chamberlain. Their chief town, Kanigorum, was occupied, and the section was heavily fined, but the spirit of the tribe was unbroken, and in 1861 a murderous outrage necessitated their proscription and exclusion from British territory. At last, after years of turbulence, the Balolzais submitted in 1873 to the Government. They agreed for the future to restore property plundered in British territory, to pay compensation for the death or injury of British subjects, and to submit, in the case of any proved offence, to any fine that might be inflicted at the discretion of the Government. For past misconduct they paid down in cash an indemnity of upwards of Rs. 10,000, and, in return, the section was re-admitted to the privileges of intercourse and trade, and its political prisoners were released. Hostages for the observance of the terms, being thirty-three representative men of the different clans, were sent to Dera Ismail Khan, these being liable to imprisonment or deportation if the conditions of the engagement made were violated.

From 1868 the Shaman Khel section had been subjected, owing to outrages committed by them, to the same disabilities and restraints as their Balolzai tribesmen. But in 1873, many of the clan having fallen as prisoners into our hands, they accepted terms offered them by the Government, and in 1874 the Lieutenant-Governor received the submission of the representatives of all the sections of the Mahsud tribe at Tank, an event unprececented in the history of the Waziri tribe.

The Tank valley and its management.

55. The semi-independent district of Tank, ruled by a Nawab related by blood to the Mahsud Wazirs, had long been the most unsatisfactory part of the Punjab border. The whole arrangements for police control and for necessary communications with the independent tribes in the neighbouring hills were in the hands of the Nawab, whose influence, great though it may have been, was still insufficient to control his warlike and savage neighbours, whose raids, robberies and murders were incessant in the Tank valley. This state of things became at length so intolerable, that in 1872–73, after the most careful consideration of the whole case, the Lieutenant-Governor submitted certain proposals in regard to this district, which in 1874 received the sanction of the Government of India. The police administration was taken out of the hands of the Nawab, who was compensated for this loss of dignity by a very large increase to his revenue, which the land assessment, then being carried on in the district, permitted the Government to satisfactorily arrange. The revenue administration was left in his hands, his eldest son being appointed the chief revenue officer. The Mahsud Waziris were encouraged to go direct to the district officer of Dera Ismail Khan or Bannu, as the case might be, to state any grievances of which they might have to complain; and the intervention of the Nawab of Tank between the independent tribes and the British Government was ended.

The Gumal trade route.

56. Through the Mahsud country passes the Gumal route, the road chiefly used by the Povinda traders between Hindustan and Ghazni and Kandahar, comparatively easy for laden camels, with abundant water and forage. Next to the Bolan, this route, more commonly known as the Ghwalari, is the most important on the North-west Frontier. In 1861 the trade passing by this road was estimated at Rs. 33,00,000, and in 1870 at Rs. 50,00,000. The improvement of this route has been long desired by the Government, and on the submission of all the sections of the Mahsuds in 1874, opportunity was taken to discuss the subject with them. The difficulty of the road is chiefly owning to the hereditary feud between the Mahsuds and the Povindas, though the former have been the aggressors and the latter the attacked. Should the behaviour of the Mahsuds continue satisfactory, it is proposed to engage them to defend the road, or at any rate to guarantee its protection.

The satisfactory result of the Tank arrangements.

57. The result of the arrangements made in Tank, together with the acceptance of pass responsibility by the powerful Bhittanni tribe who hold the lands at the mouths of the principal passes leading into the Mahsud country, has been to altogether change the character of the border during the past year. The Bannu frontier has been tranquil; and on the Tank border the improvement has been still more marked. Previous to the changes effected in 1874–75 in the administration of Tank, serious crime by the Mahsuds and Bhittannis was matter of weekly or even more frequent occurrence. The total number of offences for the past year amounts to only 18, in all of which full redress was obtained. The policy of the Government with regard to the Tank district would thus seem to have been justified by the marked increase of security to life and property on that border.

58. To the immediate south of the Waziris come the Sharanis, living opposite the British subdivision of Kolachi and Draband. Since the expedition against this tribe in 1853, in which they received severe punishment, the Sharanis have generally behaved well. In March 1875 friendly relations with them were for a time endangered by the misconduct of the Gandapur chief, Guldad Khan, who took advantage of the authority allowed him and the confidence reposed in him by the Government to erect a fort in Sharani territory, a step at once opposed by the tribe, who attacked his followers engaged in this work and killed 15 of them. For thus taking the law into their own hands, although the provocation was great, it was necessary to impose upon them a fine, which was at once paid, while the offending Gandapur chief was deposed and compensation made from his allowances to the families of the slain.

The Sharanis.

59. That portion of Dera Ismail Khan occupied by the Ushtranas and Kasranis has been entirely quiet throughout the year. The Ushtranas are a Pathan tribe who inhabit the outer hills opposite the southern portion of the Dera Ismail Khan district. They are a brave and warlike tribe, but the great number of the tribe that has acquired lands in Dera Ismail Khan has for many years past guaranteed their conduct being peaceable and friendly.

The southern portion of the Dera Ismail Khan district.

The Ushtranas

60. The Kasranis are a poor and feeble tribe inhabiting a desert and rugged country, and in the early days of annexation gave much annoyance by their constant raids. Their offences were crowned in 1852 by an audacious attack on the town of Dera Fatah Khan, which resulted in an expedition the following year under Major Nicholson. Between them and their neighbours, the Bozdars, a blood feud of long standing exists which has given rise to many inter-tribal disputes and engagements. But, so far as the British Government is concerned, the conduct of the Kasranis has for some years past, indeed since 1870, been satisfactory. Very many of the tribe inhabit the plain country, and although, like all Biluch tribes, of most predatory tastes originally, they are gradually settling down into a more honest life.

The Kasranis.

61. The state of the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier, reaching from the Bozdars on the north to the Bugtis on the border of Sind, has been comparatively undisturbed during the year, and all the property of British subjects carried across the border has been recovered. The means used for the recovery of stolen property, or for obtaining an equivalent from the offending tribes, are exceedingly simple. The constitution of the Biluch tribes facilitates such recoveries, and all that is usually required to be done is to hold the chiefs and headmen in charge of the passes responsible for the restoration of cattle or other property taken through those passes to independent territory. Our relations with the chiefs of the trans-border tribes in the Dera Ghazi Khan district are generally on a footing so amicable that little difficulty is experienced in obtaining restitution, through them, of property carried away into their territory, or its value. The estimated value of all such property, consisting chiefly of camels and bullocks, during the past year was less than Rs. 4,000, or about a quarter of the aggregate of the preceding year, and the whole, as already stated, was recovered. Most of these petty thefts were committed on the Bozdar and and Gurchani border. No British subject was murdered by hillmen, and there were no raids properly so called. Upwards of a thousand head of cattle, stolen from Upper Sind by members of the Marri or Bugtee tribes, were either restored to their owners, or an equivalent exacted from the offending tribe, through the District Officer of Dera Ghazi Khan and his Assistant at Rajanpur, and the headmen of the Biluch tribes on the lower portion of the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier, the assistance of the Mazari chief being very conspicuous.

The Dera Ghazi Khan frontier. Its complete tranquillity.

62. Only one event of the smallest importance occurred involving the violation of British territory. This was due to an inter-tribal dispute between the Khetrans on the one hand, and Bozdars and Bugtis on the other. A large party of Khetrans entered British territory stealthily by night, and penetrated one of the Bozdar passes and plundered the first Bozdar village they reached, killing some of the occupants, returning after this outrage by the same road. Although this raid was committed beyond the border, yet British territory had been violated by the Khetrans passing through it, They were intercepted on their return by our troops and militia, and compelled to disgorge their spoil, which was restored to the Bozdars, and a fine was also imposed, which has been paid.

Khetran and Bozdar disputes in foreign territory.

63. Of the tribes on the Dera Ghazi Khan border, their attitude having thus been shown to be altogether friendly to the British Government, and only giving trouble by feuds among themselves in the independent hills, it is necessary to note but very few particulars.

The Biluch tribes on the Dera Ghazi Khan border.

64. First, the Bozdars, who occupy the hills on the immediate north of the Dera Ghazi Khan border, and who, up till 1857, gave constant trouble to the local authorities by raiding into the plain country. The tract which they occupy is very barren, and its character accounts in a great measure for their thievish habits. In 1857, when their offences, robberies, and raids had become so numerous as to render punishment imperative, an expedition under General Chamberlain, and numbering over 3,000 men, entered their hills by the Sanghar pass, and inflicted on them severe loss, the tribe submitting to the terms imposed of compensation for the property stolen and the lives lost in their raids in British territory, and giving hostages for their good conduct in the future. Since this expedition the conduct of the Bozdars has, on the whole, been friendly.

The Bozdars.

65. The Ketrans are a Pathan tribe, with no very defined boundary of the territory they inhabit, but generally occupying the country opposite the Luni Pass. They are an industrious and an agricultural tribe; their country is open, and a blockade paralyses their trade; consequently their conduct, from a consideration of their own interests gives rise to no other complaint than that they are, though not themselves thieves, notoriously receivers of stolen property, which they dispose of for other tribes. But the enforcement of pass responsibility, and compensation for everything stolen, has brought this means of profit to an end.

The Khetrans.

66. All the tribes to the south are Biluch. First come the Kosas, a brave and formerly a very influential tribe, and many of their number have done good service in the ranks of the British army. Their internal disputes have, however, reduced the tribe to political insignificance, although the richness of their country and their industrious habits make them, for their numbers, one of the wealthiest tribes on the border. There is no cause of complaint against them.

The Kosas.

67. The Lagharis occupy the country opposite the famous shrine and pass of Sakki Sarwar, Choti and Kura. The head of the tribe, Jamal Khan, is an exceedingly intelligent and enterprising man, possessing great influence with the Khetrans and other tribes, and his services have been largely utilized by successive district officers. For some years past the conduct of this tribe has been excellent.

The Lagharis.

68. Next come the Gurchanis, a mongrel tribe of half Biluch descent. A large section resides within the Dera Ghazi Khan district in the Jampur subdivision, in the neighbourhood of the Harrand fort. For many years the Gurchanis had an exceedingly bad reputation as robbers and raiders, and their border was always disturbed. But in 1857, when the town and fortress of Harrand was attacked by the assembled Marris, Bugtis and Khetrans, the Gurchani chief, Ghulam Haidar Khan, with a view of re-habilitating his people in the estimation of the Government, joined cordially the English, and, with the Lund tribe, attacked and defeated the raiders, with the loss of their leader and 257 men killed. The privileges and rewards which were granted to the Gurchanis for this excellent service have thoroughly attached them to the British Government, and latterly they have given no cause of complaint.

The Gurchanis.

69. The Marris acknowledge the nominal supremacy of the Khan of Khelat, and their lands do not actually touch British territory; but their conduct has a great effect on the peace of our border, and their control forms one of the most important duties of the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan. The tribe, which is a powerful one, numbering 4,000 fighting men, has always been distinguished for its habits of robbery and violence; their country is large and difficult, while the importance of the trade routes which pass through it make the orderly conduct of the Marris of the greatest importance. Their nominal allegiance to the Khan of Khelat has not prevented them from committing constant raids into his country, and it is due to them that the rich tract of Katchi, in Khelat territory, instead of being highly cultivated and covered with populous villages, is almost deserted. The arrangements which have been effected in the last few years, and notably since the conference held by the present Lieutenant-Governor with the Sind authorities at Mithankot in 1871, when the Sind and Punjab system of policy towards this and the Bugti tribe was made uniform, have resulted in a great change. The attitude of the Marris towards the

The Marris.

British Government is now exceedingly friendly, and their headmen have given cordial assistance to Major Sandeman, the Deputy Commissioner, in his recent visits to Khelat territory. In former days the raids by Marris committed on British territory were innumerable.

The Bugtis.

70. Of the Bugti tribe a large number inhabit British territory, the rest living in the rocky and barren country on the Rajanpur border. Like the Marris, this was a tribe absolutely devoted to robbery. Their allegiance to the Khan of Khelat, was, like that of the Marris, nominal, and the greater proportion of their robberies and their raids were committed in Khelat territory. With the Marris they have been continually at war, only uniting with them to commit raids on the lands of their neighbours. During the last four or five years the conduct of the Bugtis towards the British Government has been satisfactory. Their chiefs have accompanied the Deputy Commissioner to Khelat, and have given him every assistance in their power. Many of the tribe have taken service in the Frontier Militia, for which their chief, Ghulam Murtaza Khan, receives an annual subsidy of Rs. 8,880.

The Mazaris.

71. The Biluch tribe to the extreme south of the Dera Ghazi Khan border is the Mazari. The majority reside in British territory, where they own a large number of villages, and their chief, Imam Baksh Khan, holds large estates and subsidies from Government, to which he has often rendered the most distinguished service. Formerly of very predatory habits, the Mazari tribe have settled down peaceably as cultivators.

The whole of the Derajat frontier more tranquil than at any former time.

72. The above resumé will show that the state of the Derajat border during the past year will compare favourably with its condition in any previous year since the annexation of the Punjab.

The internal administration of frontier districts.

The regular settlements of land revenue.

73. It is now necessary to notice certain matters with reference to the internal administration of the Trans-Indus districts. First, perhaps, in importance, are the measures undertaken with reference to the land revenue demand. The summary settlements made shortly after annexation were necessarily rude and defective. The assessment of land revenue was unequal, and the record of rights most incomplete. The regular settlements have now been undertaken in all the frontier districts; that of Hazara is completed and sanctioned by the Government; those of Peshawar and Dera Ghazi Khan are also completed and about to be submitted for final sanction. Operations in certain subdivisions of Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu are finished, and the assessment reports submitted. Those of Kohat and the remaining portions of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan will be completed during next year.

The policy of Government in frontier settlements.

74. Although in some cases a large increase of Government revenue will be the result of the re-settlement, owing chiefly to the great extension of cultivated area since the summary settlements, yet it has been the desire of the Government, here as elsewhere, to keep the revenue demand within such limits as to ensure the contentment and loyalty of the population. In border villages a system has been introduced of assessing the village lands at the full average rate of the district, and then remitting a portion, often as much as a third of the whole payment, in consideration of the exposure of the inhabitants to attack from independent tribes, and on condition of active loyalty and union with the local authorities in preserving the peace of the border. The deviations from the commonly accepted principles of revenue policy which the state of frontier society has shown to be necessary are nowhere considerable, and are such as the local peculiarities of any special portion of a large province might reasonably involve. Care has been taken to recognise, by the liberal grant of jagirs and allowances, the interests and position of the heads of the tribal and rural communities. It has been the desire of the Punjab Government to invest its revenue policy, in the frontier districts, with the character best suited to a country whose inhabitants, rapidly developing or perhaps disintegrating under the influences of British rule into village communities of the familiar type, are still, as corporate bodies, associated with the Government for the defence of British territory against attack from without.

Special and fluctuating assessments.

75. In a few tracts, and notably in certain riverside villages in the Isa Khel and Dera Ismail Khan subdivisions and in the submontane region of the last-named district, systems of *fluctuating* assessments have been approved in consequence of the capricious changes of the river Indus, or owing to the precarious condition of cultivation, dependent alone upon irrigation from hill streams; but these varieties of land assessment have no special frontier significance,

and are adopted in other parts of the province where the conditions are similar, and where such divergence from the usual procedure is needed for the relief of agriculturists.

The increase in the cultivated area. Appendix H., p. 122.

The statements attached to this report give the statistics of the increase in the land revenue and in the cultivated and assessable area, and show how large an amount of prosperity has accrued since the date of the summary settlements.

The introduction of regular police.

76. A second measure of importance, as affecting the internal administration of the districts, has been the introduction of the regular police. This has been effected with certain modifications, the commissioner of the division taking the place held, Cis-Indus, by the inspector-general of police; the deputy commissioners of districts holding the place of the deputy inspectors-general, having the whole control of the police in their respective charges, with special police officers subordinate to them. This measure, though at first it was opposed, on theoretical grounds, by many frontier officers, has worked thus far well, and those who most objected to it are now ready to admit its advantages.

Appendix I., p. 127.

The effect of this measure on the statistics of crime.

77. With reference to statistics of offences committed, it must be especially borne in mind that on a frontier like that in question, which has, by slow degrees, been brought from a state of anarchy to comparative tranquillity, the number of offences might reasonably be expected, with the introduction of a rigid procedure and an efficient police, to appear to increase rather than to diminish. The theft of a single bullock in 1876 attracts almost as much attention, and occasions as much correspondence and inquiry, as a raid in force in 1856. Even murders were often not reported at all, and ordinary thefts and cattle-lifting were so accepted by the people as the ordinary incidents of frontier life that they did not form the subject of special complaint. The people were accustomed to defend themselves; they even ploughed their fields armed with sword and matchlock; and it has only been increasing tranquility and security which have made them regard crimes against person or property as matters requiring the consideration and action of the Government. The population of the frontier districts has further increased very rapidly since annexation; and when these facts are allowed their due weight, the statistics of crime, which show a steady diminution in the number of offences since 1868 (the figures for 1875 being for the first time increased by the addition of the offences on the Tank border, hitherto excluded from the statements), will probably be considered to show a satisfactory advance. It must lastly be remembered that the general disarmament, which has long been enforced rigidly throughout the Cis-Indus territory, has never been extended Trans-Indus, and thus, among a naturally turbulent, hot-blooded and fanatical population, one, too, especially sensitive in the matter of female chastity, and in a tract where escape from justice across the border is so easy and pursuit so impossible, crimes of violence must necessarily be far more frequent than among a disarmed and less excitable population. So far as these crimes are concerned, the Peshawar district has always had an evil pre-eminence, and, at the present time, the murders in this district from year to year may be said to equal those in the other five Trans-Indus districts put together. To this subject the attention of the Lieutenant-Governor has been most seriously directed for some years, as voluminous correspondence with the Government of India and the annual reports of the Punjab Government prove. The state of crime in the Peshawar district cannot be considered satisfactory; but the Frontier Regulations, which have been before noted, and the power which has, within the last few months been granted to the Puujab Government of disarming villages or portions of the district in which crimes of violence are specially rife, will, it is to be hoped and may reasonably be expected, have each year an appreciable effect in diminishing the amount of violent crime.

No general disarmament has been enforced on the frontier.

Crime in the Peshawar district.

Public Works system.

78. It is necessary to say a few words on the system under which Public Works are undertaken in the frontier districts; and first it may be noted that, for Public Works purposes, the cantonment of Peshawar, with its five outposts and connecting roads, has been made over to the Military Works Branch, under the immediate control of the Government of India. With this exception, all works on the frontier required in connexion with the troops, and all civil works that have not been entrusted to municipalities or to district committees are, as in other parts of the province, constructed and maintained by the Public Works establishment under the orders of the local Government.

79. The Frontier Public Works Divisions are Hazara, Kohat, and Dera Ismail Khan. Each is in charge of an officer of Royal Engineers, with such a staff of assistants and subordinates as may be suitable for the work to be done.

The Public Works Frontier Divisions.

All works requiring professional supervision (excepting municipal works) are carried out by Public Works officers; but there are many of a less important character not requiring close professional superintendence, in which the assistance of the local officers, both civil and military, is very valuable, such for example as a petty military work at a distant outpost, when it is at times convenient to employ the British officer of the Frontier Force who may be on duty there as a Public Works agent, to see that the work is properly done and to pay the workmen.

Co-operation of Public Works and Civil officers and officers of the Frontier Force.

Again, in the construction and repair of the less important civil buildings and roads, the assistance of the civil establishments is both useful and economical, particularly in the more remote tracts. The civil officers have charge of many roads and buildings, and in connexion with their maintenance and construction act as agents of the Public Works Department, rendering accounts to the Examiner.

80. In those towns where municipalities exist, the committees raise their own income, and expend it, in accordance with rules framed under the Punjab Municipal Act of 1873.

Municipal and district expenditure on Public Works.

Funds raised under the Punjab Local Rates Act of 1871 are administered by District Committees guided by special rules issued for their observance.

81. The Public Works arrangements are not peculiar to the frontier (excepting in the employment of officers of the Frontier Force as Public Works agents), but are similar to those which obtain in all other parts of the province. There are no difficulties in carrying them out, and for administrative convenience it is most desirable that over the whole Punjab the same general system should prevail.

The Public Works arrangements on the frontier are similar to those all over the province.

Under the local Government are all the cantonments for troops on the frontier. This has obvious advantages in the more special attention that can be given to their sanitation and improvement. The Sanitary Commissioner of the Punjab, whose duties do not include the care of the Imperial cantonments, has, under the direction of the Lieutenant-Governor, been engaged in 1873 and 1874 in a careful examination of the condition of frontier cantonments, with especial reference to the prevalence of pneumonia, and his suggestions will, it may be hoped, have good results in improving the sanitary condition of these stations.

Frontier cantonments.

82. Similarly, the operations of the Irrigation Department are under the control of the local Government. During the last few years, in the districts of Peshawar, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan, extensive surveys have been made with the view of improving existing, and designing new canals. The project for the Swat River Canal to water the Doaba and Hashtnagar plains in the Peshawar district has been submitted in detail, and has been sanctioned by the Secretary of State. The construction of this canal was strongly advocated by the Punjab Government, which considered it desirable to develope cultivation on the Peshawar border and to encourage, by facilities of irrigation the settlement in the plain of members of independent tribes.

Operations of the Irrigation Department.

The Swat Canal.

83. The Trans-Indus parts of the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts have been closely examined with the view to giving to existing canals an additional supply from the various rivers and mountain torrents which pass through these districts on their way to the Indus. As the result of these investigations proposals for various works have been made, and estimates of their costs are now being prepared in communication with the local Civil and Settlement officers.

Derajat canals.

A canal commenced by Abdul Rahim Khan, of Isá Khel, has been purchased from him, as he was unable to complete it.

A very large project for extending and supplementing the existing irrigation in the Dera Ghazi Khan district was drawn up some time ago. Its cost, however, was calculated to be so great, and the returns from it so uncertain, that it is not considered advisable to recommend its adoption to the Government of India.

Of the existing system of canals in the Derajat, the principal ones are managed by officers of the Irrigation Department. A large area, varying from about 120,000 to 170,000 acres, is irrigated in the course of the year, and on the cultivation of this irrigated tract the land revenue mainly depends.

84. The efforts of the Punjab Government to maintain the legitimate influence of the chiefs and headmen over their clansmen have been generously seconded by the Government of India, who have sanctioned liberal grants and emoluments, both by deductions from the land revenue demand in favour of the headmen of villages, and in jagirs and allowances to the principal chiefs. Many of these latter have performed, both in the critical days of 1849 and 1857, and generally in the political administration of the border, the most loyal and distinguished services. Prominent among these may be mentioned the chief of the Khattaks in the Kohat district, Nawab Sir Khwaja Muhammad Khan, K.C.S.I.; Abdul Majid Khan, chief of the Kalil tribe in the Peshawar district; Fatah Khan and Sarfaraz Khan, chiefs of the Mohmand tribe in the same district; the late Nawab Sir Faujdar Khan, all of whose jagirs have been continued, together with the title of Nawab, to his son; Nawab Sarfaraz Khan, of Dera Ismail Khan, and Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan, formerly British agent at Kabul; and, in the Dera Ghazi Khan district, Jamal Khan, chief of the Lagharis, and Imam Baksh Khan, the Mazari chief. These noblemen and gentry, though their services have generally had some connexion with the frontier, are still among the most important of the provincial aristocracy, and it is to Lahore that they look for the recognition of their services, and for the representation of their claims and grievances to the Government of India. Their sons and relations receive a liberal share of the higher judicial and administrative appointments in the gift of the local Government; and should the day ever arrive when, for reasons which it may be hoped that the statement of facts here recorded will prove not now to exist, it might be desirable to remove the Trans-Indus districts from the charge of the Punjab Government, such a change would, in the opinion of the Lieutenant Governor, be viewed by the chiefs and people of the entire frontier with extreme discontent and alarm.

The chiefs on the frontier; their services and rewards.

85. This report has now, with unavoidable briefness and incompleteness, touched upon all those points on which Her Majesty's Secretary of State desired information.

Conclusion.

The frontier tribes are slowly but surely losing their suspicion of and dislike to the British Government. The change is gradual; but if we look back 20 or even 10 years, we see how substantial has been the progress made. They are still savage, fanatical, and ignorant; but they have learnt to believe in the fairness of our intentions, and so far appreciate our rule that they leave their hills in large numbers, abandon their predatory life, and settle quietly in British territory. It may reasonably be questioned whether any change in the administration could work more beneficially or influence the independent tribes more quickly or more powerfully for good.

With the people in the interior of the districts the case is similar, though in a less marked degree. They have reached a more advanced stage of social evolution than their mountain neighbours, and under laws which secure life and property, and discourage ontbursts of savage sentiment, they are losing their tribal homogeneity for that multiform heterogeneity which, in its ever increasing complexity, is the result and sign of increasing enlightenment and development. That the Punjab Government have freely acknowledged that this development is still backward is evident by the tendency of the legislation which they have proposed to the Imperial Government as suited to frontier districts. But every effort is being made to encourage the social advance of the frontier population, by withdrawing them from their sullen isolation, and extending to them the rights and privileges which belong to the inhabitants of more tranquil districts. They have now, it may fairly be said, entered, with somewhat hesitating steps, the community of enlightened and civilized men. They approve the equal law of the courts; in the less fanatical districts they are eager to accept education for their children at the hands of the Government. Their chiefs and representative men become honorary magistrates, and are as efficient, in time of peace, as guardians of civil rights, as, in time of war, at the head of their clans in the field. To separate these chiefs and people from the wholesome influences of the civil administration, and to deny them a share in the life and progress and prosperity of the Punjab as a united province, would, if necessary, be a matter for profound regret. It would almost seem a retrograde step in the history of civilization for the British Government to drive back a capable and intelligent race into the isolation from which it is being so slowly and painfully won, and compel it to produce, by its very isolation, the tribal peculiarities which, though they must be accepted as the necessary attributes of one stage of national life, are still the badge and sign of social degradation.

LEPEL GRIFFIN,
Officiating Secretary to Government, Punjab.

October 1876.

APPENDIX A.

Honorary Magistrates.

District.	No.	Name.
Peshawar - - -	1	Arbab Muhammad Sarfaraz Khan.
	2	Shah Passand Khan.
Kohat - - - -	3	Nawab Sir Khwaja Muhammad Khan, K.C.S.I.
	4	Bahadur Sher Khan.
	5	Muhammad Zaffar Khan.
Dera Ismail Khan - -	6	Nawab Muhammad Sarfaraz Khan.
	7	Nawab Foujdar Khan, C.S.I.
	8	Nawab Shah Nawaz Khan
	9	Walidad Khan, Bahadur, Alizai.
	10	Aliwardi Khan.
	11	Aladad Khan.
	12	Dir Muhammad Khan.
	13	Farakh Sher Khan.
	14	Diwan Daulat Rai.
	15	Haidar Shah.
	16	Gosain Heth Nand Lal.
	17	Nawab Rabnawaz Khan, Alizai.
Dera Ghazi Khan - - -	18	Imam Bakhsh Khan.
	19	Ghulam Haidar Khan (Lund).
	20	Meran Khan.
	21	Ghulam Mustafa Khan.
	22	Beli Laddu Ram.
	23	Mian Abdulla Makwal.
	24	Ghulam Haidar Khan (Gurchani).

APPENDIX B.

STATEMENT showing the different Tribes and Clans composing the Batteries and Regiments, Punjab Frontier Force.

DETAIL OF TRIBES.		No. 2 Light Field Battery.	No. 3 Light Field Battery.	Hazara Mountain Battery.	Peshawar Mountain Battery.	No. 4 Garrison Battery.	Guides Cavalry (Queen's Own).	1st Punjab Cavalry.	2nd Punjab Cavalry.	3rd Punjab Cavalry.	4th Punjab Cavalry.	5th Punjab Cavalry.	1st Sikh Infantry.	2nd Sikh Infantry.	3rd Sikh Infantry.	4th Sikh Infantry.	1st Punjab Infantry.	2nd Punjab Infantry.	3rd Punjab Infantry.	4th Punjab Infantry.	5th Punjab Infantry.	6th Punjab Infantry.	Guides Infantry.	5th Goorkha Regiment.	Grand Total.
HINDUSTANI	Mussalmans	1	1	—	13	1	9	164	91	141	92	126	27	13	21	44	—	—	13	20	4	3	3	—	787
	Hindus	—	1	—	2	—	8	—	70	12	50	42	59	2	3	47	—	45	32	45	2	85	—	—	505
PUNJAB	Mussalmans	53	48	77	70	22	17	16	84	42	72	42	105	180	93	147	148	260	180	165	106	102	77	—	2,106
	Hindus	9	5	22	14	4	46	26	13	15	49	34	16	—	2	—	9	8	13	22	4	8	14	—	333
	Sikhs	39	44	66	68	12	116	95	146	173	125	169	377	175	373	360	185	177	190	137	275	169	192	—	3,663
	Kukas	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	3	—	—	7
	Dogras	2	1	—	—	—	7	34	—	26	45	—	43	277	93	42	85	88	131	139	86	112	99	—	1,310
PATHANS	Within border	—	—	—	—	—	105	143	72	73	54	72	89	37	45	42	158	59	86	95	131	172	151	—	1,584
INDEPENDENT PATHANS. AFRIDIS.	Kuki Khel	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	1	—	—	4	2	17	6	9	6	17	2	4	4	6	—	84
	Malikdin do.	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	5	11	12	12	60	6	34	10	21	11	25	—	208
	Kambar do.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	24	17	6	40	12	16	25	39	5	37	—	228
	Kamr do.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	2	—	5	—	12
	Zaka do.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	—	—	—	11	—	28
	Aka do.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Sipah do.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	4
	Adam do.	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	14	—	—	1	2	5	20	5	10	6	8	17	8	21	8	—	126
	All other sections.	—	—	1	—	—	6	—	—	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	5	3	—	11	—	6	—	42
	Orakzais	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	6	4	1	10	—	11	1	—	37
	Momands	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	3	6	—	—	8	—	—	—	19
	Bajaoris	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	1	—	5	5	—	—	—	13
	Swatis	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	2	—	—	—	—	2	3	1	—	—	10
	Bunerwal	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	3	4	—	—	—	9
	Kabulis	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	1	3	7	10	9	26	6	5	—	6	13	1	36	—	—	127
	Farsiwans	—	—	—	—	—	22	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	29
	All other tribes	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	3	4	—	1	5	26	—	16	20	6	6	—	89
Goorkhas		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	104	776	880
Totals		104	100	166	167	39	345	484	490	492	492	493	751	742	731	728	729	713	738	728	735	746	751	776	12,240

APPENDIX C.

RETURN of Outposts and their Strength for the Half-year ending the 30th June 1876.

Name of Ouposts.	Punjab Frontier Force.		Militia.		Total.		Remarks.
	Sabres.	Bayonets.	Sabres.	Bayonets.	Sabres.	Bayonets.	
ABBOTTABAD.							
Haripur Fort	—	15	—	—	—	15	Total of district. Punjab F. Force. Sabres 0 Bayonets 55; Militia. 0 0
Ughi (Agror)	—	26	—	—	—	26	
Mangli	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Mansahra	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Khaki	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Thandiani	—	14	—	—	—	14	
YUSAFZAI DISTRICT.							
None.							
KOHAT DISTRICT.							
Fort Garnett	2	25	—	—	2	25	Total of district. Punjab F. Force. Sabres 40 Bayonets 109; Militia. 0 0
Muhammadzai	2	25	—	—	2	25	
Gadda Khel	5	—	—	—	5	—	
Lachi	5	—	—	—	5	—	
Banda	5	—	—	—	5	—	
Bahadur Khel	21	59	—	—	21	59	
BANU DISTRICT.							
At Head-quarters	—	—	—	—	—	—	Total of district. Punjab F. Force. Sabres 61 Bayonets 130; Militia. 91 41
Jani Khel	39	35	5	—	44	35	
Kurram	12	25	2	—	14	25	
Adhammi or Burganati	—	—	21	7	21	7	
Gumatti	—	—	9	3	9	3	
Gumatti Tower	—	—	—	8	—	8	
Baran	—	—	9	6	9	6	
Tochi	—	—	10	7	10	7	
Burji	—	—	6	4	6	4	
Khairu Khel	—	—	10	2	10	2	
Tajori	—	—	10	2	10	2	
Wali	—	—	9	2	9	2	
Lattammar	10	23	—	—	10	23	
Shekh Budin	—	47	—	—	—	47	Temporary arrangement.
DERA ISMAIL KHAN DISTRICT.							
At Head-quarters	—	—	—	—	—	—	Total of district. Punjab F. Force. Sabres 97 Bayonets 170; Militia. 101 132
Tank Zam	26	32	2	—	28	32	
Girni	25	33	3	3	28	36	
Bain darra	—	—	8	45	8	45	
Ama Khel	—	—	3	—	3	—	
Mullazai	—	—	14	8	14	8	
Kot Nasran	—	—	16	8	16	8	
Tak	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Kot Khirgi	—	36	12	44	12	80	
Tittor	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Dabra	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Jatta	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Manjhi	21	21	3	—	24	21	
Murtaza	—	—	13	8	13	8	
Luni	—	—	12	8	12	8	
Zarakni	—	—	13	8	13	8	
Draband	25	22	2	—	27	22	

Name of Outposts.	Punjab Frontier Force.		Militia.		Total.		Remarks.
	Sabres.	Bayonets.	Sabres.	Bayonets.	Sabres.	Bayonets.	
Dera Ismail Khan District —*continued.*							
Shah Alam - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Chaudhwan - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Kot Tagga - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Gurwali - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Daolatwala - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Shekh Budin - - -	—	26	—	—	—	26	Temporary arrangement.
Dera Ghazi Khan District.							
Vihowa - - -	—	—	8	4	8	4	Total of district. Punjab F. Force: Sabres 32, Bayonets 42. Militia: Sabres 41, Bayonets 10
Jhok Bodo - - -	—	—	8	—	8	—	
Mangrotha - - -	18	42	3	—	21	42	
Mahoi - - -	—	—	13	4	13	4	
Nurpur - - -	—	—	9	2	9	2	
Batil - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Vidor - - -	14	—	—	—	14	—	
Choti - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Ganger - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Rajanpur District.							
At Head-quarters - -	—	—	5	—	5	—	Total of district. Punjab F. Force: Sabres 70, Bayonets 91. Militia: Sabres 97, Bayonets 24
Harrand - - -	21	37	3	—	24	37	
Drigri - - -	16	22	3	—	19	22	
Muhammadpur - -	12	12	3	—	15	12	
Rumka Thul - - -	—	—	17	8	17	8	
Sabzalkot - -	—	—	26	7	26	7	
Toziani - - -	—	—	15	5	15	5	
Dilbar - - -	—	—	11	4	11	4	
Bandowala - - -	21	20	3	—	24	20	
Shekhwali - - -	—	—	11	—	11	—	
Rojhan - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Asni - - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Total - - -	300	597	330	207	630	804	

APPENDIX D.

STATEMENT showing various occasions on which Punitive Measures by way of Blockade or Reprisals, &c. have been taken in Frontier Districts, since annexation, against Border Tribes.

1.	2.	3.		4.	5.	6.
Tribe.	Section.	Mode of Coercion.		Date.	Cause of Coercion.	Reparation exacted, Amount of Fine, &c.
		Blockades.	Reprisals, Buhramta.			
PESHAWAR.						
Adam Khel -	Muhammadi -	Blockade -	Nil - -	26th September 1850	Murder of Jamaldin, British subject.	Nil.
Ditto -	Hassan Khel, of Kohat Pass.	Ditto -	3 cattle, 3 arms, and some firewood.	5th November 1853	Robberies in the Kohat Pass.	
Ditto -	Galli, Ditto -	Ditto -	59 cattle -	22nd June 1854 -	Robberies and wounding of 3 British subjects.	
Ditto -	Ditto Ditto -	Ditto -	Cattle, number not known.	30th December 1854	Robberies - -	
Ditto -	Muhammadi -	Ditto -	Nil - -	25th February 1858 -	Default in payment of Rs. 750 fine imposed on the tribe in a criminal case.	Rs. 750 fine.
Ditto -	Galli - -	Ditto -	Nil.	19th September 1860	Robbery - - -	Rs. 145 fine.
Ditto -	Hassan Khel	Ditto -		13th February 1867 -	Ditto - -	Nil.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Ditto -		28th October 1868 -	Breach of agreement	
Ditto -	Kandi, of Hindu Khel	Ditto -		20th September 1869	Kidnapping of a woman -	
Ditto -	Basti Khel and Zarghan Khel.	Ditto -		11th May 1870 -	Robbery - - -	
Ditto -	Hassan Khel and Musa Din.	Ditto -		8th June 1870 -	Firing at Colonel Johnstone, Revenue Surveyor.	
Ditto -	Jowaki and Hassan Khel.	Ditto -		18th December 1870	Murder of Nizam, and several other crimes.	Rs. 900 fine.
Ditto -	Kalla Khel - -	Ditto -		5th February 1871 -	Theft of 16 cattle -	Rs. 270 fine.
Ditto -	Kandi, of Mahabat Khel.	Ditto -		27th January 1873 -	Murder of Muhammad Khan.	Rs. 600 fine.
Ditto -	Kandi, of Widan Shah.	Ditto -	7 cattle -	6th October 1874 -	Theft of 3 cattle - -	Rs. 50 ransom, recovered.

1.	2.	3.		4.	5.	6.
Tribe.	Section.	Mode of Coercion.		Date.	Cause of Coercion.	Reparation exacted, Amount of Fine, &c.
		Blockades.	Reprisals, Buhramta.			
Aka Khel -	Bassi Khel - -	Ditto -		1st April 1851	Theft of 6 camels and Rs. 200 cash.	Stolen property recovered in full.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Ditto -		2nd February 1854	Robbery of Rs. 220 -	Nil.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Ditto -	Nil - -	30th January 1855	Murder of a British subject, and subsequent attack on the Badhair Police Post, in which Lieutenant Hamilton, Assistant Engineer, was wounded and several others murdered, and Rs. 7,000 robbed.	Rs. 2,500 fine.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Ditto -		12th February 1867	Robbery - - -	Nil.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Ditto -	357 cattle -	23rd March 1874 -	Robbery of cattle -	Rs. 591 fine.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Nil -	1st April 1875 -	Robbery of Government mail	Rs. 500 fine.
Ditto -	Madda Khel -	Ditto -	6 persons and 15 cattle.	3rd May 1875 -	Kidnapping of a Hindu from Bazid Khel.	No reparation was exacted. The Hindu was brought back and the prisoners were released on 7th June 1875.
Kamar Khel -	Kamar Khel -	Ditto -	53 cattle -	December 1874 -	Robbery of Rs. 1,362–5–0, Government money.	Rs. 470 recovered.
Mallikdin Khel -	Mallikdin Khel -	Ditto -	Nil - -	15th October 1856 -	Murder of Fateh Khan, Government servant.	Rs. 1,265, debt due by the tribe to the deceased, was recovered and paid to his heirs.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Ditto	Cattle, number not known.	11th April 1861 -	Robbery of cattle and wounding of 6 persons, British subjects.	Rs. 2,619 fine.
Kummurai -	Kummurai - -					
Sipara - -	Sipara - -					
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Ditto -	452 cattle -	16th February 1872 -	Allowing Zakha Khels to pass through their territory for the purpose of committing robbery in the district of Peshawar.	Rs. 1,953–13–6 fine.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Ditto -	360 cattle -	19th January 1874 -	Ditto ditto - -	Rs. 100 fine, in addition to the serious loss occasioned by the blockade.
Kukki Khel -	Kukki Khel - -	Ditto -	Cattle - -	4th January 1854 -	Kidnapping of 3 women, British subjects.	The kidnapped women were brought back.

Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	Nil	27th July 1855	Theft of 2 cattle.	Nil.
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	Cattle	23rd April 1856	Robbery of a bottle of quinine sent to Kabul for the British Agent.	
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	18th March 1858	Several murder and robbery cases.	Rs. 3,000 fine.
Zakha Khel	Zakha Khel	Ditto		18th June 1856	Theft of 500 cattle.	
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto		18th September 1856	Theft of 400 cattle and wounding of 4 British subjects.	
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	Nil	1862	Robbery	Rs. 350 fine.
Ditto	Pakhi Shan Khel, Bass Khel and Anai of Bazar.	Ditto		16th May 1867	Murder of 2 police sowars.	
Ditto	Zakha Khel	Ditto	19 cattle	16th February 1872	Robberies	Rs. 179 fine.
Ditto	Ditto		Nil	4th December 1874	Kidnapping bandmaster of 72nd Highlanders.	The bandmaster was brought back on 18th December 1874, and his property recovered. Two houses belonging to the principal offenders were burnt and a sum of Rs. 600, out of Rs. 1,200 expended by Arbab Abdul Majid Khan, was recovered from the tribe, and in lieu of the Balance (Rs. 600) 354 head of cattle, which the tribe had from time to time stolen, were taken and made over to their rightful owners on different dates during 1875.
Shinwari	Lowargi Wal	Blockade	10 cattle	18th March 1856	Firing at Khan Bahadur Fateh Khan when deputed to the Kabul Court.	Rs. 1,000 fine.
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	18 mules	25th September 1858	Theft of a horse	Horse recovered.
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	24 cattle	29th May 1862	13 cases of robbery	Rs. 1,000 fine.
Ditto	Shekh Mul Khel and Piro Khel.	Ditto	28 mules	29th March 1866	Several crimes committed.	Rs. 500 fine,
Mullagori	Mullagori	Ditto	22 cattle	1st July 1854	Robbery of cattle worth Rs. 537.	Cattle worth Rs. 456 recovered.
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	100 ditto	29th May 1872	Robberies	Rs. 115 fine.
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	Nil	30th December 1870	Robbery	Rs. 300 fine.
Ditto	Ditto, of Zomakka Bara.	Ditto	4 persons and 9 cattle.	9th September 1875	Various offences.	Rs. 246-8-0 recovered and paid to complainants. Prisoners released on 13th October 1875.
Mohmand	People of Lalpura and Pundiali.	Ditto	Nil	29th March 1859	Robbery	Nil.
Ditto	People of Pundiali	Ditto	38 cattle	24th June 1854	Robbery of 46 cattle, and murder of Zyudn, British subject.	Rs. 503 fine.
Ditto	Mohmand	Ditto		1863	Attack on the Shubkaddar Fort and neighbouring village.	Their villages burnt.

1.	2.	3.		4.	5.	6.
Tribe.	Section.	Mode of Coercion.		Date.	Cause of Coercion.	Reparation exacted, Amount of Fine, &c.
		Blockades.	Reprisals, Buhramta.			
Mohmand -	Mohmand Rami Khel, Kutta Sur, Dand Kori and Pirak family	Blockade -	16 cattle -	26th June 1865 -	Kidnapping of Rattan, Hindu, of Shubkaddar.	The Hindu was brought back.
Ditto -	Mohib Khel Section of Turkzai	Ditto -	- - -	20th December 1873	Firing at Captain Anderson	The premises of the offenders were burnt and lands of the Mohib Khel confiscated.
Utman Khel -	Umer Khel, of Pranghar.	Ditto -	- - -	27th March 1870 -	Fighting against British subjects.	
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Ditto -	- - -	20th December 1860	Several offences - -	Rs. 200 fine.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Ditto -	19 Persons -	1st April 1874 -	Various offences - -	Rs. 652-10-0 realised and paid to complainants. Parties under arrest released on 31st July 1875.
Khabbal -	Khabbal Wal -	Ditto -	- - -	23rd July 1856 -	Murder of Mir Hazar, British subject.	Rs. 1,000 fine.
Gaddoon -	Gaddoon, Utmanzai, Khabbal, Gazat and Akhoon Khel.	Ditto -	Cattle - -	25th May 1861 -	Numerous offences -	Rs. 350 fine.
Ditto -	Gaddoon - -	Ditto -	Ditto -	16th June 1870 -	Harbouring Khadi Khan, absconded criminal.	Rs. 1,489 fine.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Ditto -	60 cattle -	7th December 1872 -	Kidnapping of a Hindu girl.	Rs. 300 fine.
Ditto -	Mansur and Salar -	Ditto -	Cattle - -	27th February 1874 -	Several offences - -	Rs. 500 fine.
Abba Khel, Swat	Zormandi, Sher Khanu and Bazdarra.	Ditto -	- - -	21st May 1863 -	Robberies - -	Stolen property recovered.
Ditto -	Abba Khel - -	Ditto -	- - -	10th September 1868	Ditto.	
Salarzai -	Salarzai - -	Ditto -	- - -	23rd October 1863 -	Misconduct during the Umbeyla Expedition.	
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Ditto -	Nil - -	19th April 1868 -	Declining to send a Jirgah.	Rs. 100 fine.
Ashazai and Gadidazai.	Ashazai and Gaddazai.	Ditto -	Nil - -	20th May 1868 -	Ditto. ditto.	

KOHAT DISTRICT.

Adam Khel Afridis.	Gullai and Zarghun Khel.	Ditto -	- - -	17th September 1860	The plundering of property, valued at Rs. 218, from inhabitants of British Government.	Compensation for property, and Rs. 197-14-0 fine paid.

Ditto -	Gallai Akor - -	- - -	Reprisal -	21st June 1850 -	Intending to create ill-feeling against British Government.	Rs. 967-15-0 fine realised by sale of confiscated property, result of which was that they behaved themselves well for 4 years.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Blockade -	Nil - -	18th May 1854 -	Robbery on the highway of property amounting to Rs. 16-6-0.	Compensation for the property plundered, and Rs. 20 fine paid.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Reprisal -	2nd June 1854 -	Infringement of treaty with British Government regarding robbery.	Compensation for all property plundered, and Rs. 170 fine; kept the peace till 1865.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Blockade -	- - -	28th December 1856	Wounding 4 travellers -	The real offenders were apprehended and sentenced to imprisonment.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Ditto -	- - -	29th December 1862	Rescuing 2 prisoners chalaned from Peshawar to Kohat, and robbing escort of property valued at Rs. 41-12-0.	Paid compensation for the property robbed and handed over the 2 prisoners; since then no such cases have occurred.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Ditto -	- - -	17th April 1865 -	Intending to create ill-feeling against British Government.	They sued for pardon and bound themselves to be obedient to Government orders; they have behaved well since.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Ditto -	- - -	11th May 1870 -	Murdering of 3 syces and carrying off 2 mules loaded with property.	(1.) Paid Rs. 3,000, including blood-money and value of property plundered and fine. (2.) Three of their Gahris were burnt down and ordered not to be re-built. (3.) One of the offenders was given up and hanged on the crest of the Kothal. (4.) The remaining offenders were banished for one year.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Ditto -	- - -	26th December 1875	Negotiations for the right to repair the road through the Kohat Pass.	Still under blockade.
Ditto -	Jowaki - -	Ditto -	- - -	10th September 1852	Suspected of plundering dak.	Rs. 200 fine.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Reprisal -	11th May 1861 -	Carrying off cattle belonging to Malik Mushki from Tagh, British territory.	Restored the cattle.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	10th May 1869 -	Theft of property, valued at Rs. 75, from British territory.	Compensation for the property paid.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	28th July 1869 -	Theft of 2 cattle - -	Rs. 35 fine, including Rs. 25, price of cattle.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	3rd September 1869 -	Theft of property -	Paid Rs. 50 fine, and 45, value of stolen property.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	2nd April 1870 -	Abduction of 2 boys from British territory.	The two boys given up and a fine of Rs. 100 paid.

1.	2.	3.		4.	5.	6.
Tribe.	Section.	Mode of Coercion.		Date.	Cause of Coercion.	Reparation exacted, Amount of Fine, &c.
		Blockades.	Reprisals, Buhramta.			
Adam Khel Afridis.	Jowaki - -	- - -	Ditto -	13th July 1870 -	Rescue of an accused -	(1.) Accused re-captured. (2.) House of the offender burnt. (3.) Paid Rs. 32 fine.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	5th September 1870	Cattle theft in British territory.	Paid Rs. 10, price of the cattle.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	21st November 1870	Theft of cattle, valued at Rs. 839-8-0.	Value of cattle easily realised.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	3rd February 1871 -	Carrying off 2 men from British territory.	The 2 men released and Rs. 100 fine realised.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Reprisal -	15th February 1871 -	Disobedience of order in carrying away camels detained for Government use.	Camels restored, and Rs. 50 fine realised.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	20th March 1872 -	Carrying off 95 sheep and a sword and pouch (Government property).	Sheep restored and tribe fined Rs. 700, because the track of the offenders was traced to their village.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	2nd February 1873	House-breaking in British territory, theft of property valued at Rs. 300.	Rs. 330 fine, including price of stolen property recovered.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	19th June 1873 -	Theft of cattle, &c., in British territory, valued at Rs. 20.	Rs. 15 fine, and compensation for the property.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	16th January 1874 -	Theft of property, valued at Rs. 13, in British territory.	Rs. 50 fine, and compensation for stolen property.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	2nd February 1874	Theft of property, valued at Rs. 19, in British territory.	Ditto ditto ditto.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	14th July 1876 -	Permitting the Afridis of the Kohat Pass to go through their country and plunder in British territory.	Compensation for the property plundered to the extent of Rs. 1,705 agreed to, and parties taken prisoners released.
Ditto -	Hassan Khel -	Blockade -	- - -	19th November 1866	General hostilities against British Government.	Rs. 2,000 fine realised, and compensation for the property plundered; since then they have behaved well.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Reprisal -	14th November 1870	Cattle-lifting in British territory.	Paid compensation for the cattle.

Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	24th October 1871 -	Cattle theft, valued at Rs. 200.	Ditto ditto.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	19th February 1873 -	Ditto, ditto, at Rs. 50	Ditto ditto.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	15th November 1873	Theft of 3 cows - -	Paid Rs. 50 fine, and compensation for the property.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	20th October 1874 -	Cattle theft, valued at Rs. 612.	Paid Rs. 50 fine, and compensation for the cattle.
Aka Khel Afridis.	Bassi Khel - -	Blockade -	- - -	15th December 1855	Robbery on highway; orders received from Peshawar district.	Paid Rs. 2,500 as fine, and compensation for the property; also sued for pardon and renewed the treaty for good behaviour.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Reprisal -	18th April 1872 -	Theft of a rifle, Government property.	Rifle restored.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	5th March 1872 -	Dacoity of 28 camels -	Camels restored.
Ditto -	Daulatzai Bazoti -	Blockade -	- - -	23rd November 1862	Theft in Uchadara, and resisting to deliver up property valued at Rs. 50.	Paid compensation for the property.
Ditto -	Ditto Sipah -	Ditto -	- - -	4th January 1868 -	Giving an asylum to Fateh Khan, Alizai, contrary to orders.	Their village of Garah was attacked and burnt, on which they paid Rs. 1,290 fine, including blood-money, &c., and sued for pardon, giving 9 hostages for future good behaviour, since which they have behaved well.
Ditto -	Ditto Bazoti -	- - -	Reprisal -	18th November 1858	Plundering British subject.	Rs. 82 fine.
Orakzai -	Ditto -	- - -	Ditto -	10th March 1874 -	Insolent conduct in leaving Kohat without permission, and declaring intention of committing hostilities.	About 93 men arrested and kept in custody; afterwards released on security of border tribes.
Ditto -	Daulatzai and Utman Khel.	- - -	Ditto -	17th March 1859 -	Theft of cattle, valued at Rs. 51.	Paid compensation for the cattle.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	21st October 1868 -	Ditto, valued at Rs. 37	Ditto ditto.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Blockade -	- - -	22nd February 1869	Abduction of 6 men of Marai village.	The 6 men given up.
Ditto -	Daulatzai and Bar Muhamad Khel.	- - -	Reprisal -	22nd July 1868 -	Theft of 3 cattle from Marai.	Paid Rs. 50 fine, and price of stolen cattle.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	23rd July 1869 -	Theft of 2 cows from Kachai.	Paid Rs. 25 fine, and Rs. 71, price of cows.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	2nd September 1871	Theft of 30 goats -	Rs. 3-8-0 fine and price of 30 goats realised by sale of confiscated property.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	18th June 1874 -	Plundering British subjects.	Property recovered.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	29th June 1874 -	Theft of property, valued at Rs. 30.	Paid compensation for the property.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	7th December 1874 -	Theft of property -	Paid compensation for the stolen property.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	9th December 1874 -	Ditto - -	Ditto ditto.
Ditto -	Abdul Aziz Khel -	- - -	Ditto -	15th June 1873 -	Theft of 2 cows - -	Ditto ditto.

1.	2.	3.		4.	5.	6.
Tribe.	Section.	Mode of Coercion.		Date.	Cause of Coercion.	Reparation exacted, Amount of Fine, &c.
		Blockades.	Reprisals, Buhramta.			
Orakzai -	Mishti - -	- - -	Reprisal -	19th January 1871 -	Theft of property, valued at Rs. 136, and wounding a man.	Paid Rs. 20 fine, and compensation for the stolen property.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	24th January 1871 -	Theft of cattle, valued at Rs. 761.	Paid Rs. 761, price of stolen cattle.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	2nd October 1873 -	Theft of a "peshkabz" knife, valued at Rs. 4.	Rs. 4 recovered by sale of property.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	15th November 1873	Theft of 2 goats, valued at Rs. 9.	Rs. 9, price of goats, and Rs. 4 fine, recovered by sale of confiscated property.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	Ditto -	Theft of a bullock, valued at Rs. 30.	Rs. 30 recovered by sale of confiscated property.
Ditto -	Ismailzai and Rabia Khel.	- - -	Ditto -	27th October 1855 -	Theft of property -	Rs. 1,070-2-0 fine realised by sale of confiscated property.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Blockade -	- - -	28th September 1853	For murder in revenge -	Blood-money paid to the heirs of deceased.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Reprisal -	9th December 1871 -	Theft of 11 cattle, and carrying off a man.	Cattle and men restored, and Rs. 40 fine realised.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	8th March 1873 -	Theft of 3 goats - -	Paid Rs. 5 fine, and compensation for 3 stolen goats.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	2nd May 1873 -	Cattle theft, valued at Rs. 280.	Paid Rs. 50 fine, and Rs. 280, price of stolen cattle.
Ditto -	Akhel - -	- - -	Ditto -	5th April 1874 -	Murder of a man, British subject.	Paid Rs. 640 fine, and in lieu of Rs. 360, blood-money, brother of accused is kept in prison.
Ditto -	Ali Khel - -	- - -	Ditto -	6th April 1871 -	In default as sureties for blood-money.	Paid 180 Kabuli rupees.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	11th April 1871 -	Theft of 4 cows - -	Paid Rs. 160, price of cows.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	23rd February 1874 -	Cattle theft, valued at Rs. 665.	Stolen cattle recovered, Rs. 200 fine.
Ditto -	Alisherzai - -	Blockade -	- - -	24th March 1870 -	Theft of property, valued at Rs. 1,100.	Paid compensation for stolen property.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Reprisal -	28th May 1870 -	Murder of a man - -	Paid Rs. 300 as blood-money.
Ditto -	Asturi Khel - -	- - -	Ditto -	25th February 1875 -	Robbery on highway of property amounting to Rs. 783.	Compensation for property plundered.
Turi - -	Turi - - -	- - -	Ditto -	12th April 1853 -	Dacoity of Rs. 790 -	Paid Rs. 790, price of stolen property, and gave hostages for good behaviour, who were released afterwards.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	13th August 1854 -	Dacoity - - -	Paid compensation for the property.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	19th April 1855 -	Ditto - - -	Ditto ditto.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	28th August 1858 -	Cattle theft, valued at Rs. 300.	Paid compensation for the cattle.

Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	11th December 1869	Murder of 11, and wounding 6, men of the Wazir tribe.	Rs. 4,872 fine fixed for payment to Wazirs. Rs. 3,872 realised, balance pardoned by Wazirs. They have behaved well since.	
Zaimusht -	Zaimusht - -	- - -	Ditto -	29th June 1869 -	Theft of 5 cows - -	Cattle restored.	
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	7th May 1870 -	Theft of a cow, valued at Rs. 30.	Ditto.	
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	29th June 1874 -	Theft of 3 bullocks -	Ditto.	
Wazirs - -	Kabul Khel - -	- - -	Ditto -	11th October 1853 -	Plundering property valued at Rs. 1,033.	Rs. 1,033 realised by sale of confiscated property.	
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	5th December 1856 -	Murder of grass cutters of cavalry.	Fine Rs. 2,260 realised.	
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	5th January 1860 -	Cattle lifting - -	Rs. 70-12-0 credited as fine after paying for the stolen cattle by sale of confiscated property.	
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	30th June 1868 -	Robbery of property.		
Ditto -	Ditto, Saifali Miami.	- - -	Ditto -	5th April 1869 -	Theft of cattle and property, valued at Rs. 1,600.	Paid Rs. 2,000 fine, and 1,600 compensation for the stolen property.	
Ditto -	Kabul Khel - -	- - -	Ditto -	22nd August 1868 -	Theft of 10 camels, valued at Rs. 1,600.	Paid Rs. 1,080, price of stolen camels.	
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	20th November 1872	Theft of cattle, valued at Rs. 80.	Paid Rs. 80, price of cattle.	
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	10th November 1873	Theft of cattle, valued at Rs. 200.	Paid Rs. 200, ditto.	
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	13th November 1873	Dacoity, property robbed, valued at Rs. 137.	Suspicion cleared off by oath.	
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	11th March 1874 -	Theft of property, valued at Rs. 19.	Paid compensation for the stolen property.	
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	18th April 1874 -	Murder of a man, inhabitant of British territory.	Rs. 100 fine fixed, of which Rs. 17-10-9 realised by sale of confiscated property.	
Ditto -	Khujal Khel -	- - -	Ditto -	7th March 1874 -	Theft and carrying off 3 men with property.	Men and property restored, Rs. 200 fine.	
Ditto -	Tazi Khel - -	- - -	Ditto -	22nd January 1858 -	Theft of property -	Paid compensation for stolen property.	
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	November 1874 -	Wounding Usman Khan, jamadar of Gandiour thana.	Fine Rs. 100.	
Afridi - -	Mallikdin Khel -	- - -	Ditto -	2nd January 1872 -	Abducting a woman -	Paid Rs. 140 as compensation.	
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	4th June 1866 -	Theft of cattle, valued at Rs. 304.	Paid price of cattle.	
Ghilzi - -	Ghilzi - -	- - -	Ditto -	4th March 1871 -	Theft of 14 camels -	Paid price of stolen cattle.	
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	24th March 1874 -	Theft of 10 camels - -	Cleared themselves by oath.	

1.	2.	3.		4.	5.	6.
Tribe.	Section.	Mode of Coercion.		Date.	Cause of Coercion.	Reparation exacted, Amount of Fine, &c.
		Blockades.	Reprisals, Buhramta.			
HAZARA DISTRICT.						
Utmanzai and Jadun.	Allai Akazai Kanazai Salar Mansur	Blockaded 3 months.	- - -	26th June 1861 -	Breach of their promise that thieves of Sittana should not commit crimes in British territory.	Fine realised, Rs. 1,000; houses in Sarri demolished.
Swati of Tikri	Ashlor Naror Malkal	- -	- - -	8th November 1861	Raid on Kabbal Agror, a boundary question.	Fined Rs. 1,000; plundered property restored; boundary question settled.
Utmanzai Jadun	Alizai Akazai Kanazai Salar Mansur	Blockade -	- - -	5th June 1863 -	Hindustani colony occupying Sittana.	This resulted in the Umbeyla campaign; destruction of Malka; and burning of Mandi.
Swati of Nindahar.	Panjmiral - -	Ditto -	- - -	4th March 1868 -	Raid on Sharkul in Konsh	Their Jirga came in, and Rs. 200 fine realised.
Ditto	Ditto Panjghol Dudal Ashlor Naror Deshi Khan Khel Malkal	- -	- - -	30th July 1868 -	Raid on Oghi thana -	Their Jirgas came in, and Rs. 7,000 fine was paid.
Allai Swati Sayad Mada Khel	Thor - -	- - -	- - -	11th August 1868 -	Attack on the camp of Mr. Scott, Revenue Surveyor.	Fine Rs. 250, or in default Rs. 500, which has never been paid.
Isazai, Sayads of Pariari.	Akazai, Hassanzai -	Blockade -	- - -	25th August 1869 to June 1870.	Raid on Jaskot, Agror -	The blockade was taken off on return of the Khan of Agror; no fines imposed.
Mada Khel	Sayads, Gujars, Thor of Allai.	Ditto -	- - -	3rd November 1874 -	Raid on Jabbar, attended with two murders and theft of cattle.	Fines realised, Rs. 800, and paid away in compensation to sufferers.

DERA ISMAIL KHAN DISTRICT.

Mahsuds (Wazirs).	Ahmal Khel, Shingi, Nana Khel and Band Khel, Balolzais.	Blockade, extending over several years, since annexation.	Property of the value of Rs. 3,983 in the Bannu district.	14th August 1861	For the murder of 5 syces of the 3rd Regiment Punjab cavalry.	On 26th April 1874 Rs. 7,000 was paid by tribe as reparation for past offences, and the tribe placed in the hands of Government 35 hostages, who were located at Dera as a guarantee for the good behaviour of the tribe in future.
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	1 person as reprisal.	2nd April 1868	Committing raids and robbery in British territory.	
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	2 persons, with their property.	5th September 1868		
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	3 ditto, ditto	31st December 1868		
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	2 persons, as reprisal.	5th September 1870		
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	1 person as reprisal.	7th November 1870		
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	1 ditto	4th May 1871		
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	23 persons, with their property.	27th January 1873		
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	3 persons as reprisal.	20th February 1873		
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	5 ditto	1st April 1873		
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	4 ditto	2nd May 1873		
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	5 ditto	5th May 1873		
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	1 person, with property.	9th June 1873		
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	1 person	3rd October 1873		
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	3 persons	4th January 1874		
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	2 ditto	23rd January 1874		
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	2 ditto	17th February 1874		
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	1 person	8th April 1874		
Ditto	Ditto	Blockade	80 persons	4th May 1875	Breach of engagements, and committing raids on British territory.	Rs. 3,406; that is, they were made to pay Rs. 614 in cash and restore property to the value of Rs. 2,792 carried away by them. They were also made to give up a kidnapped child; of the reprisals, 80 were released on 11th November 1875. The tribe paid up a further sum of Rs. 1,252 in cash in May 1876, when the remaining prisoners were released.
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	6 ditto	17th March 1876		
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	4 ditto	1st April 1876		
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	12 ditto	3rd April 1876		
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	1 person	24th April 1876		
Ditto	Shama Khel	Ditto	5 ditto	2nd September 1868	Committing raids and robberies in British territory.	On 17th May 1873 a fine of Rs. 3,000 was paid in reparation of past offences, and 20 hostages lodged by the tribe at Dera as a guarantee for the future good behaviour of the tribe.
Ditto	Ditto	- - -	2 ditto	10th August 1869		
Ditto	Ditto	- - -	1 person	1st September 1869		
Ahmadzai (Wazirs).	Jali Khel	Blockade	4 persons	21st May 1873	Ditto	Rs. 300 fine.
Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	17 persons, with property.	2nd May 1874	Ditto	Rs. 480 fine.

1.	2.	3.		4.	5.	6.
Tribe.	Section.	Mode of Coercion.		Date.	Cause of Coercion.	Reparation exacted, Amount of Fine, &c.
		Blockades.	Reprisals, Buhramta.			
Sheorani -	Sen Khel and Uba Khel.	Blockade -	73 persons -	9th September 1874	Kidnapping of a child from Kulachi, and the murder of 2 persons at Daraband.	Rs. 1,500 from Sen Khel, and Rs. 1,000 from Uba Khel tribe; entered also into engagements to be responsible in future for any crime committed in British territory by Sheoranis or others living within Sheorani limits.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Ditto -	1 person -	11th May 1875 -	The murder of Gama, a tahsil chaprass, and committing raids in British territory.	Rs. 360 as blood-money for the murder of the chaprassi, and Rs. 117 on account of property carried away, total Rs. 477, paid on 6th December 1875. The reprisals were released, and free intercourse permitted in British territory.
			1 ditto -	23rd June 1875 -		
			1 ditto -	26th June 1875 -		
			2 persons -	31st July 1875 -		
Bhittanni { Fatta - Dhunra - Oraspur -		- - -	- - -	- - -	- - - -	There are no records to be found showing that these tribes have ever been blockaded since annexation, or that reprisals were ever made from them with a view to their making reparation for crime. They occupy land within British border, and can be controlled in consequence more easily than those tribes who simply trade with British territory.
Ushtrana { Ahmadzai - Guggulzai -						
Kasrani -	- - -	Blockade -	4 persons -	19th June 1875 -	Committing 2 murders in British territory.	Rs. 720 to be paid in instalments as blood-money for the murders committed; reprisals liberated on 3rd May 1876.
Uzmarah -	- - -		2 persons -	14th July 1875 -		

DERA GHAZI KHAN DISTRICT.

Bugti - -	Shambani - -	- - -	- - -	2nd October 1850 -	Cattle-lifting on the Asni border.	Four Shambani Bugtis carried off a number of goats from Asni; they were pursued and arrested by Dost Ali, the Mazari Tomandar, and sentenced to 1½ years imprisonment each.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	- - -	14th December 1850	Theft - - -	Nine hillmen (5 Bugtis and 4 Marris) carried off some goats from the Kot Mitham ilaqua. They were pursued by the inhabitants of the place where the theft was committed, and 2 of their number killed and 1 captured; the other 6 escaped. The man captured was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and while in jail attacked the keepers and was cut down by a barkandaz.

Ditto	Ditto	- - -	- - -	27th March 1851	Highway robbery	A Shambani named Chutta committed highway robbery near Rajanpur. He was captured by the Thanadar of Kot Mithan, and eventually sentenced to 2 years imprisonment.
Ditto	Ditto	- - -	Reprisal	1st November 1851	Ditto	The Butis of the Shambani section robbed a bani on the highway in British territorry and fled to the hills. They were pursued and overtaken by Imam Baksh Khan, Mazari, who killed 2; the third robber escaped. By sanction of Commissioner a reward of Rs. 100 was given to Imam Baksh Khan; the horses and arms of deceased were also made over to him.
Ditto	Ditto	- - -	Ditto	14th May 1852	Ditto	Three Shambani Bugtis carried off 2 sheep from mauza Kin, ilaqua Kot Mitham. Some Mazaris followed them into the hills and killed 1 of their number.
Ditto	Ditto	- - -	Ditto	14th June 1852	Ditto	Three persons stole a sheep at Gobalan and made their way into the hills. They were pursued by some shepherds who recovered the sheep, and killed 1 of the thieves; the other 2 escaped.
Ditto	Ditto	- - -	Ditto	10th November 1852	Theft	Twelve persons committed theft in the Rojhan ilaqua and fled into the hills. Some Mazaris pursued and attacked them, killing 8.
Bugtis	Mashori	- - -	Ditto	15th April 1856	Ditto	Fourteen persons committed theft at Harrand and were pursued by Harran bazgir and some sowars, who killed 1 and wounded 2 of the thieves; the others escaped.
Ditto	Ditto	- - -	- - -	23rd May 1856	Murder	A Mashori Bugti named Dorak committed murder and escaped; he was arrested through Ghulam Murtaza, Tomandar of the Bugtis, and released on security of Kattu Khan.
Ditto	Ditto	- - -	Reprisal	7th April 1867	Theft and mischief	Seven Mashoris carried off 6 camels; they were pursued by Sher Muhammad, Mazari. On being close pressed in the Jobbari Pass, they slaughtered the animals and continued their flight. They were, however, overtaken, and 3 of their number killed.
Ditto	Shambani	- - -	-	10th December 1873	Going armed in British territory.	Nine Shambanis were found strolling about armed, and made over to the Mazari Tomandar to be sent back to their Toman.
Marris	Ditto	- - -	- - -	28th July 1849	Resisting authority	A man named Drishan was found strolling about near Harrand. The sowars of Harrand taking him for a suspicious character attempted to take him into custody; he, however, attacked them, and was killed.
Ditto	Ditto	- - -	- - -	18th September 1850	Cattle theft	A man named Dildar was charged with the theft of 2 camels, and while in jail under trial made his escape, and has not since been heard of.

1.	2.	3.		4.	5.	6.
Tribe.	Section.	Mode of Coercion.		Date.	Cause of Coercion.	Reparation exacted, Amount of Fine, &c.
		Blockades.	Reprisals, Buhramta.			
Marris - -	Shambani - -	- - -	Reprisal -	28th November 1850	Cattle theft -	Eighty men plundered some camels in ilaqua Kot Mith; they were pursued by Kalandar Shah and other Zamindars who killed 2 of the thieves; the others escaped into the hills.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	25th May 1855 -	Murder and theft -	Gul Sher, a murderer and noted outlaw committed theft in the Kot Mithan ilaqua, and made his way into the hills; he was pursued by Horan Khan's sowars, and killed at Sham.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	17th August 1857 -	Dacoity and murder -	Three hundred Marris raided on Bhakalpur and Drigri. Bijar Khan and Shekh Mahbub Ali with their followers attacked and drove them back; Bijar was, however, killed. A number of the raiders were killed and wounded.
Ditto -	- - - - -	- - -	- - -	25th April 1859 -	Theft - - -	Three men came into the Harrand ilaqua and committed theft; they were arrested by Bahadur Khan and eventually sentenced to six years' imprisonment each.
Ditto -	Shambani - -	- - -	- - -	6th September 1859	Ditto - - -	Imam Baksh Khan and Pangu, Lishari, committed theft in the Harrand ilaqua; were arrested by militia sowars, and sentenced to 2 years imprisonment and fine of Rs. 200 each.
Ditto -	Lishari - -	- - -	Reprisal -	2nd March 1860 -	Robbery and murder -	Seven Marris and Khetrans, who committed robbery and murder at Choti, were pursued and had 6 of their number killed, the seventh escaped.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	20th April 1862 -	Theft - - -	Two Marris committed theft in the Harrand ilaqua, and were pursued and killed by Sodar and Khira Khan, Pitafis, for which act they received a reward of Rs. 300.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	29th November 1866	Ditto - - -	Forty Marris carried off 97 camels from Asni. They were pursued by militia sowars, 1 of the thieves was wounded, the others escaped into the hills.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto by cavalry	15th July 1867 -	Dacoity and murder -	Ghulam Hussain Khan, Mashori Makadam, with 1,200 Marris, Bugtis, and Khetrans, raided on Pachad Gurchani, near Harrand. A detachment of cavalry with a body of Biluch sowars pursued and killed Hussain with 227 of his followers. The property plundered was recovered, and Kattu Khan and other Mashori Makadams gave a written agreement that they would do no harm in British territory for the future.

Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Reprisal -	2nd January 1868 -	Theft - - -	Two men who committed theft in the Khojan ilaqua were pursued and killed by Bahadur Khan and other Mazaris.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	31st Janury 1868 -	Ditto - - -	Four men who committed theft in the Harrand ilaqua were pursued by Bazgir Gurchani, who killed 1 of the theives, the rest escaped.
Bozdar - -	Ditto - -	- - -	Ditto -	19th September 1849	Cattle-lifting - -	Nihal, Bozdar, with 8 of his followers, carried off a number of cows from mauza Kalati. They were pursued and attacked by the inhabitants of that place; 2 of the thieves were killed, and 1, a Marri, named Nihal, captured. He was eventually sentenced to 2 years imprisonment.
Ditto -	Gulamani and Shambani.	- - -	- - -	20th September 1849	Theft - - -	Two men named Ali and Hakim, Gulamani Bozdars, committed theft in mauza Kalati. They were arrested and eventually sentenced to 2 years imprisonment each.
Ditto -	- - - -	- - -	- - -	31st December 1851 -	Attack on Vidor - -	Mir Muhammad, Bozdar, and Tagia, Khosa, with about 140 followers raided on Vidor and carried off some property. They were pursued by Azim Khan and Miran, Lagharis, who killed 3 of the robbers and captured Mir Muhammad and Tagia; the former was imprisoned for life, the latter for 14 years.
Ditto -	- - - -	- - -	Reprisal -	22nd July 1852 -	Cattle-lifting - -	Sixty Bozdars carried off a number of goats, &c., from mauza Boglani, and were pursued by militia sowars; 1 of the thieves was severely wounded, the others escaped.
Ditto -	- - - -	- - -	- - -	16th November 1852	Theft - - -	Bijar and Muhammad, Bozdars, committed theft at mauza Sokar. They were captured by the lambardars of that place, and eventually sentenced to 3 years imprisonment each.
Ditto -	- - - -	- - -	Reprisal -	18th January 1853 -	Cattle-lifting - -	Ali Muhammad, Khosa, with 14 of his followers, carried off a number of cows from mauza Amdani. They were pursued by Fazl Ali Khan, Tomandar Lund, who recovered the cattle and wounded 1 of the thieves.
Ditto -	- - - -	- - -	- - -	3rd March 1853 -	Ditto - -	Hosain, Bozdar, was captured by Usman with a stolen camel in his possession at mauza Mankotha, and was imprisoned for 3 years.
Ditto -	- - - -	- - -	- - -	3rd June 1853 -	Theft - - -	Muhammad and Balocha, Bozdars, committed theft in mauza Meva, and were captured by the inhabitants of that place. They were tried and imprisoned for 6 months each, and ordered to give security for good behaviour, or to undergo further imprisonment for a similar period.

1.	2.	3.		4.	5.	6.
Tribe.	Section.	Mode of Coercion.		Date.	Cause of Coercion.	Reparation exacted, Amount of Fine, &c.
		Blockades.	Reprisals, Buhramta.			
Bozdar				8th March 1854	Theft and criminal force	Three men named Bibrak, Kallu, and Muhammad, Bozdars, carried off a number of goats from Chabri. They were pursued and overtaken by the Thanadar of Yaru with a few policemen. The thieves showed fight, of whom Kallu and Muhammad were killed and Bibrak captured; he was eventually sentenced to imprisonment for 7 years.
Ditto	Jafrani			7th June 1854	Theft	A man named Soni, of the Jafrani Bozdar section, committed theft at Mangrota; he was captured by the chaukidar, and imprisoned for 3 years.
Ditto		Blockade		11th August 1854	Cattle-lifting	On the 11th August 1854, some Bozdars (number not known) carried off a herd of goats from the Sanghar ilaqua into the hills. On the 28th August 1854, a proclamation was issued offering a reward of Rs. 10 for every Bozdar captured in British territory. This order was issued in consequence of incessant Bozdar raids.
Ditto				29th August 1854	Bad livelihood	A Bozdar named Mewa was found strolling about at Kot Kasrani. He was captured by the chaukidars of the mauza, and eventually sentenced to 3 months imprisonment.
Ditto				5th September 1854	Breach of orders, political	A man named Alwa, Bozdar, was captured for entering British territory, but was released on giving some useful information in a case.
Ditto				2nd November 1854	Attempt to commit theft	A man named Umar, Bozdar, was arrested by the lambardar of mauza Bhati for an attempt to commit theft. He was tried, and imprisoned for 3 months.
Ditto				27th December 1854	Ditto ditto	A man named Zakria, Chandia Bozdar, committed theft at mauza Makwal. He was arrested by Ahmad Khan, lambardar, and others, and sentenced to 3 years imprisonment.
Ditto				2nd July 1855	Robbery	Ali Morad, Lishari, and Kalel, Bozdar, committed robbery and wounded some men near the Banjra mauza; they were captured by the Thanadar of Towsa, and sentenced to imprisonment for 10 years each.
Ditto				3rd December 1855	Attempt to commit theft	A Bozdar named Khan Muhammad was arrested for attempting to commit theft by Sarfraz Khan, Daffadar, at Mandrani, and imprisoned for six months.

Ditto - - - -	Blockade -	- - -	9th January 1856 -	Dacoity and murder -	As numerous cases of robbery, dacoity, and murder had been committed by the Bozdars in the Towsa ilaqua, they were debarred from intercourse with British territory, and their allowances stopped.
Ditto - - - -	- - -	- - -	20th April 1856 -	Disobedience of orders, political.	A Bozdar named Sadhu came from the hills into British territory. He was arrested by the Thanadar of Towsa, and imprisoned for six months.
Ditto - - - -	- - -	- - -	30th August 1856 -	Cattle theft - -	A Bozdar named Gulmere, who had carried off camels into the hills on 8 different occasions, was captured through Mithi Khan, Kasrani Makadam, and imprisoned for 3 years.
Ditto - - - -	- - -	- - -	16th January 1857 -	Theft of cattle - -	A Bozdar named Usman committed cattle theft at Towsa. He was captured by the Thanadar of Towsa, and was imprisoned for 3 years.
Ditto - - - -	- - -	Reprisal by Deputy Commissioner.	15th March 1857 -	Robbery and murder -	The Bozdars were continually making raids, and in 1854 were debarred from intercourse with British territory; they at last made a desperate raid on the Sanghar ilaqua. Captain Pollock, the then Deputy Commissioner, with a small force pursued them to their village. They gave 200 sheep and goats in token of submission, agreed to pay Rs. 150 as blood-money for the parties killed by them, and engaged to restore all property plundered.
Ditto - - - -	- - -	- - -	15th July 1862 -	Theft - - -	A Bozdar named Mowrang and Dilshad committed theft in the Rahi Pass. They were captured and imprisoned for 3 years each.
Ditto - - - -	- - -	- - -	30th April 1865 -	Ditto - - -	A Chandia Bozdar named Ishak committed theft, and was captured by some Khosas, and imprisoned for 2 years and fined Rs. 25.
Ditto - - - -	- - -	- - -	4th July 1865 -	Theft - - -	A Bozdar named Uman committed theft in the Yaru ilaqua; was captured and sentenced to imprisonment for 1 year and fine of Rs. 25.
Ditto - - - -	- - -	- - -	15th April 1870 -	Ditto - - -	Two Bozdars named Mir Gul and Ditta committed theft at Kot Mithi. They were captured by Hassan Khan and other Khosas, and fined Rs. 30 each.
Ditto - - - -	- - -	- - -	15th May 1870 -	Ditto - - -	A Bozdar named Dilshad committed theft at Soni. He was captured by Kallu Khosa, and fined Rs. 200, in default imprisonment for 1 year.
Ditto - - - -	- - -	- - -	14th November 1870	Bad conduct - -	Fazal, a hill Bozdar, was strolling about in British territory. He was found to be a bad character, and was ordered to give security of Rs. 500 for good conduct for 6 months, or to undergo 6 months imprisonment.
Ditto - - - -	- - -	- - -	15th December 1870	Enticing away a woman -	A woman having escaped from the Towsa Havalat, was sheltered by Yar Muhammad, who took her into the hills. He was captured through the Bozdar Tomandar and fined Rs. 25.

1.	2.	3.		4.	5.	6.
Tribe.	Section.	Mode of Coercion.		Date.	Cause of Coercion.	Reparation exacted, Amount of Fine, &c.
		Blockades.	Reprisals, Buhramta.			
Bozdar				25th August 1871	Rape	Kallu kidnapped a woman, took her into the hills, and committed rape on her; Kallu was captured and imprisoned for 5 years.
Ditto				1st February 1872	Theft	Two Shabani Bozdars committed theft at mauzi Halti, and fled into the hills; some inhabitants of the place went in pursuit and killed 1 of the thieves; the other escaped.
Ditto				26th May 1872	Ditto	A Chandia Bozdar named Samditta committed theft at Yaru. He was captured by some Khosas, and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 100, or to undergo 1 year's imprisonment.
Ditto	Baliani, Ladwani			14th February 1875	Murder	Haji and Dowlat, Bozdar Balianis, and Gulzar, Bozdar Ladwani, murdered one Chiman, a Hindu, residing at mauza Mandrani; were captured, and eventually sentenced, the 2 former to 6 years' imprisonment each, and the latter to transportation for life.
Not known	Not known			14th February 1875	Bad livelihood	A man named Hallam, a Jat, resident of the Bozdar country, was found prowling about Sanghar and taken up. He failed to give security of Rs. 200 for good behaviour for 6 months, and was sentenced to imprisonment in consequence for 6 months.
Bozdar	Hajana			9th December 1875	Theft	Kotha, a Bozdar Hajana, carried off a riding camel which was grazing near Sanghar, valued at Rs. 80, and made off into the hills. He was, however, pursued and captured by Gul Muhammad, a sowar of chauki Mandrani, and eventually sentenced to 1 year and 6 months imprisonment.
Ditto	Gulamani			20th August 1876	Ditto	Arzi, a Gulamani Bozdar, carried off a mare from mauza Sakhira while grazing, and made off into the hills, but was captured on his way by the police, and eventually sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years.
Khosas			Reprisal	7th February 1851	Cattle-lifting	Two Khosas carried off a number of cows from Pir Adil; they were pursued by Ahmad Khan, who recovered the cows and killed 1 of the thieves, the other escaped.
Ditto			Ditto	18th February 1853	Theft	Haji, Khosa, a murderer, for whose apppehension a proclamation had been issued, was discovered at Mamori by the lambardar of that place in the act of committing theft. Haji attacked the lambardar, but was killed.

Ditto	-	22nd May 1853	-	Highway robbery	-	Jana, Khosa, a proclaimed offender, was captured, while attempting to commit robbery in the Yaru ilaqua, by some sowars of Ghulam Haidar Khan, Khosa, and was eventually sentenced to 7 years imprisonment.
Ditto	Reprisal	14th June 1853	-	Murder and theft	-	Shere, an escaped murderer, was found with Jana, a notorious bad character, in the act of committing theft at Yaru. Some sowars of Ghulam Haidar Khan, Khosa, attempted to seize them; Shere attacked the sowars, and was killed.
Ditto	-	26th November 1854	Ditto	-	-	Bijar, Durkani, after committing murder escaped, and was found strolling about in company with Kharan, Khosa, a noted bad character, in the Choti ilaqua. Some Ligharis attempted to seize them; they resisted, and were both killed.
Ditto	-	31st December 1854	Ditto	-	-	Shahdad, Khosa, who after committing murder escaped to Gadoi, was arrested while in the act of committing theft by Gaman, lambardar. The lambardar received a reward of Rs. 100, and Shahdad was transported for life.
Ditto	Reprisal	31st August 1855	Ditto	-	-	Ali Muhammad, Khosa, who, after committing one of a series of murders and thefts, absconded into the hills, and was pursued by some Ligharis, who killed him. They received a reward of Rs. 200.
Ditto	-	14th May 1856	Bad livelihood	-	-	Five Chandias, noted bad characters, were captured by some Khosas, and sentenced to 6 months imprisonment each.
Ditto	Reprisal	25th June 1856	Theft	-	-	Tagia, Vadani Khosa, a proclaimed offender, together with another person (name not known), attempted to commit theft at Yaru. Rohal Khan and some other Khosas tried to seize the offenders, who resisted and were both killed.
Ditto	-	29th October 1857	Robbery, &c.	-	-	Barkardar, Khosa, a proclaimed offender, was captured by Muhammad Khan, Militia sowar, and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment.
Ditto	-	18th September 1857	Murder	-	-	Lalu, Khosa, after committing murder escaped into the hills, and was there captured by some of the inhabitants of mauza Derabi. He was transported for life, and his captors received a reward of Rs. 100.
Ditto	-	15th November 1865	-	-	-	Lalu, Khosa, after committing murder fled into the hills and there attempted to thieve, but was captured by some Khosas. He was sentenced to transportation for life.
Gurchanis	Reprisal	19th November 1850	Theft	-	-	Nuran, Bazgir, committed theft in the Harrand ilaqua and fled into the hills. He was pursued and overtaken by the inhabitants of the place, and in endeavouring to fight his way out was killed.

1.	2.	3.		4.	5.	6.
Tribe.	Section.	Mode of Coercion.		Date.	Cause of Coercion.	Reparation exacted, Amount of Fine, &c.
		Blockades.	Reprisals, Buhramta.			
Gurchanis	-	-	-	30th March 1851	-	Mandu, Gurchani, committed theft at Harrand and wounded a man named Bhoda. He was pursued and captured by Mawa, and was eventually sentenced to imprisonment for 7 years.
Ditto	-	-	-	11th July 1852	Cattle-lifting	Seven men carried off a number of camels from Hazratwala. Some Militia sowars went in pursuit. The thieves tried to fight their way out, and had 1 of their number killed and 2 wounded; the rest escaped.
Ditto	-	-	-	15th April 1852	Ditto	Four persons carried off a number of goats from Kot Mithan. They were pursued by Nandu Khan, Drishak, and his followers, who recovered the property. The thieves threw down their arms and fled.
Ditto	-	-	-	4th May 1852	Raid	Baru, Shahan, Shahu, and Bakhtawar, with 6 followers, raided in the Khot Mithan ilaqua. They were captured by the inhabitants, aided by Militia sowars, and eventually sentenced to 14 years imprisonment each.
Ditto	-	-	Reprisal	25th June 1852	Theft and murder	Seventeen Gurchanis of the Lishari section committed theft in the Tibbi ilaqua and murdered Alam Khan. They were pursued by the Lunds, who wounded 7 of them; the rest escaped.
Ditto	-	-	Ditto	24th July 1852	Theft	Three men committed theft at Tibbi. The inhabitants of the place went in pursuit of the offenders and killed 1; the rest escaped.
Ditto	-	-	-	5th November 1852	Raid	Four persons with Shahu, a noted outlaw, raided on mauza Ilampur. Mir Dost, Khablani, with his followers, attacked the raiders and killed Shahu, and drove the others into the hills.
Ditto	-	-	Reprisal	27th January 1853	Resistance of authority	One of Dost, Khablani's, followers was also killed. Dost, Khablani, received a reward of Rs. 100. Ten hillmen (names not known) were found strolling about near Drigri. Resaldar Dal Singh and some sowars, taking them for suspicious characters, wanted to take them into custody, but the hillmen resisted, and in the struggle 3 of them were killed.
Ditto	-	-	Ditto	17th February 1853	Cattle-lifting	Hotan, Gurchani, with 3 of his followers, carried off a number of cows from mauza Danor. They were pursued and killed by Gazi and his followers. The horses and arms of the deceased were given to him.

Ditto -	- - -	- -	Ditto -	15th March 1853 -	Robbery - - -	Five Lisharis attempted to commit robbery in the Dajil ilaqua. They were pursued by the Lunds, who killed 1 of them; the rest escaped.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	Ditto -	Ditto - -	Ditto - - -	Haidar, with 3 of his followers, attempted to commit robbery in the Dajil ilaqua. The Lunds pursued them and killed Haidar; the rest escaped.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	11th May 1853 -	Resisting arrest - -	Four hillmen (names not known) were found strolling about near Harrand. On some Lunds attempting to seize them a fight ensued in which 1 of the hillmen was killed; the rest escaped.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	Reprisal -	25th May 1853 -	Theft - - -	Three men committed theft at Kambarshah and were pursued by militia sowars, who wounded 1 of the thieves; the rest escaped.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	Ditto -	3rd June 1853 -	Resisting arrest - -	Five hillmen were found strolling about near Harrand, and on some of the Lunds attempting to seize them were attacked. One hillmen was killed, the others escaped into the hills.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	1st August 1853 -	Cattle-lifting - -	Kadra, Gurchani, carried off a camel from mauza Sangan Langa, but was pursued and captured by the owner of the camel, and sentenced to imprisonment for 3 years.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	12th November 1853	Bad livelihood - -	Mir, Gurchani, was found strolling about near Dajil armed. He was seized by Jahan Khan, jamadar, and imprisoned for 6 months.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	28th November 1853	Thief - - -	A man named Mamu attempted to commit theft at Hajipur, and was captured by Kalandar Shah, sowar, and imprisoned for 1 month.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	20th January 1854 -	Bad livelihood - -	Dalu, Lishari, a noted bad character, was found strolling about near Miranpur and seized by Ghulam Haidar Khan, Gurchani, Tomandar, and sentenced to imprisonment for 3 years.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	8th February 1854 -	Cattle-lifting - -	Noka, Darkani, carried off some cows. He was pursued, captured, and sentenced to imprisonment for 6 months.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	25th February 1854 -	Cattle theft - -	Chitta, Darkini, carried off a number of cows from Harrand. Some Pitafis pursued and captured him. He was imprisoned for 6 months.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	Reprisal -	Ditto - -	Ditto - - -	Baksh Ali, Pitafi, committed theft at Jampur and made towards the hills. He was pursued by the owner of the property and overtaken; a conflict ensued, resulting in the death of the thief.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	Ditto - -	Bad livelihood - -	Three Darkanis, named Bakshu, Doda, and Morad, were found strolling about near Harrand; were seized by Jaffar Ali, and sentenced to imprisonment for 6 months.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	14th March 1854 -	Cattle-lifting - -	Valosh and Bangal, Darkanis, carried off 2 mares from mauza Tibbi Landan. The thieves were pursued and captured by the lambardars of the mauza, and sentenced to imprisonment for 4 months each.

1.	2.	3.		4.	5.	6.
Tribe.	Section.	Mode of Coercion.		Date.	Cause of Coercion.	Reparation exacted, Amount of Fine, &c.
		Blockades.	Reprisals, Buhramta.			
Gurchanis -	- - -	- - -	- - -	4th May 1854 -	Theft - - -	Tagia, Lishari, carried off a mare, but was pursued and captured by the owner of the animal, and sentenced to imprisonment for 6 months.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	10th August 1854 -	Murder - - -	Haji, after murdering his wife, escaped into the hills. He was discovered by some frontier sowars in company with Mir Khan, Mustang and Tago, Lisharis, in the Chachar pass. The sowars attempted to seize them, and they resisted. In the affray Haji was killed, Tago wounded, and the others escaped. Tago was eventually sentenced to 1 year's imprisonment.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	7th May 1855 -	Theft - - -	Tajia and Mandar, Lisharis, committed theft at Lalgarh; they were captured by Ghulam Haidar Khan, and sentenced to imprisonment for 3 years each.
Ditto -	- - -	Blockade -	- - -	15th June 1855 -	Incessant misconduct -	A case of cattle theft (Vakshan *versus* hillmen, names not known) where the thieves were believed to be Darkanis. An order was issued that any Darkanis found in British territory would be apprehended.
Ditto -	- - -	Ditto -	- - -	27th June 1855 -	Ditto - - -	Owing to increase of crime committed, chiefly by Gurchanis of the Darkani section, an order was issued that Darkanis were not to be allowed to enter British territory, and if any were found within the border they were to be arrested.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	11th July 1855 -	Theft - - -	Lalu, Darkani, committed theft at Tibbi, but was arrested by the owner of the property, and eventually sentenced to imprisonment for 6 months.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	9th August 1855 -	Ditto - - -	Vahdad, Darkani, attempted to commit theft at Tibbi, but was arrested by Nasir Khan, sowar, and sentenced to imprisonment for 6 months.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	16th August 1855 -	Theft - - -	Fazal and Tagia, Lisharis, committed theft and caused grievous hurt at Landi. They were pursued by the owners of the property, who captured Tagia; Fazal escaped. Tagia was imprisoned for 10 years.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	30th August 1855 -	Bad livelihood - -	Muhammad and Hairo, Darkanis, were found strolling about near Dajil and were seized by Jallu Khan, sowar, and subsequently imprisoned for 6 months each.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	11th December 1855	Ditto - - -	Hairo, a noted bad character, was arrested by the Moharrir of thana Harrand, but was released on security given for his future good behaviour.

Ditto	- - -	- - -	- - -	20th December 1855	Disobedience of orders (political).	Dad, Dilawar and Ghazi, Darkanis, were found strolling about near Thal Ali Muhammad Khan. They were seized, in accordance with orders issued in June, by Kamal Shah, jamadar, and other sowars. Forty-nine goats belonging to the Darkanis were forfeited and sold for Rs. 45, and Rs. 33 were given to the jamadar as a reward.
Ditto	- - -	- - -	- - -	9th April 1856 -	Robbery - - -	Three persons committed robbery in the Choti ilaqua. They were pursued and captured by Ligharis, and eventually imprisoned for 7 years each.
Ditto	- - -	- - -	- - -	14th May 1855 -	Bad livelihood - -	Hairo, Shikar and Bhura, noted bad characters, were found strolling about near Harrand and were arrested by Hairo Khan, Bazgir, and released on security of Mithu Khan.
Ditto	- - -	- - -	- - -	11th July 1856 -	Theft - - -	Musa, Darkani, committed theft at mauza Tibbi, and was arrested by Ghulam Haidar Khan, and imprisoned for 2 years.
Ditto	- - -	- - -	- - -	30th August 1856 -	Ditto - - -	Sakal, Darkani, committed theft at Harrand; was arrested, and imprisoned for 6 months.
Ditto	- - -	- - -	- - -	12th November 1856	Ditto - - -	Two persons (names not known) committed theft at Choti. They were pursued and attacked by Jamal Khan, Tomand, Lighari. Both were killed.
Ditto	- - -	- - -	- - -	29th November 1856	Theft and grievous hurt -	Bisum Pitafi and another hillman attempted to commit theft at mauza Soman, and wounded a person. Bisum was arrested, and subsequently sentenced to imprisonment for 10 years; the other offenders escaped.
Ditto	- - -	- - -	- - -	2nd February 1857	Theft - - -	Kamal, Darkani, committed theft at mauza Hassan Mat, and fled towards the hills. He was arrested by Hairo Khan and Muhammad Khan, and imprisoned for 3 years.
Ditto	- - -	- - -	- - -	23rd April 1857 -	Bad livelihood - -	Sadik and Doda, Darkanis, were found strolling about near Tibbi; were arrested by Mihan, chaukidar, and subsequently imprisoned for 6 months each.
Ditto	- - -	- - -	- - -	28th April 1857 -	Ditto - - -	Massu Khan, Darkani, was found strolling about near Chaukigarh; was arrested by Barkandazes, and imprisoned for 6 months.
Ditto	- - -	- - -	- - -	29th May 1857 -	Theft - - -	Mirani, Dad Ali, and Moghilan, Lisharis, committed theft at Tibbi Landan. They were pursued by Khira Khan, Lishari, and his followers. Mirani was captured, and subsequently imprisoned for 6 months; the others escaped.
Ditto	- - -	- - -	- - -	8th August 1857 -	Robbery - -	Vashal and Fattu, Lisharis, committed robbery at Tibbi Landan, and fled. They were pursued by Horan Khan and other sowars. Vashal was captured, and imprisoned for 14 years; Fattu escaped.
Ditto	- - -	- - -	- - -	8th August 1857 -	Theft - - -	Jamal, Lishari, committed theft at Harrand, was arrested by Horan Khan and Mir Khan, Lisharis, and imprisoned for 7 years.

1.	2.	3.		4.	5.	6.
Tribe.	Section.	Mode of Coercion.		Date.	Cause of Coercion.	Reparation exacted, Amount of Fine, &c.
		Blockades.	Reprisals, Buhramta.			
Gurchanis -	- - -	- - -	- - -	14th September 1857	Bad livelihood - -	Khaira, a noted bad character, entered British territory with the object of committing theft; he was arrested by Shahu and Jahnab Khan, Jaskanis, and was sentenced to imprisonment for 5 years.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	2nd December 1857	Theft - - -	A person named Shah Baksh committed theft at Harrand; was arrested by Ghulam Haidar Khan's (Gurchani Tomandar) followers, and imprisoned for 2 years.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	13th December 1857	Ditto - - -	Khaira, Lishari, attempted to commit theft; was captured by the followers of Ghulam Haidar Khan, and imprisoned for 2 years.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	24 th December 1857	Bad livelihood - -	Hotan, Lishari, came to Drigri to commit theft; was arrested by some sowars, and sentenced to imprisonment for 6 months.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	29th December 1857	Ditto - - -	Bokha, Lishari, came to Kalkari Pass to commit theft; was arrested by Biloch Khan, and sentenced to imprisonment for 6 months.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	10th January 1858 -	Theft - - -	Six Lisharis (names not known) committed theft at Lundi Saidan. They were pursued by frontier sowars, who killed 2; the others escaped.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	22nd February 1858	Bad livelihood - -	Lalan, Lishari, was found strolling about near Harrand; was arrested, and imprisoned for 2 years.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	3rd March 1858 -	Resisting authority -	Shah Ali, a noted outlaw, in company with Ghana, a Lishari, was found strolling about near Harrand. Some frontier sowars tried to seize them; they resisted; Ghana was killed; Shah Ali captured. He was eventually sentenced to imprisonment for 3 years.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	18th June 1858 -	Cattle-lifting - -	Hoti, Lishari, carried off a number of goats from Rajhan Iaqua. He was pursued and arrested by Ghulam Haidar Khan, Jamadar, and was eventually imprisoned for 7 years.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	14th July 1858 -	Theft - - -	Fatah Ali and Sarang, Lisharis, committed theft at Lalgarh, and were arrested by Khan Muhammad, lambardar, and some frontier sowars. They were eventually imprisoned for 7 years each.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	5th September 1858	Bad livelihood - -	Dostu and Dahi, Darkanis, were found strolling about near mauza Mastoi. They were arrested by Daraus Khan, havildar. Dahi was sentenced to imprisonment for 6 months, Dostu was discharged.

Ditto	-	-	-	30th April 1859	Theft	Mitha, Shikani, and Tagia, Khosa, escaped from police custody in a theft case, but were recaptured by Kahi and Chutta Khosas near Harrand. Mitha was imprisoned for 1 year and Tagia for 2½ years, and received 30 stripes in addition.
Ditto	-	-	-	17th September 1859	Ditto	Dorag and Nihalan, Lisharis, committed theft at Harrand; were arrested by Imam Baksh Khan, sowar, and Odat, chaukidar, and imprisoned for 6 months each, and received 30 stripes in addition.
Ditto	-	-	-	27th July 1860	Ditto	Sagu and Havalan, Darkanis, committed theft in the Choul ilaqua, and were arrested by Fatah Ali Khan, Dodani, and other Ligharis; they were eventually sentenced to imprisonment for 8 years and fine of Rs. 200 each.
Ditto	-	-	-	22nd August 1861	Bad livelihood	Moghelan, Lishari, a noted bad character, was captured in the hills by Ghulam Haidar Khan's followers, and was released on furnishing security of Rs. 200.
Ditto	-	-	-	13th July 1862	Robbery	Shah Ali, Darkani, committed robbery in the Lundi Saidan ilaqua, and was captured by some sowars, and imprisoned for 4 years.
Ditto	-	-	-	8th September 1864	Theft	Ghulam, Darkani, committed theft at Tibbi Lundan; was arrested by the owner of the stolen property, and sentenced to 30 stripes.
Ditto	-	-	-	8th October 1864	Ditto	Tarak Ali committed theft in the Choti ilaqua; was arrested by Dal Singh, barkandaz, and some others, and sentenced to 30 stripes.
Ditto	-	-	-	24th October 1865	Ditto	A man named Moghelan committed theft in the Dajil ilaqua; was arrested in the hills by Khaira Khan, Lishari, and sentenced to receive 30 stripes.
Ditto	-	-	Reprisal	23rd January 1863	Ditto	Nasir, Homhi, committed theft at Bakharpur; was pursued and overtaken by Madi Khan, Naib Daffadar; a conflict ensued, resulting in Nasir's death.
Ditto	-	-	Blockade	16th April 1868	Incessant misconduct	Owing to the bad conduct of Mewa, an order was issued that no Darkani should enter British territory.
Ditto	-	-	-	6th May 1868	-	Katu, Darkani, a noted bad character, who was imprisoned in default of security, was released on security of Rs. 1,000 being furnished.
Ditto	-	Darkani	-	Ditto	Cattle theft	Shahi and Shahdman, Darkanis, carried off a bullock from near Harrand, and made for the hills. The owner went in pursuit, and came up to the thieves near one of the passes, where, with the aid of the pass-keeper, the thieves were captured and brought into Rajanpur. They were eventually sentenced, Shahi to 2 years imprisonment, and to pay a fine of Rs. 25, or 6 months further imprisonment; and Shahdman to 1 year and 6 months imprisonment, and a fine of Rs. 25, or 6 months further imprisonment.

1.	2.	3.		4.	5.	6.
Tribe	Section.	Mode of Coercion.		Date.	Cause of Coercion.	Reparation exacted, Amount of Fine, &c.
		Blockades.	Reprisals, Buhrawta.			
Gurchanis -	Bazgir - -	- - -	- - -	20th June 1870 -	Ditto - - -	Mitha, a Gurchani Bazgir, committed a large cattle theft near Harrand, in consort with two Marris, named Rahman Ali and Sadan. They were captured by Sardar Jamal Khan, Laghiri, while escaping with their booty into the hills. Mitha, being an old offender, was sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years and 3 months, and to pay a fine of Rs. 100, or to undergo a further term of imprisonment of 1 year; the other 2, Rahman Ali and Sadan, were released on the security of the Lighari chief.
Ditto -	Lishari - -	- - -	- - -	8th July 1876 -	Theft of 3 camels -	Shah Bhag and Fouja, Lisharis, old offenders, carried off 3 she camels while grazing near Kot Rum, and made off into the hills. They were, however, pursued and captured by some sowars of Kot Rum, brought into Rajanpur, and eventually sentenced to imprisonment for 1 year and 6 months each.
Marri (1) - Gurchani (2) -	(1) Not known - (2) Lishari.	- - -	- - -	18th April 1868 -	Mischief - - -	A Marri (section and name not known) and a Gurchani Lishari, named Sobha, came into British territory with intent, it is alleged, of committing theft. A number of the inhabitants of Kot Rum fell upon them and killed the Marri, and wounded Sobha and brought him into Rajanpur. He was released on a security of Rs. 500 being tendered by Ghulam Haidar Khan, Gurchani.
Gurchani -	Lishari - -	- - -	- - -	2nd January 1875 -	Highway robbery -	Two men, named Shah Murad and Baksha, Gurchani Lisharis, committed highway robbery on the road between Fazilpur and Hajipur, on some travellers. They were captured by the police, and sentenced eventually to imprisonment for 7 years, and to pay a fine of Rs. 250 each, in default to undergo further imprisonment of 1 year and 9 months.
Ditto -	Darkani - -	- - -	- - -	14th February 1875 -	Bad livelihood - -	A Lishari Darkani, named Shahana, came into British territory and was found lurking about. It being suspected that he intended committing some mischief, security was required of him for good behaviour, which he failed to furnish, and was in consequence sentenced by Commissioner to 3 years imprisonment.

Ditto -	Ditto - -	- - -	- - -	24th June 1875 -	Burglary - -	Shakir, a Gurchani Darkani, was caught in the act of committing a burglary, and sentenced to receive 25 stripes.
Ditto -	Saifaz - -	- - -	- - -	15th September 1875	Bad livelihood - -	Ghurki, a Gurchani Saifaz, was found prowling about Choti, and seized by the police. He failed to give the security of Rs. 100 required of him, and was in consequence sentenced to 1 year's imprisonment.
Ditto -	Darkani - -	- - -	- - -	4th November 1875 -	Cattle theft - -	A man named Nur, Gurchani Darkani, carried off 3 cows, valued at Rs. 60, from Tibbi Landan, and made off into the hills, but was captured by Mazar Khan, Tomandar, Lund, and eventually sentenced to imprisonment for 1 year.
Khetrans -	- - -	- - -	- - -	21st November 1851	Ditto - -	Five persons carried off a number of goats from mauza Banah. Frontier sowars went in pursuit, and captured 3 men, named Hassan, Yaru, and Lehna, who were eventually sentenced to 3 years imprisonment each; the others escaped.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	26th January 1853 -	Cattle-lifting - -	Four persons carried off a number of goats from the Dajil ilaqua. Some frontier sowars pursued and overtook the thieves; a conflict ensued, in which 1 of the thieves was killed and 3 captured. They were eventually sentenced to 7 years imprisonment each.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	16th October 1854 -	Bad livelihood - -	Ladha, Dostan, and Dost Ali were found strolling about near Kotepur. Some frontier sowars took them into custody. They were eventually sentenced to 1 year's imprisonment each.
Ditto -	- - -	Blockade -	- - -	21st April 1857 -	Incessant depredations -	On account of the Khetrans committing incessant depredations an order was issued stopping intercourse between them and British subjects, and directing the arrest of every Khetran found in British territory.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	28th May 1875 -	Bad livelihood - -	Phirdad and Gadhu, Khetrans, were found in British territory and arrested; the former was imprisoned for 6 months, and the latter fined Rs. 10.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	Resisting authority -	Three Khetrans were found strolling about in British territory, and, as suspicious characters, were tried to be arrested. They resisted the arrest, and in the conflict 1 of them was killed; the other 2 were captured and sentenced to imprisonment for 8 years each.
Ditto -	- - -	Blockade -	- - -	19th December 1868	Bad livelihood - -	On the 19th December 1868 an order was issued that no Khetran should enter British territory. Seventeen Khetrans in contravention of the above order entered, and were arrested and imprisoned. After undergoing about 6 months imprisonment they were released on the Khetran Tomandar entering into an agreement not to shelter offenders, and to restore stolen property.

1.	2.	3.		4.	5.	6.
Tribe.	Section.	Mode of Coercion.		Date.	Cause of Coercion.	Reparation exacted, Amount of Fine, &c.
		Blockades.	Reprisals, Buhramta.			
Khetrans -	Darkani - -	- - -	- - -	17th December 1875	Going armed in British territory.	Miran Khan, Mir Khan, Karam Khan, Bahadur Khan, Gaman Khan, and Nawab Khan were sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 40 each. Mazar Khan and Sher Muhammad (all Khetrans) Rs. 50 each for going armed in British territory.
Drishaks -	- - -	- - -	- - -	20th April 1854 -	Bad livelihood - -	Four persons were found strolling about near Shikarpur. In attempting to arrest them, 1 of the 4 was killed; the other 3 escaped.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	27th April 1852 -	- - - -	Mazar and Mahamdi, Ligharis, who recently committed a raid on Vidor, attempted to commit theft at mauza Salani. They were pursued by some Lighari sowars; Mazar was killed, and Mahamdi arrested, and eventually sentenced to 14 years imprisonment.
Mazaris -	- - -	- - -	- - -	12th January 1860 -	Theft - - -	Jangu, Mazari, and Lalan, Shikari, outlaws, who had taken up their residence in the Khetran toman, committed theft in British territory; were arrested, and sentenced to imprisonment for 10 years and fined Rs. 200 each.
Kasranis -	- - -	- - -	- - -	4th September 1867 -	Carrying off the Deputy Commissioner forcibly into the hills.	Koura Khan, Kasrani, with 100 men, carried off Captain Grey, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, into the hills. Captain Sandeman, with all the Tomandars of the district and a small force, went in pursuit. Koura Khan, however, released Captain Grey without doing him any harm. He, with a number of his people who were concerned in this case, were tried and imprisoned for various terms. Koura Khan's term was reduced by Chief Court on appeal.
				RAJANPUR.		
Bugti -	- - -	- - -	Reprisal -	8th June 1853 -	Dacoity and murder -	The offenders were pursued; 1 killed and 4 escaped.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	Ditto -	13th June 1853 -	Robbery - - -	One man killed and 9 escaped.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	26th September 1853	Dacoity and murder -	The offenders were pursued; 2 were killed and 20 escaped.
Ditto -	- - -	- - -	- - -	1st October 1853. -	Robbery and causing hurt	Out of the 5 offenders 2 were killed and 3 made their escape.

	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6th March 1854	-	Robbery - - -	One Bugti killed and 18 escaped.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3rd February 1855	-	Murder - - -	Two persons were fined Rs. 200 each.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9th August 1855	-	Robbery - - -	Makadams ordered to return the property stolen.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27th August 1857	-	Cattle theft - -	Two persons imprisoned for 3 years each.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2nd April 1858	-	Cattle theft - -	One person received 15 stripes.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24th May 1858	-	Robbery - - -	Three persons were imprisoned.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10th June 1858	-	Murder of Bijar Khan, Tomandar Drishak.	Bangal, accused, was sentenced to imprisonment for 14 years.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3rd December 1858	-	Causing hurt - -	One person imprisoned for 5 years.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31st July 1859	-	Robbery - - -	One person sentenced to 2½ years' imprisonment and fine of Rs. 200, or in default further imprisonment for 2 years.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	Reprisal	13th February 1862	-	Dacoity - - -	Out of 8 offenders pursued, 2 were killed and 6 escaped.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	Blockade	19th November 1862		Robbery - - -	Orders issued prohibiting them entering British territory.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30th May 1864	-	Dacoity and murder -	Thirty-three persons were pursued; 3 killed and 30 escaped. Property recovered.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22nd June 1865	-	Cattle theft - -	Two men prohibited from entering British territory.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	Reprisal	October 1864	-	Robbery - - -	The robbers were pursued; 3 killed and 4 escaped. Property recovered.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Ditto	- -	Ditto - - -	Of the offenders 1 was killed, the rest escaped.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21st August 1865	-	Robbery and causing hurt	Four persons sentenced to 2 years imprisonment each.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10th January 1866	-	Cattle theft - -	One person imprisoned for 6 months.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22nd March 1866	-	Robbery - - -	Two persons imprisoned for 3 years each.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1st May 1866	-	Ditto - - -	Three of the offenders were wounded, and the property recovered.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2nd May 1866	-	Cattle theft - -	Two persons fined Rs. 1, and security of Rs. 50 taken from each.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Ditto	- -	Receiving stolen property	Ditto ditto.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21st July 1866	-	Cattle-lifting - -	Thieves were pursued by Mazaris, and 3 of them killed.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30th January 1866	-	Robbery - - -	Three persons sentenced to 1 year's imprisonment each.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	Blockade	-	-	16th November 1867		Dacoity and murder -	Orders issued prohibiting them from entering British territory.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20th June 1867	-	Cattle theft - -	One person sentenced to 6 months imprisonment and fine of Rs. 15.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7th August 1867	-	Receiving stolen property	Out of 2 offenders, 1 was fined Rs. 40; the property of the 2nd was confiscated, as he absconded.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17th September 1867		Theft of a camel - -	Three men killed, 1 escaped.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	Reprisal	17th April 1868	-	Dacoity and murder -	The murderers were pursued by Lisharis, and 16 of them killed.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5th June 1868	-	Theft of cattle - -	Two men were killed.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	January 1870	-	Murder of a woman -	Kattu and Babil fined Rs. 1,500 each.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27th April 1869	-	Cattle-lifting - -	One person imprisoned for 3 years.
	Ditto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7th April 1870	-	Theft - - -	Four persons fined Rs. 20 each.

1.	2.	3.		4.	5.	6.
Tribe.	Section.	Mode of Coercion.		Date.	Cause of Coercion.	Reparation exacted, Amount of Fine, &c.
		Blockades.	Reprisals, Buhramta.			
Marris				September 1859	Dacoity and murder	One Marri was killed and 2 arrested.
Ditto				21st December 1859	Ditto	One man sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment and fine of Rs. 200; 1 fined Rs. 100, in default 1 year's imprisonment; and 5 fined Rs. 30 each, in default 6 months imprisonment each.
Ditto				13th February 1862	Robbery	One man killed.
Ditto				1st May 1866	Theft	Ditto.
Ditto				January 1867	Cattle-lifting	Two men were killed in the pursuit, and 14 escaped.
Ditto				8th April 1868	Robbery	One man killed.
Gurchani Lisharis				6th August 1853	Ditto	One person imprisoned for 6 months.
Ditto				12th September 1853	Ditto	Ditto ditto 9 ditto.
Ditto				6th December 1853	Dacoity	Two persons ditto 7 years each.
Ditto				Ditto	Ditto	One person ditto 7 ditto.
Ditto				29th July 1854	Dacoity and murder	Two persons ditto 5 ditto each.
Ditto		Blockade		10th February 1855	Murder of 9 Ligharis	Prohibited from entering British territory.
Ditto				27th October 1856	Murder	Transported for life.
Ditto				1st September 1857	Dacoity	One person imprisoned for 9 years.
Marris		Blockade		28th June 1858	Robbery	Prohibited from entering British territory.
Ditto				8th February 1859	Theft of a camel	The price of the camel, Rs. 70, was recovered.
Ditto				18th June 1863	Cattle theft	Two persons sentenced to 2 years imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200 each, or in default 6 months further imprisonment.
Ditto				20th October 1866	Robbery	One man killed in pursuit.
Ditto				29th October 1868	Cattle theft	Two persons imprisoned for 2 years each.
Ditto				20th June 1870	Robbery	One person sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years and a fine of Rs. 100—in default 1 year's further imprisonment.
Ligharis				6th December 1853	Dacoity	One person imprisoned for 7 years.
Ditto				23rd December 1866	Cattle theft	Four persons sentenced to 1 year's imprisonment and fine of Rs. 50 each, in default to undergo 6 months' further imprisonment.

Khetrans -	- - -	- - -	- - -	23rd December 1857	Dacoity - - -	Two persons sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.
Ditto -	- -	Blockade -	- - -	January 1858 -	Incessant cattle theft -	The Khetrans were prohibited from entering British territory.
			BANNU DISTRICT.			
Balolzai, Alizai and Shaman Khel.	Mahsud - -	Blockade -	- - -	1860 - -	For committing numerous depredations on the Tank border, and subsequently making an attempt to attack the Tank city, and when a troop of the 5th Punjab Cavalry was despatched to oppose their advance, they fought with them.	The tribe was punished by an expeditionary force sent into the Mahsud hills, and their chief village, Kani Karrum, was burnt down. In 1861 overtures of peace were made by the tribe. This was accepted, and peace was concluded on the tribe agreeing to certain conditions of Government and locating hostages at Bannu.
Balolzai -	Ditto - -	Ditto -	- - -	1863 - -	Non-fulfilment of agreement made in 1861.	Major Urmston ordered that the tribe should pay a fine of Rs. 500; this was, however, not realised. In 1866 peace was concluded a second time in Dera Ismail Khan district, and the Commissioner remitted the fine.
Baba Boback and Vardorah.	Bhittanni Dhunnah -	Ditto -	- - -	1865 - -	For committing depredations in British territory.	In 1865 the Bhittannis paid Rs. 912 on account of the thefts committed, and peace was concluded for the future.
Ditto -	Ditto - -	Ditto -	- - -	1865 - -	Non-fulfilment of contract	The tribe paid Rs. 1,211-8-0 in lieu of thefts committed by them, and peace was concluded a second time. The Government, considering the tribes poor, granted a tract of land (waste) near Laki, measuring about 20,000 kanals, rent free, for their maintenance.
Shahabi Khel -	Alozai Mahsud -	Ditto -	- - -	23rd April 1868 -	Non-fulfilment of agreement.	The tribe paid Rs. 2,635 on account of thefts committed, and gave hostages to be located at Bannu for 1 year.
Kabul Khel Saifli	Utmanzai - -	Ditto -	- - -	1867 - -	Committing depredations and receiving stolen property.	The tribe brought 40 sheep, valued Rs. 200, as nazarana; also gave Ahmadzai tribe as security for future good behaviour.

1.	2.	3.		4.	5.	6.
Tribe.	Section.	Mode of Coercion.		Date.	Cause of Coercion.	Reparation exacted, Amount of Fine, &c.
		Blockades.	Reprisals, Buhramta.			
Muhammad Khel	Ahmadzai Isparka -	Blockade -	- - -	13th June 1870 -	For attacking a guard proceeding to the Kuram Post, and killing 7 persons and wounding 4.	Rupees 7,440 paid by the tribe as fine for thefts and murders committed. Their village was burnt and lands confiscated; 6 of the leading members of the tribe were imprisoned for various terms and sent to Lahore. After the tribe had agreed to all that the Government desired, they received back their lands, and were located in their village.
Dour - -	Dour - -	Ditto -	- - -	1872 - -	The Government fined the tribe for harbouring the Muhammad Khels when they were at war with the Government, but the Douris refused to pay the fine imposed upon them, and would not come to any terms.	A force was sent against their country; it burnt their villages and killed some men. After this the tribe paid up Rs. 6,500 as fine.
Lower Dour -	Edak, So Khel and Haider Khel.	Blockade -	Reprisals - -	16th March 1876 -	A band of robbers had established themselves at Edak in Lower Dour, and committed several robberies in the cavalry lines at Bannu and in the country round; the stolen property being taken off to Edak, the people of So Khel and Haider Khel giving the robbers a right-of-way.	One of the robbers was shot by a cavalry sentry, and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. The people of Dour were required to restore the stolen property, and pay a fine, Rs. 300, for harbouring the offenders, both of which requirements they complied with.
Bizun Khel Ahmed.	- - -	- - -	- - -	1872 - -	For harbouring the Muhammad Khels when at war against the Government.	The tribe paid a fine of Rs. 685, and their village was burnt.

APPENDIX E.

TABLE of EXPEDITIONS undertaken against Frontier Tribes from Annexation.

No.	Year.	Tribes against which undertaken, or Name of Expedition.	Independent or British.	Number of Troops employed.
1	1849	Yusafzai - - - - -	British -	1,500
2	1850	Afridis - - - - -	Independent	3,200
3	1851	Miranzai - - - - -	British -	2,050
4	1852	Mohmands - - - - -	Independent	700
5	1852	Ranizai - - - - -	Ditto	2,000
6	1852	Utman Khels - - - -	Ditto	2,000
7	1852	Kaghan - - - - -	British -	850
8	1852	Umarzai Wazirs - - - -	Independent	1,500
9	1853	Hassanzais - - - -	Ditto	850
10	1853	Sheoranis - - - -	Ditto	2,800
11	1853	Kasranis - - - - -	Ditto	600
12	1853	Bori Afridis - - - -	Ditto	1,500
13	1854	Mitchni Mohmands - - -	Ditto	1,600
14	1855	Miranzai - - - - -	British -	3,700
15	1855	Rabia Khel Orakzais - - -	Independent	2,300
16	1856	Turis and Zaimakht Afghans - -	Ditto	4,553
17	1857	Bozdars - - - - -	Ditto	2,640
18	1857	Inhabitants of western villages on Yusafzai border, aided by chiefs of Puntjar, &c., Hindustani fanatics and mutineers of 55th Native Infantry.	Independent and British.	330 in attack on Shekh Jana. 2,400 in attack on Naringi.
19	1858	Sittana fanatics - - - -	Independent	4,877
20	1859	Kabul Khel Wazirs - - -	Ditto	3,900 regulars. 1,337 levies and police. 5,237
21	1860	Mahsud Wazirs - - - -	Ditto	5,196 regulars. 1,600 levies. 6,796
22	1863–64	Umbeyla—Hindustani fanatics, &c. -	Ditto	5,556
23	1866	British villages of the Utman Khels in the Landkhor Valley.	British -	4,182
24	1868	Black Mountain tribes - - -	Independent	12,544, including reserve 14,762.
25	1869	Bazotis and Utman Khels - -	Ditto	2,038
26	1872	Dour Valley - - - -	Ditto	1,786

APPENDIX F.

PUNJAB FRONTIER REGULATIONS.

No. 1 of 1872.

I. In the event of any frontier tribe acting in a hostile or unfriendly manner to the British Government, it shall be lawful for the Deputy Commissioner, subject to the sanction of the Commissioner, to detain all or any members of the said tribe, and to detain or confiscate their property, to debar members of the tribe from access into British territory, and to prohibit British subjects from all intercourse with such tribe.

II. No new hamlet, village, tower, or walled inclosure, shall be erected within five miles of the British frontier, without the consent of the Commissioner of the division, who shall have power to prohibit the erection thereof, if deemed necessary. In the event of the Commissioner prohibiting such erection, he must record the grounds of his decision.

III. The Deputy Commissioner, with the concurrence of the Commissioner, may impose fines on village communities, the inhabitants of which, after due inquiry, are found to be guilty of colluding with or harbouring criminals, or combining to suppress evidence in criminal cases:

Provided that when the fine imposed shall exceed one-half of the year's revenue of the village, the case shall be referred for sanction to the local Government.

All fines imposed under this section shall be recoverable, in default of payment, in the same manner as arrears of land revenue.

IV. When any person is known or believed to have a blood-feud, or other cause of quarrel likely to lead to bloodshed with parties beyond the border, the Deputy Commissioner may require such person to reside beyond the limits of the territory to which these rules apply, or in such place within the territory as he may deem desirable:

Provided that if such person be a resident of the village, hamlet, or place from which he is required to remove, the sanction of the local Government be obtained.

V. Whenever it may be expedient on military grounds, it shall be lawful for the local Government to direct the removal of any village on the immediate border to any other site within five miles of the original site, and to award such sums to the inhabitants as shall, in the opinion of the local Government, be proper compensation for any loss which may have been occasioned to them by such removal.

VI. *Repealed by Punjab Frontier Regulation No. IV. of* 1873, *Section I.*

VII. Section 445B.* of Act VIII. of 1869 shall have no force in the districts to which these rules apply. Cases contemplated in that section shall be tried according to the procedure provided in Chapter XIV. of the Criminal Procedure Code.

* This section runs;—"Such chief officer" (*i.e.*, the chief officer charged with the executive administration of a district in criminal matters when invested with power to try all offences not punishable with death, and to pass sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years, &c.), "shall try as a Court of Session offences which, under the schedule hereto annexed, are triable by a Court of Session only, and in such trials shall be guided by the rules contained in Chapter XXV. of this Code."

VIII. Any man who has sexual intercourse with a person who is and whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of another man, without the consent or connivance of that man, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape; and any married woman who knowingly and by her own consent has sexual intercourse with any man who is not her husband, is guilty of the offence of adultery, and shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both.

IX. Section 209 of Act VIII. of 1869 shall be read as if the clause noted in the margin were omitted.

Specified in column 7 of the Second Schedule, as hereto annexed, as triable by the Court of Session.

X. Persons offending against any of the rules here laid down shall be liable, on conviction, to imprisonment, rigorous or simple, which may extend to six months, or fine which may extend to Rupees 1,000.

XI. In every district a register shall be kept up of all cases dealt with under these rules, and a statement of all such cases shall be submitted half-yearly to the local Government.

XII. The Police Act V. of 1861 may, at the discretion of the Lieutenant-Governor, be extended to the districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan, subject to the limitations specified below:—

(*a.*) Such portion of the duties of the Inspector-General of Police as refer to inspection, pay and clothing, shall be performed by the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab.

(*b.*) All other duties now performed by the Inspector-General shall be performed by the Commissioner, who shall be held to possess the powers of an Inspector-General, within the limits of his own division.

(*c.*) Deputy Commissioners shall be held to be *ex-officio* Deputy Inspectors-General of Police within the limits of their respective districts, without prejudice to their exercise of all the powers of a magistrate.

* * * * * * * * *

No. 4 of 1873.

REGULATION to amend the Punjab Regulation for the Peace and Government of the Districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan (No. 1 of 1872).

I. The sixth section of the Punjab regulation for the peace and government of the districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera, Ismail Khan, and Dera Ghazi Khan is repealed.

II. Whenever any person or persons shall be accused of any offence, if, in the opinion of the Deputy Commissioner, it is expedient that the question of the guilt or innocence of such person or persons, or of any of them, should be tried according to the ordinary procedure, the Deputy Commissioner may cause such question to be referred to the decision of elders convened according to the Pathan or Biluch usage as he may in each case direct,

and may cause their decision thereon to be carried into effect as if it were a sentence of a court of law:

Provided that no decision imposing any penalty other than a fine shall be carried into effect as aforesaid.

The powers conferred by this section may be exercised notwithstanding any proceedings short of actual conviction or acquittal of the accused person against whom they are exercised, taken or recorded under the ordinary procedure, and as against some of the persons jointly accused of an offence, though the ordinary procedure is followed in the case of others.

No. 7 of 1873.

I. No person duly warned in the manner herein-after described shall pass out of British territory across the frontier of the districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan.

II. A warning for the purpose of this regulation, if addressed to an individual, shall be in writing under the hand of the Commissioner of the division, or of the Magistrate of the district within which such individual dwells or may be found, and shall be served upon him in such manner as the local Government may from time to time prescribe; if addressed to a class of persons or to the public generally, the previous sanction of the Governor General in Council must be obtained, and this warning shall be notified in the *Punjab Government Gazette*, and be otherwise published in such manner as may be directed by the local Government.

III. Whoever disobeys, or attempts to disobey, or abets, within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code, another person in disobeying, or attempting to disobey, the prohibition contained in the first section of this regulation shall be punishable with fine not exceeding five hundred rupees.

The provisions of sections sixty-four, sixty-seven, sixty-eight, sixty-nine and seventy of the Indian Penal Code shall apply to all fines imposed under this section.

IV. If any person disobeys, or attempts to disobey, or abets, within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code, another person in disobeying or attempting to disobey, the said prohibition, the local Government may order him to remove to such place under the Government of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab as the local Government in each case directs.

V. If any person contravenes any such order, the Commissioner of the division or Magistrate of the district within which he is dwelling or may be found may cause him to be apprehended and detained in custody until he is released upon such conditions as the local Government thinks fit.

VI. If the Commissioner of the division, or Magistrate of the district, within which any person (whether a European British subject or not) is dwelling, or may be found, reasonably suspects that he intends to disobey the prohibition contained in the first section of this Regulation, such Commissioner or Magistrate may require such security for his good behaviour, for a period not exceeding *six* months, as to the Commissioner or Magistrate may seem sufficient.

The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, sections 507 to 516 (both inclusive), shall apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to all cases under this section.

No. I. of 1874.

I. This Regulation may be called "The Frontier Grazing Regulation, 1874."

II. In this Regulation "cattle" includes also elephants, camels, buffaloes, horses, mares, geldings, ponies, colts, fillies, and mules.

III. No cattle, sheep, asses, or goats shall, except in the cases provided for in section IX., be grazed to to the west of the frontier military road in the districts of Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Dera Ghazi Khan, without being accompanied by an armed guard of not less than the following strength, namely :—

(*a.*) For sheep, goats, and asses, where the number does not exceed 100, one man; for every additional 100, or part of 100, one man.

(*b.*) For cattle, where the number does not exceed 100, two men ; for every additional 100, or part of 100, two men.

Whereas in the Marwat district of Bannu the frontier military road skirts the foot of the hill ranges in independent territory, no cattle, sheep, asses, or goats, except as provided for in section IX., shall be grazed on the lands of any village which immediately adjoins the frontier, unless accompanied by an armed guard of the strength already mentioned.

IV. Any cattle, sheep, asses, or goats discovered by the patrols grazing within the above-mentioned limits, unaccompanied by the guard prescribed in the preceding section, shall be seized and sent to the nearest police station.

V. No animals taken to a police station, under the preceding section, shall be released, except on payment of the following penalties, in addition to all charges incurred in seizing and keeping them:—

For each camel - - - - -	2 annas.
For each head of cattle other than camels, and for each ass -	1 anna.
For each sheep or goat - - - -	3 pies.

VI. When animals which have been carried off, owing to the gross negligence of the owners and their failure to comply with the requirements of this Regulation, are subsequently recovered by the police, or by other officers of Government, the following penalties shall be exacted on their restoration to the owners, in addition to all charges incurred in recovering and keeping them :—

For each camel - - - - -	5 rupees.
For each head of cattle other than camels - - -	1 rupee.
For each ass - - - - -	8 annas.
For each sheep or goat - - - -	2 annas.

VII. If the owner of any animals seized or recovered under this Regulation, or his agent, appear and refuse to pay the penalties and charges incurred, the animals, or as many of them as may be necessary, shall be sold, under the orders of the Deputy Commissioner, to defray the said charges and penalties, as nearly as may be in accordance with the rules prescribed for impounded cattle by section 16 of "The Cattle Trespass Act, 1871."

VIII. If any animals seized or recovered under this Regulation be not claimed within seven days from the date of their being so seized or recovered, they may, after proclamation of the number and description of the animals, the place where they were seized or recovered, and the police station to which they have been taken, be sold, under the orders of the Deputy Commissioner, as nearly as may be in conformity with the rules prescribed for impounded cattle by section 14 of "The Cattle Trespass Act, 1871." The surplus proceeds of the sale, after deducting all penalties and charges, shall be held in deposit for three calendar months, and, if no claims thereto be preferred and established within that period, shall, at its expiry, be at the disposal of the local Government.

IX. When tracts of territory, hill and plain, on both sides of the frontier line, in the districts before mentioned, are occupied by members of the same tribe (as in the cases of the Ushteranis in Dera Ismain Khan, and of the Ahmadzai Wazirs in Bannu), the Deputy Commissioner of the district may in his discretion accept written guarantees from the headmen of such tribes for the security of cattle, sheep, asses, or goats at graze on the border, should such headmen represent that armed guards are unnecessary ; and in the event of his accepting such guarantees, the tracts in question shall be exempt from the operation of sections III., IV., and V. of this Regulation. Information of such exemptions from the operations of the said sections shall be invariably conveyed to the Officer Commanding the Militia and Outposts.

No. II. of 1876.

Whereas it is expedient to provide for the peace and good government of the districts of *Hazara*, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Dera Ghazi Khan, in manner herein-aftar appearing ; it is hereby enacted as follows:

Preamble.

Short title. This Regulation may be called "The Punjab Frontier Regulation, 1876 ;"

Local extent. It shall extend to all the said districts;

Commmenceent. And it shall come into force on being published in the *Gazette of India* and in the *Punjab Government Gazette.*

Arrest without warrant of person who has committed, or who intends to commit, an offence punishable under section 498 of the Indian Penal Code.

2. When there is reason to believe—

(*a.*) That any person has committed an offence punishable under section 498 of the Indian Penal Code ; or

(*b.*) That any person designs to commit such an offence ;

and that the commission of such offence cannot be prevented otherwise than by his arrest, the officer in charge of a police station may, without orders from a magistrate, and without warrant, arrest such person if required so to do by the husband of the woman concerned, or by the person (if any) having the care of her on behalf of such husband, or, in the absence of such husband and of such person as last aforesaid from the village in which such woman resides, by the headman of such village.

3. Every police officer making an arrest under this Regulation shall, without unnecessary delay, take or send the person arrested before the nearest magistrate having jurisdiction in the case, to be dealt with according to law.

Disposal of arrested person.

APPENDIX G.

STATEMENT of CASES dealt with under Frontier Rule.

Year.	District.	Rule 1. Detention of Members of hostile Tribes, &c. &c.	Rule 2. Erection of Hamlets, &c.	Rule 3. Villages fined for suppressing Evidence, &c.	Rule 4. Removing Persons beyond Border.	Rule 5. Removal of Villages.	Rule 6. Reference to Council of Elders.	Rule 8. Adultery.
1872	Peshawar	3	—	27	23	—	33	6
	Kohat	—	—	2	—	—	40	5
	Hazara	—	—	6	—	—	2	2
	Dera Ismail Khan	—	—	—	—	—	2	1
	Dera Ghazi Khan	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	Bannu	—	—	15	—	—	16	3
	Total	3	—	50	23	—	94	17
1873	Peshawar	2	—	37	36	—	150	5
	Kohat	—	—	1	—	—	84	3
	Hazara	—	—	1	—	—	45	3
	Dera Ismail Khan	—	—	2	—	—	16	9
	Dera Ghazi Khan	—	—	—	—	—	2	3
	Bannu	—	—	16	—	—	18	7
	Total	2	—	57	36	—	315	30
1874	Peshawar	4	—	18	44	—	324	—
	Kohat	—	1	1	—	—	192	4
	Hazara	—	—	1	—	—	44	—
	Dera Ismail Khan	1	—	—	—	—	26	7
	Dera Ghazi Khan	—	—	—	—	—	8	3
	Bannu	—	—	10	—	—	23	5
	Total	5	1	30	44	—	617	19
1875	Peshawar	—	—	13	19	—	206	1
	Kohat	1	1	4	—	—	257	5
	Hazara	—	—	2	—	—	90	4
	Dera Ismail Khan	—	—	—	—	—	13	2
	Dera Ghazi Khan	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
	Bannu	—	—	5	—	—	55	3
	Total	1	1	24	19	—	627	15

APPENDIX H.

COPY of Letter No. 48 S. M., dated 4th September 1876, from the Secretary to Financial Commissioner, Punjab, to the Secretary to Government, Punjab.

WITH reference to your confidential demi-official dated 10th August, calling for statements showing for six frontier districts—

I. The increase in assessed and assessable area as compared with the first settlements;

II. The amount of inams which have been sanctioned in the different settlements for chiefs and headmen,—

I am desired to forward three statements prepared under the Financial Commissioner's supervision, with the following explanatory remarks.

2. *Area and Resources.*—Statement I. gives, so far as it is available, information regarding the comparative cultivation and resources of the six districts at summary settlement and at the recently completed or now progressing settlements.

The cultivated area may be regarded as tolerably correct. Where it has not been possible to obtain the area under cultivation at summary settlement for a portion of the district, owing to the absence of measurements, a comparison has been made for those tahsils on account of which statistics are forthcoming upon which a comparison can be instituted, or else the census returns of 1855 have been consulted.

The assessable area, or cultivated and abandoned, cannot be given with any approach to accuracy for former settlements, and no safe comparison can be made.

The population given in the Settlement Officer's returns is frequently only the agricultural portion of the population, so the column has been filled up for the most part from the census returns of 1855 and 1868. The limits of the districts in the Derajat, however, have been so much altered that in these districts the Settlement Officer's figures have had to be taken. For Bannu no returns are available at present. The Settlement Officer has been addressed, but meanwhile, as it is considered best not to delay this reference, the figures given in the census returns of 1855 and 1868 have been compared, the districts of Leia and Dera Ismail Khan in the former representing the same area as Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan in the latter.

3. *Assignments.*—The statement showing assignments (No. III.) is a transcript of the annual return accompanying the Financial Commissioner's report. As this is not exhaustive, remarks have been added so as to convey an idea of the total amount assigned. There is considerable difficulty in compiling a statement of these assignments upon any other plan at a short notice; but as in the recent settlements all assignments were considered and reported for orders of Government, it may fairly be said that to some extent all the Peshawar, Hazara, and Dera Ghazi Khan assignments have been granted or continued at these settlements.

4. *Remarks on each District.*—A few remarks will be offered in regard to each district, which the Financial Commissioner hopes will give a succinct view of the fiscal property of each.

5. *Peshawar.*—The Sikh collections in this district amounted in 1842–43 to Rs. 9,96,944, including assignments, which reached Rs. 2,89,767. The jama at the summary settlement of 1851 was Rs. 7,80,183, and the present jama Rs. 8,09,963, of which Rs. 1,44,876 are assigned. The incidence of the summary settlement in tahsils Peshawar, Nowshera, and Doaba Daudzai was Rs. 3-13-0 per acre of cultivation, but, notwithstanding that the demand has not been lowered at the recent settlement, cultivation has increased to such an extent (67 per cent.) that the rate per acre is now only Rs. 2-4-4. In the other three tahsils it falls at Re. 0-11-11 per acre.

Favourable assessments have been granted to border villages in this district; Rs. 38,000 of the Government demand has in this way been abated.

The proprietors of land in jagir villages have received the same favourable terms of assessment as their brethren in khalsa villages, and Government has compensated the jagirdars by large grants from the Imperial revenue.

The excise revenue has not increased since 1860–61, but the stamp revenue has risen from Rs. 24,079 to Rs. 62,716. The selling price of land has been steadily rising, and now amounts to 16 years' purchase of the Government demand, according to the annual returns received by the Financial Commissioner. Between 1855 and 1868 population increased 16 per cent.

6. *Kohat.*—For Kohat not much information is procurable. Between 1855 and 1868 cultivation increased 37 per cent.; population 43 per cent. The large jagirs held by the Khattak and Shakardarrah chiefs have not been assessed, so the total amount of assignments enjoyed cannot be given. The excise and stamp revenue both show a large increase between 1860–61 and 1875. The rise in price of land is very marked.

7. *Hazara.*—The extent to which this district has increased in prosperity has recently been fully reported by the Settlement Officer. Between 1864 and 1874 cultivation increased 26 per cent.; population between 1855 and 1868 rose 24 per cent. The amount of assignments in this district is Rs. 87,238. The stamp revenue has nearly tripled, and the selling price of land has largely increased. Although the assessment of the district was raised 35 per cent., yet the incidence of the new assessments was scarcely higher than that of the summary settlement when applied to the cultivated area of 1864.

8. *Dera Ismail Khan.*—Comparative statistics are available only for the Bhakkar and Leia tahsils. The increase in cultivation here has been 103 per cent., the whole being irrigated land. The assessments are under report. Upwards of a lakh of rupees are alienated to chiefs and others. The excise and stamp revenues show great elasticity. Land, however, is not so valuable here as in other districts.

9. *Dera Ghazi Khan.*—The recently concluded settlement shows an increase in cultivation of 103 per cent.; population 29 per cent.; ploughs 45 per cent.; cattle 36 per cent.; and although the assessment was enhanced 37 per cent., yet the rate on cultivation fell 50 per cent. lower than that of the summary settlement. The value of land is very high as compared with the Government demand on it. The excise and stamp revenues have doubled and quadrupled since 1860–61. The assignments in this district amount to Rs. 17,515, besides the tumandars' allowances, Rs. 35,000, and the Kalora jagir, valued at Rs. 13,715.

10. *Bannu.*—As before remarked, the only way in which any comparison of area can be effected is by taking the two districts of Leia and Dera Ismail Khan and comparing them with the present districts of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. The former were converted into the latter in 1860–61. The comparison does not show so favourably as in other districts, but as in the Bhakkar and Leia tahsils in cultivation has been shown by the Settlement Officer, Dera Ismail Khan, amounting to 103 per cent., the correctness of the census figures of 1868, which only give an increase of 2 per cent. on the two districts, may well be questioned. The demand has been lowered, reducing the incidence per acre of cultivation from Rs. 0-15-7 to Rs. 0-12-2. The Financial Commissioner hopes that the Settlement Officer may be able to supply further information, though it is not probable that he can do this for all tahsils.* The statistics for parganna Marwat have been received, and are added to the statement. From these it appears that in the Marwat tahsil the increase in cultivation since the first summary settlement is 40 per cent. This confirms the opinion above stated. The excise revenue has also expanded, and stamp income nearly tripled. Land fetches a good price, amounting to 21 years' purchase of the revenue. The assignments in Bannu are small, amounting to Rs. 10,085; but the Settlement Officer's proposals have not been received yet for any tahsil except Marwat, and in that tahsil he proposes a remission of revenue of about Rs. 3,700 to frontier villages.

* Subsequently received and incorporated with Statement I.

No. I.—Statement showing comparative Cultivation and Resources of Six Frontier Districts at Summary and Regular Settlements respectively.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.
District.	Tahsil.	Period for which comparison is made.	Total area of district in acres.	Cultivated area in acres.			Culturable and fallow, area in acres.	Population.	Ploughs.	Cattle	Wells.	Jama, including Jagir.	Rate of assessment per cultivated acre.	Remarks.
				Irrigated.	Unirrigated.	Total.								
												Rs.	Rs. As. P.	
Peshawar	Peshawar, Nowshera, Doaba Daudzai	Summary settlement, 1851	—	99,555	37,132	136,687	*a* 77,009	—	—	155,280	811	5,21,463	3 13 0	*a*. Incomplete.
		Regular settlement, 1875	—	129,331	99,971	229,302	230,500	—	—	159,871	1,511	5,21,919	2 4 4	
		Increase per cent.	—	30	169	67	—	—	—	3	86	·09		
	Hashtnagar, Yusafzai, Utman Bolak	Summary settlement, 1851	—	—	No measurements made			—	—	—	—	2,58,720		
		Regular settlement, 1875	—	38,977	384,438	423,415	124,465	—	—	123,002	2,714	2,88,044	0 11 11	
	Total	Regular settlement, 1875	1,401,986	168,308	484,409	652,717	354,965	*b* 450,099	—	—	—	7,80,183	—	*b*. Census of 1855.
								c 523,152	45,825	282,873	4,225	8,09,963	1 3 10	*c*. Ditto 1868.
		Increase per cent.	—	—	—	—	—	16	—	—	—	3·8		
Kohat	All	Census of 1855	1,817,600	Not available			*d* 16,295	101,232	Not available			*d* 97,641	1 8 11	*d*. Excluding jagir.
		Census of 1868	1,816,600			*d* 62,620	*d* 25,430	145,419				*d* 92,605	1 1 3	
		Increase per cent.	—	—	—	*d* 85,788	50	43	—	—	—	−5		
						37								
Hazara	All	Summary settlement, 1864	—	33,950	279,030	312,980	Not available	*b* 296,364	Not available			2,28,497	0 11 11	
		Regular settlement, 1874	1,785,776	36,661	357,092	398,753	18,527	*c* 367,218	37,241	205,240		3,09,640	0 12 7	
		Increase per cent.	—	8	28	26	—	24	—	—	—	35		
D. I. Khan	Bhakkar, Leia	Summary settlement, 1854	—	120,221	371	120,592	*a* 31,174	Not available			3,708	1,89,585	1 2 3	
		Regular settlement, 1876	—	244,453	295	244,748	895,204	—	—	—	4,878	2,25,570	0 14 9	
		Increase per cent.	—	103	20	103	—	—	—	—	30	19		
	D. I. Khan, Tank, Kulachi	Summary settlement, 1854	—	No measurements made.					—	—	—	2,14,986		
		Regular settlement, 1876	—	447,353	95,143	542,496	1,248,833	—	—	—	448	2,88,481		
	Total	Regular settlement, 1876	4,305,101	691,806	95,438	787,244	2,144,037	391,874	50,170	728,014	5,326	5,14,051	0 8 3	
D. G. Khan	All	Summary settlement, 1859	*a* 1,108,992	149,369	176,110	325,479	*a* 532,210	238,964	29,743	249,297	—	3,21,316	0 15 9	
		Regular settlement, 1874	2,898,776	266,522	395,747	66,269	1,545,087	308,840	43,265	340,379	—	4,41,278	0 10 6	
		Increase per cent.	—	79	125	103	—	29	45	36	—	37		
Bannu and D. I. Khan together	All	Census of 1855	6,556,643	Not available			*d* 912,724	*d* 395,653	671,737	Not available		*d* 8,92,097	0 15 7	
		Census of 1868	6,556,986			*d* 914,828	*a* 1,360,314	682,411				*d* 6,99,531	0 12 2	
		Increase per cent.	—	—	—	2	—	1·5	—	—	—	−21		
								Not available.						
Bannu	Bannu	Summary settlement, 1854	—	Not available		73,653	73,653	80,826	—	—	—	*e* 1,13,437	1 5 8	*e*. Second summary settlement as reduced in 1866–67.
		Regular settlement, 1876	284,507	80,129	49,146	129,275	178,455	84,232	8,522	65,478	—	1,45,324	1 2 0	
		Increase per cent.	—	—	—	75	142	4	—	—	—	28	—	
	Marwat	Summary settlement, 1854	—	Not available		164,191	164,191	51,531	—	—	6	*f* 1,12,319	0 10 11	*f*. Second summary settlement as reduced in 1866–67.
		Regular settlement, 1876	841,073	20,649	209,767	230,416	302,899	64,257	12,527	82,710	9	1,17,230	0 8 2	
		Increase per cent.	—	—	—	40	84	24	—	—	—	4	—	
	Isa Khel	Summary settlement, 1854	176,556	12,655	26,228	38,883	39,030	30,987	—	—	62	*g* 43,037	1 1 9	*e*. Ditto in 1869–70.
		Regular settlement, 1876	417,817	12,072	59,105	71,177	101,113	47,081	7,532	60,184	112	66,820	0 15 0	*g*. Ditto ditto.
		Increase per cent.	—	—	125	83	159	51	—	—	—	55	—	*h*. Ditto in 1866–67.
	Mianwali	Summary settlement, 1854	Not available	677	119,006	119,683	169,632	85,679	—	—	204	*h* 1,22,164	1 2 5	*h*. Ditto ditto
		Regular settlement, 1876	936,674	1,046	151,331	152,377	223,040	83,097	18,051	137,292	216	1,41,569	0 14 10	Ditto in 1868–69.
		Increase per cent.	—	54	27	27	31	−3	—	—	—	15		
	Total	Regular settlement, 1876	2,480,071	113,896	469,349	583,245	805,507	278,667	46,632	345,664	337	4,70,943	0 12 11	

No. II.—Statement showing Excise and Stamp Revenue and Selling Price of Land in Six Frontier Districts of the Punjab, in quinquennial periods from 1860–61 to 1875–76.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
—	1860–61.	1865–66.	1870–71.	1875–76.
Excise—Net Receipts.				
Peshawar	59,791	53,538	57,605	52,108
Kohat	6,526	6,671	8,479	8,025
Hazara	7,558	6,491	5,535	7,205
Dera Ismail Khan	7,869	16,604	16,209	19,751
Dera Ghazi Khan	11,921	10,590	16,455	23,403
Bannu	6,924	6,631	7,400	8,174
Total	1,00,589	1,00,545	1,11,683	1,18,666
Stamps—Net Receipts.				
Peshawar	24,079	45,090	59,927	62,716
Kohat	2,976	4,196	8,417	7,965
Hazara	6,822	8,856	12,086	20,267
Dera Ismail Khan	11,543	34,900	50,433	60,470
Dera Ghazi Khan	11,946	23,987	34,341	48,570
Bannu	11,887	21,916	31,379	33,149
Total	69,253	1,38,945	1,96,583	2,33,137
Selling price of Land. No. of Years Purchase of Government Demand on Land sold.				
Peshawar	—	10	13	16
Kohat	—	4	36	59
Hazara	—	No record	73	14
Dera Ismail Khan	—	11	8	8
Dera Ghazi Khan	—	30	35	33
Bannu	—	17	31	21

No. III.—Statement of Local Revenue assigned to Individuals or Societies in the Six Frontier Districts for the Year 1875–76.

In Perpetuity.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
Division.	District.	Villages.		Fractional Portion of Villages.		Plots (Rezah).		Total.	
		Area.	Jama.	Area.	Jama.	Area.	Jama.	Area.	Jama.
		Acres.	Rs.	Acres.	Rs.	Acres.	Rs.	Acres.	Rs.
	Dera Ismail Khan	50,964	24,911	2,331	2,553	10,508	692	63,799	28,156
	Dera Ghazi Khan	2,158	195	—	—	103	236	2,254	431
	Bannu	29,693	5,901	—	—	1,859	1,408	31,552	7,309
	Peshawar	74,376	27,530	8,633	16,912	1,422	257	84,481	44,699
	Hazara	334,631	52,288	10,833	10,299	5	25	345,469	62,612
	Kohat	3,583	1,361	—	—	—	—	3,583	1,361

For One Life.

—	—	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.
		Acres.	Rs.	Acres.	Rs.	Acres.	Rs.	Acres.	Rs.
	Dera Ismail Khan	8,701	30,430	129,228	41,070	4,786	3,465	142,715	74,965
	Dera Ghazi Khan	273,675	15,241	30	30	1,378	1,575	275,083	16,846
	Bannu	574	925	3,391	675	2,283	759	6,248	2,359
	Peshawar	48,241	20,953	14,006	20,009	15,564	30,917	77,811	71,879
	Hazara	14,889	2,530	1,136	4,060	650	615	16,675	7,205
	Kohat	1,785	7,884	1,386	1,164	—	—	3,171	9,048

FOR MORE THAN ONE LIFE.

—	—	19.	20.	21.	22.	23.	24.	25.	26.
Division.	District.	Villages.		Fractional Portion of Villages.		Plots (Rezah).		Total.	
		Area.	Jama.	Area.	Jama.	Area.	Jama.	Area.	Jama.
		Acres.	Rs.	Acres.	Rs.	Acres.	Rs.	Acres.	Rs.
	Dera Ismail Khan	—	—	197	379	80	110	277	489
	Dera Ghazi Khan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Bannu - -	—	—	—	—	223	417	223	417
	Peshawar -	1,802	325	1,957	667	720	2,331	4,479	3,323
	Hazara - -	—	—	870	14,571	—	—	870	14,571
	Kohat - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

DURING MAINTENANCE OF ESTABLISHMENTS.

—	—	27.	28.	29.	30.	31.		33.	34.
		Acres.	Rs.	Acres.	Rs.	Acres.	Rs.	Acres.	Rs.
	Dera Ismail Khan	—	—	—	—	806	1,050	806	1,050
	Dera Ghazi Khan	—	—	—	—	225	238	225	238
	Bannu - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Peshawar -	1,248	610	—	—	1,943	2,658	3,191	3,268
	Hazara - -	—	—	—	—	2,400	609	2,400	609
	Kohat - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

PENDING REPORTS OR ORDERS OF GOVERNMENT.

—	—	35.	36.	37.	38.	39.	40.	41.	42.
		Acres.	Rs.	Acres.	Rs.	Acres.	Rs.	Acres.	Rs.
	Dera Ismail Khan	—	—	—	—	1,379	2,187	1,379	2,187
	Dera Ghazi Khan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Bannu - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Peshawar -	—	—	126	528	78,771	64,132	78,897	64,660
	Hazara - -	10,509	2,057	2,000	184	—	—	12,509	2,241
	Kohat - -	—	—	—	—	1,374	2,784	1,374	2,784

TOTAL REVENUE ASSIGNED.

—	—	43.	44.	45.	46.	47.	48.	49.	50.
		Acres.	Rs.	Acres.	Rs.	Acres.	Rs.	Acres.	Rs.
	Dera Ismail Khan	59,661	55,341	131,756	44,002	17,559	7,504	208,976	1,06,847
	Dera Ghazi Khan	275,826	15,436	30	30	1,706	2,049	277,562	17,515*
	Bannu - -	30,267	6,826	3,391	675	4,365	2,584	38,023	10,085
	Peshawar -	125,667	49,418	24,772	38,116	98,420	1,00,295	248,859	187,829†
	Hazara - -	360,029	56,875	14,839	29,114	3,055	1,249	377,923	87,238
	Kohat - -	5,368	9,245	1,386	1,164	1,374	2,784	8,128	13,193‡

* Exclusive of Tumandars' inams, Rs. 35,000, and Kalara Jagir, valued at Rs. 13,715.

† Exclusive of Rs. 38,029, remissions to frontier villages.

‡ Exclusive of the E. Khattak, Teri Khattak, Shakardarrah Jagirs, and also of assignments of salt revenue, and allowances to maliks for Khwarra and Zira jungles.

NUMBER OF HOLDERS.

	—	51.	52.	53.	54.	55.	56.
Division.	District.	In Perpetuity.	For One Life.	For more than One Life.	During maintenance of Institutions.	Total.	Remarks.
	Dera Ismail Khan	43	146	37	72	298	
	Dera Ghazi Khan	31	70	—	8	109	
	Bannu - -	14	30	4	—	48	
	Peshawar -	124	11,571	8	620	12,323	
	Hazara - -	165	156	399	158	878	
	Kohat - -	2	252	—	—	254	

APPENDIX I.

STATEMENT to illustrate the STATE of CRIME in the Frontier District.

Year.	District.	Offences committed								Other Offences.	Total.
		Against the Person.				Against Property.					
		Murder.	Culpable Homicide.	Grievous Hurt.	Others.	Robbery and Dacoity.	Criminal Trespass and House-breaking.	Theft.	Others.		
1860	Hazara - -	9	2	—	308	—	15	103	276	252	965
	Peshawar - -	47	16	16	801	23	144	631	327	665	2,670
	Kohat - -	10	—	1	320	10	44	224	39	28	676
	Bannu - -	14	2	9	264	4	29	246	57	463	1,088
	Dera Ismail Khan -	4	1	4	182	2	6	218	41	226	684
	Dera Ghazi Khan -	11	2	—	498	7	35	377	57	285	1,272
	Total - -	95	23	30	2,373	46	273	1,799	797	1,919	7,355
1861	Hazara - -	8	3	17	401	1	100	166	31	188	915
	Peshawar - -	33	15	22	870	21	277	798	266	503	2,805
	Kohat -	9	1	1	24	31	64	223	16	1	370
	Bannu - -	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9
	Dera Ismail Khan -	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6
	Dera Ghazi Khan -	8	—	10	491	10	54	413	46	251	1,283
	Total - -	73	19	50	1,786	63	495	1,600	359	943	5,388
1862	Hazara - -	10	1	11	467	1	32	177	17	76	792
	Peshawar - -	44	16	28	831	12	160	702	264	420	2,477
	Kohat - -	10	5	4	313	1	77	171	18	67	666
	Bannu - -	9	2	8	316	5	57	285	38	87	807
	Dera Ismail Khan -	9	6	8	195	17	135	542	33	141	1,086
	Dera Ghazi Khan -	12	2	1	556	34	54	390	36	65	1,150
	Total - -	94	32	60	2,678	70	515	2,267	406	856	6,978
1863	Hazara - -	10	3	4	569	1	52	307	43	172	1,161
	Peshawar - -	27	9	11	673	6	199	573	216	395	2,109
	Kohat - -	10	3	13	178	13	39	280	15	59	610
	Bannu - -	7	6	73	261	3	42	223	47	150	812
	Dera Ismail Khan -	8	4	9	252	41	96	417	47	73	947
	Dera Ghazi Khan -	5	3	1	478	7	69	403	42	82	1,090
	Total - -	67	28	111	2,411	71	497	2,203	410	931	6,729
1864	Hazara - -	12	7	6	698	6	145	337	63	155	1,429
	Peshawar - -	55	8	13	597	5	261	673	297	408	2,317
	Kohat - -	11	9	9	183	15	45	144	24	69	509
	Bannu - -	12	4	16	336	7	153	690	60	167	1,445
	Dera Ismail Khan -	11	2	9	416	56	118	471	52	46	1,181
	Dera Ghazi Khan -	16	3	1	457	8	111	401	66	97	1,160
	Total - -	117	33	54	2,687	97	833	2,716	562	942	8,041

APPENDIX I.—*continued.*

Year.	District.	Offences committed									
		Against the Person.				Against Property.				Other Offences.	Total.
		Murder.	Culpable Homicide.	Grievous Hurt.	Others.	Robbery and Dacoity.	Criminal Trespass and House-breaking.	Theft.	Others.		
1865	Hazara - -	13	7	1	508	1	61	397	32	123	1,143
	Peshawar - -	65	9	16	890	16	299	741	316	335	2,687
	Kohat - -	21	5	2	300	23	129	418	48	86	1,032
	Bannu - -	11	6	12	440	6	136	687	74	269	1,641
	Dera Ismail Khan -	8	3	7	373	33	95	530	50	61	1,160
	Dera Ghazi Khan -	22	2	4	321	12	132	516	61	125	1,195
	Total - -	140	32	42	2,832	91	852	3,289	581	999	8,858
1866	Hazara - -	15	6	43	611	6	113	337	121	187	1,439
	Peshawar - -	61	14	48	796	24	553	799	371	388	3,054
	Kohat - -	26	4	6	288	10	187	338	50	75	984
	Bannu - -	13	7	2	481	6	148	133	51	186	1,027
	Dera Ismail Khan -	9	5	2	393	23	133	516	66	103	1,250
	Dera Ghazi Khan -	16	2	—	386	5	156	631	73	138	1,407
	Total - -	140	38	101	2,955	74	1,290	2,754	732	1,077	9,161
1867	Hazara - -	19	8	13	356	10	121	243	65	161	996
	Peshawar - -	67	10	27	803	8	468	714	339	371	2,807
	Kohat - -	21	4	11	320	26	178	322	80	130	1,092
	Bannu - -	16	4	23	505	8	274	364	80	233	1,507
	Dera Ismail Khan -	16	6	9	341	24	133	502	65	197	1,293
	Dera Ghazi Khan -	13	—	4	405	—	132	529	44	201	1,328
	Total - -	152	32	87	2,730	76	1,306	2,674	673	1,293	9,023
1868	Hazara - -	10	7	13	292	11	108	303	48	108	900
	Peshawar - -	80	16	46	873	7	520	1,063	404	708	3,717
	Kohat - -	25	6	12	204	26	160	448	64	180	1,125
	Bannu - -	17	6	24	401	7	294	446	50	230	1,475
	Dera Ismail Khan -	15	5	15	419	33	251	575	65	213	1,591
	Dera Ghazi Khan -	17	1	3	521	6	190	489	38	142	1,407
	Total - -	164	41	113	2,710	90	1,523	3,324	669	1,581	10,215
1869	Hazara - -	17	4	12	279	15	182	383	80	114	1,086
	Peshawar - -	73	10	70	819	31	571	839	453	779	3,645
	Kohat - -	25	4	13	178	13	147	408	50	154	992
	Bannu - -	21	6	19	309	11	331	317	113	198	1,325
	Dera Ismail Khan -	14	4	21	371	3	164	575	110	186	1,448
	Dera Ghazi Khan -	14	2	4	509	1	189	487	80	191	1,477
	Total - -	164	30	139	2,465	74	1,584	3,009	886	1,622	9,973
1870	Hazara - -	13	7	15	33	7	121	176	36	49	455
	Peshawar - -	94	20	65	158	80	1,258	864	242	164	2,947
	Kohat - -	26	7	19	186	20	90	321	76	228	973
	Bannu - -	21	2	21	321	22	327	334	164	256	1,468
	Dera Ismail Khan -	6	—	21	98	1	206	563	76	166	1,137
	Dera Ghazi Khan -	6	1	5	84	1	268	582	49	54	1,050
	Tofal - -	166	37	146	880	131	2,270	2,840	643	917	8,030

APPENDIX I.—*continued.*

Year.	District.	Offences committed								Other Offences.	Total.
		Against the Person.				Against Property.					
		Murder.	Culpable Homicide.	Grievous Hurt.	Others.	Robbery and Dacoity.	Criminal Trespass and House-breaking.	Theft.	Others.		
1871	Hazara - -	11	2	16	110	13	152	224	51	60	639
	Peshawar - -	93	19	88	318	137	1,726	705	321	307	3,714
	Kohat - -	20	6	18	232	24	85	632	95	266	1,378
	Bannu - -	24	7	19	500	9	332	367	152	412	1,822
	Dera Ismail Khan -	9	3	28	168	8	209	488	104	156	1,173
	Dera Ghazi Khan -	7	—	5	44	3	177	379	45	213	873
	Total - -	164	37	174	1,372	194	2,681	2,795	768	1,414	9,599
1872	Hazara - -	16	5	19	130	16	219	244	72	64	785
	Peshawar - -	102	13	62	180	68	1,336	470	245	271	2,747
	Kohat - -	24	6	42	186	99	245	808	70	204	1,684
	Bannu - -	15	7	33	474	16	176	274	175	474	1,644
	Dera Ismail Khan -	15	2	22	144	23	231	600	97	218	1,352
	Dera Ghazi Khan -	13	1	6	55	7	267	508	78	185	1,120
	Total - -	185	34	184	1,169	229	2,474	2,904	737	1,416	9,332
1873	Hazara - -	15	5	35	252	21	220	256	163	161	1,128
	Peshawar - -	77	20	72	42	55	936	432	192	575	2,401
	Kohat - -	22	3	26	189	29	279	461	134	239	1,382
	Bannu - -	18	5	22	79	20	317	321	162	743	1,687
	Dera Ismail Khan -	14	2	32	72	13	340	618	148	283	1,522
	Dera Ghazi Khan -	7	2	4	96	6	178	607	76	165	1,141
	Total - -	153	37	191	730	144	2,270	2,695	875	2,166	9,261
1874	Hazara - -	16	4	27	197	25	240	186	108	181	984
	Peshawar - -	75	8	61	166	56	862	391	225	761	2,605
	Kohat - -	9	1	53	226	29	276	243	129	296	1,262
	Bannu - -	15	3	37	111	20	404	625	165	244	1,624
	Dera Ismail Khan -	15	2	15	71	5	190	315	71	89	773
	Dera Ghazi Khan -	18	3	15	105	11	255	426	120	128	1,081
	Total - -	148	21	208	876	146	2,227	2,186	818	1,699	8,329
1875	Hazara - -	13	3	24	254	26	184	214	76	225	1,019
	Peshawar - -	81	14	70	270	53	840	349	201	471	2,349
	Kohat - -	11	4	33	180	12	302	312	175	271	1,300
	Bannu - -	11	9	48	149	11	455	419	168	617	1,887
	Dera Ismail Khan -	10	2	24	154	17	244	306	117	237	1,111
	Dera Ghazi Khan -	13	4	12	117	9	283	402	127	191	1,158
	Total - -	139	36	211	1,124	128	2,308	2,002	864	2,012	8,824

No. 15.

RE-ORGANISATION OF THE FRONTIER.

MINUTE BY THE VICEROY. (Extract.)

Dated 22nd April 1877.

1. In February 1876 the Secretary of State addressed a despatch to the Government of India on the subject of the administration of the frontier and "the changes which, "under existing circumstances, seem necessary for the purpose of ensuring unity of "action in the government of the Western and North-western Frontier of India."

2. In this despatch the Secretary of State reviewed briefly the past administration of the frontier, and the evils which had arisen from the dual system of government. In so doing, he dwelt strongly on the necessity for unity of action, and for bringing the whole frontier under the direct control of the Government of India. He confined himself, however, to indicating broadly the various measures by which this object might be effected; leaving it to the Government of India to make proposals for carrying it out, and requesting an early expression of their views on the subject.

3. On the 7th April the Government of India replied to the above-mentioned despatch, expressing their unanimous opinion that the transfer of Sindh from Bombay to the Punjab is desirable both on political and administrative grounds; but deprecating any arrangement involving the severance from the Punjab of the frontier districts now under its control.

4. On the 13th of July the Secretary of State expressed, in reply, his satisfaction at finding his views with regard to Sindh in accord with those of the Government of India, but deferred any expression of opinion as to the future administration of the frontier,—a question which could, he observed, be better decided after I had had the opportunity of personally visiting the localities, and consulting the officers, concerned.

5. The negotiations going on in Khelat at the time of my arrival, and my own proposed autumn tour (for the express purpose of visiting the frontier districts, and meeting and conferring with the principal frontier officers on the spot), decided me to postpone action till matters in Khelat should be more settled. The Delhi assemblage, and the urgent calls of the Bombay and Madras famines, have still further delayed action in the matter. But, in the meanwhile, I have been assiduously collecting the detailed information requisite for a practical decision of this question, which is rendered peculiarly urgent by the character of recent and present events. In recognition of this fact, as also in deference to the expressed wishes of the Home Government, I now desire to submit to the earliest consideration of my colleagues a statement of those arrangements which, after careful and prolonged attention to the object in view, I believe to be best adapted for the attainment of it.

6. In the despatch of 3rd February 1876, the Secretary of State thus indicates the courses which suggest themselves to him:—"The whole territory of Sindh may be "annexed to the Punjab; or the lower portion of the valley of the Indus may be placed "under a distinct government; or the districts requiring special military supervision "may be separately administered; or some other division of these provinces, involving "larger re-adjustments, may be made." And he continues—"Local circumstances, "facilities of communication, the character of the population under British rule and of "the tribes beyond the frontier, must be taken into careful consideration before any "decision can be taken on this important point."

7. Before discussing the courses thus suggested, I would premise that there are three points on which there seems to me to be such an overwhelming concurrence of opinion that it is unnecessary for me to go over the arguments concerning them. The first point is the necessity for a re-adjustment of our frontier administration. This the Government of India has affirmed both by its action and in despatches and telegrams. It has been equally affirmed by the Home Government, which only withheld its sanction to the measures originally proposed by this Government because those measures appeared to it temporary and incomplete.

8. The second point is the severance of Sindh from Bombay. On this point the Government of India and the Secretary of State are in complete accord; and the

Secretary of State, in his despatch of 13th July, authorises the early adoption of such measures as may be requisite to effect such a severance.

9. The third point is that the line of demarcation between the Sindh, or lower frontier, and the Punjab, or upper frontier, should be re-adjusted according to the distribution of the races on the border; so that the Belooch tribes may all come within one district and administration, and the Pathan tribes within the other. On this point there seems perfect unanimity of opinion.

10. Accepting, then, these three points, and keeping in view the main principles laid down by the Secretary of State, viz., unity of action, and direct control by the Government of India over our frontier policy, it seems to me that we have practically the choice between three courses: first, having severed Sindh from Bombay, and rectified its northern boundary, to form it into a separate province, directly under the Government of India; second, to attach Sindh to the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Punjab, either retaining its autonomy, or merging it entirely in the Punjab; third, to form a separate Trans-Indus district, under one head, who, as the Viceroy's representative, would directly control all frontier administration and trans-frontier relations.

11. Now, whether we approach this question from an *à priori* consideration of broad principles of policy and administration, or work upwards from the existing condition of affairs to an *à posteriori* solution of the difficulties and anomalies in which our frontier administration is now involved, we seem to be irresistibly led to the same conclusion.

12. It is not necessary for me to dwell again on the growing importance of our frontier politics,—their gradual merging into one great Central Asian question, and so into the Imperial policy of the British Government; nor on the effect which our advance in Khelat may have on our trans-frontier relations. It will probably be admitted that at no time has there been such urgent necessity for care, combined with vigour and unity of purpose and action, in our frontier policy. And, if it is asked how such *desiderata* can be best secured, the natural answer must be, by placing all in the hands of one officer; by selecting him with special regard to the peculiar requirements of the appointment, which should be high enough to command the services of the best men; by letting him have as little as possible to attend to apart from his purely frontier duties, and as much power as possible within his own jurisdiction; on the affairs of which he should be in direct communication with the Viceroy, who is the only exponent of Imperial policy in India.

13. Such a reply at once outlines a scheme in accordance with what I have mentioned as the third course open to us. The "one officer" cannot be the present Commissioner of Peshawur, whose control is limited to a small portion of our frontier, and whose position is not sufficiently high for the purpose here proposed; nor can it be the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, who, already burdened with the administration of a large province, can give but a fraction of his time and attention to frontier politics. The Foreign Secretary occupies a position equally unfitted for the personal supervision of the frontier: for he is not an executive officer; he is too far removed from the spot; and he has many other important duties to perform. The "one officer" required for this purpose must necessarily be a Chief Commissioner and Governor General's Agent, residing on the spot; and his authority must be co-extensive with the whole length of the frontier. Mixed up as are the tribes within and beyond our border, he must evidently have charge of the immediate frontier districts, as well as of all our trans-frontier relations; while, at the same time, his jurisdiction should be confined to the smallest possible limits, in order to diminish the pressure of his purely administrative work. To all those conditions, the Indus boundary naturally tends itself. Finally, as every unnecessary link between the responsible head and his executive agent tends to sub-divide responsibility and diminish efficiency, the Viceroy's agent on the frontier should be responsible to the Viceroy only, owing no divided allegiance to any local government.

14. This may, perhaps, appear too abstract and theoretical a way of dealing with a very practical question, but I think an examination of the actual condition of affairs, and of the several proposals hitherto made for the amelioration of it, will lead to the same conclusion. There has always been, and I conceive that there always must be, an officer of rank at Peshawur charged with the general management of our relations with the tribes on that frontier and with Cabul. Similarly there always has been, and always must be, an officer in Sindh, having in his hands the general conduct of our relations with the Belooch tribes and Khelat. And the question which this Government is now forced to

decide (as the result of Major Sandeman's mission to Khelat, and the disagreements between him and Sir W. Merewether,) is—What should be the relations of these officers to one another, to the local governments, and to the Government of India?

15. The first course I have named, viz., to form Sindh into a separate province directly under the Government of India, does not seem to me to meet the difficulty at all. The dual system of government would remain, as before, with no better guarantee against the recurrence of similar complications, for at the very time that the disputes between the Sindh and Punjab officials obliged the Government of India to interfere, Sindh, so far as its political relations beyond the border are concerned, was directly under the Government of India.

16. There are other reasons also against forming Sindh into a separate province. On administrative grounds the multiplication of small independent provinces is undesirable; though, under exceptional circumstances, it may become necessary, but none of these exceptional circumstances exist in Sindh. On the contrary there are special reasons why that province should be attached to its great neighbour, the Punjab. Its revenue is small, its population scanty, and it is in no sense self dependent. Its importance is derived from two sources, both depending on extraneous support. The first is the harbour of Kurrachee, which is important, not as the port of Sindh, but as the future port of the Punjab, and the development of which depends more upon its communications and trade with the Punjab than on the comparatively small trade of Sindh. The second source of Sindh's importance is its position at the debouch of the Bolan Pass, thus commanding the great western gate of India. But this again, so far from being a reason for the isolation of Sindh as a separate province, suggests a strong argument for the closest possible connexion of Sindh with the rest of the frontier, of which it forms an integral part.

17. I think, therefore, that the first of the three above-mentioned proposals may be dismissed, and that we may pass on to the consideration of the second, viz., the attachment of Sindh to the Punjab, keeping both undivided. This proposal has, I am aware, received the support of many distinguished men, my predecessor among others, and I believe has, on more than one previous occasion, been considered and strongly advocated by the Government of India. It therefore claims our most attentive consideration, and I now propose to examine how far it fulfils the conditions essential to the attainment of the objects we have here to keep in view as the great, but only, justification of any change at all in the present regime.

18. These are, 1st, unity of action in the government of the Western and North-western Frontier; and, 2nd, the exercise of direct and effective control by the Government of India over the whole frontier. Now, from the context of the despatch we are acting on, as well as from the circumstances which gave rise to our receipt of that despatch, it is evident that what is there meant by the "government of the frontier" is not so much the internal administration of the frontier districts as the conduct of our relations with the frontier tribes and the independent states beyond our frontier. I cannot too often repeat that the tendency of recent political events has been more and more to merge minor tribal politics into the larger general question of our relations with the independent States beyond our border. We know for certain, for instance, that foreign intrigues are now active in these States, and that these intrigues react on the conduct of the independent tribes immediately located on our border.

* * * * * *

19. Now the great questions which, arising out of this situation, must necessarily and surely tend to swallow up, or govern, the minor ones of tribal policy, are questions not directed, or susceptible of direction, by the Punjab Government. As stated in the memorandum of that Government, the Punjab Government has no foreign policy of its own, and the Lieutenant-Governor merely acts as a medium of communication for carrying out the wishes, orders, and policy of the Supreme Government. The contingencies mentioned in the Secretary of State's despatch, as most needing the action of a single will along the whole frontier, are those which fall entirely outside the administrative scope or political influence of the Punjab Government. Placing the Khelat frontier under the Punjab Government would, therefore, do little towards securing the desired unity of action unless the Punjab Government were given a much greater control than it now exercises over the whole sphere of our trans-frontier politics. But this again would be directly at variance with the second object proposed, viz., the more direct and unembarrassed management of frontier affairs by the Government of India.

20. At present the Commissioner at Peshawur practically obeys two masters, for while he receives instructions regarding local politics and administration from the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, he receives his orders regarding the larger trans-frontier politics direct from the Government of India. In the same way, the Commissioner in Sindh formerly received his orders from Bombay on matters of administration, and from the Government of India on matters of foreign policy. It has already been found necessary to place the present Governor General's Agent for Beloochistan, Major Sandeman, more directly under the Government of India. I cannot consider the present dual system of managing our relations with the tribes and independent States beyond the Punjab border as conducive to administrative efficiency, or such as it is, from any point of view, desirable to extend and perpetuate.

21. Of the friction inevitable under such a system, we have, at the present moment, an illustration in the correspondence still going on with Bombay regarding the removal of Colonel Loch. If an officer appointed by a local Government, and performing his duties to the entire satisfaction of the local Government, is removed because in another branch of his duties he has failed to give satisfaction to the Government of India, such removal cannot be effected without giving rise to considerable irritation on the part of the local Government. But the evil lies deeper than this. If there be one department of the Government, for the administration of which, more than of any other, the Viceroy is directly responsible, it is the Foreign Department. This department he directs, not merely as head of the Government of India, but, unlike all other departments, personally as head of the department itself. This, therefore, is, above all others, the one department in which the selection of officers should rest entirely in the hands of the Viceroy. Under the present system, however, the Viceroy has to carry out the most important and delicate of all the duties devolving on him, not through agents of his own selection, but through officers selected for him by the Punjab Government, and looking to that Government for their advancement.

22. I am aware that it is urged in favour of the present dual system, that it has worked well hitherto. But on this point the Viceroy is necessarily the best authority; and with the fullest appreciation of the loyalty and ability with which I have been served by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and the Commissioner of Peshawur, I am bound to say that, from my assumption of office up to the present moment, the existing system has been to me a source of grievous embarrassment. Under this system, either the Lieutenant-Governor must be made the channel of all correspondence on frontier matters, and in that case, the most delicate, confidential, and urgent communications can only be sent through him with a risk of misconception, a certainty of delay, a greatly increased chance of publicity, and no compensatory advantage whatever; or else he feels himself slighted, kept in the dark about important matters closely affecting his own duties, and entitled to complain that his subordinates have been practically withdrawn from dependence on his orders. By the growth of this system, the Punjab Government, though inferior in status to others which are necessarily subordinate to the Supreme Administration, has now virtually become the Foreign Office of the Government of India; and a Foreign Office more inconveniently situated or organised could not possibly be devised. The present arrangement is, indeed, so palpable an anomaly, and so contrary to the first principles of good administration, that I should not have thought it necessary to discuss it at all, but for the fact that it has been defended on the fallacious ground that it works well in practice; and because it indirectly derives an apparent support from the weight of those opinions which have been expressed in favour of attaching Sindh to the Punjab without any modification of our actual frontier arrangements.

23. Briefly then:—the addition of Sindh to the Punjab would extend and continue an anomalous and most inconvenient system of frontier administration; without giving us any greater guarantee than we have at present for unity of action in the most important of our frontier relations, unless the Government of the Punjab be simultaneously invested with a wider control than it now exercises over those relations; and to give it such control would involve the sacrifice of one of the principal objects of any change in the present system, viz., the more direct administration of the whole frontier by the Government of India. Such enlargement of the local, with a corresponding reduction of the supreme authority, appears to me particularly undesirable at a time when the character of frontier politics is daily becoming less provincial and more Imperial; and when, by the addition of a large district to his already heavy charge, the Lieutenant-

Governor would be able to devote less time than ever to the study and management of these politics.

24. The addition of so large a tract as the whole of Sindh to the already onerous charge of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, would be, even apart from this consideration, a measure fraught with serious disadvantages. Although the lieutenant-governorship of the Punjab is inferior to those of Bengal and the North-western Provinces as regards population and revenue, yet the extent of its jurisdiction, coupled with the variety of interests included in that jurisdiction, and the amount of care and constant attention demanded by the condition of affairs along the whole length of its frontier, render it, perhaps, as at present constituted, a more difficult lieutenant-governorship than either of the other two. With Sindh, and the control of our political relations with Beloochistan added thereto, the present burdens of the Punjab Government would be heavily increased. The administration of three localities, each of them so distant from the other, yet all of them so important, as Peshawur, Delhi, and Kurrachee, is in itself a severe strain to throw on the machinery of a lieutenant-governorship, already occupied with the most difficult task of all, viz., the care of a long unsettled line of frontier; while the amount of responsibility devolving on the Lieutenant-Governor in other ways may be roughly measured by the fact that his province would require nearly one third of the whole armies of India for its garrison.

25. It remains now to consider the third proposal, viz., that of forming a frontier district separate from Sindh and the Punjab under a Chief Commissioner, or Governor General's Agent, having the management, directly under the Government of India, of all our frontier business, and trans-frontier relations. The administrative advantages of such a measure, as regards the conduct of these relations, have to a great extent, been already indicated. The Viceroy would, by means of this arrangement, command the services of his own specially selected agent, in whose hands the threads of all our border politics and tribal relations, would be concentrated. The time of such an agent could be devoted, almost entirely, to purely frontier duties; and he would be better able, than any Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab can possibly be, to visit with adequate frequency, freedom of mind, and singleness of interest, all parts of the frontier; thus making himself personally and thoroughly familiar with the social facts, individual characters, and local sentiments, which claim incessant and concentrated attention in the successful administration of border politics. The political and administrative conduct of the frontier would be in the same hands, and pass through the same channels. All division of responsibility, and all antagonism of schools and systems, would thus be eliminated.

26. I am aware, however, that some decided opinions have been expressed against this proposed severance, based, as far as I understand them, on the following principles: —1st., that these frontier districts naturally form an integral part of the Punjab; 2nd., that their internal administration would suffer by separation; 3rd, that our frontier relations are best carried on through the Punjab Government.

27. Now, as regards the first of these objections, all that I can learn on the subject leads me to an exactly opposite conclusion. The frontier districts are separated from the Punjab by almost every possible kind of distinction. They are separated geographically, historically, by race, by institutions, and by customs. The Indus, for a great part of its course, forms a natural and little-traversed boundary between two essentially distinct territories. The Trans-Indus districts were only conquered and annexed to the Sikh kingdom late in the reign of Runjeet Singh. They are mostly inhabited by races different from those which occupy the Cis-Indus districts; and the tribal system prevalent throughout the greater portion of them differs widely from the institutions of the Cis-Indus population. Their essentially different conditions have been practically recognised by making them the subject of separate and special legislation. Sir H. Maine, in a remarkable and most suggestive minute written on the subject in 1864, pointed out that the association with the Punjab of districts so essentially different from it in character and conditions as those which lie beyond the Indus, is quite as likely to delay the progress of the Punjab as to hasten that of their less civilized populations. And, so far from these districts forming a natural and necessary part of the Punjab, Sir J. Lawrence (than whom no one knew the Punjab better) actually advocated their abandonment, and the selection of the Indus as the boundary of the Punjab and of India.

28. As regards the second objection, it seems to me to rest on assertion rather that argument, at least in the numerous papers on the subject before me; though I find in repeatedly declared that the separation of these districts would be prejudicial to their internal administration, yet I have found almost no arguments advanced in support of that assertion, except the general one as to the injurious effect of change, whatever, the change may be. But any such general objection applies with equal force to the severance of Sindh from Bombay, to the steps already taken with regard to our political relations on the Belooch frontier, and to every administrative improvement rendered necessary by the progress of time and the development of a country. I confess I am unable to understand why the Commissioners and Assistant Commissioners of these frontier districts should administer them less ably and conscientiously when reporting to a high officer at Peshawur, than when reporting to a high officer at Lahore, or why the closer and more frequent supervision of the former should be less efficient than the rarer and more distant supervision of the latter.

29. I may here observe that the great weight of opinions against the separation of the frontier districts is from officers who are, or have been, directly connected with the Government of the Punjab. These officers are, undoubtedly, the best qualified judges on certain points which must not be lost sight of in our consideration of the question we are dealing with; but on the general merits of an arrangement involving some reduction in the scope and power of a particular Government, the previous and present officers of that Government, proud as they may justly be of their association with its achievements and traditions, are scarcely in a position to form the soundest, or most impartial, opinion. At any rate, if overwhelming weight be given to the opinions of the Punjab officers on the question of separating the frontier districts from that province, then the same weight must be given to the opinions of the Bombay and Sindh officers on the question of the transference of Sindh to the Punjab, a measure to which the last-named local officials are quite as unanimously opposed, but which the Government of India has declared to be expedient. I venture to think it would be difficult to find an instance in which measures of this kind, however beneficial they may have ultimately proved themselves to be, have not been opposed by those who were called upon to surrender a portion of their administration of the special interests to which they had devoted much care and attention.

30. The last objection is, that our frontier relations are best carried on through the Punjab Government; or, as it has been expressed, that the proposed separation would deprive the Government of India, *quoad* its administration of the western border, of the assistance of a Government which has cordially carried out our policy, and is best fitted, by position and experience, to conduct under our orders the relations of the British Government with its Belooch and Afghan neighbours. Now, this argument seems to me to require very careful examination. Governments are not entities possessed of special knowledge or experience, but a collection of individuals selected for certain special qualifications. If the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab were specially selected for his knowledge of frontier affairs, then he would naturally be the best adviser of the Government of India on these matters. If, on the other hand, an exceptionally qualified frontier officer is sent to Peshawur, and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab is selected rather with a view to his special qualifications for the administration of the more settled districts, then the whole argument falls to the ground. As regards Secretariat assistance, it is only necessary to instance the circumstances of the present moment, when the Secretary of the Punjab Government happens to be officiating as Foreign Secretary to the Government of India. The Government of India is, therefore, presumably better advised on these matters than the Government of the Punjab. So long as our relations with the trans-frontier States are carried on by an officer of comparatively subordinate position there may be reasons why he should communicate through the local Government rather than directly with the Government of India. But, if the conduct of these relations be transferred to an officer whose official rank is little below that of the Lieutenant-Governor himself, it is, in that case, difficult to imagine what advantage could be gained by reserving to the Punjab Government any share in the conduct of them. All unnecessary links in an administrative chain admittedly weaken the strength of it. The frontier officer has all the local knowledge necessary to enable him to form and submit an opinion, or to frame a line of policy, for the consideration of the Government of India. The Government of India reviews the information and opinions thus submitted to it, with a knowledge of British and Imperial interests, as also of the military and financial conditions of India, far wider and more accurate than that of any local

administration. But what new light can the Punjab Government throw on the matter? It has not the local knowledge of the Chief Commissioner on the spot, and it has no knowledge of Imperial policy and political conditions which the Commissioner does not equally possess.

31. Therefore, whether I consider the question on abstract principles of administration or policy, or from the standpoint of the practical unity of our present frontier administration, I am irresistibly brought, in either case, to the conclusion that the unity and direct impulse, so necessary to the efficiency of our frontier policy, will be best secured by the formation of a separate Frontier Government, such as I shall now proceed to describe.

Proposed Frontier Government.

Territorial.

32. The proposed Frontier Government should comprise the six frontier districts of the Punjab, viz., Hazara, Peshawur, Kohat, Bunnoo, Dera Ismail, and Dera Ghazi, Khan, with the exception of the Cis-Indus portions of Bunnoo and Dera Ismail Khan; and the Trans-Indus portion of Sindh, with the exception of Kurrachee. The Indus would thus form the boundary of the new Government along almost the entire length of its jurisdiction; and this great natural boundary would conveniently divide countries which are not only geographically separate, but also socially distinct; countries differing from each other in their material configuration and popular institutions.

33. The two points where the boundary line leaves the Indus are at the extreme north, and the extreme south, of it. The Cis-Indus district of Hazara, which forms part of the present Peshawur district, is included in the Frontier Government; because it is essentially a frontier district, and allied in character and conditions to the Trans-Indus, rather than to the Cis-Indus, territories. Some modification of the present boundary between this district and Rawul Pindi may be found desirable for the convenience of the population; but these details may be hereafter settled by the local authorities.

34. The Trans-Indus taluka of Kurrachee, and, perhaps, a small portion of the adjoining Trans-Indus territory, are *not* included in the Frontier Government; because Kurrachee, as the great future port of Sindh and the Punjab, is connected rather with the development of those countries than with the management of frontier tribes; because, with its large English population and mercantile community, it requires a more elaborate judicial system than would probably be found necessary for the ruder frontier districts; and because the administration of it, with its promising harbour and growing mercantile interests, &c., would be a heavy and most undesirable addition to the charges of the frontier administration.

35. The Cis-Indus portions of Bunnoo and Dera Ismail Khan are detached from those districts; because they are physically separated from the Trans-Indus portion by a great natural barrier, the river which divides them; because the population of them is Cis-Indus in character, and their administration unconnected with frontier arrangements. In fact, their association with Trans-Indus districts is comparatively recent in time, and has not, I believe, proved convenient in practice.

36. The question whether the great military supports of the frontier, Rawul Pindi, Attock, and Mooltan should be included in the Frontier Government, is a military rather than a territorial question, and will be so considered. Nothing, however, but very strong military reasons should outweigh the manifest disadvantage of including in the Frontier Government large Cis-Indus towns and districts, which would materially add to the charges of the frontier administration, and are entirely distinct in population and condition from the districts constituting its special charge.

Administration and "Personnel."

37. At the head of the Frontier Government should be a "Chief Commissioner of the North-western Frontier," with the powers of a Chief Commissioner, and such additional powers as it may be found necessary to confer upon him. In consideration of the importance of his charge, he should take rank above other Chief Commissioners, and his pay should be slightly higher than theirs, say Rs. 5,000 per mensem. He should

have the power of a local Government in all revenue matters, and the power of temporarily moving troops without having to make formal requisition for their services. He should also be assisted by a Judicial Commissioner exercising the powers and performing the duties of the Chief Court throughout the territory. He should further have a secretary, assistant secretary, and staff and office establishment on a scale proportionate to his position. The head-quarters of the Frontier Government should be at Peshawur.

38. Under this presiding authority, the Government should be divided into two great divisions,—an upper and a lower division; each under a Commissioner; the Commissioner of the southern division being also Governor General's Agent, or Political Agent for Beloochistan. The upper division should include the districts now forming part of the Punjab, with the exception of Dera Ghazi Khan; the lower division should include the latter and the territory taken from Sindh. By this arrangement the administrative divisions would correspond with the great tribal divisions on our frontier.

39. The head-quarters of the northern division should be at Peshawur; that of the southern division at Jacobabad, or Sukkur. It is probable that when Khelat affairs are more settled, a sanitarium may be found at no very great distance from the former place, which would remove the principal objections to making it the seat of an important Government.

40. Each Commissioner should exercise, not only the ordinary powers of a Commissioner, but also the powers of Judicial and Financial Commissioners; and should be allowed the services of an Assistant or "Additional" Commissioner. In consideration of the importance and responsibility of their duties, these officers should also receive salaries somewhat above that of an ordinary Commissioner; the Commissioner of the lower division receiving, in addition thereto, a special allowance as Governor General's Agent for Beloochistan.

41. Each division should be distributed into three districts; the upper division to consist of the Hazara, Peshawur, and Dera Ismail Khan districts; the lower, of Dera Ghazi Khan, Shikarpore, and a southern district embracing parts of the Sukkur and Kurrachee Collectorates.

42. By this sub-division of the upper frontier, two districts (those of Bunnoo and Kohat) would be abolished; the former being merged in Dera Ismail Khan, the latter principally in Peshawur. If this proposal be adopted, able assistants to the Deputy Commissioners of Peshawur and Dera Ismail Khan would have to be stationed at Kohat and Bunnoo, respectively. But there seems reason to think that greater administrative unity and efficiency would be gained by making these two, out stations of, and subordinate to, Peshawur and Dera Ismail Khan, respectively, than by making them independent districts.

43. Each district should be administered by a Deputy Commissioner, with increased judicial powers, nearly equal to those now exercised by a Commissioner; and each Deputy Commissioner should be provided with a judicial assistant. In the case of Peshawur, two such assistants will, perhaps, be necessary.

44. The staff of assistants in the upper division would be increased by two, to replace the deputies at Kohat and Bunnoo; and a still further increase would probably be advisable throughout the province generally. I am aware that these changes will entail a slight increase in the cost of the administration of the frontier; but I think such cost is more than compensated by the relief that will be afforded to the divisional and district officers from the drudgery of routine work, and the increased opportunities afforded them of becoming personally acquainted with the tribes, &c. on their frontier, a point to which I attach the highest importance.

45. The above is only a sketch of the proposed administrative staff of the province. When once the broad principles of our frontier administration have been approved, a detailed list would be prepared by the officer appointed to the charge, in communication with the local authorities, and submitted for the approval of the Government of India. Possibly it would not be desirable, for the present at any rate, to interfere with the district of Kohat.

46. Proposals regarding the administration of the Cis-Indus portions of Bunnoo and Dera Ismail Khan, and Kurrachee and the Cis-Indus portions of Sindh, might be submitted by the Punjab Government; Kurrachee and the Cis-Indus portions of Sindh being annexed to the Punjab and forming a commissionership under that Government.

47. I do not consider that the position of the officers in the frontier districts need be much affected, nor their prospects in any way injured, by the transfer of these districts to the Frontier Government. They would, it is true, lose their chance of succeeding to some of the high offices of the Punjab; but, on the other hand, their actual appointments should, I think, be raised in importance and in pay; their work would be more varied, and they would have exceptional opportunities of bringing themselves under the notice of the Government of India, and succeeding to the higher political appointments in the Viceroy's gift. The Sindh and Punjab frontier officers would be amalgamated in one list separate from that of the Punjab proper, but with every facility offered for exchanges; and the titles, and as far as possible the powers, of the Sindh officers should be assimilated to those of the Punjab officers, as being those generally accepted under the Government of India.

48. Agents in Khelat, Quetta, and any places beyond our border, should be directly subordinate to the Frontier Government, and correspond through it; the agent at Khelat being immediately subordinate to the Commissioner of the lower division. To save time, diaries and ordinary communications might be sent direct by the Commissioner of the lower division to the Government of India; and, in cases of urgency, important communications might be similarly sent; but copies of all communications so sent, and, in the latter case, telegraphic notice of papers having been so sent, as also of their contents, should always be despatched to the Chief Commissioner. Political agents beyond the border should be included in the frontier list of officers.

49. Kashmir, however, being as it were in the rear of the new frontier Government, should not be considered as coming within the sphere of the Chief Commissioner's frontier duties; and the officer on duty with the Maharaja should communicate direct with the Government of India, keeping the Chief Commissioner informed, however, of anything in any way affecting his duties.

Military.

50. The Punjab Frontier Force and the Sindh Frontier Force should be amalgamated into one "Frontier Force," and the whole placed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. It seems to me unnecessary to revert to the many discussions and controversies which have taken place on the subject of the peculiar position of the Punjab Frontier Force. Conditions have changed; along most of the frontier the position and duties of the Frontier Force now differ in no respect from those of any other part of the Indian army; and most of the arguments urged in favour of maintaining its special character have lost their force. In practice, in almost all recent military operations the Frontier Force has been associated with other troops, and the whole have passed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. On the other hand, all the anomalies and inconveniences of the system remain as strong as ever; and some of the chief arguments for placing it under the Commander-in-Chief have been strengthened by the increasingly Imperial character of our frontier politics. I think, too, the frontier has passed the stage which all countries and borders go through when military and police duties are almost synonymous; when the civil government partakes of a military character, and the military force partakes necessarily of a civil, or police and local, character. In short, the time, I think, has come for the military force to take its proper place with the rest of the troops under the immediate orders of the Commander-in-Chief; and for the civil government to rely more directly, under ordinary circumstances, on its own force, the police. The intermixture of commands, which has been so often pointed out as the great blot in our frontier military system, would thus cease; and Peshawur, instead of being a separate command interposed between, and interrupting the continuity of, the frontier chain of posts, would take its natural position as the military head-quarters of the northern division.

51. Though amalgamated and placed under the Commander-in-Chief, the force should still be localised, and retain its character of a frontier force, that is to say, the regiments should serve only within the frontier military districts, though interchangeable within these.

52. As regards the constitution of the frontier military districts, I know that many arguments are urged in favour of making the military and civil divisions of the frontier conterminous; but if it is decided that the military force should be directly under the

Commander-in-Chief, and not under the local Government, these reasons in a great measure disappear. On purely military grounds the most convenient distribution would appear to be to make Peshawur the head-quarters of the upper military district and Mooltan of the lower; the upper to include Peshawur, Nowshera, the districts of Eusefzai, Kohat, and Bunnoo, with their outposts; the lower to include Dera Ghazi Khan, Dera Ismail Khan, Jacobabad, and the troops in Khelat.

53. Although Mooltan is without the limits of the Frontier Government, it is undoubtedly the most convenient military head-quarters for the lower district, with most parts of which it will be in easy communication when the Indus Valley Railway is opened; it is, moreover, an important frontier fortress and arsenal, and the station of a British regiment; and I see no objection in the fact of its lying outside the civil boundary of the frontier sufficient to counterbalance these advantages; while, on the other hand, I see no sufficient military advantage in including Mooltan within the Frontier Government to outweigh the undoubted disadvantages of extending the Commissioner's jurisdiction across the Indus.

54. As regards Rawul Pindi, there seems no military reason for including it within the Frontier Goverment; and interests of civil administration are strong against it. It would remain, therefore, as now, the great support of the frontier, but outside the boundaries of the frontier district. The troops at Abbottabad, Khyragully, and Kuldunna might form a brigade under a brigadier, reporting to the major-general commanding at Rawul Pindi; and the troops at Kurrachee and Hyderabad remain, as now, under a brigadier at Kurrachee.

55. The precise staff for these commands would be hereafter matter of discussion in the Military Department. The Peshawur command, increased as it would be by the troops at Kohat, &c., is such an important one that perhaps it might be raised to a major-general's command; and, in this case, it would seem better that the brigade at Abbottabad, &c., which essentially forms part of the Frontier Force, should report to Peshawur rather than to Rawul Pindi, which latter is *not* a frontier command.

56. The precise manner in which the amalgamation of the Sind and Punjab Frontier Forces should be carried out is also a point to be settled in the Military Departments of the Governments of India and Bombay. I think, however, that in the process one regiment of Sind Horse might be reduced and the Jacob Rifles abolished altogether. The unhealthiness and inefficiency of this corps has been the subject of frequent report; its abolition has been several times considered; and the peculiar constitution of it would make very difficult its delocalisation from Jacobabad and amalgamation with the rest of the Frontier Force.

57. By the transfer of the command of the Frontier Forces to the Commander-in-Chief, the patronage of the regiments composing them will naturally devolve on him; and I think it is for the interests of the force itself, as well as of the army generally, that this should be the case. As a rule, promotion should still go within the force, but facilities should be given for exchanges, and thus by degrees the field of selection, as well as the field of employment for frontier officers, would be widened. But, considering the special character and importance of the two frontier commands, I think that these appointments should be subject to the approval of the Government of India.

58. Some slight modifications of the distribution of the military force along our frontier will probably be desirable, in connexion with recent events and frontier re-organisation. I have already expressed my opinion that one regiment of Sindh Horse might be reduced. On the other hand, the occupation of the high ground of Beloochistan renders necessary an increase of infantry on the lower frontier. Dera Ismail Khan has somewhat lost in importance, and the cavalry regiment there would apparently fulfil its object better at, or near, Tonk. These points, however, would be better settled hereafter in consultation with the officer in charge of the frontier.

59. For the immediate security of the frontier against petty raids, &c., it is essential that it should possess a picked and most efficient police force, commanded by picked officers. For the Sindh frontier the money saved by the reduction of one regiment of Sindh Horse might suffice to increase and improve the police force, the existing Belooch Guides forming part of the police organisation. Whether the Frontier Force in the upper frontier also admits of reduction, or the conversion of part of it into a police force, is a question which would have to be considered later, in connexion with the re-distribution of the Frontier Force; but, in any case, I consider the formation of a picked and efficient

police force one of the first requisites for the successful administration of the frontier. I am hopeful that the force thus formed may eventually become an admirable school for frontier work, and a promising and popular field of distinction for young men of energy and character.

60. As regards the judicial system of the new Government, little change seems immediately necessary. All the districts included in it are subject to Statute 33 Vict. c. 3., and are "scheduled districts" within the meaning of our Act XIV. of 1874. The differences in civil procedure between the Sindh and Punjab frontier districts are few, and of no serious importance, and, as regards criminal procedure, the same Code (Act X. of 1872) is in force in both groups of districts. Appeals lie now, in the case of the Punjab frontier districts, to the Chief Court at Lahore, and, in the case of the Sindh frontier districts, to the Sadr Court at Kurrachee. In future all appeals should lie to the Judicial Commissioner at Peshawur, giving him power, in case of doubt, to make such references to the Chief Court at Lahore as the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh is already empowered to make to the High Court at Allahabad. Any legislation needed to assimilate the judicial procedure in the upper and lower frontiers, and to invest the Chief Commissioner with the powers of a High Court, can be effected in the simplest and easiest manner by a regulation under 33 Vict. c. 3., and a notification under Act XIV. of 1874. Whether the whole system of legislation for the Frontier Government might not be simplified is a difficult question, deserving very careful consideration, but I think it would certainly be undesirable to attempt it until the new Government has worked for some time and gained experience. All changes not absolutely necessary should be avoided at first.

In the same way, as regards the revenue systems, I think it would not be desirable to attempt any assimilation until experience has proved that change is necessary or expedient.

General Principles of Frontier Administration.

61. I think it desirable that I should take this opportunity of indicating broadly the views I personally hold regarding frontier administration. Very broad the sketch must necessarily be, when so much depends on conditions constantly changing, on the prejudices and passions of races with whom we are as yet but imperfectly acquainted, and on the individual judgment and special qualifications of the officers on whom so much depends. If, in the views I am about to express, I have the concurrence of our frontier officers, and they claim to have been endeavouring to act on the lines here set forth, I shall feel myself strengthened and encouraged by their support. If, on the other hand, they differ on some points from the conclusions I have arrived at, I can only say that these conclusions are not "evolved from my inner consciousness," and that I claim no supernatural insight into frontier politics. My views on this subject have been derived from long and careful study of masses of correspondence, reports, minutes, &c., containing the opinions of the most competent judges, both actors and spectators. By the recorded experience of others I have endeavoured to test and correct all *à priori* impressions of my own, and the conclusions thus gradually matured are confirmed by such knowledge of the facts they refer to as I have been able to acquire from a year's tenure of office, during which several important frontier questions have forced themselves prominently on my notice. It is well to bear in mind that in policy, as in other games of skill, the observant spectator is often a better judge than the player absorbed in the chances of the game.

62. In the first place, then, I think it should be our aim to cultivate more direct and frequent intercourse than at present exists between ourselves and the tribes on our borders. I have already had occasion to observe more than once, what I cannot too often repeat in reference to this subject, that it is to the effect of the straightforward, upright, and disinterested action of English gentlemen, and to the influence which higher mental power and culture never fail to exert over those who are brought much in contact with them, rather than to superiority in fighting power and appliances, that I attribute British supremacy in India, as well as the exceptional success of British rule in all quarters of the globe. If personal character and influence be the powerful engines I believe them to be, it is desirable that their force should be exercised as constantly and directly as possible. For this, among other reasons, I propose the appointment of a Chief Commissioner at Peshawur, invested with exceptionally high powers, who can represent to the Native mind more directly and personally than either the Lieutenant-Governor at Lahore, or the still more distant Viceroy at Calcutta, the embodied power and dignity of

the British Government. For this reason also I propose to increase the administrative staff of divisions and districts, so that the Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners, relieved of much purely routine work, may have more time for visiting and becoming personally acquainted with their troublesome, but not hopelessly unmanageable, neighbours. I have before me now a minute by Major James, formerly Commissioner of Peshawur, in which, as the result of 13 years' frontier experience, he expresses himself most strongly as to the absolute impossibility of combining a proper intercourse with the border tribes with the execution of his ordinary civil duties. The then Lieutenant-Governor and Lord Lawrence hinted, indeed, that this incompatibility of functions was Major James's own fault, yet from all quarters I hear Major James spoken of as one of the ablest and most active administrators the frontier has known, and one who, but for his untimely death, had a brilliant career before him.

63. Again, for the reasons given above, I think that the employment of Arbabs, or middlemen, should be discontinued as much as possible. I do not myself believe that it strengthens our hold even upon the small class we thus employ. For every man gratified by employment a host of jealousies are raised against him and ourselves. There is some reason to fear that these personages are not altogether incapable of provoking or promoting difficulties on the frontier in the hope of increasing their own importance, and the police authorities at Peshawur have now ascertained that one of the Arbabs most trusted by the Punjab Government on that frontier was carrying on a few months ago a treasonable correspondence with persons in Cabul, which nothing but the man's death enabled us to detect. I admit, however, that there are many occasions on which the services of Arbabs have been, and may again be, most valuable to us, especially in opening communication with frontier tribes, but I think that whenever their services can be dispensed with, and direct communication opened or maintained by our own authorities, this should be done. Even if we could always depend on the absolute loyalty of Arbabs, these men cannot convey to the Native the same clear idea of our views and character that he would gain by personal intercourse with British officers.

64. For the same reasons I would be inclined to relax somewhat the restrictions now placed on district officers corresponding with chiefs beyond the border, and on officers crossing the border. I am aware that this is a matter which will require very careful and delicate handling; and that any relaxation of the present restrictions may be attended with considerable risk. But it seems to me that, in our anxiety to avoid present risk and complications, we have somewhat sacrificed future influence and security. I think there is no one who considers our present relations with the trans-frontier tribes to be altogether satisfactory. I believe that our North-western Frontier presents at this moment a spectacle unique in the world; at least, I know of no other spot where, after 25 years of peaceful occupation, a great civilized Power has obtained so little influence over its semi-savage neighbours, and acquired so little knowledge of them, that the country within a day's ride of its most important garrison, is an absolute *terra incognita*; and that there is absolutely no security for British life a mile or two beyond our border. I can see no force in the oft repeated argument that the Sikh and other kingdoms were no more successful than ourselves in their intercourse with these hill tribes; unless, indeed, it be assumed that English civilization and rule are no better than those of a Sikh or Persian kingdom; that an English officer represents no higher type of character than the servant of an Eastern king; and that our power and military resources and appliances are not immeasurably superior to those of the kingdoms which were crushed by a mere fraction of the force now at our command.

65. Next, as regards our general system of frontier defence, and the punishment of offences committed by the independent tribes; I think, as already stated, that the time has come when the military force should pass under the Commander-in-Chief, losing somewhat of its police character, while the civil power should be more directly responsible for the protection of life and property. I propose, therefore, to increase somewhat the police force, giving it as good an organisation as possible, and placing it directly under the district officers. The local militia also should be under the district officers; and ordinarily these civil forces should be sufficient to meet and punish any attempts from over the border. With a picked police force, composed of men of the same stamp, and as inured to hill work as the tribes whom they have to act against, but better armed, organised, and disciplined, under picked officers, and with a proper system of espionage and intelligence, I see no reason why the security of the frontier should not be maintained, in ordinary times, without the assistance of troops. But when once the troops are called out, then the control of all armed forces, military, police, or militia, should

pass into the hands of the officer commanding the troops; and he alone, acting of course in concert and communication with the civil authorities, should be responsible for the protection of the frontier.

66. I have already, on several occasions, expressed my strong disapproval of the system of small punitive military expeditions; and I have twice within my short tenure of office refused to sanction them when they have been recommended. I do not for a moment suppose that these turbulent and savage tribes can be managed without occasional displays of power and severe punishment; but I object to this particular form of punishment. I object to it because it perpetuates a system of semi-barbarous reprisals, and because we lower ourselves to the ideas of right and might common to our barbarous neighbours, rather than endeavour to raise them to our own ideas;—because it seldom really touches the guilty, and generally falls most heavily on the innocent; because its natural tendency is to perpetuate animosity rather than lead up to good relations; because, as a rule, it leaves no permanent mark, and the tribes assailed by us can point triumphantly to our having evacuated their country after all; because there can be no more trying fighting for our own troops than that which obliges them ultimately to retire before an enemy increasing in strength and boldness; and it appears from the records of these expeditions, which are not always successes even in the most limited sense, that the losses suffered by ourselves often exceed the losses we inflict. Finally, I object to this system because I think the confidence of the hill tribes and their warlike spirit are quite as likely to be raised as lowered by contests in which they generally fire the last shot at a retreating foe. I am aware that the expeditions I thus deprecate are defended by a large number of our most experienced frontier administrators on the grounds, so far as I understand them—1st, that they are the only means of dealing with barbarous races; and 2nd, that their success has been proved by results. With regard to the first argument, I cannot find that any other system has ever been tried with sufficient persistence to give it a chance; and, with regard to the second, I cannot at all admit the results that have been obtained, after 25 years' frontier administration, as evidence of successful dealings with these tribes, seeing that European life is as insecure as ever beyond our immediate border; that we have recently been exposed to a series of successful raids and outrages from one tribe; and that in my short tenure of office I have twice had to consider the necessity of military operations against offending sections. I maintain that under ordinary circumstances the police should be able to cope with offences committed within our border, and, if necessary, follow up and inflict punishment beyond it. I also maintain that when troops are used, the expeditions should be on a considerable scale, and productive of *permanent* results. At any rate, under no circumstances should the troops be withdrawn until all opposition has absolutely ceased; they should never be required to turn their backs to an enemy who is still firing at them. And I think these expeditions, in which, while doing little to put our relations permanently on a better footing, we injure a whole tribe for the vicarious punishment of an individual, are particularly inapplicable where (as is so repeatedly and strongly represented to us by the Punjab authorities) there really is little or no tribal responsibility or control. In the Punjab Report of October 1876 it is pointed out that the Beloochee system of tribal responsibility cannot be applied to the Pathan tribes, because "every "tribe is divided and sub-divided into numerous clans, each independent of the others, "and yielding but small obedience to its own petty headman." These tribes, it is stated, "only unite against a common enemy. Control exercised over such tribes "through their chiefs would be impossible, for the chiefs do not exist." Yet it is to these very tribes that the system is applied of burning certain villages because other members of the tribe have committed outrages.

67. In dealing with barbarous tribes, our object should be either to support and enforce tribal responsibility to the utmost wherever it already exists, or to reduce tribal cohesion to a minimum where no recognised authority can be found and used. The worst system of all is that which, while it gives us none of the advantages of tribal responsibility, yet unites the tribe against us when we seek to exact reparation for injuries inflicted. If, therefore, as we are repeatedly assured by the Punjab authorities, the heads of these tribes cannot be held answerable for the actions of individuals, it should be an object to trace the offence, and bring home the punishment to the individual and his immediate abettors, rather than to punish the tribe itself for the acts of the one or more of its members.

68. It is hardly necessary to say that in reference to this, as to other points which I have indicated, I am fully alive to the difficulties of execution; but I think it none the less important to lay down general lines for guidance in our action.

69. The last point, to which I attach special importance, is the gradual disarmament of the population immediately within our frontier. The old reasons for allowing and encouraging them to carry arms, namely, that they were required to participate actively in the defence of the frontier, have almost disappeared; and, in any case, I would entrust the protection of the frontier against violence to the police and military, rather than to the inhabitants themselves. One of the first steps towards civilization and social progress is the separation of the military from the agricultural and trading classes; and the sooner our subjects can be taught to confine themselves to peaceful pursuits, looking to the authorities for protection and redress instead of taking the law into their own hands, the better it will be for all concerned. Such a measure would require care and time for its execution; but whenever the inhabitants of a village or district have shown themselves troublesome, or specially mischievous, or slow to render assistance when called upon, the opportunity should be taken to deprive them of their arms. Meanwhile all who do carry arms should be to some extent organised; and the carrying of arms be clearly understood to carry with it certain responsibilities. The number of able-bodied men carrying arms, and the nature of their arms, should, as far as possible, be registered, and all armed villages required to furnish assistance to the police or civil power, or supply escorts, watchmen, &c., in proportion to their armament.

70. These are my general views on the subject of border policy. The re-organisation of the frontier districts, which is here proposed, will doubtless afford great facilities and advantages for giving practical effect to the principles on which I am anxious to see the management of frontier affairs conducted. But I need scarcely point out that the necessity for a speedy and complete re-organisation of the present system of Frontier Government is entirely independent of any administrative theories, or political principles, peculiar to myself. This measure is absolutely and urgently requisite for the efficient execution of the policy of the Government of India, whatever that policy may be, or howsoever that Government may be composed now or hereafter.

71. I need hardly add, that notwithstanding the special pains I have devoted to the consideration of this subject, on which my opinions have been guided by careful reference to the most experienced local authorities in every important part of the frontier, as well as by personal investigation of the geographical and administrative facts to be dealt with, it is practically impossible to lay down, in such a paper as the present, a scheme of re-organisation complete and perfect in all its details.

Many of my recommendations on incidental points may, of course, be susceptible of important modification; for instance, it may be found, on further consideration, expedient to constitute two Courts of Appeal, one at Jacobabad, and the other at Peshawur; and some of the military details to be dealt with must necessarily be re-considered, in further consultation with the military authorities concerned.

I by no wise desire to commit either my colleagues, the Secretary of State, or myself to the premature adoption of every particular subsidiary measure roughly indicated in this memorandum; but, as head of the Government of India, I must honestly say that I cannot, with any comfort to myself, or any confidence in the future, accept, as permanent, the present system of frontier management, and the only reform of it which I could recognise as satisfactory must be in general accordance with the principles I have now laid down.

LYTTON.

Naini Tal, 22nd April 1877.

No. 16.

MINUTE by the Honourable Sir E. C. Bayley, K.C.S.I., dated 22nd May 1877.

It is hardly to be disputed that the political arrangements on our North-west Frontier require modification, and modification in the direction of bringing them more completely and directly under the direction of the Government of India, at any rate, *as regards the relations with ruling Powers beyond our own frontier*.

I quite think that our relations with Khelat, Afghanistan, and even with Kashmir, should be managed directly by the Supreme Government, and not through the local Governments. This opinion is based on the general course of political action in India,

so far as I have observed it, of which I have had considerable opportunities for forming a judgment, and it may be illustrated by the case immediately before us; for, as I have had occasion to point out elsewhere, the result of the interposition of the Government of Bombay between the local authorities in Sind dealing with the subject of the relations with Khelat and the Government of India, was that through a long series of years the local authorities carried out a policy diametrically opposed to that inculcated by the Government of India, and with the most disastrous consequences.

As regards the relations with the tribes on our borders, the relations of our officers with these tribes also, I believe, seem to need improvement; but the matter is far from an easy one, and as the evils arise from wholly different sets of causes, so also they require different treatment in different places.

In the first place, the relations between these tribes and ourselves vary seriously in character along the different portions of the border, and it is hardly possible, except in the broadest terms, to lay down any general policy equally applicable to the whole. Thus, as far as I am able to gather, all along our frontier in Lower Sind the tribes owe a very loose allegiance to the Khan of Khelat, and are very much bound up in interests and kinship with the neighbouring inhabitants within our frontier; this is very nearly the case also with the tribes on the Dehra Ghazee Khan frontier; while intermediately we march with territory directly under the authority of the Khan himself. Passing northwards till we reach our northern and western boundary (roughly speaking) on the Koorum river, we have tribes who are absolutely independent, who owe no allegiance to any one, and are little open to the influence of either the Khan of Khelat or of the Ameer of Cabul. Some of them are more or less connected *inter se* by various interests, others more nearly isolated. Koorum itself again owes allegiance to the Ameer, but that allegiance sits lightly on the people and their prepossessions are certainly more hostile to him than to ourselves.

Then we come to the tribes of the Khyber Pass, and to the Mohmunds, who certainly (at least the Mohmunds without our border) are nominally subject to the Ameer, and to a certain extent really under his influence. Indeed, so long as that influence is in harmony with their feelings and prejudices, it is considerable; but neither the Ameer's influence or authority is usually of much avail for any good or pacific end. Then come again tribes who are independent, but, no doubt, to a certain extent open to the Ameer's influence, and comparatively little to ours, though with some of them we have established a kind of footing of amity.

It is evident that the same sort of relations cannot be established with all of these differing tribes. No doubt it is essential in all cases, as far as may be possible, to gain their confidence; but the possibilities of so gaining, and of bringing that influence to account, vary in almost every individual case. With the wholly independent tribes it may be carried to any extent, even so far as not only to exclude the Ameer's influence, but eventually to render them entirely amenable to our own authority. With time and patience I do not despair of seeing this result, even with the most refractory tribes; but where the Ameer's authority is already fully established, we can, of course, so long as we are at peace with him, only look to work through him. This is, however, the case to a very limited extent at present; and if our border system is fully efficient, as I admit it is not at present, his influence may be so greatly diminished, and our own so increased, as to render his interference a factor of very little importance in our purely frontier politics. In short, therefore, I consider external politics—that is to say, our relations with the larger chiefs, like the Ameer of Cabul and the Khan of Khelat, especially those with the former—of very partial importance as regards our domestic border policy.

The success or failure of this latter policy is, I believe, far more affected by the relations of our district officers personally with the border tribes. I think I could show that the greater number of our quarrels with them have arisen from mistakes actually in civil administration within our borders; for example, it seems to me that the recent onslaught on the coolies employed on the Eusofzye Canal was provoked by a careless disregard of the rights and feelings of the people, which would probably have produced a riot in our oldest territories.

If I am not misinformed, even the Kohat Pass troubles, just ended, were really the result of an unwise disregard of the feelings of some of the tribes. But perhaps the most instructive example is that of the Mahomed Kheyl Vuzeerees, who, after living in perfect peace with us for 20 years, suddenly fired on a party of our troops who were marching in perfect security. And this outbreak was distinctly traced to the impatience of the tribe under what was probably a mistake on the part of our officers, and certainly to their inability to obtain what they thought fair attention to their complaints.

My own opinion, therefore, is that the subjects of external foreign policy, and of our domestic border policy, may, for all practical purposes, be dealt with separately. I propose to deal with the latter first, and I begin by at once admitting that the present state of the frontier leaves much to be desired, and that reformatory action is needed; but, before proceeding to treat of the real evils and the mode of remedying them, I wish to say that, as I understand the actual policy which has been pursued on the Peshawur frontier, the Viceroy's Minute appears to show a considerable misapprehension of it, especially in paragraph 67. So far as I know, small punitive military expeditions are no cardinal feature of that policy; and, although they are no doubt sometimes unavoidable, when any such expeditions have been resorted to, it has been with as much reluctance and dislike as is expressed in the Viceroy's Minute.

No doubt impatient officers frequently unnecessarily recommend them; but the best proof of the judgment with which they have been sanctioned is, I think, to be found in the fact that it has been seldom necessary to repeat them in each individual instance, and that they have become gradually more and more rare. In fact, of late years "blockades" of the tribes have, in practice, nearly superseded punitory expeditions.

I except, however, the Black Mountain expeditions, which have partly arisen from a separate exciting cause, and which have borne closer resemblance to foreign wars.

Again, I think his Excellency, in condemning the frontier administration of the past 25 years in his 65th paragraph, hardly makes allowance for the condition in which the country was at the beginning of that period. The argument used in its defence is, not that the Sikh and Mahomedan Governors were less successful than ourselves, but that the state of things which they bequeathed as a legacy to us, and which had existed certainly in the same condition as far back as the invasion of Timur (who describes it), burdened us with the most extraordinary difficulties. Literally, for centuries the tribes from Hazara to Bannu have gloried in disorder and bloodshed. All history represents them as absolutely resisting all control, wholly reckless of life, predatory, and violent. So independent and so impatient of control, indeed, that they had practically become almost destitute of any formal cohesion among themselves, except temporarily, and for the purpose of resisting for the time being some external pressure. Till we came in contact with them nobody had ever attempted to deal with them, except by sheer force, which they have always been able to resist or evade.

Our policy has been to use patience, and to resort to force but rarely, and never except to resist or punish aggression. The success of this policy must be measured, not by its absolute, but by its comparative, results.

It is quite true that even now much remains to be done; but it is not to be forgotten that, under Sikh rule, some of what are now our frontier villages near Peshawur were actually held by a yearly tribute of so many human heads taken from their neighbours across the border; and that, when any of the latter were caught alive, they were kept in prison to be hanged without reference to their individual guilt, whenever circumstances seemed to indicate the necessity of severe measures.

Neither is it to be forgotten that for some years after our rule officers even in Peshawur could not walk in safety to mess; that a dropping fire of musketry was to be heard all night, and that the same state of things prevailed almost everywhere on the border. The success of our border policy should be measured, not so much by what remains to be done, as by what it has already effected. And what is this? Our own frontier territories is actually, in many respects, better ordered and more peaceful than districts in Bengal which we have administered for over 100 years! and yet they are peopled by races differing little in blood and in manners from those across the frontier. Indeed, the complaint which the Secretary of State makes, and with some justice, is that our system is too refined and too regular!*

So much for our own districts. As regards those beyond it, we have, too, effected something; we have established a reputation at least for general equity and fair dealing which has made us, I will not say popular, but certainly not unpopular as neighbours; and this influence has spread far and wide, and is felt even in Western Afghanistan. Moreover, we have drawn, and still draw, a large number of the best soldiers of our army

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* NOTE.—I append an extract from a letter which appeared in the *Englishman* newspaper of the 15th instant, and which shows how the change strikes a perfectly unprejudiced observer:—

"About ten days ago I paid a visit to the city of Peshawur. Not many years since for a European to be there without an escort, or first having given notice of his coming, was impossible. Now not only do Europeans go to the city daily, but ladies often go there alone, and are always treated with the greatest civility."

not merely from our own Trans-Indus districts about Peshawur, but from the independent tribes beyond them; and it is to be remembered that the training and discipline which these men received does not lose its effects wholly when they leave our service, and is certain more and more by degrees to bring home to these savage tribes habits of discipline and civilization. I cannot help feeling that it is unjust to the system by which our Punjab frontier has been administered for the past 25 years to condemn it, and the admirable officers who initiated it, because there is much yet to be done. This last fact I quite admit, nay more, I am ready to confess, that our frontier system is not now working as it ought to do, and that some reform is needed. It seems to me, however, that the real fault is not so much in the system itself as in the mode of working it. Major James' memorandum, which his Excellency quotes in his 63rd paragraph with approbation, exactly hits the blot, and with all that his Lordship says in that paragraph I heartily concur.

The truth is, indeed, not that the original policy and system have failed, but that the evil has literally arisen from their success. The domestic administration of our frontier districts has taken such a detailed shape, and has so occupied the time and attention of the frontier officers, that their duties of personally mingling and dealing with the tribes beyond, and even with the people of their own districts within, the frontier have been far too much neglected. In fact, the tendency, which is so mischievous to our administration everywhere, of making our officers rather mere creatures of paper routine than active governors of men, has been developed to its full extent on the frontier, where its evil consequences have been more marked and more immediately patent than elsewhere.

The problem really is how, without impairing what I may call the domestic administration, (for, as I have said, its indirect effect is valuable even beyond our border) to improve the external relations of our frontier officers. His Excellency has, it seems to me, rightly apprehended the proper remedy, which, broadly speaking, is to employ only selected men, and more of them; that is, to find men fitted for all these duties, and to give them leisure to attend to both, by relieving them of the drudgery which the necessary improved working of the "domestic" administration continually involves.

I agree also with the view that it is expedient to relax somewhat the restriction placed on the action of our district officers as regards entering into friendly relations with chiefs across the border. This may involve some risk; but if we have picked officers to do the work, the risk will be reduced to a minimum, and we often shall gain much advantage from such intercourse.

On other points of detail, I am forced to express an opinion contrary to that held by his Excellency the Viceroy, especially as to the 64th and 68th paragraphs. If I am not misinformed, our difference of opinion rests on a different apprehension of facts. It is to be remembered, as I have said, that when we first came in contact with the border tribes, there was scarcely any tribal cohesion. It has been, as I understand, the aim of our officers to create this, or a substitute for it. I do not understand how the contrary policy of reducing it to a minimum, where no recognised authority can be found or used, could work for a moment.

To attempt, without any aid from the tribes themselves, to trace individual offenders and their abettors, and always to a great extent without our frontiers, is simply and absolutely impossible, much more impossible is it to exercise any authority over them, or to punish them when traced. It is true that occasionally some clue may be independently found, but it would ordinarily be impracticable to follow it up without the aid of the people. It is true that *with* their aid notorious and signal offenders have been occasionally traced, caught, and punished: without it nothing will ever be done. The people beyond our border, at any rate, are certain to resent the attempt to deal with offenders independently; indeed such an attempt would give rise to violent irritation, and would infallibly soon result in the restoration of the old relations which existed under the Sikhs, and undo every good effected up to the present time.

Strictly speaking, as I understand, the term "Arbab" is confined to the Mohmund tribe, and means a chief more or less hereditary. We found on the annexation of the frontier several of these, who from their position, combined with their personal character, exercised considerable influence, not only among their own, but among neighbouring tribes. That influence was naturally used by our officers, and so far and so long as it exists it would be the gravest possible error to ignore it. It will continue to exist whether we ignore it or not, and, if not utilized for our purposes, will certainly be exerted to hinder them, for such men will always be driven into opposition by neglect. The term "Arbab" has, however, I believe, been loosely used in reference to other chiefs. Wherever a man of influence was found who led other tribes as well as his own,

our officers naturally used him as a means of getting at isolated, and often otherwise inaccessible, clans or villages, until almost every natural division of our frontier had some leading man through whom negotiations with the tribes were carried out. It may be said that this is a very weak and unsatisfactory system, but it was, and I believe still is, the only system possible. We cannot, beyond our border, deal with individuals, it is a physical impossibility. Our writ does not run beyond the frontiers, and the attempt to enforce it would at once produce a general embroilment. Our system of indirect influence, at any rate, does something. We should not destroy, but improve it. At present its success or failure depends mainly on the judgment of our officers in employing the man who has real influence with the people. The system has worked less satisfactorily of late than previously, I understand; but, as I am informed, this has resulted from the less perfect knowledge both of chiefs and people among our frontier officers, of which Major James wrote, and which it should be, I take it, our first object to resuscitate.

As regards disarmament, I understand his Excellency to refer to disarmament within our own frontier. There has been much correspondence on this subject, and it is an object which, however desirable, involves very grave questions. We certainly cannot deprive our own people of the means of defending themselves until they are otherwise defended, which is hardly yet the case; and, in fact, in some of the narrow isolated valleys in immediate contact with independent tribes no military or police of anything like existing strength could afford adequate protection to the people. I think, however, the bearing of arms might, as his Excellency suggests, be gradually brought under regulation, but even this measure will be highly unpopular and difficult to enforce.

These are the general remarks which I wish to make with reference to our dealings with our own frontier people, and with the border tribes.

As regards the principle of dealing with them, no change is, I believe, required. What is really required, is to make the existing system more perfect, and to restore the balance which has been lost by too exclusive attention to the measures of internal administration. The details of the measures needed for effecting this will be discussed afterwards.

As regards the dealings with Khelat, it seems to me quite essential that they should be direct between the officers on the spot and the Government of India. It would be, in my opinion, most undesirable that they should pass through any medium. I see nothing but confusion, delay, and mischief in such course. Wherever it has been tried before, it has been found a mistake and abandoned.

For the same reason I quite agree that any relations with the Ameer of Cabul, and with any officers who may be in immediate communication with him, should be direct with the Government of India, and not through the Punjab. On the other hand, so long as the officers so employed, and the officer at Khelat, are directly in correspondence with, and under the immediate control of the Government of India, there need be no fear of any divergence of policy between them.

It seems to me that it is on the basis of the principles above stated that any re-organisation of external relations along our frontier should be placed.

What, therefore, I would propose in the first place, is that the relations with the Khan of Khelat should be made over entirely to the Governor General's Agent there, who should correspond direct with the Government of India. I would, for the purpose of dealing with the relations between our own people and the frontier tribes in the Khan's dominion, make all our frontier district officers *ex-officio* assistants to the Governor General's Agent at Khelat. This would enable them to deal, in communication with him and under his direction and orders, with all trifling matters of dispute, and I believe this would be found an effectual mode of disposing of them. This system would, I think, apply as far as the northern end of the Dehra Ghazee Khan district;* if necessary, a rectification of boundaries might be made so as to suit it.

At Peshawur I would have another Governor General's Agent, who should, for the present, be charged with the relations between the Governor General and the Ameer of Cabul. These relations, however, are of a nature which may be changed or extended any day, and I confine my expression of opinion to the existing state of facts. If, for example, we entered into such relations as necessitated the placing of officers of our own beyond our frontier in the Ameer's dominions, it might be necessary to re-consider the entire matter.

So far in regard to purely external political matters, and in respect to the lower part of our frontier as to the relation of civil government with *frontier* politics. I do not,

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* NOTE.—Possibly it would not quite apply beyond "Harrund."

in respect to this lower portion of our frontier, see why the civil government should be in any way under the Government of India. There are, on the other hand, very important revenue and other considerations which I think make it imperative that the Government should be assimilated with the Punjab administration, the people, their custom, tenure, language, and manners all more or less assimilate, and it would be convenient, moreover, to exchange officers with the Punjab, and many urgent reforms, especially in the revenue system, will best be carried out under the control of the Punjab Government. I think, however, a partial re-organisation of the machinery of the administration will be requisite, on the principle of which I have already spoken, so as to give a better selection of individual officers, and more leisure for political duties, than they have at present, at least as regards Trans-Indus districts. I shall, however, indicate more precisely what I mean when speaking of the Peshawur frontier.

I do not think that this addition to the Government of the Punjab will overweigh it with work, especially if it be relieved of the Peshawur frontier; but even if this proved to be the case, the necessary relief could be found elsewhere; into the discussion of this subject, however, I do not enter here.

The political relations of our frontier to the north of Dehra Ghazee Khan are, no doubt, partly complicated with our relations as to the Ameer of Cabul, though not, as I believe, in any very important degree. They still depend far more, as I have said, on the proper civil administration of our frontier and on the immediate and personal relations of our administrative officers to the frontier tribes.

At the same time I admit that these relations require closer and more direct attention than they have of late years received, and if no change of *system* be inaugurated, but only a change of machinery, I can see a possible advantage in placing, at any rate for the present, these relations under a separate high officer on the spot. The difficulty arises in regard to the separation of the civil administration from that of the Punjab. Now I cannot desire to see less attention or less close supervision given to this portion of the administration than it now obtains by the subdivision of labour which the constitution of a large Government like that of the Punjab renders possible. There are also other advantages in maintaining the connexion which, I think, are somewhat overlooked in his Excellency's Minute.

Officers of the class who should be entrusted with frontier duties require to be specially qualified, both by natural gifts and by local training. Many a very excellent officer otherwise may prove deficient, either in health, or energy, or temper, or tact, for frontier duties. So long as the connexion of the frontier with the Punjab is, in some degree at least, maintained, it would always be possible to relieve officers not fully qualified for frontier work, and to provide for them elsewhere.

I would accordingly partly retain the present connexion so far as to provide that the junior part of the Commission should be provided from the Punjab, and should be graded among the officers of that administration, though I would place the direction of the administration, civil and political, for the present, under the Governor General's Agent, and through him immediately under the Governor General in Council. He should have the power of a Chief Commissioner within the tract from the north of the Dehra Ghazee Khan district to the Indus. In some respects I think it might be preferable to retain the Hazara district under the Punjab Government, constituting the Deputy Commissioner, as he was before, an "independent" Deputy Commissioner on somewhat higher pay, and, in regard to his political relations, constituting him a Political Agent corresponding directly with the Government of India. There are, however, close relations between the tribes of Eusofzye and those of Hazara which I learn would make it difficult to separate them, and perhaps it may be found necessary to include Hazara in the territories under the Governor General's Agent.

By this arrangement the relations with Khelat, which I think it important should be directly under the Government of India, will be so retained. The inconvenience of having the administration of Sind and the Lower Derajat, which is closely connected with the Punjab, separated and placed under an office situated at the extreme northern corner of the Punjab, will be avoided. The Governor General's Agent at Peshawur will have a compact and manageable jurisdiction.

By this arrangement, too, and by a certain re-apportionment of the Sind Commission, the authority of the Chief Court might, if thought desirable (as I think it may be), be introduced there.

Mozuffergurh, Dehra Ghazee Khan, and Upper Sind would be combined under one Commissioner. A Commissioner would be appointed for Lower Sind, but the salary of the Judicial Commissioner in Sind would be saved, as also the difference between the salary of a Commissioner and that of the present Chief Commissioner of Sind. Some

strengthening of the civil officers, both as to numbers and emoluments, in the frontier districts would be necessary to enable them to apply themselves to their political duties, but this need not be quite to the same extent as on the Peshawur frontier, and is a matter of detail which might be settled hereafter.

As regards the Peshawur province, the Governor General's Agent having the powers of a Chief Commissioner, would take also a share of the present Commissioner's executive duties. I would give him a Financial and Judicial Commissioner (in one) to assist him, with power to refer cases for opinion to the Punjab Chief Court, if necessary; also one or more Additional Commissioners for the ordinary work, now taken by the Commissioner and the Additional Commissioner. I think two would be requisite, but perhaps one would suffice eventually; it will be well to have two, at any rate, till the work of organisation is complete. I would give in each district a Junior Deputy Commissioner, giving to the Senior Deputy Commissioner, perhaps, certain increased power of dealing with criminal cases, and I would add to the staff of Assistant Commissioners. I would, as a rule, select all these officers below the rank of Senior Deputy Commissioner (I think the name might possibly be changed with advantage) from the Punjab Commission, on the list of which they should be borne in italics, and to which they should return if the Governor General's Agent think that their services ought to be dispensed with on the frontier for any reason which would not require their removal from civil employ altogether, and on this point I would allow no question between the Punjab Lieutenant-Governor to the Governor General's Agent.

The higher officers, and on special occasions others also, might, if it be expedient, be selected from elsewhere, but their names should be seconded on the list of the Government to which they belong, in order to provide, as in the case of the Punjab, for their return if necessary.

I would give the Governor General's Agent a salary of Rs. 5,000 and 500 sumptuary allowance; to his Judicial and Financial Commissioner Rs. 3,500 and travelling allowance; to the Additional Commissioners Rs. 2,500 each and actual travelling allowance. To the Senior Deputy Commissioners I would give Rs. 2,250 each and actual travelling allowance, as in a first-class regulation province, and I would give the necessary number of Assistant Commissioners on the usual pay, allowing to any officer who had passed in Persian Rs. 100 extra; to an officer who had passed in Pushtoo Rs. 150, and if invested with political powers (as an officer, for example, at Bannu and Kohat ordinarily would be), Rs. 200 in addition. It would thus be possible for an Assistant Commissioner serving on the frontier to draw Rs. 450 of allowances besides his pay. I think I would give the Junior Deputy Commissioner also the language allowances; this would make the appointments very popular and much sought after.

The extra cost of these arrangements would not be very great, even if, as I think should be done, the language allowances be extended to the police.

I agree, too, that the police might be strengthened and improved. I would express no opinion on the system of patrolling. If done at irregular times and in a proper manner it may be useful, especially in some parts of the frontier; I would not give any hard and fast order regarding it, but leave it to the discretion of the local officers.

Lastly, I would encourage all officers to mix with the people and to treat them liberally and hospitably, and for this purpose I would allow the officers in charge of districts and outposts and others of higher rank to draw contingent bills for any reasonable expenditure in entertaining or in presents on the authority of the Governor General's Agent.

I would extend this permission to the officers commanding frontier regiments, and I would give the language allowances to the officers of the Frontier Force also. It would not be a very expensive measure, for not many would pass. I would add one subaltern at least to every regiment. As it is, I am assured, the higher attention now paid to discipline, drill, marshalling &c., &c., leave the officers little time to learn much of their own men, still less of the country and its inhabitants, with which it is very desirable they should be well acquainted.

I have no very strong objection to the transfer of the Frontier Force to the Commander-in-Chief, provided care be taken not to assimilate it too closely to the Regular Army; and to provide for this, I think, it should always be a Special Assistant Adjutant-General at head quarters for the Frontier Force, as in the case of the Assistant Adjutant-General for Artillery, who would, of course, be an officer trained in the force. This would cause little or no extra expense, for the Military Secretary to the Government of the Punjab would be of course abolished. In conclusion, I can only say that I have written this Minute very hurriedly, and that, while I have suggested the separation of the Peshawur frontier from the Punjab, I yet feel not wholly satisfied whether it would not be better to keep the superintendence of the Punjab Government

over the civil Government, at any rate eventually, but the experiment of separation might be tried. I cannot, however, deprecate too strongly any alteration of the principle of treating the tribes on the frontier, although the machinery employed should be improved.

I must, however, say that I disagree absolutely as to that part of the proposed despatch which contemplates as possible the transfer to Bombay of the whole of the Central Provinces. The Secretary of State has expressed his unwillingness to derogate too much from the importance of the Government of Bombay. Even without Sind, Bombay would be, with the addition of North Canara, more important than it once was; still if it be deemed advisable to enlarge it, the most obvious mode of doing so is by adding to it the Mahratta provinces of the Central Provinces, those more especially which formed the old kingdom of Nagpore. This, indeed, is the inevitable ultimate fate of these districts, which are allied in every way with the Bombay Presidency; and the only hesitation as to this point which I feel is based on the opinion stated by Lord Northbrook regarding the causes which render it temporarily inexpedient for political reasons.

But to transfer the whole of the Central Provinces to Bombay would be, I am convinced, in the last degree mischievous. The portion which formed the old Saugor and Nerbudda territories is allied by tenures, language, kindred, feeling, history, and interests to the North-western Provinces, and has been administered for some 55 years on the North-western Provinces system. In fact, the great drawback to the success of the Central Provinces administration has always been the diverse character of its component parts, and the different qualifications required for the administration of each. This will be aggravated if these districts be made over to Bombay; whereas their transfer to the North-western Provinces will remove the difficulty. Such a transfer will, moreover, be economical, as it will require hardly any addition either in Bombay or the North-western Provinces to the superior establishments, and the offices of Chief Commissioner or Judicial Commissioner in the Central Provinces may be abolished, and the charges for them saved.

E. C. BAYLEY.

May 22nd, 1877.

No. 17.

No. 86 of 1877.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.—Political.

To the Most Honourable the Marquis of Salisbury, P.C., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Marquis, Simla, the 17th May 1877.

Your Lordship's Political Despatch No. 72, page 40, of 13th July 1876, on the subject of changes necessary for the improved administration of the Western and North-western Frontiers of India, was duly received and considered by us; but our reply to it, postponed at first until his Excellency the Viceroy should have had the opportunity, desired by your Lordship, of personally visiting the frontier, was further delayed by the pressure of other questions urgently demanding our more immediate attention.

2. In the despatch above referred to, your Lordship expressed your satisfaction at finding that the views of the Government of India, regarding the transfer of the province of Sindh from the Presidency of Bombay to the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Punjab, were in full accordance with those already expressed by yourself on the subject; and your Lordship then authorised us to take the steps necessary for giving effect to these views at such time as might seem to us most convenient.

3. But, although thus finally approving the principle of the withdrawal of Sindh from the charge of the Government of Bombay, your Lordship pointed out that many difficult questions of detail in regard to the future management of the two provinces of Sindh and the Punjab remained to be settled. For instance, whether the Trans-Indus districts should be governed as a single district, or be divided; whether, for administrative purposes, they should be entirely disconnected from districts on this side of the Indus; and whether the system of administration should be civil or military. On these points your Lordship suspended your opinion, considering that they could be decided with less difficulty should his Excellency the Viceroy be in a position to personally visit the localities and consult with the officers by whom the arrangements which may be ultimately thought best will have to be carried out.

4. We have now the honour to transmit for your Lordship's consideration a Minute by his Excellency the Viceroy on the re-organisation of the frontier. The details of

the measure therein recommended will doubtless require revision; and to these our best attention is now being given. But the views expressed by his Excellency as to the broad principles upon which the administration of our frontier should now be re-organised, without any avoidable delay, have been formed with careful consideration after a personal inspection of the frontier; and in those views we generally concur. We adhere to the opinion expressed in our Political Despatch No. 85, page 39, of 7th April 1876, regarding the severance of Sindh from Bombay, and also to the opinion that there are no districts requiring a separate military government. But, having in view the tendency of recent events on our own frontier, as well as in Central Asia and in Europe, and the growing importance and imperial character of our frontier and trans-frontier relations, we think it has now become desirable that the conduct of these relations should be under the direct control of the Government of India, and not administered, as heretofore, through the agency of a local Government. We are further of opinion that the separation of political from administrative duties is practically impossible when these two classes of duties are interwoven as closely as they now are in the government of the frontier. To place the frontier officers under the local Government, *quoad* their administrative duties, and under the Government of India, *quoad* their political duties, is a system fraught with inconvenience; and one which has already proved the source of serious embarrassment to this Government. We think that in the marked separation of the frontier districts, geographically, historically, by race, by institutions, and by customs, from the Cis-Indus districts, there are many and strong reasons for their administrative separation also. Lastly, we consider that to add the distant province of Sindh, with its rising seaport and important frontier relations, to the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Punjab, without affording the latter any corresponding relief, would unduly increase the administrative charges and responsibilities of that Government; which, owing to the extent of its jurisdiction, its long and troublesome frontier line, and the variety of the interests it has to deal with, is already, perhaps, the most difficult and onerous of all the local Governments.

5. We therefore recommend that the Frontier or Trans-Indus districts of the Punjab and Sindh be formed into a separate Frontier Government; administered, under the direct control of the Government of India, by a Chief Commissioner and Governor General's Agent at Peshawur; that this officer should be charged with the general conduct of all our frontier and trans-frontier relations; and that he should be provided with subordinate officers accordingly at Peshawur and Jacobabad, the latter having the special charge of the administration of the lower frontier and our relations with Beloochistan. We further recommend that the Sindh and Punjab Frontier Forces be amalgamated and placed under the Commander-in-Chief in India, retaining, however, their local and special character, but making them interchangeable within the limits of the Frontier Government.

6. If these recommendations meet with your Lordship's approval, and the general principles of frontier administration, as indicated in the Minute of his Excellency the Viceroy, be accepted, measures will be commenced at once to carry them out, and to settle the details of transfer and administration with the local Governments and officers concerned.

7. In making these recommendations we have not failed to consider fully the views expressed by your Lordship on the necessity of compensating the Presidency of Bombay, in other quarters, for the loss of territory to which it will be subjected by the necessary transfer of Sindh. We recognise the propriety of such compensation, if the present scheme of frontier re-organisation be carried into effect; and we are of opinion that it can be best provided for in the manner suggested in your Lordship's above-mentioned despatch; viz., by the administrative union of the whole or part of the Central Provinces with the Presidency of Bombay.

8. As, however, the detailed arrangements for carrying out any such subsidiary measure are clearly distinct from, and independent of, all the measures directly involved in the administrative re-organisation of the frontier districts, we propose to take the earliest opportunity of addressing to your Lordship a separate despatch upon this subject.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.

E. C. BAYLEY.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
J. STRACHEY.
E. B. JOHNSON.
W. STOKES.

No. 18.

Political No. 1.

To His Excellency The Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord, India Office, London, November 29, 1877

Para. 1. I have received and considered in Council Political Letter of your Excellency's Government, No. 86, dated the 17th May last, forwarding a Minute by your Excellency on the subject of changes considered necessary for the improved administration of the western and north-western frontiers of India, and recommending certain measures to give effect to the views therein expressed, which have received the general concurrence of the Government of India as a body.

2. The recommendations of your Excellency in Council are that the frontier, or Trans-Indus, districts of the Punjab and Sind should be formed into a separate frontier government, administered, under the direct control of the Government of India, by a Chief Commissioner and Governor General's Agent at Peshawur; that this officer should be charged with the general conduct of all our frontier and trans-frontier relations; that he should be provided accordingly with subordinate officers at Peshawur and Jacobabad, the latter having the special charge of the administration of the lower frontier and our relations with Beloochistan; and that the Sind and Punjab frontier forces should be amalgamated and placed under the Commander-in-Chief in India, retaining, however, their local and special character, but becoming interchangeable within the limits of the Frontier Government.

3. I agree with your Excellency in Council in thinking that the attachment of the province of Sind to the Punjab will overtask the powers of the Punjab Government unless some relief be afforded to it; and I concur in the opinion expressed in the Despatch under reply, that, under existing circumstances, it will be expedient to place the management of our frontier and trans-frontier relations more directly under the Government of India. That these relations, whether they concern the petty tribes along the border, or the more important States behind them, must be conducted according to the views of the Government of India, is not open to dispute. Nor can it be reasonably doubted that administration is rendered more vigilant and more vigorous by shortening the "administrative chain" that connects the authority which gives the orders with the officer by whom they are carried into execution. The Punjab Government was interposed between the Governor General and the frontier officers at a time when communication between Calcutta and the Punjab was tedious and difficult, when the state of affairs beyond our territory caused little solicitude, and when the duties imposed upon the Government of Lahore were not such as to prevent the frontier from receiving a large share of its attention. In all these respects great changes have taken place. Since the construction of the telegraph, and of the nearly completed railway, distance has ceased to be a consideration of primary importance. The Government of Lahore, besides the care of a province advancing with singular rapidity in every kind of improvement, has been burdened with accretions from the territory, first, of the north-west, and more recently of Bombay. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that frontier questions involve more important consequences and present greater difficulties than was the case in former times. Various causes have contributed to create irritation and restlessness among the turbulent Mussulman populations who are our immediate or more distant neighbours. The critical position of the first Mahometan State in the world has given a renewed vigour to the impulses of fanaticism which in these countries are never in complete repose. At the same time the military activity and large territorial acquisitions of Russia have, undoubtedly, created excitement among populations beyond the sphere of her immediate influence, and may have generated in some minds the illusion that a conflict with the British power was no longer so hopeless as it formerly had been.

4. All these considerations appear to me to justify you in wishing to strengthen the administrative machinery through which your frontier relations are managed, and I am prepared to authorise the measures necessary for that purpose. Fears have been expressed that administrative modifications of this kind might carry with them a change in the pacific policy which has for many years guided the Indian Government in its dealings with neighbouring tribes and States. It is almost superfluous for me to draw your Excellency's attention to these apprehensions, for they are as much at

variance with your own views as they are with the instructions which the Indian Government has uniformly received from the Government of Her Majesty. Your Excellency discerns as plainly as Her Majesty's Government that a policy of conquest on your north-west frontier would lead to no advantage which would in any degree countervail the certain financial and political embarrassment it would cause. The changes now under consideration have no such object. They are measures of defence and security, not of aggression. They will operate as a guarantee for the maintenance of existing territorial limits. In that they tend to discourage attack from without and so to prevent war, they make less possible the only contingency under which an advance of frontier might conceivably be forced upon your Government.

5. Your Excellency has intimated an opinion that though the main object you have in view is a more effective control of frontier relations, the change would be more satisfactorily effected by the constitution of the Trans-Indus districts into a distinct and separate administration. Many of the considerations you advance are cogent, and in forbearing at the present time to give effect to them I must not be understood to be recording an opinion definitively adverse. But while I admit that it may possibly hereafter be found expedient to adopt some such comprehensive scheme as that proposed by your Excellency's Government, I am disposed to think that both the objects in view, viz., the relief of the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, and the more effective control by the Supreme Government of frontier policy, might be adequately secured by a less extensive change. Any unnecessary disturbance of administrative arrangements is distasteful to the people of India, and open to many practical objections; and a large change can seldom be effected without considerable cost, which is to be deprecated at the present time.

6. Financial considerations, even at this period of extreme pressure, might not justify the abandonment of any measure shown to be absolutely necessary; but any administrative change, involving a considerable increase of expenditure, should at all events be deferred, if a less costly arrangement may seem to offer a reasonable prospect of being attended with success. Nor can it be forgotten that grave objections have been expressed, in various quarters entitled to respect, against the transfer to a new authority of the jurisdiction in civil matters at present exercised by the Punjab Government over the inhabitants of the districts byond the Indus. I do not say that such a transfer need, in fact, be seriously or permanently injurious to the persons who would be affected by it; but in any change of the kind it is important that the feelings and interests of all concerned should be previously ascertained and carefully considered.

7. In lieu therefore of the proposals of your Excellency's Government, I am prepared to sanction the adoption of the following measures:—

(*a.*) The Trans-Indus districts of the Punjab and Sind to be divided into two divisions, taking the dividing line at the point where the Belooch gives place to the Pathan.

(*b.*) A Commissioner to be appointed over each division by the Viceroy, but in respect to all internal affairs to take his orders from the Punjab Government.

(*c.*) The Northern Commissioner to be styled Governor General's Agent and Frontier Commissioner; to receive the salary of a Chief Commissioner; and upon all external matters, *i.e.*, matters concerning those who are not subjects of Her Majesty, to correspond with the Viceroy direct, and be the superior of the Southern Commissioner, who upon those matters will correspond with him alone.

(*d.*) The frontier forces, for the present at least, to be under the orders of the Governor General's Agent, not under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

It would be for your Excellency to decide in respect to each class of cases whether the communications of the Frontier Commissioner should be sent under flying seal through the Punjab Government; and it would also be for your consideration whether, in view of the present financial exigency, the post of Commissioner of the Southern Division should not be filled by the Commissioner of Sind.

8. I do not deem it necessary to enter, at present, into the minor questions involved, such as the residence of the Frontier Commissioner, or the number of Deputy Commissioners, or any of the military details. Upon these points the Punjab Government should be directed to submit to your Excellency in Council, as speedily as possible, detailed proposals in conformity with the above principles, after consideration of which you will be in a position to make specific recommendations for the approval of Her Majesty's Government. I trust that having regard to existing financial exigencies, it

may be found possible to establish the new organisation without any considerable increase on the present cost of administration in the Punjab and Sind.

9. I have not overlooked the fact that the measures sanctioned in this Despatch involve a duplicate responsibility, which is in theory objectionable, and may be attended with occasional inconvenience. But there are precedents which justify the belief that they may practically be worked with general success; and, having regard to the various considerations which make it advisable that no greater change should be made in the existing order of things in the Punjab and Sind than may be really necessary to the effectual attainment of the ends desired, they are probably more suitable to the circumstances of the present juncture than a more extensive reorganisation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

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